

How the Home Office does history: empire, time and the making of Britain's mass deportation regime

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Declaration

I declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.

Bobby Phe Amis

30/11/2023

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Abstract

Since the Immigration Act of 1971, Britain's Home Secretary has had executive administrative powers to detain and deport non-citizens from the United Kingdom. These powers are the statutory foundation of Britain's contemporary mass deportation regime. This thesis maps the connected histories through which this regime has emerged. It examines how deportation, criminalisation, and citizenship functioned in British colonial governance, and explores how colonial forms of deportation informed Home Office policies in the long twentieth century: both before, during, and after decolonisation.

The thesis argues that it is useful to understand the Home Office as 'doing history.' In other words, the Home Office can be understood as an agent that imagines and acts upon normative views as to how history should progress, how change should be managed, how events should be remembered, and how the past should be recorded and consulted. The Home Office does history in two overlapping ways. First, it entrenches the patriality clause at the heart of the 1971 Immigration Act not only in its immigration control work but also in wider approaches to managing, measuring and pacing change over time. Secondly, the Home Office does history through an expanding labyrinth of documentation regimes that embed racist burdens of proof, notions of criminality, and legal categories – forged during empire – into present-day systems of criminalisation and migration control.

The thesis contextualises the administrative violence meted out by the contemporary Home Office's so-called broken system with archival research into the making of bureaucratic power, social facts about race, and legal privilege in a range of colonial mobility regimes. Through these explorations, this thesis offers a new lens with which to view histories of deportation, foregrounding how historical narratives, archival processes and the everyday politics of time get folded into the banal routines of administrative state power.

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Introduction

Today, the Home Office regularly refuses visas, citizenship and asylum applications on the basis of a person's so-called immigration history. According to the immigration rules, an 'adverse immigration history' is evidence of 'overstaying, breaching conditions, illegal entrance, [and] using deception in an application.'¹ Home Office entry clearance officers and caseworkers must search the 'Police National Computer, internal Home Office systems and the information on the application form' to check if the applicant has a 'criminal history, deportation order, or travel ban or has previously been listed as non-conducive to the public good or a threat to national security.'² Each of these counts as evidence of an applicant's 'adverse character, conduct or associations' and therefore as general grounds for refusing the application, the first step towards deportation proceedings.³ In Home Office policy, then, one's history is reduced to a log of immigration crimes, suspected *bogus* deceptions, criminal associations, and anti-social behaviours. It is a log that re-sequences life stories into preludes to deportation and removal. But what is the history of this labyrinth of immigration rules, these invented immigration crimes, these racialised, racist, burdens of proof? *How* the Home Office does history has a history of its own.

This thesis examines the historical development of Britain's mass deportation regime through a lens foregrounding the historical narratives, archival processes, and everyday politics of time that get folded into the routines of administrative state power. Britain's mass deportation regime has emerged as part and parcel of the global system of citizenship, immigration controls and deportation powers that have intensified since the Second World War. After that war anticolonial movements for independence, as well as the insurmountable war debts owed by imperial powers to their colonies, resulted in the reconfiguration of the world from one made up of empires into one populated by sovereign nation-states. Migration and citizenship – controlling who was permitted to move across or stay within national territories – became the fundamental way that nation-states could experience and act upon their sovereignty, assert state power, control labour, and serve capital in the geopolitical order that emerged after the end of empires. It is a global system of citizenship, immigration and deportation that today seems immovable and impossible to undo.

In this thesis I demonstrate that Britain's mass deportation regime depends upon the Home Office doing history in two distinct ways. Firstly, the Home Office 'does history' in ways

¹ Home Office, 'General Grounds for Refusal: Considering Entry Clearance', GOV.UK, 11 January 2018, 3. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/general-grounds-for-refusal-considering-entry-clearance>.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

prefigured by the 1971 Immigration Act's 'patriality' clause.⁴ In other words, the Home Office's postwar immigration laws have tried to rewrite the history of imperial Britain by obstructing people from former colonies – lacking a father or grandfather born in the British mainland – from securing British citizenship.⁵ Secondly, the Home Office 'does history' in ways that reflect how the 1971 Act remodelled the immigration system.⁶ In place of a numbered quota of New Commonwealth immigrants, the new system was premised on the individualised scrutiny of each immigrant's compliance, documents, and immigration history. The Home Office's immigration laws are operationalised through this documentation regime, a regime reliant on notions of criminality, legal categories, and what one anthropologist has described as the 'recording mechanisms' of 'the carceral state archive.'⁷

Altogether, the thesis demonstrates that this logic of patriality and this documentation regime both developed through the practical unfolding of empire before migrating into the systems of immigration and criminalisation we inhabit today. It contributes to historical scholarship on postwar Britain's deportation regime by bringing to the fore interconnected histories of how deportation – widely defined – operated during empire and its endings in both the colonies and the British mainland. The thesis builds on Priya Satia's recent history of British imperial history; I extend her argument that 'the narrative of the British Empire is also a narrative of the rise and fall of a particular historical sensibility' to examine how this particular way of doing history has endured into Britain's contemporary mass deportation regime.⁸

Over the twentieth century, and particularly since the constitutional end of empire, a documentation regime has developed as part of Britain's mass deportation regime.⁹ In it the act of being undocumented, or without documents has been increasingly associated with various forms of illegality.¹⁰ Successive British governments have criminalised migration.¹¹ Over the decades, British immigration law has been characterised by Immigration Tribunal judges as 'an impenetrable jungle of intertwined statutory provisions and judicial decisions' and 'a shanty town' far removed from 'the grand design of Lutyens's Delhi.'¹² Between 1999

⁴ Immigration Act, 1971, S.2.

⁵ I am indebted to Nadine El Enany for this analytic, see Nadine El Enany, *Bordering Britain: Law, Race and Empire* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2020).

⁶ Immigration Act, 1971, S.26.

⁷ Damien M. Sojoyner, 'You Are Going to Get Us Killed: Fugitive Archival Practice and the Carceral State', *American Anthropologist* 123, no. 3 (2021): 658–70.

⁸ Priya Satia, *Time's Monster*, 2.

⁹ Anna Tuckett, 'Managing Paper Trails after Windrush: Migration, Documents and Bureaucracy', *Journal of Legal Anthropology* 3, no. 2 (December 2019): 120–23.

¹⁰ Mike Slaven, 'The Windrush Scandal and the Individualization of Postcolonial Immigration Control in Britain', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 45, no. 16 (10 December 2022): 49–71.

¹¹ The majority of enforcement action against third parties and migrants has been undertaken through civil penalties and removals rather than criminal prosecution. Ana Aliverti, 'Immigration Offences: Trends in Legislation', accessed 4 August 2023, <https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/immigration-offences-trends-in-legislation-and-criminal-and-civil-enforcement/>.

¹² Colin Yeo, 'How Complex Is UK Immigration Law and Is This a Problem?', *Free Movement* (blog), 24 January 2018, <https://freemovement.org.uk/how-complex-are-the-uk-immigration-rules-and-is-this-a-problem/>.

and 2016, eighty-nine new immigration offences were invented.¹³ Between 2004 and 2016 the Government introduced eight new Immigration Acts, approximately thirty new statutory instruments and ninety-seven changes to the Immigration Rules.¹⁴ In the Home Office's documentation regime, immigration laws and rules change quietly and quickly, and the border is always moving.¹⁵

Meanwhile, the Home Office often mislays people's case files, condemning thousands to indefinite, tortuous waiting, and thousands more to live anxiously amid what has been called the Home Office's pinball or lottery logic.¹⁶ The vanishing of files from Home Office desks mirrors the now infamous physical destruction in 2010 of thousands of landing card slips stored in the basement of a government tower block. Those landing slips were the only material record proving that thousands of older Caribbean-born British citizens, known as the Windrush generation, had arrived into the United Kingdom before the 1971 Act's patriality clause took effect on 1 January 1973. With those slips destroyed, hundreds of black Britons found themselves entrapped in an increasing web of passport checks in employment, healthcare, housing, and pensions, leading to destitution, detention and deportation for many.¹⁷ The so-called Windrush records scandal, far from a singular aberration, demonstrated that immigration status has emerged as a vector of privilege and inequality alongside class, race, gender and able-bodiedness.¹⁸ For people in the struggle for papers and their communities, to get your papers – to have 'leave to remain' granted – is to *get status*. Conversely, to lose your immigration status is also to lose, or better put to be denied status, in all the meanings of that word: to lose social standing, rank, inclusion as a citizen, as part of a public. In very real, very material ways, to lose status is to lose recourse to public funds.

In opposition to how the Home Office 'does' legislative history, scholars and public history initiatives have in recent years redoubled their efforts to correctively detail the history of Britain's hostile environment policy, locating its origins not in Theresa May's infamous 2010 statement but much earlier with the start of racist immigration restrictions in the 1960s or even

¹³ Aliverti, 'Immigration Offences: Trends in Legislation'.

¹⁴ Yeo, 'How Complex Is UK Immigration Law'.

¹⁵ Luke de Noronha, *Deporting Black Britons: Portraits of Deportation to Jamaica* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2020), 6. See also, Bridget Anderson, *Us and Them?: The Dangerous Politics of Immigration Control* (Oxford: OUP, 2013), 116-117.

¹⁶ Joel White, 'Think like the Home Office: States and Stateness', in *Holding Space: Friendship, Care and Carcerality in the UK Immigration Detention System* (PhD diss., University of Edinburgh, 2022), 134-61.

¹⁷ Amelia Gentleman, 'Home Office Destroyed Windrush Landing Cards, Says Ex-Staffer', *The Guardian*, 17 April 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/apr/17/home-office-destroyed-windrush-landing-cards-says-ex-staffer>.

¹⁸ Luke de Noronha, 'Deportation, Racism and Multi-Status Britain: Immigration Control and the Production of Race in the Present', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 42, no. 14 (26 October 2019): 2413-30. See also, Bridget Anderson, 'About Time Too: Migration, Documentation and Temporalities', in *Paper Trails: Migrants, Documents, and Legal Insecurity*, ed. Sarah B. Horton and Josiah Heyman, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2020).

prior.¹⁹ Histories of Britain's postwar immigration system tend to begin with the 1948 British Nationality Act, legislation which created the CUKC (citizen of the UK and Colonies) passports with which thousands of Caribbean and South Asian Commonwealth citizens arrived into the UK to help rebuild postwar Britain.²⁰

In the aftermath of the Second World War and India and Pakistan's 1947 independence, and amid attempts by Britain's white-settler dominions to inaugurate their own national citizenships, the 1948 Act was an attempt to rebrand British imperial subjecthood for a unified, modern, postwar British Commonwealth. Despite the egalitarian principle embedded into CUKC citizenship, Caribbean and South Asian CUKCs migrating to the British mainland experienced unofficial colour-bars in housing, employment, social security, violent policing and extensive on-the-spot, off-record harassment by immigration control. In 1962 the Conservative Party passed the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, which abolished the freedom of movement for any CUKC from anywhere in the empire to enter and settle in the British mainland. It introduced a set quota of 'labour vouchers' to limit the number of New Commonwealth citizens arriving from the Caribbean, India and Pakistan. It also extended the British Government's formal powers of deportation to Commonwealth citizens for the first time: previously, only aliens could be deported upon conviction in the British mainland's courts.²¹ In 1968, in the context of the so-called 'Asian exodus from Kenya' and the divisive vitriol of Enoch Powell's infamous 'Rivers of Blood' speech, the Labour Government passed an emergency act to further tighten immigration restrictions. The resulting act legislated the exclusion of CUKC passport-holders 'who have *no substantial connection with the United Kingdom*'.²² For the first time that 'substantial connection' was defined as ancestral.

The 1971 Immigration Act arrived soon after. It carved into law what Ted Heath's Conservative election manifesto had promised: the end of 'permanent immigration', delivered through a portfolio of immigration policy changes first proposed in Powell's infamous speech. The 1971 Act granted Britain's Home Secretary extensive new administrative powers to detain and deport non-citizens from the United Kingdom, as well as statutory powers to determine the immigration rules, with minimal parliamentary oversight. As well as the patriality clause and

¹⁹ James Kirkup, 'Theresa May Interview: 'We're Going to Give Illegal Migrants a Really Hostile Reception'', 25 May 2012, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/9291483/Theresa-May-interview-Were-going-to-give-illegal-migrants-a-really-hostile-reception.html>. See also, Maya Goodfellow, *Hostile Environment: How Immigrants Became Scapegoats*, (Verso, 2020); Leah Cowan, *Border Nation: A Story of Migration* (Pluto, 2021); Ian Sanjay Patel, *We're Here Because You Were There: Immigration and the End of Empire*, (London: Verso, 2022); Kennetta Hammond Perry, 'Undoing the Work of the Windrush Narrative', *History Workshop*, 11 September 2018, <https://www.historyworkshop.org.uk/anti-racism/undoing-the-work-of-the-windrush-narrative/>.

²⁰ Important recent analysis of the 1948 Act include Kennetta Hammond Perry, *London Is the Place for Me: Black Britons, Citizenship and the Politics of Race* (Oxford: OUP, 2016).

²¹ Jordanna Bailkin, *Afterlife of Empire* (University of California Press, 2012), 208.

²² From 1965 onwards, several thousand CUKCs – "Kenyan Asians" to some, "British Asians" to others – began to resettle in increasing numbers in the British mainland to avoid the majoritarian policies of President Jomo Kenyatta's newly independent Kenyan government. B. A. Hepple, 'Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968', *The Modern Law Review* 31, no. 4 (1968): 424–28

individualised compliance model, the Act's Powellite policy changes included powers to deport entire families, to implement any deportation deemed *conducive to the public good* and a new financial principle committing public funds to deportation and immigration detention. The Act also invented the 'illegal immigrant' in law as well as legal grounds to administratively remove them.²³ Together, these different components combined to create what I call Britain's mass deportation regime. The 1971 Immigration Act remains the statutory foundation upon which this regime is made and maintained. This thesis therefore situates it as the moment in which Britain's mass deportation regime, long in the making, solidified.

In contrast to the people blindsided by the twists and turns of immigration rules and documentation requirements, the Home Office has the power to change its story. The history of its immigration laws show that it can change how it remembers empire and its citizenship regimes, missing out details large and small, and making mistakes that are incompetent, devious, or both. Meanwhile Home Office decisionmakers and appeal court judges regularly refuse asylum claims if the applicant's 'credibility' is 'damaged'; evaluating the credibility of sources, of course, is what historians do. In the Home Office's asylum system, 'damaged credibility' means that banal inconsistencies in how someone retells their life history and migration story – a jumbled sequence of events, or a misremembered name for instance – regularly leads to refusal, and onwards towards deportation. Beyond asylum, the immigration rules penalise an applicant's failure 'without reasonable explanation, to make a prompt and full disclosure of material facts.'²⁴ How the Home Office does history, then, comprises a particular regime of reasonable explanations, of promptness, of full disclosure, of material facts. All of these compound normative notions. A particular form of reasoning, explaining, justifying, rationalising. A particular form of durational time, quantifiable enough to qualify promptness and penalise lateness.²⁵ A particular form of full disclosure, one that smacks of exposure and subjugation. And a particular form of material facts about immigrants and their countries-of-origin, facts that buttress the material force of racism as it shapes the modern world and patterns of migration through it.

This thesis begins from the material fact that despite the impossibility that border controls and deportation regimes present to migrating, people move, defiantly and every single day. People move, and refuse to move, in ways that assert what E. Tendayi Achiume calls 'Third World migrants' ethical claims to inclusion in First World nation-states' as 'co-sovereigns in neo-

²³ Immigration Act, 1971, s. 24.

²⁴ This is stated in paragraph 339M of the Immigration Rules. Nadia O. Mara, 'Briefing: Why and How Is the Home Office Treating More Asylum Claims as "Withdrawn"?', *Free Movement* (blog), 26 July 2023, <https://freemovement.org.uk/briefing-why-and-how-is-the-home-office-treating-more-asylum-claims-as-withdrawn/>.

²⁵ For similar questions about the political value of "durational time", see Elizabeth F. Cohen, *The Political Value of Time: Citizenship, Duration, and Democratic Justice* (Cambridge: CUP, 2018).

colonial empire.²⁶ Migration is a worldmaking project that makes life and lives possible, which is not to say that it is not heavily criminalised and crisscrossed with violence and death. Today campaigns led by people threatened by deportation make causal connections between British imperialism, its beginnings with the transatlantic slave trade, and the racial violence of the present-day British immigration system. At protests and mobilisations against the violence of Britain's border regime, popular chants ring out and resound, enacting and nurturing an anti-racist common-sense about how the world could be and already is.²⁷ Chants of *no-one is illegal* make common-sense causal links between on one hand, the contemporary border regime that illegalises humans and makes them deportable, and on the other hand, the ongoing legacies of enslavement and colonisation, which enslaved people as non-human property to be forcibly transported from West Africa to the Americas, and treated colonised lands and their indigenous sovereign populations as *terra nullius*.

Meanwhile, to chant *no borders, no nations, stop deportations* is to succinctly articulate, as a roaring multitude, what scholars of migration, nationality, citizenship and statecraft elaborate in long form: nation-states need deportation as a tool with which to generate and maintain territorial borders and internal divisions between citizens and non-citizens. My thesis begins from this anti-racist common-sense about how firstly, deportation works as state power in its imperial and national forms, and secondly, about the long *durée* of enslavement and colonisation that Britain's mass deportation regime today is very much part of.

Sources

The making of the modern world is entangled with global processes of dispossession, genocide and enslavement, and these are themselves migration-related processes.²⁸ Alongside the 'new imperial histories' movement and the development of post-colonial theory – both discussed later in my literature review – my inquiry into the making of Britain's mass deportation regime owes much to the connected histories approach associated with the research, thinking and teaching of Gurminder Bhambra. This is a perspective that emphasises the migration of not just people but also of ideas, technologies, resources, and wealth.²⁹ A connected histories approach prompts me to ask *when, where* and *what* is involved in the

²⁶ E. Tendayi Achiume, 'Migration as Decolonization', *Stanford Law Review* 71, no. 6 (2019): 1515.

²⁷ Gargi Bhattacharyya argues that the interspersing of poetic and theoretical fragments in speeches, chants, pamphlets, and placards within anti-racist movements operates to nurture an "anti-racist common-sense" and to 'create a shared rhythm that establishes mutuality.' Gargi Bhattacharyya, 'The Poetics of Justice: Aphorism and Chorus as Modes of Anti-Racism', *Identities* 0, no. 0 (5 April 2019): 1–18.

²⁸ Gurminder Bhambra, 'Postcolonial Reflections on Sociology', *Sociology* 50, no. 5 (2016): 962.

²⁹ Well-known examples of this approach are Gurminder Bhambra, *Rethinking Modernity: Postcolonialism and the Sociological Imagination* (Springer, 2007); Bailkin, *Afterlife of Empire*; Priyamvada Gopal, *Insurgent Empire: Anticolonial Resistance and British Dissent* (London: Verso, 2019).

making of Britain's mass deportation regime, and to choose the *when*, *where* and *what* of my sources accordingly.

Where and *when* is the Britain, I am referring to? Britain as the United Kingdom after the end of empire, or Britain as the British Empire? Wary of reproducing how anti-immigrant sentiment and immigration controls have drawn 'a border around the British mainland, physically marking out for the first time a Britain distinct from the remainder of the colonies and the Commonwealth', I choose the latter.³⁰ Nursing an unscientific hunch, I began my archival research looking sideways at Nigeria. From my limited set of experiences in migrant solidarity organising – limited by never being targeted by, or being negatively racialised by, Britain's racist citizenship regimes – the Home Office seemed particularly obsessed with excluding Nigerian nationals from settling in the British mainland.³¹ Nigeria was a key destination for mass deportations via charter flight; the Home Office ran various voluntary returns pilot schemes targeting Nigerian nationals; and in 2018, as I was starting my PhD research, ministers were drawing up plans to build a new wing at a prison in Lagos, Nigeria, so that Britain could directly transfer Nigerian foreign nationals incarcerated in UK Prisons to serve the rest of their sentences in Kirikiri prison.³² I wondered how much present-day Home Office hostilities towards Nigerian nationals were shaped by empire, or more specifically, by colonial Nigeria's centrality to the codification of Britain's 'indirect rule' colonial policy in the 1920s. I held on tightly to Mahmood Mamdani's influential theorisation of how indirect rule had shaped the 'decentralised despotism' of the Janus-faced colonial state, a form of colonial state power maintained by distinguishing citizens from subjects.³³

Mamdani's history of indirect rule emphasised its global interconnections, tracing its well-known origin story in Frederick Lugard's Northern Nigeria back to an earlier origin story in settler colonial Southern Africa, and back further to earlier iterations in how the East India Company engaged with parts of the Indian subcontinent.³⁴ Where-wise, then, this thesis primarily engages with how various forms of deportation – widely defined as interrelating regimes of criminalisation, citizenship, and mobility control – operated as part of colonial rule in parts of Nigeria, Southern Africa, and parts of the Indian subcontinent. Most of the world, therefore, seems to be left out of what I refer to as 'empire' or 'the British Empire.' Moreover

³⁰ El Enany, *Bordering Britain*, 14.

³¹ Frances Webber describes 'South Asians and West Africans, particularly Nigerians, [as] the *bêtes noires* of the immigration service, were treated [...] badly.' Frances Webber, *Borderline Justice: The Fight for Refugee and Migrant Rights* (London: Pluto, 2012), 35.

³² 'UK to Build Prison Wing in Lagos to Transfer Nigerian Prisoners', *Reuters*, 8 March 2018, Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-nigeria-prison-idUSKCN1GK1BA>.

³³ Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton University Press, 1996), 8, 18-19.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 62 – 64. See also Frederick Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (London: W. Blackwood and Sons, 1922), <http://archive.org/details/cu31924028741175>. For a recent study of indirect rule's origins in East India Company engagements with India in the early 1800s, see Callie Wilkinson, *Empire of Influence: The East India Company and the Making of Indirect Rule* ((Cambridge: CUP, 2023).

despite these ad hoc glances at Nigeria, Southern Africa and the Indian subcontinent, my lines of sight remain on the British mainland and how governance over Britain's else-wheres circulated back to the metropole.

This is largely due to my sources; or rather, I chose my sources because of my lines of sight and ways of seeing. The thesis is largely based on top-down government records held at the National Archives in Kew. The shifting of jurisdiction over deportation between the Home Office and Colonial Office, and sometimes other government or quasi-government departments, speaks to the multiple meanings of deportation in the period before deportation became a routinised aspect of the postwar, post-imperial British border regime. Significantly, my thesis draws on Colonial Office records as much as it draws on Home Office sources. Three of my chapters draw on Colonial Office records: about empire-wide legislation for the deportation of 'fugitive offenders', about colonial development and welfare schemes in Northern Nigeria, about postwar training for the Colonial Service, and about the compensation and pension arrangements for colonial servants at the end of empire. The Northern Nigeria research also took me to the British Film Institute's archive of colonial instructional films, to the London School of Tropical Medicine's archive, and to countless colonial medicine, anthropology and law textbooks. Researching postwar Colonial Service training led me to the 'Devonshire Course' archives at both Oxford and Cambridge Universities.

It is important to underline that Colonial Office records at Kew present a particular – not entire – view of colonial administration in overseas colonies: these are not the archives of colonial governments, but of the Whitehall-based Office of the Colonial Secretary. When letters, cases, queries arrived at the Colonial Office from colonial governors overseas, the incidents or problems therein had already been escalated to the highest level. Colonial Office records, then, contain what a colonial government wanted to share with the imperial government, and the instructions, intentions, and replies sent in the opposite direction. I use these records to reconstruct how Britain's imperial state and colonial administrations overseas imagined the people, processes and institutions they governed, and acted upon these imaginings. Much of the material I draw on are drafts: draft circular despatches, draft policies, draft replies to ministers. This attention to redrafting helps to picture the banal iterative changes and obsessive repetitions, allowing us to see the anxieties and fears of the state and its administrators. These fragilities are important: they point, very imprecisely, at the power and agency of the world's mobile poor who, however silent and absent in the sources, were always frightening the state into action, into making policies, decisions, changes.

By contrast, aside from using Home Office records about fugitive offender cases as they occurred in England and its police courts, I largely sidestep the official records of the Home Office at Kew when dealing more directly with the history of that department. My two chapters

about the history of the Home Office and its immigration service approach this history through material produced by Home Office employees, often in unofficial or retired capacities. This allows for a more nuanced look at the unofficial means through which Home Office officials formed and expressed historical narratives about the institution they worked for, presumably outside of office time.

My choice of sources itself, then, is part of how my research tries to think through what deportation can tell us about statecraft, adding detail to Radhika Mongia's connected history of the fundamentally '*colonial* genealogy of the modern state.'³⁵ The selection of these sources says: the Home Office does history in ways shaped by multiple ways of doing history embedded across various parts of the state. To suggest that the Colonial Office, the Colonial Film Unit, Oxbridge's Colonial Service Training, practitioners of colonial medicine, and civil servants in their unofficial capacities, all *do history* the way that the Home Office does history is to argue there exists some kind of state-mentality. Nonetheless this points us towards understanding the state *not* as an autonomous, bounded 'entity, agent, function or relation', but instead as a 'multi-layered, contradictory, trans-local ensemble of institutions, practices and people in a globalized context.'³⁶

Archival Methodology

My choice of sources, then, largely reflects how the British state looked at, imagined, and acted upon its colonies, and the empire as a whole. As we have seen, when I refer to 'empire' I am primarily drawing on vignettes relating colonial rule in Nigeria, southern Africa and the Indian subcontinent, as well as to statecraft and state mentalities in the British mainland. However the way I *read* my sources is informed by an understanding of empire that is different from the British imperial state's way of looking, and not looking, at its empire. Drawing on important critical interventions against imperialist historiography, I approach 'empire' how it was theorised by anticolonial nationalists.³⁷ Anticolonial thinkers and movement-builders saw empire as processes of unequal integration and racial hierarchy in the international order, an international order that reproduced 'the arbitrary power and exploitation that structured the relationship of the coloniser and the colonised.'³⁸ My archival strategy, therefore, looks for the uneven, shifting development of 'race' as a pervasive structure of thought the world over. I

³⁵ Radhika Mongia, *Indian Migration and Empire: A Colonial Genealogy of the Modern State* (Duke University Press, 2018), emphasis added.

³⁶ Philip Abrams, 'Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State (1977)', *Journal of Historical Sociology* 1, no. 1 (1988): 58–89; Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta, *The Anthropology of the State: A Reader* (John Wiley & Sons, 2009), 6.

³⁷ Gopal, *Insurgent Empire*; Adom Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019); Leslie James, *George Padmore and Decolonization from Below* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015).

³⁸ Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire*, 10 – 11.

search for everyday shifts in officials' language and vocabulary as legal categories and racial identities arrive, exit, return, move, or refuse to move.

Racial categories were a key tool for colonial rule. As Mahmood Mamdani has written, populations were 'classified, placed in a hierarchy, placed in their territories, differentiated by culture and race, personality and intelligence, declared "indigenous", "tribal" and "urban", with ethnicities tied to territories.'³⁹ Over the course of the nineteenth century, 'race theory and its scientific study – known as ethnology' were developed in European empires, and presented as 'key tools for unlocking the secrets of human history' in ways that could explain social and biological differences among humans.⁴⁰ During empire, economic processes of exploitation, expropriation and expulsion rendered racial difference through delineating certain groups of people as deserving or undeserving of labour protections, property rights, degrading living conditions, and legal-political rights of citizenship.⁴¹ Throughout the chapters of this thesis, I approach my archival material with questions and perspectives highlighting the persistent centrality of legally precarious, exploitable migrant labour for enabling key moments of capitalist development. This is a key way in which capitalism is always 'racial', as first theorised by Cedric Robinson in his important 1982 intervention, *Black Marxism*.⁴²

In *Black Marxism*, Robinson highlighted how the growth of the working class in industrialising Europe was accompanied by working-class consciousness becoming acutely attuned to the value of ethnic and racial difference. Workers in Europe were encouraged to see workers in colonies elsewhere as unskilled, uncivilised, and inferior. Capitalist social and economic relations had not homogenised the global proletariat, as Karl Marx had initially predicted, but had created processes of fragmentation between differently exploitable people: processes of racialisation. As such, capitalist economies depend upon migrant labour, displaced from *elsewhere* by cycles of poverty and extraction, as a key resource. Migrant labour is made cheap and highly exploitable by its simultaneous political exclusion from citizenship, welfare state provisions, and labour rights. This double bind leads to an enduring false distinction between skilled and unskilled labour in which migrant labour is racialised as unskilled, and therefore as undeserving of citizenship, decent pay, labour rights, welfare safety net. The political exclusion yet economic inclusion of migrant labour racializes certain subjects as inferior and confines them to live in degrading material conditions, befitting Ruth Gilmore-Wilson's influential definition of racism. Racism, she writes, is 'the state-sanctioned and/or extra-legal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature

³⁹ Mahmood Mamdani, 'The Invention of the Indigène', *London Review of Books*, 20 January 2011, <https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v33/n02/mahmood-mamdani/the-invention-of-the-indigene>.

⁴⁰ Mark Brown, 'Race, Science and the Construction of Native Criminality in Colonial India', *Theoretical Criminology* 5, no. 3 (2001): 345–68.

⁴¹ Gargi Bhattacharyya, *Rethinking Racial Capitalism: Questions of Reproduction and Survival* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 103.

⁴² Cedric J. Robinson, *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition* (London: Zed, 1983).

death.⁴³ I carry Gilmore-Wilson's formulation with me as I study deportation and the making of administrative power.

In many ways, then, my method and inquiry are about demonstrating how racial differences are constructed, which is to say, about how race as a social fact has been crafted. As the work of Karen and Barbara Fields demonstrates, 'the common refrain, "race is a social construction" can obscure the fact that race ultimately results from racism itself.'⁴⁴ They offer the concept of 'racecraft'. Racecraft, the Fields sisters tell us, describes the everyday doing through which a social world is constituted whose 'inhabitants experience (and act on) marrow-deep certainties that racial differences are real and consequential, whether scientifically demonstrable or not.'⁴⁵ In this way racecraft describes the 'social alchemy' through which racism creates race as a category, not the other way around. Fields and Fields draw an analogy between, on one hand, how people in early modern Europe utterly believed in witchcraft, seeing evidence of it everywhere, and on the other hand, the way in which in our contemporary present, 'daily life produces an immense accumulation of supporting evidence for' believing in the idea of race and racial difference.⁴⁶

The concept of racecraft is sensitive to, and curious about, how material facts are materialised, and how evidence appears evident 'whether scientifically demonstrable or not'. It is therefore useful for drawing out the historical development of documentation regimes. Racecraft helps me to 'read *along* the grain' as Ann Laura Stoler advocates, not just against it. I follow the racist 'rational software' of 'circular reasoning, [...] confirming rituals, self-fulfilling prophecies, multiple and inconsistent casual ideas, and colourfully inventive folk genetics' at work in my sources, as new and old rationales for deporting, expelling, dispossessing, excluding are formed and forgotten over time.⁴⁷ Racecraft's engagement with magic and the supernatural leads me to draw on a fairly established historiographic position presenting colonial modernity as just as enchanted as it was disenchanting.⁴⁸ This enchantment analytic animates how I study the making and remaking of law in my sources. Informed by Katharina Pistor's work on the legal construction – or 'code' – of capitalism, I approach law as the 'magic ingredient for seemingly making something from nothing' by 'transforming a simple commitment into an enforceable claim.'⁴⁹ In this way, the historical emergence of capitalism's markets, and of

⁴³ Ruth Wilson Gilmore, *Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California* (University of California Press, 2007), 247.

⁴⁴ Sophia Hussain, 'How Race Is Conjured: Jacobin Interviews Barbara and Karen Fields on Racecraft', Verso, accessed 10 August 2023, <https://www.versobooks.com/en-gb/blogs/news/2089-how-race-is-conjured-jacobin-interviews-barbara-and-karen-fields-on-racecraft>.

⁴⁵ Barbara J. Fields and Karen E. Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life* (Verso, 2022), 198.

⁴⁶ Fields and Fields, *Racecraft*, 20, 24.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 198.

⁴⁸ For an overview of 'the enchantment of modernity' in historiography, see Michael Saler, 'Modernity and Enchantment: A Historiographic Review', *The American Historical Review* 111, no. 3 (1 June 2006): 692–716.

⁴⁹ Katharina Pistor, 'Coding Private Money', Institute for New Economic Thinking, accessed 11 July 2023, <https://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/coding-private-money>.

credit, is the history of states creating laws to ‘throw public power behind private [financial] commitments’, to protect and enable creditors.⁵⁰ Law is the magic, the repertoire of conjuring tricks, which has created an ‘impressive empire of law, which stretches far beyond the territory of a single state and encompasses the globe, a legal empire that sustains global trade, commerce and finance.’⁵¹ Pistor’s framing of law helps to situate my study of administrative law and order in a longer history of empire that enmeshes the perpetuation of private law into statecraft.

This way of understanding the privileged role of private law in the ‘empire of law’ necessitates an archival strategy that moves between scales, from the macro-level of states and statecraft to the granular, intimate level of private and property law, including the family, the household, and the lines of inheritance transmitting wealth and property, or inequality and debt, from generation to generation. Taxes, deeds, debts, pensions, and wills are economic technologies of the family, and when these surface in my archival research into deportation and deportability, they allow me to layer up individual cases with statecraft writ large. In short, my archival strategy traces how racial categories were generated through norms about the family. I explore the making of Britain’s mass deportation regime as part of a global system of racial capitalism, one attuned to eugenicist interventions into the family as the fundamental unit of society, as capitalism’s basic unit for guaranteeing debtors and for evading the costs of socially reproductive labour.⁵² I draw on an established anti-racist literature analysing common-sense notions of the bourgeois family in relation to culture, nationhood, imperial kinship and its racialised outsiders.⁵³ The thesis links these themes of family, propriety, ancestry, legitimacy and inheritance to questions about the politics and cultures of time and history.

These questions are the bread and butter of postcolonial and queer theory perspectives. These perspectives make room for multiple, uneven experiences of time and non-linear histories, and throw into relief the historical, contingent construction of Eurocentric, civilizational timelines and cis-heteropatriarchal kinds of timeliness. The thesis is particularly indebted to Elizabeth Freeman’s concepts of ‘chrononormativity’ and ‘queer temporalities’, which encourage us to examine how ‘institutional forces come to seem like somatic facts’ which in turn organise the meaning and value of time.⁵⁴ Throughout my sources, scaling from the intimate to the international, my archival method looks for the unspoken sequences and

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Katharina Pistor, *The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality* (Princeton University Press, 2019), 160. See also, Kojo Koram, *Uncommon Wealth: Britain and the Aftermath of Empire* (John Murray, 2023).

⁵² For a controversial polemic against the technologies and technology of the family, see Sophie Lewis, *Abolish the Family: A Manifesto for Care and Liberation* (Verso, 2022).

⁵³ Errol Lawrence, ‘Just Plain Common Sense: The Roots of Racism’, in *Empire Strikes Back: Race and Racism in 70s Britain* (Routledge, 1982). For an important new study of how “race” is constructed through hegemonic norms about the family, sexuality and gender, see Sita Balani, *Deadly and Slick: Sexual Modernity and the Making of Race* (Verso, 2023).

⁵⁴ Elizabeth Freeman, *Time Binds: Queer Temporalities, Queer Histories* (Duke University Press, 2010), 3.

hidden rhythms of productive, reproductive cis-heteropatriarchal life cycles that are naturalised and made familiar by administrative routines. At its heart, empire's so-called civilising missions, its programmes of colonial development, and visions of modernity were all about time, and about plotting the colonised other as 'backwards.'. As such, as Dipesh Chakrabarty has argued, 'historicism enabled European domination of the world in the nineteenth century.'⁵⁵ My archival method looks for affective and embodied patterns of feeling and thinking about British history and about 'postcolonial melancholia', a phrase from Paul Gilroy that encapsulates 'an unhealthy and destructive post-imperial hungering for renewed greatness.'⁵⁶ By paying attention to the everyday politics of time and memory as well as empire's grand historical and historicist narratives, the thesis offers multiple ways of looking at British history through the temporalities of deportation.

These themes are now unpacked further in my literature review, where I outline how my thesis sits across three fields of scholarship: deportation studies, contemporary British history, and literature on public administration.

Literature Review

Deportation Studies

This thesis focuses on deportation, rather than immigration, migration, or citizenship.⁵⁷ It draws extensively on a rich literature of Britain's postwar immigration system and yet departs from it in three significant ways. Firstly, by focussing on deportation I approach migration from the politics of exit, rather than the politics of arrival.⁵⁸ In general, the history of Britain's immigration system has focussed on the politics of people arriving into rather than leaving, or being forced to leave, the British mainland.⁵⁹ By focusing on exit, I prioritise a perspective on the

⁵⁵ Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton University Press, 2000), 7.

⁵⁶ Paul Gilroy, *Postcolonial Melancholia* (Columbia University Press, 2005); Paul Gilroy, 'Has It Come to This?', in *The New Imperial Histories Reader* (Routledge, 2009), 331.

⁵⁷ In the early 2000s, migration studies scholars Nicolas de Genova and William Walters in 2002 noted the 'astounding theoretical silence' and the 'poorly developed [...] historical and political analysis of deportation' in comparison to the growing field of immigration/border studies. Deportation Studies as a discrete field emerged thereafter, nestled between migration studies and security studies. Nicholas De Genova, 'Migrant "Illegality" and Deportability in Everyday Life', *Annual Review of Anthropology* 31 (2002): 419–47; William Walters, 'Deportation, Expulsion, and the International Police of Aliens', *Citizenship Studies* 6, no. 3 (2002): 265–92. For an overview of deportation studies, see Susan Bibler Coutin, 'Deportation Studies: Origins, Themes and Directions', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41, no. 4 (21 March 2015): 671–81. For early studies focussed on deportation in the U.K., see Alice Bloch and Liza Schuster, 'At the Extremes of Exclusion: Deportation, Detention and Dispersal', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28, no. 3 (1 May 2005): 491–512; Bridget Anderson, Matthew J. Gibney, and Emanuela Paoletti, 'Citizenship, Deportation and the Boundaries of Belonging', *Citizenship Studies* 15, no. 5 (1 August 2011): 547–63.

⁵⁸ I borrow the phrase 'politics of exit' from Jordanna Bailkin, 'Leaving Home: The Politics of Deportation in Postwar Britain', *Journal of British Studies* 47, no. 4: 852–82.

⁵⁹ See for instance, Kathleen Paul, *Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in the Postwar Era* (Cornell University Press, 2014); Randall Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation* (Oxford: OUP, 2000); Robert Samuel Moore, *Slamming the Door: The Administration of Immigration Control* (London: Robertson, 1975).

machinations of state power instead of a perspective detailing the movements of communities marginalised by deportation, immigration control and state racism.⁶⁰ Secondly, my focus on deportation and Home Office policies emphasises bureaucracy and civil service work, decentring parliamentary politics and the media as key players.⁶¹ Lastly, the thesis approaches the contemporary immigration and deportation system through a much longer chronology than the postwar period.⁶²

Historical accounts of Britain's postwar immigration system often pinpoint the British mainland's 1905 Aliens Act as the beginning of Britain's modern immigration system, then skip forward to the postwar period.⁶³ Meanwhile histories of nineteenth and early twentieth century migration and citizenship in the Old Commonwealth have shown that immigration control and deportation were key sites through which white settler colonies consolidated claims to self-governing Dominion status through immigration politics.⁶⁴ This thesis draws attention to both forms of migration control in British colonies as well as the considerable migratory flows of British colonial administrators and other white Britons in the late nineteenth and twentieth century, framing this under-researched constituency as 'economic migrants'.⁶⁵ Altogether the thesis contributes to the history of British immigration control by demonstrating that restrictions on the free movement of black and brown British subjects did not begin, as the dominant narrative suggests, with the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act but instead began much earlier with the everyday administration of British imperialism.

⁶⁰ Recent scholarship on Britain's postwar immigration system foregrounds the organising power of communities minoritized by racist immigration controls and the global contexts and internationalist perspectives that Commonwealth "immigrants" brought to organising in the British mainland. Kennetta Hammond Perry, *London Is the Place for Me: Black Britons, Citizenship and the Politics of Race* (Oxford: OUP, 2016); Anandi Ramamurthy, *Black Star: Britain's Asian Youth Movements* (London: Pluto, 2013); Ian Sanjay Patel, *We're Here Because You Were There: Immigration and the End of Empire*, (London: Verso, 2022); Bailkin, *Afterlife of Empire*.

⁶¹ There exists an important historiographic debate about whether the Conservative Party or "public opinion" determined the creation of the 1962 Act. See Bob Carter, Clive Harris, and Shirley Joshi, 'The 1951–55 Conservative Government and the Racialization of Black Immigration', *Immigrants & Minorities* 6 (1 November 1987): 335–47. On Labour governments' role in postwar immigration law, see Shirley Joshi and Bob Carter, 'The Role of Labour in the Creation of a Racist Britain', *Race & Class* 25 (1 January 1984): 53–70, and Erica Consterdine, *Labour's Immigration Policy: The Making of the Migration State*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

⁶² Histories of Britain's immigration system largely focus on the postwar period. An important exception is Laura Tabili, *We Ask for British Justice": Workers and Racial Difference in Late Imperial Britain*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).

⁶³ See, for example, Mary Bosworth, *Inside Immigration Detention*, (Oxford: OUP, 2014), 29; El Enany, *Bordering Britain*, 50; Steve Cohen, *It's the same old story: immigration controls against Jewish, Black and Asian people, with special reference to Manchester* (Manchester: Public Relations Office, 1987); Colin Yeo, 'UK Immigration Law Timeline: 1905 to 2018', Free Movement (blog), 3 September 2020, <https://freemovement.org.uk/uk-immigration-law-timeline-1905-to-2018/>.

⁶⁴ See Charles Price, *The Great White Walls Are Built: Restrictive Immigration to North America and Australasia* (Australian National University Press, 1974); Barbara Roberts, *Whence They Came: Deportation from Canada 1900 - 1935* (University of Ottawa Press, 1998); Alison Bashford and Catie Gilchrist, 'The Colonial History of the 1905 Aliens Act', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 40, no. 3 (2012): 409–437; Kama Maclean, 'Examinations, Access, and Inequity within the Empire: Britain, Australia and India, 1890–1910', *Postcolonial Studies* 18, no. 2 (3 April 2015): 115–32.

⁶⁵ For similar approaches, see Jordanna Bailkin, 'The Birth of the Migrant: Pathology and Postwar Mobility', in *Afterlife of Empire*, 23–53; Jean P. Smith, *Settlers at the End of Empire: Race and the Politics of Migration in South Africa, Rhodesia and the United Kingdom* (Manchester University Press, 2022). For the migration of colonial administrators, see later in this literature review.

Significantly, the thesis addresses the history of not just deportation but of Britain's mass deportation *regime*, a frame widely used in the field of deportation studies. Nicolas de Genova and Nathalie Peutz argue that 'deportation is in fact the expression of a complex sociopolitical *regime* that manifests and engenders dominant notions of sovereignty, citizenship, public health, national identity, cultural homogeneity, racial purity, and class privilege.'⁶⁶ While deportation studies scholars also identify a distinctive turn towards deportation in the 1990s, I connect the relatively recent routinisation of deportation in immigration and criminal justice systems to longer, colonial histories of criminalisation, forced migration and mobility control.⁶⁷ I trace the uneven emergence of both 'migrant illegality' and 'immigrant racialisation' over the twentieth century, and situate these developments within a global *longue durée* of racialized dispossession and empire's expanding carceral archipelago.⁶⁸ Informed by a wealth of deportation studies scholarship, I approach deportation as a 'constitutive practice' through which the modern meanings of state power, citizenship and non-citizenship are made, negotiated, and acted out.⁶⁹ For this reason, my thesis traces the changing contours of whose migration was *not* criminalised just as much as it follows the increasing criminalisation and illegalisation of the world's mobile poor. Importantly, my thesis approaches deportation from a perspective shaped by anti-deportation movements.⁷⁰ In other words, I understand deportation as an assertion of state power, yes, but an assertion of state power that has been continually contested, refused and ignored by communities refusing the state's terms of membership and exclusion.⁷¹

Deportation, in its present legal meaning in the United Kingdom, refers to the ejection from the UK of a foreign-national with a criminal conviction, and their enforced return to a place deemed to be their country-of-origin.⁷² Meanwhile, legally speaking, 'administrative removal' refers the

⁶⁶ Nicholas De Genova and Nathalie Peutz, eds., *The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 2.

⁶⁷ The phrase 'the deportation turn' was first used in Matthew Gibney, 'Asylum and the Expansion of Deportation in the United Kingdom', *Government and Opposition* 43, no. 2 (2008): 146–67. See also, Bridget Anderson, Matthew J. Gibney, and Emanuela Paoletti, *The Social, Political and Historical Contours of Deportation* (Springer, 2012), 1. For a 'colony-centred perspective' on imperial histories of criminalisation, forced migration and mobility control, see Christian G. De Vito, Clare Anderson, and Ulbe Bosma, 'Transportation, Deportation and Exile: Perspectives from the Colonies in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries', *International Review of Social History* 63, no. S26 (2018): 1–24.

⁶⁸ Nicholas De Genova, 'Migrant "Illegality" and Deportability in Everyday Life', *Annual Review of Anthropology* 31 (2002): 419–47; Paul A. Silverstein, 'IMMIGRANT RACIALIZATION AND THE NEW SAVAGE SLOT: Race, Migration, and Immigration in the New Europe', *Annual Review of Anthropology* 34, no. 1 (2005): 363–84. See also, Didier Fassin, 'Policing Borders, Producing Boundaries: The Governmentality of Immigration in Dark Times', SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY, 1 October 2011).

⁶⁹ Walters, 'Deportation, Expulsion, and International Police of Aliens', 288.

⁷⁰ Anti-deportation campaigns have an integral place in anti-racist movements. See for example, Ambalavaner Sivanandan, *From Immigration Control to 'Induced Repatriation'* (Institute of Race Relations, 1978); ----, 'From Resistance to Rebellion: Asian and Afro-Caribbean Struggles in Britain', *Race & Class* 23, no. 2–3 (1981): 111–52; ----, 'UK Commentary: Racism 1992', *Race & Class* 30, no. 3 (1989): 85–90; Gargi Bhattachryya and John Gabriel, 'Anti-Deportation Campaigning in the West Midlands', in *Rethinking Anti-Racisms: From Theory to Practice*, ed. Floya Anthias and Cathy Lloyd (Routledge, 2005); Ramamurthy, *Black Star*.

⁷¹ For similar perspectives, see Bridget Anderson et al, 'Citizenship, Deportation', 547–63.

⁷² Peter William Walsh, 'Deportation and Voluntary Departure from the UK', 23 August 2023, <https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/deportation-and-voluntary-departure-from-the-uk/>.

enforced 'return' of a foreign-national who has no criminal conviction but can be forcibly returned to their country-of-origin because they lack permission to stay in the UK. In practice, as communities experiencing deportation well know, 'administrative removal' and 'assisted voluntary return' are just deportation by another name.⁷³ Unstable notions of *return* and *origin* loom large in deportation: *return* referring to some kind of movement to a territory, while *origin* gets regularly mapped on to the notion of racial origins and the suggestion that you can be *racially* from elsewhere. Studying deportation is therefore an important way to study the changing valences, forms, and appearances of racism in Britain, especially in a political and academic context in which migration is aggressively 'de-racialised'.⁷⁴

It is imperative, then, to insist upon the term *deportation*, precisely because the word uncomfortably foregrounds connected histories of previous forms of forced migration now deemed as on the wrong side of history.⁷⁵ These include the many middle passages of Transatlantic slavery, the global circuits of penal transportation and the violent programmes of 'population transfers' in the twentieth century ranging from the Holocaust to the British colonial partitions of India and Pakistan from 1947 onwards.⁷⁶ This thesis also draws on a cohesive body of historical materialist scholarship that locates the origins of today's immigration systems in the regimes of poor laws and vagrancy acts that were part of the earliest unfolding of capitalism through empire's expanding carceral archipelago.⁷⁷

Against the British state's administrative word-play this thesis works with a wide definition of deportation, loose enough to include any intersection of migration control and with systems of criminalisation. In doing so, my research contributes granular archival detail and a longer historical trajectory to the burgeoning literature on 'crimmigration'. Crimmigration scholarship documents and analyses the immigration consequences now embedded into criminal prosecutions, the growing use of criminal justice technologies within immigration control, and in total, the increasing criminalisation of migration as part of a broader strategy of carceral

⁷³ Frances Webber, 'How Voluntary Are Voluntary Returns?', *Race & Class* 52, no. 4 (2011): 98–107.

⁷⁴ Luke de Noronha, 'Deportation, Racism and Multi-Status Britain'; see also Umut Erel, Karim Murji, and Zaki Nahaboo, 'Understanding the Contemporary Race-Migration Nexus', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 39, no. 8 (2016): 1339–1360.

⁷⁵ Anderson, *Us and Them?*, 117.

⁷⁶ For an overview of deportation in relation to other forms of expulsion see Walters, 'Deportation, Expulsion, and the International Police of Aliens'. For deportation in relation to banishment, citizenship-removal, and exile, see Matthew J. Gibney, 'Banishment and the Pre-History of Legitimate Expulsion Power', *Citizenship Studies* 24, no. 3 (2 April 2020): 277–300; Nisha Kapoor, *Deport, Deprive, Extradite: Twenty-First Century State Extremism* (London: Verso, 2018); De Noronha, *Deporting Black Britons*, 240 – 250. For modern deportation in relation to criminal transportation, see Melanie Griffiths, 'Foreign, Criminal: A Doubly Damned Modern British Folk-Devil', *Citizenship Studies* 21, no. 5 (2017): 527–546.

⁷⁷ For an overview of connections between vagrancy, poor laws, and colonial global labour mobility regimes, see Sabrina Axster et al., 'Colonial Lives of the Carceral Archipelago: Rethinking the Neoliberal Security State', *International Political Sociology* 15, no. 3 (1 September 2021): 426; Dimitris Papadopoulos, Niamh Stephenson, and Vassilis Tsianos, *Escape Routes: Control and Subversion in the 21st Century* (London: Pluto, 2008), 42–55; David Feldman, 'Migrants, Immigrants and Welfare from the Old Poor Law to the Welfare State', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 13 (2003): 79–104; Robbie Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor* (Newcastle: Agenda, 2018), 9 – 32.

expansion.⁷⁸ I focus on deportation, widely defined, to welcome the so-called foreign criminal into the very heart of my research, rather than sidelining this media bogeyman in favour of ‘genuine refugees’, and ‘good immigrants.’⁷⁹ The politics and histories of asylum-seeking and refugee protection are an incredibly important component of Britain’s mass deportation regime today. But asylum is important because for the world’s mobile poor refugee protection exists as one of the only remaining routes to permanently settling in the British mainland, not because asylum-seekers are more innocent, and more deserving, than other categories of migrants and non-citizens.⁸⁰

To study the construction of the foreign criminal over time is to study the shifting contours of foreignness alongside the changing contents of criminality. It goes almost without saying that both have a lot to do with the practical unfolding of empire: criminalising foreignness and racializing criminality as something foreign are part of how states facilitate capital to control and exploit labour, during empire and after its constitutional end. Focussing on deportation foregrounds the entanglement of immigration control with policing and prisons.⁸¹ My research situates that whole package alongside the enclosure of the commons in Europe, the Americas and Africa, the transatlantic slave trade, industrialisation and waged labour, and the development of a criminal justice, policing and prison system.⁸²

If we return to look at those notions of *return* and *origin* in the current meaning of deportation, we remember there is something economic about *returns*. Returns are profits, revenues, proceeds; bringing to mind the continuing ‘empire of law’ perpetuating inequalities of wealth, health, and life chances. Throughout this thesis I situate deportation and deportability as state-enforced economic manoeuvres that maintain a renewable pool of legally precarious, illegalised migrant labour.⁸³ My framework of *how the Home Office does history* approaches deportation through the politics of time, history and temporality, drawing attention to how states

⁷⁸ The term ‘crimmigration’ was first used in 2006 by Juliet Stumpf to describe the intersection of criminal justice systems with immigration policing in the U.S. Juliet Stumpf, ‘The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power’, *American University Law Review* 56, no. 2 (1 January 2006). An important consolidation of “crimmigration” literature was Katja Franko Aas and Mary Bosworth, *The Borders of Punishment: Migration, Citizenship, and Social Exclusion* (Oxford: OUP, 2013).

⁷⁹ There is a growing and urgent literature on the foreign criminal. See for instance, Luke De Noronha, *Deporting Black Britons*; Ines Hasselberg, ‘Balancing Legitimacy, Exceptionality and Accountability: On Foreign-National Offenders’ Reluctance to Engage in Anti-Deportation Campaigns in the UK’, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41, no. 4 (2015): 563–79.

⁸⁰ For similar perspectives, see Lucy Mayblin, *Asylum after Empire: Colonial Legacies in the Politics of Asylum Seeking*, (London: Roman & Littlefield, 2017) and Becky Taylor, *Refugees in Twentieth-Century Britain: A History* (Cambridge: CUP, 2021).

⁸¹ See, for instance, Phe Amis and Tom Kemp, ‘Why Borders and Prisons, Border Guards and Police?’, in *Abolishing the Police: An Illustrated Introduction*, ed. Koshka Duff (Dog Section Press, 2021), 52–67.

⁸² For recent anti-capitalist and abolitionist writing on intersecting systems of immigration control, policing, criminalisation and incarceration in the British mainland, see Adam Elliott-Cooper, *Black Resistance to British Policing*, (Manchester University Press, 2021); Gracie Mae Bradley and Luke de Noronha, *Against Borders: The Case for Abolition* (London: Verso, 2022); Gargi Bhattacharyya et al, *Empire’s Endgame: Racism and the British State* (London: Pluto, 2021); Aviah Sarah Day and Shanice Octavia McBean, *Abolition Revolution* (London: Pluto, 2022).

⁸³ Nicholas De Genova, ‘The Deportation Power’, *Radical Philosophy*, no. 203 (2018): 23–27.

'steal time' from illegalised migrants and non-citizens by withholding pension and welfare benefits from workers who are made into non-citizens, made legally precarious and super-exploitable by colonial mobility regimes and immigration regimes in the metropole.⁸⁴

While time and temporality have been established as useful frameworks with which to study deportation in contemporary border regimes, specifically *historical* scholarship describing how deportation worked in the past are rarer.⁸⁵ Historical accounts of British deportation policy remain sparse, but a wider glance at deportation history-writing relating to other parts of the world shows two formats. On one hand, historians have studied the forced movement of a particular social group within a specific phase of time.⁸⁶ On the other hand, historians have investigated deportation over a longer time span in order to identify historical shifts in *who* the state subjects to deportation and what that *who* tells us about historically changing contours of the state itself.⁸⁷ My thesis adopts the latter approach to demonstrate deportation's changing role as one process through which the British Empire and its imperial mobility regimes – regimes initially more interested in facilitating migration around the empire – was reconceptualised at the end of empire as a nation-state reliant on a 'logic of restriction.'⁸⁸ The complicated transformation of the British Empire into the United Kingdom at the end of empire has impacted how Britain and Britishness have been imagined and debated since, with enormous consequences for the study of British history.

Contemporary British history

This thesis is about the long historical making of Britain's contemporary mass deportation regime, a regime entrenched into statutory law by the 1971 Immigration Act. The subfield of 'contemporary British history' emerged in the 1980s. Around the same time, the genealogical

⁸⁴ Shahem Khosravi describes life under threat of deportation as being 'in the condition of circulation [where] one never gets the chance to finish anything'. Shahram Khosravi, 'Stolen Time', *Radical Philosophy* 2.03 (December 2018), <http://www.radicalphilosophy.com/article/stolen-time>.

⁸⁵ Temporality is a keyword in deportation studies. See for example, Nicholas De Genova, 'Detention, Deportation, and Waiting: Toward a Theory of Migrant Detainability', *Gender and Research* 20, no. 1 (1 March 2019): 92–104; Melanie Griffiths, Alasdair Rogers, and Bridget Anderson, 'Migration, Time and Temporalities: Review and Prospect. COMPAS Research Resources Paper' (Compas, 2013); Melanie Griffiths, 'Out of Time: The Temporal Uncertainties of Refused Asylum Seekers and Immigration Detainees', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 40, no. 12 (2 December 2014): 1991–2009.

⁸⁶ Examples include Cindy Hahamovitch, *No Man's Land Jamaican Guestworkers in America and the Global History of Deportable Labor*, (Princeton University Press, 2011); Andrew Gentes, *The Mass Deportation of Poles to Siberia, 1863-1880* (Springer, 2017); G. Uehling, *Beyond Memory: The Crimean Tatars' Deportation and Return* (Springer, 2004).

⁸⁷ For survey histories on deportation in the USA, Australia and the USSR, see: Adam Goodman, *The Deportation Machine: America's Long History of Expelling Immigrants* (Princeton University Press, 2020); Glenn Nicholls, *Deported: A History of Forced Departures from Australia* (University of New South Wales Press, 2007); Pavel Polian, *Against Their Will: The History and Geography of Forced Migrations in the USSR*, (New York: Central European University Press, 2003).

⁸⁸ Literature on empire and migration often distinguishes between what Radhika Mongia calls the imperial 'logic of facilitation' and the post-imperial 'logic of restriction'. See Mongia, *Indian Migration and Empire*, 2. See also, Nandita Sharma, *Home Rule: National Sovereignty and the Separation of Natives and Migrants* (Duke University Press, 2020).

methodologies of Micheal Foucault drew thinkers and scholars towards offering histories-of-the-present that begin with a problem in the present and deconstruct it backwards, rather than reconstructing ‘a past that is dead.’⁸⁹ My history-of-the-present of Britain’s contemporary deportation regime enters the field of British history more than thirty years after the transnational turn and the ‘new imperial history’ movement set out to recover the histories of a Britain co-constituted by its empire and colonial subjects.⁹⁰ Shaped by new imperial histories’ sensitivity to unpacking how empire shaped the social facts of gender, sexuality, class and race, my thesis throughout its chapters asks what processes of racialisation reveal to us about modern British history.⁹¹

The end of the Second World War – 1945 – is often pinpointed as when the recent past begins, where it starts to surround and engulf us. There exists a hard-wearing narrative of contemporary British history that pinpoints 1945 as a moment of rupture, marking the rise of a universal welfare state, the beginning of the end of empire, and the onset of so-called mass immigration bringing a host of new social problems referred to as ‘race relations’ into postwar British society.⁹² Since the Brexit vote in 2016, a determined literature has emerged across academic disciplines to analyse how anti-immigrant, ethno-nationalist politics have not only survived but have solidified as part of the twenty-first century’s globalised world both in Britain and across the world. Civil Servants’ blithe suggestions in 2018 to replace EU trade relationships with an ‘Empire 2.0’ made palpably clear that ‘Brexit [was] nostalgia for empire.’⁹³

⁸⁹ For an overview of the emergence of “contemporary British history”, see Peter Catterall, ‘What (If Anything) Is Distinctive about Contemporary History?’, *Journal of Contemporary History* 32, no. 4 (1997): 441–52. For arguments for writing “histories of the present” to recognise ‘both the persisting or repeating character of the past in the present and the non-necessary character of pasts present and presents past’, see Ethan Kleinberg, Joan Wallach Scott, and Gary Wilder, ‘Theses on Theory and History’, *History of the Present* 10, no. 1 (1 April 2020): 157–65. For arguments unpacking the limitations of Foucault’s “history of the present”, see John Braithwaite, ‘What’s Wrong with the Sociology of Punishment?’, *Theoretical Criminology* 7, no. 1 (1 February 2003): 5–28. For an example of writing “histories of the present” instead of about “a past that is dead”, see Daniel Renwick and Robbie Shilliam, *Squalor*, Giants: A New Beveridge Report (Newcastle: Agenda, 2022), 2.

⁹⁰ For early interventions reframing modern Britain as co-constituted by empire and colonial subjects, see Peter Fryer, *Staying Power: The History of Black People in Britain* (London: Zed, 1984); Rozina Visram, *Ayahs, Lascars, and Princes: Indians in Britain, 1700-1947* (London: Pluto, 1986) and *Asians In Britain: 400 Years of History* (London: Pluto, 2002). Key theoretical texts on “new imperial history” include Dane Kennedy, ‘Imperial History and Post-Colonial Theory’, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 24, no. 3 (1996): 345–63; Mrinalini Sinha, ‘Britain and the Empire: Toward a New Agenda for Imperial History’, *Radical History Review* 72 (1998). See also edited volumes including, Gyan Prakash, *After Colonialism: Imperial Histories and Postcolonial Displacements* (Princeton University Press, 1995); Catherine Hall and Sonya O. Rose, *At Home with the Empire: Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World* (Cambridge: CUP, 2006); Antoinette Burton, ed., *After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and through the Nation* (Duke University Press, 2003); Stephen Howe, ed., *The New Imperial Histories Reader* (Routledge, 2010).

⁹¹ For a useful overview of “race” as analytic rather than subject of British history, see Marc Matera et al., ‘Marking Race: Empire, Social Democracy, Deindustrialization’, *Twentieth Century British History* 34, no. 3 (1 September 2023): 552–79.

⁹² For an early critical history of the “race relations industry” in the British mainland, see Jenny Bourne and A. Sivanandan, ‘Cheerleaders and Ombudsmen: The Sociology of Race Relations in Britain’, *Race & Class* 21, no. 4 (1 April 1980): 331–52. For a very recent one, see Rob Waters, ‘Race, Citizenship and “Race Relations” Research in Late-Twentieth-Century Britain’, *Twentieth Century British History* 34, no. 3 (1 September 2023): 491–514.

⁹³ Chloe Farand, ‘Ministers Want to Create “British Empire 2.0” after Brexit’, *The Independent*, 6 March 2017, sec. News, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/uk-government-africa-free-trade-zone-post-brexit-empire-2-liam-fox-international-commonwealth-a7613526.html>. See also, Kojo Koram and Kerem Nişancıoğlu, ‘Brexit: The Empire That Never Was’, *Critical Legal Thinking: Law and the Political*, 31 October 2017, criticallegalthinking.com.

The figure of the 'left-behind white working class' mobilised within the Brexit vote has warranted a determined efforts to draw out what one scholar calls 'those time-consuming *is-it-class-or-race* debates' as well as framing those debates in relation to colonial capitalism.⁹⁴ Such analysis draws on decades of anti-racist theory and action that comprehends the political economy of race, racism and anti-immigrant nativism for crisis management.⁹⁵

The extent to which 1945 is assessed as a clean and clear rupture has narrative consequences for debates about who gets included in a universal welfare state, whether reparations are owed for the British Empire, and whether the relatively recently made immigration control system should be unmade. Perhaps more importantly this prevalent way of emphasising postwar changes to British society aligns easily with the historical and political sensibilities of Enoch Powell.⁹⁶ From the late 1950s onwards, Powell – a conservative MP who served in the Indian army during the Second World War and used to dream of becoming India's next Viceroy – advocated for Britain to retreat from empire, liberate itself from the Commonwealth, and reinvent itself as a nation-state safeguarding the rights of 'ordinary Englishmen' and 'the white man'.⁹⁷ Redefining Britain at the end of empire involved redefining the terms and conditions of British history, excluding the empire from the island-nation, all the better to 'ease the trauma of decolonisation' and render instead 'the tale of Britain as an independent, pioneering state that always stands alone.'⁹⁸

Significantly, as one historian has argued, 'Powell's rhetoric may seem exceptional, but his racial sensibility was ordinary.'⁹⁹ This thesis looks for Powell's racial sensibility and its institutional pinning within how the Home Office does history. In other words, I carry with me Arun Kundani's important provocation: that Enoch Powell was not only Britain's most famous racist but also its first neoliberal politician, one who twinned loud anti-immigrant campaigning

⁹⁴ Olivia U. Rutazibwa, 'Hidden in Plain Sight: Coloniality, Capitalism and Race/IsM as Far as the Eye Can See', *Millennium* 48, no. 2 (1 January 2020): 221–41; Robbie Shilliam, 'Redeeming the "Ordinary Working Class"', *Current Sociology* 68, no. 2 (1 March 2020): 223–40; Gurminder K. Bhambra, 'Brexit, Trump, and "Methodological Whiteness": On the Misrecognition of Race and Class', *The British Journal of Sociology* 68, no. S1 (2017): 214–32; Luke De Noronha, 'Race, Class and Brexit: Thinking from Detention', *Verso* (blog), 9 March 2018, <https://www.versobooks.com/en-gb/blogs/news/3675-race-class-and-brexit-thinking-from-detention>.

⁹⁵ Perspectives developed by Paul Gilroy et al in 1982's *The Empire Strikes Back: Race and Racism in 70s Britain* remain cornerstones for scholars today unpacking how 'race has increasingly become one of the means through which hegemonic relations are secured in a period of crisis management'. Likewise, grappling with history remains key for recent analytical efforts to delineate how the specific form of nativist nationalism in "Brexit Britain" has germinated within, to paraphrase Gilroy, the formation of the British class system spanning the breadth of colonial societies as each reproduced "race", class and citizenship as divisive forces of British imperialism. Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies et al., 'The Organic Crisis of British Capitalism and Race: The Experience of the Seventies', in *EMPIRE STRIKES BACK: Race and Racism In 70's Britain* (Routledge, 2004), 7–43.

⁹⁶ Koram, *Uncommon Wealth*, 31 – 34.

⁹⁷ Contemporary forms of nativist, anti-immigrant nationalism now associated with the rise of UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party) and the Brexit vote in 2016 have prompted historians to provide new biographies of Powell and histories of his ideas. See for example, Sally Tomlinson, 'Enoch Powell, Empires, Immigrants and Education', *Race Ethnicity and Education* 21, no. 1 (2 January 2018): 1–14; Camilla Schofield, *Enoch Powell and the Making of Postcolonial Britain* (Cambridge: CUP, 2013); Shirin Hirsch, *In the Shadow of Enoch Powell: Race, Locality and Resistance*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2018).

⁹⁸ Koram, *Uncommon Wealth*, 34.

⁹⁹ Ian Sanjay Patel, 'Enoch Powell's Altered World', LRB Blog, 20 April 2018, <https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2018/april/enoch-powell-s-altered-world>.

with quieter parliamentary pushes toward anti-welfarist monetary policies.¹⁰⁰ I am looking, therefore, for the makings of Britain's 'neoliberal age' within the making of Britain's mass deportation regime.¹⁰¹ This deportation regime, as I explained earlier, was built upon deportation policy proposals set out in Powell's notorious 'Rivers of Blood' speech. My research is more about retracing how the 'ordinary' racial sensibility within public administration and ruling class milieus shaped Powell and Powellism, than it is about the aberrational impact Powell had on contemporary British history. I leave aside a specific focus on Powell (although he surfaces, at a distance, in two chapters) but bring with me an analytical focus on the twinning of anti-immigrant nativism with neoliberalism. The phrase 'racial neoliberalism' helps to conceptualise the somewhat contradictory dovetailing of neoliberal globalisation with anti-immigrant nationalisms in the contemporary present.¹⁰² This thesis, then, attends to the long, and never inevitable, making of racial neoliberalism in Britain by connecting deportation to the history of decolonisation and to the history of the Britain's welfare state, two fields of study I will now briefly survey.

Much scholarship has presented decolonisation as a process driven by colonial powers and the anticolonial nationalist independence movements striving to replace them.¹⁰³ This zoomed-out frame coincides easily with historical accounts suggesting that society and culture in the British mainland was minimally affected by the end of the British Empire.¹⁰⁴ However recent work has disrupted the diplomatic push-pull approach to decolonisation, diversifying its protagonists and fraying the 1945 rupture to unravel much longer trajectories.¹⁰⁵ My thesis extends the insights, methods and commitments of new imperial history from the study of eighteenth and nineteenth century British Empire to apply to colonial mobility regimes and

¹⁰⁰ Arun Kundani, 'Disembowel Enoch Powell', *Dissent Magazine* (blog), 18 April 2018, https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/enoch-powell-racism-neoliberalism-right-wing-populism-rivers-of-blood/; Robbie Shilliam, 'Enoch Powell: Britain's First Neoliberal Politician', *New Political Economy* 26, no. 2 (4 March 2021): 239.

¹⁰¹ I periodise Britain's "neoliberal age" as since the 1970s, drawing from Aled Davies, Ben Jackson, and Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite, *The Neoliberal Age?: Britain Since the 1970s* (UCL Press, 2021).

¹⁰² Stephen D. Ashe, 'Racial Neoliberalism', *GLOBAL SOCIAL THEORY* (blog), accessed 25 September 2023, <https://globalsocialtheory.org/topics/racial-neoliberalism/>.

¹⁰³ For examples of this "push-pull" approach to studying decolonisation, see John G. Darwin, 'The Fear of Falling: British Politics and Imperial Decline since 1900', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 36 (1986): 27–43; Brian Harrison, *Finding a Role?: The United Kingdom 1970-1990* (Oxford: OUP, 2011); Ronald Hyam, *Britain's Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918–1968* (Cambridge: CUP, 2007). For criticisms of this approach see Nicholas Owen, 'Decolonisation and Postwar Consensus', in *The Myth of Consensus*, ed. Harriet Jones and Michael Kandiah (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1996), 157–81, and Jordanna Bailkin, 'Where Did the Empire Go? Archives and Decolonization in Britain', *The American Historical Review* 120, no. 3 (2015): 890.

¹⁰⁴ Quintessential texts arguing that the British metropole was minimally impacted by its empire are David Cannadine, *Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire* (Oxford: OUP, 2002) and Bernard Porter, *The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society and Culture in Britain* (Oxford: OUP, 2004). For a concise overview of counter-arguments, and the basis of "new imperial history" approaches, see Tony Ballantyne, 'Introduction: Debating Empire', *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 3, no. 1 (2002).

¹⁰⁵ For intellectual histories of decolonisation entangling metropolises and colonies, reaching back much earlier than the postwar period, see Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire*; Gopal, *Insurgent Empire*; Marc Matera, *Black London: The Imperial Metropolis and Decolonization in the Twentieth Century*, (University of California Press, 2015); Michael Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism* (Cambridge: CUP, 2015).

statecraft in the late nineteenth to later twentieth centuries, as well as the ‘long moment of decolonisation’ unfurling throughout that century.¹⁰⁶

This allows for the nuanced study of decolonisation as the transformation of temporal horizons, racial meanings and political cultures. My research is informed by and contributes to a rich literature querying not only the histories but the timing and temporalities of empire and its end. What is after, what is an end, what is ongoing, what is returning? The ideas of *return* and *origin* do not only capture the multiple forms of displacement and shifting calibration of territory, nationality and race; we can think with *return* and *origin* about time, temporality, and history. What Suzanne and Aime Cesaire called the ‘imperial boomerang’ and what Homi K. Bhabha and Avery Gordon each captured as ‘haunting’ are also forms of *return*, forms of remembering and re-remembering.¹⁰⁷ By situating the historical development of Britain’s deportation regime within a long *durée* of racialised dispossession, my research adds to existing scholarship that locates the aftermath, afterlives, boomerangs and hauntings of empire within its contemporary political and financial institutions.¹⁰⁸

Meanwhile, Gargi Bhattacharyya et al’s concept of ‘empire’s endgame’ provides my thesis with clarity about the contemporary period that I am trying to describe the making of. Those eight authors argue that ‘for all the fanfares of a remade authoritarian nationalism, the period we examine is one of imperial decline’, which is to say, ‘the endgame of one imperial phase.’¹⁰⁹ Thinking with this endgame helps me to not over-determine the continuities between Britain’s mass deportation regime now and the forms of deportation operating within colonial administration. Thinking through the contemporary period as a period of unfinished imperial decline helps me remain sensitive and specific, looking for change, for what is new and different. After all, as Nandita Sharma, Radhika Mongia and many others have argued, the constitutional end of empires and the global rise of the nation-state form of power was the greatest geopolitical transformation of the twentieth century.¹¹⁰ The world of border controls and restrictive citizenship regimes erected in this new, recent world order really is qualitatively different from the previous imperial system.

¹⁰⁶ I borrow the generative phrase ‘the long moment of decolonisation’ from Mark Matera, and use it throughout this thesis. Marc Matera, ‘Metropolitan Cultures of Empire and the Long Moment of Decolonization’, *The American Historical Review* 121, no. 5 (2016): 1435–43.

¹⁰⁷ Aime Cesaire, *Discourse on Colonialism* (New York: Monthly Review, 2000), 41. Cesaire’s ‘imperial boomerang’ analytic is used widely. Haunting – or what Homi Bhabha calls the ‘furious emergence of the projective past’ within neoliberal, late twentieth century nation-states – is a key analytic in postcolonial literary theory. See Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (Routledge, 1994), 254. See also, Avery F. Gordon and Janice Radway, *Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination* (University Of Minnesota Press, 2008).

¹⁰⁸ Koram, *Uncommon Wealth*; Sarah Stockwell, *The British End of the British Empire* (Cambridge: CUP, 2020); Gurminder Bhambra and Julia McClure, *Imperial Inequalities: The Politics of Economic Governance Across European Empires* (Manchester University Press, 2022).

¹⁰⁹ Gargi Bhattacharyya, et al, *Empire’s Endgame*, 12.

¹¹⁰ Mongia, *A Colonial Genealogy of the Modern State*; Sharma, *Home Rule*.

For this reason, my research situates the crystallisation of Britain's mass deportation regime from the 1970s onwards as part of the long history of decolonisation, while squarely connecting the history of decolonisation to the historical development of neoliberalism. The neoliberal counterrevolution of the 1970s was, among many things, a reaction to the 'new international economic order' threatened by newly independent ex-colonies and their attempts to finally tax imperialist enterprises and provide labour protections to workers who had hitherto been super-exploited.¹¹¹ The historical development of neoliberalism in Britain has long been a key theme in contemporary British history, but the last decade has seen a turn towards relating neoliberalism to the British Empire and its end, paying particular attention to the global effects of financialization, de-industrialisation, trade agreements and post-imperial labour migration regimes.¹¹²

My thesis therefore brings together histories of decolonisation, deportation and neoliberalism. It traces the afterlives of colonial development and welfare schemes not only in the making of international development and the aid-industrial complex but also across the neoliberal un-making of the welfare state within the British mainland after decolonisation. I draw on recent work dedicated to re-writing how empire and decolonisation crisscross the making of Britain's postwar welfare state. There exists an important scholarship critiquing the mythical universalism of the postwar welfare state, foregrounding the legislative and practical exclusion of a growing constituency of non-citizens from the welfare safety net.¹¹³ With this in mind, we can appreciate histories of anti-racist movements in the British mainland as, de facto, alternative histories of Britain's postwar welfare state and its decimation by the neoliberal counterrevolution of the 1970s.¹¹⁴ Likewise, we have a rich literature that entwines the development of welfare – as well as its punitive functions – in the British mainland with the

¹¹¹ Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire*.

¹¹² Quinn Slobodian, *Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism* (Harvard University Press, 2020); Tehila Sasson, 'Afterword: British Neoliberalism and Its Subjects', in Aled Davies, et al, *The Neoliberal Age?: Britain Since the 1970s*.

¹¹³ See Steve Cohen, *Immigration Controls, the Family and the Welfare State* (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2000), 27; Amina Mama, 'Black Women and the British State: Race, Class and Gender Analysis for the 1990s', *Racism and Antiracism: Inequalities, Opportunities and Policies*, 1992, 79–101; Diane Sainsbury, *Welfare States and Immigrant Rights – The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion* (Oxford: OUP, 2012), 37; Christian Ydesen and Kevin Myers, 'The Imperial Welfare State? Decolonisation, Education and Professional Interventions on Immigrant Children in Birmingham, 1948-1971', *Paedagogica Historica* 52, no. 5 (2016): 453–66; Ed Mynott, 'Nationalism, Racism and Immigration Control: From Anti-Racism to Anti-Capitalism', in *From Immigration Controls to Welfare Controls* (Routledge, 2014), 11–29. For an important study of the explicitly internationalist anti-colonial framing of anti-racist struggles against welfare controls in the 1980s, see Kathryn Medien, 'No Pass Laws Here! Internal Border Controls and the Global "Hostile Environment"', *Sociology* 57, no. 4 (August 2023): 940–56.

¹¹⁴ Robbie Shilliam argues that 'Black and Asian collective actions had no choice but to politically defend the working class at its most vulnerable points, [...at...] the edge or outside of the protections of the national compact' and 'in doing so, Black and Asian struggles made visible the future struggle that waited after the dissolution of the national compact, a future that has subsequently attracted the label of "neoliberalism".' Robbie Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor*, 105.

interlinked forms of welfare services, mobility control and criminalisation evolving in colonies or in the service of British imperialism.¹¹⁵

However the grip of anti-immigrant, nativist politics on the current politics of Britain's postwar welfare state makes it consistently urgent to reframe the latter as the 'spoils of empire' as Nadine El Enany calls it.¹¹⁶ Central to this literature is an understanding that the British mainland's postwar 'cradle to grave' education, social security, and national healthcare system was paid for with wealth stolen from British colonies in the form of heavy taxation, resource extraction and labour exploitation.¹¹⁷ As Beverley Bryan put it in the 1980s, 'Black women's labour has propped up this country not only over the past four decades but for centuries' and 'far from draining [Britain's] resources, we have been producers of its wealth', rearticulating Dadabhai Naoroji's 'colonial drain thesis' first set out in 1901.¹¹⁸ By attending to the institutional development of the Home Office's carceral and welfare responsibilities, this thesis connects the nineteenth and early twentieth century origins of Britain's postwar welfare state to the historical development of the carceral archipelago at 'home' and in its colonies.¹¹⁹ It contributes to analyses of 'internal colonialism' within the British mainland's welfare and immigration systems by itemising in archival detail actual moments and circumstances in which the societal structures and hierarchies of access at work in colonies' citizenship, welfare and criminal justice regimes were reproduced or adapted in the metropole.¹²⁰

In summary, this thesis is about the historical development of Britain's contemporary mass deportation regime, a regime solidifying as part of the neoliberal counterrevolution from the 1970s onwards. That counterrevolution, firstly, was a response to constitutional decolonisation, and secondly, began to erode a hard-won postwar consensus on national welfarism in ways that, although never inevitable, were already baked in by the colonial

¹¹⁵ Joanna Lewis, *Empire State-Building: War & Welfare in Kenya, 1925-52* (Ohio State University Press, 2000); Daniel Gorman, 'Empire, Internationalism, and the Campaign against the Traffic in Women and Children in the 1920s,' *Twentieth-Century British History* 19, no. 2 (2008): 186–216; Marjorie Levine-Clark, "From 'Relief' to 'Justice and Protection': The Maintenance of Deserted Wives, British Masculinity and Imperial Citizenship, 1870–1920," *Gender and History* 22, no. 2 (2010): 302–321.

¹¹⁶ El-Enany, *Bordering Britain*, 2.

¹¹⁷ See in particular, Gurinder Bhambra, 'Relations of Extraction, Relations of Redistribution: Empire, Nation, and the Construction of the British Welfare State', *The British Journal of Sociology* 73, no. 1 (January 2022): 4–15; ---- and John Holmwood, 'Colonialism, Postcolonialism and the Liberal Welfare State', *New Political Economy* 23, no. 5 (3 September 2018): 574–87.

¹¹⁸ Beverley Bryan, 'The Uncaring Arm of the State: Black Women, Health and the Welfare Services', in *Heart Of The Race: Black Women's Lives in Britain*, (London: Virago, 1985); Dadabhai Naoroji, *Poverty and Un-British Rule in India* (London: S. Sonnenschein, 1901). Naoroji argued that that 'not only was India more heavily taxed than Britain, but there was another additional circumstance: the whole of British taxation returned entirely to the people themselves from who it was raised' – returned in the form of welfare – 'but that which was obtained out of India did not all return to them.'

¹¹⁹ The classic text on the nineteenth and twentieth century origins of the postwar welfare state is Pat Thane, *The Foundations of the Welfare State* (London: Routledge, 1996).

¹²⁰ James Trafford defines internal colonialism as 'the production and reproduction of colonial relations through the intensification and reproduction of societal structures and hierarchies [...and...] strategies [that] have redeployed structures that facilitated and legitimised slavery, exploitation, extermination and frameworks that suppressed dissent and resistance to them.' Trafford, *The Empire at Home: Internal Colonies and the End of Britain* (London: Pluto, 2021), 9. The notion of "internal colonialism" is long established, see for instance Salman Rushdie, 'The New Empire within Britain', *New Society* 9, no. 1 (1982): 417–21.

practice and meaning of welfare in British colonies, where welfare was primarily punitive, immobilising and racializing. My *how the Home Office does history* framework provides a perspective on contemporary British history focussed on statecraft and race throughout. The thesis therefore contributes to the ‘histories of racialised government, law and politics’ called for by Paul Gilroy as a means to remedy the history of racism as ‘principally a history of racism’s many victims, invoked as an act of Europe-centred piety.’¹²¹ A short survey of scholarship about public administration is therefore now required.

Public administration

This thesis approaches the politics of deportation – writ large – through the aperture of public administration, rather than parliamentary or popular politics, in order to demystify the hidden rhythms and institutional culture of bureaucratic work. Public administration, simply put, is the implementation of government policies. The phrase can refer to government policies planned, organised and put to work by local government within a nation-state. However, in this thesis I am largely referring to central government planning by both the British imperial state and British colonial governments. One of the significant contributions made by this thesis is its attempt to disaggregate what the Home Office *is*, what it does, how it shapes and is shaped by, and relates to, other parts of the British state, as well as how those relationships to other departments, institutions, and functions change over time.¹²² As befits the ‘connected history’ methodology I outlined earlier, I treat the British mainland’s public administration, its Home Civil Service, as something connected and co-constituted with Britain’s Colonial Civil Service.

The history of Britain’s Civil Service is not at present a popular field for academic historical scholarship. There are a small number of academic monographs on the history of the Home Office, thematising the institution’s first twenty years after 1782 and the Northcote-Trevelyan civil service reforms of the 1850s.¹²³ Other historical accounts – in the form of illustrated books, published lectures, short pamphlets and online blogs – have been written by civil servants, often retired. These rehearse a cherished origin story about the modernisation and professionalisation of the British Civil Service and the Home Office’s subsequent role as one of the ‘great departments of state’ in shaping Victorian Britain’s industrial, political and social welfare developments.¹²⁴ There also exist studies – mainly in article form and as unpublished

¹²¹ Paul Gilroy, *Darker Than Blue: On the Moral Economies of Black Atlantic Culture* (Harvard University Press, 2010), 72 – 73.

¹²² For similar questions, see Joel White, ‘Think like the Home Office: States and Stateness’, in *‘Holding Space: Friendship, Care and Carcerality in the UK Immigration Detention System’* (PhD diss, University of Edinburgh, 2021), 134–61.

¹²³ Ronald Roy Nelson, *The Home Office, 1782-1801* (Duke University Press, 1969); Jill Pellew, *The Home Office, 1848-1914, from Clerks to Bureaucrats* (Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1982).

¹²⁴ The historiography of the Home Office is detailed in Chapter 1. For the history of the British mainland’s Civil Service, see Emmeline W. Cohen, *The Growth of the British Civil Service, 1780-1939* (G. Allen & Unwin, 1941);

theses – of how the Home Office has administered its different functions, including prisons, criminal justice, policing, borders and asylum, in both in the past and in the contemporary present.¹²⁵ By contrast, this thesis travels across, back and forth along the Home Office’s long history, between the present day and 1782.

When the Home Office was established in 1782, its jurisdiction over domestic affairs included British colonies which at that time, amid Britain’s defeat in the American War of Independence and the East India Company’s non-governmental rule in the Indian Subcontinent until 1857, primarily referred to the plantation colonies in the Caribbean.¹²⁶ This remains a largely under-researched history, and although this thesis primarily concentrates on public administration in the late nineteenth and twentieth century, my analysis remains alive to how this earlier period boomerangs into the events and sources I study. In other words, I situate my analysis of British statecraft within the long historical development of an ‘empire of law’, as outlined earlier.¹²⁷ The thesis contextualises the modernisation of the Home Office and the British Civil Service over the Victorian era of industrialisation, situating the latter in relation to expanding British imperialism and the long durée of racialised dispossession, a context otherwise absent from histories of the British Home Civil Service.¹²⁸

In comparison, there is an abundant historical scholarship on the administration of British colonies critically assessing the multi-faceted work of colonial administration. The term ‘civil servant’ was first used by the British East India Company to distinguish its civilian clerks from its military personnel in the eighteenth century. The piecemeal historical development of the Indian Civil Service (ICS) along the administrative pattern already established by the Mughal Empire has long been studied, initially by ICS men themselves.¹²⁹ The history of the ICS has since been readdressed by historians shaped by Subaltern Studies interventions to

Edward Bridges, *Portrait of a Profession the Civil Service Tradition*. (Cambridge: CUP, 1950); Richard A. Chapman, *Civil Service Commission 1855-1991: A Bureau Biography* (Routledge, 2004); Michael Coolican, *No Tradesmen and No Women: The Origins of the British Civil Service* (London: Biteback, 2018); Rodney Lowe, *The Official History of the British Civil Service: Reforming the Civil Service, Volume I: The Fulton Years, 1966-81* (Routledge, 2011). An important exception is James Southern, ‘Black Skin, Whitehall: Race and the Foreign Office, 1945–2018’, *History Notes*, no. 21 (2018).

¹²⁵ For an useful example of contemporary Home Office practice, see John R. Campbell, ‘The World of Home Office Presenting Officers’, in *Asylum Determination in Europe: Ethnographic Perspectives*, ed. Nick Gill and Anthony Good, Palgrave Socio-Legal Studies (Springer, 2019), 91–108. For a history of postwar immigration largely focused on the Home Office as an agent, see Evan Smith and Marinella Marmo, *Race, Gender and the Body in British Immigration Control: Subject to Examination* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). For an example of scholarship on the Home Office’s no longer existing functions see Melissa Smith, ‘Architects of Armageddon: The Home Office Scientific Advisers’ Branch and Civil Defence in Britain, 1945–68’, *The British Journal for the History of Science* 43, no. 2 (2010): 149–80.

¹²⁶ Few have explored this part of the Home Office’s early history. An exception is Bhambra, ‘Relations of Extraction, Relations of Redistribution’, 5.

¹²⁷ Pistor, *Code of Capital*. For an application of Pistor’s arguments to the colonial formations of contemporary Britain, see Kojo Koram, *Uncommon Wealth*, particularly 20 – 29.

¹²⁸ Significant interventions to reframe Britain’s “industrial revolution” in its uneven global dimensions include Gurinder Bhambra, *Rethinking Modernity: Postcolonialism and the Sociological Imagination* (Springer, 2007) and Priya Satia, *Empire of Guns: The Violent Making of the Industrial Revolution* (Prelude, 2018).

¹²⁹ L. S. S. O’Malley, *The Indian Civil Service 1601-1930*, (John Murray, 1931); Anthony Kirk-Greene, ‘The Indian Civil Service, 1858–1947’, in *Britain’s Imperial Administrators, 1858–1966*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2000), 87–124.

disaggregate triumphalist narratives of Indian nationalism and critically re-evaluate the classed, gendered and racialised dynamics through which Indians shaped empire as both stakeholders and opponents.¹³⁰ Significantly, there exists a keen historiographic debate over the extent to which the reform of the ICS was the blue-print for the reform of Britain's Home Civil Service, and this debate has implications for how policy transfer between metropole and colonies is conceptualised.¹³¹

A key thematic in histories of colonialism and colonial administration is the archive itself. The archival system was integral to the classificatory systems and legal regimes through which colonial states sought to exploit, expropriate and control colonised people.¹³² The everyday business of colonial administration involved particular forms of formatting information, the privileging of certain kinds of knowledge, the telling of some histories and not others, and the routinisation of counting and classifying. In general, colonial administration engendered landscapes of paperwork and the creation of state-sanctioned 'paperrealities' through which writing and written records have emerged as the *modus operandi* of modern bureaucracies.¹³³ This thesis situates the Home Office's present-day documentation regimes and racist burdens of proof in a long *durée* spooling back to the 'Document Raj' constructed by East India Company rule, tracing the changing contexts in which bureaucratic legibility, and documentedness, are associated with accountability, legitimacy and legality.

Colonial administration in 'British Africa' evolved in the early twentieth century out of nineteenth century colonisation by militarised chartered companies and missionary organisations.¹³⁴ Within seven years of the 1833 abolition of slavery, leading English abolitionists established 'the Society for the extinction of the African Slave Trade' – a slave trade racialised as 'Mohammedan' – whose funded expeditions would 'materially aid in the civilisation of Africa' through 'the diffusion of information' about 'the cultivation of the soil', 'commercial intercourse' and 'the establishment of the Christian faith on the Continent of Africa.'¹³⁵ Whether colonial development can be seen as an altruistic civilising mission or instead as 'a thinly-veiled attempt to produce raw materials, foodstuffs and profits for the British public' remains today a

¹³⁰ See Sukanya Banerjee, 'Bureaucratic Modernity, the Indian Civil Service, and Grammars of Nationalism', in *Becoming Imperial Citizens: Indians in the Late-Victorian Empire*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 150–90; Clive Dewey, *Anglo-Indian Attitudes: The Mind of the Indian Civil Service* (London: Hambledon Press, 1993). See also, Mrinalini Sinha, *Colonial Masculinity: The 'Manly Englishman' and the 'Effeminate Bengali' in the Late Nineteenth Century* (Manchester University Press, 1995)

¹³¹ For a useful overview of this debate see Agnes Cornell and Ted Svensson, 'Colonial Origins of Modern Bureaucracy? India and the Professionalization of the British Civil Service', *Governance* 36, no. 2 (2023): 533–53.

¹³² C. A. Bayly, *An Empire of Information: Political Intelligence and Social Communication in North India, c. 1780–1880* (New York, 1997); Ann Laura Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton, N.J., 2009); Bernard S. Cohn, *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India* (Princeton, N.J., 2006); Arjun Appadurai, 'Number in the Colonial Imagination', in *Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993).

¹³³ Bhavani Raman, *Document Raj: Writing and Scribes in Early Colonial South India* (University of Chicago Press, 2012).

¹³⁴ Michael Jennings, 'A Short History of Failure? Development Processes over the Course of the 20th Century', in *International Development Governance* (Routledge, 2017), 599–609.

¹³⁵ Thomas Fowell Buxton et al., *The African Slave Trade and Its Remedy* (London: John Murray, 1840), 5.

fierce debate, not among historians per se but within the so-called imperial history wars raging in the British mainland.¹³⁶ This thesis uses Barbara and Karen Fields' rubric of racecraft to unpack the administrative conjuring tricks through which colonial development was fashioned as altruistic at the same time as generating processes of material exploitation and expropriation that themselves became processes of racialisation.

The Colonial Service was separate from the Indian Civil Service, and this distinction was distinctly classed.¹³⁷ The history of the Colonial Service was for a long time dominated by Anthony Kirk-Greene, a former district officer in Northern Nigeria's Colonial Service until decolonisation prematurely retired him to a long career as a historian of colonial and postcolonial Africa.¹³⁸ Historically, the study of colonial administration was developed at Oxford, Cambridge, London School of Economics and the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), with the figure of Dame Margery Perham looming over it.¹³⁹ Nonetheless, under the rubric of colonial development, historians of Anglophone Africa have expanded the study of colonial administration far beyond Kirk-Greene's or Perham's parameters. New directions in this research have highlighted the extensive role played by a wide range of non-state actors – including businesses, banks, missionaries, churches and philanthropic agencies – within the everyday routines and tensions of colonial statecraft. This thesis contributes to the fast-growing historiography of colonial development and its evolution into 'international development', connecting these to the study of colonial and postcolonial migration regimes. It brings together perspectives from diverse literatures on the political structures of indirect rule, business history, labour migration, criminal punishment, welfare policy, science and tropical medicine, as manifested in colonial and later postcolonial Anglophone Africa.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁶ Charlotte Lydia Riley, *Monstrous Predatory Vampires and Beneficent Fairy-Godmothers: British Post-War Colonial Development in Africa*, (PhD diss, UCL, 2013). For an overview of the 'imperial history wars' see, Charlotte Lydia Riley, 'Imperial History Wars', *History Workshop*, 19 March 2018, <https://www.historyworkshop.org.uk/empire-decolonisation/imperial-history-wars/>.

¹³⁷ Ronald Hyam described the Colonial Service as 'dominated by the Blues and 2.2s'. Ronald Hyam, 'Bureaucracy and "Trusteeship" in the Colonial Empire', in *The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume IV: The Twentieth Century*, ed. Alaine Low et al, (Oxford: OUP 2007), 280.

¹³⁸ For an obituary and annotated bibliography of Anthony Kirk-Greene, see William Beinart, 'Anthony Kirk-Greene - Obituary', St Antony's College, 11 July 2018, <https://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/anthony-kirk-greene>. Calls to "decolonise" university curriculums have galvanised critical reassessments of the 'post-colonial careering' of academics (like Kirk-Greene), and how their disciplines and institutions evolved unevenly out of colonial administration and the localised transformations of decolonisation. See, for example, Ruth Craggs and Hannah Neate, 'Post-colonial Careering and Urban Policy Mobility: Between Britain and Nigeria, 1945–1990', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 42, no. 1 (2017): 44–57; Tim Livsey, *Nigeria's University Age: Reframing Decolonisation and Development*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

¹³⁹ This history is addressed in Chapter 5. Perham's own bibliography is too vast to mention here. Recent literature on colonial administration training across its multi-faceted institutional forms includes, Ian Brown, *The School of Oriental and African Studies: Imperial Training and the Expansion of Learning* (Cambridge: CUP, 2016); Chris Jeppesen, "'A Worthwhile Career for a Man Who Is Not Entirely Self-Seeking": Service, Duty and the Colonial Service during Decolonization', in *Britain, France and the Decolonization of Africa*, Future Imperfect? (UCL Press, 2017), 133–55; Sarah Stockwell, 'Teaching What "the Natives Need to Know": The Universities of Oxford and Cambridge and Training for Overseas Public Administration', in *The British End of the British Empire*, 93–141.

¹⁴⁰ See for instance Véronique Dimier and Sarah Stockwell, eds., *The Business of Development in Post-Colonial Africa*, (Springer, 2020); Rebekah Lee, *African Women and Apartheid Migration and Settlement in Urban South*

The postwar decades of Britain's 'second colonial occupation' saw the Colonial Office implement a change in colonial policy to 'Africanize' – in other parts of the empire, to 'localize' – the administration, government and civil service of colonies in preparation for independence.¹⁴¹ This thesis situates the gendered and racializing dynamics of developmental discourses at work in 'Africanization' and colonial development schemes, linking these to the histories of racialisation and statecraft at work in regimes of citizenship and migration. I approach public administration with a comparative emphasis on the migration and racialisation of both colonial administrators and colonised people, so as to address a historiographic gap through which the unrestricted free movement of 'expatriates' around the empire can often go unacknowledged and under-analysed.

My connected histories approach to public administration draws on anthropological debates and questions about states and statehood. Broadly speaking, many anthropologists have increasingly turned away from their discipline's colonial origins towards instead identifying cultural practices at work in modern state apparatuses within former imperial metropolises.¹⁴² This thesis reads along the grain of Britain's state archives, attending to constitutional decolonisation as a time of significant transformations in statecraft and public administration. As such the thesis explores how imperial and postimperial states saw themselves, as well as how they saw the world around them and its emerging new global order.¹⁴³ My *how the Home Office does history* framework sustains an analytical discussion about how difficult it is to study the state, which is to say, how difficult it is to disaggregate the 'palpable nexus of practice and institutional structures centred in government' from the projected idea of the state.¹⁴⁴ The central claim of this thesis – that it is useful to think of the Home Office as an agent, entity or function that does history – depends on the archival detail with which I draw out the historically-changing practices with which the state – imperial, colonial, postimperial, postcolonial, or national – are projected and collectively believed in.

Africa, (London: Tauris, 2009); Megan Vaughan, *Curing Their Ills: Colonial Power and African Illness* (John Wiley & Sons, 2013); Helen Tilley, *Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development, and the Problem of Scientific Knowledge, 1870-1950* (University of Chicago Press, 2011); Aaron Windel, *Cooperative Rule: Community Development in Britain's Late Empire*, (University of California Press, 2022); Frederick Cooper and Randall M. Packard, eds., *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge* (University of California Press, 1998); Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*.

¹⁴¹ Bekeh Utietiang Ukelina, *The Second Colonial Occupation: Development Planning, Agriculture, and the Legacies of British Rule in Nigeria* (Lanham: Lexington, 2017).

¹⁴² Of particular note to my research are: R. Rhodes, 'Everyday Life in a Ministry: Public Administration as Anthropology', *The American Review of Public Administration* 35, no. 1 (2005): 3–25; Anthony Good, *Anthropology and Expertise in the British Asylum Courts* (London: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007). See also, Aradhana Sharma, ed., *The Anthropology of the State: A Reader* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2006).

¹⁴³ Exploring how states "see" themselves, and the world around them, is the central analytic in James Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, (Yale University Press, 1999).

¹⁴⁴ Abrams, 'Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State', 82.

Thesis structure

Using a handful of publications about the Home Office by the Home Office, Chapter 1 explores how the Home Office does its own institutional history. The chapter provides a loose genealogy of a key component of Britain's mass deportation regime: the patriality clause of the 1971 Immigration Act. I trace the making of patriality not only through immigration law but through the Home Office's interrelated and changing responsibilities: policing, prisons, penal policy, mental health, children's services, and the regulation of the Factory Acts. I draw out an institutionalised historical sensibility that affixes particular understandings – about how law should operate, and about how change should happen over time – to race. This particular historical sensibility – entangled in eugenicist notions of generational change, patriarchal order, inheritance, fit and unfit families – was shaped by the practical unfolding of empire and its criminalisation and citizenship regimes for disciplining the mobile poor both in colonies and in the British mainland. The chapter demonstrates how this sensibility, the Home Office's way of doing history, shifted and recalibrated amid the changing global circumstances of the twentieth century: industrial militancy in the 1920s, the Cold War tensions of the 1950s, and the emergence of neoliberal governance amid decolonisation in the 1980s.

Chapter 2 continues the history of the Home Office, with a particular focus on the Immigration Service and its institutional culture. It provides a history-of-the-present that spools backwards from the restructure of the Home Office in 2007 amid the so-called foreign prisoner crisis, during which the institution was pronounced 'not fit for purpose'. I draw on two partisan accounts of the Immigration Service, each written by retired immigration officers, one a history book from 1968 and the other a memoir from 2013. The chapter unpacks the creation in the late 1960s of a moral panic about 'immigration fraudulence' in postwar Britain, a crisis which led to a new immigration system based on the individualised scrutiny of an immigrant's compliance. I contextualise immigration fraudulence in relation to, on one hand, decline and fall narratives lived and breathed by immigration officers experiencing the end of empire, and on the other hand, longer, connected histories of fraudulence, failed reforms and broken systems within the history of the British Empire and the history of the British Civil Service. In doing so, it unpacks the archival violence, bureaucratic power and documentation regimes that are part of how the Home Office does history. The chapter contributes to scholarship and debates about the global making of racial neoliberalism at the end of empire as well as to discussions about how cycles of crisis and reform entrench carceral power.

Chapter 3 traces a genealogy of the foreign criminal and the bogus asylum seeker, the folk-devils and quasi-legal categories at the heart of Britain's mass deportation regime today. This draws out a now defunct meaning of deportation: deportation as the extradition of 'fugitive offenders' between territories within the British Empire. The chapter traces a prehistory of *how the Home Office does history* by reconstructing the paper trails, evidence protocols and

documentation regimes at work in the Fugitive Offenders Act of 1881. I follow the life and times of this under-researched act, from its inception in 1881 to its effective end amidst apartheid and Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1967. The chapter demonstrates that the foreignness and the criminality of the foreign criminal have changed over time as the borders of empire and the bureaucratic technologies of racecraft rearranged the contents of British subjecthood and imperial belonging. Entangled with this story is another about how during empire colonised people were largely illegible as political refugees, and about how political crimes against empire – anticolonial resistance – were depoliticised as part and parcel with colonial policing, surveillance, migration control and de facto ways of unmaking citizens in the colonies. The chapter not only argues that 'race' affects who can access the safeguards of 'British Justice' and international refugee protection, but also that racist documentation regimes shape the social facts of race itself.

Chapter 4 sidesteps the Home Office and the British mainland almost entirely. It presents a case-study of how migration control, punitive welfare and criminalisation – all three of which intersect as deportation – functioned in a specific colonial development scheme in Northern Nigeria between 1936 and 1948. The chapter offers a capacious definition of deportation as a technique of distributing citizenship and non-citizenship to facilitate the exploitation of labour and expropriation of land. Reconstructing the specifics of the *Anchau Rural Development and Resettlement Scheme* helps to articulate more precisely what is, or seems, 'colonial' about Britain's present-day mass deportation regime. The Anchau Scheme began and ended during a decade in which the administration of indirect rule overlapped with competing visions of Nigeria's transition to 'responsible self-government.' The chapter emphasises how the eugenic, patrial historical sensibility (drawn out in Chapter 1) manifested in colonial Northern Nigeria amidst an epidemic of what colonial scientists called African Sleeping Sickness. There, local cultivators, British officials, and indigenous leaders negotiated the meanings of development, progress and modernity on the ground. The chapter shows that local cultivators' everyday resistance to migration control, colonial capitalism and ecological destruction unsettled and reterritorialized officials' historical imaginaries about how, by who and for whom, change happens over time.

Chapter 5 builds on the previous chapter's exploration of the global origins of welfare, migration control and citizenship regimes. I pinpoint 'welfare nativism' as key to what Robbie Shilliam calls the 'analytical framing' of Britain's mass deportation regime today, a framing which 'owes an intellectual debt to Powell' and the neoliberal anti-welfarist economic policies he twinned with racist immigration policy proposals. Nativism is a term used to describe popular and governmental articulations of anti-migrant and anti-refugee sentiment – often structured around entitlement to state welfare. The chapter explores the 1940s – 1970s timespan typically periodised as the era of postwar migration to Britain, but approaches this

period and its themes via the postwar migration of Colonial Civil Servants. This migration included both the training up and sending out of recruits at Oxbridge universities, and later the complicated pension, compensation, and resettlement arrangements for 'prematurely retired' colonial officials returning to the British mainland. At the end of empire, complicated and contradictory policymaking initiatives were required to normalise, legalise, and make legible the entitlement of white Colonial Service members to freely move, work, settle, resettle, and enjoy the spoils of empire while limiting the same opportunities for non-white 'locally recruited' employees and officials of British colonial governments. This final chapter traces the making of both the patrial historical sensibility and the criminalising documentation regimes imbricated in *how the Home Office does history*: both components were at work within eugenicist discourse about welfare, work, and 'responsibility' in both colonies and in the British mainland.

Additionally, between each chapter sits a fragment of a story. The fragments piece together and unpack a particular moment around 1968: the moment when Home Office officials began to dream up Britain's first purpose-built detention centre at Heathrow Airport. The purpose of these fragments is to show that despite the dynamics and sensibilities borne over decades of colonial administration – dynamics and sensibilities drawn out in my five chapters – the making of a mass-deportation regime in the British mainland was never inevitable. Rather, Britain's mass deportation regime (and its statutory foundation in the 1971 Act) were determinedly, not absentmindedly, made by a cohort of Home Office administrators.

Together these chapters and fragments show that over the course of the long twentieth century a mass deportation regime developed unevenly in the British mainland, shaped by modes of doing history fashioned during the practical unfolding of empire.

Chapter One

Origin stories: how the Home Office does its own history

Introduction

A man stands to attention, holding a spear in a boxing-gloved hand. Under the weight of a horned helmet, beady eyes recede behind a bulbous nose fringed with an enormous moustache. His squat body is half hidden by a large round shield, emblazoned with the word *Horsa*. He is the cartoon mascot of *The HORSIA Chronicle*, 'an occasional news-sheet to be issued from time to time to members of the Home Office Retired Staff Association', a newsletter first appearing in Winter 1983.¹⁴⁵

HORSIA had been set up during the Home Office Bicentenary celebrations in July 1982, with the objective of 'maintain[ing] a link between past and present staff of the Home Office, to keep retired colleagues in touch with one another and with the social life of the office.'¹⁴⁶ Ten newsletters issued between Winter 1983 and Autumn 1986 variously chronicle: the choice of official Home Office Christmas cards for sale; notices and directions to the annual Home Office sports days, craft fairs and summer picnics; minutes from AGMs; historical details about Home Office buildings; ghost stories about long-dead Home Office clerks; ditties about birthday cakes and other long-lost office customs; numerous obituaries of HORSIA members; invitations to summer picnic parties; and detailed arrangements for a group trip from London to Boulogne, on a ferry named the *Horsa*.

'It has to be admitted,' wrote the newsletter's editor in its first edition, 'that the choice of an insubstantial alien character to represent the new association arose out of the inability of the Publicity Officer to make anything more appropriate out of the logo, rather than from some tangible link with the character in question.'¹⁴⁷ He continued:—

As most of us who paid attention during school history lessons will remember, Horsa was part of a double act, who, with his partner, Hengist, booked into Thanet for the summer season, round about the year 500AD. They had arrived at the perpetual invitation of the local King Vortigern, who looked to their help in fending off attacks by various unsavoury Teutonic tribes from across the North Seas. But having received their landing cards, the terrible twins proved a pair of proper cuckoos in the nest by straight away declaring war on the local population – a sorry state of affairs which, it is said, was only brought to an end some years later when Horsa received his comeuppance at the hands of Catigern, a British chieftain, somewhere just off the A20. The rest is mere conjecture. Traffic Index have no record of his landing, let alone a passport photo or any other clue to his appearance. The British Museum, who we

¹⁴⁵ Home Office Retired Staff Association, 'Horsa Mascot' in *HORSIA Chronicle*, No.1, Winter 1983, 2.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

consulted in the matter, were equally diffident, except to pour derision on our concept. Horsa, they say, if in fact he existed, would have been a Jute not a Viking. Furthermore, archaeological research confirms that no self-respecting Viking would be seen with horns on his helmet, unless he happened to be coming to this country with a contract to sign Wagner at Covent Garden. As King Alfred said when he received his Cordon Bleu certificate – there are times when history is an inconvenient irrelevance.¹⁴⁸

The historical development of immigration enforcement technologies. The social life of the Home Office. The civilisational development – or not – of various unsavoury tribes and the Anglo-Saxon making of Englishness. The paying of attention in school history lessons to Horsa and Hengist, to the decline of the Roman Empire that they signal, to comparisons between imperial Rome and imperial Britain. A proper education, the rigour of history-proper, and the authority of historical evidence. The haphazard texture and trajectory of English history, and the legitimacy it confers upon its defendants. This tiny newsletter paragraph compounds all of these, and all of these compound various notions of history itself: history as the location of the past, as the passing of time, as the parsing of historical evidence, as the theorising of how change happens over time. This is the moment, Winter 1983, that I choose to begin an exploration into the history of the Home Office, a history of *how the Home Office does history*, a history of the historical imaginaries that have shaped Britain's mass deportation regime.

It is perhaps a trivial fragment to take so seriously, and to name as a moment. But as Raphael Samuels once wrote, 'the past that inspires genealogists, local historians and collectors is not random but connected to what for them is important.'¹⁴⁹ In this light, we can take the *HORSA Chronicle* as a fragment of local institutional history and think of its makers as doing what numerous recently-retired people with a certain class background are wont to do: the piecing together of family, here institutional, genealogy. The contribution of this chapter, then, is its careful attention to the embodied, everyday practices of historicising embedded within a particular generation of Home Office officials. These were officials who were ending their own careers during the messy end of the British Empire's working life.

These were the unrecognised policy architects designing and making Britain's mass deportation regime, and in Kathleen Paul's term, 'white-washing' the terms of British citizenship.¹⁵⁰ These were the postwar immigration policies which would, as Nadine El Enany persuasively argues, rewrite the history of empire so that 'citizens are taught, in part through immigration law, that the parameters of the imperial, and national, project of ensuring white entitlement to wealth gained in the course of colonial conquest are theirs to enforce.'¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Raphael Samuels, quoted in: Jorma Kalela, 'History Making: The Historian as Consultant', *Public History Review* 20 (2013): 34.

¹⁵⁰ Kathleen Paul, *Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in the Postwar Era* (Ithaca, N.Y. London: Cornell University Press, 1997).

¹⁵¹ Nadine El-Enany, *Bordering Britain: Law, Race and Empire* (Manchester University Press, 2020), 5.

Significantly, this was the generation involved in the making of the 1971 Immigration Act, legislation which made possible the mass deportation regime we inhabit today. The 1971 Act rewrote the history of British imperial citizenship and belonging with its patriality clause. The patriality clause granted the *right of abode* to any Commonwealth citizen who could claim a father or grandfather born in the United Kingdom. It effectively disinherited African, Asian and Caribbean Commonwealth citizens from the right to freely live, work, and settle in the United Kingdom. The clause created a new origin story for British citizenship, one that undid the freedom of movement rights given to all Commonwealth citizens by the 1948 British Nationality Act.

This chapter addresses the making of Britain's mass deportation regime by piecing together a genealogy of the patriality clause and patriality writ large. It argues the clause reflected an existing way of 'doing history' institutionalised at the Home Office. As Priya Satia argues, 'Britain's imperial career from the era of slavery to the current Brexit crisis depended on the sway of a particular historical sensibility', and this chapter traces that particular historical sensibility at work within the institutional culture of the Home Office.¹⁵² In what follows, I show that this patriality way of doing history involved particular understandings of how law should operate and how change should happen over time, understandings shaped by the practical unfolding of empire and the inequalities it underwrote both abroad and in the British mainland. This was a way of thinking historically which delineated between certain people as the agents of history – the doers – and others as the objects of history – those who history got done to.

The history of mainland Britain's carceral state cannot be told without the connected histories of empire in which techniques and institutions of criminalisation, legal violence and economic exploitation were first created and tried out, before boomeranging home.¹⁵³ In turn, Britain's mass deportation regime cannot be understood in isolation from the British mainland's carceral state. Both are part of a longer, global, connected history of empire. The chapter therefore foregrounds how this particular, this patriality way of doing history was shaped by the practical unfolding of empire and its criminalisation regimes for disciplining the mobile poor both in colonies and in the British mainland. Using a handful of publications about the Home Office by the Home Office, the chapter shows that across the twentieth century this sensibility was deeply entrenched not only in the Home Office's immigration control work but across its interrelated and historically changing responsibilities: policing, prisons, penal policy, mental health, children's services, and industrial relations.

¹⁵² Priya Satia, *Time's Monster: How History Makes History* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2020), 2.

¹⁵³ The concept of colonisation's "boomerang effect" was first developed by anti-colonial thinkers and activists Suzanne Césaire and Aimé Césaire. See, Aimé Césaire, *Discourse on Colonialism* (NYU Press, 2001), 36, 41. For recent examples of "colonial boomerang" see also, Kojo Koram, *Uncommon Wealth: Britain and the Aftermath of Empire* (John Murray, 2023); Sabrina Axster et al., 'Colonial Lives of the Carceral Archipelago: Rethinking the Neoliberal Security State', *International Political Sociology* 15, no. 3 (1 September 2021): 415–39.

This way of doing history was intimately rooted into everyday, institutionalised modes of eugenic thinking. In other words, across the twentieth century the ways in which the Home Office thought about and managed change over time was laced through with shared norms about patriarchal order, generational change, inheritance, racial hierarchy, civilisational decline, and fit/unfit families. The eugenic, patrial historical sensibility studied here was a racist one. But as Amabalaver Sivanandan argued, racism does not ‘stay still, it changes shape, size, contours, purpose, function’ as the economy changes, as societal structures change, and above all, as people challenge and resist racism and its systemic structures.¹⁵⁴ The chapter demonstrates that this sensibility, the Home Office’s way of doing history, shifted and recalibrated amid the changing global circumstances of the twentieth century. Building upon Satia’s argument that ‘the narrative of the British Empire is also a narrative of the rise and fall of a particular historical sensibility’, I examine the extent to which the Home Office retains this particular historical sensibility, this patrial way of doing history, in our contemporary present.¹⁵⁵

In what follows I piece together an institutional history of how the Home Office does its own history. Alongside the *HORSA Chronicle* newsletter, I use an A4 illustrated brochure and a booklet of lectures published around the 1982 bicentenary to reconstruct how Home Office officials and their invited audiences situated their work in time, both in their 1980s context and in relation to history itself.¹⁵⁶ To these I add the 1926 publication of *The Home Office*, written by Sir Edward Troup, a former Home Office Permanent Under-Secretary, to provide ‘a short account of the Home Office, its functions and the way in which its work is done.’¹⁵⁷ Troup’s was ‘the first volume in the Whitehall Series of books on great Departments of State’ and it was aimed at ‘members of parliament, civil servants, municipal workers, journalists, students of administrative methods, young men and women who are thinking of the Civil Service as a career, [and] the general reader who is interested in the government of his country.’¹⁵⁸ Thirty years later, Troup’s later successor Sir Frank Newsam published ‘an authoritative, completely up-to-date and *readable* survey’ of the work of the Home Office as the first volume in the *New Whitehall Series*.¹⁵⁹ It was presented as ‘of special value overseas’, on account of ‘the intimate concern of the Home Office with the liberty and security of the subject and with many other features of the British way of life’.¹⁶⁰ Published in the mid-1950s, Newsam’s book was targeted at an audience of future leaders of soon-to-be self-governing ex-British colonies. This was the

¹⁵⁴ Amabalaver Sivanandan, *Communities of Resistance: Writings on Black Struggles for Socialism* (London: Verso, 2019), 64.

¹⁵⁵ Satia, *Time’s Monster*, 2.

¹⁵⁶ Home Office, *Home Office 1782 – 1982: To Commemorate the Bicentenary of the Home Office* (London: Home Office, 1981); Home Office, *The Home Office: Perspectives on Policy and Administration Bicentenary Lectures* (London: Royal Institute of Public Administration, 1983).

¹⁵⁷ Charles Edward Troup, *The Home Office*, (G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1926), i. Troup was Permanent Under-Secretary at the Home Office between 1908 and 1922.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid*, book-jacket.

¹⁵⁹ Sir Frank Newsam, *The Home Office* (Oxford: OUP, 1955), book-jacket

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid*.

decade in which the 'Africanisation' or 'localisation' of colonies' civil services was hurriedly unfolding. Significantly, as belied by the emphasis on 'the liberty and security of the subject', when it came to training the nationalist future leaders of British colonies, the British understood themselves as in competition with the USSR, which was intensifying the generous educational scholarships offered to young Africans and students from other parts of the decolonising world.¹⁶¹

Together, Troup's and Newsam's accounts of the Home Office and its history help illustrate continuities and historical differences between the Home Office of the early and mid twentieth century in comparison with the Home Office and British society depicted in the 1982 bicentenary material. To compare the 1980s and the early twenty-first century, I draw on *The New Home Office: An Introduction*, which was published in 2008 to 'explain the duties and responsibilities of the Home Office following its reorganization in 2007.'¹⁶² Although *The New Home Office* was not written by a senior Home Office official, nor published by the Home Office, its author describes himself as a 'non-practising barrister, a sleeping partner/investor in Waterside Press' who has 'previously worked with the Home Office, former Lord Chancellor's Department and in the courts.'¹⁶³ The 2007 publication is therefore at some level self-published and authored by a Home Office insider, similar enough to my other sources.

This handful of publications – to which we can add a short booklet about the 1870 – 1896 period internally published in 1961 by Deputy Under-Secretary Sir Austin Strutt – show that across successive generations, Home Office officials have remained invested in telling the history of the institution they are part of. It is important to underline that in this chapter I focus less on repeating or refuting the contents of these Home Office-authored histories. Instead, I analyse why and how these Home Office source-makers – who were also law and policy-makers – created and inhabited their particular histories of Britain and the world. Throughout I ask: what is the history of the Home Office, and how has it historicised itself as an institution? To what extent had its understanding of history changed historically over time?

The chapter has three parts, each loosely anchored to an example of the everyday practices of historicising embedded within the 1980s generation of Home Office officials. The first section outlines the history of the Home Office. It shows that immigration control has not always been integral to the meaning of the Home Office, but controlling and disciplining the mobile poor has. The second part uses a Christmas card design advertised in the *HORSA Chronicle* to introduce how officials and retirees situated the Home Office, its history and its role in postwar Britain during the fraught decade of the 1980s. It outlines changes to the

¹⁶¹ See for instance, Maxim Matusevich, 'Journeys of Hope: African Diaspora and the Soviet Society,' *African Diaspora* 1, no. 1–2 (2008): 68.

¹⁶² Bryan Gibson, *The New Home Office: An Introduction* (Waterside Press, 2007).

¹⁶³ 'About Waterside Press - Publishers of Criminal Justice and Related Matters', Waterside Press, accessed 17 November 2022, <https://www.watersidepress.co.uk/about/>.

deportation system made in that time. The third part unpacks a ghost story found in the *HORSA Chronicle* and argues that its particular historical sensibility, one shared by other Home Office sources, can be described as patril. It shows that this way of doing history involved particular understandings of how law should operate and how change should happen over time. The final section connects this patril historical sensibility to everyday, institutionalised modes of eugenic thinking. It does so by returning to the *HORSA Chronicle*'s mascot, a Viking-esque Jute from the earliest phase of England's Anglo-Saxon period, and contextualises him in relation to, firstly nineteenth and twentieth century British eugenics, and secondly the hegemonic narratives of English history embedded in the current Home Office *Life in the UK Test*.



Figure 1: The HORSA mascot. Source: *HORSA Chronicle*, No.6, Summer 1985.

Immigration control and Home Office history

Today immigration control appears to be a core, integral function of the Home Office. In its own words, the Home Office is 'the lead government department for immigration and passports, drugs policy, crime, fire, counter-terrorism and police'.¹⁶⁴ Immigration looms large

¹⁶⁴ 'About Us - Home Office - GOV.UK', 2 June 2023, <https://web.archive.org/web/20230602070232/https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/home-office/about>

in each of these functions. Successive legislation, policies and technologies have scaled up counter-terrorism surveillance measures into a 'hostile environment' of controls on bank accounts, driving licenses, rental agreements, education, and healthcare provision for all non-citizens. Counter-terrorism policy increasingly turns to passport removal and citizenship deprivation as routinised techniques of state racism.¹⁶⁵ Drugs policies made by the Home Office are part and parcel of a 'global colour line' strengthened by the 'war on drugs' that crafts and perpetuates racialised stereotypes of 'immigrant drug-dealers'.¹⁶⁶ Meanwhile, for people in the struggle for papers, to speak of *the Home Office* is to refer to the entity administering Britain's brutal border regime, an entity that makes decisions on individual cases, swallows case-files whole, issues last-minute charter flight tickets, and turns up at dawn or dusk to raid homes and workplaces.¹⁶⁷ In short, the Home Office is today shorthand for immigration control, and immigration control has enmeshed within itself all of the Home Office's other functions.

But immigration has not always been a key area of Home Office work, nor the main rubric through which public safety and national security have been imagined. The disciplining of the working class and the exploitation of its labour, however, has remained a central imperative in the changing forms of Home Office responsibilities, functions and duties. There are 260 pages of Edward Troup's 1926 publication *The Home Office*; only 14 of which concern 'the control of aliens'.¹⁶⁸ These pages cover the implementation of measures between 1914 and 1919 leading up to 'a complete card register called the Central Register of Aliens [which] is kept in which ever resident alien can be traced'.¹⁶⁹ The Central Register index was filled with police records of aliens' registration of their changes of address: a far cry from how the policing and surveillance of migrants operates today. As scholarship by Laura Tabili and others has shown, from the early twentieth century it was local police forces that carried out these internal immigration control functions, including the violent stop-and-search immigration and passport checks that we now associate with 'immigration enforcement officers' and the UK 'Border Force'.¹⁷⁰

By contrast to alien control, large swathes of Troup's book are dedicated to the policing of riots, dangerous drugs policy, the regulation of the Factory Acts, and a proliferating universe of sites for incarcerating criminals, 'lunatics' and vagrants.¹⁷¹ Troup's section on *Maintaining The King's Peace* outlines the Home Office's machinery for anticipating and responding to

¹⁶⁵ Nisha Kapoor, *Deport, Deprive, Extradite: Twenty-First Century State Extremism* (London: Verso, 2018).

¹⁶⁶ Kojo Koram, *The War on Drugs and the Global Colour Line* (London: Pluto, 2019).

¹⁶⁷ See in particular 'Think like the Home Office: States and Stateness' in Joel White, '*Holding Space: Friendship, Care and Carcerality in the UK Immigration Detention System*' (Ph.D. diss, University of Edinburgh, 2022).

¹⁶⁸ Troup, *Home Office*, 146 - 148.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁰ Laura Tabili, *We Ask for British Justice": Workers and Racial Difference in Late Imperial Britain*, (Cornell University Press, 1994). See also, Phe Amis and Tom Kemp, 'Why Borders and Prisons, Border Guards and Police?', in *Abolishing the Police: An Illustrated Introduction*, ed. Koshka Duff (Dog Section Press, 2021), 52-67.

¹⁷¹ Troup, *Home Office*, 156.

threats of 'serious disturbances' with the appropriate operation of police forces, special constables and where required, the military. He contrasts disastrous and controversial episodes of pre-policing riot control – from the 1780 Gordon Gin Riots to the 1819 Peterloo Massacre – with what he calls the 'the immense, almost revolutionary, change' of the invention of policing, without which 'the advances of civilisation of the last hundred years would have been impossible.'¹⁷² Troup frames the 'maintenance of the King's Peace' in relation to preserving public order and repressing serious disturbances because, writing in the 1920s, his was a context shaped by the 'widespread industrial disturbances' of that decade.¹⁷³

Accordingly, in Troup's work, 'the administration of the Industrial Laws [...] is the largest and most important branch of work which the legislation of the nineteenth century committed to the charge of the Home Office.'¹⁷⁴ In reality, the prohibition of child labour in factories was a won by organised labour and conceded by the state and its administrator, the Home Office. The ban on child labour affected the development of Britain's carceral system, which began to broaden its estate of Borstals, remand centres, and reformatory schools for criminalised children. Added to these were the so-called 'Industrial Schools' in which were detained 'children who were likely living under such conditions as would be likely sooner or later to lead to a criminal life – children found begins or wandering, children whose parents are in prison, children of drunken parents unfit to have charge of them, children found living in brothels.'¹⁷⁵ This carceral universe grew alongside an infrastructure of prisons, prison camps, 'preventative detention' facilities and 'Broadmoor institutions' for adults, expanding to accommodate widening constituencies of poor people criminalised for various forms of avoiding wage labour – shoplifting, sex work, drug-dealing – and put to work and confined in institutions that created profit for the state and its private partners.

For Troup, 'the King's Peace' included subsections on 'the maintenance of order', 'duties of magistrate, special constables and police' and 'military aid': essentially, in Troup's time maintaining 'the King's Peace' amounted to riot control.¹⁷⁶ Importantly, Frank Newsam's 1954 publication altered this: his chapter on 'the Queen's Peace' included subsections on 'the Control of Aliens' and 'Nationality and Naturalisation.'¹⁷⁷ Although these two subsections remained comparatively small in pages, the fact that Newsam framed these duties as part of 'maintaining the Queen's Peace' reflected the institutionalised migrant-blaming logic at the time. Thirty years earlier, Troup had referred to 'large numbers of aliens from Eastern Europe', whose 'habits had a demoralising effect in the crowded areas in which they settled' and making

¹⁷² Ibid, 94.

¹⁷³ Ibid, 54.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid, 156.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, i.

¹⁷⁷ Newsam, *Home Office*, iii.

no reference to the virulent anti-Semitism experienced by these communities.¹⁷⁸ By the 1950s, Newsam's framing of immigration had scaled up from the crowded areas of East London spoken of by Troup, reaching instead noticeably ethno-national dimensions. Newsam framed the maintenance of order and liberty in relation to a foreign threat from out-with 'this country', rather than the internal threat of its demoralised underclass in the metropole. He wrote:–

In this country, notwithstanding the post-war increases in various types of crime, it is still true to say that the community as a whole is law-abiding. The reasons for this are complex, but include the following. In the first instance this country is fortunate in having a homogenous population, with a tradition of order and high standards of public conduct which over a long period have not been disturbed by invasion, foreign conquest, or civil war.¹⁷⁹

Newsam presented the necessity of balancing order and liberty without allowing so much liberty that Britain might, 'have its parliamentary system perish, overthrown, as seen in recent years in many other lands.'¹⁸⁰ The gathering momentum of decolonisation, shot through with Cold War tensions, had externalised and made foreign the threat of home-grown industrial unrest in Troup's earlier scene. By 1954 the need for the Home Office's *unceasing vigilance* was couched in terms denoting immigration as a formidable threat to the 'national and natural characteristics' of British society.¹⁸¹ He continued, in 'controlling aliens the Home Secretary must look to the preservation of the national and natural characteristics of that society' and 'in this role, the Home Secretary acts as a kind of practitioner, with the whole community as his patient.'¹⁸² In this way, whereas Troup had invoked the contagiousness of revolutionary labour organising, for Newsam the Home Office resembled the newly born NHS – an emblem of the hard-won postwar welfare state – surgically removing immigrants and inoculating Britain against the infection of immigration.

Reaching the bicentenary brochure of 1982, Newsam's portrayal of a particularly foreign, specifically communist threat to British order and liberty had shifted. In its place appeared a somewhat de-politicised threat of social unrest, a threat cut loose from the Cold War and instead personified by the figure of the black rioter. In 1982 the Home Office was reeling from the recent urban revolts in St. Pauls, Brixton, Toxteth and Handsworth. In his illustrated survey of Home Office history, Robert Pittam characterised the period since 1945 as one in which 'the Home Office priorities of police administration, the criminal law and the treatment of offenders, were increasingly joined by a fourth focal point – aliens and Commonwealth immigrants, British nationality, and new responsibilities in British society arising from the presence of ethnic minorities.'¹⁸³ One such 'new responsibility' lay in setting policy for the violent policing of people

¹⁷⁸ Ibid, 143.

¹⁷⁹ Newsam, *The Home Office*, 31.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, 17.

¹⁸¹ Ibid, 14.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Home Office, *Bicentenary*, 15.

racialised as black and brown, as well as managing the resulting accusations of racist policing while 'trying to look for the underlying social factors and lessons, not least because future police tactics and strategies, can be drawn from them.'¹⁸⁴ Despite Pittam's narrative that this was a *new responsibility*, a wealth of Black British history literature details the much longer history of racist policing against communities racialised as black and non-white in the British mainland, particularly students in London and seamen in British port cities.¹⁸⁵ Throughout the interwar period, Black resistance to racism and imperialism circulated through the metropole, the colonies, and wider global struggles in a determinedly internationalist and anti-capitalist movement that linked racist policing in Britain to the murderous policing and repression of militant Caribbean labour organising.¹⁸⁶

The postwar period had seen the imposition of severe restrictions on immigration from the New Commonwealth, starting with the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act. In the 1980s the Home Office's emerging focus on immigration must be contextualised with the institution's internalised perception that there had begun 'the erosion throughout Western society of the tradition belief in the rehabilitative value of custodial measures.'¹⁸⁷ Together with 'constraints in public expenditure' and 'serious overcrowding', this 'erosion' was undermining the relevance, importance, and viability, of the lion's share of Home Office work: its administration of the penal system.¹⁸⁸ At the end of empire, the British mainland's economic crises and the 'erosion' of 'traditional' British beliefs and values were blamed on migrants from the former empire, and immigration has been routinely framed as the reason for the ongoing pattern of crises ever since.¹⁸⁹

Between 1926 and the Home Office's Bicentenary in the 1980s, many of the departments' responsibilities changed. More importantly, there were changes in how its duties and functions were expressed in relation to the institution's purpose. In 1925, its core function was expressed in terms of 'public morals' and 'the maintenance of order' within the British mainland, conjuring the spectre of industrial unrest at home, rather than overseas. During the 1950s, this was phrased more in terms of defending 'the liberty and security of the subject' and what Frank Newsam called 'the British way of life' as Cold War politicking, and decolonisation, began to gather momentum.¹⁹⁰ In 1982, the Home Office permanent undersecretary referred to the 'timeless character of the Home Secretary's responsibilities for the civil peace', a pointed invocation of civility amidst the acrid aftertaste of Brixton, Toxteth, Handsworth set on fire the

¹⁸⁴ Home Office, *Bicentenary*, 31.

¹⁸⁵ See for instance, Marc Matera author, *Black London: The Imperial Metropolis and Decolonization in the Twentieth Century*, (University of California Press, 2015); Tabili, *We Ask for British Justice*.

¹⁸⁶ Adam Elliott-Cooper, *Black Resistance to British Policing* (Manchester University Press, 2021), 23 – 28.

¹⁸⁷ Home Office, *Bicentenary*, 31.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 36.

¹⁸⁹ Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, *EMPIRE STRIKES BACK: Race and Racism In 70's Britain*, (London: Routledge, 1982), 324.

¹⁹⁰ Newsam, *Home Office*, book-flap.

year before.¹⁹¹ In the next section, I analyse a christmas card design to outline how officials and retirees situated the Home Office, its history and its role in postwar Britain during the fraught decade of the 1980s, and connect these internal framings of the institution to changes to the deportation system made in the same period.

Empire and the common-sense of Christmas cards

In 1982, the Home Office celebrated its bicentenary, marking two hundred years since ‘the Home Office and the Foreign Office were born on 27 March 1782.’¹⁹² The Home Office was created out of what had been the Southern Department, and the Foreign Office out of the Northern Department, a division created during the religious splintering of the seventeenth century to separate diplomatic dealings with Catholic from Protestant powers. The rebranding in 1782 came amidst the arrival of a new government, after a significant British defeat in the American War of Independence had led to a forceful Vote of no Confidence in the previous administration. The new Rockingham Government built upon Edmund Burke’s 1780 *Speech on Economical Reform*, to begin an elaborate programme of constitutional purification seeking to reduce the lucrative sale, purchase and outsourcing of appointments within Britain’s state administration, including limits on the Sovereign in this regard. These dynamics in the heart of the British state were utterly interconnected with ongoing scandals and tensions arising from the plunder and brutal violence of East India Company expansion across the Indian Subcontinent. In short, the global circumstances shaping Britain’s empire were part of the Home Office’s internal world from the very outset, as chapter two examines in more detail.

Importantly, while the Foreign Office was to deal with matters relating to all foreign powers and diplomatic relations, Britain’s colonies were initially under the jurisdiction of the Home Office. The Home Office was responsible for ‘issuing His Majesty’s instructions, to officers of the Crown, Lord Lieutenants, Magistrates, Governors of Colonies and others, and sometimes to local authorities’ until the Secretaryship of State for War was created in 1801, and – indicatively – given responsibility for the Colonies.¹⁹³ Crucially, ‘the earliest duties of the Home Office were heavily weighted in the direction of Crown grants, appointments and preferments of all kinds – the King’s business in fact’, just as Burke’s scheme of economic reform had envisaged.¹⁹⁴ In other words, after temporarily absorbing some of the Board of Trade and Plantation Departments’ duties, much of the Home Office’s late eighteenth and early nineteenth century work consisted in administrating and routinising how Crown grants – usually of land in newly colonised territories of the expanding empire – were allocated.

¹⁹¹ Brian Cubbon, ‘Foreword’ in *Bicentenary Lectures*, 7.

¹⁹² Home Office, *Bicentenary*, 3.

¹⁹³ R. R. Nelson, *The Home Office, 1782-1801* (Duke University Press, 1969), 5.

¹⁹⁴ Home Office, *Bicentenary*, 3.

This was the birthdate, the beginning, being celebrated in the early 1980s. Imagine: it is Christmas 1983, and there are official Home Office Christmas cards for sale, 25p to all HORSAs members. There are a few designs for sale, but it is the 'double-fold design which bears the Secretary of State's seal die-stamped in blue and is tied with a blue silk ribbon' that, according to the newsletter, is the most popular.¹⁹⁵ The authority of the Home Secretary, explained Permanent Secretary Sir Brian Cubbon in 1982, flows from his 'ancient and constitutional functions', functions 'deriving directly from his position as successor to the Queen's secretary in the days of Elizabeth I.'¹⁹⁶ These were constitutional functions through which the Minister remained 'the traditional channel of communication between the Monarch and the people.'¹⁹⁷ The Home Secretary's signet seal had been entrusted with the Sovereign's prerogative powers since the fourteenth century, and through this lineage, civil servants were, and are, *Servants of the Crown*. Everything these officials do was, and is today, done in the name and by the authority of the Home Secretary. HORSAs members held this lineage, this chain of transference, in such high esteem that they bought, signed and posted to their friends and families those 'double-fold designs which bears the Secretary of State's seal die-stamped in blue.'

The sale of this seal appears as an invitation, incorporating members into the pomp of royal lineage. Pomp like this entrenched attachments to the monarchy, which, as Priya Satia argues, functioned as 'the romance that helped legitimize the bureaucratic structures and impersonal, often brutal social relations of colonial and industrial capitalism' by projecting 'the image of a nation of hereditary rather than looted wealth, which working classes were told they belonged to even as they were excluded from its privileges and exploited for its benefit.'¹⁹⁸ These were the Secretary of State seals with which Crown grants of stolen, dispossessed land had been stamped by eighteenth century officials, on behalf of the Sovereign.

At the other end of the British Empire, Home Office officials retiring in the 1980s remained demonstrably proud of this institutional ancestry. To celebrate the bicentenary of the Home Office's birth back in 1782, a brochure was produced on glossy card in deep leathery brown. On its first page, a message from the Home Secretary, William Whitelaw:—

The duties of the Home Secretary and his Department have changed greatly over these two centuries. But one feature has remained constant in almost every aspect of the work: the need to weigh the rights of the individual against the needs of society as a whole. Almost every decision reached in the Home Office affects in one way or another the freedom of individuals. I and my predecessors are privileged to know with what care and humanity — often

¹⁹⁵ *HORSA Chronicle*, Winter 1983, 1.

¹⁹⁶ Home Office, *Bicentenary*, 28.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁸ Priya Satia, 'The British Monarchy Helped Mortgage Our Collective Future', *Time*, accessed 3 February 2023, <https://time.com/6212672/queen-elizabeth-death-empire-climate-change/>.

unrecognised – officials accept this heavy responsibility. For that we and the country owe them a considerable debt of gratitude.¹⁹⁹

The retired Home Office staff who created HORSAs in the 1980s were these *unrecognised* officials who, in their daily work over their working lives, enabled decisions to be made, decisions which in one way or another *affected the freedom of individuals*. So it is important to understand how HORSAs members themselves understood the institutional structure of the Home Office, and its relationship to both the Home Secretary and to ‘the country [which] owes them a considerable debt of gratitude.’ Their understandings of themselves as civil servants compounded particular notions of *the public*, of *society as a whole* and of *the country* that their daily work administrated and sought to transform or conserve, depending on the policy objectives in hand. Writing in 1982, Brian Cubbon characterised Home Office work as balancing ‘factors of fundamental importance’ in a democratic society, ‘between the State and the individual, between order and liberty, between law and justice, between precedent and common-sense, between freedom and responsibility.’²⁰⁰ The generation of Home Office officials retiring and buying die-stamped Christmas cards in the 1980s were the generation who had, directly or indirectly, routinised deportation and administrative removal procedures.




Figure 2: Front Cover. Source: Home Office, *Bicentenary*, 1982

¹⁹⁹ Home Office, *Bicentenary*, 2.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid*, 30




Figure 3: Cartoon about deporting Santa. Source: *HORSA Chronicle*, No.1, Winter 1983

Significantly, the 1971 Immigration Act rewrote the history of British imperial citizenship and belonging with its patriality clause. The Act equipped the Home Secretary with executive powers over deportation and removal, and it also remodelled immigration control over New Commonwealth citizens into a system of individualised scrutiny, as I outlined earlier in the introduction to this thesis.²⁰¹ To this effect, as Robert Pittam wrote in 1982, ‘there [had] been a tendency in recent years for the establishment of specific procedures affecting some of the work such as the establishment of the Parole Board, the Police Complaints Board and the Immigrant Appeals Tribunal.’²⁰² On one hand, ‘practically every member of the Home Office, from ministers, the Permanent Under-Secretary and the Deputy Secretaries downwards, necessarily devotes at least part of his time to the consideration of individual cases.’²⁰³ On the other hand, however, the establishment of these ‘specific procedures’ effectively placed particular kinds of ‘individual cases’ further away from the Home Secretary’s discretionary powers to decide an individual case either by following precedent, or using his common-sense.²⁰⁴ But as Stuart Hall et al put it in 1978, common-sense is ‘shot through with elements

²⁰¹ This qualitative change is examined in Mike Slaven, ‘The Windrush Scandal and the Individualization of Postcolonial Immigration Control in Britain’, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 45, no. 16 (10 December 2022): 49–71.

²⁰² Home Office, *Bicentenary*, 31.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, 31.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

and beliefs derived from earlier or other more developed ideologies which have sedimented into it.²⁰⁵ The decision-making of Home Secretaries is threaded through with what Errol Lawrence called 'important clues as to how racist ideologies have come to be such a tenacious feature of the common-sense thinking of the white working and other classes', other classes including those from which, or into which, Home Secretaries come.²⁰⁶

Crucially, the kind of individual cases now routinised through *specific procedures* were those 'of deportation, or where wrongful arrest is alleged.'²⁰⁷ According to Cubbon, these were the cases which increasingly 'aroused intense interest.'²⁰⁸ In other words, the particular cases now further from the Home Secretary's powers to pardon, reprieve, or intervene against precedent were the cases – deportation, police brutality and parole – now predominantly belonging to people recently racialised as Commonwealth 'immigrants' and experiencing the sharpest end of state violence. The deportation, police complaints and parole cases that increasingly *aroused intense interest* help us to situate the Home Office and its bicentenary-marking officials within the 1980s British society around them. Around the time of the 1982 bicentenary, empire and its loss, its striking back, was a haunting mix of everywhere and nowhere: 'the period immediately after decolonization' had been the moment in which 'not knowing the Empire exists [became] official.'²⁰⁹ Against this strategic, state sanctioned colonial amnesia, anti-racist movements often organised around refrains like *we are here because you were there* and *here to stay, here to fight*, slogans which 'spoke to a political, historical and legal reality [of empire], no matter how disavowed and denied.'²¹⁰

The immediate years and months preceding the 1982 Home Office bicentenary were fraught with the political, historical and legal legacies of empire's exploitative labour regimes, mobility controls, violent policing, and selective disregard for human life. In the late 1970s the Grunwick Strike, led by Jayaben Desai at a film processing factory in North London, escalated into one of the defining industrial disputes of the decade, at its height garnering unprecedented multi-racial trade union support and incurring the wrath of so-called 'proactive policing' and surveillance delivered by the Home Office and the Metropolitan Police.²¹¹ A year after the strike

²⁰⁵ Stuart Hall, *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order* (Holmes & Meier, 1978), 154.

²⁰⁶ Errol Lawrence, 'Just Plain Common Sense: The Roots of Racism', in *EMPIRE STRIKES BACK: Race and Racism In 70's Britain* (London: Routledge, 1982), 46

²⁰⁷ Home Office, *Bicentenary*, pn.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁹ Lawrence, 'Just Plain Common-sense', 67.

²¹⁰ Ian Sanjay Patel, *We're Here Because You Were There: Immigration and the End of Empire*, (London: Verso, 2022).

²¹¹ Satnam Virdee argues that the Grunwick Strike helped to transform 'a narrow understanding of class that nested within dominant conceptions of race and nation towards a more inclusive language that could also encompass a racialised minority and female workers.' Satnam Virdee, *Racism, Class and the Racialized Outsider* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 135; a note from PM James Callaghan, archived in the National Archives and dated 5 July 1977, read 'keep me informed about Scargill's movements. He may have to be warned off.' See Alan Travis and home affairs editor, 'Callaghan Had Scargill Watched as Grunwick Dispute Escalated', *The Guardian*, 28 December 2007, sec. UK news, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2007/dec/28/past.politics4>

ended, national coverage broke over the sexual violence of Home Office immigration officers, who had imposed a decade of 'virginity testing' on South Asian women arriving to UK airports on spousal visas.²¹² The Home Office legally challenged the resulting investigation, arguing that the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) did not have the authority or jurisdiction to investigate the Home Office.²¹³ Soon after in January 1981, thirteen teenagers died in a house-fire in New Cross, South East London. The fire was widely suspected to have been an arson attack by the area's active white supremacist National Front group. The lack of response from the Met Police and the Government led to the formation of the 'New Cross Massacre Action Committee', an intergenerational alliance of black Britons who mobilised vigils and what was at that point the largest march for racial justice in British history, under the refrain *13 dead, nothing said*.²¹⁴ A month later in April 1981 the extreme brutality of 'stop and search' police harassment ignited what are commonly called the Brixton Riots, with further uprisings in Toxteth, Handsworth, Chapeltown and Moss Side in July. In October 1981 the British Nationality Act was enacted, drawing a 'border around the British mainland, physically marking out for the first time a Britain distinct from the remainder of the colonies and the Commonwealth.'²¹⁵ The Act was widely protested, and prompted strategic union action among NHS workers mobilising against its imposition of passport controls on access to healthcare.²¹⁶ Added to all this, 'the excitements of the Falklands War of 1982 demonstrated [that] imperial pride was not wholly shattered', evidencing 'the persistence of empire in metropolitan culture' even after the majority of British colonies had won Independence from Britain.²¹⁷

This was the immediate context in which the Home Office prepared to celebrate its bicentenary in July 1982. Introducing the Home Office's bicentenary lecture series in 1982, then Permanent Secretary Brian Cubbon noted that 'there is clearly a substantial gap between the role of the Home Office as it appears to those who work there, and the role desired for the Home Office by outside commentators.'²¹⁸ According to the bicentenary brochure, the Home Office had 'moved from a situation in which central decisions were the responsibility of a few, challenged only in comparatively rare and striking instances, to a position where it is more and more expected that decisions should be explained and justified through statutory machinery

²¹² The scandal was exposed in the Guardian. See Melanie Phillips, 'From the Archive: Airport Virginity Tests Banned by Rees', *The Guardian*, 3 February 2010, sec. UK news, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/feb/03/airport-virginity-tests-banned>.

²¹³ For the case between the Home Office and CRE, see CARF Collective, 'Background: British Racism', *Race & Class* 23, no. 2–3 (1981): 242. For India's battle to take Britain's virginity-testing scandal to the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) as a violation of international law, see Jinal Parekh and Antara Datta, 'India, the United Nations Human Rights Commission, and the 1979 Virginity Testing Scandal', *Journal of Global History*, June 2023, 1–20.

²¹⁴ Adam Almeida, "'13 Dead, Nothing Said': Remembering the New Cross Fire", *Tribune*, 18 January 2021, <https://tribunemag.co.uk/2021/01/13-dead-nothing-said-the-new-cross-fire-at-40>.

²¹⁵ El Enany, *Bordering Britain*, 14.

²¹⁶ Kathryn Medien, 'No Pass Laws Here! Internal Border Controls and the Global "Hostile Environment"', *Sociology* 57, no. 4 (August 2023): 940–56.

²¹⁷ John M. MacKenzie, 'The Persistence of Empire in Metropolitan Culture', in *The New Imperial Histories Reader*, ed. Stephen Howe (Routledge, 2010), 281.

²¹⁸ Home Office, *Bicentenary Lectures*, 7.

and at the bar of public opinion.²¹⁹ By July 1982, a number of contentious reviews into Home Office functions were unfolding, including the May Committee on Prisons, the Royal Commissions on Criminal Procedure and on Gambling, and a review of public order legislation in relation to the European Commission on Human Rights.²²⁰

The final talk in the 1982 bicentenary lectures was by Hugo Young. At the time Young was the political editor of *The Sunday Times*. His lecture argued that ‘the British authorities are rather more interested in order than law’ and he outlined numerous examples of the Home Office as ‘a body totally committed to the preservation of its own unregulated powers and discretions.’²²¹ A key example was the issue of the *Standing Orders* operating in Britain’s prisons. Over the course of the 1970s several high profile cases arose in which the Home Office obstructed prisoners from corresponding with their solicitors to pursue personal injury negligence and libel cases against the prison authorities. Denying prisoners these rights had been established practice for decades, although not practice established in written laws but in the *Standing Orders*, unwritten and secret rules, with no basis in statutory law. Crucially, these cases were able to arise for the first time in the 1970s because Britain had joined the European Community in 1973, meaning that prisoners could now take their grievances to the European Court of Human Rights. The Home Office was by law compelled to adjust its prison rules and practices to befit the European Convention but fought these obligations fiercely.

The Home Office had the same attitude when it came to retaining its ‘absolute and unreviewable discretion’ over the 1981 Nationality Act’s ‘good character’ requirement.²²² This wide margin of discretion had been built into the 1971 Immigration Act, which allowed the Home Secretary to determine the Immigration Rules with limited parliamentary scrutiny.²²³ Strongly critical, Young summarised the Home Office’s institutional ethos as ‘we know we are breaking the Convention, we can get away with it for a long time, and eventually comply on our own terms.’²²⁴ Yet despite his criticisms, the invited speaker openly shared the Home Office’s abhorrence at the prospect of the nascent Liberal-SDP Alliance, led by former Home Secretary Roy Jenkins. This ‘political force on the horizon’, Young grimaced, ‘is committed to a structure of law and rights which would have revolutionary effects, not least on the way the Home Office conducts itself.’²²⁵ This kind of European, un-British intervention contravened what Young called ‘the British habit’ that preferred to order British society ‘not by due legal

²¹⁹ Home Office, *Bicentenary*, 20.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*

²²¹ Hugo Young, *Bicentenary Lectures*, 88.

²²² *Ibid.*

²²³ Immigration Act, Section 3(2).

²²⁴ Hugo Young, *Bicentenary Lectures*, 90.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, 94.

process but by methods which exclude, to a startling extent, the normal remedies of the judicial system' and preferring, wherever possible, 'to be the judge in its own case.'²²⁶

This *British habit* comprises a way of thinking historically, one which involved specific, normative understandings of how law should operate and how change should happen over time. Perhaps more important than the events they emphasise, the Home Office histories written in 1926, 1954 and 1982 share an historical sensibility, a common framework for understanding not only the historical developments considered formative, but also for describing the way that history *should* develop. It was a view of history structured upon a belief that laws were made by the ruling classes, passed down over generations, respected, upheld and slowly adjusted by what Edmund Burke had imagined as England's 'Little Platoons.'²²⁷ Official histories of the Home Office presented laws, customs and institutions, buttressed by generational institutional memory transmitted through staff hierarchies and gently improved systems for finding precedent, carrying the wisdom of previous generations of Englishmen. As Troup described in 1925:–

...when a Home Secretary comes into office, he finds himself at the head of a great organisation, based on the prerogative powers of the King and on a long series of parliamentary enactments, and guided in its working by a mass of principles, rules and precedents which embody the results of innumerable discussions and settlements and of long practical experience, but which are constantly being modified or added to as new movements or changing circumstances demand.²²⁸

Across the 1926, 1954 and 1982 texts, the essential task of the Home Office appears to be to safeguard, uphold and evolve laws, customs and institutions in order to preserve the ancestry and inheritance compounded within them. These concepts of inheritance and ancestry authenticate the organic, home-grown British character in a way that makes the historical into something racial, making history into what Dipesh Chakrabarty calls the 'developmental process' of historicism.²²⁹ 'Delicate as is the balance which the Home Office holds,' wrote Newsam in 1954, 'it is the British people themselves who largely guarantee its stability: perhaps because the liberal principles which it is the fashion in some countries to deride are deeply ingrained in the British character.'²³⁰

At first glance, the shift by the 1980s towards specific procedures for dealing with deportations, police complaints and parole controversies was, in some ways, a decisive turn away from these 'liberal principles [...] deeply ingrained in the British character.'²³¹ But in other ways, the predominantly racialised subjects of these cases were being imagined and acted upon as

²²⁶ Hugo Young, *Bicentenary Lectures*, 88.

²²⁷ For a useful analysis of Edmund Burke's concept of England's *little platoons*, see Robbie Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor* (Newcastle: Agenda, 2018), 15 – 20.

²²⁸ Troup, *Home Office*, 3 – 4.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*

²³⁰ Newsam, *Home Office*, 14.

²³¹ *Ibid.*

excluded from integrating into ‘the British people’, excluded from the ‘stability of the liberal principles [...] ingrained in the British character’, and excluded from ‘the delicate balance which the Home Office holds between the rights of the individual and the needs of society as a whole.’²³² In the 1950s Sir Frank Newsam had argued that the Royal Prerogative of Mercy defined the task of the Home Secretary as ‘on the one hand to protect society against its misfits, and on the other to help these misfits to find their way back into society again.’²³³ But by the 1980s ‘specific procedures’ had been installed which dislocated immigration, police and prison cases – cases disproportionately belonging to communities racialised as non-white and non-patrial – from accessing the Home Secretary’s discretionary powers, powers premised on the ancient Royal Prerogative of Mercy. In this way, these ‘specific procedures’ amounted to new bureaucratic structures that cast people racialised as immigrants as society’s misfits, but the kind of misfits who would *not* be ‘helped to find their way back into society again.’²³⁴

The next part of the chapter retraces this particular historical sensibility, a sensibility haunted by empire and cultivated in the furtive space *between precedent and common-sense*, and replays it through a ghost story found in the *HORSA Chronicle* newsletter.

Haunting lineages of institutional ancestry

The Christmas 1984 edition of the *HORSA Chronicle* contains a *Christmas Ghost Story*. It begins on ‘one wild winter’s night, forty years ago [...] on the top floor of the old Whitehall building.’²³⁵ The writer was with his colleague and mentor, Edward Cordes, ‘one of the succession of legendary C division figures.’²³⁶ Together they searched for ‘a file which the Registry insisted they had sent us but, search as we would, could not be found.’ After ‘a dragging, rustling sound coming from the clerk’s room next door’, the file miraculously appeared on the younger official’s desk. It was, we are told, a gift from the ghost of Arthur Locke. Locke was the ‘semi-mythical, red-headed clerk who had been the driving force of the Registry, the true creator of the Home Office Notebooks and later, Assistant Secretary of C

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Newsam, *The Home Office*, 14.

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ *HORSA Chronicle*, No.4, Xmas 1984, 2.

²³⁶ Ibid.

Division.²³⁷ Arthur Locke had mentored Cordes during the latter's first job at the Home Office, long before Cordes became, in turn, the writer's own mentor.²³⁸

The writer of the ghost story was Robert Pittam, the same Home Office official who wrote the history of the Home Office for the official Bicentenary. As an *unrecognised official*, it is difficult to find details about Pittam's career. But glimpses of his career path surface in other historians' research. He appears in memos about divorce law reform in 1957 and again in 1967. In 1957 we find him in correspondence with the Lord Chancellor's secretary about the public response to the Wolfenden Report's recommendations to decriminalise homosexuality. He seems to have been deeply involved in the making of the Race Relations Act of 1965, replete with its credibility-lacking conciliation board and what Simon Peplow has called its 'bipartite lack of desire to address the politically unpopular issue of race and immigration.'²³⁹

What can we do with these glimpses of Robert Pittam? An unrecognised official who wrote a history of the Home Office for the Bicentenary brochure. An author who tells ghost stories about long-dead clerks. A colleague who visits his former manager on his deathbed to listen:—

at length about the founding fathers of C Division, of Everest, the clerk from the convict hulks who started it all and had to wait nearly fifty years till he was established; of Murdoch, the first Admin. Assistant Under Secretary who was appointed after a petition by his colleagues; of H. B. Simpson, whose career was blighted by the Adolph Beck case and, finally, of Arthur Locke.²⁴⁰

Yes, take the 'semi-mythical' kindly ghost clerk with a pinch of salt. But take seriously the homosocial bonds of late night bureaucratic work in C Division, bonds between unrecognised officials, their departmental 'legendary' seniors and their 'founding fathers' of the previous century. Take these seriously because these were lineages of institutional ancestry that connected unrecognised officials, like Pittam, to the convict hulk ships, penal policy changes and internal Home Office reforms of the nineteenth century. These were the lineages that underpinned Pittam's understanding of the institution he worked within and the society he administered as he meanwhile worked on stilted reforms of divorce law, homosexuality legislation and race relations for a postwar Britain that was rapidly rearranging itself after the end of its empire.

²³⁷ Ibid. In 1913, C Division's responsibilities included: 'prerogative of mercy except sentences of penal servitude and preventative detention; extradition; prisons; probation except children under 16; criminal lunatics; police, county and borough; disturbances and riots; coroners; production of prisoners; commissions rogatoires; colonial prisoners removal; other matters relating to administration of criminal justice.' Appendix C, in Jill Pellew, *The Home Office, 1848-1914, from Clerks to Bureaucrats* (Fairleigh Dickinson Univ Press, 1982).

²³⁸ Arthur Locke also featured in Sir Austin Strutt's fantastically boring booklet *The Home Office 1870-1896: The Modernisation of an Office*, internally published at the Home Office in 1961, and full of juicy details 'about the way in which papers were dealt with as well as details as to the organisation of the Office, methods of working are passed on from generation to generation and normally are not written down. Sir Austin Strutt, *The Home Office 1870-1896: The Modernisation of an Office*, Administrative Studies No. 6 (London: Home Office, 1961), v; 126.

²³⁹ Simon Peplow, 'The "Linchpin for Success"? The Problematic Establishment of the 1965 Race Relations Act and Its Conciliation Board', *Contemporary British History* 31, no. 3 (3 July 2017): 430–51.

²⁴⁰ *HORSA Chronicle*, No.4, Xmas 1984, 2.

We find in Pittam's ghost story respect for authority, for the wisdom and experience of seniors, for the breeding of merit, and the inheritance of institutional memory, passed from generation to generation. I argue that this sensibility can be described as patrilial. It was a way of imagining and shaping change over time premised on the violently naturalised normalcy of the generational passing down of wealth, resources, status along the patrilial line. This chain of transference travelled father to father, man to man, resembling the common-sense normalcy of private law and the family: the proper and legitimate rather than improper and illegitimate way for matters to proceed and proceeds to be shared.

This highly gendered, classed nexus of legitimacy, propriety, and ownership was embedded within the daily bureaucratic work of Home Office officials, from the nineteenth century onwards. In 1848, for instance, a Parliamentary Select Committee on Civil Service Expenditure stated that 'much of the business in the Secretary of State's department consists of routine and precedent' and that 'a great deal of information is not recorded, it exists only in the minds of those who have been there, and are the depositories of this information.'²⁴¹ Before Arthur Locke's system of Home Office Notebooks began in 1890, registry staff searched haphazardly for precedents without the benefit of any form of index.²⁴² As the twentieth century unfolded, and the Home Office's work expanded to include increasingly complicated welfare responsibilities, a separate 'Noters Section' was created within the Home Office's Establishment Division, in which 'Noters provided a centralised service to divisions, noting precedents on request and undertaking research in archived closed files for the department.'²⁴³ This turn towards writing down information previously held in the minds of officials was a change, but a change that strengthened the pre-existing notion that certain personnel – now those employed as Noters – were the living depositories of this information. These daily routines of noting down, keeping and consulting precedent also including enabling the ignoring of precedent, whenever that might better serve a Home Secretary's common-sense approach to the issue in hand: 'while the existing law or the rule from precedent may be of impeccable logic,' Cubbon mused in 1982, 'if ministers or Parliament say that the shoe pinches nevertheless, logic has to give.'²⁴⁴

Remembering, locating and mobilising precedent filled the working hours of Home Office officials in the policymaking grades. The authority and process of precedent also shaped the structure of authority within the Home Office. Finding and mobilising precedent, and operating institutional memory effectively was how 'unrecognised officials' at the Home Office could garner status and become 'a legendary figure', as Pittam's story suggested, unrecognised by

²⁴¹ Select Committee on Misc Expenditure, 1847-8, Minutes of Evidence 3036, quoted in Pellew, *The Home Office, 1848-1914*, 8.

²⁴² 'Home Office: Noters Section: Precedent Books' (1821 – 1993), HO 384, TNA.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁴ Home Office, *Bicentenary*, 31.

the public but immortalised within civil service circles. Precedent, of course, was at the root of the Home Secretary's constitutional functions, empowered by the Royal Prerogative since the 1400s and increasingly entrusted with increasing parliamentary statutory powers since the creation of parliamentary supremacy and constitutional monarchy after 1688. Perhaps more importantly, the authority of Home Office officials was bundled together with a perceived capacity to take command of that ambiguous territory *between precedent and common-sense*. The structures, and culture, of authority at the Home Office were decidedly shaped by masculinist, paternalistic and patriarchal ways of being and believing. As an 1870 article evocatively put it, the Home Office was 'a home-keeping institution, concerned chiefly in our personal, private, and family concerns', an institution that blended the concerns of 'the nation as with a family', an institution which should 'regulate the staple and substance of life' just as 'we expect this of our wives and housekeepers.'²⁴⁵

These crisscrossing references to mummy and daddy circulated throughout the Home Office histories of 1926, 1954 and 1982, each of which described the Home Office as the 'parent' of the majority of the British state's welfare functions. Each text emphasised the wide variety of the Home Office's work, presenting the miscellany of Home Office responsibilities as evidence of the Home Secretary's seniority over and above other Cabinet ministers. In this way, any new governmental responsibility without an obvious home in an existing department would *de facto* fall upon the Home Secretary, leaving him at various moments in history with responsibility for wild birds, for fisheries, for deciding and announcing the beginning of British Summer time, for the regulation of mines and factories, until those new duties *grew up* into their own ministerial departments: the Ministry for Health and for Education were cases in point.²⁴⁶ For each of the Home Office authors, the wide and changing variety of the Home Office's responsibilities, then, is a motif through which the Home Office articulated its historical legitimacy as both historic and as historically changing.

Nonetheless, the authors phrase this parentage a little differently in each epoch. For Troup writing in 1925, the Home Office was 'the parent' providing 'the nucleus of the powers of four new departments of State.'²⁴⁷ For Newsam thirty years later, the Home Office was still the parent of multiple departments, but sometimes those departments 'become larger than the parent.'²⁴⁸ But the sense of the Home Office as the parent – as a fertile, reproductive patriarch siring well-bred departments of good stock – falters and changes key by the 1980s, resembling instead the grumbling self-importance of the left-behind grandparent, resentful of younger generations and their new ways of doing things. 'Many of the other Departments of State',

²⁴⁵ 'The Home Office', *Saturday Review of Politics, Literature, Science and Art* 30, no. 772 (13 August 1870): 192–93.

²⁴⁶ Gibson, *New Home Office*, viii.

²⁴⁷ Troup, *Home Office*, 25 (emphasis added).

²⁴⁸ Newsam, *Home Office*, 25.

wrote Brian Cubbon, 'were *carved out of what used to be* the work of the Home Office, *leaving* the Home Secretary with his major constitutional and law-and-order responsibilities and also some general, unallocated functions.'²⁴⁹ In 1980s, Home Office officials held strong to these bourgeois norms about the way the family, and the Home Office, ought to be run. At the end of the bicentenary brochure, Neil Cairncross wistfully recalled Sir Frank Newsam as 'fairly fierce', citing one of the 'delicious clerihews' written by his colleague J.M. Ross:–

Frank Aubrey Newsam

Affected to look gruesome

This carried weight

With successive Secretaries of State.²⁵⁰

For Cubbon, himself a regular invitee to HORSAs events, the Home Office was 'essentially a marriage between the professionalism and experience of its individual officials and the policy objectives and political skill of the Home Secretary and his ministers.'²⁵¹ This marriage was, nonetheless, one in which the Home Secretary had 'the absolute power of decision at all times.'²⁵² The history of the Home Office, as it was both written down and held in the mind of officials and retirees, was embedded with norms about marriages in which patriarchs retained *absolute power of discretion at all times*, and about ancestral lineages in which father-figures bore down on their sons, scions, and heirs apparent.

Where have all the old characters have gone? read the title of Cairncross's article for the bicentenary. The article was written 'with help from K. B. Paice, J. M. Ross and A. I. Tudor', all of whom were soon to grace the pages of the *HORSA Chronicle* with sonnets and limericks about tea, cake, and the Home Office's evacuation to sunny, sandy Bournemouth during the Second World War. HORSAs emerged within this trajectory of remembering, loss, yearning and decline. As their individual careers eked out, HORSAs members assembled their first newsletters, AGMs and picnic invitations to maintain connection and a sense of belonging with the social and institutional life of the Home Office, an institution whose way of doing things was increasingly under fire and even ridiculed. Here it is important to remember, via Errol Lawrence and *The Empire Strikes Back*, that the common-sense images of the family embedded in the Home Office's internal structures were throughout the 1970s being violently deployed as a gold standard against which 'images of black families and black youth are [...] pathologized once via their association with the "cultures of deprivation" of the decaying "inner cities" and again as the bearers of specifically black cultures.'²⁵³ It was this long-established genre of institutional eugenic thinking about national decline, 'national stock' and invading

²⁴⁹ Home Office, *Bicentenary*, 29.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 42.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 32.

²⁵² *Ibid.*

²⁵³ Lawrence, 'Just plain common-sense', 54.

'alien strains' that made the 1971 Act's patriality clause and 'the operation of banishing blacks, repatriating them to the places which are congruent with their ethnicity and culture' appear doubly congruent, proper, and familiar to Home Office officials.²⁵⁴

The next, final section of the chapter names this patrial historical sensibility as eugenic, and contextualizes the *HORSA Chronicle's* mascot within the 'Anglo-Saxonism' of the nineteenth century eugenics movement. It connects everyday, institutionalised modes of eugenic thinking alive in the 1980s to the cultivation of enduring, hegemonic narratives about the Anglo-Saxon making of Englishness and English history.

The insubstantial alien character of English history

Let's now hark back to where we started: the early 1980s. The *HORSA Chronicle* took as its mascot Horsa, one of the Jute forerunners of the Anglo-Saxons. According to the eighth century historian Saint Bede, Horsa arrived in Kent to fight for Vortigern, king of the Britons, against the Picts between 446 and 454AD. Despite the fortuitous acronym, the newsletter's title and mascot are much more than a happy coincidence. During the mid to late nineteenth century 'Anglo-Saxon stock' became the organising concept at the heart of the emerging English eugenics movement. In the context of a Victorian society making sense of industrialisation for the first time, an 'Anglo-Saxon revival' took shape, through which was constructed 'an integrative English identity through the possession and reinvention of an Anglo-Saxon inheritance.'²⁵⁵ The Anglo-Saxon race were imagined as ethnically distinct from the Irish, who were associated with the Celts. The protection and perpetuation of the so-called Anglo-Saxon race lay at the heart of nineteenth century 'race science'.²⁵⁶ As the nineteenth century unfolded, working class uprisings elsewhere in the British Empire shifted the racial politics with which the English poor was imagined and acted upon. Previously enslaved peasantry mobilised an insurrection in Jamaica's Morant Bay in 1865. Indian troops in the East India Company's Bengal Army mutinied in 1857 and sparked a widespread rebellion that toppled the Company state. These powerful events, in Robbie Shilliam's words, 'decisively re-racialised the imperial family', envisioning 'an Anglo-Saxon family [...] stretching from metropole to settler-colonies' on one hand, and on the other 'an agglomeration of non-white colonial subject populations that required discipline.'²⁵⁷

²⁵⁴ Paul Gilroy, *There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack* (London: Routledge, 2002), 46.

²⁵⁵ Billie Melman, 'Claiming the Nation's Past: The Invention of an Anglo-Saxon Tradition', *Journal of Contemporary History* 26, no. 3 (1 July 1991): 575–95.

²⁵⁶ The shift from nineteenth century 'urban residuum' to commonwealth immigrants shows that the contents of "race" change historically as do the forms taken by racism. See, Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor*,

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 37. Similar arguments are made in Paul Gilroy, 'Has It Come to This?' and Andrew S. Thompson, 'The Language of Imperialism and the Meanings of Empire', in *The New Imperial Histories Reader* (Routledge, 2009).

In all of this, the family loomed large, both at the macro-level of imperial kinship and the intimate level of the individual household. The family, of course, was the organising unit of the eugenics movement, a movement emerging in the second half of the nineteenth century to proliferate 'the post-1857 view of racial difference and the limits of liberal universalism' into the heart of both welfare policy and penal policy in both British colonies and the British mainland.²⁵⁸ Eugenics was a pseudo-science, premised on the violent state intervention against the family life and social reproduction of groups of people deemed disposable, undeserving, and 'dysgenic', translating loosely as *bad for the race*. Events such as the Anglo-Boer War at the turn of the century redoubled, or at least mirrored, the deepening interconnections between Anglo-Saxonism and eugenics. Firstly, because the spectacular defeat of the British Army by Boer peasant guerrillas in 1899 turned public attention in the metropole to question whether the defeat was due to the dysgenic decay and decline of the British metropole's working class men of fighting age, and whether social welfare reforms could remedy and repair the British as an 'imperial race.'²⁵⁹ Secondly, because that Boer War defeat strengthened the efforts of groups like the Imperial South Africa Association and the Navy League in consolidating 'a familial language of imperialism' premised on 'racial ties' between the English-speaking, notionally Anglo-Saxon white Dominions.²⁶⁰

The Home Office and the Home Civil Service were deeply and directly implicated in the rise of eugenics. The upper-middle-class elites of the nineteenth century that are associated with the mid-century reform to Britain's Indian Civil Service and Home Civil Service were the very same social circles within which, and for which, the English eugenics movement arose. This network was 'tightly-knit, held together by continuing intermarriage and by a common commitment to educational modernisation and administrative reform, to the abolition of religious tests and to the introduction of competitive examination in the civil service.'²⁶¹ The reforms were centred in the *Northcote-Trevelyan Report* of 1854, discussed in detail in chapter two, and the *Report on the Indian Civil Service* of 1853.²⁶² Demonstrably, the author of the latter, Thomas Babington Macauley, was brother-in-law to Charles Trevelyan, one of the authors of the former. Trevelyan himself was responsible for creating the eugenic concept of 'feeble-mindedness' in 1876 during his work with the Charity Organisational Society and its campaign for the indefinite detention of a growing spectrum of 'feeble-minded mental-defectives' supposedly threatening 'the moral and physical welfare of society.'²⁶³ Civil service

²⁵⁸ Satia, *Time's Monster*, 125.

²⁵⁹ Thompson, 'The Language of Imperialism', 311.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid*, 316.

²⁶¹ Donald MacKenzie, 'Eugenics in Britain', *Social Studies of Science* 6, no. 3/4 (1976): 505

²⁶²

²⁶³ Charles Trevelyan's early involvement in the Society is mentioned in a speech by Lord Hershel, at the National Association for the Care of the Feeble-Minded, reported in *The Times*, 11 June 1898. Despite the supposed de-legitimising of eugenics from government policy in the later twentieth century, campaigns like Trevelyan's secured the expansion of what would become "Broadmoor institutions" in the twentieth century, through which many would be indefinitely detained.

work and eugenics movement work were thoroughly entwined. During the 1880s, the self-appointed pioneer of eugenics himself, Francis Galton, began to study ‘the correlation in the Indian Civil Service between the examination place of the candidate and the value of the appointment held by it.’²⁶⁴ Despite the inevitable failure of Galton’s hypothesis, the statistical modelling that he developed during this data analysis project had a formative impact on the development of the modern Civil Service, with statistics expertise sanctioning the professional middle class’s increasing dominance over the so-called science – and eugenics – of modern government.

Eugenic thinking connected migration, race and British histories of the world in a particular way: a patrilial way, rooted in concepts of inheritance and ancestry. The founder of eugenics Francis Galton described ‘the history of the world’ as:–

... a tale of the continual displacement of populations, each by a worthier successor, and humanity gains thereby. We ourselves are no descendants of the aborigines of Britain, and our colonists were invaders of the regions they now occupy as their lawful home. But the countries into which the Anglo-Saxon race can be transfused are restricted to those where the climate is temperate. The Tropics are not for us, to inhabit permanently.²⁶⁵

More than a hundred years after Galton’s tale of continual displacement, the *HORSA Chronicle* reran its narrative. Here comes the insubstantial alien character once again, trotting from Winter 1983 into Spring 1984, where the little munchkin extends an arm and points across a hand-drawn map of Barnes, Chiswick and Hammersmith, picking out the Civil Service Sports Ground, in Chiswick: the Home Office’s Annual Sports Day will be held there on Tuesday, 5th June. Next we find him, in Summer 1985, heaped against a tree, on a picnic blanket, in brilliant sunshine, rubbing his belly and chomping down on a big juicy sandwich, surrounded by cheese, meat, fruit and brandy. He has cutlery, he has a wine glass, he has a wicket basket that closes: he has manners, standards, and equipment. He invites HORSAs to the HORSAs Summer Picnic, ‘made possible by the kind offer of Sir Brian and Lady Cubbon to allow the event to take place in grounds of their country residence, Brook Farm House.’²⁶⁶ Next the little self-respecting Viking trapeses across the newsletters from Christmas 1985, through Spring 1986 and into Autumn 1986. He is proposing, failing, and lastly succeeding in organising a day trip to Boulogne aboard a car-ferry called – guess what – the *Horsa*.

Sports days, picnics and day-trips to Boulogne: these are very English activities for a middle class attuned to the industrious pacing of school, then office, and finally the well-earned delights of retirement. The day trip to France affirmed the distance between England and her oldest enemy, crossing the channel twice in a day, returning the day-trippers home to the white

²⁶⁴ Letter from Francis Galton to Karl Pearson, 26 October 1901, quoted in Raymond E. Fancher, ‘Galton on Examinations: An Unpublished Step in the Invention of Correlation’, *Isis* 80, no. 3 (September 1989): 449.

²⁶⁵ Francis Galton, Letter to the Editor, *The Times*, 5 June 1873.

²⁶⁶ *HORSA Chronicle*, No.6, Summer 1985, 1.

cliffs of Dover, cliffs symbolising the celebrated retreat from Dunkirk in 1940. All of this: the making of Englishness, the making of an Anglo-Saxon Englishness. In the universe of the *HORSA Chronicle*, the joke that the mascot is himself *an insubstantial alien character*, an illegal entrant with *no record of his landing* at the Traffic Index, is ‘funny’ because this little guy stands in for the only kind of *various unsavoury Teutonic tribes* that the Home Office drafters and doers of racist nationality law could abide. The mascot represents the various tribes of ‘early Britons’ that assimilated, through King Alfred and *his Cordon Bleu certificate*, into the Anglo-Saxon making of some kind of proto-England, which could finally burst into being with the Norman conquest of 1066, and all that.

This was the hegemonic, and often humourised, narrative of English history that pervaded British popular culture and school education. That narrative has served as the bedrock of anti-immigration nationalist and racist rhetoric. We have already seen that in the 1950s, Permanent Secretary Frank Newsam attributed the fact that Britain’s ‘community as a whole is law-abiding’ to the country’s ‘homogenous population, with a tradition of order and high standards of public conduct which over a long period have not been disturbed by invasion, foreign conquest, or civil war’, invoking 1066 as the last invasion of England.²⁶⁷ The same narrative glues together Enoch Powell’s vision of England, as outlined in the introduction to this thesis. 1066 is directly pinpointed in the title of a book by a retired Home Office Immigration Inspector, called *The Key In the Lock: Immigration Control in England from 1066 to the Present Day*, a source analysed in chapter two of this thesis.²⁶⁸ Likewise, today applicants studying for *Life in the UK Test* for British Citizenship learn that ‘the Norman Conquest was the last successful foreign invasion of England, and led to many changes in government and social structures in England.’²⁶⁹

First introduced by the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002, the test requires applicants for naturalisation as a British citizen to answer questions about British customs and traditions, sport, leisure, institutions of British democracy and, since 2011, about Britain’s ‘long and illustrious history.’ The *Life in the UK Test*’s long and illustrious history highlights particular moments of British history as it progresses through six sections: ‘Early Britain, the Middle Ages, the Tudors and the Stuarts, a global power, the 20th Century, and Britain since 1945.’²⁷⁰ The test’s main events of British history share the same broad brushstrokes narrativized by the Home Office histories written in 1926, 1954, 1982 and 2007.

²⁶⁷ Newsam, *Home Office*, 31.

²⁶⁸ T. W. E. Roche, *Key in the Lock: Immigration Control in England from 1066 to the Present Day* (London: John Murray, 1969).

²⁶⁹ Home Office, *Life in the UK Test: Study Guide*, 9th ed. (London: Red Squirrel, 2015), 16.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 3.

Imagine (or recall, if you have had this experience yourself) applying for citizenship in the territory that colonised the place you were born in, and sitting down to study for this test. You turn to page 18 of the official study guide, and come face to face with ‘an Anglo-Saxon helmet found at Sutton-Hoo currently on display at the British Museum.’²⁷¹ Imagine, you dutifully become engrossed in Anglo-Saxon history. You make your way to the British Museum, just like the HORSAs did. You ask directions to the famous Sutton Hoo helmet, make your way to the vitrine, and gasp: the helmet does not look like that in your book! The photo on page 18 is in fact a seventh century Viking helmet, found somewhere in the South of Sweden. The Home Office made a mistake, ‘however for the purposes of your test you must learn the material as reproduced’ in the official, incorrect guidebook.²⁷²

The historical inaccuracies of this long and illustrious history go much deeper than this blithering error. In June 2020, over six hundred historians of Britain and the British Empire called for ‘an immediate official review of the history chapter’ on account of its ‘ongoing misrepresentation of slavery and Empire’ which presented a ‘fundamentally misleading and in places demonstrably false’ account of British history, and ‘a step backwards in historical knowledge and understanding.’²⁷³ A particular sentence of the test’s study guide stands out: ‘by the second half of the twentieth century the transition from Empire to Commonwealth was orderly for the most part, as countries were granted their independence.’²⁷⁴

Orderly for the most part. Imagine, or remember, having to regurgitate, for a multiple choice test, the idea that the transition from empire to Commonwealth was *orderly for the most part*. That the country you were born in was *granted*, given independence by the UK Parliament. That the partitions, the Nakbas, the Malayan emergency, the so-called Mau Mau rebellion: all *orderly for the most part*. Or, less than the most part: a part not to teach, not to test, not to tell. Decades of internationalist, anti-colonial organising, both networked and everyday: all of it, *orderly for the most part*, and silenced beneath the so-called granting of independence to colonies waiting, in an orderly queue, being trained up, to become nation-states.

Imagine reading, in your official study guide, about the ancient origins and formative struggles to establish the rights of Englishmen-in-the-making. Having to imbibe a narrative line spooling from the 1215 Magna Carta’s constraints on arbitrary regal powers, through to ‘the Habeas Corpus Act becoming law in 1679 [...] a very important piece of legislation which remains relevant today.’²⁷⁵ Practising to tick boxes about that Act, which ‘guaranteed that no one could be held prisoner unlawfully’, a piece of legislation *important* and *relevant* for the national story,

²⁷¹ Ibid, 14.

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ ‘Historians Call for a Review of Home Office Citizenship and Settlement Test’, *History Journal* (blog), 21 July 2020, <https://historyjournal.org.uk/2020/07/21/historians-call-for-a-review-of-home-office-citizenship-and-settlement-test/>.

²⁷⁴ Home Office, *Life in the UK Test*, 61.

²⁷⁵ Ibid, 30.

a national story which spells out the un-importance and irrelevance of thousands of people detained indefinitely in immigration centres and prisons, administered separately beyond the margins of the Habeas Corpus Act.

Now think again of our starting point, a newsletter begun in Winter 1983, and its 'choice of an insubstantial alien character to represent the new association' of the Home Office Retired Staff Association.²⁷⁶ Its misremembering of a Viking, or a Jute, its invention of tradition. The derision of the British Museum, the inability of experts to enjoy a joke, to engage in banter. History as mere conjecture, as *an inconvenient irrelevance*. The irrelevance and banter with which the history of a territory and national culture can be rewritten by those to which it supposedly belongs. Re-written into immigration policies with a patriality clause that remodels an English heredity through a notional Anglo-Saxon racial identity. An Anglo-Saxon whiteness as near mythical as Horsa, *if in fact he ever existed*. This was – this is – a racial Englishness constructed with deterrent landing cards, criminalising passport photos and traffic indexes, all increasingly systemised to better evidence illegalised entry and disinherit postcolonial migrants from the spoils of empire.

Conclusion

Priya Satia has argued that 'Britain's imperial career from the era of slavery to the current Brexit crisis depended on the sway of a particular historical sensibility', a sensibility that nonetheless has been knocked sideways and overtaken by the profound geopolitical transformation of the world effected by constitutional decolonisation. After the Second World War this particular historical sensibility – one generated in the practical unfolding of empire – no longer held court, and 'the historical discipline was increasingly claimed as a site for protest against the powers that be.'²⁷⁷ Building on Satia's arguments, this chapter has traced that particular historical sensibility at work within the institutional culture of the Home Office as well as the Home Civil Service in which it was a prominent part. I have drawn out diffuse ways in which the institution's internal framings of the Home Office's history have been shaped by the changing global circumstances of imperialism abroad. These included the end of convict hulks and criminal transportation, the whitening of imperial kinship in response to mid-nineteenth century uprisings in Jamaica and across India, the colonial contexts in which the eugenics movement and eugenic methods expanded, and Cold War politicking over the hearts and minds of 'Third World' nationalist civil servants in the making.

There was, I argue, a shared rhetoric around managing change-over-time through piecemeal evolutionary transitions. Transitions and change were managed by finding and mobilising

²⁷⁶ *HORSA Chronicle*, No.1, Winter 1983, 2.

²⁷⁷ Satia, *Time's Monster*, 2.

precedent, or when no convenient precedent could be found, by using ‘common-sense’ to establish new, unwritten practices that would become precedent. The cultivation of an institutionalised commonsense was at the heart of civil service reforms, especially to recruitment, and as we have seen, that institutionalised commonsense extended to the kinds of inside jokes, cartoon mascots, and humorous asides that filled the *HORSA Chronicle* newsletter in the 1980s. An administrative precedent was always preferred above the intervention of the courts to interpret the letter of the law. When it became clear that neither precedent nor common-sense could resolve an issue in the way the Home Office thought it should be, new legislation would be drafted and proposed.

A recent example illustrating this pattern played out in November 2023. After eighteen months of legal battles, the Supreme Court unanimously declared the Home Secretary’s plan to transport asylum-seekers to Rwanda unlawful. In response the Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak, declared he would have the Home Office draft emergency legislation that would ‘enable parliament to confirm that with our new treaty, Rwanda is safe’ by declaring in law that Rwanda was a safe country.²⁷⁸ Crucially, Sunak decried the possible intervention of the European Court of Human Rights against this possible emergency legislation as the illegitimate incursions of a ‘foreign court’ against ‘the express wishes of parliament’.²⁷⁹ These were, of course, the same dynamics and rhetoric espoused by Hugo Young during the Home Office’s bicentenary lectures. Despite Young’s criticism of the Home Office’s unreviewable discretions, he shared with the institution a pronounced aversion to Strasbourg telling the Home Office how it ought to maintain law and order, order and liberty, within Britain. They shared a specific view of change: that any changes to Home Office policy and law ought to come from in-house, from within the British Civil Service who surely knew the country, its history, character, and remedy better than powers-that-be on the continent.

It is important, however, not to overstate how uniform or ahistorical this institutionalised set of specific, normative views about time and history really was. As Satia argues, this way of thinking historically was undermined and altered by the end of empire, after which the ‘theories of history and civilisation that underwrote imperialism abroad and inequality at home’ were no longer hegemonic.²⁸⁰ An example from the 1968 Fulton Committee Inquiry into Britain’s Home Civil Service depicts the weakening of this particular historical sensibility at the end of empire.

In the mid 1960s, as Britain’s empire was disintegrating, Harold Wilson’s Labour Government announced an inquiry into the Civil Service to ‘ensure that the service is properly equipped for

²⁷⁸ ‘Rishi Sunak Vows Emergency Legislation after Rwanda Ruling’, Sky News, 15 November 2023, <https://news.sky.com/story/rishi-sunak-says-flights-will-be-heading-off-in-the-spring-as-planned-despite-rwanda-ruling-13008917>.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ Satia, *Time’s Monster*, 2.

its role in the modern state.²⁸¹ The subsequent inquiry found that it was in no way equipped for Britain's postwar 'modern state', because it was 'still fundamentally the product of the nineteenth-century philosophy of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report.'²⁸² The recommended reforms to civil service recruitment proposed bringing in technical, scientific and management expertise. But not all members of the Fulton Inquiry's committee agreed on this way of modernising Britain's Civil Service. Professor Lord Thomas Simey, sitting on the Committee in his capacity as the Charles Booth Professor of Social Science, expressed his whole-hearted 'disappointment that the proposals embodied in this report assume that what is required is something approaching revolutionary changes' whereas '[his] own view is that necessary reforms could be obtained by encouraging the evolution of what is basically the present situation.'²⁸³ Simey's conviction in encouraging the *evolution of what is basically the present situation*, and his revulsion at the prospect of 'revolutionary' changes, exemplify the historical sensibility that this chapter has traced across the sources. His 'reservation', on the last pages of the Fulton Report, nonetheless also clearly shows that his way of thinking was very much in the minority among the team of experts assembled to reform and modernise the Civil Service.

Simey was not, it has to be admitted, a civil servant at the Home Office, nor a civil servant at all. He was an academic, a 'key proponent of the "modern sociology" and of the burgeoning field of social policy.'²⁸⁴ His 1946 publication *Welfare and Planning in the West Indies* was 'the first scholarly attempt to come to grips with the sociology of the region and set the agenda for discussion on the family for the next two decades.'²⁸⁵ But what came first? His conviction in encouraging evolution rather than revolutionary changes? Or his eugenicist studies of how to re-plan 'the family' in the Caribbean in the aftermath of the region's militant labour uprisings throughout the 1930s? It was the fear of the world's mobile poor that frightened the British state into developing its carceral and welfare functions, entangling both into norms about how, and to whom, change *should* happen over time. This was a historical sensibility that understood historical progress, or historical decline, as part and parcel with the eugenic, or dysgenic, transformation of society.

All the same, the lifetime of this eugenic, patrial way of doing history is far from over. The patriality clause has routinised the colonial amnesia through which historical connections between Britain and its former colonies are, legally at least, undone. At the same time, the clause has perpetuated an already existing genre of thinking about proper and improper

²⁸¹ House of Lords, 'Public Service Report' (House of Lords, 19 January 1998), <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199798/ldselect/ldpubsr/055/psrep01.htm>.

²⁸² Lord Fulton, 'The Fulton Report - Vol. 1 Report of the Committee 1966 - 1968' (London, June 1968), 9.

²⁸³ Lord Simey, 'Reservation on Chapter One', in *The Fulton Report*, 101.

²⁸⁴ Mary Chamberlain, 'Small Worlds: Childhood and Empire', *Journal of Family History* 27, no. 2 (April 2002): 186–200.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

families, inheritance and ancestry. It was a genre born of empire and it has endured into the present through the everyday, intimate doing of family life and its state-sanctioned norms. This patial sensibility has proved durable. Sticky even, leaving residues in hard to reach, hard to see parts of Britain's postwar immigration system. Remember the *HORSA Chronicle*. Remember the *inability of the Press Officer* and his meaningless, historically incorrect choice of mascot. This is the ease, the confidence, the disingenuous self-deprecation with which even haphazard inefficiency, historical inaccuracy and inexpertness become familiar markers of the idiosyncrasies of the development of English history. This is the historical change-making ease of its law-making ruling classes, and the everyday papering an England-in-the-making into existence. All of this, a confusing nexus organised only by the proudly haphazard logic of Home Office decision-making, through which the violent precarity of Britain's mass deportation and documentation regime is produced.

Fragment: Before Harmondsworth

Harmondsworth immigration detention centre opened on the outskirts of Heathrow Airport in early 1970. The construction of Harmondsworth appears, on one hand, an unsurprising continuation of illiberal practices towards formerly colonised people. On the other hand, the opening of Britain's first purpose-built immigration detention centre marked a distinctive transformation in the postimperial politics of deportation from the British mainland. In what follows I outline the legal and legislative context in which the proposal to build an immigration detention centre first arose.

The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act permitted criminal courts to hand down a deportation order when convicting and sentencing a Commonwealth citizen.²⁸⁶ Judges in criminal courts took eagerly to the new legislation; 422 people from the Caribbean had been recommended for deportation following their conviction for petty crime within eighteen months of the 1962 Act.²⁸⁷ In fact, many judges saw fit to hand down a sentence that included an order for deportation but no fine or prison time, also known as an absolute discharge. Absolute discharges largely resembled the imperfect practice of 'binding over' that courts and judges had used throughout the twentieth century to effectively deport British colonial subjects from the mainland. Binding over orders meant that the convicted person could choose either to serve a prison sentence in the mainland or to return to their country-of-origin for a certain number of years. The practice was predominantly used to expel Irish citizens back to Ireland instead of costly stays in prison or Borstals.²⁸⁸

From 1962 onwards, 'absolute discharges' were increasingly met with both public and parliamentary opposition, arguing that these sentences contravened Section 12 of the 1948 Criminal Justice Act.²⁸⁹ Home Office policymakers began trying to 'put beyond doubt the validity of a recommendation for deportation which is combined with an absolute or conditional discharge.'²⁹⁰ In the Home Office's Deportation department, known as B2, officials began brainstorming different ways to 'discourage the courts to recommend deportation in trivial

²⁸⁶ For a comparison of how Irish Republican "criminals" and West Indian "petty criminals" manifested by the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act's deportation provisions, see Jordanna Bailkin, 'Leaving Home: The Politics of Deportation', in *Afterlife of Empire* (Univ of California Press, 2012), 202–34. See also, Charlotte Lydia Riley, *Imperial Island: A History of Empire in Modern Britain* (London: Bodley Head, 2023), 146 – 7.

²⁸⁷ Marjorie H. Blackman, 'The Long History of the Hostile Environment', in Red Pepper, accessed 15 July 2019, <https://www.redpepper.org.uk/the-long-history-of-the-hostile-environment/>.

²⁸⁸ Ian A. Macdonald, *Race Relations and Immigration Law* (London, 1969), 78; H. Lintott to Sir A. Clutterbuck, 11 January 1960, DO 35/7997, TNA; 'Binding over British Subjects to Leave the U.K.', HO 344/162, TNA.

²⁸⁹ Section 12(1) of the *Criminal Justice Act* 1948 stated that 'placing the offender on probation or discharging him absolutely or conditionally shall be deemed not to be a conviction for any purpose other than the purposes of the proceedings in which the order is made.'

²⁹⁰ The 'lessons' of the 1962 Act are recounted in Memo from W. J. Bohan to Mr Shuffrey, 'Re: Deportation, Recommendations combined with absolute or conditional discharge', 14 Sep 1970, in 'Immigration Bill: Deportation Proposals' (1970 - 71), HO 394/5, TNA.

cases' to minimise the attention 'given to Parliament in regard to Commonwealth citizens by Conservative Ministers.'²⁹¹ The hope was to find a way to make the deportation of any Commonwealth Citizen into an *administrative* decision taken by and at the Home Office, rather than in the criminal justice system, whose open courts potentially invited the wide audience of the liberal public, press and Parliament.

But the denial of immigration appeal rights to Commonwealth immigrants had begun to concern a growing number of MPs, leading to the formation in 1966 of the Committee on Immigration Appeals, also known as the Wilson Committee. Soon after the Committee presented its evidence and recommendations, the Commonwealth Immigrants' Act 1968 became law on 1 March 1968. It had been rushed through Parliament by the Labour Government as emergency legislation, amid what the Commonwealth Relations Office called 'the Asian exodus' of Kenyan Asians from independent Kenya's majoritarian regime.²⁹² A month later in April 1968, Enoch Powell gave his infamous 'Rivers of Blood' speech to a meeting of the Conservative Political Centre in Birmingham, mounting a critique of the proposed Race Relations Act that incited racist violence and anti-immigrant antipathies. Soon after this, Conservative Leader Ted Heath removed Powell, a Conservative MP, from the Shadow Cabinet.

By the autumn of 1968, the denial of appeal rights to all those refused entry under the recent Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968 had captured the attention of a growing cross-party alliance of MPs seeking to distinguish their mode of British politics from Powell's distasteful, illiberal, explicit racism. The questionable legality of removing Commonwealth immigrants without appeals under the 1968 Act added to the loud existing campaigns against the racist injustice of summarily deporting people for petty, inconsequential crimes under the 1962 legislation. Commonwealth citizens refused entry under the 1968 Act were held in Heathrow Airport's 15-person capacity 'detention suite', or in police stations, remand homes and prisons while their removal was arranged back to where they had travelled from.²⁹³ In law these refused and detained migrants held no right to appeal the decision of the immigration officer who had refused their entry, a decision that led to their temporary detention. By contrast, all aliens had that right of appeal under the Aliens Order of 1920.

Many MPs saw this discrepancy as racial discrimination, and viewed it as contravening the proud tradition of British rule of law supposedly upheld in the metropole, through which Parliament derived its legitimacy. Significantly, for many this racism was an accidental

²⁹¹ Ibid.

²⁹² 'Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968: Qualification of Entry into the UK' (1 December 1968), FCO 50/329, TNA.

²⁹³ Bosworth, *Inside Immigration Detention*, 36.

aberration to be ironed out legislatively, in order to repair and protect the hallowed principle of British rule of law that was the proud and cherished legacy of Britain's empire.

This was the parliamentary and media context in which Home Office officials drafted and offered up the Immigration Appeals Act of 1969. The legislation directed the creation of a separate Immigration Tribunal to divert contestations of deportation policy away from the criminal justice framework.²⁹⁴ This would place the Commonwealth citizen/immigrant at further remove from the protections of the Criminal Justice Act of 1948.

Anticipating the Immigrant Appeals Act of 1969, the Home Office's B2 Deportation Division set to work on ways to mitigate the incoming legislation. The Head of B2, Mr W. J. Bohan, sought the opinion of the Home Office's Senior Legal Advisor, QC John Pakenham-Walsh on B2's proposal to build a new 'hostel near London Airport' where 'women and children would be detained by Securicor guards acting as agents of the airlines and at the airlines' expense.'²⁹⁵ People would be detained at the Harmondsworth 'hostel' while they awaited firstly, their appeal against refusal of entry, and subsequently, their administrative removal back to where they had come from. Crucially, this hostel would sit alongside the Immigration Tribunal Court within the same locked-down site.

As detailed elsewhere by Mary Bosworth, the hostel was built in a hurry, using an expedited local planning application lodged in the fraught weeks before the Immigration Appeals Act received Royal Assent on 16 May 1969.²⁹⁶ Harmondsworth detention centre opened in early 1970 with a capacity to detain forty-four people. Despite regular changes between the various multinational private security companies running Harmondsworth, it still exists today, rebuilt nearby on the same bypass, with a twin facility – Colnbrook – across a single service road. As of 2023, Harmondsworth and Colnbrook provide 'secure accommodation' for 965 detainees, and remain the procedural and operational heart of the UK's monstrous immigration detention estate.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁴ *Immigration Appeals Act*, 1969, Part 1, Section 1(b).

²⁹⁵ 'Places of Detention: London Airport', 30 September 1968, in 'Detention of Commonwealth Citizens on Refusal of Admission to the United Kingdom.' (1968 - 1972), HO 344/186, TNA.

²⁹⁶ Mary Bosworth, *Inside Immigration Detention* (Oxford: OUP Oxford, 2014), 38.

²⁹⁷ Independent Monitoring Board, 'Annual Report of the Independent Monitoring Board at Heathrow Immigration Removal Centre', 18 August 2023, <https://imb.org.uk/news/home-office-failings-and-lack-of-investment-undermine-the-fair-and-humane-treatment-of-people-in-detention/>.

Chapter Two

Not fit for purpose: colonial patterns of crisis and reform

Introduction

How the Home Office situates itself in time, how it manages change, refers to the past and plans for the future, is part of how it projects, remakes, manages and maintains its power and legitimacy. Patterns of crisis and reform circulate through the wide institutional history and day-to-day working culture of the Home Office. This chapter assembles a chronology of changing administrative structures within the Civil Service and the Home Office, changes that were prompted by crises, resolved by reforms, and often resulted in an increase of the institution's bureaucratic power. It maps the historical thinking at work within the popular narrative that the Home Office is 'not fit for purpose', and it unpacks how this narrative helps to resecure, maintain and expand Britain's mass deportation regime.

In 2006, in the aftermath of the so-called 'foreign prisoner crisis', the Home Office was declared 'not fit for purpose' by incoming Home Secretary John Reid.²⁹⁸ The next year, responsibilities for the prison estate, sentencing and parole were taken from the Home Office and invested in a newly created Ministry of Justice. The Home Office was further reorganised by the dissolution of the Immigration Service (IS) and the formation of an 'executive agency' titled UK Border Agency (UKBA).²⁹⁹ This new agency was created by merging three separate departments – UK Visas, HM Revenue and Customs and the Border and Immigration Agency – in order 'to track and intercept terrorists and criminals, as well as, of course, illegal immigrants.'³⁰⁰ UKBA was to be commanded by a Director of Operations rather than by the Home Secretary or another minister. That Director of Operations would answer to the Home Secretary and yet accountability for crises within this somewhat externalised executive agency would sit more clearly with the UKBA rather than with the Home Office. This was also the moment in which the UK Border Force was created, kitted out in police-like uniforms, resembling the police enough to redouble the affective impact of its powers of arrest and detention over people suspected of 'immigration crimes.'³⁰¹ Nonetheless after further crises

²⁹⁸ The 'crisis' unfolded after the Home Office admitted that more than 1,000 'foreign criminals' were released between 1999 and 2006 without being considered for deportation. For detailed analysis, see Luke De Noronha, 'Unpacking the Figure of the "Foreign Criminal": Race, Gender and the Victim-Villain Binary', in *COMPAS*, 2015, https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/2015/wp-2015-121-denoronha_unpacking_foreign_criminal/.

²⁹⁹ Britain's Immigration Service (IS) was the operational port-based arm of the Home Office's Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND), between 1973 and 2007. The IS was preceded by the Immigration Branch, (1933 – 1973), and that by the Aliens Branch (1920 – 1933). In 2007 the IS was replaced by the short-lived Border and Immigration Agency (BIA), which in 2008 became the UKBA.

³⁰⁰ PM Gordon Brown, HC Debate, 25 July 2007, cc 842.

³⁰¹ Phe Amis and Tom Kemp, 'Why Borders and Prisons, Border Guards and Police?', in *Abolishing the Police: An Illustrated Introduction*, ed. Koshka Duff (Dog Section Press, 2021), 52–67.

the Home Office abolished UKBA in 2013, and the former once again took direct control over, and accountability for, Britain's border regime. A year after the UKBA's abolition, the National Audit Office found that 'it was not apparent that [a] new structure would increase operational performance.'³⁰²

Throughout the 2010s, the movement against immigration detention, deportation and the Home Office's hostile environment grew in scale and reach through community organising, strategic litigation, policy work and investigative journalism.³⁰³ These struggles surfaced and dramatized the repeated scandals, crises and human rights abuses produced by the racial violence of the Home Office's documentation regime and its private, outsourced detention centres, charter flight transportation and deportation escort services, and asylum housing.³⁰⁴ As we know well from both the Windrush records scandal and the 2014 and 2016 Immigration Acts connected to it, for the Home Office and Britain's leading political parties the 'operational performance' of Britain's border regime is measured in terms of, firstly, the quantifiable 'net migration' into the United Kingdom, and secondly, the numerical 'backlog' of cases awaiting decisions by Home Office officials.³⁰⁵ Discursively, the latter operates first to signify of the Home Office's 'broken' and inefficient system, and second to suggest that the Home Office system has been 'broken' by the unmanageable scale of the net migration rates.

In 2022, Home Secretary Priti Patel announced a 'new plan for immigration' to reform the 'broken global asylum system.'³⁰⁶ The resulting *UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership* was presented as a deterrent to the increasing, and increasingly spectacularised, numbers of people crossing the English channel in small boats during the Covid19 pandemic on account of decreased lorry traffic and cancelled flights. The Rwanda plan – to relocate asylum-seekers arriving 'illegally' into the UK to live instead in Rwanda – was pronounced 'a template for how to deliver a fairer and more effective global asylum system – one that deters criminality, exploitation and abuse' and 'breaks the business model of criminal gangs of people smugglers.'³⁰⁷

³⁰² NAO quoted in Matthew Gill, Nathaniel Amos, and Grant Dalton, 'How to Abolish a Public Body: Ten Lessons from Previous Restructures' (Institute for Government, 8 March 2023), 9, <https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publication/abolish-public-bodies>

³⁰³ For reflections comparing the 2010s and the current context in the 2020s, see Bobby Phe Amis, Helen Brewer, Tom Kemp and Joel White, 'Shut them down: non-reformist reforms in anti-detention organising' in *Border Abolition*, (London: Pluto, forthcoming).

³⁰⁴ See for instance, Phil Miller et al., *Collective Expulsion: The Case Against Britain's Mass Deportation Charter Flights* (Corporate Watch, 2013); Corporate Watch, *The UK Border Regime: A Critical Guide* (Corporate Watch, 2018).

³⁰⁵ For a discussion of how history gets "done" within the nexus of the "Windrush generation", see Kennetta Hammond Perry, 'Undoing the Work of the Windrush Narrative', *History Workshop*, 11 September 2018, <https://www.historyworkshop.org.uk/anti-racism/undoing-the-work-of-the-windrush-narrative/>.

³⁰⁶ Home Office, 'Repairing the Broken Asylum System Is a Moral Imperative - Home Office in the Media', Home Office in the Media, 19 May 2022, <https://homeofficemedia.blog.gov.uk/2022/05/19/repairing-the-broken-asylum-system-is-a-moral-imperative/>.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

The last two decades' pattern of crises cultivated by the Home Office – escaping foreign criminals, scrounging illegal immigrants, unauthorised smalls boats, criminal gangs of people smugglers – all depend on a notion of 'immigration fraudulence': the belief that people racialised as immigrants are cheating, deceiving and defrauding the immigration system to gain entry to Britain and its besieged welfare state.³⁰⁸ Despite the sense of urgency and emergency projected on to each crisis, there is in fact 'nothing new under the sun' about the Home Office's circular reasoning about illegalised immigration and 'criminal gangs of people smugglers.' In 1968, referring to the time of the 1905 Aliens Act, immigration officer and historian T. W. E. Roche pronounced that 'there is, as I have constantly reiterated in these pages, nothing new under the sun, and similar artifices today are employed by those who are making money out of facilitating the entry of Commonwealth immigrants.'³⁰⁹

This is a chapter about how proverbs like *there is nothing new under the sun* circulate through the history of the Home Office as *not fit for purpose*. In other words, this is about how Britain's mass deportation regime is made and maintained through recurring moral panics about immigration fraudulence that feed cycles of crises and reform that expand carceral state power. What kinds of historical imaginaries and affective temporalities are embedded in the Home Office's *not fit for purpose* narrative? What does that narrative *do*?

After all, there are some things that *are* new under the sun. The cycle of crises at the Home Office happen within an immigration system that was substantively remodelled by the 1971 Immigration Act. As demonstrated by Mike Slaven, this change happened after 'the purported failure [of the Home Office] to reduce non-white immigration enough became intertwined with the state's supposed lack of strictness in catching rulebreakers.'³¹⁰ Forged documents, illegalised entry, and so-called illegitimate claims to British nationality and National Assistance had loomed large in Enoch Powell's 'Rivers of Blood' speech. In the wake of Powell's speech, Ted Heath's Conservative Government of 1970 promised and implemented a change in Home Office immigration policy. The new system moved away from the aggregate numerical capping policy enacted by the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act and instead devised a scheme of individualised scrutiny over immigrants' compliance. In doing so it drew on racist stereotypes of deviance, corruption and criminality produced over centuries of racial capitalism overseas. New Commonwealth citizens were reframed as foreign guests, either compliant or deviant, to be authorised or disqualified on a case-by-case basis, but altogether utterly undeserving of automatic entitlement to either Britishness or entry to the British mainland.

³⁰⁸ Even the mainstream public furore at the Home Office's cruel expulsion of Windrush generation migrants reinforced the "good immigrant" rhetoric through which many are discounted as undeserving, non-compliant and proto-criminal rule-breakers.

³⁰⁹ T. W. E. Roche, *Key in the Lock: Immigration Control in England from 1066 to the Present Day*, (London: John Murray, 1969), 73.

³¹⁰ Mike Slaven, 'The Windrush Scandal and the Individualization of Postcolonial Immigration Control in Britain', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 45, no. 16 (10 December 2022): 57.

This shift into a regime of individualised scrutiny lay the foundation for the emergence of what Anna Tuckett has called the UK's 'documentation regime', in which, as Slaven writes, 'over time, policymakers began associating relative undocumentedness with various forms of illegality.'³¹¹ The pattern of crises at the Home Office, and the cyclical declarations of the institution as *not fit for purpose*, depend on this association of undocumentedness with illegality, as if more work-flow processes and chains of command put down in documents, and more immigration rules added to the labyrinthine index, will deliver clarity, ensure efficiency and produce lawfulness in place of internal lawlessness and external fraudulence. The solutions proposed to reform this unfitness always expand and strengthen Home Office powers and resources, even as other dimensions of the state – its diminished welfare functions for instance – are rolled back and stripped away.

This chapter reconstructs a pattern of moral panic about immigration fraudulence from the late 1960s to the present day, in order to connect the history of the Home Office as *not fit for purpose* to the global history of Britain's empire. It pieces together a pattern of crises and reform through which Britain's carceral state continually increases in size, durability, reach, resources, and seeming inevitability. I trace a history that reaches back from the present day, through the onset of what is now commonly called 'neoliberalism' to the end of empire, its numerous middles, and its various beginnings. The chapter demonstrates the longevity of internal and external debates about administrative inefficiencies and staffing problems of an institution which, I will show, has been declared not fit for purpose multiple times over the course of its history, connecting the present day to previous episodes in which crises in imperial rule were met with restructures of accountability and reforms to documentation regimes.

The purpose of this chapter is to tease out the racial thinking secured by the historical imaginaries animating the Home Office's not fit for purpose narrative in order to understand how this enduring pattern of crisis and reform secures and remakes both administrative state and capitalist development. This is a history that connects the rise of outsourcing in post-imperial Britain's nascent neoliberal era to a much longer, global history of the outsourced chartered companies governing large regions of Britain's empire.³¹² My account here contributes to historiographical debates about 'racial neoliberalism' by framing the immigration

³¹¹ Anna Tuckett, 'Disjuncture in the Documentation Regime: The Second Generation's Challenge to Citizenship Law' in *Rules, Paper, Status: Migrants and Precarious Bureaucracy in Contemporary Italy*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2018), 110 - 127; Slaven, 2022, 62. For Tuckett's study of documentation regimes in the context of the U.K., see Anna Tuckett, 'Managing Paper Trails after Windrush: Migration, Documents and Bureaucracy', *Journal of Legal Anthropology* 3, no. 2 (December 2019): 120–23.

³¹² For the historical development of English Common Law in relation to imperial statecraft and capital, see Katharina Pistor, *The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality* (Princeton: University Press, 2019). See also, Kojo Koram, *Uncommon Wealth: Britain and the Aftermath of Empire* (John Murray, 2023). For an important study of how the end of the British empire reshaped Britain's core institutions including the Bank of England, the Royal Mint, the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, and Oxbridge universities, see Sarah Stockwell, *The British End of the British Empire* (Cambridge: CUP, 2020).

system changes of the late 1960s as part and parcel with changing modes of accumulation and labour regimes that we can call neoliberal. In the last decade, a wealth of new scholarship has drawn out what Siddhant Issar calls the ‘colour-blindness’ of dominant critiques of neoliberal rationality.³¹³ The political economy of both empire and decolonisation have become key analytics for redrawing genealogies of neoliberalism. Focusing on the Home Office’s *not fit for purpose* narrative allows me to draw out, as Axster et al have, the ‘deep historical continuities between ‘the “new” and “neoliberal” forms of domestic control’ – such as immigration control, policing, incarceration and surveillance – that manifest ‘the global longue durée of racialised and colonial accumulation by dispossession.’³¹⁴

By tracing a moral panic in the late 1960s about immigration fraudulence up to the present day, I follow Robbie Shilliam in ‘helping to assess the degree to which the current debate [about immigration] owes an intellectual debt to [Enoch] Powell in terms of its analytical framing rather than simply its moral character.’³¹⁵ In taking moral panics and anxieties about documents as my starting point, I follow Ann Laura Stoler’s emphasis on the affective resonance as well as the political origins of a ‘racialized common sense about people and places.’³¹⁶ I have anchored this chapter, therefore, around close readings of two accounts of postimperial immigration control written by two retired immigration officers.

The first, *The Key in the Lock: Immigration Control in England from 1066 to the Present Day*, was written by Thomas William Edgar Roche, a steam railway enthusiast, local historian of medieval Cornwall and an Assistant Chief Inspector in the Immigration Service during the 1960s. Published in 1969, Roche’s history of immigration control describes ‘how history has repeated itself in a demand this time for a control of Commonwealth Immigration, resulting in the Acts of 1962 and 1968.’³¹⁷ The second, *The Branch is Broken*, is a memoir written in 2013 and self-published by Tim Stocke (real name Mike Scott), an immigration officer compelled into early retirement by the reorganisation of the IS into the UKBA in 2008. The memoir, proudly not ‘well-balanced and politically correct’, details an immigration officer’s career between 1971 and the mid-2000s, and offers ‘an explanation why the UK Border Agency is currently a shambles.’³¹⁸ I use these partisan sources to unpack the historical imaginaries and nascent forms of misremembering empire coursing through the day-to-day doing of

³¹³ See for instance, Siddhant Issar, ‘Listening to Black Lives Matter: Racial Capitalism and the Critique of Neoliberalism’, *Contemporary Political Theory* 20 (2021): 48–71 and Quinn Slobodian, ‘Perfect Capitalism, Imperfect Humans: Race, Migration and the Limits of Ludwig von Mises’s Globalism’, *Contemporary European History* 28, no. 2 (2019): 143–55.

³¹⁴ Sabrina Axster et al., ‘Colonial Lives of the Carceral Archipelago: Rethinking the Neoliberal Security State’, *International Political Sociology* 15, no. 3 (1 September 2021): 415.

³¹⁵ ‘Robbie Shilliam, ‘VIEWPOINT: Populism and the Spectre of Enoch Powell’, *Discover Society* (blog), 4 December 2018, <https://archive.discover society.org/2018/12/04/viewpoint-populism-and-the-spectre-of-eno-ch-powell/>.

³¹⁶ Ann Laura Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton University Press, 2010), 24.

³¹⁷ Roche, *Key in the Lock*, book jacket.

³¹⁸ Tim Stocke, *The Branch Is Broken* (AuthorHouse UK, 2013), back cover.

immigration control by those putting Home Office laws and policies into practice at Britain's borders. I do so to trace the historical making of what Gargi Bhattacharyya et al call 'the racialised nationalism of this moment' in the 2020s, which is supposed to 'redirect the very real disappointment and dispossession arising from economic crisis, the fragmentation of the welfare state and the doubling down of state practices.'³¹⁹ It is a moment in which Britain – both as a former empire and as a bordered nation-state – is supposed to be fit for purpose for people racialised as white Britons, and purposefully not fit for purpose for those deemed unfit for, and undeserving of, secure belonging in the British mainland.

The chapter begins by outlining the pattern of crises and reform through which the modern Civil Service itself emerged from the entanglement of the East India Company rule and the British Government. The following section connects these eighteenth and nineteenth century anxieties about Company Rule to postimperial Britain in the 1960s, focusing on a moral panic about immigration fraudulence thematised by both immigration officers and Enoch Powell. The third part unpacks the historical imaginaries circulating through an immigration officer's experience of the 'problems of the Jumbo Jet Age' and the impact of the end of empire upon working conditions in the Immigration Service.³²⁰ The final section details a yearly 'tradition' upheld between 1974 and 2013 by a group of retiring and retired immigration officers, and demonstrates the structural racist violence made possible by the particular historical imaginaries at work in how the Home Office does history.

Crises and East India Company rule

The East India Company (EIC) 'emerged at the turn of the [seventeenth] century when England was spearheading the "outsourcing" of its imperial adventures.'³²¹ It was formed by Royal Charter on 31 December 1600 to enable English merchants to participate in, and try to monopolize, the spice trade in the Indian subcontinent, East and Southeast Asia. The EIC was part of an explosive rise of private companies, each of which paid hefty payments to the Crown in exchange for a monopoly on trading rights and often also the private investment of the monarch and other key parts of the ruling class. Many shareholders and directors of the East India Company were also involved in the Royal African Company, undertaking some of the first slave-trading expeditions to West Africa, as well as the Levant Company. Despite being an executive agency ostensibly external to the British Government, the EIC governed most of the Indian subcontinent, which was Britain's prize imperial possession.

³¹⁹ Gargi Bhattacharyya et al., *Empire's Endgame: Racism and the British State* (London: Pluto, 2021), 12.

³²⁰ Roche, *Key in the Lock*, 218.

³²¹ Koram, *Uncommon Wealth*, 42.

However from the mid-eighteenth century, the corruption, brutality and immorality of EIC servants overseas provoked outrage in England. Company servants returning to England with immense wealth amassed during the violent conquest of territory and trading relationships in the Indian Subcontinent became nicknamed the ‘nabobs.’ The term was borrowed from the North-Indian language word *nawab* for local rulers, local rulers who were racialised as despots in the English imagination. The resulting moral panic thematised the Company Servants’ corruption and genocidal behaviour in India, although often only as an afterthought added to louder outrage over the threat of parliamentary corruption posed by the nabobs. Nabobs’ ill-gotten new wealth amounted to colossal new purchasing power, and by buying land in so-called ‘rotten boroughs’ many could effectively purchase representation as MPs, positions previously limited to the landed gentry. Fears grew that the EIC’s culture of bribes and corruption would infect Parliament as an institution, and would undermine Parliament’s oversight over the EIC and its self-interest. The spectacular collapse of the Company’s finances in 1772 turned these fears about corrupt company servants into indignation at the incompetent administration of the Company overall.

Two prominent Company officials Robert Clive and later Governor-General Warren Hastings soon became the targets of attacks by MPs and investigations by parliamentary committees. Edmund Burke led a long campaign to impeach Hastings on charges of high crimes and misdemeanours throughout the 1780s, leading to Hastings’ spectacular trial beginning in 1788.³²² In the late eighteenth century, a pattern emerged in which Royal Charters granted by Parliament to the EIC (in 1793, 1813, 1833 and 1853) increasingly eroded the Company’s commercial rights and trading monopolies. As Priya Satia has persuasively argued, before the 1857 Indian Uprising, ‘liberal imperialism had depended on a notion of original sin – the scandal of eighteenth century conquest – that might be redeemed by a reformist style of imperialism.’³²³ A central component of this reformist style of imperialism lay in periodic proposals to train, educate and discipline the recruits to the East India Company as well as to repeated attempts to intervene in the system of patronage through which the Company recruited. In the 1790s, committees had been set up and legislation enacted to stop the lucrative sale of writerships by the EIC’s Board of Directors to the wealthy families of prospective recruits. In 1806, the East India College was set up to train young men between the ages of 15 and 21 with lessons in local Indian languages, political economy, history and mathematics and moral discipline to prepare them for entering the writership tier of the East

³²² Priya Satia argues that the acquittal of Warren Hastings in 1795 was a turning point after which Edmund Burke’s case against him deflected focus from the scandal of empire itself. Priya Satia, *Time’s Monster: History, Conscience and Britain’s Empire*, (Penguin, 2022), 109.

³²³ Satia, *Time’s Monster*, 109.

India Company.³²⁴ Crucially, the East India College was where the phrase *civil servant* was first used.

The College, soon known as Haileybury, was purpose-built in Hertfordshire, England, after a debate about the unsuitability of overseas climates and environments for training young English men who might, it was suggested, become corrupted by the climate – physical and moral – in India. Haileybury was built in conjunction with Fort William College, set up in Calcutta in 1802 also to train administrators.³²⁵ The two colleges had ostensibly similar aims yet soon showed a clash of personalities within the East India Company, throwing into relief the many problems of the patronage system.³²⁶ This debate was itself a renewal of the existing script about the damaging, un-reforming effects of India's *nawabs* on the Company servants. The unruly indiscipline of the Haileybury's pupils was frequently thematised in Parliament as both a microcosm and a cause of the 'unfitness' of the young recruits going to India as company servants. In an impassioned attack on the institutional culture of the College, Lord Grenville described its pupils as having become 'a distinct class like an Indian caste.'³²⁷ Together with the 'purpose' of the young men's curriculum, particularly their language learning or lack thereof, the debates about scandals at Haileybury frequently suggested that the Company directors, the College itself and the Company's servants were not fit for purpose.

The 'reformist style of liberal imperialism' described by Priya Satia routed through the East India Company to shape the emergence of a Home Civil Service in the British mainland. Practices and ideas migrated between India and the British mainland, carried back and forth by the physical migration of prominent personalities. For instance, Charles Trevelyan, one half of the duo responsible for the mid-century reforms to Britain's Home Civil Service, was himself educated at Haileybury College, followed by a stint at Fort William College. Trevelyan rose to prominence as an EIC official in the 1820s when he led the reform of Delhi's *madrasa* into Delhi College, an institution prioritising English language instruction and premised upon the arguments pushed by his brother-in-law, Thomas Babington Macauley.³²⁸ Trevelyan returned to the British mainland in 1840 to serve as assistant secretary at the Treasury. By that time, the practice and principle of the Treasury seeking to control government departments' spending had been solidifying since Edmund Burke's push for economical reform during the

³²⁴ Catherine Hall, 'Making Colonial Subjects: Education in the Age of Empire', *History of Education* 37, no. 6 (November 2008): 773–87; Robert Lynn McCarter, 'The John Company's College: Haileybury and the British Government's Attempt to Control the Indian Civil Service' (PhD Diss, Texas Tech University, 1981); Callie Wilkinson, 'The East India College Debate and the Fashioning of Imperial Officials, 1806–1858', *The Historical Journal* 60, no. 4 (2017): 943–69.

³²⁵ Fort William College was the controversial pet-project of empire-builder Arthur Wellesley, the first Duke of Wellington.

³²⁶ For analyses of 'patronage' in the East India Company see Joshua Ehrlich, 'The East India Company and the Politics of Knowledge', (PhD Diss, Harvard University, 2018).

³²⁷ Thomas Robert Malthus, *A Letter to Lord Grenville* (Johnson and Company, 1813), 17.

³²⁸ For primary documents relating to the split between "Anglicists" like Macauley and "Orientalists", see Lynn Zastoupil and Martin Moir, *The Great Indian Education Debate: Documents Relating to the Orientalist-Anglicist Controversy, 1781-1843* (London: Curzon, 1999).

EIC crisis of the late eighteenth century. The Treasury had since been granted the right to control part of Civil List expenditure by parliamentary approval.³²⁹ These changes had been made to resolve crises relating to East India Company rule, crises which boomeranged back around to shape principles, practices and institutions in the British mainland.

In 1853 Thomas Babington Macauley published a report recommending the reform of the Indian Civil Service.³³⁰ A year later Macauley's brother-in-law Charles Trevelyan published *The Northcote-Trevelyan Report* with Stafford Northcote. Despite coming up through the patronage system himself, Trevelyan and his colleague Stafford Northcote led a push to rid public office of recruitment via patronage. They recommended establishing salaries in place of the sinecures, fees and emoluments through which positions in public office had become lucrative business, in ways modelled on the East India Company. The 1854 Report found that the Civil Service of the mid-nineteenth century was beset by 'complaints of official delays, official evasions of difficulty and official indisposition to improvement.'³³¹ A culture of indolence and entitlement was entrenched by systems of appointment by political or personal patronage to the highest positions of leadership, which left 'public servants of long standing and undoubted merit' in the lower ranks of the service.³³²

Eventually in 1858, following widespread mutinies and civilian rebellions during the 1857 Indian Uprising, the EIC lost all its powers and privileges when Parliament passed the Government of India Act 1858. The Company's territories and military forces were taken under the Crown, and the role of Director of the Company morphed into a ministerial position: the Secretary of State for India. Competitive exams had been introduced in 1855, just before the Uprising, and soon there were tensions between the 'Old India Hands' and the newer generation. Once again, the accusation was that the newer generation (of 'competition wallahs') did not have the training or skills needed to understand or rule India. Resistance to competitive entry was even stronger in the Home Civil Service.³³³ Almost two decades passed until the Home Office fully implemented the Northcote-Trevelyan recruitment reforms.

Nonetheless, by the early twentieth century, the first generation of open competition entrants had risen into senior positions throughout the Civil Service. The career of Sir Edward Troup, permanent secretary to the Home Office between 1908 and 1922, was a case in point.³³⁴ Accordingly, the period between the First World War and the mid 1950s has been described

³²⁹ Jill Pellew, *The Home Office, 1848-1914, from Clerks to Bureaucrats* (Fairleigh Dickinson, 1982), 11.

³³⁰ Thomas Babington Macauley, *Report on the Indian Civil Service*, 1854, accessed at https://www.civilservant.org.uk/library/1854-Macauley_Report.pdf; Stafford Henry Northcote and Charles Edward Trevelyan, *Report on the Organisation of the Permanent Civil Service*, (London: HMSO, 1854).

³³¹ *Ibid.*, 5.

³³² *Ibid.*, 6.

³³³ John M. Compton, 'Open Competition and the Indian Civil Service, 1854-1876', *The English Historical Review* 83, no. 327 (1968): 265-84.

³³⁴ For details of Troup's career, see Chapter 1.

as 'the apogee of the Northcote-Trevelyan ideal'. This was an era during which the Civil Service developed 'a central machine for the effective exercise of political and administrative power' that prepared the Service for its 'finest hour' orchestrating the war effort between 1939 and 1945.³³⁵ By all official accounts, this was the golden epoch of Britain's Home Civil Service. It was a time in which Sir Edward Bridges, a prominent senior civil servant, could confidently present a 'portrait' of the 'training and tradition, the outlook of mind, and aspirations' of 'the higher staffs of Whitehall, the headquarters staffs of Government, who handle the broader questions of administration and policy.'³³⁶

Bridges himself retired at the end of 1956 at the age of 64. The autumn of 1956 had witnessed the Suez Crisis. Within the official history of the British Civil Service, Suez is regarded a critical turning point that damaged public confidence in what Bridges had encapsulated as 'the Civil Service Tradition' forged out of Northcote and Trevelyan's modernising reforms.³³⁷ That 'training and tradition' and 'outlook of mind' now came increasingly under fire, culminating in the Fulton Committee Inquiry of 1966 'to examine the structure, recruitment and management, including training, of the Home Civil Service, and to make recommendations.'³³⁸

According to the Fulton Committee, the rigid distinctions between what Northcote and Trevelyan had called 'classes' – grades and types – of civil service work, separating policy work from 'mechanical' work, had entrenched a Victorian-era social class system into the culture of government. This had blocked mobility between grades of work in ways that obstructed the emerging technocratic paradigms and incorporation of engineers and scientists into government. Moreover, the Northcote-Trevelyan 'classes' system was now regarded offensive to the postwar social sensibilities around speaking about class, in which the word 'could produce feelings of inferiority.'³³⁹ The Fulton Report expressly described the Home Civil Service as 'still fundamentally the product of the nineteenth century philosophy of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report [but] the tasks it faces are those of the second half of the twentieth century.'³⁴⁰ In other words, the Fulton Report had found Britain's Home Civil Service at the end of empire to be entirely not fit for purpose.

³³⁵ Rodney Lowe, 'WAR AND PEACE: THE FISHER-BRIDGES SETTLEMENT, 1916–56', in *The Official History of the British Civil Service* (Routledge, 2011).

³³⁶ Edward Bridges, *Portrait of a Profession the Civil Service Tradition*. (Cambridge: CUP, 1950), 5.

³³⁷ For an account of the Suez Crisis trained on civil servants and government officials rather than politicians, see Saul Kelly and Anthony Gorst, *Whitehall and the Suez Crisis* (London, Curzon, 2000).

³³⁸ Fulton Committee, *The Fulton Report* (Royal Institute of Public Administration, 1969), 3.

³³⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

Immigration fraudulence in the late 1960s

On the 24 April 1968, 40 immigration officers from Heathrow Airport sent a petition to Enoch Powell. The petition expressed support for his infamous ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech in Birmingham.³⁴¹ The speech had called for an end to the permanent immigration of ‘Commonwealth immigrants and their descendants.’³⁴² Powell’s anti-immigrant rhetoric was structured around his strident belief that despite Britain’s long life as a global imperial power, ‘the continuity of [England’s] existence was unbroken.’³⁴³ In other words, England as an island nation had maintained its authentic home-grown character by preserving its ‘unique and uniquely ancient institutions [of] the law, the monarchy and particularly Parliament.’³⁴⁴ An end to ‘permanent coloured immigration’, Powell argued, would allow the forging of a new post-imperial nation in which ‘our generation [...could...] find ourselves once more akin with the old English.’³⁴⁵ A new postimperial nation, held together with affinities with the Horsas, Hengists, King Vortigerns and King Alfreds of the ‘old English’, the kind of cartoons animating the Home Office Retired Staff Association’s *HORSA Chronicle* newsletter.³⁴⁶

The 40 immigration officers’ petition invited Enoch Powell ‘to pay a weekend visit to the airport so that he can see exactly what goes on here.’³⁴⁷ Their spokesman reported to the *Evening Standard* that the officers were ‘fed up with the corruption and deceit that goes on to get immigrants into the country [that] has been going on for years’.³⁴⁸ In turn, T. W. E. Roche’s history of ‘Immigration Control in England from 1066 to the Present Day’ of 1969 dutifully dedicated four pages to the favourable coverage of ‘our hard-pressed Immigration Officers’ in the papers, television and the House of Commons.³⁴⁹

Come, let’s unpack this ‘corruption and deceit that goes on to get immigrants into the country.’ Not so that we can repeat and authenticate, like Roche did but so we ‘can see exactly what goes on here.’ By *seeing exactly what goes on here*, I actually mean, tracing the kinds of conjuring tricks and ‘strange manoeuvring that is part of what we call racecraft’, which give racism its ‘now you see it, now you don’t’ quality.³⁵⁰ I will lay out the loops of racist circular reasoning through which Roche not only associated ‘corruption and deceit’ with ‘the lucrative racket [of] the false documentation and transportation of penniless immigrants’, but also

³⁴¹ The National Archives, ‘Support for Enoch Powell’, (blog) 14 March 2023, <https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/resources/sixties-britain/support-ench-powell/>.

³⁴² Enoch Powell, ‘Rivers of Blood’, 1968.

³⁴³ Enoch Powell, Speech to the Royal Society of St. George, 1964, quoted in Tom Nairn, ‘Enoch Powell: The New Right’, *New Left Review* 61, no. 3 (1970): 5.

³⁴⁴ David Olusoga, *Black and British: A Forgotten History* (London: Macmillan, 2016), 12.

³⁴⁵ Powell, in Nairn, *Enoch Powell*, 5.

³⁴⁶ See Chapter 1.

³⁴⁷ Roche, *Key in the Lock*, 245.

³⁴⁸ ‘Airport’s Watchdogs back Enoch’, 24 April 1968, *The Evening Standard*, quoted in Roche, *Key in the Lock*, 245.

³⁴⁹ Sir Cyril Osborne to the Home Secretary, quoted in Roche, *Key in the Lock*, 246.

³⁵⁰ Barbara and Karen Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life* (Verso, 2022), 16.

presented corruption and deceit as the inherent, timeless, racial attributes of ‘penniless immigrants’, particularly those from the Indian subcontinent.³⁵¹

Roche’s text pointed to fake entry stamps on passports, ‘forgeries [which] began to fetch a healthy price’ after the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act made it necessary for Commonwealth citizens to show an embarkation stamp as evidence of the person’s returning-resident status. Blocked from the 1962 Act’s labour quota system, Commonwealth citizens began entering the United Kingdom on student visas, as ‘fake’ students who had been ‘hoodwinking the British representative overseas’ as Roche saw it.³⁵² He bemoaned the lucrative racket in forged vaccination certificates, through which ‘Commonwealth immigration has brought to this country diseases which had long since been banished from its shores.’³⁵³ He implicitly associated the arrival of Asian immigrants with the contagious spread of disease, and moreover associated the spread of disease with the infectious undoing of historical progress, as if the 1960s were being haunted by late Victorian immigration quarantine controls.³⁵⁴ Immigrants were, according to Roche, even faking their ages to abuse the existing system of allowing in dependent children under 16 and elderly parents over 65. This ‘matter [was] complicated by the almost total lack of a proper system of registration of births in the Indian subcontinent’, a subcontinent which was administered by the East India Company and the British Crown until 1947, context missing from Roche’s moaning.³⁵⁵ This moral panic about forgery and fraudulence even extended to the family itself: ‘penniless immigrants’ were suspected of faking family relationships as part of the ‘corruption and deceit that goes on to get immigrants into the country.’³⁵⁶ ‘Is the boy really going to his father,’ asked Roche, ‘or is the older man who has come to collect him no relation at all merely a compatriot intending to exploit his working abilities?’³⁵⁷ Here exploitation, corruption and deceit applied only to the racialised immigrant ‘older man’, depicted as a bad father figure, leaving unspoken the widescale exploitation, corruption and deceit of the British Empire. To Roche’s mind, only scientific and medical modern machinery could help the British immigration officer deal with suspicious and deceitful ‘penniless immigrants.’ Only ‘arranging for an x-ray test [to] get a rough idea of the age of the child’ could cut through all the corruption and deceit of these faked ages and forged families, to arrive at the historical truth of the matter.³⁵⁸

³⁵¹ Roche, *Key in the Lock*, 237.

³⁵² Ibid.

³⁵³ Ibid.

³⁵⁴ Ibid.

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

³⁵⁶ Ibid, 243.

³⁵⁷ Ibid.

³⁵⁸ Ibid. For analyses of the infamous “virginity testing” abuse of South Asian women arriving on spousal visas to UK airports in the 1970s, see Evan Smith and Marinella Marmo, *Race, Gender and the Body in British Immigration Control: Subject to Examination*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Sita Balani, ‘What’s Love Got to Do with It? Marriage and the Security State’, *Identities* 30, no. 2 (4 March 2023): 257–75.

Next Roche reeled in three reported sightings of Pakistani immigrants arriving by small fishing vessels along the Kent coastline and the Thames Estuary. Eight people arrived into Sandwich Bay in August 1967; three more people were apprehended on a train to London ‘having rowed ashore at Hythe’; and 11 others were ‘apprehended by the Police when trying to restart a van at Banstead in Surrey’ with their clothing still wet.³⁵⁹ These three sightings, lifted from newspaper reports in the *Sunday Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*, washed up in a deadly mixture of rumour, report, and circular reasoning; ‘some [sightings] were obviously rumours,’ Roche admitted, ‘but it was certain there was a basis of truth in many.’³⁶⁰ The sightings were only three, an inadequate basis of evidence for the rumours of many landings. But the ‘basis of truth’ that mattered most in this formulation was that the migrants seen arriving illegally were ‘jumping the queue.’ Not examined by immigration officers, and evading the long wait for Commonwealth labour vouchers, these men were imagined as assaulting the invented British custom of queuing up and waiting patiently in turn to enter Britain; or better put, waiting patiently in turn to be turned away by immigration officers.³⁶¹

This queue-jumping, alongside ‘the great waste of official and juridical time’ occasioned by interventions by the ‘organisations for the welfare of immigrants’ against immigration officer decisions, added to this nexus of forgeries and fraudulence.³⁶² All of these gained the authority of evidence through the circular reasoning that made them evident as ‘rumours’ with some ‘basis of truth.’ To follow Roche’s strange manoeuvring is to follow the loops of circular reasoning that go something like this. Immigrants are forging entry stamps in ways that abuse the sanctity of the historical record, falsify the events of the past, and therefore abuse not only immigration control but Britain’s control of time in the future, present and past. Forged vaccination certificates are abusing immigration control, abusing the controlled historical progress of British public health, threatening the British public with diseases of the past.³⁶³ Faked ages and pretended family relationships abused not only immigration control but abused the family as the very ‘basis of truth’ securing the nation’s social contract through which laws and institutions could pass down generation to generation.

To abuse immigration control was to abuse time and history itself, in ways that threatened the orderly progress of British history towards a humanitarian present in which exploitation,

³⁵⁹ Roche, *Key in the Lock*, 244 – 5.

³⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁶¹ For a history of the queue as an “invented [British] tradition”, see Joe Moran, ‘Queuing up in Post-War Britain’, *Twentieth Century British History* 16, no. 3 (1 January 2005): 283–305.

³⁶² Roche, *Key in the Lock*, 234. For analysis of how these paper regimes were unfolding in postcolonial India ‘in the time of Licence Raj’, see Sriraman Tarangini, *In Pursuit Of Proof: A History of Identification Documents in India*, (Oxford: OUP, 2018).

³⁶³ Here it is worth pointing out that, as Robbie Shilliam has carefully shown, although “race” has long structured the making and marking of the ‘undeserving poor’, in the nineteenth century it was primarily the white underclass in the metropole’s urbanising cities who were seen as a dysgenic threat to the body politic. This constituency was racialised as the ‘urban residuum’ distinct from the Anglo-Saxon race. Robbie Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor* (Newcastle: Agenda Publishing, 2018).

corruption and deceit had supposedly become things of the past in Britain, despite continuing in places racialised as elsewhere and un-British. 'The lamentable fact,' Roche explained:–

...was that many simple, semi-illiterate Commonwealth citizens were being ensnared by their compatriots into mortgaging their prospective earnings in this country and what little property they had at home in order to pay for a package deal of a forged passport, bogus supplementary documents and airline ticket. The conditions which gave rise to these things did not apply in Canada, New Zealand and Australia, and therefore it was generally the inhabitants of the Indian sub-continent who suffered.³⁶⁴

Here is the 'busy repertoire of strange manoeuvring that we call racecraft.'³⁶⁵ Immigration control was pitched as a humanitarian tool to protect penniless, illiterate migrants from the deprivation of a normal family life and from the evil of immigration smugglers, explicitly named as 'the Pakistani and Indian businessmen who sit in their offices in Britain and mastermind the traffic.'³⁶⁶ According to Roche, the conditions that gave rise to these things simply did not apply in Canada, New Zealand and Australia, because the conditions that brought about this simple-mindedness, illiteracy, corruption and deceit were conditions attributed, in a circular and unspoken way, to race. The practical unfolding of empire had, over centuries, materialised a growing archive of bureaucratic, juridical and medical evidence proving the 'marrow-deep certainties' that Europeans and empire's racialised others were racially different.³⁶⁷ Racially different in their capacity for moral or immoral propriety, for law-abiding or criminal behaviour, for intelligence or so-called feeble-mindedness, for humanitarian conduct towards their colonised wards or inhumane treatment of their own compatriots.³⁶⁸

The petition of support for Enoch Powell by 40 of the Home Office's immigration officers was, in a way, the officers' answer to the question *how does the Home Office do history?* For these 40 officers, the Home Office was doing history all wrong. It was administering its immigration system in ways that allowed penniless immigrants and their supporters to waste time – in the bureaucratic and juridical sense – and to desecrate the progress of history. Complaints about immigrants' access to Britain's system of National Assistance perpetuated historical imaginaries shaped by the racial thinking of colonial administration and imperialist business, as if the welfare state was being looted and plundered by colonised others – others figured in

³⁶⁴ Roche, *Key in the Lock*, 234.

³⁶⁵ Fields and Fields, *Racecraft*, 16.

³⁶⁶ Roche, *Key in the Lock*, 234.

³⁶⁷ Fields and Fields, *Racecraft*, 19.

³⁶⁸ In relation to the colonial roots of current moral panic about 'criminal people smuggling gangs', scholarship about the British Empire's repeated and generally unsuccessful attempts to regulate and intervene in the transnational migration of millions of Hajjis each year shows the routines of racecraft in which 'Arab captains of dhows and ferry boats' were held responsible for the defrauding of 'ignorant and penniless' West African Hajjis trying to cross the Red Sea. See for instance, JONATHAN MIRAN, "'STEALING THE WAY" TO MECCA: WEST AFRICAN PILGRIMS AND ILLICIT RED SEA PASSAGES, 1920s–50s', *Journal of African History* 56, no. 3 (2015): 389–408.

colonial discourse as ‘recordless people’ – in ways that desecrated and vandalised history itself.³⁶⁹

The 1960s moral panic about immigration fraudulence partly resembled how the eighteenth century East India Company had increased its reach and power within the empire through the construction of a *Document Raj*. As conceptualised by Bhavani Raman, this was a form of government premised on ‘the idea that writing could ensure political accountability and limit the abuse of power by making actions transparent and legible.’³⁷⁰ The East India Company’s bureaucratic universe of papers and files engendered ways of thinking and writing that imagined the world that it recorded could be made transparent, legible, accountable.³⁷¹ Nonetheless as legibility multiplied, so did possibilities of illegibility, creating anxieties about which document was credible, and the ways in which a document arrived to colonial officials to be dealt with.³⁷² These anxieties were profoundly racialised. This is to say that corruption was fashioned as a group-differentiated racial attribute associated with non-European scribes and Cutcherry officials, in ways that dissociated the notion of corruption from the enormous privatised profits made by the East India Company and its European company servants.

Fast-forward – or boomerang back around – to the late 1960s. From one way of looking, to uphold the sanctity of British rule of law, effective immigration control would require more paperwork and documentation in order to sort the entitled from the unentitled. But racially-coded concerns about fraudulence and corruption, predominantly targeted at ‘the inhabitants of the Indian subcontinent’, meant that larger documentation and paperwork requirements at the border in turn created even larger scope for immigration officers to imagine and act upon racialised burdens of proof. The margins widened for officers their on-the-spot discretionary powers to refuse entry on suspicion of a fake entry stamp, or a forged document, a false age or a pretended family relationship. The larger emphasis on paperwork was both produced, and reinforced by racist circular reasoning around the prevalence of immigration document forgeries. This in turn redoubled the necessity for ‘common-sense’, on-the-spot, in-the-moment and off-the-record suspicions, presumptions, decisions and actions of immigration officers at Britain’s borders. If the only answer to ‘immigration control abuse’ was an increased documentation regime, but that documentation regime and its rule of law would always be overwhelmed by abuse by immigrant ‘hoodwinking’, then the stage was set for the system to be constantly in crisis, for the Home Office to be perpetually not fit for purpose and for the Branch to be broken over and over again.

³⁶⁹ For a critique of the construction of colonised people as ‘recordless people’, see Clapperton Mavhunga, *The Mobile Workshop: The Tsetse Fly and African Knowledge Production* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2018), 14 – 16.

³⁷⁰ Bhavani Raman, *Document Raj: Writing and Scribes in Early Colonial South India* (University of Chicago Press, 2012), 3.

³⁷¹ *Ibid.*

³⁷² *Ibid.*

Imperial decline and Immigration Service work

Immigration officers, and at a further remove, their policymaking colleagues at the Home Office in Whitehall, were enmeshed in racecraft's mental terrain of documentation regimes and racialised burdens of proof as they designed and carried out, imagined and acted upon, the infrastructure of Britain's border controls and carceral processes. In the 1960s, expanding London's airport was a central government priority, and Treasury funding was ploughed into an array of private contractors providing Heathrow's multiplying functions. James Vernon has persuasively argued that Heathrow Airport itself was a microcosm of the 'restaging of racial capitalism at home, after empire' in which 'Commonwealth citizens were subjected both to new forms of racism and to exploitation as outsourced workers in emergent forms of neoliberal capitalism.'³⁷³ In other words, the material space of the airport was fashioned by, and helped to fashion, racialised forms of neoliberal capitalism emerging locally amid the reorganisation of the world by constitutional decolonisation and the beginnings of the 'neoliberal counterrevolution of the 1970s.'³⁷⁴

In this part of the chapter, I use T. W. E. Roche and Tim Stocke's accounts of working at Heathrow Airport to think through how immigration officers – at least two of them – experienced their immigration control work during the end of empire. By tracing the historical imaginaries at work in the material expansion of Heathrow Airport, I follow Gargi Bhattacharyya et al in arguing that 'we cannot describe this moment [today] in Britain solely in terms of the *rise* of something, of nativist authoritarianism but we must also pay attention to the overbearing sense of decline – the decline of Britain's greatness, the end of empire.'³⁷⁵ The overtly racist historical imaginaries – of historical decline and the desecrated historical record – that we found in the moral panic about immigration fraudulence also manifested in the material infrastructure of London's expanding Heathrow Airport. According to Roche, in the 1960s Heathrow was growing from an 'unsightly [...] shanty town [...] adaptable to traffic growths' into 'the great immutable castle of later days', to accommodate what he called 'the problems of the jumbo jet age.'³⁷⁶

The problems of the jumbo jet age. What is happening historically in the naming of the 'jumbo jet age' and its problems? How is history being done here? From the perspective of immigration control, the jumbo jet age and its problems translated as the age of decolonisation, and its problems. Roche snidely suggested that 'the possession of jet aircraft became a status

³⁷³ James Vernon, 'Heathrow and the Making of Neoliberal Britain', *Past & Present* 252, no. 1 (2021): 213–47.

³⁷⁴ Adom Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination* (Princeton University Press, 2019), 12.

³⁷⁵ Bhattacharyya et al., *Empire's Endgame*, 187.

³⁷⁶ Roche, *Key in the Lock*, 221.

symbol for emergent nations after independence', and then these enormous 'status symbols' brought bellyfuls of passengers from 'emergent nations' to the United Kingdom.³⁷⁷ The work of the Immigration Service in the newly built 'airless' terminal buildings had begun to resemble 'sitting at the factory bench shelling endless rows of peas.'³⁷⁸ Immigration staff's daily arrival to Heathrow's buildings was marked by 'a sinking feeling in your stomach as you enter the tunnel.'³⁷⁹ As a periodisation, the *jumbo jet age* framed the material expansion of Heathrow Airport as if its expansion was being forced violently upon the site and its staff by unwanted historical forces. This evocative mental and bodily terrain of sinking feelings, tunnels, endless rows, and factory benches, alongside the 'great deal of hard and unpalatable work' expected of immigration officers, evoked a disorientating and degrading landscape of the opening era of Britain's de-industrial revolution.³⁸⁰

The staff of Heathrow Airport, Roche reported, 'now reached the staggering figure of 40,000 so the staff – the IS among them – are forced to move further and further out'. Whereas 'fifteen to twenty years ago everybody lived on the London side', by the late 1960s 'many people are living well to the west of Reading [where] they at least find accommodation within a more acceptable price range.'³⁸¹ The *problems of the Jumbo Jet Age* – roughly translating as the problems of the end of empire – had, to Roche's mind, degraded the working conditions of even the immigration officers in the United Kingdom. He argued: –

There is none of the sense of individual achievement enjoyed by the seaport officer coming ashore from a crossing, be it on the *Invicta* or the *Queen Elizabeth*. The sense of completion when a ship is cleared is not for the London Airport man; there will always be more passengers a minute or so away and always a colleague to take over when one's own stint is done, maybe even to take over one's own case when it lasts too long. Heathrow is in some respects representative of infinity in the worst sense.³⁸²

Roche himself was born in the Plymouth area, moved to Dover in the 1950s for his work with the immigration service, and 'sometime after that, he moved with his wife and three daughters to [...] Dorney Reach', a small village on the Reading side of London Heathrow Airport. I learn this from a pdf floating in my Google search results, cut loose from the Dorney Village Local History Group's website. According to that pdf, Roche himself 'was a prolific author, and his interests and publications ranged far beyond his work – local and medieval history, railways and shipping.'³⁸³

Railways were celebrated, and remain celebrated, as both cause and evidence of 'how Britain made the modern world' with steel track and engines that materialised the progress, the

³⁷⁷ Ibid, 218.

³⁷⁸ Ibid, 223.

³⁷⁹ Ibid.

³⁸⁰ Ibid, 237.

³⁸¹ Ibid, 223.

³⁸² Roche, *Key in the Lock*, 223.

³⁸³ Dorney History Group 'Roche', n.d., accessed 21 December 2022, <https://www.dorney-history-group.org.uk/dorney-parish-news-articles-by-virginia-silvester/>

speeding up, the hurtling momentum, of history and civilisation.³⁸⁴ Railways and shipping, along with the telegraph system, were considered the British Empire's 'most powerful weapon in the cause of Inter-Imperial Commerce.'³⁸⁵ Britain's empire was sustained by global shipping; shipping carried goods to trade, soldiers to colonise or repress, people and labourers migrating, and ideas. By the start of the twentieth century, British shipping owned 40 percent of the world's tonnage. At the outbreak of the First World War, Britain had the largest merchant navy in the world.³⁸⁶ Despite some global changes to shipping during the interwar years, the British share in world shipping remained dominant until 1967, and Britain's Merchant Navy fleet continued to grow until 1975.³⁸⁷

Working conditions at Heathrow Airport in the late 1960s were, Roche insisted, much degraded from those enjoyed by seaport officers completing 'on-passage control' during the Immigration Service's interwar glory-days. Those glory-days had coincided with the heyday of British shipping during the largest spread of the British Empire in the 1920s. More to the point, the zenith of British shipping had brought with it the glory days of the Immigration Service, formative years in which its institutional culture and identity had been forged into 'a splendid tradition despite its youth.'³⁸⁸

The Immigration Service had developed in the 1910s and 1920s under the tight control of Sir William Haldane Porter, 'a man to inspire and be admired, who was synonymous with the phrase *the Chief*.'³⁸⁹ Significantly, Roche described the 'birth' of Porter's immigration service as 'like so many British institutions, though brought into being in an emergency, [surviving] the lack of decorum attendant upon its birth.'³⁹⁰ Such a framing implicitly and somewhat proudly summoned the drama of the Warren Hastings trial and the EIC's late eighteenth century crises, crises aptly described as the 'scene of original sin' by Priya Satia.³⁹¹ Throughout the 1920s the Chief circulated monthly bulletins to his small but scattered department. He 'neglected no detail' in assembling a small, elite male force whose 'officers were comparatively rare birds and proud of that distinction.'³⁹² They were primarily ex-Servicemen, with 'wide experience of the world' and who 'prided themselves on being as unlike the Civil Service as possible.'³⁹³ To Roche's mind, these men were capable of making on-the-spot decisions, equipped with loose enough legal instruments to make those decisions. These were men who were, in themselves,

³⁸⁴ Niall Ferguson, *Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World* (Penguin, 2012).

³⁸⁵ Engineer Charles Tilston Bright (1911) quoted in Ben Marsden, *Engineering Empires a Cultural History of Technology in Nineteenth-Century Britain* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 1.

³⁸⁶ 'Maritime Business During the Twentieth Century: Continuity and Change', accessed 1 May 2023, <https://lawexplores.com/maritime-business-during-the-twentieth-century-continuity-and-change/>.

³⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁸ Roche, *Key in the Lock*, 114.

³⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 111.

³⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 101.

³⁹¹ Satia, *Time's Monster*, 129.

³⁹² Roche, *Key in the Lock*, 101.

³⁹³ *Ibid.*, 115.

not only *fit for purpose* but fit for defining and deciding the purpose to be fit for. For Roche this was a time in which men worked without instructions, inventing and filling ‘the book of General Instructions’ as their experience progressed.³⁹⁴ The group character of this ‘founding club’ would, according to Roche, be passed down and cultivated by later generations of officers, who ‘throughout the years, have been enjoined to display humanity and common-sense in preference to slavish adherence to *the book*.’³⁹⁵

Now let’s dwell on ‘on-passage control’. On-passage control was first instituted in 1919 between Boulogne and Folkstone, after a former Aliens Officer, W.R. Perks, ‘was struck by the appalling conditions in which [immigration control] examination was being carried out’ upon returning British soldiers like himself.³⁹⁶ Not only did on-passage working quickly ‘become a success’, it also became ‘a hallowed tradition’ of the nascent Immigration Service.³⁹⁷ During the general strike of 1926, immigration officers demonstrated their collective commitment to breaking the dockworkers’ strike not only by continuing all on-passage working but also ‘unloading coal wagons, helping discharge cargoes and even driving cranes’ to compensate for the absence of striking workers.³⁹⁸ Immigration officers helped ‘the summer of 1926 to break all records’ of channel crossings despite the mass strikes.³⁹⁹ In short, on-passage working became tacitly associated with the *esprit de corps* and ‘true gusto’ of the ‘high spirited young bloods of the Immigration Service.’⁴⁰⁰ Crucially, after the Second World War:–

...the Cunard Company approached the Home Office with the request that an Immigration Officer should travel right across the Atlantic in the ship so as to be able to deal with the passengers during the whole four days of the eastbound passage [and] the company would give him first class cabin accommodation, he could have his meals in the main dining room during the voyage, and with the ship’s officers while the ship was in port in New York.⁴⁰¹

Step back from the global scale of British shipping, its tipping point finally reached in the late 1960s, and shrink back into Heathrow airport’s airless halls and sinking feelings. To Roche’s mind, processing arrivals and ‘shelling peas’ at Heathrow had none of the first-class glamour, mobility, and historicity of on-passage working. ‘Heathrow is literally in the middle of nowhere’, wrote Roche. He continued: –

Unlike the seaports it has no ancient town at its back to give it corporate entity, historical pride and a sense of “belonging”. It is an outlet and an inlet of the great Metropolis, but not actually part of it; though in some respects a microcosm of

³⁹⁴ Ibid, 104.

³⁹⁵ Ibid, 104, 102.

³⁹⁶ Ibid, 97.

³⁹⁷ Ibid.

³⁹⁸ Ibid, 110.

³⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid, 100. Illustration on page 165.

Metropolitan vice – for the rackets and the racketeers of the big city have their counterparts here, and travel through it – it lacks the solidity of the Metropolis itself.⁴⁰²

Unlike the seaports where the ‘splendid tradition’ of the young Immigration Service had been forged, Heathrow Airport as a material environment deprived the Immigration Service of ‘corporate entity, historical pride and a sense of belonging.’⁴⁰³ By contrasting the tedium of working at Heathrow Airport against the glamour of first-class cabin quarters on a transatlantic ocean liner, Roche articulated the multiple privations of Heathrow Airport Immigration Service work as a fall from grace, entailing what Bhattacharyya et al describe as ‘misremembered [grace] as a state of happy racialised prestige.’⁴⁰⁴ In doing so, Roche renewed and adapted a well-known script of anti-immigrant rhetoric: that immigrant labour depressed working conditions for British workers, even including the working conditions of immigration officers themselves.⁴⁰⁵ The working environment for Immigration Officers in Heathrow Airport in the 1960s, lined up in ‘endless rows shelling peas’ in a wide open terminal hall processing every passenger, from any place, of any type, had lost the strictly classed and highly racialised infrastructures of immigration control at the ports and railway stations of an earlier, fading era. As a no-place, in ‘the middle of nowhere’, Heathrow Airport and its apparent loss of belonging and place-ness appeared as a microcosm for the loss of the secure terms of belonging in Britain at the end of empire.

Obsolete railways and broken punchlines

On the first Wednesday of November, 2009, a large group of 60 or 70 ‘old and new [immigration] officers’ met up in ‘a certain public house in South East London.’⁴⁰⁶ The ‘merry group’ had assembled to commemorate the anniversary of a racist joke first made on ‘a hot Saturday morning in the mid-70s’ in Heathrow’s Terminal 2.⁴⁰⁷ This was the ‘Cape to Cairo rendezvous’, an annual celebration which had initially ‘started off with the original members’ but had since grown to include ‘people who had never even worked at Heathrow.’⁴⁰⁸

I am going to reconstruct the microaggression of that hot Saturday morning in 1974 or 1975. Not to reduce the discussion of racism to the individualised behaviours and prejudices. Nor to suggest the racism of immigration control can be rooted out solely by retiring the ‘old guard’ of old white men from Britain’s immigration service. To be clear, the ‘Cape to Cairo rendezvous’ is, or perhaps now was, a get-together of self-identified ‘old dinosaurs’ who have mostly either

⁴⁰² Ibid, 222 – 223.

⁴⁰³ Ibid, 119.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid, 223; Bhattacharyya et al., *Empire’s Endgame*, 12.

⁴⁰⁵ The institutional origin story of the modern Immigration Service, after all, was indebted to the anti-Semitic rhetoric that ‘uncontrolled entry of aliens from Eastern Europe [at the end of the nineteenth century] had lowered the wages in some of the unorganised trades to starvation point’, necessitating, to the Home Office’s mind, the creation of an Aliens Office after the Aliens Act of 1905. Roche, *Key in the Lock*, 65.

⁴⁰⁶ Stocke, *Branch is Broken*, 276.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid.

retired or died.⁴⁰⁹ Their group identity as ‘the grassroots’ was forged on their cadre’s distance from managers at Whitehall and ‘the current border agency hierarchy.’⁴¹⁰ In many ways this dynamic resembled Roche’s admiration in 1968 for how the 1920s Aliens Branch had styled themselves as modern-day ‘men on the spot’ and proudly cultivated their dissimilarity from the Civil Service proper. Instead, I reconstruct the Cape to Cairo rendezvous to unpack the modes of doing history at work in its annual commemoration: the invention of a tradition to bind together a constituency, the restaging of racial capitalism at Heathrow Airport’s labour regimes, and lastly, the ‘multiple and inconsistent causal ideas’ about empire embedded – which is to say, racecrafted – in the invocation of the Cape to Cairo colonial railway scheme.⁴¹¹

So. It was a hot summer morning. The arrivals hall was full of passengers. Immigration officers who had started work at 06:45am worked continuously, processing arrivals throughout the shift without toilet breaks. At noon, the whole group left their control desks against the orders of their commanding officer and to the displeasure of the long queues of passengers. This was, for the group, a spontaneous act of protest, one we already know was laced through with racialised complaints about the degradation of the IS profession by ‘the problems of the Jumbo Jet age.’ The group headed directly to Heathrow Airport’s staff bar, and began drinking heavily. Soon enough, a porter passed through the staff bar, and remarked that the bar was much busier than usual, at which point:–

...our chap [Rick] looked down at him and said that it was just like being on the Cape to Cairo. On seeing the look of incomprehension on the poor wee porter’s face, he moved his face down further towards him and said something like *and you have got no fucking idea what I’m talking about!* But I’ve a newsflash for you, Rick. None of us had a clue what you were talking about that day. But that is how legends are made and how the Cape was born.⁴¹²

Just like being on the Cape to Cairo? The Cape to Cairo was a famous colonial project to build a continuous railway line running through Britain’s colonies in Africa, linking Cape Town to Cairo. It was first mooted in the 1870s, closely associated with Cecil Rhodes and the late nineteenth century ‘scramble for Africa’. The project was billed as the building of ‘iron ribs and spine for Africa.’⁴¹³ This project captured the colonial imagination. It imagined materialising empire’s straight, continuous line of historical progress into a physical line of railway. It epitomised empire’s promise of technological, modern engineering to legitimate British colonial occupation and enable the modernisation of Africa by facilitating the extraction of raw materials and the transportation of troops for colonial wars and repression. The vision of a

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid, 280.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹¹ Fields and Fields, *Racecraft*, 16.

⁴¹² Stocke, *Branch is Broken*, 278.

⁴¹³ Leo Weinthal, *The Story of the Cape to Cairo Railway and River Route from 1887 to 1922; the Iron Spine and Ribs of Africa* (London, Pioneer Pub. Co, 1923), <http://archive.org/details/storyofcapetocai04wein>.

continuous line of railway was itself a dream of gaining sovereign control over uninterrupted territories of Southern, Central and Eastern Africa.

By the 1920s, with Britain gaining trusteeship of mandated territories, this uninterrupted political control was complete. However the global economic depression of the 1930s and then the Second World War frustrated the Cape to Cairo building projects. After the war, movements for African independence had compelled British colonial economic and political policy to change. More to the point, as one railway enthusiast described it, even though 'Britain was the leading railway builder of the nineteenth century, her own free market tendencies meant that standardisation of railway gauges was never fully realised'. Ironically, 'by not wishing to allow the state to dictate to private companies, the British Empire ended up with a myriad of differing gauges.'⁴¹⁴

The Cape to Cairo was never completed. Its scattered lines fell into disuse or remained unfinished as African states gained independence from Britain and found their economies and development plans undermined by neo-colonial financial institutions. The fragments of line never came together into a single straight line progressing north to south. The gauges would never, could never, fit together. The construction took so long it outlived its celebrated purpose of facilitating economic progress, which was to say, of extracting raw materials and transporting troops to repress disturbances. The Cape to Cairo, then, serves as another ragged metaphor for the British Empire as *not fit for purpose*.

Come back to the staff bar, to Heathrow airport, noon on a hot summer day. Come back to Rick the immigration officer looking down at 'the poor wee porter.' As James Vernon details in his work on Heathrow, 'men of colour were over-represented among the unskilled employees in maintenance and porter work' and women of colour were in practice confined to working in outsourced, largely unregulated and highly exploitative cleaning companies and aeroplane-food processing manufacturers.⁴¹⁵ In this way, Heathrow Airport replicated 'the [racialised] division of labour characterises the workforce of Britain' as observed by Amabalaver Sivandandan in 1981.⁴¹⁶ The poor wee porter at the butt of the Cape to Cairo joke was, almost certainly, an 'Asian or West Indian man.'⁴¹⁷

In recent years, scholars have found it increasingly urgent to analyse 'the function of humour as a tool for producing racial alienation, dehumanization, exclusion, and even violence.'⁴¹⁸ Racist jokes allow interlocutors to reaffirm group identities around discourses of racial

⁴¹⁴ Christian Wolmar, *Blood, Iron and Gold: How the Railways Transformed the World* (Atlantic Books, 2009).

⁴¹⁵ Vernon, *Heathrow*, 239

⁴¹⁶ A. Sivanandan, 'From Resistance to Rebellion: Asian and Afro-Caribbean Struggles in Britain', *Race and Class*, xxiii, issue 2-3 (1981), 143.

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁸ Raúl Pérez, *The Souls of White Jokes: How Racist Humor Fuels White Supremacy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2022).

superiority and inferiority, making disavowed discourses speakable, often in the form of unpredictable and unstable forms of 'fun' that play with taboo, and delight in extending outside of the ordinary.⁴¹⁹ But what actually was the joke on that hot day in Heathrow airport? What was the punchline? Please assume I have a bad sense of humour, that I am slow-witted, that I cannot take a joke. Then let me murder this joke in its retelling.

Was the joke that the staff bar was *obviously* busier than the Cape to Cairo railway, because that railway was never built? Was the joke that the staff bar was, at noon that day, about as empty and un-busy as the never-functional Cape to Cairo? Was Rick poking fun at himself and his colleagues, poking fun at their own obsolescence as immigration officers? Obsolete and broken in their bodies by the heat of the airless *not fit for purpose* arrivals hall? Obsolete and ruined by their heavy day-time drinking, their uncharacteristic spontaneous group protest? Obsolete and broken as part of an immigration system that was broken and failing, and failing a broken Britain after the collapse of empire?

The punchline lay somewhere between the 'look of incomprehension' on the 'poor wee porter's face' and the unrestrained delight of Rick 'looking down at him.'⁴²⁰ The joke was that the porter, a man of colour in a low-paid and outsourced job, a recent immigrant from somewhere in the New Commonwealth, did not share the cultural references to the Cape to Cairo railway project, because he had not grown up with school textbooks about it. Except that possibly, probably, perhaps he had? Neither the porter nor the other immigration officers knew what the Cape to Cairo was, nor what Rick's garbled and drunken punchline about the failed railway project was. Whatever the joke was, the porter's un-Britishness was the punchline. As one sociologist has pointed out, 'in Britain there are strong cultural sanctions for those lacking a demonstrable capacity for humour' and the 'benign properties of humour are celebrated in folk-wisdom through such utterances as *if we can laugh together we can live together* and it's *not so bad if you can laugh about it*.'⁴²¹ Rick's joke became 'legendary' the group of immigration officers precisely because the 'look of incomprehension on the poor wee porter's face' seemed to confirm that white Britons and New Commonwealth immigrants in low-paid outsourced jobs could not laugh together, and could not live together. As a joke, Rick's incomprehensible punchline was *not fit for purpose*. Nonetheless, the joke worked well enough to become an informal hallowed tradition of the Immigration Service, according to at least one immigration officer. More to the point, the joke did in fact *fit the purpose* of the Immigration Service: as a Home Office lawyer bluntly put it in 1980, 'it is of the essence of the 1971 Immigration Act that

⁴¹⁹ Ibid.

⁴²⁰ Stocke, *Branch is Broken*, 278.

⁴²¹ Charles Husband, 'Racist Humour and Racist Ideology in British Television, or I Laughed Till You Cried', in *Humour in Society: Resistance and Control*, ed. Chris Powell and George E. C. Paton (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1988), 150.

people will be discriminated against on the grounds of race and nationality and it is the function of certain officials to ensure that the discrimination is effective.⁴²²

Conclusion

This chapter has pieced together a history of the Home Office as *not fit for purpose*. I have demonstrated that the East India Company, the Home Civil Service, the Home Office and the immigration system have frequently been declared not fit for purpose and then subjected to changes, reforms and reorganisations that have strengthened, rather than shrunk, the power, reach and legitimacy of the carceral state. I have concentrated on a moral panic about ‘immigration fraudulence’ among immigration officers at the end of the sixties, contextualising its roots in earlier phases of imperial rule and its cyclical resurgence in Britain’s postcolonial present. Racialised concerns about forged documents and fraudulence, shaped by racial thinking during empire, prompted a substantive change to the immigration system in 1971, shifting into an enduring model that individualised immigrants’ compliance. However, the enduring pattern of crisis and reform fashioned a double bind. In it, an increased documentation regime appears the only solution to immigration fraudulence. But at the same time that documentation regime and its rule of law are routinely imagined as abused and abusable by innately fraudulent immigrants. As such, the compliance model of the post-1971 immigration system was designed to be constantly in crisis, for the Home Office to be perpetually ‘not fit for purpose’ and for ‘the Branch’ to be broken over and over again.

The pattern of crises at the Home Office since the late 1960s, and the cyclical declarations of the institution as *not fit for purpose*, depend on the association of undocumentedness with illegality. This association links the racist treatment of Commonwealth citizens from India and Pakistan at the end of empire with much earlier administrative crises within East India Company rule that led to a bureaucratic regime of power – a ‘Document Raj’ – that gave white Company officials off-record, discretionary powers. As with East India Company rule, the solutions proposed to reform the post-1971 immigration system would always expand and strengthen Home Office powers and resources, even as other functions and purposes of the state – its fading role of safeguarding welfare and basic sustenance, for instance – were rolled back and stripped away.

Not fit for purpose is, I admit, an anachronistic phrase. Edmund Burke did not declare Warren Hastings and the East India Company to be not fit for purpose. Northcote and Trevelyan did not use those words to describe the dysfunction of the nineteenth century Civil Service. The

⁴²² Home Office Legal Advisor, quoted in CARF Collective, ‘Background: British Racism’, *Race & Class* 23, no. 2–3 (1981): 242. This response was made in reply to the investigation launched by the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) into the “Virginity Testing” scandal in the 1970s.

Fulton Report declared the Civil Service to be out of date rather than not fit for purpose. The immigration officers, supporting Enoch Powell in 1968 or towering over ‘the poor wee porter’ in 1974, did not use the phrase. The phrase actually comes to us from consumer rights law. The Sale of Goods Act 1979 and later the Consumer Rights Act 2015 laid out that ‘the goods should be fit for the purpose they are supplied for, as well as any specific purpose you made known to the retailer before you agreed to buy the goods.’⁴²³ In fact, according to one lexicographer, the phrase has only become ubiquitous since 2008 after ‘the announcement by John Reid, newly appointed Home Secretary, that his government department was *not fit for purpose* – meaning it was no good at doing its job.’⁴²⁴

Really, what does it mean to describe a government department as not fit for purpose, in terms templated by consumer law? The transformation of citizens into consumers of public services is widely understood as a hallmark of neoliberal rationality: much has been written about the relationship between, on one hand, the ‘neoliberal counterrevolution of the 1970s’ responding to decolonisation, and on the other, New Public Management approaches to civil service reform emerging at the same time.⁴²⁵ In 2022, Jack Straw, Home Secretary under Blair’s New Labour, distinguished the Home Office as ‘different from almost every other government department’ because unlike health, education, transport, housing and social security departments, which broadly share ‘an alignment between their customers and what the departments and ministers want’, the Home Office’s ‘customers’ consist of ‘terrorists, criminals and immigration overstayers’.⁴²⁶ It is, Straw argues, the ‘determination of these “customers” to avoid the law [that] makes running the Home Office so inherently difficult, despite the fact that its staff are overwhelmingly dedicated and professional at doing their jobs.’⁴²⁷ In this respect, he concludes, ‘the inherent, timeless problem with the Home Office is not its fitness, but its purpose.’⁴²⁸

In 1982, historian Jill Pellew opened her institutional history of the Home Office by observing that for historians of institutions, ‘the institution itself is an entity – almost a persona – over and above those individuals who constitute its personnel at any given moment.’⁴²⁹ This chapter

⁴²³ The Sale of Goods Act 1979 cited in ‘Sale of Goods Act’, Which?, 4 August 2022, <https://www.which.co.uk/consumer-rights/regulation/sale-of-goods-act-a4fvv5x8SaYa>.

⁴²⁴ John Ayto, ‘Learning English - Keep Your English up to Date - Fit for Purpose’ (British Broadcasting Corporation), accessed 5 April 2023, https://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/learningenglish/language/uptodate/2010/10/101026_kyeutd_fit_for_purpose_page.shtml.

⁴²⁵ See for instance, Samuel Knafo, ‘Neoliberalism and the Origins of Public Management’, *Review of International Political Economy* 27, no. 4 (2 July 2020): 780–801; Patrick Diamond, ‘Destroying One Public Service Bargain Without Making Another: A Comment on Lowe and Pemberton, The Official History of the British Civil Service, Volume II: 1982–1997’, *The Political Quarterly* 92, no. 1 (2021): 95–100; Louise Dalingwater, ‘Civil Service Reform and the Legacy of Thatcherism’, *Observatoire de La Société Britannique*, no. 17 (1 November 2015): 61–78.

⁴²⁶ Jack Straw, ‘The Home Office Always Was a Graveyard for Aspiring Ministers’, *Politics Home*, 4 May 2022, <https://www.politicshome.com/thehouse/article/the-home-office-always-was-a-graveyard-for-aspiring-ministers>.

⁴²⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁹ Jill Pellew, *The Home Office, 1848-1914* (Fairleigh Dickinson Press, 1982), 1.

has tried not to see the Home Office as *almost a persona*, an *entity*, as one rogue cop. Instead it has paid attention to ‘those individuals who constitute its personnel at any given moment’, a changing constituency of East India Company officials and their detractors, strike-breaking immigration officers in the 1920s, strike-making immigration officers in Enoch Powell’s 1968, a self-identified proud ‘old guard’ and the UKBA ‘new management regime’ in the 2000s.⁴³⁰

Over recent years, particularly since the so-called Windrush Scandal in 2017 and the #BLM mobilisations in 2020, a phrase – *abolish the Home Office* – has begun circulating in social movements and political arguments for reforming or ending immigration controls. In fact in 2017 the Liberal Democrats proposed a scheme to abolish the Home Office, suggesting parcelling out student visas to the Department of Education, work visas to the Department of Business, and asylum claims to the Department of International Development. As a transitional demand, *abolish the Home Office* seems to promise, in four small words, some commitment to shrinking the state’s deeply interconnected systems of immigration controls, citizenship, policing and counter-terrorism. But a cursory glance back at the 2007 ‘shaking out’ of the Home Office, the creation of the UKBA in 2008, the Home Office’s own ‘abolition’ of UKBA in 2013, as well as earlier iterations of this colonial pattern of crises and reform, should caution us against short-circuiting the entirety of our demands into *abolishing the Home Office*. Calling to close the Home Office on the basis of its enduring, fetid institutional culture could work like the rooting out of *one rogue cop*, absolving the rest of the British state apparatus from its systemic violence. To abolish the Home Office requires undermining the very notion that the Home Office has a purpose to be fit for at all. Undermining the Home Office’s purpose requires undoing the everyday practices of othering, policing, punishing and bordering embedded in our society at large. It requires undoing how the Home Office does history, undoing these colonial patterns of crises and reform that expand carceral power and limit abolitionist futures. This is long-term ongoing work, daunting in scale, and yet it is the work that is already going on, and has been going on a long time.

⁴³⁰ Stocke, *Branch is Broken*, 269.

Fragment: Outsourcing hostels

The Harmondsworth proposal was justified using a phoney concern about creating a purpose-built environment for women and children that would keep them at a safe distance from the prisons and remand homes in which they would otherwise be detained. This rationale depended on distinguishing ‘immigrants’ from ‘common criminals’. At the same time it sought to rationalise the arbitrary detention of Commonwealth citizens racialised as non-white, excluding them from Britain’s treasured Magna Carta principle of *habeas corpus*. Details like these remind us that our movements against immigration controls must avoid reformist narratives that *immigrants should not be detained like criminals*, because after all the Home Office has the easiest access to chop, change, and blur what the words immigrant and criminal mean in law.

The archived correspondence between QC John Pakenham-Walsh and the head of B2 Deportation division W. J. Bohan throws into relief the administrative conjuring tricks and legalistic word-play at the heart of Home Office business. In notes and letters back and forth, Pakenham-Walsh and Bohan figured out ways to stretch vocabulary, legal terms and the letter of the law. Eventually, they found a way to stretch existing legal provisions to argue that a hostel built one mile from London Heathrow Airport could just about be phrased as part of the airport vicinity itself.

The Harmondsworth hostel has to be situated in relation to empire. Hostels and barracks were a vital component of colonial infrastructures for moving, confining, and exploiting the labour of enslaved people, indentured servants and migrant labourers. From the 1860s to the 1930s, barracks were the prevalent forms of worker-housing across the empire.⁴³¹ Major epidemics in the British Armies during the Crimean War and across British India had led to standardised designs for barrack buildings. The colonial barrack was ‘typically a long single-storey structure, internally arranged as a single or double row of standard-sized rooms’ built with machine-cut timber, a dung-earth floor, a corrugated iron roof, an outside cooking area at the front and communal washing facilities provided in a separate outhouse, if at all.⁴³²

Hostels and barracks were shoddily built to accommodate large groups of single men or women, rather than families, who migrated to cities, mines, plantations, and industrial areas to seek works. Mines, plantations and factories sometimes provided this accommodation on-site, and sometimes colonial municipal authorities were required to provide additional housing

⁴³¹ Robert Home, ‘Barracks and Hostels: A Heritage Conservation Case for Worker Housing in Natal’, *Natalia* 28 (1998): 46.

⁴³² *Ibid.*

of this kind.⁴³³ In South Africa, hostels were a key part of the migrant labour system established by the British to facilitate the expanding mining industry, and its economic, social and political geography became the blueprint for the Apartheid system formalised after 1947.⁴³⁴ South Africa's African (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 used the term 'hostel', and gave local municipalities statutory powers to build 'hostels' for migrant African workers within, and increasingly at the perimeter, of the expanding cities they administered. The abolition of indentured labour in 1917 did nothing to improve workers' horrific housing and living conditions in the indentured labour destinations of South Africa, India and the Caribbean. The municipal authorities in Bombay constructed multi-story worker housing known as *chawls* to accommodate mill workers, crowding multiple families into each floor. By the 1930s, labour uprisings across the Caribbean forced the British imperial state to investigate workers' grievances against the 'indescribable' squalor and degradation of colonial barrack housing.⁴³⁵ The Forster and Moyne Commissions at the end of the 1930s recommended a shift away from warehoused single-sex barracks towards providing family accommodation in complexes of cottages with gardens. Both commissions were formative to the distinctive change in colonial policy signalled by the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940.

Hostels were also a key part of the British Empire's infrastructures for trying and often failing to regulate and intervene in the migration of millions of hajj pilgrims from British colonies, through British colonies, to Mecca, and back again. Many West African hajjis undertook the journey on foot over three or more years, stopping to labour in different colonial territories along the way, and sometimes getting stuck after completing the hajj, in Jeddah or elsewhere, destitute and without means to continue the journey back. A key area of colonial administration therefore involved running and regulating visiting hostels where destitute pilgrims could stay while their respective colonial government sorted out and paid for travel arrangements to repatriate these pilgrims home amidst diplomatic pressure from Jeddah.⁴³⁶

The colonial hostel also existed in the British metropole. In 1857, the 'Strangers' Home for Asiatics, Africans and South Sea Islanders' opened in West India Dock Road, Limehouse. 'Lascar Homes' were framed from the outset as mechanisms to enable the repatriation of seafarers from the Indian subcontinent. By law British shipping companies were supposed to repatriate lascars to their country-of-origin when the seamen became ill or injured, but the majority of shipowners did not fulfil these obligations, leaving thousands of seamen destitute

⁴³³ University of Natal Department of Economics Research Section, *The Durban Housing Survey: A Study of Housing in a Multi-Racial Community*, 4 (University of Natal Press, 1952), 315.

⁴³⁴ Christo Vosloo, 'Extreme Apartheid: The South African System of Migrant Labour and Its Hostels', *Image & Text*, no. 34 (2020): 1–33. See also, Rebekah Lee, *African Women and Apartheid: Migration and Settlement in Urban South Africa* (I.B.Tauris, 2017).

⁴³⁵ Home, 'Barracks and Hostels', 47.

⁴³⁶ Jonathan Reynolds, 'Stealing the Road: Colonial Rule and the Hajj from Nigeria in the Early Twentieth Century', *Journal of West African History* 1, no. 2 (2015): 27–44; John Slight, 'British Colonial Knowledge and the Hajj in the Age of Empire', in *The Hajj and Europe in the Age of Empire* (Brill, 2017), 81–111.

in London's freezing winters.⁴³⁷ Another example were the transmigrant hostels of the 1920s and 1930s. In the 1920s, as reported in Roche's *Key in the Lock*, the Home Office's nascent Immigration Service succeeded in entreating global shipping companies – the White Star, Cunard, and Canadian Pacific Lines – to build 'a special hostel' at Eastleigh, nearby to the international port of Southampton in order 'to house these transmigrants pending their onward shipment' to North America.⁴³⁸ Known as 'Atlantic Park', the hostel was built within 'an aerodrome built during the war by the American Government.'⁴³⁹

These various but interconnected forms of the colonial hostel circulated through Bohan and Pakenham-Walsh's proposed hostel at Harmondsworth, making it coherent, familiar and thinkable. If the Harmondsworth hostel were considered legally part of the airport's vicinity then, territorially speaking, anyone detained there had not yet really arrived into the United Kingdom proper: that had been the logic and the practice of the transmigrant hostels in Eastleigh, East London and Tilbury. Like the hostels for destitute hajjis, the Harmondsworth site would temporarily hold migrants from former colonies while their repatriation was arranged for them. Similar to how the late 1930s Forster and Moyne Commissions recommended building new labour hostels in a cottage-style suitable for families, it was what Bohan called 'space outside for exercise' that apparently qualified the Harmondsworth hostel as suitable accommodation in which to detain families and children.⁴⁴⁰ The local council planning authority in 1969 had granted permission to build Harmondsworth, but only on the premise that the chosen site on Drayton Bypass was a temporary, emergency measure until a permanent location within the confines of the Airport could be found.⁴⁴¹ This reflected the time-tested colonial pattern of supposedly temporary, shoddily built buildings that nonetheless became lasting features of colonial infrastructures.

More to the point, the Harmondsworth hostel was to be run by Securicor, a British private security company. In 1968, Bohan and Pakenham-Walsh easily envisaged giving Securicor the contract to run the proposed site. At that time, Securicor was already employed by a range of airlines at Heathrow Airport to detain passengers refused entry to the United Kingdom.⁴⁴² It

⁴³⁷ Rozina Visram, *Ayahs, Lascars, and Princes: Indians in Britain, 1700-1947* (London: Pluto, 1986). For an interesting account of the 13-bed 'colonial seamen's hostel' opened by the Colonial Office in 1942, see, S. Milne, 'Accounting for the Hostel for "Coloured Colonial Seamen" in London's East End', *National Identities* 22, no. 4 (22 July 2019): 395–421.

⁴³⁸ Roche, *Key in the Lock*, 103.

⁴³⁹ Ibid. A similar transmigrant hostel opened soon after in East London by the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company. See also, Becky Taylor, 'Immigration, Statecraft and Public Health: The 1920 Aliens Order, Medical Examinations and the Limitations of the State in England', *Social History of Medicine* 29, no. 3 (1 August 2016): 512–33.

⁴⁴⁰ Letter from W. J. Bohan to John Pakenham-Walsh, 18 May 1970, 'Detention of Commonwealth Citizens on Refusal of Admission to the United Kingdom.' (1968 - 1972), HO 344/186, TNA.

⁴⁴¹ Independent Monitoring Board, 'Annual Report of the Independent Monitoring Board at Heathrow Immigration Removal Centre', 18 August 2023, <https://imb.org.uk/news/home-office-failings-and-lack-of-investment-undermine-the-fair-and-humane-treatment-of-people-in-detention/>.

⁴⁴² The practice of airlines and passenger shipping companies having responsibility for returning refused entrants had solidified, unevenly, in the 1920s when the Home Office's new Immigration Service tried to compel the major

was easy, therefore, to imagine extending Securicor's contract towards running this hostel on the outskirts of Heathrow airport, once the Home Office had ironed out the legalities. Securicor was first incorporated in 1935 as *Nightwatch Services*, with a staff of security guards wearing decommissioned police uniforms and riding a fleet of bicycles. In 2004 Securicor, which had become a multi-faceted business of enormous proportions, merged with the Danish company *Group 4 Falck* to become the multinational security giant we know now as *Group 4 Securicor*, or G4S.⁴⁴³ Today, it is well-known and routinely publicised that G4S and other private security companies – Mitie, Mears, and Serco, for instance – make enormous profits from outsourced government contracts to run asylum accommodation, immigration detention centres, deportation escort services as well as civil transportation and security for NHS services. Since 2010, G4S and four of these companies have been awarded government contracts worth £5.8 billion.⁴⁴⁴

The outsourcing of the Harmondsworth site to Securicor as a private company illustrates two important truisms about British colonialism. First, as we saw in chapter two, private companies – Securicor and the East India Company alike – are integral to and interconnected with the British state, whose modern administrative structures are fundamentally colonial.⁴⁴⁵ Second, the privatising of immigrants into an outsourced Securicor-run facility mirrored the postimperial dynamics of NGO-run international development and foreign aid. As Charlotte Lydia Riley has argued, after the end of empire NGOs such as Oxfam took up the mantle of what had been colonial development.⁴⁴⁶ What had once – perhaps unevenly – been trumpeted as the metropole's paternalistic duty to take care of and develop Britain's colonies was reconceptualised through individualised charitable giving, rather than the collective commitment of the 'mother country.' Notably, today's border regime in the British mainland is partly managed and delivered by NGOs and charities, entities which have been coopted into forms of policing, custodial 'care' and punitive welfare provision that entrench rather than reduce carceral state power.⁴⁴⁷

These dynamics were clearly at work in the making of Harmondsworth at the end of the 1960s. The Home Office justified their use of private security by arguing that 'the use of police to

passenger shipping lines to build an enormous "hostel" – in a disused air-hanger – to accommodate and confine the hundreds of "transmigrants" waiting for shipping connections to the United States. This practice was not legally binding, however, until the 1987 Carriers Liability Act

⁴⁴³ Market-Based Go, 'Transborder Service Systems', 2004, <https://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/TransborderServiceSystems.pdf>.

⁴⁴⁴ John Lubbock and Sian Norris, 'Meet the Companies for Which Asylum Policy Is Big Business', *Byline Times*, 9 December 2021, <https://bylinetimes.com/2021/12/09/meet-the-companies-for-which-asylum-policy-is-big-business/>.

⁴⁴⁵ That the genealogy of the modern state is fundamentally colonial is argued by Radhika Mongia, *Indian Migration and Empire: A Colonial Genealogy of the Modern State* (Duke University Press, 2018).

⁴⁴⁶ Charlotte Lydia Riley, *Monstrous Predatory Vampires and Beneficent Fairy-Godmothers: British Post-War Colonial Development in Africa*, (PhD diss, University College London, 2013), 266 – 268.

⁴⁴⁷ For an important analysis of care, custody and immigration control, see Miriam I. Ticktin, *Casualties of Care: Immigration and the Politics of Humanitarianism in France* (University of California Press, 2011).

control people who were not criminals would be too oppressive and because it was felt that immigration officers, who are civil servants, could not be asked to perform such tasks.⁴⁴⁸ The Harmondsworth site was designed, and rationalised, as a physical part of administrative process of removing and deporting people. On paper, immigration detention was not defined as punishment.

More importantly, as Felix Bazalgette has written, 'the Home Office wanted to define [Harmondsworth's] buildings as mere warehouses, like the industrial units that often surround them, holding centres for stuff that is on its way out.'⁴⁴⁹ Such a framing, then as now, imagined detention in Harmondsworth as merely an administrative tool to ensure repatriation arrangements could be made. It sought to gloss over the dehumanising violence of incarceration, and yet at the same time it eerily recalled the warehousing and transportation of enslaved and indentured people during empire's many middle passages. This was 'the busy repertoire of strange manoeuvres that is part of what we call racecraft', par excellence.⁴⁵⁰ The material, architectural design of the Harmondsworth site was invested with the magical powers of racecraft, crafting the social facts of race itself. As if for formerly colonised people, immigration detention in a warehouse-looking confinement was not dehumanising, but appropriate, hospitable, family-friendly and ultimately, in the colonial mindset, what formerly colonised people were imagined as being used to.

⁴⁴⁸ Home Office, quoted in Felix Bazalgette, 'Notes on the History of a Detention Centre', *The White Review*, November 2017, <https://www.thewhitereview.org/feature/notes-history-detention-centre/>.

⁴⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵⁰ Fields and Fields, *Racecraft*, 16.

Chapter Three

Before foreign criminals and bogus asylum seekers: fugitive offender deportations before and during the end of empire

Introduction

On Tuesday 27 November 1962, the Metropolitan Police arrested Chief Anthony Enahoro on the doorstep of his friend's flat in Chiswick, West London. Enahoro had entered Britain two days earlier using a Ghanaian travel document in the name of George Wilson.⁴⁵¹ He was taken to Bow Street Magistrates Court, refused bail and the next morning transferred to Brixton Prison where he remained in detention for four months. His attempts to claim political asylum in the United Kingdom failed. Towards midnight on 27 April 1963 Enahoro was handcuffed, driven to Gatwick Airport, and deported to Lagos, Nigeria on a chartered Dakota aircraft carrying no one but him, the pilots, and two senior Nigerian police officers.⁴⁵²

Arrest, refusal of bail, detention, refusal of asylum, refusal of bail, refusal of a writ of habeas corpus, removal back to a country-of-origin. This is a choreography of immigration control moves familiar to us today. However, Enahoro was not arrested for breaching immigration entry conditions, nor for entering under a false document. This was 1962, and neither of the above would be encoded as immigration crimes until the 1971 Immigration Act took effect. Enahoro was deported to Nigeria neither as an illegalised immigrant nor as a convict, but as a pre-trial 'fugitive offender' subjected to late nineteenth century imperial extradition procedures created for an expanding British Empire. In an unprecedented move, the recently inaugurated first Federal Government of Nigeria had used the Fugitive Offenders Act of 1881 to request the return of a prominent opposition party politician – Chief Enahoro – to face charges of treason in Lagos.

Under the 1881 Act, Enahoro was forced to leave England despite having the legal right to be there as a citizen of the UK and Colonies, and despite having no convictions under UK or Nigerian law. His deportation case prompted colossal furore, and confusion, over the Nigerian's right to political asylum in Britain. In turn, the question over whether Enahoro qualified for refugee protection brought into contradiction two popular narratives of British national history. First, that historically Britain had a proud, distinctive and progressive humanitarian tradition of welcoming refugees, from the persecuted French Huguenots in the

⁴⁵¹ 'Copy of factual note sent to PM', in 'Deportation of Chief Anthony Enahoro' (1 December 1963), LCO 2/8595, TNA.

⁴⁵² Anthony Enahoro, *Fugitive Offender: The Story of a Political Prisoner* (London: Cassell & Company, 1965), 244.

1600s to tolerated political exiles like Karl Marx in the 1800s.⁴⁵³ Second, that British colonialism had been necessary in that it had installed rule of law into illiberal, lawless colonies like Nigeria: to grant Enahoro asylum as a persecuted refugee from Nigeria would be to admit that British rule of law and the imperial project had failed. In these ways, Enahoro's deportation case in the early 1960s precipitated a reckoning in real-time, about how to evaluate the British Empire's historical legacies, and how to do British history, after and during the end of empire. Enahoro's deportation resembled an extradition more than a deportation. The Enahoro case, and the peculiarities of imperial extradition arrangements, have not yet figured in histories of postwar immigration control and the remaking of British citizenship. Aside from its inclusion in *Political Trials in History: From Antiquity to the Present*, scholarship on the Enahoro case is limited to one legal review written at the time and a handful of passing mentions in histories of postcolonial Nigerian politics and digests of international extradition law.⁴⁵⁴ Texts noting its significance for British politics are rare.⁴⁵⁵ This scarcity is surprising considering the thirteen parliamentary discussions prompted by the case, discussions that amounted to more than 140,000 words of Hansard parliamentary transcripts.⁴⁵⁶ More than a desire to re-insert Enahoro's case into the historical record, it is the blurriness of his deportation-cum-extradition that animates this chapter. The chapter investigates long patterns of bureaucratic deportation policymaking rather than reconstructing an episode of parliamentary politics. In what follows, I trace an earlier history of how the Home Office does history by piecing together the paper trails, evidence protocols and documentation regimes at work in the 1881 Fugitive Offenders Act and processes of criminalisation related to it. By contextualising Enahoro's case with other cases the chapter demonstrates that 'race' affected who could access the safeguards of so-called British Justice when threatened with deportation. As seen in the previous chapter on racist constructions of immigration fraudulence, the 'ordinary course of everyday doing' and the 'busy repertoire' of procedural, archival and legal manoeuvres involved in colonial regimes

⁴⁵³ This narrative was at the heart of what Perry calls 'the mystique of British anti-racism.' Kennetta Hammond Perry, *London Is the Place for Me: Black Britons, Citizenship, and the Politics of Race* (Oxford: OUP, 2015), 19.

⁴⁵⁴ Ron Christenson, ed., *Political Trials in History: From Antiquity to the Present*, (Routledge, 1991), 27. For legal digest, see Paul O'Higgins, 'The Enahoro Case', *International & Comparative Law Quarterly* 12, no. 4 (October 1963): 1364–78. For mentions in international law, see Ivan Anthony Shearer, *Extradition in International Law* (Manchester University Press, 1971), 56; Adeoye Akinsanya, 'The Dikko Affair and Anglo-Nigerian Relations', *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 34, no. 3 (1985): 609; A. Lowe and J. Young, 'Suppressing Terrorism under the European Convention: A British Perspective', *Netherlands International Law Review* 25, no. 3 (December 1978): 326. For mentions in later histories of Nigerian politics see Assa Okoth, *A History of Africa: African Nationalism and the de-Colonisation Process* (East African Publishers, 2006), 256; Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, *The Challenge of the Nigerian Nation: An Examination of Its Legal Development, 1960-1985* (Lagos: Heinemann, 1985), 204; James O. Ojiako, *Nigeria: Yesterday, Today, And ?* (Africana, 1981), 138 – 145.

⁴⁵⁵ Philip Norton, *Dissension in the House of Commons: Intra-Party Dissent in the House of Commons' Division Lobbies 1945–1974* (Macmillan International Higher Education, 1975), 236.

⁴⁵⁶ HC Debate, 21 February 1963, vol 672, cc86-7W; HC Debate, 14 March 1963, vol 673, cc1541-56; HC Debate 21 March 1963, vol 674, cc581-682; HC Debate 26 March 1963, vol 674, cc1271-88; HC Debate, 4 April 1963, vol 675, cc624-6; HC Debate, 9 April 1963, vol 675, cc1097-104; HC Debate, 10 April 1963, vol 675, cc1287-377; HC Debate, 13 May 1963, vol 677, cc949-51; HC Debate, 15 May 1963, vol 677, cc1393-454; HC Debate, 23 May 1963, vol 678, cc631-6; HC Debate, 27 May 1963, vol 678, cc989-1055, HC Debate, 30 May 1963, vol 678, cc1524-5.

of criminalisation and mobility control helped to fashion the social facts of race itself, as Barbara and Karen Fields would put it.⁴⁵⁷ The under-researched history of fugitive offender deportations helps denaturalise what we think we know about the history of Britain's mass deportation regime, and helps connect it to the global circuits of many different kinds of migrants, many kinds of foreigners, many kinds of criminals, and many kinds of refugees.

I first bumped into the Enahoro case as I combed the National Archives catalogue for every mention of deportations to, from and within Nigeria. Alongside Pakistan, Jamaica, Ghana, Iraq and Albania, I was hoping – perhaps expecting – to find stacks of material that would demonstrate an early history explaining today's Home Office's mass deportation charter flights to these six particular countries.⁴⁵⁸ The initial details of this 1963 deportation – of a black man, a Nigerian national whose asylum claim and identification as a Commonwealth citizen were overruled – coincided with a long-established 'set of political and cultural assumptions, often unspoken, that Black people in Britain are not and cannot be British', which has manifested recently in the Windrush Scandal.⁴⁵⁹ Something about Enahoro's deportation upon pre-emptive treason charges also made me think of recent government efforts to revise British treason laws as counterterrorism measures that, like passport removals and citizenship deprivation, aim to 'un-make' British citizens who would otherwise be safe from deportation.⁴⁶⁰

Despite these flashes of recognition, Enahoro's case felt peculiar and disorientating. The case scrambled all my secretly pointed searching. I tried to make the case resemble a definitive historical rupture, a rupture I could pin to, and blame for, contemporary moral panics about 'bogus' asylum-seekers. No luck. The case was from another time I did not recognise. It was a time in which more than thirty Conservative backbenchers put a motion to the Commons that 'this House is of opinion that Chief Anthony Enahoro should, as a Commonwealth citizen, be accorded rights and liberties not less favourable than those granted to an alien seeking political asylum', because refugee protection was one of the 'British traditions of which the British people were, with justification, very proud.'⁴⁶¹ Although today this 'British welcome' narrative remains embedded in anti-immigrant and anti-refugee rationales for cracking down on 'bogus' asylum-seekers, the early 1960s Tory backbencher investment in Enahoro's case still suggested a very different political landscape to today's.⁴⁶²

⁴⁵⁷ Barbara Fields and Karen Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life* (Verso, 2022), 16.

⁴⁵⁸ The Deportation of Chief Anthony Enahoro (1 December 1963), LCO 2/8595, TNA.

⁴⁵⁹ See Kennetta Hammond Perry, Christianna Fryar, and Nicole Jackson, 'Windrush and Britain's Long History of Racialized Belonging', *Black Perspectives - African American Intellectual History Society*– *AAIHS* (blog), 31 July 2018, <https://www.aaihs.org/windrush-and-britains-long-history-of-racialized-belonging/>.

⁴⁶⁰ Nisha Kapoor and Kasia Narkowicz, 'Unmaking Citizens: Passport Removals, Pre-Emptive Policing and the Reimagining of Colonial Governmentalities', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 42, no. 16 (10 December 2019): 45–62.

⁴⁶¹ Enahoro, *Fugitive Offender*, 226 – 227.

⁴⁶² Whether a conflict is covered by British media or politicians and whether its refugees are considered deserving or not, is largely defined by racism. Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 saw the clearest revitalising of this narrative. Much of the Migrant Rights sector and no borders movement has been quick to highlight the 'unashamed

Moreover, this 1963 deportation under the 1881 Act constituted a form of deportation that I did not recognise, and that did not coincide with what I thought this thesis was investigating. Deportation, I thought, meant ‘the removal from a country of an alien whose presence is unlawful or prejudicial’ and ‘the action of forcing someone to leave a country, especially someone who has no legal right to be there or who has broken the law’, as the Merriam-Webster and Cambridge dictionaries put it. I knew that in the British mainland, deportation powers began with the Aliens Act of 1905. That act permitted the ‘expulsion of undesirable aliens.’⁴⁶³ It codified as ‘undesirable’ anyone whom the police encountered and decided were paupers, lunatics or criminals, and it created for the first time a legal distinction between British subjects and aliens.⁴⁶⁴ I knew that the Aliens Act, which sought to restrict the immigration of Jewish people from Eastern Europe and Russia, had been deeply informed by white-settler campaigns in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada against ‘Asiatick immigration.’⁴⁶⁵

But as I read through fugitive offender proceedings at the National Archives, I realised that another meaning of deportation had once existed: deportation as internal extradition within the British Empire. Deportation in today’s sense of the word, of ‘expelling an alien from a country’ had not evolved out of the fugitive offender deportation arrangements; rather, both types of deportation had co-existed until 1967 when the 1881 Act was replaced. This chapter, then, reconstructs a defunct meaning of deportation, a meaning no longer in circulation. Deportation under the 1881 Act was part of a world organised into empires. That meaning of deportation died out during the 1960s, the decade in which constitutional decolonisation reorganised a world of empires into a new international order of nation-states, or countries-of-origin.⁴⁶⁶ This was a qualitative change from how imperial states had treated colonised populations as enormous pools of transportable, exploitable labour during the world-historical processes of

racism’ of governmental and Home Office efforts to distinguish Ukrainian refugees from those fleeing Sudan and Afghanistan. See for instance, Tiara Ataii, ‘Britain Has Betrayed Afghan Refugees’, *Tribune*, 8 June 2022, <https://tribunemag.co.uk/2022/06/afghanistan-refugees-ukraine>; Mark Townsend, ‘Home Office Accused of Being “Unashamedly Racist” towards Sudanese’, *The Observer*, 7 May 2023, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/07/home-office-accused-of-being-unashamedly-racist-towards-sudanese>.

⁴⁶³ *Aliens Act*, 1905, s.3.

⁴⁶⁴ There is an interesting parallel here in colonial India with British vagrants, lunatics and ‘undesirable’ women who were expelled from colonial spaces, particularly from military cantonments. They were gathered and sent to Deolali for deportation, hence the phrase, ‘Going Doolaly’. These powers to control and criminalise the large population of “poor whites” in British India had roots in military law and military cultures in which maintaining social order within a cantonment was directly and urgently linked to imperial security writ large. David Arnold, ‘European Orphans and Vagrants in India in the Nineteenth Century’, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 7, no. 2 (1 January 1979): 104–27. For recent work on European vagrants in colonial Singapore, see Denise Zhi Qing Lim, ‘Europeans Behaving Badly: European “misbehaviour” in Colonial Singapore c. 1890-1940’, Master’s thesis, Nanyang Technological University, 2021.

⁴⁶⁵ Alison Bashford and Catie Gilchrist, ‘The Colonial History of the 1905 Aliens Act’, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 40, no. 3 (2012): 427.

⁴⁶⁶ Nandita Sharma, *Home Rule: National Sovereignty and the Separation of Natives and Migrants* (Duke University Press, 2020). See also, Adom Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination* (Princeton University Press, 2019).

imperial enslavement, convict transportation and indentured ‘free labour’ migrations.⁴⁶⁷ In this chapter, I use the phrase *countries-of-origin* instead of nation-states. Countries-of-origin helps to capture how the postcolonial new world order was one in which populations were increasingly reconstituted as belonging to the territory in which they had been born.

The first half of the chapter describes the juridical conundrum that prompted the creation of the 1881 Fugitive Offenders Act. It digests the legislation to show how its architects intended the Act to work, at least on paper. I problematise the archival material, querying the practical implementation of these on-paper procedures, particularly in Southern Africa at the turn of the century. The second half of the chapter outlines the particular challenge posed in the 1950s and 1960s by white minority regimes in Southern Africa alongside the decolonisation of British colonies in Africa. This was the context in which the Enahoro controversy unfolded and in which the 1881 Act was replaced by the English Fugitive Offenders Act of 1967.

Fugitive offenders in the late nineteenth century

The Fugitive Offenders Act of 1881 was designed to resolve imperial anxieties incited by a ‘mutiny on the high seas’ in 1874.⁴⁶⁸ On 29 January 1874, five seamen onboard the *Satsuma*, a British barque headed to Cape Town from Cardiff, ‘barbarously ill-treat[ed] the captain [and] deserted the ship in an open boat’, taking with them six rifles and ‘a number of stores.’⁴⁶⁹ Pretending to have survived a shipwreck, the five men on their stolen boat were taken to safety by the crew of the *Kate Kearney*, whereupon the five promptly dispersed in different directions. One was later apprehended in Hong Kong, one in Melbourne, two slipped away entirely, and one – Anderson, real name John Johnstone – was found and arrested ‘on board the *City of Florence* at Gravesend’ on the Thames.⁴⁷⁰

Was this a ‘mutiny on the high seas’, as the *Irish Times* had reported, or was this a case of piracy? The charge eventually indicted against John Johnstone at the Old Bailey was for ‘feloniously and piratically on the high seas assaulting [Captain] William Leslie and wounding

⁴⁶⁷ For an account contextualising deportation as one form of historical exclusion alongside transportation, banishment and population transfer see William Walters, ‘Deportation, Expulsion, and the International Police of Aliens’, *Citizenship Studies* 6, no. 3 (2002): 265–292. For an important study of the relationship between Indian indentured labour programs and the institution of a passport-based British immigration system, see Mongia, *Indian Migration and Empire*. For a discussion of the historical reconstruction of the indentured labourer as an “immigrant” see Alessandro Stanziani, ‘From British Servants to Indentured Immigrants: The Case of Mauritius’, in *Sailors, Slaves, and Immigrants: Bondage in the Indian Ocean World, 1750–1914*, ed. Alessandro Stanziani, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 107–24. For an intervention complicating the argument that indentured labour migrations replaced slavery, see Clare Anderson, ‘Convicts and Coolies: Rethinking Indentured Labour in the Nineteenth Century’, *Slavery & Abolition* 30, no. 1 (1 March 2009): 93–109.

⁴⁶⁸ *The Irish Times*, 11 July 1874, 5.

⁴⁶⁹ *Ibid.* For questionable details of what was stolen, see Captain Leslie’s testimony in Old Bailey Online, ‘JOHN JOHNSTONE, Breaking Peace, Wounding, 23rd November 1874.’, accessed 30 October 2020, <https://www.oldbaileyonline.org/print.jsp?div=t18741123-40>.

⁴⁷⁰ Notes, 21 November 1874 and 28 January 1875, in ‘Draft Bills Etc Leading to the Fugitive Offenders Act 1881, Police Orders, Application to British Territories Overseas’, TNA, HO 45/9530/40034.

him with intent to murder.⁴⁷¹ While a mutiny points to the military and its close associations with an imperial or national state, in international law pirates have long been understood as enemies of humanity whose piracy crimes effectively make them stateless. The *Satsuma* was a commercial vessel, rather than part of Britain's Royal Navy. The sailors in question were not naval officers: if they had been, it would have been dealt with by the Admiralty as a clear case of mutiny. Piracy, however, seems ill-fitting to describe the making off with six guns and 'tobacco, pipes, and matches, and [...] a bag of bread, tins of preserved meat, and a new log line.'⁴⁷² That this case was described in terms of both mutiny and piracy demonstrates that in the late nineteenth century, the boundaries between empire and nation, commercial power and governmental authority, citizenship and non-citizenship, were highly ambiguous.

By the late summer, all but John Johnstone had evaded conviction. The Colonial Office at Westminster had discovered it had zero legal power to enforce removal from either Hong Kong or Melbourne in order to face trial or testify as a witness in London. Moreover, the legal courts in both Hong Kong and Melbourne lacked the jurisdiction to prosecute for a crime committed somewhere on the high seas in the South Atlantic Ocean, thousands of miles beyond the borders of their territories. Getting and keeping evidence proved very difficult when the only possible evidence of the crime were the spoken testimonies of its only witnesses, the *Satsuma's* captain and crew. These were sailors dispersed across the maritime world, enjoying the autonomy of movement their transnational line of work afforded to them. Seamen, as Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker point out, lived lives and created life-worlds at the intersection of multiple authorities and multiple economic systems.⁴⁷³

As such, the Magistrate trying John Johnson at the Bow Street Court reported great statutory difficulty in 'detain[ing] him on remand for several months awaiting the return to this country of the Captain of the Ship who was the principal Witness, as well as the victim.'⁴⁷⁴ This difficulty was compounded by the next hurdle of 'inducing the witnesses to remain here [in London] till the Trial took place.'⁴⁷⁵ Entreating seamen to lose work and stay, unaccommodated, in London, for weeks or months as witnesses-in-waiting had proved 'practically impossible.'⁴⁷⁶ The murder trial against John Johnstone eventually went ahead on 23 November 1874. The Captain, first mate, and a sixteen year old apprentice gave evidence against the defendant.⁴⁷⁷ Johnstone had no witnesses to call: his fellow accused were thousands of miles away, out of reach. Johnstone argued that 'if any of the rest of the crew are taken they will be witnesses

⁴⁷¹ Old Bailey Online, 'JOHN JOHNSTONE'.

⁴⁷² Ibid.

⁴⁷³ Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000).

⁴⁷⁴ Report of the Law Officers to the Colonial Office, 30 July 1874, in 'Draft Bills Etc', TNA, HO 45/9530/40034.

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁶ Circular Dispatch from Lord Carnarvon (Colonial Secretary) to Colonial Governors, 6 December 1874, in 'Draft Bills etc', TNA, HO 45/9530/40034.

⁴⁷⁷ Old Bailey Online, 'JOHN JOHNSTONE'.

for me', and would have been able to corroborate his 'assertion that the captain and officers were constantly drunk during the voyage', and that the Captain had threatened to throw him overboard, the first mate had beaten the cook very badly, so 'that in consequence of this they made up their minds to leave the ship'.⁴⁷⁸ But bereft of witnesses, Johnstone was found guilty and sentenced to death.

The *Satsuma* case had exposed weaknesses in the expanding infrastructure of British imperial law. The telegram, a nineteenth century technology increasingly celebrated as central to British imperial expansion, seemed to offer a way forward. Whitehall officials began to prepare legislation that would 'enable offenders escaping from one part of Her Majesty's dominions to another to be arrested, *by telegram*, and sent home for trial.'⁴⁷⁹ The challenge was to streamline intra-imperial police and court proceedings, rethinking standards of proof and technologies of proving, without appearing to compromise rule of law, the ideological centrepiece of the British imperial project.⁴⁸⁰ Rule of law had become indivisible from popular notions about Britain's role, through its Royal Navy, as the world's policeman defending the high seas against the remaining slaver ships of the 'Mohammedan Slave Trade.'⁴⁸¹

The Fugitive Offenders Act that received Royal assent on 27 August 1881 was 'an Act to amend the Law with respect to Fugitive Offenders in her Majesty's Dominions.'⁴⁸² It laid out a much simpler procedure for returning fugitive offenders than the process outlined in the 1870 Extradition Act. First and foremost, the 1881 Act made a fugitive 'liable to be apprehended and returned in manner provided by this Act to the part from which he is a fugitive.'⁴⁸³ That liability in law to be returned to a territory had simply not existed in this way before. There now was a general understanding that a state could, and may need to, forcibly return someone to another place. Although sovereign powers had banished subjects from their jurisdiction throughout the medieval and early modern periods, the kind of deportation and state-enforced return involved in fugitive offender proceedings pointed more clearly towards the kind of 'global monopoly of states over the international movement of people' that we recognise today.⁴⁸⁴

Sections 3 and 4 of the 1881 Act allowed for the arrest of a fugitive on the basis of an 'endorsed warrant' and a 'provisional warrant' respectively, outlining terms and conditions that stretched

⁴⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁹ *Apprehension of Offenders*, Confidential Dispatch No.21 Printed for Use of the Colonial Office, 28 January 1875, in 'Draft Bills etc', TNA, HO 45/9530/40034.

⁴⁸⁰ A text associated with codifying British Rule of Law was Albert Venn Dicey, *Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1915). [First edition 1885]. <http://archive.org/details/cu31924030503720>. For recent engagements with Dicey, see Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor*, and Dylan Lino, 'The Rule of Law and the Rule of Empire: A.V. Dicey in Imperial Context', *Modern Law Review* 81, no. 5 (2018): 739–764.

⁴⁸¹ After the abolition of Slavery in 1833, white English abolitionists quickly reconceptualised slavery as an evil invented, perpetuated and endemic to "the Mohammedans." See for instance, Thomas Fowell Buxton et al., *The African Slave Trade and Its Remedy* (London: John Murray, 1840).

⁴⁸² *Fugitive Offenders Act*, 1881.

⁴⁸³ Ibid, Part I, s.2.

⁴⁸⁴ Mongia, *Indian Migration and Empire*, 1.

and warped the treasured principle of freedom from arrest under general warrants. An endorsed warrant was issued by the territory from which the fugitive had fled. It was telegraphed to the colonial governor of whichever British territory the fugitive was hiding in, or to a Secretary of State, if the fugitive was in the British mainland. The colonial governor, or Secretary of State, then conferred with 'a judge of a superior court' (or a Bow Street Metropolitan Police magistrate if in the United Kingdom) as to whether the warrant 'was issued by some person having lawful authority' to do so.⁴⁸⁵ If deemed credible, this telegram was endorsed and the local police force empowered to arrest the fugitive. The fugitive would then be brought before a magistrate, whose 'lawful authority' was checked again. If that magistrate was satisfied by the telegraphed evidence alongside the warrant of 'a strong and probable presumption that the fugitive committed the offence mentioned in the warrant', then the fugitive would be detained in prison for fifteen days pending their deportation to the territory in which they were accused.⁴⁸⁶ The fugitive could use these fifteen days to issue a writ of habeas corpus and, once in court, dispute that magistrate's presumption.

A 'strong and probable presumption' was a much less stringent threshold of evidence than the *prima facie* threshold required to extradite a British imperial subject from a sovereign foreign country back to Britain under the 1870 Extradition Act and its bilateral arrangements. In 1880, the Cabinet and the Home Office agreed that 'no international question can arise such as might occur in Extradition cases' and therefore 'there does not appear to be the same necessity for hearing every [fugitive offender] case at Bow Street.'⁴⁸⁷ The 'provisional warrant' procedure made the intra-imperial arrest procedure even more capacious. It operated as a signal that evidence was still being collected in the first territory but that the police force receiving the warrant should find and detain the fugitive for seven days in the meantime. This extra time enabled police forces to gather enough evidence towards a warrant for a crime serious enough to be included in the scope of the 1881 Act. Importantly, that scope was not codified by a single shared list of offences but defined as:–

apply[ing] to the following offences, namely, to *treason and piracy*, and to every offence, whether called felony, misdemeanour, crime, or by any other name, which is for the time being punishable in the part of Her Majesty's dominions in which it was committed, either on indictment or information, *by imprisonment with hard labour for a term of twelve months or more*, or by any greater punishment.⁴⁸⁸

Twelve months of hard labour was the measure to approximate equivalence between the very different legal systems operating in different parts of the empire. Criminal offences were named and punished differently in different colonies. The titles of, and powers invested in, the

⁴⁸⁵ *Ibid*, Part I, s.3.

⁴⁸⁶ *Fugitive Offenders Act*, 1881, Part I, s.5.

⁴⁸⁷ Letter from G. Herbert to Under Secretary (Home Office), 30 January 1880, in 'Draft Bills etc', HO 45/9530/40034, TNA.

⁴⁸⁸ *Fugitive Offenders Act*, 1881, Part I, s.9.

criminal justice authorities also differed from colony to colony. This is because British colonial regimes inserted themselves into existing systems of law and order, made use of indigenous institutions of authority and punishment, and invented crimes in ad hoc localised responses to non-compliance and resistance, as studied in chapter four of this thesis.⁴⁸⁹

The Extradition Act of 1870 was created to regulate bilateral arrangements between rival European imperial powers. Its wording suggested that, at least on paper, extradition was brokered sensitively to ensure the sending nation was not sending a man to be politically persecuted by a sovereign he fled. Its intricacies reflected the distrust and rivalry between these imperial powers in a particularly ferocious and unregulated time of imperial expansion.⁴⁹⁰ By contrast, under the 1881 Act, the court 'did not weigh up the evidence but simply order[ed] the fugitive's return unless the offence is too trivial.'⁴⁹¹ The Act attempted to standardise deportation procedures across the empire. It sought to signal a uniformity of practice across the expanding British Empire. Unlike extradition arrangements with European neighbours, the simpler 1881 process presumed that the territories of the British Empire already shared a common British legal culture. To this effect, the archival material about the 1881 Act consists of memos detailing pro-forma arrest warrants, check-lists of minimum of evidence required to enclose with a warrant, and rescheduled lists of which was the 'person having lawful authority' to initiate or magistrate upon fugitive offender proceedings in each of the empire's territories.⁴⁹² The legislation laid out a large number of ways to 'duly authenticate' evidence and testimonies:—

Warrants and depositions, and copies thereof, and official certificates or judicial documents stating facts, shall be deemed duly authenticated for the purposes of this Act if they are authenticated in manner provided for the time being by law, or if they purport to be signed by or authenticated by the signature of a judge, magistrate, or officer of the part of Her Majesty's dominions in which the same are issued, taken, or made, and are authenticated either by the oath of some witness, or by being sealed with the official seal of a Secretary of State, or with the public seal of a British possession, or with the official seal of a governor of a British possession, or of a colonial secretary, or of some secretary or minister administering a department of the government of a British possession.⁴⁹³

⁴⁸⁹ The differences between metropolitan and colonial criminal justice systems, and between different colonial territories has attracted much scholarly attention from new imperial historians, especially in relation to capital punishment and murder charges. See for example, Martin J. Wiener, *An Empire on Trial: Race, Murder, and Justice under British Rule, 1870 - 1935*, (Cambridge: CUP, 2008); Clare Anderson, 'Execution and Its Aftermath in the Nineteenth-Century British Empire', in *A Global History of Execution and the Criminal Corpse*, ed. Richard Ward, (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015), 170–98; Elizabeth Kolsky, *Colonial Justice in British India: White Violence and the Rule of Law*, (Cambridge: CUP, 2011); Stacey Hynd, 'Murder and Mercy: Capital Punishment in Colonial Kenya, ca. 1909-1956', *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 45, no. 1 (2012).

⁴⁹⁰ By 1889 this sense of threat had prompted Parliament to pass a Naval Defence Act committing Britain to the 'two-power standard', a pledge to match the combined naval strength of France and Russia which galvanised monumental expansion in the iron-based shipbuilding industries of Clydeside, Merseyside and Tyneside.

⁴⁹¹ 'Cabinet Legislation Committee: Fugitive Offenders Bill' (1966), TNA, DO 211/47.

⁴⁹² *Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881*, Part IV, s.29.

⁴⁹³ *Ibid.*

This list is nearly impossible to follow or comprehend. In practice, the list gave paramount discretionary power to the magistrates who issued and authenticated arrest warrants. Warrants could be authenticated by a receiving magistrate if he was satisfied that a real, bona fide official or magistrate had sent the warrant. This was all about signatures and seal-stamps, as well as long lists of job titles pinpointing which magistrate or official had warrant-making power.

How did these labyrinth lists and on-paper procedures work in real time, in real lives, in actual places – or, better put – between actual places? Looking into how fugitive offender deportation procedures have shaped today's mass deportation regime requires me to trace changes in how race is referred to, signalled, and conjured up. These changes are sometimes haphazard, sometimes strategic and often both. The terrain between the concept of race and that of country-of-origin is shifting and unstable. I trace these changes by comparing fugitive offender cases to see how where someone was born, the offence they committed and the place they committed it, effected how a fugitive offender was treated. Or more precisely: how race effected the extent to which that offender could access the safeguards afforded to them under the 1881 Act. This is not, however, a comparative analysis of fugitive offender deportation cases. The archives hold no consolidated stores of casefiles. The lack of central organised records, tables, numbers and periodic reviews of fugitive offender deportations testifies to the jumbled nature of imperial law-making and colonial administration. Immigration, it seems, has not always been the numbers game it is today.

Nothing makes this clearer than a large volume I found in the Home Office archives. Half the size of my desk, this was a 'Precedent Book' which indexed extradition and fugitive offender cases country by country and topic by topic.⁴⁹⁴ Despite the National Archives' assertion that 'the registers as a whole act as subject index to Home Office papers', there is nothing whole about this book.⁴⁹⁵ Its pages are titled in curling red cursive with names of colonies or places that have since been renamed. Often the book itself registers those changes with hurriedly added sections and plenty of crossings out. It is a patchwork of different handwriting crowded onto pages while swathes of the book remain empty. Pages have been left open for countries and topics to be added as new precedents are sought to deal with new anxieties. It is a book waiting for things to need to be remembered. Multiple reference index systems seem to be at work here, and many of the files are listed as destroyed. The book, then, is haunted by no longer existing shelf-stacks and archive rooms, and by mislaid or shredded files. Nothing is easily found or well-placed in this grandiose but ruinous book. Altogether it manifests the

⁴⁹⁴ Registry clerks at the Home Office began to keep many precedent books like this in 1890 and soon expanded to a separate division of the Home Office, called 'the Noters section' which 'provided a centralised service to divisions, noting precedents on request and undertaking research in closed files and archives for the department and members of the public.' 'Home Office: Noters Section: Precedent Books' Description, TNA, HO 384.

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid.

labyrinthine nature of Home Office thinking about deportation between 1890 and 1964, the book's end.

This book helps me focus on institutional policy-making, rather than the politics or legalities of deportation cases. I look for what and who prompts changes to fugitive offender procedures. I pull together what I call 'traces of cases': names of fugitive offenders, crimes accused, judicial difficulties, transnational miscommunications, solicitors instructed, expenses incurred and other details. Which details of which individual cases prompt anxiety, scrutiny, and policy change in Home Office and Colonial Office deportation policy-making? Which fugitive offenders, from which countries, committing what kinds of crime, moved the British imperial state to amend its deportation procedures with Orders in Council? I look for patterns and settle for peculiarities, hoping that whatever seems peculiar can at least help to sketch the pattern it diverges from.

What traces can I find in the archives of fugitive offenders processed under the 1881 Act in its early years? In 1882 the Netherlands Government communicated to the colonial government of Jamaica that one David Heilbron, a Dutch Subject, was suspected to be on route to Jamaica. If found there, his extradition back to the Netherlands was sought under the Extradition Act of 1870, an arrangement extended from Great Britain to Jamaica by the Fugitive Offenders Act of 1881. Heilbron was wanted 'in respect of charges of false pretences and obtaining £459 by fraud.'⁴⁹⁶ In 1892, the Home Office received an urgent telegraph requesting the provisional arrest of Henry Stafford Beyts, the 'manager at Bombay for Beyts, Craig and Company' who was 'wanted on charge of conspiring, with two others in custody, to defraud Chartered Mercantile Bank of India, London and China of large sums.'⁴⁹⁷ The next year R. H. Phillip was 'charged with forgery' by the police at Grenada in the Windward Isles.⁴⁹⁸ Between 1896 and 1898 the Home Office corresponded with the Colonial Governor of Jamaica to dutifully report that Henry Attride, a fugitive offender, had still not been found, despite 'observation [being] kept from time to time on No 32 the Gardens, Peckham Rye, the residence of Mrs. Day, Attride's sister' and that of his brother 'a ticket inspector in the employ of the London Omnibus Company [who] resides at No. 52 Reaston Street, New Cross.'⁴⁹⁹

In December 1898 the colony of British Guiana initiated fugitive offender proceedings to secure the deportation of one 'W. McLaren Reid, a man of colour, who is wanted [...] on a warrant for embezzling the monies of a Building Society of which he was secretary.'⁵⁰⁰ Letters demonstrate the painstaking efforts of the Stamford Hill Police to ascertain Reid's

⁴⁹⁶ 'Fugitive Offender David Heilbron', 6 September 1882, TNA, CO 137/506/21.

⁴⁹⁷ Draft Telegram, 'EXTRADITION: CRIMINAL: BEYTS, Henry Stafford; SENTENCE: Extradition from India.' (July 1892), TNA, HO 144/485/X37782.

⁴⁹⁸ 'Offices and Individuals. Letters from Various Government Offices', 1893, TNA, CO 321/150.

⁴⁹⁹ 'Correspondence from "Offices" on Henry Attride', 1898, TNA, CO 137/596.

⁵⁰⁰ Letter (New Scotland Yard) to Under Secretary of State (Home Office), 13 December 1898, in 'Correspondence Received from Offices', CO 111/508, TNA.

whereabouts and potential getaway plans by tailing his wife, his wife's neighbours and interviewing ticket office staff at the port of Harwich. The letters make it clear that Reid was also being followed by a private detective. Perhaps it was the pressure exerted by this private detective that made the Metropolitan Police's attempts to apprehend Reid so earnest, or at least, so carefully recorded in the archive. Perhaps he embezzled more than the other men. Or perhaps it was the 'caramel colour and almond eyes' of this 'man of colour' from Demerara.⁵⁰¹ I cannot simplify all this to argue that Reid's case inspired more surveillance and action than other fugitive offenders on account of his being racialised as 'a man of colour.' Such are the difficulties of trying to find patterns and meaning among processes of discretionary justice that are often arbitrary. What I can confidently say, having read and compared these traces of cases, is that Attride, Beyts, Heilbron and Phillips were likely to have been white men, or else the correspondence concerning them would have likely have noted their 'colour' alongside the other circumstantial 'facts' of their criminal cases.

In general it seems that the Fugitive Offenders Act of 1881 was created to regulate and make manageable the criminality of white people who had migrated abroad to the colonies to make a better life for themselves. The privatised acts of getting rich, through forgery, larceny, and embezzlement, after all resembled the driving force behind the empire itself. Most of these cases, except for Attride's, were initiated and paid for by solicitors acting on behalf of Mercantile Banks, insurance companies or other financial institutions operating in the British Empire.⁵⁰² British colonial governments served these institutions by corresponding with the Home Office in the United Kingdom whenever fugitive offenders absconded there.

New borders, new nations, more deportations

The 1881 Act was predominantly used to resolve financial crimes. A notable exception, however, was the deportation in 1889 of Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo, the king of the Zulu Nation. In May 1887, the British had annexed Zululand, placing it under the direct control of the Governor of Natal and the Native Law of Natal. Dinuzulu had, however, refused the annexation and ignored the changes and impositions attempted by the British. By June 1888, he had defeated Chief Zibhebhu of the Mandlakazi, a somewhat ally of the British. Soon after, the

⁵⁰¹ He remained exiled in St Helena for seven years until 1896. After Zululand was incorporated into the Colony of Natal he was invited back to the region, and appointed as advisor, the *InDuna*, to the government. See, John Henrik Clarke, 'Bambata: Last of the Zulu Rebel Chiefs', *The Journal of Negro Education* 31, no. 1 (1962): 88–91.

⁵⁰¹ Letter (New Scotland Yard) to Under Secretary of State (Home Office), 13 December 1898, in 'Correspondence Received from Offices', CO 111/508, TNA.

⁵⁰² As Katharina Pistor argues, empire's phenomenal expansion of global trade, commerce and finance would not have been possible without the 'legal coding of capital' by lawyers, 'the code's masters', through which certain assets are placed 'beyond the reach of creditors, including the tax authorities' and yet those same asset-holders are privileged in law to collect from their own debtors. Katharina Pistor, *The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality* (Princeton: University Press, 2019), 3, 7.

British ordered the arrest of Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo and exiled him to the island of Saint Helena.

In May of 1890, the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies was briefly questioned in Parliament about secret telegrams sent in 1889 that had 'proposed the removal of Dinuzulu, by force or surreptitiously.'⁵⁰³ Baron H. De Worms replied:—

No action was taken upon the suggestion I have mentioned, which was in any event unnecessary; for as Her Majesty's Government were subsequently advised a Warrant, in substance the same as that under which Dinuzulu was removed, might lawfully have been made under Section 35 of the Fugitive Offenders Act, so that his grievance was technical and his injury (if any) only nominal. I shall be happy to show the telegrams to my hon. Friend, but it seems unnecessary to publish them.⁵⁰⁴

As to be expected from De Worms' words, no record of Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo's attempted fugitive offender deportation exists in the archives of the Colonial Office or any other government department. The deportation, after all, was not actually processed through the Fugitive Offenders Act. His deportation alongside his two uncles to Saint Helena was made under some other warrant, no doubt making use of local laws rather than the empire-wide 1881 legislation and its standardised procedure for authenticating warrants. The non-fact that his deportation *could have been* processed through the 1881 Act, that it 'might lawfully have been made under Section 35', speaks volumes about how the Act worked in practice. Or better put, how it could be deployed to *not work* in the moment on the ground, but later motioned to as an afterthought. The offence that kaCetshwayo *might lawfully have been charged* with is not even mentioned here, although it was in fact treason.⁵⁰⁵

In fact, a large proportion of Colonial Office archives relating to the Fugitive Offenders Act before mid-century decolonisation revolves around the fast-changing territories and jurisdictions of Southern Africa. This points to the late nineteenth century conflicts between British chartered companies, the Boer settler community and indigenous kingdoms in the region. This intensive period of making, contesting and remaking borders allowed people to live at the edges of multiple legal regimes and evade conviction. In 1897, for instance, the Home Secretary received notice from the Chief Constable of Police in Durban, Natal Colony that 'a man named Burliston is now supposed to be residing in Johannesburg, South Africa. Can this man be extradited? The Transvaal does not appear in the Official list of countries in the memorandum published in 1890 relating to extradition and fugitive offenders.'⁵⁰⁶ Home Office officials investigated the existing laws and found that 'the law of the Transvaal precludes

⁵⁰³ 'Zulu Affairs', HC Debate, 22 May 1890, vol 344, cc1573-4.

⁵⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁵ Dinuzulu and his uncles were 'held to have committed high treason against the Queen of England.' Foreign Office, *Zululand, the Exiled Chiefs, Natal, and the Colonial Office: 1893-5*, (London, 1895). See also, Shula Marks, 'Natal, the Zulu Royal Family and the Ideology of Segregation', in *Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth Century South Africa*, ed. Saul Dubow (Routledge, 1995).

⁵⁰⁶ Letter from J. Eden (Chief Constable of Police) to Home Secretary, 25 Sep 1897, in 'EXTRADITION: Extradition Acts, 1870 and 1936, Fugitives Offenders Act, 1881' (1897 - 1936), TNA, HO 45/16439.

the surrender of British criminals in the Absence of an Extradition treaty' and as such, 'til further notice the Transvaal must be looked on as a sanctuary for British criminals.'⁵⁰⁷ Whoever Burliston was, and whatever crime he had committed, he was treated with more care and attention to legal detail than Dinizulu was eight years earlier.

The years between 1901 and 1913 in Southern Africa saw the conclusion of the Second Anglo-Boer War and the reconstitution of the Cape Colony, Natal, the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal into the Union of South Africa in 1910. These changes were reflected in no less than four Orders in Council that re-grouped territories in Southern Africa to better expedite the deportation of fugitive offenders. The Order in Council of August 1901 applied to '*certain* South African Colonies and Protectorates.'⁵⁰⁸ That of October 1906 granted powers to the Legislature of Natal to execute its own Orders in Council.⁵⁰⁹ In June 1907, another Order in Council applied the 1881 Act to Swaziland.⁵¹⁰ The 1913 South Africa Order in Council grouped the Union of South Africa with the Protectorates of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Basutoland, Swaziland and Bechuanaland. Significantly, it expressly laid out specific provisions for returning 'natives born south of the Sahara' that differed from the procedure to be followed when apprehending a fugitive *not* born 'south of the Sahara.'⁵¹¹

Each of these Orders in Council marked the territorial re-bordering of multiplying colonial states and their powers to deport fugitive offenders from or to their jurisdiction. At its most basic, then, this demonstrates a well-known truism about how borders, nations or states, and deportations reinforce each other: deportation is an important mode through which states materialise their power and mark their borders. Stepping back to look at the archival material generated by fugitive offender proceedings, to see where the material bulges and where it goes silent, helps to highlight which cases and which territories imperial and domestic policymakers were obsessing over, and how this changed over time. This perspective demystifies how states project themselves as states, as organs of state power, and as bordered jurisdictions. The larger the paper trail of procedural redrafting and correspondence, the more attention and care was being paid by policymakers in the metropole. At the turn of the twentieth century, Southern Africa was clearly the locus of these anxieties, obsessions and rewritings.

More to the point, the prioritising of some fugitive offender proceedings over others was enmeshed in sociohistorical processes by which racial identities were produced, reconfigured, lived and transformed. Following the letter of the law seemed to matter greatly in Burliston's case, whereas any old warrant had been used to deport Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo and his

⁵⁰⁷ Minute, No. 26, 1897, 'EXTRADITION: Extradition Acts', TNA, HO 45/16439.

⁵⁰⁸ HC Debate, 12 August 1901, vol 99, c411.

⁵⁰⁹ HL Debate, 30 October 1906, vol 163, c815.

⁵¹⁰ HC Debate, 12 June 1907, vol 175, c1394.

⁵¹¹ HC Debate, 24 March 1913, vol 50, c1300.

uncles, who were not protected by the procedures and safeguards of the 1881 Act. The meanings of race therein were rarely spelled out in the archival material itself but can be pieced together from what is not there in a hermeneutics of silence, as it were. Meanwhile, the process of arbitrating between ordinary and political crimes – a process documented on paper for some, and not for others – was a critical terrain in which ideas about race took shape or held tight. As we will see in the next section, these would shift and be shifted as anticolonial movements exerted increasing power over international discourse about racial discrimination and the political and legal meanings of humanity.

Winds of change and African political refugees

In the first half of the twentieth century, Southern African territories regrouped by the 1913 Order in Council could easily implement fugitive offender deportations between themselves, without input from the metropole. This ease is evidenced by a corresponding silence in the Colonial Office archives. The silence shows that colonial governors in Southern Africa were able to resolve issues around fugitive offender cases without contacting the Colonial Office. In turn the Colonial Office encountered no reason to contact those colonies. It is possible, perhaps likely, that deportations under fugitive offender proceedings were used to repress anticolonial opponents to white power regimes in Southern Africa, although no Colonial Office records exist to suggest this. The 1913 Order, after all, had been designed to create a decentralised process that would not require input from Whitehall unless the fugitive in question had fled to the United Kingdom itself.

However, towards the end of the 1950s fugitive offender proceedings in Southern Africa once again became a priority – meaning, an anxiety – for the Colonial Office. As anti-apartheid resistance and its governmental repression gathered momentum, the Union of South Africa had begun to use the Fugitive Offender Act 1881 as a mechanism for securing the return of anti-apartheid organisers. More to the point, international pressures beyond the control of the British imperial state – pressures driven by large scale anticolonial movements – began to call into question the British state's arbitrary distinction between ordinary and political crimes. Those questions and pressures increasingly found their way into parliamentary debates in Westminster.

In March 1957, Fenner Brockway questioned the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations about the 'irregular arrest' in Basutoland of Elias Monare.⁵¹² Monare, a prominent

⁵¹² For detailed a detailed accounts of MP Fenner Brockway's interactions with George Padmore, and on Brockway as a notable figure in post-war British anti-colonialism, see 'Smash Our Own Imperialism: George Padmore, the New Leader and 'Colonial Fascism' and 'A Terrible Assertion of Discontent: "Mau Mau" and the End of Imperial Benevolence', in Priyamvada Gopal, *Insurgent Empire: Anticolonial Resistance and British Dissent* (London: Verso, 2019).

anti-apartheid activist, had been returned to the Union of South Africa without due process under the Fugitive Offenders Act. Mr Alport replied that:–

As the hon. Member has already been informed, the administrative instructions, which were not precise, are being revised. In the meantime, detailed instructions have been issued to administrative and police officers regarding the correct procedure to be followed under the Fugitive Offenders Act. The individual responsible for the irregularity to which the hon. Member refers has been appropriately dealt with by the Resident Commissioner, in accordance with my noble Friend's instructions.⁵¹³

Monare was well-known for starting the Wattville Helping Hand Association in 1954, and for organising militant occupations of schools in response to South Africa's Bantu Education Act of 1955.⁵¹⁴ Alport's official response to Monare's unlawful arrest and deportation – that improved instructions would be circulated and the 'individual responsible for the irregularity [...] dealt with' – treated the incident as an aberration. The archives tell a different story; a hefty Colonial Office file of correspondence and surveillance reports monitoring Monare as he moved through regions of Southern Africa between 1956 and 1962.⁵¹⁵ Mr Scrivener, the High Commissioner of the High Commissioned Territories (Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, now Lesotho, Botswana and Eswatini), described Monare to the Commonwealth Relations Office as 'a dangerous and undesirable character; a born agitator who will not hesitate to have recourse to violence; resourceful, tough, intelligent, persuasive.'⁵¹⁶ Monare's attempts to claim political asylum in Basutoland were considered 'a dangerous precedent [which] if he gets away with it we shall have all the ruffraff from the Union here in no time.'⁵¹⁷ Lengthy preparations were made both to recategorize Monare as a 'prohibited immigrant' using early twentieth century local legislation and to prevent him from applying for a CUKC passport.⁵¹⁸

Thinking back to the unlawful deportation of Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo in 1898, we see again that ambiguity and wide discretionary powers were deliberately built into the Fugitive Offenders Act. We find here many variations on a theme: the refusal of a passport, the refusal of refugee protection, surveillance, and attempts to deny, withdraw, or remove citizenship in ways that could render Monare stateless, rightless, and immobile. Similarly, in 1960, the Colonial Secretary was questioned about why 'the Nyasaland police applied for a warrant under the Fugitive Offenders Act 1881 to return Mr. Ronald Segal and Mr. Oliver Tambo to the Union of South Africa as they were political refugees from the Union of South Africa and had been

⁵¹³ 'Basutoland (Elias Monare)', HC Debate, 5 March 1957, vol 566, cc43-4W.

⁵¹⁴ South African History Online, 'Elias Monare', South African History Online, accessed 26 January 2020, <https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/elias-monare>.

⁵¹⁵ 'Basutoland: Elias Monare Alias Korea Monare' (1 December 1956), TNA, FCO 141/481.

⁵¹⁶ Letter from T. V. Scrivener (High Commissioner's Office, Cape Town) to D. W. S. Hunt (Commonwealth Relations Office), 8 January 1957, 'Basutoland: Elias Monare', TNA, FCO 141/481.

⁵¹⁷ Secret Letter from Lieutenant B. R. Sands (District Commissioner at Maseru, Basutoland) to Central Intelligence Department, 18 January 1957, 'Basutoland: Elias Monare', TNA, FCO 141/481.

⁵¹⁸ Ibid.

granted asylum in Bechuanaland.⁵¹⁹ In reply, the Colonial Secretary simply offered procedural detail about Part II of the 1881 Act, stating that ‘in the case to which the hon. Member refers, the Nyasaland Police were following the usual practice.’⁵²⁰ The 1881 Act, and the successive Orders in Council in the early twentieth century, had made it ‘usual practice’ for police forces and colonial governments across Southern Africa to easily move suspected fugitive offenders between neighbouring territories using procedures loose and fast enough to lawfully, and conveniently, miss the fact that both Tambo and Segal ‘had been granted asylum in Bechuanaland.’

Hansard cannot tell us much about historical patterns of Home Office policymaking, nor about how the Home Office has kept records, or how it maintains records today. These transcripts cannot explain much about how the Home Office treasured certain legal precedents over others, or about which precedents have endured into the immigration and nationality policies created and enforced by today’s Home Office. In short, these Hansard sources tell us very little about how the Home Office does history. But these two traces of cases – Monare’s and the incident involving household names Tambo and Segal – at least show us that by the late 1950s, international attention to the apartheid regime in South Africa had brought the persecution of African political refugees into the emerging language of international human rights, and had brought that discourse right into the halls of Westminster’s parliamentary politics.

More interesting than these parliamentary queries is the work behind closed doors at the Home Office to use immigration control to prevent embarrassing proceedings from arising: Elias Monare’s file was a case in point. Cue the case of Alfred Hutchinson, one of ‘the usual bunch of critics of the South African Government’ who was ‘coming to speak at a meeting organised by Christian Action at the Central Hall in Westminster next Tuesday.’⁵²¹ The Dominions Office was worried about the ‘possibility of the Union Government arresting [this] member of the Basutoland Congress on his visit to the UK under Part I of the Act.’⁵²² This would ‘cause to Her Majesty’s Government grave embarrassment.’⁵²³ As memos passed between officials, a remedy was quietly sketched out: could Hutchinson be refused entry to the UK by an immigration officer?

⁵¹⁹ Iain McLeod, ‘Mr Segal and Mr Tambo’, HC Debate, 3 May 1960, vol 622, c60W.

⁵²⁰ Ibid.

⁵²¹ Accra Telegram No. 143, from E. L. Sykes (Ghana) to Mr. Jones (Dominions Office), 24 March 1960, ‘Fugitive Offenders Act, Reciprocity, South Africa/UK: Possibility of Union Government’ (1960), TNA, DO 35/9035.

⁵²² Ibid. The Methodist Central Hall in Westminster has a longer history of being the site of protest speaking. For instance, Mahatma Gandhi gave a talk to the Temperance League in the Library in 1931. Central Hall was the venue both for small organising meetings between anti-apartheid organisers (such meetings between Victor Gollancz and Christian Action’s 1946 founder Canon John Collins) as well as enormous public meetings, such as the 4,000 strong meeting at Central Hall in April 1956 where a cultural and sporting boycott of South Africa was first proposed. See Christabel Gurney, “‘A Great Cause’: The Origins of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, June 1959-March 1960”, *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26, no. 1 (2000): 123–44.

⁵²³ Ibid.

Plans and ideas percolated. Although no British subject could be refused entry to the United Kingdom, as was the effect of the 1948 British Nationality Act, officials hashed out scenarios in which on-the-ground immigration officers could refuse Hutchinson entry to the UK if he failed to prove he was a British subject. This mode of obstructing racialised British subjects' on-paper freedom of movement had been an informally established practice since the *Coloured Alien Seaman's Order* of 1925, if not before.⁵²⁴ 'Hutchinson does not "belong" to any of the territories in Southern Africa', one official wrote.⁵²⁵ This prompted memos back and forth about whether Hutchinson, having fled from so many countries as a political agitator, may conveniently lack any official identity documents that could prove to a UK immigration officer that this black African man was a British subject.⁵²⁶ Eventually it was remembered that, even if all British colonial administrations accidentally-on-purpose refused to issue Hutchinson a CUKC passport, Hutchinson could easily appeal to Kwame Nkrumah's newly independent Ghanaian government for Commonwealth-issued documents that the UK Immigration Service would be compelled to accept.⁵²⁷ The plans were scrapped, and the correspondence ended there. Whether Hutchinson arrived and whether he was arrested is not reported in the archive. Nonetheless this little trace shows the bundling together of immigration officers' discretionary powers with the decentralised withholding of identity documents, a combination that feels eerily familiar today in the wake of the Windrush records scandal.

Deporting Anthony Enahoro

This backdrop of anti-apartheid deportations was the highly charged political context in which the Enahoro controversy unfolded in late 1962. Many files on the case refer to the *deportation* case of Chief Enahoro. In the ensuing controversy, the ambiguity between deporting and extraditing Enahoro was tangled up in competing impressions of the newly independent Nigerian judiciary, and whether it would uphold the rule of law on which the legitimacy of the Fugitive Offenders Act's extensive powers rested.

Extradition is an arrangement between sovereign nations. An extradited person is wanted back somewhere they have left. A deported person is wanted got rid of and their country-of-origin has to accept them back. In his memoir, Enahoro himself interchangeably referred to both his deportation and his extradition. He generally referred to 'my deportation' when describing the wrangling over legislation, law and policy.⁵²⁸ When recounting how he felt about

⁵²⁴ Laura Tabili, *"We Ask for British Justice": Workers and Racial Difference in Late Imperial Britain*, (Ithaca: Cornell, 1994).

⁵²⁵ Accra Telegram No. 143, 24 March 1960, TNA, DO 35/9035.

⁵²⁶ Ibid.

⁵²⁷ Memo, 28 March 1960; Memo, C. W. D [Sir C. Dixon], 29 March 1960, in 'Fugitive Offenders Act, Reciprocity, South Africa/UK', TNA, DO 35/9035.

⁵²⁸ Enahoro, *Fugitive Offender: The Story of a Political Prisoner*, 1965, 242.

his impending enforced return to Nigeria, and when ruminating on the political significance of the proceedings against him, he called it his 'extradition.' His memoir, titled *Fugitive Offender: The Story of a Political Prisoner*, reflected this contradiction.⁵²⁹ Enahoro's fugitive offender proceedings throw into relief how decolonisation destabilised and refashioned the oppositions that could be drawn between 'civilised countries' and 'the dependencies.'⁵³⁰ This opposition was no longer identical with the 1881 Act's separation of Part I and Part II territories.

Enahoro was facing a treason charge in Lagos. The 1881 Act allowed for the deportation of a suspect accused of the political offence of treason. This was, then, in stark contrast to the international principle of asylum for political refugees hounded by their home governments. At the time of Enahoro's detention in London the Geneva Convention of 1951 had not yet been updated by the 1967 Refugee Protocol. This meant that, in practice, a citizen of a British colony or an independent Commonwealth country was not entitled to asylum in Britain or anywhere else in the world. International law laid down that a colonised subject already had protection from in-country persecution, the protection of the British Empire. As Lucy Mayblin has detailed, during the drafting of the 1951 Convention, the British Government was 'reluctant to sign a broad human rights Convention which might be applicable to the colonies' and 'were similarly reluctant to include colonised peoples under the rubric of the proposed Refugee Convention.'⁵³¹ British and French efforts had succeeded at inserting a 'colonial clause' that allowed Britain and France to decide when and if their dependencies were ready to access and apply the Convention. As shown by Christian Reus-Smit, the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947 allowed them to participate as sovereign states in the drafting of the 1948 Declaration and the 1951 Geneva Convention. Once participating in the UN, India and Pakistan began to refashion the principle of national self-determination into the emerging framework of postwar international human rights.⁵³² In turn, this new norm contributed towards the powerful second wave of 'transfers of power' across Asia and Africa.

The question of Enahoro's right to political asylum in England was first raised to the Home Secretary in Parliament on 20 December 1962 by MP John Stonehouse.⁵³³ In preparing the

⁵²⁹ Ibid.

⁵³⁰ Discussions of the difference between the Extradition Act and the Fugitive Offenders Act emerged in Bill readings for the 1948 Criminal Justice Act: 'If a man commits an offence in any civilised country, he is liable to be extradited under the Extradition Acts. In the British Dominions and Colonies, he is liable to be dealt with under the Fugitive Offenders Act. The only practical difference between the Fugitive Offenders Act and the Extradition Acts is that one applies to the Dominions and Colonies and the other to foreign countries.' This succinctly mapped extradition onto 'civilised countries and fugitive offender proceedings onto whichever countries were not or had not long been 'civilised countries.' Lord Goddard, HL Debate, 7 June 1948, vol 156, cc326-99.

⁵³¹ Lucy Mayblin, 'Colonialism, Decolonisation, and the Right to Be Human: Britain and the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees', *Journal of Historical Sociology* 27, no. 3 (2014): 433.

⁵³² Christian Reus-Smit, 'Human Rights and the Social Construction of Sovereignty', *Review of International Studies* 27, no. 4 (2001): 519–38.

⁵³³ Its worth pointing out momentarily, while trying not to get lost in the stranger-than-fiction details, that MP John Stonehouse – famous for staging his own death on a Miami beach in 1974 and eventually located in Australia with his secretary – eventually found himself subject to a fugitive offender extradition procedure in 1975. 'Extradition

Home Secretary's response to the tabled question, the Commonwealth Relations Office conferred with the Home Office, agreeing that 'the Home Office are wise to stand upon the technical, legal circumstances and not be drawn unduly into the question of "political asylum."⁵³⁴ Yet by spring, prompted by the Labour leader's insistent challenges, the question of political asylum had become entangled with centre-stage questions about the accelerating constitutional decolonisation of British colonies in Africa. By this time, the opposition, the press, the Cabinet, the Colonial, Home, Foreign and Commonwealth Relations offices were fully embroiled in highly charged disputes about what to do with Anthony Enahoro, and about *what* he was. Was Enahoro a political refugee, deserving sanctuary from Nigeria's illiberal, despotic government, as the latter sought to wipe out its political opponents? Or was he a treasonous threat to the national and democratic security of newly independent Nigeria?

For the British state, the slippage between these was unsettling. The decision to extradite or not would pronounce a reckoning as to the integrity of the constitutional and judicial systems installed in Nigeria, a statement of the success or otherwise of the British Empire as a project. As one MP put it, 'we shall damage the Commonwealth if we say to one Government, "you are a good Commonwealth Government and we shall return political offenders to you", but say to another Government "you are a bad Commonwealth Government and we shall not return political offenders to you."⁵³⁵ For Enahoro himself, summing up his own case in his own memoir, it was ironic to have been: –

...arrested in London, the centre of the Commonwealth; that I should appear, or be represented, in the courts ten times, and that my arrest and subsequent extradition under an out-of-date Act should have brought about political crises in the British Parliament which almost led to the downfall of the Conservative Government of that time, while in employing that Act to bring about my extradition, the Nigerian Government seemed almost to deny their own-hard won independence.⁵³⁶

The Enahoro case confronted the British state with an incompatible set of priorities and anxieties about the future of its empire's legacies. Maintaining the favour of the Federal Nigerian Government was essential for nurturing beneficial trade relationships with postcolonial Nigeria. As the largest entity in the British Empire after India and Pakistan's independence in 1947, Nigeria had become a key location for postwar British investment in industrial and agricultural 'colonial development schemes.'⁵³⁷ Also important was Enahoro's

Case: John Stonehouse, Labour MP; Extradition Following His Illegal Entry...' (10 September 1975), TNA, HO 306/150. See also, Julia Stonehouse, *John Stonehouse, My Father: The True Story of the Runaway MP* (Icon, 2021).

⁵³⁴ V. C. Martin to Mr Chadwick, 11 December 1962, in 'Granting of asylum to Chief Anthony Enahoro', TNA, DO 195/185.

⁵³⁵ John Strachey, 'Chief Enahoro', HC Debate, 10 April 1963, vol 675, cc1357.

⁵³⁶ Enahoro, *Fugitive Offender*, 208.

⁵³⁷ For a history of British business interests in the decolonisation of West Africa, see Sarah Stockwell, *The Business of Decolonization: British Business Strategies in the Gold Coast* (Oxford: OUP, 2000); see also, Bekeh Utietiang Ukelina, *The Second Colonial Occupation: Development Planning, Agriculture, and the Legacies of British Rule in Nigeria* (Lanham: Lexington, 2017).

considerable public profile as a long-running political opponent of British rule and as the ‘mover of a historic motion’: early in 1953, Enahoro had presented to Nigeria’s Central Legislature a controversial motion ‘that this House accepts as a primary objective the attainment of self-government by Nigeria in 1956.’⁵³⁸ What is more, Enahoro had been a frequent visitor to training conferences in Westminster and Stormont, to educational tours of Oxford and St Andrews Universities, and to the Royal Garden Party at Buckingham Palace organised by the Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Offices to prepare officials in British African colonies in ‘the study of parliamentary government.’⁵³⁹ In other words, the Colonial Office were sure to have monitored Enahoro for their own purposes long before the ‘embarrassing’ deportation controversy began in 1962. In early 1963, a ‘factual note’ was sent to the Prime Minister with the title ‘Secret: Chief Anthony Enahoro: Curriculum Vitae.’ The note read: –

A very puzzling personality. Undoubtedly able and gave up being a Minister as soon as he could to make money. Now makes an income generally estimated at £60,000 to £70,000 per annum by ‘facilitating contacts’. In 1945 he was imprisoned for nine months for publishing a criminal libel against the Governor. In 1947 he was sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment for attempting to secede the Police from their allegiance. In January 1949 he was sentenced to six months imprisonment for sedition. He has great charm and can talk very well.⁵⁴⁰

By 1962, fifty years of colonial administration in Nigeria had furnished an extensive body of scholarship and government policy depicting Nigeria as a society haunted by religious divisions, fraudulence, despotism, and corruption.⁵⁴¹ Nigeria was presented as a place where guardianship and the imposition of British rule of law was much needed. At the same time, the British Government needed to uphold the notionally British tradition of liberal tolerance, one that had supposedly given the indirect rule policy its integrity, a clear example of the ‘mystique of British anti-racism.’⁵⁴² In this context, the Government needed to appear fluent in the emerging vocabularies of human rights and racial discrimination that were gaining ground after the Second World War. Meanwhile, since the early twentieth century, the right of asylum had been selectively held aloft as a distinctively British tradition.⁵⁴³ In short, there were both old and new-world order reasons for and against returning Enahoro to face trial in Nigeria. As the

⁵³⁸ Enahoro, *Fugitive Offender*, 132, 121.

⁵³⁹ *Ibid*, 110.

⁵⁴⁰ ‘Copy of factual note sent to PM’, in ‘Deportation of Chief Anthony Enahoro’ (1 December 1963), TNA, LCO 2/8595.

⁵⁴¹ By the 1970s the historiography on indirect rule in British colonial Africa started shifting towards critically evaluating the role of European officials and missionaries’ colonial knowledge creation – through law, ethnography, and amateur history-writing – in stratifying, and instrumentalising multivalent African ethnic and social affiliations into rigidly defined notions of “tribe” and “tribal difference”. See for instance, John Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge: CUP, 1979). For a recent overview of historiography on indirect rule and “tribe”, see Vikram Visana, ‘Beyond Citizen and Subject: New Perspectives on Political Thought, “Tribe,” and “Indirect Rule” in Africa’, *History Compass* 17, no. 3 (2019).

⁵⁴² Perry, *London Is the Place for Me*, 19.

⁵⁴³ Prime Minister Balfour could not get the 1905 Aliens Act passed without thematising the Act’s defensive codification of the right of asylum. See Norman Wise Sibley and Alfred Elias, *The Aliens Act and the Right of Asylum* (London: W. Clowes and Sons, 1906). See also, Alison Bashford and Jane McAdam, ‘The Right to Asylum: Britain’s 1905 Aliens Act and the Evolution of Refugee Law’, *Law and History Review* 32, no. 2 (May 2014): 326.

empire began to fall apart, Enahoro's case made it clear how decolonisation was disaggregating the legal categories and the social identities that had emerged in imperial discourse to describe foreignness versus imperial belonging, as well as criminality versus innocence.

The end of the 1881 Fugitive Offenders Act

Enahoro's case had all the political parties agreed that the 'out of date' 1881 Act was in urgent need of revision before any more circumstances presented 'which could give rise to the same difficulties and embarrassment as did the Enahoro case.'⁵⁴⁴ These embarrassments prompted the British Government to renege legislative authority over how to amend the 'outmoded' 1881 Act, instead devolving responsibility to the Commonwealth Law Ministers.⁵⁴⁵ The Commonwealth Law Ministers Conferences of 1965 made amendments to the 1881 Act a key part of its agenda.⁵⁴⁶ Under the Commonwealth Law Ministers scheme, each of the 'independent Commonwealth countries' agreed to re-legislate their own Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 featuring a shared list of extraditable crimes that reflected the 1870 Extradition Act's list. This put an end to the elasticity and imbalance permitted by the 1881's Act's 'twelve months or more' hard labour definition. In 1967 the English Fugitives Offenders Act came into law. In a total reverse of imperial lawmaking in the late nineteenth century, the contents of the 1967 Act had been decided by Commonwealth law ministers, rather than by legislators based at Westminster.

It is important to note that despite the furore over Enahoro's deportation in 1963, the replacement of the 1881 Act was actually prompted by Ian Smith regime's declaration of Southern Rhodesia's Unilateral Independence [UDI] from Britain. Rhodesia's UDI had inaugurated South Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) as a nation-state independent of the British Empire. Smith's white minority regime was internationally and unequivocally recognised as contravening the 'no independence before majority rule' principle. Sanctions and worldwide protest followed. The Home Office had to move quickly to be seen to rectify the 1881 Act to avoid Rhodesia using it to recall anti-colonial political offenders, in order to protect Britain's standing in the international arena. While these arguments and pressures could have applied a decade earlier to the fate of fugitive offenders from the South African apartheid state, the key difference here was that Rhodesia's UDI was considered a direct embarrassment to Britain. UDI threatened the fragile 'orderly for the most part' historical narrative of British

⁵⁴⁴ Gordon Rudd (Home Secretary), 'Cabinet Legislation Committee – Fugitive Offenders Bill – Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Home Department', in 'Cabinet Legislation Committee: Fugitive Offenders Bill' (1966), TNA, DO 211/47.

⁵⁴⁵ 'Fugitive Offenders Act 1881: Meeting of the Working Party to Review the Act', 29 August 1963, TNA, FO 372/7884.

⁵⁴⁶ 'Commonwealth: Conferences: Law Ministers' Conference 1965', TNA, LO 2/99.

decolonisation that was in the making. So, in contrast to the relatively slow pace of Commonwealth Law ministers reworking the Fugitive Offenders Act of 1967, in 1965 the Home Office quickly drafted emergency measures in response to Rhodesia's UDI.

The content of the resulting legislation illustrates how, at the end of empire, Home Office policymakers increasingly rephrased race under the more palatable, speakable notion of someone's country-of-origin. This requires some unpacking. On 24 November 1965, the Home Secretary outlined four acts for Parliament to approve: the Southern Rhodesia (Property in Passports) Order, the Southern Rhodesia (British Nationality Act 1948) Order, the Southern Rhodesia (Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962) Order and the Southern Rhodesia (Fugitive Offenders Act 1881) Order. The Property in Passports Order was made 'because the Government do not recognise passports issued by the illegal regime of Mr. Smith in Southern Rhodesia' and therefore the British Government wanted 'the power to impound those passports when they come to official notice in the United Kingdom.'⁵⁴⁷ The impounding of passports was seen as a critical assertion of British sovereignty over the 'illegal regime of Mr Smith.'⁵⁴⁸

The Southern Rhodesia (British Nationality Act 1948) Order tried to ensure that Southern Rhodesian citizens – those who 'broadly speaking, are able to show ancestry on the male side in Great Britain, who can show a connection with Great Britain and the intention to reside in Great Britain' – could be granted CUKC citizenship as outlined by the 1948 British Nationality Act.⁵⁴⁹ Without this 1965 Order, the illegal departure of South Rhodesia from the British Empire would have prevented South Rhodesian citizens from accessing CUKC citizenship. Next, the Southern Rhodesia (Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962) Order would prevent a Rhodesian citizen from becoming 'immune from the provisions of the Act of 1962' on account of the Passport Order and the British Nationality Act Order.⁵⁵⁰ It re-emphasised that only those Rhodesian citizens who 'were able to show ancestry on the male side in Great Britain' were entitled to CUKC citizenship and UK-issued passports.⁵⁵¹ This stipulation on ancestry was absent from the original 1948 British Nationality Act: as is well known, that original act had enabled the large-scale postwar migration of Caribbean and South Asian British subjects. In short, Rhodesian citizens without ancestry on the male side in Great Britain were not the intended recipients of this control-free invitation to settle in the British mainland with British citizenship and British nationality. The majority of those without such ancestry, in South Rhodesia, were black Africans.

⁵⁴⁷ Sir Frank Soskice (Home Secretary), 'Passports, British Nationality, commonwealth immigrants and fugitive offenders', HC Debate, 24 November 1965, vol 721, cc696.

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁵¹ Ibid.

But the Southern Rhodesia (Fugitive Offenders Act 1881) Order made this racialisation of British belonging even more clear, and in a peculiar way. The ‘embarrassing’ experiences over Monare, Tambo and more sensationally Enahoro had shown the Government that an Order was required to prevent Rhodesia from using the 1881 Act to requisition anti-colonial activists fighting Smith’s regime from the neighbouring or distant countries to which they had fled. The same debates and polarised sympathies that had arisen during Monare’s, Tambo’s and Enahoro’s cases began once more to recirculate. Some MPs were loudly anxious that ‘this Order [would] give the right of sanctuary to any person who commits a normal criminal offence in Southern Rhodesia or in Basutoland’, while others questioned the biased nature of ‘what may be a political offence and what may be an ordinary crime.’⁵⁵²

But what is most striking is that the Southern Rhodesia (Fugitive Offender) Order extended the notion of political asylum to ‘a number of Rhodesians who will not so qualify [under the British Nationality Act Order], because they cannot trace their descent from Great Britain in the male line.’⁵⁵³ It sought to reconceptualise anyone under ‘any sort of pressure or persecution in Rhodesia owing to his demonstrated loyalty to the Crown’ as a ‘political refugee.’⁵⁵⁴ Here we find the emergent discourse of international human rights – a discourse borne of the postcolonial new world order driven by anticolonial movements – mobilised to conceptualise as political refugees those ‘loyal to the British Crown.’ It would be difficult for African anticolonial activists to convincingly present themselves as loyal to the British Crown and so qualify for this refugee protection. Meanwhile white British subjects in Rhodesia who were repudiating Smith’s regime would have their loyalty to the crown qualified more easily.

Altogether these four Orders recalibrated immigration legislation by using the emancipatory purchase of international human rights language to subsume race beneath more politically palatable notions. The ‘loyalty to the Crown’ clause added a caveat that nuanced the straightforward racial distinction made in the 1913 South Africa Order in Council (which still applied to Rhodesia in the 1960s) between ‘natives born south of the Sahara’ and any others.⁵⁵⁵ ‘Loyalty to the Crown’ now made a person entitled to protections: freedom of movement as a refugee to the British mainland being one of them. Nonetheless, through racecraft’s ‘busy repertoire of strange manoeuvres’, that loyalty was implicitly qualified as something ancestral, like the Crown itself.⁵⁵⁶ It was made racial, as if loyalty to the Crown was an innate, intrinsic group characteristic, rather than a behaviour learned in a country, place, or society in which one lived and participated. Implicitly, the legislation presumed that white South Rhodesian citizens *originated* from the British mainland: the United Kingdom was their

⁵⁵² Ibid.

⁵⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁵ HC Debate, 3 May 1961, vol 639, cc1398.

⁵⁵⁶ Fields and Fields, *Racecraft*, 16.

country-of-origin whereas black Africans in South Rhodesia had South Rhodesia as their country-of-origin. Origin was not just place, origin stood in for race too, and it could mean either or both in routinely unstable ways.

Glimpses of the life and times of the 1881 Act in the later twentieth century demonstrate that the British Empire was structured by racially asymmetric regimes of criminalisation that were part of racially asymmetric regimes of mobility control. In short, colonised people were not supposed to move freely around the Empire. Under indirect rule, illiberal local indigenous systems of custom and social order were supposed to tie and retie subjects to particular places: the next chapter of this thesis explores this in the context of colonial Northern Nigeria. British imperial ideology fashioned this subjection to colonial state-sanctioned regimes of customary law as some kind of freedom or civil liberty on par with the freedom of movement afforded to UK and Old Dominions-born white British imperial subjects.

Conclusion

Proceedings under the Fugitive Offenders Act were an important legal process that required dialogue, often contestation, between various territories of the British Empire and its imperial centre. These interactions shaped the changing and multiple perceptions of the Empire as a political and juridical community. Crucially, Fugitive Offender Act proceedings held treason charges at the core of a legislation premised on a sense, or at least fantasy, of the unity of the empire as a legal entity. Its proceedings were one among a number of formative processes wherein notions of treason and prototypes of traitors to the empire interfaced with shifting debates about belonging in Britain, and about the imperial track record of British Justice and British rule of law. The legislation was initially prompted by the treasonous piracy of mutinous merchant sailors in the late nineteenth century. It was designed to assist insurance companies and colonial fiscal institutions assailing the fraudulence, embezzlements and false pretences of hypermobile and largely white imperial subjects like Henry Attride or Stafford Beyts.

Yet by mid-century decolonisation, 1881 Act deportation proceedings were increasingly used by the governments of Commonwealth countries to retrieve African political refugees under repurposed treason charges. This repressive use of the Fugitive Offender Act was in no way invented by the South African apartheid state, the Federal Government of Nigeria or Ian Smith's illegal independent Rhodesia during decolonisation. Despite the British state's attempts to minimise the 'embarrassing' repressive uses of the 1881 Act, the actions of those governments were in no way aberrations from, but rather expressions of the strategic ambiguity embedded in the 1881 Act and long made use of by British imperial and colonial authorities.

The Enahoro case drew me into recovering a defunct meaning of deportation – as extradition within the British Empire – that I had not realised I was missing. I have tried to reconstruct the confusion over the meaning of alien, immigrant, refugee, traitor, subject and citizen that characterised the controversial deportation of Chief Enahoro under the 1881 Act. The chapter has contextualised this case with other traces of cases before and alongside it. I have done this not only to understand Enahoro's case, but to appreciate how much more ambiguous and open to transformation the concepts of criminality, of foreignness, and of belonging were during the 1960s, a decade in which anticolonial movements were reordering the world.

Today, to talk of deportation as *extradition* within the British Empire makes no sense: not least because the British Empire no longer exists as a legal entity. Now, deportation refers to expelling an alien back to the country-of-origin from which they once came. Contemporary deportation underlines that that alien does not belong to, and has no legal right to live in, Britain; a Britain which is the size and shape of the United Kingdom. Although the Fugitive Offenders Act of 1881, and its 1967 remake, are no longer in force today, the legislative, juridical and administrative conjuring tricks established over decades of operating the 1881 Act have helped shape what deportation means today. This is especially the case in relation to patterns of withholding the safeguards of British Justice from people who were in practice treated as un-British, both in the sense of being disloyal to the British Crown and in the sense of being racialised as not of British 'origin'. The strangely parallel cases of Dinuzulu kaCetschwayo in 1889 and Elian Monare in 1958 illustrated this well. Each case rehearsed the familiar excuse that violent policing was an aberration rather than a structural feature of British justice. Fugitive offender proceedings were part of a fragile and contingent process of delineating who was a British imperial subject within its grasp and who instead was an alien, to be dealt with under the separate 1870 Extradition Act or the 1905 Aliens Act powers. Historically reconstructing these proceedings helps to prise apart and piece together the role that deportation plays within a global regime of citizenship built during empire to 'fix and order space, mobility and populations.'⁵⁵⁷ We have seen that deportation is a legal and social constitutive process through which states imagine and act upon territorial borders, and through which states can make and unmake not only citizens but also refugees.

From a standpoint in post-Brexit Britain in the early 2020s, this disorienting past episode feels resonant and vital. My archival research into the ad hoc remaking and making redundant of fugitive offender legislation began in 2019. But the archival resonances that struck me then have since been knocked sideways. Successive Cabinet reshuffles have sought to renege on international human rights agreements. The 'Rwanda Plan' lurching towards the Supreme Court at the time of writing seeks to utterly reconceptualise not just who qualifies as a genuine

⁵⁵⁷ Luke de Noronha, *Deporting Black Britons: Portraits of Deportation to Jamaica* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2020), 172.

refugee but also the practical meaning and geographical location of refuge itself. I began this research to contribute to a leftist, abolitionist, and loving defence of those denigrated as undeserving 'foreign criminals'. I had hoped to add archival detail to key messaging drawing out the coloniality of 'good immigrant' and 'genuine refugee' discourse within the left. But the right has since dreamed bigger, faster, stronger and has exploded the terms of debate I had thought were common ground. I end this chapter, then, as newly confused as I was at the start. I end not with a pithy insight or finding, but instead with yet another question: how do we do history, how do we think coherently about historical change in the past, when everything here and now feels so dizzyingly historic?

Coda: immigration control and counterterrorism today

Remember Alfred Hutchinson in March 1960? The critic of the South African Government? He was the one whom the Dominions Office wanted to obstruct from entering the United Kingdom by getting immigration officers to disbelieve his documentation and refuse him entry. The Dominions, Colonial and Home Office officials corresponding over Hutchinson's potential fugitive offender deportation eventually remembered that even if British colonial authorities in every part of Hutchinson's Southern Africa circuit *accidentally-on-purpose* refused him official documents with which to enter the British mainland, Kwame Nkrumah's Ghanaian Government could expediate him a CUKC passport that the Home Office would be compelled to accept. The plan fell flat, and the archives went quiet.

Across the fugitive offender archives, I found the word *treason*, sometimes *sedition*. But more often than not, crimes were simply described as *ordinary*. I found it surprising that the word *terrorist* was nowhere to be found in the fugitive offender proceedings I have flailed around in. Today, 'terrorism' looms large in Britain's mass deportation regime. It is the terrorist in particular – projected onto the figure of the Muslim in general – that animates both far-right propaganda and the state's increasingly draconian border system.⁵⁵⁸ The Home Office's hostile environment policy was directly borrowed and scaled up from a counter-terrorism surveillance scheme to monitor the NHS, education, welfare, banking and driving license records. In December 2018, fifteen activists who had stopped a Home Office charter flight deporting sixty people to Nigeria and Ghana in March 2017 were convicted of an obscure terrorism-related charge. Although the word *terrorism* was absent from the fugitive offender material, everywhere I looked the archives revealed the state's attempts to monitor, depoliticise, and make stateless people like Alfred Hutchinson. If Hutchinson and the other anticolonial organisers I have glimpsed in this research were around today in the British mainland, they would likely be surveilled, reported and channelled through the Home Office's counterterrorism programmes.

Much of that failed plan to refuse Alfred Hutchinson entry at the port – refusing his passport, de facto withdrawing his citizenship, and effectively making him stateless – has now come to pass in today's regime of British citizenship. In 2001, the Home Office began to develop mass deportation charter flights, marking the intensification of immigration controls' interconnections with counter-terrorism policing as the 'war on terror' gathered momentum. The following year saw section 40 of the British Nationality Act amended to allow the Home Secretary to deprive British citizens of their citizenship when satisfied that they had 'done anything considered

⁵⁵⁸ Arun Kundnani, *The Muslims Are Coming: Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror* (London: Verso, 2014), 23.

prejudicial to the vital interests of the UK.⁵⁵⁹ Further legislative changes in 2006, 2013, and 2014 have since enlarged the Home Secretary's counter-terrorism powers. Alongside prominent headline controversies like the revocation of Shamima Begum's British citizenship in 2019 there also persists the more banal, less documented, but growing prevalence of passport removals and 'good character' citizenship refusals. These everyday administrative manoeuvres – protracted and alienating – are difficult to appeal, to challenge in court, to publicise and campaign against. As Nisha Kapoor has shown, in the context of the war on terror Britain's citizenship regime now bundles these counterterrorism measures – expedited extradition, citizenship deprivation and passport removals – with existing immigration powers to deport, detain, and refuse citizenship applications, in order to 'manage, exclude and expel racially marginalised populations' in Britain, both those born in the U.K. and born elsewhere.⁵⁶⁰

Remembering the mutinous piracy aboard *the Satsuma* in 1881, it is worth turning to Ondrej Ditrych's arguments about the historically shifting meaning of terrorism.⁵⁶¹ During the 1970s, the emerging phenomenon of air-hijacking began to mould the subjectification of the terrorist as a pirate. This drew discursive power from the much longer established precedents of international law that permitted exceptional measures against enemy pirates who had 'deliberately excluded themselves from the protection of order and civilisation.'⁵⁶² What emerged was the de-politicised, and de-humanised, figure of the terrorist that today seems hegemonic and timeless. Nonetheless, as Ditrych's work carefully reconstructs, the 1970s witnessed a ferocious ideological battle for the meaning of the word *terrorism*, with 'Third World' powers using the word *terrorism* to describe 'a system of capitalist exploitation and imperialism, or a faceless machine of the state terrorism apparatus practiced by particular alien powers against oppressed peoples.'⁵⁶³

As the saying goes, one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. Enahoro was a dangerous treasonous fugitive to some, and a refugee fleeing political persecution to others. To the British state, white settler Rhodesian subjects 'loyal to the Crown' were refugees fleeing political persecution by Ian Smith's regime, while 'non-patrial' – a term I borrow from the later 1971 Immigration Act – black Africans engaged in an anticolonial war against Smith's regime would not qualify as refugees in the same way: indeed the Rhodesian army referred to the guerillas as 'CTs', meaning communist terrorists.⁵⁶⁴

⁵⁵⁹ Nisha Kapoor, 'Removing Citizenship', Deport Deprive Extradition (blog), accessed 4 September 2023, <http://dde.org.uk/removing-citizenship/>.

⁵⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁶¹ Ondrej Ditrych, *Tracing the Discourses of Terrorism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 68–70.

⁵⁶² Ibid.

⁵⁶³ Ibid, 56.

⁵⁶⁴ Luise White, *Unpopular Sovereignty: Rhodesian Independence and African Decolonization* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2015), xv.

It is telling that the 1881 Act made a treason charge equivalent to a diffuse and enormous range of ordinary crimes stretching from false pretences and fraudulence to everyday acts of non-compliance with mobility controls. In other words, the Act's nebulous twelve months hard labour provision attached the gravity of a treason charge to whichever crime a colonial government saw fit to punish with that sentence. When we consider that many colonial governments implemented regimes of punishment to tie colonised people into highly exploitative wage labour and create large reserves of convict labour, this twelve month hard labour provision becomes really significant.⁵⁶⁵ It is significant because it tells us that the distinction between political crimes and ordinary crimes was, and remains, unstable. This unstable distinction is made and remade by the 'busy repertoire of strange manoeuvring that is part of what we call racecraft.'⁵⁶⁶

The shifting continuum between political and ordinary crimes also helps us to situate and understand the phenomenon of immigration offences that grew to shape Britain's postwar immigration system at the end of empire. In particular, the 1971 Immigration Act remodelled the system into one of individualised scrutiny of an immigrant's compliance and non-compliance with immigration laws, rules and procedures, determining the development of what Anna Tuckett has called the UK's 'documentation regime.'. Within this documentation regime, 'over time, policymakers began associating relative undocumentedness with various forms of illegality.'⁵⁶⁷ The mass deportation regime that has since solidified, a regime we inhabit today, is animated by four folk devils: the foreign criminal, the illegal immigrant, the bogus asylum seeker and the terrorist. All four percolate in a continuum of racialised – racist – group characteristics – devious, immoral, fraudulent, corrupt, non-compliant, dangerous, violent, conspiratorial, wicked – formed to sustain and further empire's intricate carceral system of borders, prisons and policing, systems with which colonial rule was made, remade and maintained.

⁵⁶⁵ In the next chapter about colonial Northern Nigeria, I show that the penalty for breaching Section 16 of Northern Nigeria's 1936 *Sleeping Sickness Ordinance* – provisions against 'improper dealings with documents' including forgery and impersonation – was twelve months imprisonment, or a fine of one hundred pounds, whereas any other breach was punishable with six months imprisonment or a fifty pound fine.

⁵⁶⁶ Fields and Fields, *Racecraft*, 16.

⁵⁶⁷ Anna Tuckett, 'Managing Paper Trails after Windrush: Migration, Documents and Bureaucracy', *Journal of Legal Anthropology* 3, no. 2 (December 2019): 120–23.

Fragment: John Pakenham-Walsh

Harmondsworth detention centre opened in early 1970. With ‘the detention quarters forming a separate block adjacent to the building where appeals will be heard and space outside for exercise’, the Harmondsworth site would architecturally segregate non-patrial, non-white Commonwealth citizens from the rights historically afforded to all citizens of the UK and Colonies under the 1948 British Nationality Act.⁵⁶⁸ As such, the site functioned in ways that the 1971 Immigration Act would regularise into statute.

While working together on the Harmondsworth proposal, John Pakenham-Walsh and W. J. Bohan also collaborated on proposals for the new immigration legislation requested by Ted Heath’s Conservative administration elected in July 1970. The Home Office was instructed to prepare new legislation that would deliver on their manifesto promise to ‘allow no further large-scale immigration’, a promise made in the shadow of Enoch Powell’s inflammatory ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech.⁵⁶⁹ In August 1970 the Home Secretary decided that the proposed immigration legislation should make it so that Commonwealth citizens would no longer be exempt from deportation on the basis that they already resided in the UK. For Bohan’s B2 Division and John Pakenham-Walsh, the Immigration Bill was an opportunity to permanently invest the Home Secretary with much wider executive powers to deport or administratively remove a wider range of people. They set out to do this by taking decisions about who could be deported, and for what reason, further away from the judiciary and the courts.

It is important to note that John Pakenham-Walsh, the Home Office Legal Advisor who helped to conceptualise the UK’s first purpose-built Immigration Detention Centre, proudly identified himself as one of the ‘last children of the British Raj.’⁵⁷⁰ He was born in Rangoon in 1928, his father Reverend Wilfred Pakenham Walsh had likewise been born in India in 1898, and his great uncle Herbert Pakenham-Walsh had been the first Bishop of Assam in 1915. The Pakenham-Walshes were landed gentry, appearing in Burke’s Peerage.⁵⁷¹ John Pakenham-Walsh was called to the bar in 1951. In 1953 he joined the Crown Council of the Colony of

⁵⁶⁸ Letter from W. J. Bohan to John Pakenham-Walsh, 18 May 1970, ‘Detention of Commonwealth Citizens on Refusal of Admission to the United Kingdom.’ (1968 - 1972), HO 344/186, TNA.

⁵⁶⁹ This permanent end to large-scale immigration was to be delivered by permanent legislation, in comparison to the Commonwealth Immigrants Acts of ‘62 and ‘68, and the 1920 Aliens Order which had all been subject to annual re-enactment in Parliament. For an archivally rich intellectual history of Enoch Powell and his effect on racial politics in Britain see Camilla Schofield, *Enoch Powell and the Making of Postcolonial Britain* (Cambridge: CUP, 2013).

⁵⁷⁰ Laurence Fleming and Mark Tully, *Last Children of the Raj: British Childhoods in India* (Dexter Haven Publishing, 2016).

⁵⁷¹ *Kelly’s Handbook to the Titled, Landed and Official Classes* (London, 1919), 110. <http://archive.org/details/1919kellyshandbo00londonuoft>

Hong Kong.⁵⁷² In 1958, he moved to serve on the Parliamentary Council of Nigeria in the last years of colonial administration there.⁵⁷³ Upon Nigerian Independence in 1960, Pakenham-Walsh joined the Home Office Legal Advisors' Branch in 1961. Between 1980 and retiring in 1987, he served as Legal Under-Secretary to the Home Secretary.⁵⁷⁴ His career at the Home Office thus encompassed the fast and furious succession of restrictive immigration and nationality immigration from 1962 to 1987.

In short, as a lawyer, Pakenham-Walsh was trained and experienced in the making of law in British colonies. As a person, until moving to the Home Office in 1961, he had lived his whole life within the bifurcated legal regimes of the British Raj, Hong Kong, and Nigeria. Colonial legal regimes, as Mahmood Mamdani argues, relied upon a 'Janus-faced, bifurcated' power that formed two simultaneous regimes; one of citizens bound by civil rule of law and another of subjects excluded from civil freedoms by their incorporation into state-sanctioned regimes of tribal authority and traditional custom.⁵⁷⁵ The co-existence of these two regimes maintained a gulf of unregulated, discretionary state power in which alien colonial power over natives was redoubled. This was the essence of the indirect rule model of colonial administration, one described by Mamdani as 'decentralised despotism.'⁵⁷⁶

However tempting, I try my best not to believe in the great-man-theory-of-history, or the terrible-man-theory-of-history. Pakenham-Walsh was not the single causal factor. He was not *the* direct and tangible force of change that brought the legal culture of decentralised despotism home, in one fell swoop, from Nigeria's colonial apparatus to the Home Office's postwar immigration regime. But there remains something tantalizing, and frustratingly difficult to evidence, about the latent parallels between how indirect rule was supposed to work, and how the 1971 Immigration Act fundamentally restructured the immigration system.

Significantly, section 3(2) of the empowered the Home Secretary to determine the Immigration Rules. The Immigration Rules are 'not subordinate legislation' scrutinised by Parliament but are instead 'detailed statements by a minister of the Crown as how the Crown proposes to exercise its executive power to control immigration.'⁵⁷⁷ To a certain extent, the Immigration Rules, and the power to change and determine them laid out in Section 3(2), decentralise and devolve executive power to the Home Secretary to decide 'the practice to be followed [...] for

⁵⁷² 'Pakenham-Walsh, John, (7 Aug. 1928–12 Dec. 2017), Standing Counsel to General Synod of Church of England, 1988–2000', WHO'S WHO & WHO WAS WHO, accessed 5 October 2023, <https://www.ukwhoswho.com/display/10.1093/ww/9780199540891.001.0001/ww-9780199540884-e-29924>;

⁵⁷³ Fleming and Tully, *Last Children of the Raj*, 344.

⁵⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷⁶ Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton University Press, 2018), 8.

⁵⁷⁷ House of Lords - Odelola (FC) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent), No. [2009] UKHL 25 on appeal from: [2008] EWCA Civ 308 (House of Lords 20 May 2009), <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldjudgmt/jd090520/odelol-1.htm>.

regulating the entry into and stay in the United Kingdom', whatever means, procedures, and initiatives they deem fit.⁵⁷⁸ Sometimes, Immigration Rules are contested by MPs within the forty-day initial period, and sometimes this leads to a rule being redacted. But generally the contents and consequences of the Immigration Rules are in practice obscured from public and parliamentary scrutiny. In this way, the unregulated customary violence of the border regime grows, routinising levels of violation and harm against those deemed beyond the remit of British justice and the rights of British citizenship.

Through such a lens, we could perhaps start to see the Immigration Tribunal – the one established by the 1969 Immigration Appeals Act – as functioning in ways somewhat similar to so-called 'native courts' under indirect rule. Section 12 of the 1971 Immigration Act determined that 'the adjudicators shall sit at such times and in such places as the Secretary of State may direct': in other words the tribunals' quasi-judges were appointed by the Home Office.⁵⁷⁹ Under indirect rule, colonial governments exercised a large margin of control over the 'native chiefs' who either served as or appointed the adjudicators in native courts, through which customary justice, including customary violence and punishment, were dispensed. In 2012, immigration lawyer and anti-deportation campaigner Frances Webber recalled that:–

In the 1980s, when I began representing migrants [...] the "old guard" of [Immigration Tribunal] adjudicators were appointed by the Home Office and were frequently ex-colonial judges or civil servants, with attitudes to match. Adjudicators became independent of the Home Office in 1987, but nothing really changed. [...] Some displayed overt racism, remarking that West Africans should not be accountancy students, for example. Although such openly racist attitudes have become culturally and legally unacceptable, there are still immigration judges who (privately) boast that they have never allowed an appeal; many have cosy relationships with Home Office presenting officers whom they see daily, many relish their power and brook no challenge to it; and many become quickly and permanently case-hardened. As entry to the judiciary has broadened in race, class and gender terms, a decent number of immigration judges now bring a refreshing open-mindedness and humanity to the job. Their decisions are the ones that are routinely appealed by the Home Office.⁵⁸⁰

In Britain's mass deportation regime today, immigrants – particularly so-called foreign-national offenders – are on one hand, bound by civil rule of law to live within reach of the criminal justice system – for instance serving a prison sentence – and yet, at the same time, they are also excluded from civil freedoms – such as the *habeas corpus* freedom from indefinite detention without trial – and after serving a prison sentence, will be detained indefinitely pending their deportation from Britain. In some striking ways, then, the postimperial

⁵⁷⁸ Immigration Act 1971, s.3(2).

⁵⁷⁹ Immigration Act 1971, s.12(5).

⁵⁸⁰ Frances Webber, *Borderline Justice: The Fight for Refugee and Migrant Rights* (London: Pluto, 2012), 38.

immigration system resembles that 'Janus-faced, bifurcated' power that maintains a gulf of unregulated, discretionary violence over non-patrial people from the former empire or beyond it.

John Pakenham-Walsh was awarded the status of 'Companion, Order of the Bath (C.B.) in 1986.⁵⁸¹ He retired in 1987, the same year in which Immigration and Asylum Tribunal adjudicators became independent of the Home Office. He died on 12 December 2017, at the age of 89.

⁵⁸¹ SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 14 JUNE 1986.
<https://www.thegazette.co.uk/London/issue/50551/supplement/3/data.pdf>

Chapter Four

Scheming carceral cosmographies: colonial development and deportation in Northern Nigeria

Introduction

In 1951, Margery Perham opened her book *The British Problem in Africa* by suggesting that ‘it is not a very bold speculation to believe that [Britain’s African Colonies] may become fully self-governing nation states by the end of the century.’⁵⁸² Ruminating on the future history of Africa, Perham speculated that ‘future African writers of history books may be able to very neatly sum up the first half of the twentieth century as the age of imperialism and the second as the age of liberation’, an age of liberation that would eventually lead to African independence sometime in the far-away 1990s. Perham was one of Britain’s foremost specialist advisors on colonial African affairs, and yet, as we know well, this is far from what happened. Within six years of 1951, Ghana had independence. By the mid-1960s so did the majority of African colonies. Perham’s ‘not very bold’ (but clearly very wrong) prediction therefore raises important questions about how colonial officials understood themselves as experts, how they imagined historical progress, planned for the future, and situated themselves in time.

As Priya Satia has argued, ‘culture, in the form of particular imaginaries of time and change, shaped the practical unfolding of empire.’⁵⁸³ The ways in which time, history and transformation were imagined materially shaped the daily work of colonial administration. From the 1930s onwards, colonial rule in ‘British Africa’ involved implementing the indirect rule policy, alongside the uneven emergence of ‘colonial development and welfare’ schemes, as well as folding everyday archival processes into tax collection, policing and surveillance. The period between the 1930s and the 1970s has been characterised as ‘an era of settlement schemes’ in which ‘prepacked settlement schemes flourished in Africa.’⁵⁸⁴ Accordingly, colonial officials imagined that historical change could be managed, planned, and systematically implemented with technological progress and technical assistance.

Both indirect rule’s association with ‘the invention of tradition’ and colonial development’s with progress and modernisation are the subject of rich historiographic debates with implications

⁵⁸² Margery Perham, ‘The British Problem in Africa’, *Foreign Affairs* 29, no. 4 (1951): 637. Perham was a close confidant of Captain Fredrick Lugard. She also held a prestigious, central role in the post-war redesign of Colonial Service training, explored in the last chapter of this thesis.

⁵⁸³ Priya Satia, *Time’s Monster: How History Makes History* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2020), 6.

⁵⁸⁴ Christophe Bonneuil, ‘Development as Experiment: Science and State Building in Late Colonial and Postcolonial Africa, 1930-1970’. *Osiris* 15 (2000): 258–81.

for the extent to which Africans are included as agents in the making of the modern world.⁵⁸⁵ This chapter offers a case-study of a single colonial development scheme located in Northern Nigeria, the supposed birthplace of indirect rule. It was known as ‘the Anchau Rural Development and Resettlement Scheme’ of 1937 – 1947. The chapter reconstructs everyday contestations as they shaped competing meanings and practices of indirect rule, colonial development, and ways forward to African self-government, thus offering a hyper-local look at how Africans, never listless victims, determined how colonial development and its various forms of expertise operated on the ground, shaping the global making of colonial modernity.⁵⁸⁶

In the name of eliminating the region’s epidemics of ‘African Sleeping Sickness’, the Anchau Scheme coupled the forced resettlement of rural communities out of infected areas with a series of experiments in agricultural methods, livestock management, public hygiene, colonial medicine, adult literacy and nutrition. The chapter offers a case-study of how migration control, punitive welfare and criminalisation intersect to assemble a deportation regime. Reconstructing the specifics in this way helps to articulate more precisely what is, or seems, ‘colonial’ about Britain’s present-day mass deportation regime. My analysis draws upon a large body of historical materialist scholarship that locates the origins of today’s immigration systems in the regimes of poor laws and vagrancy acts that were part of the earliest unfolding of capitalism. In this way, as Axster et al have argued, ‘the history of mobility controls cuts

⁵⁸⁵ The extent to which indirect rule involved what Terence Ranger called ‘the invention of tradition’ and the ossification of “tribe” and “tribal difference” by colonial authorities has been fiercely debated for decades. Later generations of historians have intervened to complicate and temper the influential arguments of Ranger and John Iliffe with frameworks foregrounding African agency in determining local patterns of state formation as well as the meaning and practice of tribal political and social identities. See Terence Ranger, ‘The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa’, in *The Invention of Tradition*, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, (Cambridge: CUP, 1983), 211–62, and John Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge: CUP, 1979). Important revisionist arguments are made in Sara Berry, ‘Hegemony on a Shoestring: Indirect Rule and Access to Agricultural Land’, *Africa* 62, no. 3 (July 1992): 327–55; Thomas Spear, ‘Neo-Traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa’, *The Rise and Fall of Modern Empires, Volume III*, 2017, 419–44 and Vijay Visana, ‘Beyond Citizen and Subject’ New Perspectives on Political Thought, “Tribe,” and “Indirect Rule” in Africa’, *History Compass* 17, no. 3 (2019): e12525-n/a. Meanwhile, historiographies of colonialism and development add nuance and detail to polarised public discourse about empire as either an exercise in violent extraction, or one of altruistic “uplift”. Recent directions in the field emphasising the inclusion of situated local voices from farmers, workers, “traditional” authorities, different kinds of “experts”, as well re-evaluating the diverse motivations and external pressures on colonial state actors, such as Clement Atlee’s 1945 – 1951 Labour administration. For the latter, see Charlotte Lydia Riley, *Monstrous Predatory Vampires and Beneficent Fairy-Godmothers: British Post-War Colonial Development in Africa*, (PhD Diss, UCL, 2013). For emphases on the practical implementation of colonial development, see special Issue edited by Monica M. Van Beusekom and Dorothy L. Hodgson, ‘LESSONS LEARNED? DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCES IN THE LATE COLONIAL PERIOD’, *The Journal of African History* 41, no. 1 (March 2000).

⁵⁸⁶ My perspective on African expertise in the making of colonial development is indebted to Clapperton Chakanetsa Mavhunga, *The Mobile Workshop: The Tsetse Fly and African Knowledge Production* (Cambridge: MIT, 2018). Setting out to ‘re-Africanize’ rather than ‘decolonise’ histories of medicine, science and technology, Mavhunga demonstrates that *chidzimbahwe* keywords readily compound African knowledge and technological expertise for cohabiting with tsetse fly before, during and after colonialism. In this way, Mavhunga repositions “colonial conquest” instead as ‘*kusangana kweruzivo* (knowledge encounter) [to] represents instead a front-to-front engagement, albeit one that occurred within unequal relations of power.’

across a variety of interconnected geographies, including the town and the parish as well as the settler colony and the “many middle passages” that build the modern/colonial world.⁵⁸⁷

This micro-history of the Anchau Scheme adds the rural development scheme to the interconnected geography often referred to as the carceral archipelago. The carceral archipelago refers to a set of disciplinary relations and practices that have emanated from empire and racial capitalism. Elsewhere, in the context of the Atlantic world, Marcus Rediker has enumerated these as the ‘four violences of Atlantic history’, namely the enclosure of the commons in Europe, Africa and the Americas; transatlantic slavery; the imposition of an exploitative wage labour regime; and the system of prison and criminalisation. As we will see, each of these appears in the Anchau Scheme’s compulsory evacuation of peasants from their land, the scheme’s attempt to extract unpaid labour from peasants in the form of a refashioned custom of ‘voluntary communal labour’, the overall policy to better capture self-sufficient cultivators into a taxable money economy, and the proliferation of laws and lock-ups with which to criminalize and incarcerate fugitive labour.

Reconstructing how colonial officials visualised and acted upon the contagious spread of a life-threatening and economically-destructive disease illuminates how the same officials imagined and acted upon what Margery Perham called ‘the [un]certain possibility that African self-government will spread surely and smoothly.’⁵⁸⁸ Crucially for this thesis, at the heart of both the contagious spread of African Sleeping Sickness and the unsure, unsmooth spread of African self-government we find the spectre of the unruly, ungovernable mobile poor. Colonial officials perceived and experienced ‘the speed of African change hastening’ as an encounter with the violence, political disorder, financial misfortune, and contagious spread of decolonisation.⁵⁸⁹ This chapter therefore approaches decolonisation, the twentieth century’s most significant geopolitical transformation, through the lens of enchantment, magic and witchcraft. In doing so I draw on a fairly established historiographic position, developed over the last thirty years, which presents colonial modernity as just as enchanted as it was disenchanting, and I also make use of Karen and Barbara Fields’ influential concept of racecraft.

⁵⁸⁷ Sabrina Axster et al., ‘Colonial Lives of the Carceral Archipelago: Rethinking the Neoliberal Security State’, *International Political Sociology* 15, no. 3 (1 September 2021): 426; Emma Christopher, Cassandra Pybus, and Marcus Rediker, *Many Middle Passages: Forced Migration and the Making of the Modern World* (University of California Press, 2007). See also Robbie Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor* (Newcastle: Agenda, 2018), 9 – 32; Dimitris Papadopoulos, Niamh Stephenson, and Vassilis Tsianos, *Escape Routes: Control and Subversion in the 21st Century* (London: Pluto, 2008), 42–55; Bridget Anderson, *Us and Them?: The Dangerous Politics of Immigration Control* (Oxford: OUP, 2013), 12–28; David Feldman, ‘Migrants, Immigrants and Welfare from the Old Poor Law to the Welfare State’, *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 13 (2003): 79–104.

⁵⁸⁸ Perham, *British Problem in Africa*, 637.

⁵⁸⁹ Arthur Creech Jones, ‘Local Government Despatch, 25 February 1947’, in A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, *The Principles of Native Administration in Nigeria: Selected Documents, 1900-1947* (London: OUP, 1965), 248.

Racecraft describes the everyday doing through which a social world is constituted whose 'inhabitants experience (and act on) marrow-deep certainties that racial differences are real and consequential, whether scientifically demonstrable or not.'⁵⁹⁰ Racecraft, as Fields and Fields tell us, 'refers to mental terrain and to pervasive belief', and this chapter maps the mental terrain of colonial officials' pervasive beliefs in racial difference as they tried to implement extensive ecological change and economic 'development' in the Anchau Corridor.⁵⁹¹ I unpack the processes of exploitation, expropriation and expulsion at work in the Anchau Scheme as processes of racecraft's social alchemy through which materialised, in Clapperton Mavhunga's disturbing phrase, 'not only metaphors of the colonized as pest but also the actual transformation of colonised people into pests.'⁵⁹² I do so to throw into relief the administrative conjuring tricks, and scheming, through which – to paraphrase Ruth Gilmore Wilson's influential definition of racism – the colonial state produced and exploited 'group differentiated vulnerabilities to premature death' for its colonised subjects. These conjuring tricks and enchanted, deathly practices of racecraft manifest the Anchau Scheme as what I call a *carceral cosmography*: a site which is enmeshed in empire's wider 'carceral archipelago' and which, meanwhile, exists as a 'mutable spatial configuration [with] cosmic depth exceeding what is conventionally encompassed by the term geography.'⁵⁹³

The first part of the chapter draws out the enchanting, magical valences of colonial development as imagined by officials in the British metropole. The next section outlines the Anchau Scheme and demonstrates how deportation and deportability functioned as longstanding racialised patterns of exploitation and expropriation enabling the capitalist development of late colonial Nigeria. The third section reconstructs an encounter between colonial officials, a village headman and disease-causing spirits in a grove of sacred trees in order to evidence the widespread resistance and non-compliance to colonial rule and racialised capitalism. The final part of the chapter uses visual sources to map the Scheme's new town as a carceral cosmography, in which welfare was punitively distributed to sort people into migrants and non-migrants while withholding citizenship rights from all.

The magic of colonial development

Writing in 1951, Margery Perham made her 'not very bold' prediction about African decolonisation in the context of the recent 'marked change in approach to indirect rule'

⁵⁹⁰ Barbara Fields and Karen Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life* (London: Verso, 2022), 198.

⁵⁹¹ Ibid, 18.

⁵⁹² Clapperton Chakanetsa Mavhunga, 'Vermin Beings: On Pestiferous Animals and Human Game', *Social Text* 29, no. 1 (106) (1 March 2011): 151.

⁵⁹³ Jeffrey S. Kahn, 'Smugglers, Migrants, and Demons', *American Ethnologist* 46, no. 4 (2019): 470–81.

announced by Britain's Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech Jones in 1947.⁵⁹⁴ Indirect rule referred to a system of government whereby, in the words of an Annual Colonial Report, 'the actual functions of Government are for the most part carried out through the Native Chiefs with the assistance and advice of the Administrative staff.'⁵⁹⁵ The policy had, by most accounts, first been elaborated in Northern Nigeria by Captain Frederick Lugard, who had led the Royal Niger Company's military conquest of the region and was established as Governor of Northern Nigeria in 1900 and then as Governor of Nigeria in 1914.⁵⁹⁶ Lugard's enormous textbook *The Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa* codified this 'method of ruling native races [through] recognition of the principle of rule through chiefs' to adapt existing systems of tax collection and Islamic jurisprudence into a nameable, and supposedly distinctively *British*, approach to colonial rule and racial equality.⁵⁹⁷

However according to Creech Jones, by the late 1940s the 'unmodified traditional machinery' of indirect rule had become 'inadequate', and therefore 'local government machinery was required for the administration of plans of progress in the economic and social fields.'⁵⁹⁸ The departure of India and Pakistan from the empire in 1947 loomed large: a change in African colonial policy was needed to dissipate the clamour of anticolonial movements the world over. Shifting away from notions of 'traditional tribal authority', Creech-Jones hoped that the creation of English-style institutions of African local government would suffice as 'an outlet [...] for the growing political consciousness of ordinary people', ordinary people who had begun 'to demand services, development and responsibility as existed in the modern world outside their own territories.'⁵⁹⁹ Over the next decade, the delivery of colonial development and welfare schemes, as well as measures to install new legislative councils and 'Africanise' expatriate-led administrative services and the judiciaries, unfolded across British colonial Africa.

In 1965, introducing a new textbook on 'the principles of native administration in Nigeria', Perham evaluated Creech-Jones' 'marked change in approach to indirect rule' in the following terms:–

⁵⁹⁴ Perham, *British Problem in Africa*, 637; Creech Jones, 'Despatch, 1947', 245 – 246.

⁵⁹⁵ Colonial Office, *Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of Nigeria* (London: H.M.S.O., 1932), n.p.

⁵⁹⁶ For a recent intervention that highlights the development of 'indirect rule' in the early decades of nineteenth century East India Company rule, see Callie Wilkinson, *Empire of Influence: The East India Company and the Making of Indirect Rule* (Cambridge: CUP 2023).

⁵⁹⁷ Frederick John Dealtry Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (London: W. Blackwood and Sons, 1922), xiv, <http://archive.org/details/cu31924028741175>. See also, Margery Perham, *Native Administration in Nigeria* (London: OUP, 1937), 346. Indirect rule offered the most convenient way to take control of existing systems of political and social control as well as systems of tax collection. Important historical research has since shown that the British colonial taxation scheme "changed" more than "continued" the Hausa-Fulani scheme it found. See Tijjani Garba, 'Taxation in Some Hausa Emirates, C. 1860-1939' (PhD diss, University of Birmingham, 1986) and A. G. Adebayo, 'Jangali: Fulani Pastoralists and Colonial Taxation in Northern Nigeria', *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 28, no. 1 (1995): 113– 50.

⁵⁹⁸ Creech Jones, 'Despatch, 1947', 245 - 246. See also, John W. Cell, 'On the Eve of Decolonization: The Colonial Office's Plans for the Transfer of Power in Africa, 1947', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 8, no. 3 (1 May 1980): 235–57.

⁵⁹⁹ Creech Jones, 'Despatch, 1947', 245 - 246.

By the forties [...] experience had accumulated to show that the Lugard model of indirect rule [...] had rarely been wholly suited to African institutions outside Hausaland. It had also become clear that the rising tide of political consciousness was going to catch up and overflow the more leisurely advance of evolution through a local government system based upon chief and tribe. The new movement became an almost uncontrollable flood ten years after Mr Creech Jones's despatch. But as the tide of nationalism races to its final limits in ex-'British' Africa the Emirates of Nigeria are seen standing like some massive breakwater, barely affected by the storms which, even in the rest of Nigeria, have so changed the political landscape. [...] This striking contrast [...] raises deep questions about *the proper pace of change*, the value of stability and the character of Islam.⁶⁰⁰

The Emirates of Nigeria are seen standing like some massive breakwater. A breakwater is a seawall that protects a harbour from big waves. Like a dam, like irrigation infrastructures, a breakwater is an example of engineering, of technical assistance, of colonial water management, of infrastructure built benevolently by colonial administrations. Infrastructure built to power up and protect the extraction of natural resources from colonies. Technical infrastructures, photogenic and recognisably modern, to protect the land, the country, the state, from the 'storms which might so change the political landscape', from the 'rising tides of political consciousness', from the overflows, uncontrollable floods, and tidal waves of nationalism. Through this technological register, the need for technical assistance or the capacity for self-help, readiness or unreadiness for responsible self-government, could be materialised as either progressive, propelling, developing, or as obsolete, broken down, and backwards.

The questions that Perham raised about 'the proper pace of change' implicitly suggested that there was such thing as '*the proper pace of change*', singular, to be contrasted to a host of *improper* paces of change. The *improper* pacing of change would lead to improper, unruly, reprehensible, blameworthy consequences for history. Perham's notion of *the proper pace of change* mapped easily on to what I have been calling the eugenic, patril historical sensibility. The concept of history was imbricated in how colonial officials imagined and acted upon different groups of people as either obsolete or fully functional. These processes of imagining and acting upon were processes of racialisation, grounded in the daily business of rationalising and materialising exploitation, expropriation and expulsion.

Storms that wreck crops, waves that sink boats, floods and overflows that destroy homes. Controlling and conjuring up world-changing and life-threatening weather conditions has long been associated with witchcraft. Perham's *massive breakwaters* and *political storms* collapsed together the transformational power – the magic – of colonial development as technological and socio-political engineering. Similarly, Creech-Jones invoked the rational software of machinery and also the magical, psychic powers of foresight. 'It is also necessary', Creech-

⁶⁰⁰ Margery Perham, 'Foreword' in Kirk-Greene, *The Principles of Native Administration*, xii, emphasis added. Kirk-Greene marketed this textbook as a historical sourcebook for the new generation of African administrators.

Jones wrote, 'to foresee clearly what is happening to African society by the play of modern influences and forces.'⁶⁰¹ Modern forces: a decidedly supernatural framing. A framing in which the 'new factors' put in motion by colonial state actors and imperialist enterprise – 'such as education, organized labour, money economy and cash crops' – had unleashed powerful, troublesome, mysterious and potentially uncontrollable effects, namely 'the rise of new classes, the decay of old customs, the problems of urban populations.'⁶⁰² Modern forces, magical and threatening in their transformational power to act upon colonised people, people implicitly imagined as passive recipients of modernity rather than as real-life human political agents of historical change and worldmaking after empire.⁶⁰³

Such invocations of the magical forces of modernising colonial development should alert us to the 'busy repertoire of strange manoeuvres that is part of what we call racecraft.'⁶⁰⁴ Racecraft, Fields and Fields tell us, 'refers to mental terrain and to pervasive belief.'⁶⁰⁵ Witchcraft and racecraft share 'intellectual commonalities' in that the 'rational software' of both depends on 'circular reasoning, [...] confirming rituals, self-fulfilling prophecies, multiple and inconsistent casual ideas, and colourfully inventive folk genetics.'⁶⁰⁶ In this way, just like 'bygone believers in witchcraft' in Martin Luther's early modern Europe, today 'daily life produces an immense accumulation of supporting evidence for' believing in the idea of race.⁶⁰⁷ Racecraft describes the everyday doing through which a social world is constituted whose 'inhabitants experience (and act on) marrow-deep certainties that racial differences are real and consequential, whether scientifically demonstrable or not.'⁶⁰⁸ In this way racecraft describes the social alchemy through which racism creates race as a category, not the other way around.

Arthur Creech-Jones and Margery Perham were, respectively, a Colonial Secretary and a senior Colonial Office advisor, based in Westminster, at the heart of the British imperial government in the metropole. But their shared cultural imaginary of the proper pace of change at which colonial development should proceed, their shared concerns about the dysgenic pull of modern forces and influences, and their emotive mental terrain of supernatural stormy waters and powerful foresights were deeply entrenched into the colonial mindset of administrators, scientists, and experts on-the-ground across the empire. Schemes like the Anchau Corridor involved the bureaucratic, practical and legislative work of planning,

⁶⁰¹ Creech Jones, 'Despatch, 1947', 247.

⁶⁰² Ibid.

⁶⁰³ Adom Getachew uses the phrase 'worldmaking after empire' to critically reassess the ambitions and revolutionary political horizons of Third World anticolonial nationalism, political actors and ideas that have been predominantly historicised as politically misguided for reifying the nation-state form. Adom Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination* (Princeton University Press, 2019).

⁶⁰⁴ Fields and Fields, *Racecraft*, 16.

⁶⁰⁵ Ibid, 18.

⁶⁰⁶ Ibid, 198.

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid, 20, 24.

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid, 198.

evaluating, recording, documenting, narrativizing, and proposing legislation and policy. In the daily course of their work administrators and officials situated themselves in time, at the teleological forefront of humanity, leading and making historical change. They situated their subjects at a historical distance: supposedly backwards in time, pre-modern and in need of development. Colonised people were widely described by officials as ‘recordless people’ distinct from ‘historically-minded people.’⁶⁰⁹ History and historical development were distinctly racialised in relation to the stages of civilisation a people or a ‘race’ had teleologically reached. Crucially, this racialised historical development was imbricated with the concept of records and the intellectual ability to systematically make, refer to, evaluate and mobilise records and narrativize evidence.

The next part of the chapter reconstructs how officials on the ground in Northern Nigeria materialised these sensibilities and beliefs as they implemented the colonial development scheme in Anchau.

Designing and implementing the Anchau Scheme

By the mid-1930s, the severe taxation of Northern Nigeria’s peasant farmers had exacerbated famine in the region, prompting epidemics of the tsetse-spread disease known in colonial medicine as African Sleeping Sickness. Famine was a characteristic pattern of colonial governance, rather than an aberration or natural disaster.⁶¹⁰ In 1930s Northern Nigeria, famines – and the epidemics enmeshed with them – were increasingly understood by the colonial state as economically disruptive. As Michael Watts has carefully detailed, a new famine policy emerged in the early 1930s because the colonial administrations of each province and the European firms operating in the region found that the crop mortgage system that had emerged amidst the ‘specific Nigerian conjecture of a global market crisis and a predatory colonial state’ had become unmanageable and unworkable even for the agents of colonial capital.⁶¹¹ The resulting ‘proliferation of rural indebtedness’ was making the process of tax collection ‘exceedingly difficult’ for colonial administrations while European mining

⁶⁰⁹ A. W. Hoernlé, ‘New Aims and Methods in Social Anthropology’, 1930, quoted in Mavhunga, *The Mobile Workshop*, 14.

⁶¹⁰ Amartya Sen’s 1983 *Poverty And Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation* is widely understood to have re-oriented scholarship on famine, stressing the political nature of famines. For work on famine and colonialism, see Bohdan Klid, ed., *Empire, Colonialism, and Famine in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (University of Alberta Press, 2022); Mike Davis, *Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third World* (London: Verso, 2002); Stephen Devereux, ‘From “old” Famines to “New” Famines’, in *The New Famines: Why Famines Persist in an Era of Globalization* (Routledge, 2006), 1–26.

⁶¹¹ Michael J. Watts, *Silent Violence: Food, Famine, and Peasantry in Northern Nigeria* (University of Georgia Press, 2013) [first edition 1983], 312, 244. This chapter is hugely indebted to Watt’s analysis of ‘the changing form and character of food crises as capitalist relations developed historically in northern Nigeria’, 5.

interests 'faced labour unrest and desertion as grain procurement on the plateau became ever more tenuous' in the face of regional scarcity.⁶¹²

In 1937, the Anchau Scheme officially began. Based on land surveys, a new census, and ethnographic studies of three existing villages, the scheme sought to create a 'tsetse-free zone' to be known as the Anchau Corridor that would both pull in nomadic herdsmen and at the same time push the Hausa peasant into modernised agriculture. By its end in 1948, 5,000 people had been evacuated from scattered hamlets and villages beyond the corridor's boundaries and rehoused in new model villages. Frequently framed in military language as *evacuations*, these compulsory population transfers effectively tried to move people out of the fly's way and into closer spatial and economic entanglements with expanding cash-crop agricultural systems for the export of cotton and tobacco.

The economic context shaping the *rural development* and *resettlement* components of the Anchau Scheme deserves further elaboration. In July 1931, Nigeria's incoming Governor-General, Sir Donald Cameron, presented his four-part plan for Nigeria's economic recovery, a plan formulated in response to 'financial crisis in Britain and [Britain's] Request for Assistance from Colonies.'⁶¹³ Firstly, expenditure on important infrastructural developments, such as trade-facilitating railway extension projects, would be charged to a loan account maintained for the government in London financial institutions. In other words, Government of Nigeria loans would be serviced by London financial institutions, creating capital reserves in London and also generating income for the British industrial companies contracted to deliver these in. This was the same economic model with which India's railways had been constructed in the nineteenth century, 'leaving therefore hardly any benefit at all to India itself, and the whole interest of the loan must also go out of the country', as Dadabhai Naoroji had articulated as long ago as 1901.⁶¹⁴ Second in Cameron's recession package was the deferral of all projects deemed less urgent or important, mostly initiatives relating to Nigerian welfare and living conditions. Third, a severe retrenchment of government staffing would be enacted, amounting to a 40 percent cut in the Colonial Service, which was the largest single employer in the colony.⁶¹⁵

Lastly, Cameron announced a significantly expanded taxation regime. Taxation was a central colonial technique for trying to 'transform a colonial subject into a governable person.'⁶¹⁶

⁶¹² Watts, *Silent Violence*, 319, 318, 313.

⁶¹³ 'Financial Crisis in Britain and Request for Assistance from Colonies', 1931, CO 583/181/15, TNA.

⁶¹⁴ Dadabhai Naoroji, *Poverty and Un-British Rule in India* (London: S. Sonnenschein, 1901), 54.

⁶¹⁵ Moses Ochonu, 'Conjoined to Empire: The Great Depression and Nigeria', *African Economic History*, no. 34 (2006): 129.

⁶¹⁶ Josephine Maltby, 'Taxation in West Africa: Transforming the Colonial Subject into the "Governable Person"', *Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Accounting and Empire*, 15, no. 1 (1 January 2004): 5–34. Perham herself linked taxation as a colonial technique of power to "race" and racialisation. In 1934 she argued that 'Lugard's taxation system was adapted to "different conditions and racial stock" in Nigeria, Tanganyika, Nyasaland and Gold

Cameron's new system would expand direct rather than indirect taxation. Southern Nigeria furnished the Nigerian Government with revenue from indirect taxes, tariffs and duties on the merchants and traders. The Government's attempts to introduce direct taxation in the South had been fiercely resisted, notably in the Aba Women's rebellion of 1929.⁶¹⁷ By contrast, in Northern Nigeria tax revenue was already squeezed out of people through direct income tax levied on rural peasants, who had been increasingly folded into cash-crop agricultural production since British colonisation began. Peasants needed to access cash with which to pay tax. In this way, over the first thirty years of the twentieth century, cotton had become Northern Nigeria's primary cash crop.⁶¹⁸

The Governor's economic recovery plan prioritised export markets above the stimulation and insulation of internal trade within Nigeria.⁶¹⁹ By 1934, the farmers of Northern Nigeria were paying more than 30 percent of their net income as tax to the Nigerian Government, an impoverishing proportion which even statisticians within the colonial administration argued was too exploitative.⁶²⁰ As taxation increased, so did famine. By the mid 1930s this had created the conditions for the exponential spread of Sleeping Sickness.

This was the economic and epidemiological context in which plans for the Anchau Scheme were drawn up and submitted to the Colonial Office in late 1936. Initial plans for a mass-treatment program, medical inspection drive and environmental tsetse control measures were declared too focused on healthcare, and moreover on healthcare measures that would require ongoing expenditure. According to imperial fiscal policy, those kinds of ongoing costs should be borne by the Government of Nigeria, which is to say, by taxpayers in Nigeria. In response the Nigerian Government's Chief Secretary Mr Maybin was instructed to 'redraft the Sleeping Sickness Scheme to exhibit a larger 'element of development.'⁶²¹ The resulting 'scientific experiment in rural development' was immediately granted £95,000 from the Colonial Development Fund to be spent over 5 years.⁶²²

Coast. Margery Perham, 'Some Problems of Indirect Rule in Africa', *Journal of the Royal Society of Arts* 82, no. 4252 (1934): 691.

⁶¹⁷ A. Adu Boahen, *African Perspectives on Colonialism* (JHU Press, 2020) [1 edition 1987], 79.

⁶¹⁸ As E. C. Duggan proudly wrote in 1922, 'the development of the cotton industry by the [British Cotton Growing] Association in Nigeria began, one might say, at the same time as effective occupation of the Northern Protectorate was established.' Around the turn of the century, 'Lancashire cotton manufacturers perceived that [their] almost complete dependence on the American [cotton] crop could only be avoided by growing cotton in other parts of the world.' The British Cotton Growing Association began cotton-growing trials across West Africa, and northern Nigeria became the focus. See, E. de C. Duggan, 'The Cotton Growing Industry of Nigeria', *Journal of the Royal African Society* 21, no. 83 (1922): 199–207.

⁶¹⁹ Ochonu, *Conjoined to Empire*, 129.

⁶²⁰ S. M. Jacob, *Report on the Taxation and Economics of Nigeria*, 1934, cited in Ochonu, *Conjoined to Empire*, 118.

⁶²¹ Memo, 9.11.36, 'Tsetse Fly Research and Anti-Sleeping Sickness Measures: Application to Colonial...' (1936), CO 583/209/1, TNA; T. A. M. Nash, *The Anchau Rural Development and Settlement Scheme* (London: H.M.S.O, 1948), 5.

⁶²² Nash, *The Anchau Scheme*, 5.

The objective of this scientific experiment, reported one of its medical officers Dr James McLetchie, was 'to assist in finding suitable men for mixed farming, to attract the nomad Fulani herdsman to settle permanently in the tsetse free area, and to increase and improve all livestock in the Corridor.'⁶²³ Both the rural development and resettlement components of the Anchau Scheme centred upon controlling migration to create a supply of exploitable labour and tax revenue. By the time of the Anchau Scheme, the nomadic Fulani herdsman had become a significant subcategory of research for colonial administrators, bureaucrats, agricultural scientists, ethnographers, and the like.⁶²⁴ British and French administrations in West Africa alike had grown fascinated and frightened by this figure. His migration routes – where and when he stopped to graze his cattle, bestow manure on the soil, and pay *jangali* cattle tax – were of keen ecological and economic interest to colonial states, their teams of agricultural scientists, district tax collectors and their constituencies of prospective cash-crop enterprises. The way that the herdsman moved easily between the British and French invisible borders manifested a threat to colonial administrations in two ways: firstly, as nomadic people escaping tax collection and secondly, as potential followers of the 'fanatical' Mahdist Islamic sect, spreading revolutionary, anti-British, anti-colonial interpretations of the Qur'an and militant political violence throughout the entirety of West Africa.⁶²⁵ In the context of the 1930s spread of tsetse-borne disease – afflicting humans and cattle – the nomadic Fulani herdsman personified the contagious spread of the mobile poor animating the expansion of empire's carceral archipelago.

Although trypanosomiasis existed in large parts of Southern Nigeria, Nigeria's Sleeping Sickness Ordinance of 1937 was specific to the Northern Provinces, a clear indication that this disease control instrument was part of Cameron's depression recovery plan.⁶²⁶ The ordinance was based on the Uganda Sleeping Sickness Ordinance of 1928 but fitted within the legislative framework formed by Northern Nigeria's Native Authority Ordinance of 1933. The latter had been primarily prompted by the 'influx of large numbers of aliens [...] spreading over towns in the Northern Provinces' drawn by 'the development of communications and the complete pacification of the country' reported by Colonial Administrators in the region from the late 1920s

⁶²³J. L. McLetchie, 'Report Sleeping Sickness Settlements in Northern Nigeria', GB 0809 Nutrition/17/01/07/43, London School of Tropical Medicine Archives, London.

⁶²⁴A. G. Adebayo, 'Jangali: Fulani Pastoralists and Colonial Taxation in Northern Nigeria', *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 28, no. 1 (1995): 113–50.

⁶²⁵For the latter, see fascinating files 'History of Islamic Political Propaganda in Nigeria: Reports by G J F Tomlinson and G J...' (1 December 1925), CO 1073/176, and 'Mahdist Incidents in Nigeria: Report on Raid on Tassawe in French Territory and Attack...' (1927 – 28), CO 583/152/6, TNA. For academic accounts of colonial rule's relationship to the 'Mahdist threat', see Paul E. Lovejoy and J. S. Hogendorn, 'Revolutionary Mahdism and Resistance to Colonial Rule in the Sokoto Caliphate, 1905–6 1', *The Journal of African History* 31, no. 2 (1990): 217–44; Benjamin D. Hopkins, 'Islam and Resistance in the British Empire', in *Islam and the European Empires*, ed. David Motadel (Oxford: OUP, 2014); Jonathan Reynolds, 'Good and Bad Muslims: Islam and Indirect Rule in Northern Nigeria', *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 34, no. 3 (2001): 601–18.

⁶²⁶Sleeping Sickness epidemics affected Southern Nigeria in the same period, but these were not met with similar initiatives. See, R. W. Orpen, 'Report on Sleeping Sickness in Eket District, Southern Nigeria', *Annals of Tropical Medicine & Parasitology* 17, no. 1 (18 April 1923): 93–99.

onwards.⁶²⁷ This influx of strangers had prompted operational conundrums about how to make ‘natives’ and ‘non-natives’ alike into movable economic migrant labourers or immobilised, taxable rural peasants as needed. The Native Authority Ordinance of 1933 sought to distinguish ‘alien natives’ and ‘non-natives’ from the European non-natives who had, after all, economically migrated to the region to open mining companies and cash-crop agricultural industries. Significantly, its Section 8 codified the ‘power of the native authority to issue orders’ for ‘(i) prohibiting, restricting or regulating the migration of natives from or to the area of its authority’, for ‘(m) for the purpose of exterminating or preventing the spread of tsetse fly’ and for ‘(n) requiring any native to cultivate land to such extent and with such crops as will secure an adequate supply of food for the support of the native and those dependent upon him.’⁶²⁸ These intersecting powers to control the migration of natives, control and prevent the spread of tsetse fly and to compel ‘any native to cultivate land’ created the legislative basis for the development of a highly coercive regime of agricultural production out of which would emerge the Anchau Resettlement Scheme.

The 1937 Sleeping Sickness Ordinance made it compulsory for anyone in the Northern Provinces to submit himself for medical examination, and if infected, to submit himself to the appropriate treatment.⁶²⁹ Aside from medical inspection and treatment the ordinance gave the Governor the power, by enacting an Order in Council, to declare areas to be ‘Sleeping Sickness areas’, denoting an epidemic zone, and to declare areas ‘Restricted Areas’, denoting zones at risk of becoming epidemic.⁶³⁰

The ordinance compelled anyone entering a restricted area to, firstly, submit to medical examination and thereafter apply for a permit from the District Officers or Native Authority. To enter a restricted area without a permit was an offence.⁶³¹ Those applying for permits were compelled to furnish the District Officer or Native Authority examining him with the reason for his entry into the area, and granted examining officers wide discretion to refuse to believe the

⁶²⁷ Draft Despatch, Lord Passfield (Colonial Secretary) to J. W. Flood (Colonial Office), July 1929, in ‘Native Courts and Native Authority (Amendment) Ordinances, Northern Provinces 1928’, CO 583/163/7, TNA. Lord Passfield was Sidney Webb, a prominent eugenicist and key member of the Fabian Society.

⁶²⁸ Northern Nigeria, *Native Authority Ordinance*, 1933, sections 8(i), 8(m), 8(n).

⁶²⁹ European colonial administrations and pharmaceutical companies collaborated in informal and deregulated ways to conduct proliferated mass treatment programs that pumped experimental drugs into hundreds of thousands of Africans. These drugs were toxic, some causing twenty percent blindness in its recipients, some derived from arsenic poison, many producing excruciating, and long-lasting painful side effects. See Ulrich-Dietmar Madeja and Ulrike Schroeder, ‘From Colonial Research Spirit to Global Commitment: Bayer and African Sleeping Sickness in the Mirror of History’, *Tropical Medicine and Infectious Disease* 5, no. 1 (2020): 1–7; David Bannister, ‘The Sorcerer’s Apprentice: Sleeping Sickness, Onchocerciasis and Unintended Consequences in the Gold Coast and Ghana, 1930–60’, *The Journal of African History* 62, no. 3 (November 2021): 460–460. For a heavy-going example of racist logic about the supposed racial difference between the biological nervous systems and pain tolerance of “primitive” and “civilised” people, see Frederick Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa*, 1922, 91.

⁶³⁰ The way this legislation shifted burdens of proof onto targeted individuals was highly reminiscent of the Victorian Contagious Diseases Acts passed in 1864 amid a growing moral panic about sexually transmitted infections hampering Britain’s military forces. That legislation empowered the police to arrest any woman at a port or in an army town suspected of sex working, and to submit her to compulsory physical inspections for venereal disease.

⁶³¹ Northern Nigeria, *Sleeping Sickness Ordinance*, 1937, s. 11.

entrant, embedding the racist and criminalising culture of disbelief within the letter of the law.⁶³² Permits had to be retained on the person at all times, and these documents had to be produced on demand if any district officer, Native Authority, medical officer, police officer, or ambiguously 'any person authorised in that behalf' by any of these authorities.⁶³³

To breach any provisions of the Nigerian Sleeping Sickness was to commit an offence, and the penalty for each offence was a fine of fifty pounds, or six months imprisonment, or both.⁶³⁴ Significantly, and fitting the established pattern in British imperial law-making, the penalty for breaching any part of the ordinance's Section 16 – provisions against 'improper dealings with documents' including forgery and impersonation – was doubled to a fine of one hundred pounds or twelve months imprisonment.⁶³⁵ In 1935, fifty pounds was roughly equivalent to thirty five wage days for a skilled tradesman in the United Kingdom.⁶³⁶ In the context of the Anchau district, where at some point between 1939 and 1945 wages paid to African labourers clearing the tsetse bush averaged four pence per day, a fine of fifty pounds was equivalent to roughly three thousand man-days, more than eight years, of wages paid by the Government to peasants.⁶³⁷

Spelling out these offences and penalties can help to illustrate how indirect rule in Northern Nigeria worked in practice, or at least, in practice on-paper. The Sleeping Sickness Ordinance was enacted in a system of courts and law defined by the Native Courts Proclamation of 1900, the Native Courts Ordinance of 1916 and amended by the Native Courts and Native Authority Ordinances of 1933. In this legal context, persons guilty of any offences in the Sleeping Sickness Ordinance would be convicted in a Native Court, and incarcerated in a Native Authority Prison, if they were legally categorised as a native.

Meanwhile, persons convicted of offences under the Sleeping Sickness Ordinance who were not 'of African or Asiatic descent' would be tried in what Mahmood Mamdani has called 'a hierarchy of courts cast in the metropolitan mould, courts designed to solve disputes involving non-natives [...wherein...] modern justice was dispensed to non-natives by white magistrates.'⁶³⁸ These people would be processed through the Magistrate Courts and High Courts. They would have recourse to appealing to the Supreme Court, and at each stage of

⁶³² Ibid, s. 13.1.

⁶³³ Ibid, s. 15; s. 17.

⁶³⁴ Ibid, s. 18.

⁶³⁵ *Sleeping Sickness Ordinance*, 1937, s. 16. For a discussion of colonial anxieties about forgery, see Bhavani Raman, *Document Raj: Writing and Scribes in Early Colonial South India* (University of Chicago Press, 2012).

⁶³⁶ The National Archives, 'Currency Converter: 1270–2017', <https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/currency-converter/>.

⁶³⁷ Nash, *The Anchau Scheme*, 19.

⁶³⁸ Letter from F. W. Badderley (Officer administering the Government) to Leo Amery (Colonial Secretary), 21 December 1928, in 'Native Courts and Native Authority (Amendment) Ordinances, Northern Provinces 1928', CO 583/163/7, TNA; Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton University Press, 2018), 109.

their court proceedings could access legal counsel and be tried by a jury. In the context of the Nigerian Sleeping Sickness Ordinance, such people would no doubt include the 'holders of a mining right', 'lessees of a mining lease' and 'employers' who were the target of its provisions to compel the owners of tin mines to 'grant facilities for inspection and treatment of their employees' and to 'take measures to prevent outbreak or spread of sleeping sickness' among their workers and in their sites.⁶³⁹

Although the Anchau Scheme was primarily framed as a large-scale intervention into peasant farming practices, befitting Governor Cameron's Northern Nigeria-targeted depression economic recovery plan, the spectre of the 1929 implosion of Northern Nigeria's tin mining industry and the prospect of their rejuvenation shines through one small sentence in Dr McLetchie's unpublished 1944 report. During 1944, he tells us, 'in seven provinces limited tsetse surveys were made [by the Sleeping Sickness Service] at the request of the Army, departmental officers and mining companies.'⁶⁴⁰ The eradication of tsetse flies and human trypanosomiasis would, it was hoped, encourage British investors to reopen mining companies in the region. Colonial Office files about the Nigerian Sleeping Sickness Ordinance, filling just one folder with five documents, demonstrate that the new legislation of 1937 was in fact primarily motivated by concerns about the gold mining companies in the Northern Nigerian province of Niger. Additional powers were 'needed for the exercise of adequate control over the movement and concentration of population, particularly as regards the inspection and treatment of labourers in mining camps.' In December 1936, Nigeria's Director of Medical Service was 'anxious that the Ordinance shall be enacted with as little delay as possible' because 'a large number of these labourers are becoming infected with sleeping sickness and are returning to their villages, where they serve as dangerous foci of the disease.'⁶⁴¹ As such, the permit-pass system was implemented to obstruct the return to rural communities of migrant labourers from the gold mines that had sacked and expelled them as soon as they presented disease symptoms. This was an unusual juncture: the needs of the mining companies – to expel its infected labourers – conflicted with those of the colonial state – to prevent the infected labourers from bringing the disease back to the rural communities, and to households which would become poorer and less taxable with another person out of work to support. In many ways, managing the contradictions and competing interests of extractive enterprises was the principal function of British colonial administrations.

Perhaps most importantly, the Sleeping Sickness Ordinance presented another opportunity to widen the discretion with which Native Authorities could use punitive powers over the subjects in their jurisdictions to fulfil the executive orders handed down to them by colonial Nigeria's

⁶³⁹ *Sleeping Sickness Ordinance*, 1937, s. 7; s. 8(1).

⁶⁴⁰ McLetchie, Report: Sleeping Sickness Settlements, 17.

⁶⁴¹ 'Sleeping Sickness Ordinance 1936', CO 583/209/2, TNA.

executive. Section 20 empowered 'the Governor-in-council [to] make regulations [...] generally for carrying into effect the purposes and provisions of this Ordinance.'⁶⁴² Regulations made by Nigeria's executive were not procedurally open to any kind of legislative or parliamentary scrutiny or debate and did not have to be published or publicised in a standardised way, such as through a *Gazette*.

From the outset of the Anchau Scheme's plans, the balance sheet had required that 'all protective clearing should be kept up by the local inhabitants, and not by temporarily imported labour.'⁶⁴³ The population concentrations, detailed above, were the 'costly' solution that would facilitate enforcing the local inhabitants to do this bush-clearing work for free. The 'costly' cost of these forced movements to the British administration were balanced against the greater economic benefit that would be procured by the 'complete absence of tsetse fly from an area' which would benefit 'not only man but his domestic animals, and hence his agriculture.'⁶⁴⁴ The entomologist had thus calculated that the population density of the new and consolidated model villages would be set at a minimum seventy people per square mile. Despite being frequently cited across scientific journals, how this equation was worked out was rarely mentioned let alone queried. Dr McLetchie's unpublished report spelled out that 'for the maintenance of the lengthy clearing involved, by ordinary agricultural practice and by the annual cutting back of tree regrowth, there must be a minimum population of seventy per square mile.'⁶⁴⁵ In other words, this equation of seventy people per square mile had been reached by arbitrarily calculating how many man-days of labour would be required each year for village communities to 're-slash' the tsetse-infested riverine vegetation within their territory, and how many people a village head could reliably coerce into this supposedly voluntary labour.

To secure these man-days of unpaid labour, colonial officials sought to reify a so-called native method of pre-colonial land tenure in which each villager contributed 'voluntary communal labour' via the village chief towards whatever improvement and maintenance the village and its farmlands needed.⁶⁴⁶ As such, the Anchau planners opted to make each village head, and district head, and Emir, 'feel responsible' for the subjects under their authority, rather than to approach colonised subjects as self-governing, 'responsible' patriarchs.⁶⁴⁷ In this way, colonial authorities sought to legitimise the historical development of precolonial unpaid labour while continuing to historically label the British colonisation of Africa as the *Pax Britannica*. *Pax Britannica* was the phrase used by colonial officials and imperial historians alike 'to convey the conditions of relative peace and stability throughout large parts of the world under British sway

⁶⁴² *Sleeping Sickness Ordinance*, 1937, s.20(3).

⁶⁴³ McLetchie, 'Report on Sleeping Sickness Settlements', 2.

⁶⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁶⁴⁶ Nash, *The Anchau Scheme*, 19.

⁶⁴⁷ McLetchie, *Report: Sleeping Sickness Settlements*, 8.

that allowed the indigenous inhabitants to learn to rule themselves in modern circumstances.⁶⁴⁸ It was a myth in which the British had led the abolition of the slave trade in Africa, and therefore saved African societies from supposed endless tribal warfare and slave-raiding.⁶⁴⁹

The rephrasing of forced labour had kept administrators, politicians and legal draftsmen busy since the abolition of slavery in 1833. A system of compulsory apprenticeship replaced slavery in British Caribbean colonies. The notion of the free labour contract, and a peculiar new meaning of *freedom*, emerged during the legal drafting of the indentured labour system.⁶⁵⁰ By the 1920s and '30s, colonial administrators under the increasing sway of Fabian Society ideas were turning to the co-operative movement to model regimes of economic development that would bind rural populations together into co-operatives ultimately managed by the Government. In practice, for colonial administrators the words *communal* and *co-operative* meant easier to bind together, coerce, decentralise and exploit.⁶⁵¹

⁶⁴⁸ Wm Roger Louis, 'Sir Keith Hancock and the British Empire: The Pax Britannica and the Pax Americana', *The English Historical Review* 120, no. 488 (2005): 937 - 938.

⁶⁴⁹ In August 1941, William George Arthur Ormsby Gore (Conservative MP and Colonial Secretary 1936 - 1938) gave an address on 'British Native Policy and Administration in Tropical Africa' to the South African Institute of International Affairs. In it, he encapsulated the Pax Britannica myth: 'the least we can do,' he argued, 'is to take power [...] to depose, and to "recognize" or "refuse to recognize" any Chief at our will. We cannot, and should not, expect perfection, and in Native Africa, if we are to train the Native in responsible local and eventually responsible self-Government of some kind or other we must effect transition from the old order. In all this we must remember that before the Pax Britannica was established, hereditary right was frequently and successfully challenged in African society by violence.' Ormsby Gore, *British Native Policy and Administration in Tropical Africa* (Johannesburg, 1941), 13.

⁶⁵⁰ Mongia, *Indian Migration and Empire*, 22-55.

⁶⁵¹ See Aaron Windel, *Cooperative Rule: Community Development in Britain's Late Empire* (University of California Press, 2021).



Figure 4: 'The dispossessed people of Anchau migrate to the newly planned town at Takalafiya', in Anchau Scheme photograph series. Source: Royal Commonwealth Society Library, University of Cambridge Archives

The corridor was therefore 'divided into blocks, and once a year the people living in a block must turn out for two or three days and slash back regenerating shoots from the stumps.'⁶⁵² Despite the fact that the 1933 Native Authority Ordinance had legislated for the 'power of the native authority to issue orders [...] for the purpose of exterminating or preventing the spread of tsetse fly', it seems that the colonial authorities were completely unable to coerce people into the first gargantuan phase of clearing '540 linear miles of stream.'⁶⁵³ As a result, 'the technique of stream clearance with large gangs of paid labour was standardised and over three hundred miles of stream cleared.'⁶⁵⁴ Although 'large gangs of paid labour' thus employed were nonetheless paid extremely low wages, only '4d per day', this was nonetheless a significant and surely reluctant U-turn, compelling the administration to pay out wages for 58,560 man-days of the 'temporarily imported labour' they had initially presumed they could extract for free.⁶⁵⁵

⁶⁵² Nash, *The Anchau Scheme*, 19.

⁶⁵³ *Native Authority Ordinance*, 1933, s. 8(m); Nash, 19.

⁶⁵⁴ McLetchie, *Report: Sleeping Sickness Settlements*, 9. Ethnologist Horace Miner reported in 1960 that, 'in at least two instances local Hausa refused to cut certain patches of brush because these were sacred and inhabited by spirits. Finally non-Hausa natives from the French Sudan were used to cut the sacred brush.' Horace Miner, 'Culture Change Under Pressure: A Hausa Case', *Human Organization* 19, no. 3 (1960): 165.

⁶⁵⁵ Miner, *Culture Change*, 165.

The majority of population transfers were carried out by the early 1940s. The movement of ‘thousands of loads of personal belongings was carried out by motor and head transport’, and ‘there were no complaints of theft.’⁶⁵⁶ Theft, in the grammar of the Anchau Scheme’s officials, meant the theft of natives’ belongings and corn by other so-called natives. But the widespread resistance to and non-compliance by the people targeted for removal were nothing less than sustained *complaints* against the *theft* of their land, the soil they had fallowed and tended, the fruit trees and crops they had grown, the homes they had built, their freedom and dignity to move, settle, and farm as they wished. Just as Africans knew this, so too did the colonial officials implementing and reporting these compulsory migrations. A single image in a photograph series of the Anchau Scheme shows four African men on the move, moving, being moved. It is titled ‘the dispossessed people of Anchau migrate to the newly planned town at Takalafiya.’⁶⁵⁷ Dispossession or theft, both the authorities moving and the people being moved shared an understanding of what was happening.

The force of the law in a grove of sacred trees

Reinventing the precolonial tradition of voluntary communal labour was at the heart of the Anchau Scheme’s plans and balance sheet. But, as Sara Berry’s important 1993 historiographic intervention into indirect rule suggested, the ‘invention of tradition’ was neither a unidirectional process, nor a singular event: rather, Africans also had agency in the remoulding of precolonial customs.⁶⁵⁸ In the indirect rule model, precolonial custom was the framework through which law and order, policing, and punishment took place. The contents of those customs remained in flux as Europeans and Africans alike asserted authority and strategized towards accessing resources: clearly it was the purported *age* of customs – their historicity – that all parties mobilised for legitimacy. A key example lay in how Africans and Europeans alike mobilised the authority of precolonial custom in relation to the supernatural forces and belief systems at work in African societies. This section of the chapter unpacks how this manifested in the local conditions of the Anchau Scheme.

Implementing the Anchau Scheme’s anti-tsetse measures brought the colonial authorities squarely up against cosmographies of ‘traditional’ African spirit-worlds and supernatural powers. When the British supervisors arrived at the villages to oversee the work, the communal labourers failed to appear. The re-scheduled dates went the same way. The Anchau Scheme’s official report, written in 1948 by Dr T. A. M. Nash, relayed that it was ‘the presence

⁶⁵⁶ Nash, *The Anchau Scheme*, 11.

⁶⁵⁷ Institute of Education Collection, ‘Moving to Takalafiya, c.1939, in “Sleeping Sickness Service Survey in the Anchau Corridor, c.1940” Series,’ GBR/0115/RCS/Y3011U/393, Cambridge University Archives [CUA].

⁶⁵⁸ Sara Berry, ‘Hegemony on a Shoestring: Indirect Rule and Access to Agricultural Land’, *Africa* 62, no. 3 (July 1992): 327–55.

of sacred trees in the streams [which] caused much trouble, especially in one village.⁶⁵⁹ He continued:–

The village head would suddenly give out that the work was reaching a place where any man would die who entered the grove; the labour gangs would not turn up the next day and work would come to a standstill. The following method soon abated this nuisance. The village head, who was also the earthly leader of the spirit world, would be interviewed in front of all his people, and after much preamble, told that the existence of these spirits was causing us much trouble, that unfortunately Europeans were quite incapable of making spirits change their abodes, but that it was rumoured he had this amazing power; we could not believe it possible for any man to do such a thing, and considered it all to be lies, but, if he really had these powers, would he kindly remove the spirits to a neighbouring hill. Invariably the old man would turn up the next day saying he had wrestled with the spirits all night and that finally they had agreed to live on the desired hill. Everyone was happy, the old man's prestige was enhanced and we got the streams cleared. After a few of these problems, the village head became tired of producing sacred trees, and the work continued smoothly.⁶⁶⁰

Nash's words and tone mocked the villagers' knowledge about the ecology of sacred trees in which lived spirits, *iska* in Hausa, that can kill 'any man (...) who entered the grove.' This was to say, an ecology of sacred trees in which lived spirits that could spread the fatal forms of Sleeping Sickness to anyone entering. It is worth underlining that the Hausa language words for the disease – *kunturu*, meaning a region under evil supernatural influence, and *dudduru*, meaning a stream with wooded banks – demonstrated that 'the Hausa thus recognized the relation between the habitat of the tsetse fly and sleeping sickness' although the 'role of the fly in the transmission of the disease was unknown – the *iska* were the vector.'⁶⁶¹ These words come from an ethnographic report on the Anchau Scheme written in 1960 by Horace Miner, a report as patronising and racist as Nash's. Miner's report conceded that although the European 'idea of microorganisms was entirely beyond their experience and comprehension', the villagers understood the spirits as local, meaning that 'the only way to escape their effects is to leave the region', and that 'whole villages have moved when threatened with epidemic disease.'⁶⁶²

In fact, as Clapperton Chakanetsa Mavhunga argues, European colonial medical staff learned everything they knew about managing and eradicating the tsetse fly from the existing knowledge of Africans who had been cohabiting with the fly for centuries before European colonisation created epidemic conditions.⁶⁶³ From the turn of the twentieth century onwards, the tsetse fly and *African Sleeping Sickness* became an obsession of the British, French, Belgian and Portuguese empires alike, an obsession that galvanised the inter-imperial

⁶⁵⁹ Nash, *The Anchau Scheme*, 19.

⁶⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁶¹ Horace Miner, 'Culture Change Under Pressure: A Hausa Case', *Human Organization* 19, no. 3 (1960): 165.

⁶⁶² Ibid.

⁶⁶³ Mavhunga's demonstrated that '*Vanhu vatema* (black people) created numerous stratagems to manage and coexist with *mhesvi* (tsetse fly) that *vachena* (white people) later borrowed and deployed to control the insect' including fire, repellents, traps, strategic human resettlement and fences. Mavhunga, *The Mobile Workshop*, 11 – 12.

transnational efforts of colonial tropical medicine. This obsession was grounded in the high mortality rates of European officers in East and West Africa, particularly because the Plateau landscapes where tsetse habitats could thrive were also home to a virulent spread of new tin mines and their accompanying European workforces of businessmen, technical staff and colonial administrators.⁶⁶⁴ In contrast, the kinds of 'endemic diseases that caused great mortality and morbidity amongst Africans were neglected.'⁶⁶⁵



Figure 5: 'A local official checking for fly distribution and tsetse movement' in Anchau Scheme photograph series. Source: Royal Commonwealth Society Library, University of Cambridge Archives.

Meanwhile the Colonial Sleeping Sickness Service developed procedures and chains of command that dispatched Africans as 'fly-boys' into tsetse fly contact-zones to collect specimens, test pesticides, set traps, and examine specimens keeping European scientists and officers out of the fly's way.⁶⁶⁶ The refusal by so-called natives to cut fly-infested vegetation was grounded in the scientifically demonstrable reality that 'the work was reaching a place where any man [could] die who entered the grove.'⁶⁶⁷ It was patently clear to Africans that the

⁶⁶⁴ As argued by David Arnold, the history of colonial medicine was predominated by the agenda of enclavist medicine because state power was intimately tied to the health of British military forces. Arnold shows that the other diseases animating colonial medicine were those that impacted the populations of mill hands and mine workers, key extractive industries. David Arnold, *Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth-Century India* (University of California Press, 1993).

⁶⁶⁵ Uyilawa Usuanlele, 'Poverty and Welfare in Colonial Nigeria, 1900-1954' (PhD Diss, Kingston, Ontario, Queen's University, 2015), 134 – 135.

⁶⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁷ Nash, *The Anchau Scheme*, 19.

colonial authorities were trying to coerce them into labouring in physically, spiritually, economically, and ecologically harmful conditions. This was health-threatening labour that was unpaid, high risk, and super exploitative. It was not for the economic or spiritual benefit of Africans but rather to get more land under cultivation and to fold more cultivators into cash-crop export agriculture and the widening regime of direct taxation on Northern Nigeria's peasant masses. It was state-sanctioned coercion, legally implemented with the 1937 Sleeping Sickness Ordinance and practically implemented with the coercive force permitted under the rubric of indirect rule's decentralised 'native courts'.

This was 'the state-sanctioned and legal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerabilities to premature death', fitting Ruth Gilmore-Wilson's influential definition of racism.⁶⁶⁸ Dr Nash, a prominent entomologist, interpreted cultivators' refusal to expose themselves to tsetse fly bites as irrational, unreasonable and mockable superstitions. This starkly demonstrates how 'objective', pervasive and all-encompassing the social world and mental terrain generated by racecraft. Dr Nash et al's 'marrow-deep certainties that racial differences are real and consequential, whether scientifically demonstrable or not' constituted a social world in which peasants' vulnerability to premature death was commonplace and part of the natural order of things.⁶⁶⁹ A natural order in which initially large numbers of European officers and soldiers dying from the same disease was unacceptable and to be made preventable at the cost of African lives. African lives after whom the disease had been named, as if African Sleeping Sickness was itself a property, an inborn behaviour, a racial trait, of Africans.

In this way, the Anchau Corridor existed as a mental terrain of pervasive belief in which – as one 1949 colonial textbook put it – a 'communal and customary set of relations' contoured the political landscape where 'all lands (whether occupied or unoccupied) are declared to be native lands; and they must be held and administered by the Governor for the use and common benefit of the natives.'⁶⁷⁰ The result was that in the name of 'the use and common benefit of natives' African cultivators were forcibly expropriated of their homes and land and resettled in new villages spatially designed for easier policing. Spatially these new villages facilitated attempts to exploit labour. Refusals and resistance to this exploitation were not actually resolved with cheery manipulations of 'the earthly leader of the spirit world', but instead with punitive force and state-sanctioned coercion. It is through these processes of coercive expropriation and exploitation that colonial authorities imagined (and acted upon) cultivators as a racial group predisposed to unskilled, low-paid and high-risk work, people therefore deserving of and accustomed to degrading material conditions, exploitative work,

⁶⁶⁸ Ruth Wilson Gilmore, *Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California: 21* (Berkeley: California University Press, 2007), 28.

⁶⁶⁹ Fields and Fields, *Racecraft*, 198.

⁶⁷⁰ C. K. Meek, *Land Law And Custom In The Colonies*, (London: OUP, 1949), 147.

despotic violent governance, perpetual ill-health, premature death and precarious cycles of resettlement.

The indirect rule model had tried to shape British colonial rule upon the existing power relations of Fulani overlords above the Hausa peasantry. Similarly, the Anchau Scheme tried to model its scheme of violent resettlement, exploitation, and expropriation upon the cycles of 'endless tribal warfare and slave-raiding' that had terrorised Northern Nigeria before the British brought peace, apparently, to the region – the so-called *Pax Britannica*. The *Pax Britannica* account of the practical unfolding of empire was threaded through colonial medicine as a proven, scientific fact. 'In the days of endless tribal warfare,' Dr Nash wrote retrospectively in 1960, 'there was little travel and the population tended to concentrate for safety in large communities, whose extensive farm clearings must have produced tsetse-free zones around the settlements.'⁶⁷¹

To use Fields and Fields' framework, here we find clear examples of the kinds of 'circular reasoning', 'self-fulfilling prophecies' and 'inconsistent causal ideas' that perpetuate racecraft.⁶⁷² The rational software of racecraft could make ambiguous correlations between, on one hand, the tsetse-free ecologies of the 'slave raiding' era before the *Pax Britannica*, and on the other hand, the twentieth century colonial state's determined recreation of those earlier ecological conditions. The Anchau Scheme simulated those conditions by coercing African cultivators into premature-death-inducing unpaid 'voluntary communal labour'. In doing so, colonial officials sought to imagine and act upon local African cultivators themselves as vectors of disease, ecologically and epidemiologically. Colonial officials approached local cultivators as creatures already organically predisposed to premature death.

Pacing change and policing welfare

As argued by Ann Laura Stoler and others, Foucault's concept of the 'carceral archipelago' can and should be extended from analysing the spread of disciplinary techniques in Europe towards an analysis of the policing of imperial borderlands and ambiguous frontiers that have shaped what Radhika Mongia calls the shared 'colonial genealogy of the modern state.'⁶⁷³ In this section, I use maps and captioned photographs to outline the carceral spaces and spatial controls instituted in the Anchau Corridor through the concept of cosmography. I define cosmography as a mapping of the earthly world, its various heavens and otherworldly

⁶⁷¹ Dr Nash is quoted in R. M. PROTHERO, 'Population Mobility and Trypanosomiasis in Africa', *Bulletin of the World Health Organization* 28, no. 5–6 (1963): 615–26.

⁶⁷² Fields and Fields, *Racecraft*, 198.

⁶⁷³ Ann Laura Stoler, *Duress: Imperial Durabilities in Our Times*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 108; Mongia, *Indian Migration and Empire*.

dimensions, including the realms of the living, the after-living and the non-living.⁶⁷⁴ I show how the physical terrain and architecture of the Anchau Scheme was populated with 'multiple entities and forces that make up a mutable spatial configuration and give it cosmic depth [...] exceeding what is conventionally encompassed by the term geography.'⁶⁷⁵ Thinking through 'cosmic depth' and cosmography helps to animate the enchanted processes of racecraft at work in the Anchau corridor. In the scheme's new model town of 'Takalafiya', welfare was used to police and confine Africans to particular settlements, either making them legal and legible as locals or making them illegal and illegible as aliens, all the while crafting an all-encompassing racial identity for the Hausa peasant.

As we have seen, a large component of the Anchau Scheme was the enforced consolidation of scattered hamlets into larger model villages and a new town. Significantly, villagers' everyday refusals to comply with and assist in the expropriation of their land, the exploitation their labour and their expulsion from their homes were, in the colonial officials' view, proximate with criminal or nearly-criminal activities, as itemised in the 'typical case [...] of the Kudumi.'⁶⁷⁶ The villagers of Kudumi 'had no wish to be moved because they lived miles away from anywhere, had valuable sugar-cane farms, and indulged in the lucrative trade of harbouring Kano thieves when they came across the border for a little peace.'⁶⁷⁷ *Living miles away from anywhere*, in the colonial mindset, enabled villagers and village heads to accommodate law-breakers, break laws themselves, and insulate their communities from the fragile reaches of policing by the local chief as well as the district officer. These kind of concerns were laced through with the sensibilities of eugenic thinking, through which the unruly urbanising city was associated with the contamination of provincial patriarchies and the orderly conservation of traditions.⁶⁷⁸

Spatially, the Scheme set out to 'make the people feel *responsible* for re-slashing a stream' by settling them 'on the high ground immediately above an uninhabited reach.'⁶⁷⁹ The plan would place these people, therefore, within immediate proximity to the flies and the disease they carried.⁶⁸⁰ The plan's designers initially suggested that:

... each farmer should have his own 80-yard stretch of stream frontage, with a farm running back for half a mile, giving him a 12-acre farm, which was the size advised by the Agricultural Department for their mixed farmers. But it turned out to be another nice theory, completely impracticable. Streams will not run straight, but often double back; rocky outcrops occur where they are not wanted, and the cost of laying out each farm with beacons would have been prohibitive. Even more serious, it would have started

⁶⁷⁴ Jeffrey S. Kahn, 'Smugglers, Migrants, and Demons', *American Ethnologist* 46, no. 4 (2019): 470–81.

⁶⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 471.

⁶⁷⁶ Nash, *The Anchau Scheme*, 9.

⁶⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷⁸ For the history of eugenic thinking about the provincial patriarchies, the urban and the rural, see Robbie Shilliam, *Race and the Undeserving Poor* (Newcastle: Agenda, 2018), 9 – 32.

⁶⁷⁹ McLetchie, *Report: Sleeping Sickness Settlements*, 8.

⁶⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 7.

the problem of land tenure with all its attendant evils. The native law decreed by the Emir of Zaria in 1938 is that after land has been left fallow for ten years, the original owner has no rights to that land, and the hamlet head can give it to any applicant. A study of native methods soon showed them to be vastly superior to our theories.⁶⁸¹

Streams will not run straight, but often double back. Administrative attempts to make unmapped, unruly, unpredictable streams 'run straight' bled into futile proposals to make chains of command run straight through each farmer as the self-governing patriarch of his family. These were the kind of patriarchal lines of inheritance and land tenure that made sense in England but which proved 'completely impracticable' in the context of Northern Nigeria.

Water, as an uncontrollable force or as technologically regulated, loomed large in officials' cosmography of the Anchau Scheme. The Scheme's officials described their approach to 'successful development' through the idiom 'a steady drip, drip is far better than a sudden deluge.'⁶⁸² *A steady drip, drip, is far better than a sudden deluge* invoked both the terrifying spectre of uncontrollable floods and rising tides, and simultaneously, the potential to control, slow, regulate, enrapture those floods, tides, deluges and weather conditions. Through this idiom, development appeared as some kind of witchcraft through what Perham called *the proper pace of change* could be administered, dispensed as medicine or regulated through ritual. The Anchau planners imagined they could 'drip, drip' small parts of 'development' into rural Northern Nigeria in ways that would 'graft onto native life those things which it lacks' rather than 'attempt to revolutionize it.'⁶⁸³ Revolution was a sudden deluge, an uncontrollable flood, the rising tides of African nationalism, and was to be mitigated at all costs. Meanwhile, these small drip, drips of welfare and development in the Anchau scheme amounted to an underwhelming dribble of 'good wells, schools and marketing facilities.'⁶⁸⁴

Like the physical terrain of the Anchau Corridor, the historical imaginary of the proper pace of change and visions of the contagious spread of the dysgenic mobile poor existed objectively as part of the mental terrain of pervasive belief and circular reasoning that officials and Africans alike had to navigate and 'could not readily stop traversing.'⁶⁸⁵ The topographical features of the Anchau Corridor's mental terrain included the vast distances between, on one hand, the planners' diagrams – of new village boundaries, model compounds, model villages, standardised butcher slabs, market stalls and water wells – and on the other hand, officials' various 'infuriating' experiences of both the physical terrain and the social relationships.⁶⁸⁶ Officials complained of bicycle-borne land surveys without an aeroplane, of villagers 'leading us off into the bush for miles' and refusing to accept proposed village sites, of entire villages

⁶⁸¹ Ibid.

⁶⁸² Nash, *Anchau Scheme*, 19.

⁶⁸³ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁴ C. Millard, 'Trypanosomiasis in Tropical Africa', *British Medical Journal* 2, no. 4589 (18 December 1948): 1075.

⁶⁸⁵ Fields and Fields, *Racecraft*, 18.

⁶⁸⁶ Nash, *The Anchau Scheme*, 15.

fleeing to the neighbouring Emirate of Kano to escape the scheme's reach.⁶⁸⁷ Officials even complained about the incomprehensible waterlogging of different sites, as if even the non-human soil itself refused to comply with officials' attempts to sink water wells.

In the colonial mindset, the Anchau Corridor's mental terrain of these disorientating distances and incomprehensible, mysterious forces could only be managed by restructuring the landscape, physically and mentally, with carceral sites and punitive processes. Damien Sojourner has argued that 'the carceral state archive' contains 'both the recording mechanisms of state power and the institutions and structures that buttress that power.'⁶⁸⁸ In Takalafiya, 'the recording mechanisms' of the 'carceral state archive' were folded into the new town's institutions, structures and mechanisms – including the new wells, butchers' slabs, and latrines.

A census is another key example of 'the carceral state archive' as it unfolded as a central building block of empire.⁶⁸⁹ From the outset of the Anchau Scheme, officials blamed the project's stunted progress on the inaccuracy of the pre-existing 'Native Administration census, prepared for administrative and tax purposes, [which subsequently] proved unsuitable for settlement work' because its 'figures bore no relation to the population on the ground.'⁶⁹⁰ The proclaimed inadequacy of the existing census offers a glimpse of the low-maintenance bureaucratic systems put in place by the British in their ad hoc efforts to 'develop' native authorities for the express purpose of decentralising direct tax collection, as reported by George Padmore in his study of indirect rule. 'So long as,' wrote the anti-colonial, Pan-Africanist activist and scholar, 'the chiefs collect the amount of taxes assigned to them and supply labour when ordered to do so, the European officials seldom interfere.'⁶⁹¹ Alongside this hands-off approach, British colonial administrations invariably blamed the unreliability of census figures in Africa upon highly racialised conceptions of widespread illiteracy, immoral schemes to evade taxation, and superstitious dread of counting.⁶⁹²

⁶⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁸ Sojourner, *American Anthropologist* 123, no. 3 (2021): 658–70.

⁶⁸⁹ A seminal text on the colonial census is Arjun Appadurai, 'Number in the Colonial Imagination', in *Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia*, ed. Carol Appadurai Breckenridge and Peter van der Veer, (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993).

⁶⁹⁰ McLetchie, *Report: Sleeping Sickness Settlements*, 5.

⁶⁹¹ George Padmore, quoted in Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*, 53.

⁶⁹² See, for instance, this 1963 geography textbook for the longevity and deep roots of this colonial perspective on the census in Africa: Ronald Harrison Church, *West Africa: A Study of the Environment and of Man's Use of It* (New York: John Wiley, 1963), 163. <http://archive.org/details/westafricastudy0000chur>.

FIG. NO 2

PLAN OF ANCHAU

OLD TOWN

R.F. - 1:2500 Feet




Figure 6: Plan of Old Anchau Town. Source: Nash, *The Anchau Scheme*, 1948



FIGURE 1. OVERCROWDING IN OLD ANCHAU
The population density was at the rate of 21,200 to the square mile.

FIGURE 2. MARKET DAY IN OLD ANCHAU
A seething mob, coughing, sneezing and spitting, owing to pepper on sale in the tumble-down booths.



FIGURE 3. OLD ANCHAU SLAUGHTER GROUND
For years all beasts had been slaughtered on this blood-drenched ground, the meeting place of vultures by day and hyaenas by night.




FIGURE 4. TYPICAL OLD ANCHAU WELL
Water was obtained from filthy wells, often situated near pit-latrines.

Figure 7: Page of Captioned Photographs. Source: Nash, *The Anchau Scheme*, 1948




Figure 8: Plan of Takalafiya. Source: Nash, *The Anchau Scheme*, 1948

The 'newly planned town at Takalafiya' was also referred to as 'New Anchau'.⁶⁹³ Visually, the planners mapped 'Old Anchau' with smudges of black to show 'solid blocks of congested compounds'.⁶⁹⁴ Captioned photographs in the scheme's official report of 1948 assembled an emotive landscape of the old town as a place overcrowded 'at a rate of 21,000 to the square mile'.⁶⁹⁵ This was, apparently, a congested town 'very unhealthy and succumb[ing] readily to fires'.⁶⁹⁶ The latent threat of those fires, excessive heat, destruction, and undisciplined succumbing – the spectre of the ungovernable mobile poor setting the world on fire – spread into the captioned image of 'market day in Old Anchau' where 'a seething mob, coughing, sneezing and spitting, owing to pepper on sale in the tumble-down booths'.⁶⁹⁷ A photograph of 'old Anchau Slaughter Ground' captioned as 'the meeting place of vultures by day and

⁶⁹³ Nash, *Anchou Scheme*, 16.

⁶⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

hyenas by night' appears alongside one of women and some children, shadowed and indistinct, in the process of drawing 'water [...] from filthy wells, often sited near pit latrines.'⁶⁹⁸

Without these captions, these photographs depict only: some compounds, a busy market square, some indistinct birds, a well in the shadows. These captions worked – or tried to work – as incantations, as collections of words, said in a certain way, with particular intention, by someone invested with special powers: here, the photographer, the editor or the archivist. With the incantations, the people of Old Anchau become shadowed and indistinct, blurring into a landscape of 'filthy wells', of 'blood-drenched ground', of 'tumble-down booths', overcrowding and overcrowded. They blur into a 'seething mob' of non-human threats to life: latent fires, vultures, hyenas, water-borne disease, mucus, rotting offal and slaughtered beasts. These captions were part of the secular, evidence-based, rational and routinised magic of colonial photography, a material process and a recording mechanism manifesting the 'busy repertoire of strange manoeuvring that is part of what we call racecraft.'⁶⁹⁹ To use the words of Clapperton Mavhunga again, in these maps and captioned photographs:–

...something beyond just blackening the native and leaving him human was happening, namely the reduction of the native into a subhuman species (as demonstrated in the publication, scientific traction and political usage of evolutionist-eugenicist literature) as a preamble to as well as a description of the actual treatment of blacks as a subspecies of things.⁷⁰⁰

New Anchau was named *Takalafiya*, meaning *good health* in Hausa. The 'bulk of the people' moved there 'were from the worst of Anchau's slums, not good farmers', reported Dr McLetchie.⁷⁰¹ These people, he continued, 'proved un-cooperative and unreceptive to propaganda and new ideas' and who 'took no advantage of the wide spaces provided for low crops until forced to do so by the district head.'⁷⁰² As a result, 'the latter [district head], and all his senior native administration staff, were moved to Takalafiya, housing a courthouse, lock-up, offices and an elementary school built'.⁷⁰³ The New Town map placed the school, the in-patients clinic and the dispensary next to the prison, and the prison within eyeline of the District Head's compound, his office and the courthouse in the centre of the town.

Good health, education, punishment, law and order all cohered in the notion of social hygiene at the heart of eugenics. Alongside the elementary school, the adult literacy classes and an expanding programme of instructional colonial medicine films touring Nigeria and British Colonial Africa, the courthouse and the lock-up were also methods of teaching towns people

⁶⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁹ Fields and Fields, *Racecraft*, 16.

⁷⁰⁰ Clapperton Chakanetsa Mavhunga, 'Vermin Beings: On Pestiferous Animals and Human Game', *Social Text* 29, no. 1 (106) (1 March 2011): 151-152.

⁷⁰¹ McLetchie, *Report: Sleeping Sickness Settlements*, 12.

⁷⁰² Ibid.

⁷⁰³ Ibid.

'good health' and its corollary of hard work, familial 'responsibility' and sexual propriety.⁷⁰⁴ The colonial state's concern about 'familial responsibility' in rural Sub-Saharan Africa related to its economic interest in extracting and exploiting what was called 'family labour' within colonial tax regimes. As Beverly Grier has shown, 'the exploitation of women's unpaid labour in agriculture has been central to the process of capitalist accumulation in colonial and postcolonial Africa', particularly in West Africa where 'certain exploitative aspects of pre-capitalist gender relations' were preserved in ways that secured women's continued production of subsistence crops and their labour contributions to the export agricultural sector [as] crucial factors lowering the costs of [agricultural] production.⁷⁰⁵ For the Anchau officials, it was hoped that standardised plans for family compounds and carefully allocated lands for subsistence farming could engineer the kinds of containing spaces in which *responsible* household patriarchs could and would compel and discipline women and children in their families into providing this unpaid 'family labour' that helped to devalue labour and market prices to the benefit of the state and imperialist enterprise.

After a few years, 'suggestions were made for additional moves of more responsible people from old Anchau' because 'the population of Takalafiya was unbalanced' by 'slum-dwellers' variously described as idle and irresponsible.⁷⁰⁶ The 'settlements were weathering difficult days' requiring a 'close watch' and 'continued supervision [...] if our standards were to be maintained.'⁷⁰⁷ Toward the end of the Scheme, 'the households of nineteen of the more substantial traders, tradesmen, priests and *mallams* were moved in from old Anchau to leaven the original pauper population and to round off the layout': a physical manoeuvring of people that merged class hierarchies with layouts – environments, habitats – to be rounded off, dehumanising even to the respectable, skilled, financially generative, socially hygienic traders, tradesmen, priests and *mallams*.⁷⁰⁸ The moving of artisans into Takalafiya showed again that migration, the moving of people, functioned as a key instrument of social, political and economic control in creating a disciplined productive workforce who might take advantage of the scheme's various nutrition initiatives and new crop experiments to better provide for their families in the clearly routinised event of famine.

Moreover, by allocating who could settle in Takalafiya, and in which compound in which part of the rounded-off layout, the colonial authorities also created an additional productive

⁷⁰⁴ There exists an exciting and growing literature on colonial instructional films in British colonial Africa. See in particular, Stephanie Newell, 'The Last Laugh: African Audience Responses to Colonial Health Propaganda Films', *Cambridge Journal of Postcolonial Literary Inquiry* 4, no. 3 (2017): 347–61; Luis Eslava, 'The Moving Location of Empire: Indirect Rule, International Law, and the *Bantu Educational Kinema Experiment*', *Leiden Journal of International Law* 31, no. 3 (September 2018): 539–67; Onyeka Igwe, 'Unbossed and Unbound: How Can Critical Proximity Transfigure British Colonial Moving Images?' (PhD Diss, UAL, 2021).

⁷⁰⁵ Beverly Grier, 'Pawns, Porters, and Petty Traders: Women in the Transition to Cash Crop Agriculture in Colonial Ghana', *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 17, no. 2 (1992): 304.

⁷⁰⁶ McLetchie, *Report: Sleeping Sickness Settlements*, 16.

⁷⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 138.

workforce of 'Kano invaders [who] are now forbidden to erect their flimsy grass shelters within the town.'⁷⁰⁹ The Anchau planners noted that while it was a struggle to 'rouse the Hausa from his dry season lethargy and interest him in irrigated farming on the banks of the tsetse free streams', by contrast 'the poorer Kano peasantry, under an energetic District Head, take full advantage of the cleared stream banks and have voluntarily extended some clearings to obtain more ground for irrigation.'⁷¹⁰ By controlling the distribution of housing in Takalafiya and the remodelled villages of the Anchau Corridor, the colonial authorities had created a houseless, landless peasantry, making people on the move into highly exploitable migrant workers who were more motivated, by degrading dispossession and hunger, to work in legally precarious, high risk (of tsetse bites) and unpaid conditions. This workforce of 'Kano invaders' could be much more easily sorted, using the coercive force of an 'energetic District Head', into 'holiday makers and beggars [who] are encouraged to move on' and on the other hand, 'craftsmen and those seeking work [who] are welcome.'⁷¹¹

This scarcity mindset shaped the most recognisable aspect of the Anchau Scheme's provision of so-called social welfare: famine relief. Beyond the troubled new town of Takalafiya, by 1942 'two of the smaller of the new villages were found to have cleared insufficient land, and be unable, mainly from lack of food in successive bad years, to clear more.'⁷¹² The 'dispossession of the peasants' in that earlier photograph was coming to the fruition that locals had foreseen and understood from the outset. To avert an uprising, rather than to alleviate the urgent food scarcity, 'relief corn was distributed through the Native Authority, the weekly ration being made proportionate to the farm work done.'⁷¹³ By the following year, the relief corn had been repaid. Decades of amateur historical scholarship on the so-called feudal society of the Hausa, melded with a wider historical imaginary of colonised people as pre-modern or backwards routinised these cycles of impoverishment – and repayments of relief corn – as something caused by and intrinsic to the race and culture of the so-called native.

In these ways, the new town of Takalafiya encompassed both the carceral spaces (the courthouse, the lock-up and the easily policed town grid) and the carceral practices (the eviction of houseless beggars from elsewhere and the allocation of famine relief 'in proportion to the work done'). As such, the Anchau Scheme demonstrated the laboured creation of a carceral state: an assemblage of formal institutions, sites and relationships through which state power deployed mobility control, punishment, surveillance, policing, criminalisation and incarceration to resolve the recurring economic and political problems of inequality, poverty and exploitation.

⁷⁰⁹ Ibid, 18.

⁷¹⁰ Ibid, 15, 20.

⁷¹¹ Ibid, 16.

⁷¹² Ibid, 20.

⁷¹³ Ibid.

Conclusion

The Anchau Scheme had been designed within the parameters of indirect rule. It had relied on indirect rule's fragile brokering of 'liberty under the law' in the colonial context of Northern Nigeria. The efficacy of the scheme's migration control laws and decentralised, customary law-and-order frameworks depended on the respect those laws inspired among Emirs, *Hakimi* and village heads. At the beginning of the scheme, the Emir had been 'persuaded to send a personal representative to remain in Anchau [...] to reinforce on-the-spot interpretations of the Emir's orders.'⁷¹⁴ But over the scheme's ten years, this upset the fragile brokering of power upon which indirect rule had depended: soon enough 'the Hakimi [district head] found he was no longer the highest local official and even the Emir [of Zaria] ultimately complained that, as a result of intense British activity around Anchau, he had been deprived of part of his emirate.'⁷¹⁵ Ultimately the Anchau Scheme – despite being designed to minimise 'deranging their existing administrative and social framework' – had undermined the provincial patriarchies through which the colonial state and imperialist enterprise could extract cheap local labour and control social unrest.⁷¹⁶

The limited services and 'development' provided by the Anchau Scheme – pit latrines, butchers slabs, market stalls and one-room schools – were the rock-bottom basics of colonial uplift: the bare minimum needed with which to create a taxable peasant. A taxable peasant healthy and able-bodied enough to also exploit as a labourer. A taxable peasant literate enough to read printed announcements of new laws, orders and exploitative market pricing. Literate enough to cut out the interpreters mediating between peasant producers and colonial export markets; interpreters who, in the social world of the Anchau planners, were corrupt middlemen skimming from the fair price paid by the state to the peasants for their export crops. Such everyday doing of racecraft enabled cycles of impoverishment produced by coercive cash-crop agriculture to appear as the naturally-occurring moral deficiencies and intellectual inferiorities particular to the Hausa peasant as a racial type. State-sanctioned legalised processes of dispossession receded from view from the official evaluation of the Anchau Scheme's failure.

Through this drip, dripping idiom, the Hausa peasant was race-crafted as a racial type who 'cannot be hurried and will not accept innovations until he is satisfied of their efficacy.'⁷¹⁷ This racial type presented a convenient way to explain the failure of the Scheme, decentering other factors like officials' incompetent preparation (the entire plan had been based on an incomplete

⁷¹⁴ Miner, *Culture Change Under Pressure*, 166.

⁷¹⁵ *Ibid*, 166.

⁷¹⁶ McLetchie, *Report: Sleeping Sickness Settlements*, 6.

⁷¹⁷ Nash, *The Anchau Scheme*, 5.

partial soil survey), a plethora of offensively conceited decisions (like the attempt to institute pig-breeding in majority Muslim areas) and the resounding shortage of motorcars, aeroplanes and almost any mechanised machinery, equipment that in imperial propaganda justified British colonialism. What appeared instead, swelling to fill the frame, was an official image of ‘the Hausa peasant [as] an inscrutable person.’⁷¹⁸ The phrase marked a whole group of people as inscrutable and hard to read. Crucially, this *hard to read* appeared as an inborn, racial characteristic alongside and entangled with the much-commented levels of illiteracy that, in the colonial mindset, *racially* distinguished ‘the Hausa’ from their ‘Fulani overlords.’⁷¹⁹

Teasing out the everyday doing of racecraft on the ground in Anchau has helped illustrate the fragility of indirect rule’s political structures in the last years before the ‘marked change in approach’ announced by Whitehall in 1947. At the heart of the Anchau Scheme’s carceral cosmography lay the administrative conjuring tricks, and scheming, through which ‘recordless people’ could be captured and operationalised, made legible or illegible, legal or illegal, by the ‘recording mechanisms of state power and the institutions and structures that buttress that carceral power.’⁷²⁰ Ideas about ‘the problems of urban populations’ and ‘the decay of old customs’ – seen in both the actual implementation of Anchau’s new town and in Arthur Creech Jones’ rationale for his ‘marked change in approach to indirect rule’ – implicitly framed the unruly migration of the mobile poor as a pathological problem to be prevented and cured. The mobile poor – variously vagabonds, beggars, or vagrants – had to be sedentarized, immobilised, and spatially controlled into a disciplined, industrious and low-paid working class in order for ‘civilisational’, and implicitly capitalist, economic development to unfold over time.

There was, however, always a gap between colonial officials’ intentions, and what actually came about out of their schemes. The gap between the realities in Anchau and its narrativization – through reports, photographs and maps – formed a shifting terrain, a cosmography, of ideas and beliefs about race, about how time moves, how historical change happens, and which bodies make technological and historical change happen. This chapter has shown that colonial development was an economic exercise grounded in processes of racialisation, exploitation, expropriation and expulsion: these processes were embedded in colonial states’ everyday modes of governing, obstructing and forcing migration. But it has also shown that colonial development – as the expansion of medical, agricultural, political ‘advances’ through which the modern world has been made – was not imported from Europe

⁷¹⁸ Ibid.

⁷¹⁹ This racial distinction between the Hausa and the Fulani was the rationale structuring Lugard’s indirect rule system. The policy had derived ‘from a functionalist version of the so-called Hamitic Hypothesis in which the Fulani oligarchy of Northern Nigeria was understood as [...] as a martial “alien” race socialised to rule and civilise less-endowed autochthons.’ Moses Ochon, *Colonialism by Proxy: Hausa Imperial Agents and Middle Belt Consciousness in Nigeria* (Indiana University Press, 2014), 54.

⁷²⁰ Sojoyner, *American Anthropologist* 123, no. 3 (2021): 658.

but shaped, designed, and co-constituted by Africans' encounters with colonising forces, albeit, as Mavhunga argues, within unequal relations of power.

In 1947, the Anchau Scheme's funding came to an end. The scheme's 'European officers' across the medical, veterinary, agricultural, and other fields departed and the Anchau Scheme was handed over for the Native Administrations in Zaria to run. Thereafter, according to Horace Miner, 'the area has received no special attention [...] since 1948'.⁷²¹ The scheme's unceremonious end coincided with the British Government's 'marked change in approach to indirect rule' announced by Arthur Creech-Jones in his despatch of 1947.

But how coincidental is coincidental? As Charlotte Lydia Riley has demonstrated, 'British colonial development saw a sea-change in the official attitude to the empire', inaugurating a qualitatively different orientation to empire in which the metropole would be expected to 'confer upon its imperial territories its knowledge of advances in industry, agriculture, healthcare and education.'⁷²² Clearly, the Anchau Scheme was not the single causal factor flipping the switch from an earlier era (of decentralised indirect rule and the colonies-fund-themselves principle) into the postwar ambitions of Arthur Creech Jones' central government-funded programmes of agricultural, industrial, and social welfare development. But at some level, the Anchau Scheme did contribute to this sea-change. Despite the scheme's many failures, Anchau circulated in developmental discourse as somewhat of a success story. In many ways, the contradictory realities of Anchau illustrated the peculiar idiom *the operation was a success, but the patient died*. The scheme's official report dutifully itemised its many failures as lessons learned, for next time. That next time would happen elsewhere in the empire, rather than in the rural communities who had been forcibly uprooted, had their farming lands confiscated, their farming methods interrupted, to the extent that some villages suffered preventable famines, all due to the Anchau Scheme's chaotic short-term interventions into rural livelihoods. The scheme, however, still served as a useful piece of evidence legitimising the plannable futures of postwar colonial policy. In other words, Anchau was a blueprint demonstrating the necessity and viability of the 'marked change in approach to indirect rule' announced by Arthur Creech-Jones' ambitious expansion of a postwar, socialist approach to colonial occupation.

This chapter has shown that the Anchau Scheme had, after all, contributed to technical research in medicine and agriculture. However, much of the knowledge it had advanced – about dealing with the tsetse fly, soil types, crop rotation, methods of testing for water logging, and ways of organising human settlement – was not the outcome of European scientists and administrators' theories and plans but instead gathered in from local Africans – farmers, *mallams* and village heads – whose expertise and knowledge had initially been totally ignored.

⁷²¹ Miner, *Culture Change Under Pressure*, 165.

⁷²² Riley, 'Monstrous Predatory Vampires,' 223.

During the Anchau Scheme, officials deferred to widespread resistance, to the superiority of locals' expertise, and as the Second World War wore on, to the technical competence of the African technicians employed to resolve shortages in 'European manpower'. Experiences like these contributed in local yet reverberating ways towards the sea-change in official attitudes to empire.

Against Margery Perham's authoritative words in 1965, the Emirates of Nigeria were never the 'massive breakwater', immune and obstructive of the storms and tides of nationalism re-landscaping the rest of Nigeria. In fact, as we have seen, even a colonial development scheme nestled within rural 'Hausaland' had unleashed 'modern forces and influences' that had conjured up a 'rising tide of political consciousness' that was 'catching up and overflowing the more leisurely advance of evolution through a local government system based upon chief and tribe.'⁷²³ As demonstrated during the sacred trees incident, despite the existence of laws like the Sleeping Sickness Ordinance of 1937, local cultivators in the Anchau Corridor repeatedly refused to clear the tsetse-infested riverbanks through so-called 'voluntary communal labour.' To use economist Katherina Pistor's terms, the resistance of local cultivators to comply with the Anchau Scheme's feudal calculus obstructed the operation of law as the magic factor, the conjuring trick, in transforming assets into wealth, and securing that wealth as capital.⁷²⁴

In many ways, the scale of local non-compliance with Northern Nigeria's Anchau Scheme prefigured – in micro – decolonisation. Decolonisation was a fundamental challenge to global capitalism, in which Third World nation-states would try to reverse patterns of exploitation by installing labour protections, reverse patterns of expropriation by nationalising natural resources and reverse patterns of expulsion by expelling or heavily taxing imperialist businesses. The transformation in colonial policy, from indirect rule towards colonial development and then into the period of 'Africanising' colonial government, was shaped by multiple forms of resistance and non-compliance to colonial laws, policies and institutions by a range of actors in Northern Nigeria. This sustained resistance was much more a 'long moment of decolonisation' lasting all sixty years of colonial rule than it was the peaceful period of *Pax Britannica* often described in imperialist history-writing.⁷²⁵

The Anchau Scheme was a large-scale attempt to plan and implement substantial societal, cultural, economic, and environmental change. In colonial Northern Nigeria, migration control and compulsory evacuations were used in tandem with expanding criminalisation and a punitive welfare system. Together, these assembled a recognisable 'deportation regime' in the way that De Genova and Peutz have defined it: a 'complex socio-political regime that

⁷²³ Perham, *Foreword (1965)*, xii.

⁷²⁴ Katharina Pistor, *The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality* (Princeton: University Press, 2019).

⁷²⁵ The phrase 'the long moment of decolonisation' is borrowed from Marc Matera, 'Metropolitan Cultures of Empire and the Long Moment of Decolonization', *The American Historical Review* 121, no. 5 (2016): 1435–43.

manifests and engenders dominant notions of sovereignty, citizenship, public health, national identity, cultural homogeneity, racial purity and class privilege.⁷²⁶ By highlighting how Africans in colonial Northern Nigeria essentially remained rightless and non-citizens, even if they complied fully with the letter of the law, the chapter has shown that deporting people, and making populations deportable, is a key technique of distributing citizenship and non-citizenship to better facilitate the exploitation of labour and the expropriation of land.

⁷²⁶ Nicholas De Genova and Nathalie Peutz, eds., *The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 2.

Fragment: Deporting entire families

In many ways, the Immigration Act of 1971 was all about the family and about defining which families were allowed to stay in the British mainland. Not only did the patriality clause use family ancestry on the father's side, the Act also contained wider provisions for deporting the entire family of a person ordered to be removed. Home Office files show that the drafting of the 1971 Act was shot through with what this thesis has identified as eugenic, patrial ways of thinking about history, ancestry, the family and 'the proper pace of change.'

Officials drafting the 1971 Immigration Act muddled through different ways to empower the Home Secretary with a 'discretionary power to require the departure of the family of a deportee' since 'it is wrong that the wife and children should be able to remain here in any event obtaining all the advantages of the welfare state without a wage earner here.'⁷²⁷ Notably, the correspondence shows these policymakers were orienting their policymaking around 'Mr Enoch Powell, who, if no-one else, will be certain to spot the point and raise it on the bill.'⁷²⁸ Officials seemed to have shaped their proposed deportation measures around 'a letter from Mr Enoch Powell in which Powell, referring to the case of the Ayoola family, said that it was ironical that there was no power to deport the children, deportation orders for the parents having been signed.'⁷²⁹

Today, Powellism is widely understood as a 'major influence on the emergence of a populist move to the political right which has found ultimate expression in the United Kingdom Independence Party and affected the 2016 vote to leave the European Union.'⁷³⁰ There exists a growing literature that highlights how Powell's anti-immigration proposals dovetailed with his parliamentary lobbying for replacing welfarism with market liberalism. Although Powell had once been 'head over heels in love' with India and the British Empire, by the 1950s Powell, a Conservative MP, argued that his party 'must be cured of the British Empire, of the pitiful yearning to cling to the relics of a bygone system'.⁷³¹ The only way to repair the damage to Britain's ruptured history, he believed, was to undo the ties between England and its former colonial dependencies, and to defend the reborn British nation against non-white Commonwealth immigrants. As Robbie Shilliam has argued, Powell 'placed redistributive economic policies in the same basket as race relations legislation', arguing that open doors to non-white Commonwealth immigration, welfare policies and strong trade union-won labour

⁷²⁷ 'Immigration Bill: Deportation Proposals' (1970-1971), HO 394/5, TNA.

⁷²⁸ Ibid.

⁷²⁹ Ibid.

⁷³⁰ Sally Tomlinson, 'Enoch Powell, Empires, Immigrants and Education', *Race Ethnicity and Education* 21, no. 1 (2 January 2018): 1–14.

⁷³¹ Bill Schwarz, 'Actually Existing Postcolonialism', *Radical Philosophy*, no. 104 (2000), 19. <https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/article/actually-existing-postcolonialism>.

rights were part and parcel of a kind of state socialism that weakened the character of the Englishman and the orderly social fabric of English society.⁷³²

It is important, then, to hold Powell's anti-welfarism in mind as we follow Bohan and his B2 Department officials in drafting policies and provisions that would resolve the problems defined by Powell from his disgraced position on the Conservative backbenches. The Home Office's answer to what Powell called the 'problem' of the Ayoola children was not to invest the courts with powers to deport, upon conviction, children below the age of 17.⁷³³ Officials argued that such a move would have offended the postwar consensus against the heavy-handed punishment of juveniles. Instead, policymakers found a work-around. They removed the minimum age restriction placed on two deportation grounds: firstly, 'breach of conditions' grounds, and secondly, 'not conducive to the public good' grounds. This allowed for the deportation of the entire family of a deportee because the deportee was assumed the breadwinner upon whom the remaining family's permission to enter the UK had been dependent. If that did not qualify the family for deportation, the Home Secretary was now invested with powers longstanding but underused in the Aliens Act of 1920. These were powers to declare that the deportation of the remaining family – of whatever age – was *conducive to the public good* in order to save the welfare state from supporting a breadwinner-less immigrant family.

Mr Bohan, head of the Home Office B2 Policy division wrote to the Home Office Legal Advisor, John Pakenham-Walsh that his team 'have been considering the related question of how to ensure that a member of deportee's family who is given the option of leaving without deportation *does not defeat us* by refusing at the last minute to accompany the principal deportee.'⁷³⁴ He continued, 'the ingenuity of a determined evader may suggest other delaying tactics, but we might reasonably hope to use the power of deportation on 'conducive' grounds as a longstop.'⁷³⁵

Bohan speaks as though the Home Office is at war, is under attack, is at risk of being defeated. In Bohan's memos, the enemy is not only the 'principal deportee' but also a 'member of the deportee's family.' All are depicted as 'determined evaders', as invaders forces whose 'ingenuity' verges on conniving. Bohan's language here is recognisably similar to Powell's anti-immigrant rhetoric. As Camilla Schofield has shown, 'individual memories of war service, the promise of postwar homeownership and the "invasion" of immigration were bundled tightly

⁷³² Robbie Shilliam, 'VIEWPOINT: Populism and the Spectre of Enoch Powell', *Discover Society* (blog), 4 December 2018, <https://archive.discoverociety.org/2018/12/04/viewpoint-populism-and-the-spectre-of-enoch-powell/>.

⁷³³ 'Immigration Bill: Deportation Proposals' (1970-1971), HO 394/5, TNA.

⁷³⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷³⁵ *Ibid.*

together' in Enoch Powell's powerful 'Churchillian language of war, appeasement and invasion.'⁷³⁶

Significantly, deportation on *conducive to the public good* grounds could not be appealed using the appeal procedure outlined in the 1969 Immigration Appeals Act. Powell's racial sensibility was, as Ian Sanjay Patel argues, ordinary and already shared by many, including the deportation policymakers in the Home Office's B2 division.

⁷³⁶ Schofield, *Enoch Powell and the Making of Postcolonial Britain*, 228.

Chapter Five

‘They are not, and never have been, immigrants’: postwar migration and the end of the Colonial Service

Introduction

In April 1968, Enoch Powell gave his infamous ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech at a Conservative Association meeting in Birmingham. The speech encouraged prejudice and violence against immigrants, and was widely recognised as dividing postwar British society. It coincided with the Second Reading of the 1968 Race Relations Bill, legislation that sought to make racial discrimination in housing, welfare benefits or jobs illegal. Powell argued that the bill would strengthen ‘the discrimination and the deprivation [...] not of the immigrant population’ but instead of the ‘native-born’ people, who had already ‘found themselves made strangers in their own country.’⁷³⁷ Beyond pitting an ‘immigrant population’ against ‘the native inhabitants of this country’, Powell also distinguished between immigrants and ‘the entry of Commonwealth citizens [...] for the purposes of study or of improving their qualifications.’ He continued:

I stress the words "for settlement." This has nothing to do with the entry of Commonwealth citizens, any more than of aliens, into this country, for the purposes of study or of improving their qualifications, like, for instance, the Commonwealth doctors who, to the advantage of their own countries, have enabled our hospital service to be expanded faster than would otherwise have been possible. *They are not, and never have been, immigrants.*⁷³⁸

Enoch Powell’s ideas – about immigrants and who was not one, about ‘ordinary English people’ and who did not count as such, about welfare and who was stealing it – were not created in a vacuum. He and his particular set of beliefs and values – about social hierarchy, political order, patriality and about *the proper pace of change* – were a product of his experiences within his generation: his lower-middle class upbringing and aspirations, experiences of university education, of military service, and of various parts of the empire including Australia, India and North Africa. Significantly, as Ian Sanjay Patel argues, ‘Powell’s rhetoric may seem exceptional, but his racial sensibility was ordinary.’⁷³⁹ This chapter demonstrates that Powell’s ordinary racial sensibility was common to a range of institutions, networks and milieus at the heart of the British state. In other words, Powell’s ordinary racial sensibility was part of the particular historical sensibility traced in previous chapters of this thesis. Indebted to Camilla Schofield’s generational lens on Powell, this chapter looks for

⁷³⁷ Enoch Powell, *Rivers of Blood Speech*, 1968.

⁷³⁸ Ibid.

⁷³⁹ Ian Sanjay Patel, ‘Enoch Powell’s Altered World’, LRB Blog, 20 April 2018, <https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2018/april/enoch-powell-s-altered-world>.

threads of his ideas within the wider interwar generation, networks of influence and institutions he was part of. It pieces together an earlier history of the nativist ideas that Powell later made bombastic.⁷⁴⁰

As Kojo Koram has argued, Enoch Powell's 'vision holds more than a passing resemblance to the nativist resurgence which has spread across Britain and much of the world over the past decade.'⁷⁴¹ Nativism is the term often given to describe the popular and governmental articulations of anti-migrant and anti-refugee sentiment – often structured around entitlement to state welfare – prevalent not just in Britain or the Global North but proliferating across the world.⁷⁴² Scholars have increasingly turned to the 'seeming paradox that our "globalised" era is profoundly marked by a proliferation of new (historically-specific) formations of the cultural politics of nativism'.⁷⁴³ Nativism fashions the rationales about welfare entitlement and non-entitlement upon which Britain's mass deportation regime is made, maintained and expanded. Informed by this growing literature, this chapter addresses the making of Britain's mass deportation regime by tracing a genealogy of welfare nativism over the postwar period, beginning several decades earlier than Powell's 'Rivers of Blood' speech, and digging into wider institutional histories.

While Powell sought to distinguish between permanently settling immigrants – supposedly stealing hospital beds, classrooms and whole streets – and temporarily resident 'Commonwealth doctors who [...] have enabled our hospital service to be expanded faster than would otherwise have been possible', another constituency of people was being left out of the category of the migrant: members of the British Colonial Civil Service.⁷⁴⁴ This chapter focuses on the postwar migration of Colonial Civil Servants to denaturalise how the migrant is routinely imagined as non-white, as welfare-scrummer, and as a problem. Between the challenges of recruiting, training and skilling-up colonial officers for a dying career in the 1940s, and the difficulties of finding employment for ex-Colonial Service officers in the 1960s UK economy, this chapter highlights white economic migrants in Crown Service as a problem holding the British state's attention.

Anthony Kirk-Greene, a colonial officer who prematurely retired at the end of empire into a comfortable career as an African historian at Oxford University, argued that 'the resettlement and re-employment of at least 25,000 overseas civil servants' was the 'ultimate diaspora in

⁷⁴⁰ Camilla Schofield, *Enoch Powell and the Making of Postcolonial Britain* (Cambridge: CUP, 2015).

⁷⁴¹ Kojo Koram, *Uncommon Wealth: Britain and the Aftermath of Empire* (John Murray, 2023), 227.

⁷⁴² For a useful overview of literature on "nativism", see George Newth, 'Rethinking "Nativism": Beyond the Ideational Approach', *Identities* 30, no. 2 (4 March 2023): 161–80.

⁷⁴³ Nicholas De Genova, 'The "Native's Point of View" in the Anthropology of Migration', *Anthropological Theory* 16, no. 2–3 (2016): 227–40.

⁷⁴⁴ As Jordanna Bailkin has argued, the category of "the migrant" was born in the 1950s and 1960s, amidst competing pathologies of postwar postcolonial migration created by various sets of experts. Jordanna Bailkin, 'The Birth of the Migrant: Pathology and Postwar Mobility', in *Afterlife of Empire* (University of California Press, 2012), 24.

the story of twentieth-century decolonization.⁷⁴⁵ In what follows I reconstruct the slow, uneven end of the Colonial Service amidst its messy interactions with emerging immigration regimes in postwar Britain. Repatriation was Enoch Powell's preferred word for deportation. This chapter is not about deportation as the expulsion of foreigners from Britain. It is instead about the repatriation of British subjects to Britain, and about the complications and contradictions involved in legislating which kind of British subjects could repatriate and resettle themselves in the British mainland. In this way, I offer a genealogy of welfare nativism that traces the unstable, changing and multivalent meanings of 'welfare' and 'natives'. I follow the trajectories of these two concepts where they take me. This approach entwines the British mainland and Britain's former colonies in ways indebted to the connected histories approach associated with Gurminder Bhambra and others.⁷⁴⁶ In what ways did decolonisation reorder who counted as a native, a local, an immigrant or an expatriate? How – in what ways and through what means – did the racial meanings of these terms change over time?

The chapter traces the migration practices of Colonial Servants. I show firstly, how these changed over time, and secondly, how these generated 'processes of differential exploitation, expropriation and expulsion [that] become racializing processes.'⁷⁴⁷ I use racial capitalism's theorisations of migrant labour and processes of racialisation, and apply these to the labour migration and expatriate identities of Colonial Servants during the last decades of empire. Theories of racial capitalism highlight the persistent centrality of legally precarious, exploitable migrant labour for enabling key moments of capitalist development. The end of empire was one of these key moments, in which capitalism adapted colonial rule's modes of extraction into 'neocolonial' regimes of aid, debt, and fiscal dependency as well as harnessing immigration and nationality law in the metropole to recalibrate control over labour. Migrant labour, displaced from elsewhere by cycles of poverty and extraction, is economically included in a capitalist economy as a key resource. It is made cheap and highly exploitable by its simultaneous political exclusion from citizenship, welfare state provisions, and labour rights. This double bind leads to an enduring false distinction between skilled and unskilled labour in which migrant labour is racialised as unskilled, and therefore as undeserving of citizenship, labour rights, and welfare. The political exclusion yet economic inclusion of migrant labour racializes certain subjects as inferior and confines them to live in degrading material conditions. My chapter looks at how a certain group of people – Colonial Servants – were marked as expatriates, racialised as white and as superior to exploitable unskilled migrants, and were supported to live in *not* degrading material conditions, but instead with decent pay,

⁷⁴⁵ Anthony Kirk-Greene, 'Decolonization: The Ultimate Diaspora', *Journal of Contemporary History* 36, no. 1 (2001): 133–51.

⁷⁴⁶ Gurminder K. Bhambra, 'Relations of Extraction, Relations of Redistribution: Empire, Nation, and the Construction of the British Welfare State', *The British Journal of Sociology* 73, no. 1 (January 2022): 4–15.

⁷⁴⁷ Gargi Bhattacharyya, *Rethinking Racial Capitalism: Questions of Reproduction and Survival* (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2018), 182.

generous pensions, labour rights, welfare entitlement, housing security and even compensation.

The chapter parses governmental archives for the germination of emerging racial categories and meanings as they recalibrated to resecure the drain of wealth from former colonies to the metropole in small, everyday ways: funding for training courses, rent due on student houses, salaries, pensions and loss of career compensation. By the early 1960s, decolonising states had been tied into legal agreements to pay out approximately £30million to former Colonial Service officers, either as loss of career compensation or generous ‘staying-on’ benefits and salaries. Newly independent states could only meet these compensation payments to British officers by securing loans from Britain.⁷⁴⁸ The chapter therefore argues that during both the training-up stage and the making-redundant stage British Colonial Civil Servants were sorted into racialised categories not simply by the use of racial language but by the differentiated allocation of migration rights, housing, pay, and pensions. This allocation took shape through ad hoc legislation but also through informally established rationales, established ‘in the ordinary course of everyday doing’ as Barbara and Karen Fields would say.⁷⁴⁹ These sorting processes shaped the social construction of whiteness and Britishness, as well as non-whiteness and immigrant-ness.

The first section of the chapter outlines postwar changes to colonial welfare and development in relation to Colonial Service training. It explores how colonial servants were taught to govern and administer colonies and newly independent Commonwealth countries, training primarily based at the Oxford and Cambridge Universities in what were called the Devonshire Courses. The Devonshire Courses trained British and Dominion-born recruits to administer the ‘localisation’ of colonies’ civil services during the transitions towards self-government. The second half of the chapter explores the so-called premature retirement of the UK and Dominion-born Devonshire cohorts at the end of empire, paying attention to the under-researched Overseas Services Resettlement Bureau set up by the Colonial Office. By focussing on themes of training, skilling up and employability these two halves analyse the racializing processes at work in the imagined binary of skilled or unskilled labour. I present these micro-histories of the Colonial Service and its end not to argue the obvious – that institutional racism existed – but to tease out the different racial meanings and practices of racecraft therein, and to follow these through into the nativist politics of Britain’s contemporary mass deportation regime.

⁷⁴⁸ David J. Morgan, *Colonial Development: A Factual Survey of the Origins and History of British Aid to Developing Countries* (Overseas Development Institute, 1964), 64.

⁷⁴⁹ Barbara J. Fields and Karen E. Fields, *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life* (Verso, 2022), 25.

Postwar conditions and the Colonial Service

In 1940 the Colonial Development and Welfare Bill was debated in Westminster. During the 1930s, organised labour unrest in Jamaica and the wider Caribbean had intensified, prompting Royal Commissions and Inquiries that began to reshape the capitalist common-sense of colonial administration. In 1938, Lord Hailey's *African Survey* had diagnosed that Africans were held back by 'poverty, ignorance and tropical pestilence which is beyond their own capacity to alleviate.'⁷⁵⁰ By 1939, Colonial Office officials agreed that there was a consensus across mainstream British politics that the 'colonial inadequacies' of British colonial governments could no longer be ignored.⁷⁵¹ The transformation of colonial policy brought about therein was, of course, primarily shaped by the resistance and refusal of colonised people to colonial rule, as chapter four of this thesis illustrated. It was also eased in by the emerging brand of socialist imperial policy brought to bear by the arrival into the Colonial Office of working-class Labour politicians like Malcolm MacDonald and George Hall.

The outbreak of the Second World War further solidified the need for a new colonial policy of extensively investing in medical, health, education and other social services in colonies. First because Britain depended ever more on the colonies for raw materials, agricultural produce, and troops. Second, because there was a propaganda war to be won against the Axis Powers, who were well placed to foster the 'growing consciousness [of] the native to his comparatively low standard of life.'⁷⁵² There was, at this point, no anticipated end date for empire as a whole, at least as far as Britain's imperial state was concerned. The Colonial Development and Welfare Bill of 1940 was a milestone of sorts. It proposed to empower the Imperial Government to provide recurrent expenditure for ongoing works and services in colonies, representing an 'entirely new' intervention against the long established 'underlying principle' that 'each Colony should get along as best it could on its own resources.'⁷⁵³ Describing the existing situation, which the new Bill would amend, Colonial Secretary Lord Lloyd explained that:—

...in the past [...] if any Colony could not make both ends meet it received a grant in aid; but the grant in aid was given only when it could be clearly shown that the Colony could not pay its way without it. The grant in aid therefore came to bear a distressing resemblance to the "dole", with all that that meant.⁷⁵⁴

By contrast, the 1940 Act would replace the piecemeal provision of these dole-like grants to bankrupt colonial governments with a scheme of recurrent imperial expenditure that would aid 'the development of a sense of financial responsibility' within the colonies as those colonies

⁷⁵⁰ For a detailed discussion of how Lord Hailey and Labour MP Malcolm McDonald shaped a transition to macro-state intervention colonial development, see Joanna Lewis, 'War, Welfare and Women at the Colonial Office', in *Empire State-Building: War & Welfare in Kenya, 1925-52* (Ohio State University Press, 2000), 42 – 48. See also, Lord Hailey, *An African Survey: A Study in Problems Arising in Africa South of the Sahara*, (London: OUP, 1938).

⁷⁵¹ Memorandum 'Colonial Development' enclosed in letter to Sir John Simon from MacDonald, 11 October 1939, TNA, CO859/19/18.

⁷⁵² Lewis, *Empire State-Building*, 45.

⁷⁵³ Lord Lloyd, Colonial Development and Welfare Bill (Second Reading), *HL Debate, 2nd July, 1940 vol 116 c725*.

⁷⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

progressed 'towards eventual self-government'.⁷⁵⁵ The costs of these imperial expenditures on colonies' infrastructures were to be provided half by the British imperial purse, and half by the colonial government of a receiving territory. This equal split, Lord Lloyd explained, was modelled on 'a technique [...] adopted by the Treasury in this country in many grants to local authorities [...] to ensure both economy in execution and the avoidance of what I may call the "dole" mentality'.⁷⁵⁶

The *dole mentality*. The development of a sense of financial responsibility. Colonial economies resembling either a hard-working breadwinner who is financially responsible, striving to provide for and govern himself and his household or, on the other hand, a man on the dole who is idle, unable to socially reproduce himself without help. Here he is, the British imperial state, the patriarch of patriarchs: the *state patriarch* as Gargi Bhattacharyya et al put it.⁷⁵⁷ Functioning to father, provide for, protect and punish the metropole's poor and Britain's colonies alike. Familial thinking in the name of the nation. Over the next thirty years, Britain's postwar welfare state arrives and flounders. Decolonisation gathers momentum and diminishes the empire. Britain enacts restrictive immigration policies which disqualify non-white British imperial subjects from accessing what Nadine El Enany calls 'the spoils of empire': healthcare, housing, basic sustenance for British citizens.⁷⁵⁸

In 1946 the Colonial Service was reconstructed 'to meet probable postwar conditions'.⁷⁵⁹ The Devonshire Committee, comprising Margery Perham of Oxford University and Sir Ralph Furse of the Colonial Office, designed new training courses to prepare Colonial Service recruits to deliver the postwar imperial policy outlined by the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945. Planned for September 1947, the so-called Devonshire Courses would train British and Dominion-born recruits to administer the localisation of colonies' civil services during the transitions towards self-government. In time this localisation would, the committee argued, offer 'opportunities which ["colonial" candidates] have hitherto lacked for obtaining qualifications to enter the higher grades of the Service'.⁷⁶⁰ *Colonial candidates* referred to people born and living in Britain's colonial dependencies, candidates implicitly understood as non-white. Historically, colonial African policy had been to inhibit the development of secondary and higher education since, as Paul Bennell argues, 'the existence of a large stratum of articulate, well-qualified Africans was incompatible with the ideological and economic rationale of British colonialism'.⁷⁶¹ Colonial Office and university officials also

⁷⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁶ Ibid., c726.

⁷⁵⁷ Gargi Bhattacharyya et al, *Empire's Endgame: Racism and the British State* (London: Pluto, 2021), 108.

⁷⁵⁸ Nadine El-Enany, *Bordering Britain: Law, Race and Empire* (Manchester University Press, 2020), 5.

⁷⁵⁹ R.D. Furse, 'Memorandum on Training: 1943', in Anthony Kirk-Greene, *On Crown Service: A History of HM Colonial and Overseas Civil Services, 1837-1997* (I.B.Tauris, 1999).

⁷⁶⁰ Colonial Office, *Organisation of the Colonial Service. (Colonial No. 197)*, (London, 1946), 5.

⁷⁶¹ Paul Bennell, 'The Colonial Legacy of Salary Structures in Anglophone Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 20, no. 1 (March 1982): 131.

increasingly referred to these candidates as *locally recruited*, a choice of language reflecting the postwar sea-change how race, racial equality and racial discrimination were named and framed as the world was reordered by anticolonial movements and decolonisation.⁷⁶² In terms of the Devonshire Courses, 'locally-recruited' candidates for Civil Service in their own countries-of-origin were presumed to be unskilled, requiring skilling-up. They were presumed to be unskilled on account of their country-of-origin, a category masking the existing notion that race and racial difference were biological realities.

On the Devonshire Courses, all cadets (a word used in the original material) had lectures in colonial history, law, economics, colonial administration, anthropology, tropical forestry, Islamic law and language instruction.⁷⁶³ The committee's recommendations, known as the Devonshire Report, outlined the function of the Devonshire Courses in 'teaching [the cadet] where he fits into the general scheme of colonial government' now that the indirect rule system of British district officers and chiefly authorities was to be replaced with elected administrations modelled on English local governments.⁷⁶⁴ All cadets received stipends, half of which was financed by the colonial government to which they would be allocated as 'First Course' graduates or to which they would return if they had been seconded as a 'Second Course' probationer. The second half of the stipend was financed by the Colonial Office from treasury funds of £2.5 million allocated by the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940.⁷⁶⁵ Of funds allocated to the Devonshire Courses, 'one million pounds [was] reserved to enable candidates from the Colonial Dependencies to reach the standard at which they can be considered on equal terms with candidates from this country and the Dominions' and 'the remaining one and a half million [was] available to provide for Dominion and United Kingdom recruits.'⁷⁶⁶

The Devonshire Courses

The proposed courses lasted one academic year and were delivered at the London School of Economics and at Oxford and Cambridge Universities. The initial purpose of the Devonshire Courses was, in the 1948 Committee's words, 'not [to teach] the Colonial Service men to administer, but [to] introduce them to the knowledge that may help to make these men good administrators.'⁷⁶⁷ Devonshire Course students were taught a complex of social facts about citizenship, law, land, and labour. These lessons enmeshed eugenicist thinking and

⁷⁶² Ibid.

⁷⁶³ Sir Henry Moore (Colonial Governor of Ceylon) to Colonial Office, 15 July 1946, TNA, CO 877/30/6.

⁷⁶⁴ Committee for Colonial Studies, 'The Colonial Service Second Course (Report/Review) 1947-1948', 1948, Oxford University Archives, CW 30, 3.

⁷⁶⁵ 'Draft Circular Despatch to all Colonial Governors', 17 June 1946, TNA, CO 877/306.

⁷⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁷ 'Recommendations for the Improvement of the Second Course,' 1948, OUA, CW17.

racecrafted social facts about where human kinship began and ended, about blood, ancestry, and the differences between races of people.

Whether through lectures on soil erosion, African marriage customs or imperial histories of eighteenth-century constitutional change, Devonshire Course students were trained to presume and perpetuate manifold processes of differential exploitation, expropriation and expulsion inherent within colonial administration into the race-making processes required for ensuring continued colonial rule and extraction. These racializing processes were made invisible by the seeming objective reality of race. Race appeared as an *a priori* explanation for cycles of poverty and underdevelopment in British colonies, cycles that were thematised by the Devonshire Courses. In general, colonial development programmes, and the training of cadets to deliver them, presumed that ‘the low standards of living that generally prevail amongst tropical peoples derives from their technical incompetence and economic inefficiency,’ as one 1957 anthropology exam question stated.⁷⁶⁸ These presumptions were self-consciously framed as generalisations: that same exam question continued, ‘examine the validity of this generalisation in light of the evidence from the societies you have studied.’⁷⁶⁹

Moreover, the economics, history, anthropology and government exams at Oxford and Cambridge consistently entangled the ‘relevance of kinship in primitive societies’ with the ‘problems of adapting African customary law to modern conditions.’⁷⁷⁰ Anthropological expertise was believed to equip the Colonial Service officers of the future with detailed understandings of how different African land tenure systems deviated from European norms of familial property and land inheritance.⁷⁷¹ Cadets were trained to relate the specifics of ‘African marriage, in particular polygyny, bride-wealth and exogamy’ to the ‘effect of customary land law on agricultural development.’⁷⁷² The practice of bride-wealth – the paying of a dowry, often in cattle – was considered particularly important for binding together rural African communities as modernity, urbanisation, and cash economies, threatened the decay of old customs.⁷⁷³ The pervasive *Pax Britannica* narrative entrenched perceptions that kinship was integral to the political structure of African societies, in ways that led to so-called feudal, backwards, and despotic family lineages predisposed to ‘endless tribal warfare’ and ‘slave-raiding’ without the British in place to provide stability. As we saw in chapter four, agricultural colonial development schemes involved trying to control land policy as well as the homestead.

⁷⁶⁸ Anthropology exam, 1951, OUA, CW 36.

⁷⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁰ Ibid; Government of Dependent Territories exam [hereafter Government], 1956, Cambridge University Archives [CUA], CDEV 8/9.

⁷⁷¹ ‘What are some of the ways’, asked one Anthropology exam, ‘in which kin relationships are used very much more broadly in some African societies than is customary amongst ourselves?’ Anthropology exam, 1953, OUA, CW 36.

⁷⁷² Anthropology exam, 1952, OUA, CW 36; Colonial History exam, 1952, CUA, CDEV 8/9.

⁷⁷³ For a connected history of the gendered politics of bride-wealth, see Elizabeth Prevost, ‘On Feminists, Functionalists, and Friends: Lobola and the Gender Politics of Imperial Trusteeship in Interwar Britain’, *The Journal of Modern History* 89, no. 3 (September 2017): 562–600.

Understanding how land was lived on, how households subsisted on land, and how extended families shared in the tax burden, settled land disputes, or sent members away to work in towns and mines, was part of the administrative work of maintaining social order through indirect rule's native courts system, as well as resourcing British mining and agricultural companies to grab land and to fold peasants into waged labour.

These kinds of lessons about land, and the form, functionality and size of family units were threaded through with the eugenicist sensibilities traced elsewhere in this thesis. 'The population problems of the colonies' were routinely linked to the divergence between African family forms and the small, European, bourgeois nuclear family.⁷⁷⁴ This divergence was interpreted as deviance, which implicitly linked the demographic notion of 'overpopulation' to eugenic concerns about improper sexual appetites, familial irresponsibility and the improper pace of reproduction threatened by the world's unruly poor. In this way, notions of 'vicious cycles of poverty and stagnation' – routinely paraded as the reasons for imperial intervention and colonial development – could be conceptualised as racial 'facts' about reproduction and respectability, as facts about the innate racial characteristics of a particular group.⁷⁷⁵ By comparing the exam papers of both Oxford and Cambridge, between 1951 and 1968, the emphasis on particular forms of African marriage customs, gender relations and kinship structures as politically and economically amenable to colonial capitalist development becomes apparent. As a vast literature has detailed, some forms of gender relations and kinship structures were much more amenable to the requirements of extractive capitalist development and, in tandem, with political stability in the form of a disunified and suppressed peasant majority.⁷⁷⁶ With these persistent everyday semantic manoeuvres, the Devonshire Course curriculum overwrote the effect of colonial land expropriation in creating the very socioeconomic conditions that could be neatly thematised as overpopulation and 'land pressure.' The exam questions marked out the limits of thinkable, speakable colonial problems, and neatly tucked land expropriation away from discussion.

Allocating accommodation: a process of racialisation

Oxbridge was insisted upon as the ideal location for the Devonshire Courses. Initially, language instruction was undertaken by cadets in the summer term at London's School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) but the London student experience for cadets was soon cited as 'too fragmentary' and 'isolating.'⁷⁷⁷ In contrast, the Devonshire Course authorities

⁷⁷⁴ Economics exam, 1954, OUA, CW 36.

⁷⁷⁵ Anthropology exam, 1958, CUA, CDEV 8/9; Economics exam, 1954, OUA, CW 36.

⁷⁷⁶ For example, see Beverly Grier, 'Pawns, Porters, and Petty Traders: Women in the Transition to Cash Crop Agriculture in Colonial Ghana', *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 17, no. 2 (1992): 304–28.

⁷⁷⁷ 'Colonial Governor Review of the First and Second Devonshire Courses', 1953, TNA, CO 1017/11.

believed Oxbridge campus life could shield locally-recruited officers from the influence of growing anticolonial movements. Margery Perham reported that 'after just a few months of friendly and uninhibited contact with other members of the Course the susceptibilities [...] of the two hostile West Indian students [...] became noticeably less over-developed and they finally departed with their rooted belief in imperialist exploitation just a little shaken.'⁷⁷⁸

With this in mind, language instruction was by the 1950s increasingly offered onsite at Oxbridge, with new lecturers for Swahili, Mende, Hausa, Luganda and Tswana installed at Oxford. Swahili, chi bemba, Cantonese and Nyanja tuition were provided at Cambridge. These administrative decisions spatially and temporally consolidated Colonial Service cadets together into the close spatial quarters and mealtime routines of shared college life amidst the increasing fragmentation of the British Empire signalled by the loss of British India in 1947. In fact, by following the persistent issue of where to accommodate Devonshire Course students across the Devonshire Course archives through the 1940s, '50s, and '60s, accommodation itself offers a framework for tracing the processes of racialisation at work within the university administration of these courses.

The purpose and the target audience of the Devonshire Courses was fast changing as decolonisation gathered pace. Recruitment within the British mainland dwindled amid the increasing job insecurity of a Colonial Service career. In 1954, Her Majesty's Colonial Service itself was renamed Her Majesty's Overseas Civil Service, reflecting the increasing, if uneven and reluctant, Whitehall emphasis on the 'localization' or 'Africanization' of colonial governments. Until the Africanization policy was adopted, the Colonial Civil Service had been designed and maintained as a racially segregated service, with European officers in the Senior branch, and African officers in the Junior Branches.⁷⁷⁹ Accordingly, the Devonshire Courses were slowly adapted to fit what were called 'locally-recruited colonials' sent by soon-to-be independent Commonwealth countries. From 1953 onwards, correspondence between the universities and the Colonial Office turned to the question of rewording Colonial Studies and the Devonshire Courses: one memo mused that 'it is unfortunate that so convenient, and itself so harmless, a word as "colonial" should have become, as it were, encrusted not with its many honourable associations but with a few which were best forgotten.'⁷⁸⁰ In 1955, therefore, the First and Second 'Devonshire Courses for Colonial Service' were renamed *Overseas Service Courses A and B*. Oxford's Institute of Colonial Studies became that of Commonwealth Studies

⁷⁷⁸ Committee for Colonial Studies, 'Colonial Service Second Course Review', 1948, OUA, CW 32, 4.

⁷⁷⁹ But as Paul Bennell writes, 'during the early years of colonial rule in West Africa, educated Africans had not been discriminated against when they applied for high government appointments, and those who displayed outstanding ability stood a good chance of reaching the most senior positions. However, with the triumph of the Imperial Movement under Chamberlain in the mid-1890s, the dogma of the racial superiority of Europeans became firmly established amongst the British 'official classes'.' Paul Bennell, 'The Colonial Legacy of Salary Structures in Anglophone Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 20, no. 1 (March 1982): 129.

⁷⁸⁰ 'Memo on the First Course', n.d., ca 1953-57. OUA, CW 32.

in 1956, and Cambridge's Committee of Colonial Studies was retitled Overseas Studies in 1958.⁷⁸¹

For the university administrators of the Devonshire Courses, the problem of accommodating locally-recruited students and their wives grew as decolonisation gathered momentum. In 1957, a review of living arrangements for the Oxford Course declared that although the accommodation of overseas students within colleges was 'important, the expected increase in numbers of such students might coincide with the "bulge" that [...] would make it very difficult for colleges to offer overseas students rooms in college.'⁷⁸² The review also noted that there were 'good reasons why such a step [towards the] institution of some qualification to these students of administration [...] should not for the present be taken.'⁷⁸³ Reading between the lines, the Oxford accommodation review in 1957 depicted 'batches' of African, Asian and Caribbean cadets whom the colleges resented having to welcome into their communities.⁷⁸⁴

The Courses' managing committee appointed a supervisor 'to arrange lodgings (with the help of the British Council) for students *unable to live in college* and to undertake the moral and disciplinary responsibility [...] to acclimatise students to English manners and customs.'⁷⁸⁵ It was also suggested that the universities should introduce a quota to determine the intake of overseas students. On the training courses, overseas students were 'rarely integrated into College communities' to the extent that 'the old "Club" was felt to be a form of segregation.'⁷⁸⁶ In many ways, then, these proposals replicated notions – intake quotas, moral acclimatisation, bulges, housing shortages, disciplinary supervision and *de facto* segregation – that were simultaneously circulating in official, liberal and anti-immigrant discussions of postcolonial immigration to the British mainland. When it came to accommodating these overseas students, the Oxbridge Courses were mired in the contradictory demands of Britain's postwar technocratic imperial state.⁷⁸⁷ On one hand the course authorities and the Colonial Office needed to market a liberal and non-discriminatory educational environment to postcolonial governments that would balk at the overt institutional segregation of their officers into a

⁷⁸¹ In many ways, the unchanged curriculum of the newly renamed courses demonstrates the 'impossibility for the Colonial Service to adapt successfully to the waning of imperial power.' Chris Jeppesen, "A Worthwhile Career for a Man Who Is Not Entirely Self-Seeking": Service, Duty and the Colonial Service during Decolonization', in *Britain, France and the Decolonization of Africa*, Future Imperfect? (UCL Press, 2017), 154.

⁷⁸² Ibid.

⁷⁸³ 'Memorandum', 27 February 1957, OUA, CW 32, 3.

⁷⁸⁴ 'Overseas Students Under the Committee for Commonwealth Studies: Administrative Arrangements', n.d., OUA, CW 32: 1.

⁷⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁶ This 'Project II: Course on Development', 8 March 1976, CUA, CDEV 5/2. By 1969, student numbers were so low that only the Cambridge Course continued, refurbished as a diploma for 'study fellows' housed and taught together at University College; the provision of a 'special residential unit for overseas officers' was no longer 'highly desirable' as in 1964, but 'essential'. Alternative Accommodation for the Commonwealth Services Club', n.d. ca 1964, OUA, CW 56: 1

⁷⁸⁷ Sabine Clarke, 'A Technocratic Imperial State? The Colonial Office and Scientific Research, 1940–1960', *Twentieth Century British History* 18, no. 4 (1 January 2007): 453–80.

special residential unit. On the other, they sought to minimise the actual integration of these overseas students into university life.

Between 1957 and 1961 the proportion of overseas students enrolled on the Oxford course doubled from 36 to 70 percent.⁷⁸⁸ This short period had witnessed Ghanaian and Malayan Independence in 1957, and that of Nigeria in 1960 and Tanzania in 1961. The latter two countries had enlisted the lion's share of Oxbridge Devonshire Course probationers since 1947. Emblematically, the annual course recruitment evening for Oxbridge undergraduates was cancelled in the year 1960-61 'owing to the uncertainty of the future of the Her Majesty's Overseas Civil Service.'⁷⁸⁹ Soon after, a 1963 governmental review of training in public administration in overseas countries known as *The Bridges Report* recommended that the courses for overseas officers should be highly specialised and made academically rigorous; 'there is probably no experience so stimulating as a period of study and observation in a highly developed country where there can be found a very wide range of institutions and a great variety of expertise and practical wisdom', the report suggested, 'it is therefore very important that the organisation of such training in Britain should be as good as possible.'⁷⁹⁰

In contrast to the pathologies of immigrant families emerging from academic ethnographies and anti-immigrant parliamentary politics in the early 1960s, these overseas students and the independent governments sending them would be fully invested in their return to prestigious positions in their own new nation-states.⁷⁹¹ They would, then, fit Enoch Powell's criteria as *not, and never will be, immigrants*. In the words of a 1968 Cambridge exam, the Oxbridge Course administrators envisaged their overseas students as temporary 'migrants who [intend] to return to their own homes' rather than 'immigrants who want to make their homes here' forever in the UK.⁷⁹² Administrators at both universities worked with the British Council to find private lodgings for overseas students and their dependants. The resulting archive of correspondence reveals the circulation of offhand, racist stereotypes of African, Asian and Caribbean family life carried over from colonial discourse.

In 1970, for instance, students Panchalingam, Cuttaree and Narayanan filed for a rent tribunal against their landlord Michael Short.⁷⁹³ Short had unofficially doubled their rent in order to 'discourage the tenants from introducing further children or perhaps other members of the family into the house at 21 Stockwell Street.'⁷⁹⁴ The landlord complained directly to the

⁷⁸⁸ Rowe, 'Reflections', OUA, CW 14: 210.

⁷⁸⁹ 'Annual Report of the Overseas Studies Committee', 1961, CUA, CDEV 2/22: 4.

⁷⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁷⁹¹ For an important analysis on how ethnographic race relations research was experienced, contested and delegitimated by people racialised as postcolonial immigrants, see Rob Waters, 'Race, Citizenship and "Race Relations" Research in Late-Twentieth-Century Britain', *Twentieth Century British History* 34, no. 3 (1 September 2023): 491–514.

⁷⁹² 'Sociological Aspects of Development', 29 May 1968, CUA, CDEV 8/9.

⁷⁹³ Howell to Lowings, 7 December 1970, CUA, CDEV 5/2.

⁷⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

Cambridge course supervisor Dr Lowings about his tenants, in squarely racist terms. He complained about the students' 'unhygienic misuse of bed linen' and wagered that his 'foreign tenants had clearly taken on a house which was more luxurious than they could afford.'⁷⁹⁵ In his own words, Lowings 'resolved' the dispute by 'telling Mr Cuttaree that probably the best way to handle this is to arrange a meeting between the whole lot on the principle of oriental bargaining, which Mr Cuttaree then had the nerve to call "the British spirit of compromise".'⁷⁹⁶ The Cambridge staff sympathised with the landlord who they considered to have 'handled the matter tactfully in the face of great provocation' and in the context of potential 'colour repercussions which would not be conducive to harmonious race relations in Cambridge.'⁷⁹⁷ Throughout the dispute, staff like Dr Lowings and the landlord operated with a shared sense of white supremacy and worked to re-secure racism's sumptuary codes within both the university and its cityscape.

Barbara and Karen Fields' term racecraft does well to describe the 'moment-to-moment practicality' and the 'ordinary course of everyday doing' that factualised – into lectures, exam questions, and administrative university policies – the human limits of kinship, ancestry, 'stock' and blood through which an objective reality of race was produced and acted upon as an existing social fact.⁷⁹⁸ Race stood in for, stood over, and concealed the processes of differential exploitation, expropriation and expulsion at the heart of interwar and postwar colonial development schemes. As seen in the Devonshire curricula, and in the previous chapter, these development schemes encompassed expropriative adaptations of indigenous land tenure systems, the exploitation of labour from people compulsorily resettled into cash-crop agricultural projects, and multiple forms of expulsion and mobility control. In the context of colonial rule, these were the political, legal, economic, social processes that racialised subjects as deserving or undeserving of degrading material conditions and legal protections.

Clearly these processes were also at work in the British mainland. The exorbitant rental of 21 Stockwell Street in Cambridge is just one tiny case in point: Panchalingam, Cuttaree and Narayanan and their families were prevented from accessing adequate housing onsite in the university: this was an effective form of expulsion. Their landlord, Mr. Short, had unofficially doubled their rent and was readily armed with the power to evict all three families. His power to evict may not have been legal nor survived a rent tribunal, but it seemed coherent enough to Short and Lowings, in the world they recognised, a world built by an 'empire of law' on eviction, enclosure and expropriation of land.⁷⁹⁹ Both the landlord and the university authorities were exploiting Panchalingam, Cuttaree and Narayanan in that both were, whether for

⁷⁹⁵ Michael Short to Dr Lowings, 28 November 1970, CUA, CDEV 5/2: 1.

⁷⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁷⁹⁷ Lowings to Howell, 1 December 1970, CUA, CDEV 5/2: 2.

⁷⁹⁸ Fields and Fields, *Racecraft*, 25.

⁷⁹⁹ The idea of an 'empire of law' is borrowed from Katharina Pistor, *The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality* (Princeton: University Press, 2019). See also Koram, *Uncommon Wealth*, 58.

personal profit in Mr Short's case or to minimise university spending on purpose-built accommodation, making full use of and deriving benefit from a resource, with the three tenants as the resource.

Stepping back from the archival detail, we can see that it is processes of differential exploitation, expropriation and expulsion that produce and remake the supposed reality of racial differences as an explanation for global inequalities entrenched by empire. In the wake of the Holocaust, and during the postwar unfolding of decolonisation, race was increasingly rearticulated through the rubric of national provenance or county-of-origin. The Devonshire Course curricula and its practical administration demonstrated the racecrafted interplay between the racial ordering of nationalities and the discursive appeal of self-determination as the latter defined the grammar of the postwar international order. The next section, exploring the archive of the Overseas Service Resettlement Bureau (OSRB), traces a comparable set of racecraft manoeuvres. Such manoeuvres wove together notions of skilled labour, migrant labour, capitalist productivity, and national/racial kinship, into rationales for resettling colonial servants into their 'premature retirement' in the British mainland upon decolonisation. The arrangements for facilitating the return of these officers to the United Kingdom can help contextualise the rise of nativist politics of welfare and immigration control.

The end of the Colonial Service

Twenty years after the Colonial Development and Welfare Bill of 1940, the Overseas Service Act of 1960 was passed. The act set out to 'encourage those who serve in Her Majesty's Overseas Civil Service [HMOCS] to continue in their work in the territories overseas and at the same time so arrange things that the cost would not be too onerous on the Governments who employ them.'⁸⁰⁰ It empowered the British treasury to subsidize newly independent Commonwealth governments to pay the salaries of HMOCS staff continuing under new terms of service after transfers of power. Crucially, the act also 'divided the cost of [the] compensation' that Commonwealth governments were contractually obliged to pay to HMOCS staff when those officers retired.⁸⁰¹

Nonetheless, the Overseas Service Act of 1960 was framed in British Parliament as a 'vast scheme of technical assistance' which 'put a large expenditure on the British taxpayer', an expenditure to be 'willingly met' by a Britain needing to posture alongside 'the United Nations, [...] the Colombo Plan and [...] the American Aid Programme' in a postwar international arena

⁸⁰⁰ Overseas Service Bill (Second Reading), HL Debate, 14 February 1961, vol 228, cc723.

⁸⁰¹ This principle had been decided in 1954 by *Colonial No. 306*, in which 'Her Majesty's Government undertook that when a territory becomes self-governing pensions and conditions of service would be safeguarded, and compensation would be paid to officers suffering premature retirement.' *HL Debate*, 28 July 1960, vol 225, cc919.

in which ‘thought is increasingly turning towards a basis of technical aid.’⁸⁰² A 1964 textbook on British Overseas Development and technical assistance specified that:–

In nearly every case, expert, training courses and equipment must be of British origin. The only exceptions which come to mind are that some experts supplied to dependent territories under O.S.A.S. happen to be of non-British origin (Australians, Canadians, etc.), and that training at British expense is given in Trinidad in agriculture, in Cyprus in forestry, and at Makerere in Uganda in education (teacher-training).⁸⁰³

Crucially, the large expenditure fronted by the British taxpayer to pay for the ‘premature retirement’ compensation or continued employment of HMOCS staff was more than matched by newly independent governments of former British colonies. The latter were liable for at least three quarters of the total costs of ex-HMOCS salaries, pensions and compensation. Upon independence, countries with economies systematically ‘under-developed’ by British colonialism did not receive financial reparations for damage done and wealth drained.⁸⁰⁴ Instead independent countries received an enormous, contractual bill to compensate the loss of career or continued retention of HMOCS staff who had designed and operated that systematic dispossession.⁸⁰⁵ As Gurminder Bhambra and Julia McClure argue, European colonial powers ‘extracted value and hardwired systems, culture and law to lock colonised countries into debt and fiscal dependency’ during the colonial period, the era of decolonisation and the post-colonial period.⁸⁰⁶

How much was paid out in these so-called premature retirement compensation and staying-on incentives? In the early 1960s, about a quarter of British technical assistance to its colonies and newly independent Commonwealth countries was spent on loss of career compensation payments to retiring HMOCS. Under the Overseas Service Aid Scheme, enacted in 1961, Britain contributed half the cost of compensation payments, and half the cost of the ‘passage costs of officer and his family (including annual visits of school children, and mid-tour concession passages of unaccompanied officers).’⁸⁰⁷ The other half of these costs was to be borne by the colony or independent country served by the retiring or continuing HMOCS officer.⁸⁰⁸ In October 1960 the White Paper on Service with Overseas Government estimated

⁸⁰² Overseas Service Bill (Second Reading), *HC Deb 24 January 1961 vol 633 cc36-107*.

⁸⁰³ Morgan, *Colonial Development*, 51.

⁸⁰⁴ Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (London: Bogle-l’Ouverture, 1972)

⁸⁰⁵ Some former colonies refused to pay these pensions, prompting the creation of the Overseas Pensioners Association in 1960. The OSPA liaised with the British Government to win a “Supplementary Overseas Pension” in the event of a former colony defaulting. In OSPA’s later years, it saw itself acting ‘as a guardian, as far as resources permit, of the good name and reputation of HMOCS [the Colonial/Overseas Service] and its antecedents’, <https://ospa.org.uk/about/objectives-activities>

⁸⁰⁶ Gurminder Bhambra and Julia McClure, *Imperial Inequalities: The Politics of Economic Governance Across European Empires* (Manchester University Press, 2022).

⁸⁰⁷ Morgan, *Colonial Development*, 63.

⁸⁰⁸ The expatriate allowance – justified around the cost of sending children back to England for boarding school – had been established in West Africa in 1947 on the recommendations of the Harragin Report. The Harragin Committee had set out to re-organise the salary scales for the Colonial Civil Services in West Africa, as part of the ‘Africanisation’ policy. Before the Harragin Report changes, the civil service in Africa had been openly racially segregated – a Senior grade of European officers with a separate salary scale, and a Junior grade of African clerks

that these compensation payments would cost the British Government £25-30million over ten years, indicating an equivalent £30million expense for newly independent ex-colonies to pay. These countries could only meet these compensation payments to British officers by securing loans from Britain.⁸⁰⁹ The table below details the other costs incurred through the retiring arrangements for British colonial servants.

<i>Expatriate Costs</i>		<i>Reimbursement</i>	<i>Estimated OSAS cost in the 1964/5 UK Estimates £'000</i>
(i) Expatriate salary allowances (less local tax element)	Full	4,893
(ii) Additional part of pension or contractual gratuity related to (i)	Full	787
(iii) Children's education allowances...	Full	623
(iv) Passage costs of officer and his family (including annual visits of school children, and mid-tour concession passages of unaccompanied officers)...	Half	1,903
(v) Compensation on premature retirement of 'pensionable and permanent' officers...	Half	6,493
(Miscellaneous)	—	(17)
Total		14,716

Source: Colonial Development: A Factual Survey of the Origins and History of British Aid to Developing Countries (London: Overseas Development Institute, 1964), 63.

The arrangements set out by the Overseas Service Aid Scheme were largely modelled on the 'Special List B' scheme trialled in 1957 in Nigeria. In 1956, with Nigerian independence clearly on the near horizon, the Colonial Office had invited Nigeria's two thousand expatriate HMOCS officers the chance to join 'Special List A'.⁸¹⁰ Special List A guaranteed re-deployed employment and pension protection elsewhere in the British Empire. In response, one thousand six hundred of these officers quickly opted to immediately quit and exercise their contractual rights to what the Scheme called 'proportionate pension allowances.'⁸¹¹ The exodus of expatriate officers from Nigeria in 1956 and 1957 prompted a second scheme. Special List B was 'designed to slow down the rate of early retirements by means of improved terms for the payment of lump sum compensation so as to mitigate the financial attraction of immediate retirement.'⁸¹²

Under Special List B, expatriate British officers were offered immediate interest-free advance loans of 90 percent of their 'loss of career' compensation money, which the officers could then invest or use to buy a property in England to later resettle in, after continuing to serve in Nigeria

and staff. For an important analysis of colonial salary scales in relation to economic inequalities in postcolonial Africa, see Paul Bennell, 'The Colonial Legacy of Salary Structures in Anglophone Africa', *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 20, no. 1 (1982): 127–54

⁸⁰⁹ Morgan, *Colonial Development*, 26.

⁸¹⁰ For an overview of Special List A and B, see Kirk-Greene, 'The Transfer of Power and Localization', in *Britain's Imperial Administrators, 1858-1966* (Springer, 2000).

⁸¹¹ This arrangement was first won by Indian Civil Service officers in the 1920s who argued that post-WWI constitutional concessions to Indian nationalist mobilisations had made their working conditions as officials different from the conditions and job roles in which they had initially contracted to serve. For an outline of 'the origin of the pension plus compensation formula', see Hugh Tinker, 'New Lamps for Old', ed. Kenneth Younger, *International Affairs* 36, no. 4 (1960): 489–94.

⁸¹² Kirk-Greene, *Decolonisation – the Ultimate Diaspora*, 2001, 140. See also, Morgan, *Colonial Development*, 27.

through and beyond the country's transition to self-government. These arrangements were the blueprint for the Overseas Service Aid Scheme enacted in 1961, a scheme which also formed an 'occasion for raising and improving expatriate allowances quite considerably', notably in the lavish provision of enhanced Children's education allowances.⁸¹³

In real terms, what did these arrangements mean for the individual HMOCs officer considering his career options in the early 1960s? Here, the memoir of John Ainley, an *Agriculturalist in Tanganyika*, proves instructive. Ainley recounts that:–

Payment was spread over three years which started, in Tanganyika's case, one year after Independence in 1961. The formula was based on current salary, times the years served, plus age. In my case I received some £4,500, a reasonable sum in those days, which I invested in the Stock Market. Some others who I knew put part of their capital in shops, post offices and the then current vogue of laundrettes.⁸¹⁴

Ainley had joined the Colonial Service in 1949 at the age of 23.⁸¹⁵ He had served for 11 years before Tanzanian independence in 1961. He left the service in 1964 at the age of 38. Using this formula, Ainley presumably had an annual salary of around £400 per year. This was lower than equivalent salaries in the UK around the time: in 1958 the Home Civil Service's lowest grade – executive officer – had a salary range of £447 to £1,140.⁸¹⁶ Nonetheless, according to the National Archives' currency converter, the £4,500 compensation that Ainley received in the early 1960s would have been worth £80 – 90,000 in the UK economy of 2017. Generally speaking, in 1960s Britain people earned less but could afford more.⁸¹⁷ Clearly, substantive quantitative research is needed to render the real terms of these kinds of compensation payments, in relation to both the 1960s economy of the metropole, and of the colony, where the money was drained from. But it is worth underlining that colonial servants like Ainley received compensation lump sums to the tune of many, many multiples of their yearly income, and that retiring HMOCs described these sums as 'reasonable', meaning generous.

Ainley, his wife Doreen and their two small children returned to England in 1964. They 'stayed a week in London at an inexpensive small hotel in Cromwell Road', 'collected the new car, a Vauxhall Estate' and then 'head[ed] north to Yorkshire where [they] moved into [their] renovated cottage bought three years ago.'⁸¹⁸ While passing through London on his way to Yorkshire, Ainley 'had an appointment with the Overseas Services Resettlement Bureau, an

⁸¹³ Morgan, *Colonial Development*, 27.

⁸¹⁴ John Ainley, *Pink Stripes and Obedient Servants: An Agriculturalist in Tanganyika* (Leicester: Ulverscroft, 2002), 352.

⁸¹⁵ Stephen Luscombe, 'Review of Pink Stripes and Obedient Servants: An Agriculturalist in Tanganyika', <https://www.britishempire.co.uk/library/pinkstripes.htm>.

⁸¹⁶ 'Civil Servants Pay', HC Debate, 22 March 1960, vol 620, cc209-14.

⁸¹⁷ Translating early 1960s salaries into equivalent incomes today is not straightforward. See Patrick Collinson, 'Oh for the 1960s! People Earned Less but Could Afford More', *The Guardian*, 10 December 2016, sec. Money, <https://www.theguardian.com/money/blog/2016/dec/10/sixties-pay-people-earned-less-but-could-afford-more>.

⁸¹⁸ John Ainley, *Pink Stripes and Obedient Servants*, 350.

organisation set up by Government to, as the title implies, assist overseas civil servants in finding employment.⁸¹⁹

The Overseas Services Resettlement Bureau

The Overseas Services Resettlement Bureau (OSRB) had started life as the Malayan Service Re-employment Bureau which had 'opened in London on 17 June 1957 under the direction of Mr R. L. Peel of the Malayan Civil Service, assisted by Mr A. R. Anderson, OBE, ex-Singapore Police Force.'⁸²⁰ Correspondence between the Colonial Office and the Ministry of Labour show that plans to scale the Malayan Bureau up to serve the widening community of retiring HMOCS officers began in 1958.

The organisation was to be called 'the Overseas "Resettlement" Bureau, *not* "Re-Employment" Bureau.'⁸²¹ To this extent, it 'would advise officers returning to this country on such questions as, for example, buying a house as well as employment and training matters.'⁸²² It would signpost returning HMOCS officers to the appropriate sections of the Ministry of Labour for employment opportunities, co-ordinate candidates to attend pre-existing Business Training courses, and help candidates to write a Curriculum Vitae.⁸²³ In fact, the Bureau was described as 'a sort of "Citizens Advice Bureau"' for officers returning to mainland Britain.⁸²⁴

More generally, the OSRB sought to promote a perception of returning Colonial Service staff as 'high calibre manpower' among potential employers in Britain and elsewhere in the British Commonwealth. In doing so, from a historian's perspective, the Bureau's archives amount to a mess of attempts to mould a particular collective memory of the expertise and progress brought to the British Empire, as it rapidly disintegrated. An early press-release, readied by the OSRB's director, Mr Robert Peel, pronounced that:–

Compulsory retirement, often at an early age, has thus thrown on the labour market a large number of carefully selected and highly trained men who must now seek new jobs. Many of them, by virtue of their administrative ability or technical skill, are well-fitted for entry into the business world. The majority possess special knowledge of African or Asian countries, including very often fluency in their languages and familiarity with their governmental machinery.⁸²⁵

⁸¹⁹ Ibid.

⁸²⁰ As recounted by J. S. A. Lewis, who worked in the OSRB's for eighteen years as its 'No. 1 Deputy Head'. J. S. A. Lewis, Nigel Cooke, and Overseas Pensioner Association, 'The Overseas Services Resettlement Bureau', accessed 15 October 2021, <https://www.britishempire.co.uk/article/osrb.htm>.

⁸²¹ Memo, Miss Hayward to Mr Davies, 6 June 1958, in 'Employment Exchange Service, Including the Professional and Executive Register: OSRB; Assistance in the Resettlement of Colonial Civil Servants Returning to the United Kingdom' (1957 - 1960), TNA, LAB 8/2357.

⁸²² Ibid.

⁸²³ Ibid.

⁸²⁴ Secret and Confidential Letter, P.G. Cartland (Office of the Governor, Uganda) to Phillip Rogers (Colonial Office), 19 July 1961, ES. 8292/2, in 'Proposed Visit of Director to East Africa' (1961), TNA, CO 1017/677.

⁸²⁵ Undated Pamphlet titled 'The Overseas Services Resettlement Bureau,' in 'Extension of Activity to Cater for Displaced Officers from East African Organisations' (1960 - 1962), TNA, CO 1017/675.

A large part of the Bureau's archived activities relates to the appointment of a succession of successful British businessmen and establishment figures as 'part-time advisors on employment in industry', leading to the formation of an 'advisory council of businessmen' in 1963. The council included, some part-time salaried and some voluntary, retired Colonial Governors and retired British Army seniors with senior positions and close connections to Shell Brunei (Sir Anthony Abell), the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (Sir Humphrey Gale) and the British Aircraft Company (Sir Reginald Verdon), the predecessor to contemporary British arms manufacturing giant B.A.E. Systems.⁸²⁶ The initiatives to resettle HMOCS officers in Britain implicitly understood Britain in its imperial sense: as both the British mainland and the fast-becoming-former British Empire. Despite decolonisation, and the imposition of racially ordered immigration restrictions in the British mainland, HMOCS officers were still presumed to have freedom of movement to live, work, settle and do business all over the world. In this respect, the OSRB made use of the Board of Trade's existing network of Senior Trade Commissioners in Britain's remaining and ex-colonies. These commissioners were asked to let 'their local contacts know, as the occasion arises, of the existence of the Bureau and its function' but were 'not expected to push the employment of ex-Colonial government officers especially where this may endanger relations with the indigenous business leaders.'⁸²⁷

From the outset, the Bureau's staff insisted that retiring HMOCS staff returning to Britain would and should be treated on a par with ex-Regulars, men demobilised from Britain's wartime military forces. By the late 1950s, British military policy had changed and the Regular Forces Resettlement Service had been established to empty out the war-enlarged ranks of senior military officers. Meanwhile, the OSRB itself and its director Mr Peel had been shaped by what officials called the Malayan Emergency, a decade-long war against anti-colonial insurgents. It is perhaps unsurprising that Peel and his colleagues presumed that all ex-HMOCS staff would be treated with the patriotic gratitude and reverence duly given to ex-Regulars in the long decade after the Second World War. The Ministry of Labour however, presumed no such parity between ex-HMOCS and ex-Regulars. A picture emerges from Ministry of Labour correspondence of ex-HMOCS as 'another class who are really quite different [from the ex-Regulars] but for whom, admittedly, the Government has equal responsibility.'⁸²⁸ A particularly sore point for the Bureau lay in securing for ex-HMOCS staff the same age concessions granted to ex-Regulars attempting to enter the Home Civil Service through its competitive entry exams. In response to repeated complaints from the OSRB asking for further

⁸²⁶ 'Employment Exchange Service', TNA, LAB 8/2357; 'Creation of an Advisory Council of Businessmen' (1962 - 1964), TNA, OD 8/120; 'OSRB: Membership of Sir Reginald Verdon Smith' (1 January 1968), TNA, OD 8/433.

⁸²⁷ 'Notice to Trade Commissioners', NTC/1/61, signed G. Lanchin, May 1961, in 'Extension of Activity', TNA, CO 1017/675.

⁸²⁸ On 12 February 1959, Mr Maston of the Ministry of Labour noted that 'it would hardly be appropriate because of their success in dealing with ex-Regulars, to ask them to take over responsibility for dealing with another class who are really quite different but for whom, admittedly, the Government has equal responsibility. I do not think the Resettlement Committees would welcome this additional task.' 'Employment Exchange Service', TNA, LAB 8/2357.

concessions for HMOCS men, Seddon of the Civil Service Commission replied curtly that 'the definition of the field is in line with that for ex-Regulars, with whom as you know the ex-O.C.S. [HMOCS] arrangements have been linked since their introduction in 1957.'⁸²⁹

Starting salaries formed another battleground between the Bureau and its increasingly derisive combatants in the Ministry of Labour, the Treasury, the Foreign Office and the Civil Service Commission. The OSRB complained that 'candidates who are made eligible for competitions are frightened away from them by the prospect of having to live for some years on salaries which, even with the addition of colonial pensions, are insufficient to support the responsibilities of middle-age.'⁸³⁰ Age, gender and sexuality loomed large in the Bureau's invocation of 'the responsibilities of middle-age', a middle-age implicitly imagined as the middle-class Englishman, as breadwinner, as patriarch, as the self-governing head of his own, orderly household, a household requiring neither poor relief nor policing. But the Civil Service Commission could only 'deal sympathetically with those whose jobs are folding up [...] within certain limits' because 'anyone entering the Overseas Civil Service since the war has known that in all probability he would be working himself out of a job.'⁸³¹ The Commission's institutional distrust towards the demands of the Bureau was palpably clear. Moreover, their derision reflected the tensions between the meritocratic aspirations of Whitehall and the century-old stereotypes of self-serving, corrupt East India Company officials that had animated late seventeenth century debates about imperial government, discussed in chapter two. In 1962, the Commission's internal correspondence continued:—

Whatever concessions we make must be subject to maintaining our standards of recruitment and being fair to all candidates, and in all this pressure there is just a suspicion that these people should be given sheltered passages. Before long we shall be expected to provide them with *punkah wallahs* in the summer months in Whitehall.⁸³²

On top of these starting salary complaints, successive directors of the OSRB advocated that the 'written exam element' should be scrapped entirely for ex-Colonial Servants.⁸³³ Internal correspondence at the Civil Service Commission reveals the scorn such requests engendered in the 'Staff Side' circles of the British Civil Service; one memo read 'the sort of HMOCS and ex-regular who fights shy of this sort of examination is not likely to settle down well in the Executive Class where no new recruits whatever age and experience has any right to expect that he will be spared of the more humdrum duties.'⁸³⁴

⁸²⁹ Letter from Seddon (Civil Service Commission) to Sweaney (Department of Technical Cooperation), 14 December 1962, in 'Proposals for Improved Concessions for HM Overseas Civil Service Candidates at Civil Service Competitions' (1962 - 1969), TNA, CSC 5/1396.

⁸³⁰ 'Civil Service Commission Competitions for former Members of HMOCS: Points for discussion', compiled by Johnston, Director of OSRB, in 'Proposals for Improved Concessions', TNA, CSC 5/1396.

⁸³¹ Untitled memo, 28th November 1962, Ibid.

⁸³² Ibid.

⁸³³ Ibid.

⁸³⁴ Ibid.

As well as appearing a bad fit – in terms of ‘age’, ‘experience’ and ‘not settling down well’ attitude – for recruitment into the Home Civil Service, a wider picture emerges of ex-HMOCS candidates as unskilled for almost every kind of job previously earmarked by the initial White Paper on *The Future of the Overseas Services* in 1960, and since pursued by the staff of the OSRB. Were HMOCS officers well-positioned for jobs in international organisations, such as the United Nations? Quite simply, no. ‘Quite often,’ noted one Colonial Office official to his senior, ‘overseas officers have not got the right experience for UN Jobs and often they have not the language qualifications required for field postings.’⁸³⁵ Neither would ‘UK nationals, particularly if they are labelled ex-overseas officers, [...] necessarily be acceptable to [newly independent] governments’ as overseas experts and consultants.⁸³⁶ Importantly, Colonial Office officials were themselves doubtful about the viability of retiring Colonial Service men’s skills. ‘Except for some specialists who can sell their skills in any market,’ began Mr. Hobden, ‘most people in the Colonial Service have become pretty specialised and their specialised knowledge is not always appropriate to conditions in the United Kingdom.’⁸³⁷ Hobden pointed to policemen, administrative officers, and scientific or professional staff, and noted that all three categories of HMOCS had tended to ‘fall out of touch with current developments in their own fields’, making them all far less employable for similar jobs in the United Kingdom.⁸³⁸

Indeed, as the 1960s wore on, OSRB meeting minutes reveal the emergence of what the Bureau called a ‘hard core’ of ‘clients who had been on the books for years and who were not endeavouring to help themselves.’⁸³⁹ This ‘hard core’ were blighting the Bureau’s metrics for its successful rehabilitations of ex-HMOCS into British and overseas job markets.⁸⁴⁰ In particular the ‘desirability of obtaining suitable posts in the Police Service for ex-colonial Police officers’ remained a consistent concern for the Bureau, a difficult task ‘in view of the low rates of pay which were offered’ for policing the British mainland.⁸⁴¹ Meanwhile, despite the OSRB’s grand intentions, soon enough the OSRB was strongly associated – within the milieu of British business – with ‘the least enterprising people’ of the ex-Colonial Service. At a party given by the OSRB in July 1961, a Colonial Office official Mr Dudley was told by ‘the Constain man’ – Constain is a British construction and engineering company established in 1865 – who was himself formerly a member of the Colonial Service in West Africa, that ‘although [Constain] had taken on a certain number of ex-Colonial Service people in recent years they did not like

⁸³⁵ Ibid.

⁸³⁶ Memo by R. H. Hobden, 23 December 1960, in ‘Extension of Activity to Cater for Displaced Officers from East African Organisations’ (1960 – 1962), TNA, CO 1017/675.

⁸³⁷ Cartland to Rogers, 19 July 1961, in ‘Proposed Visit of Director to East Africa’, TNA, CO 1017/677.

⁸³⁸ Ibid.

⁸³⁹ ‘Extension of Activity to Cater for Displaced Officers’, TNA, CO 1017/675.

⁸⁴⁰ ‘Advisory Council on the OSRB, Minutes of the 8th Meeting held on 15th November 1966’, in ‘OSRB Advisory Council; Agenda and Minutes’ (1964 -1966), TNA, OD 8/285.

⁸⁴¹ Ibid.

to take them from the official Bureau, because they thought that only the least enterprising people sought employment in this way.⁸⁴²

In many ways, then, it seems that the only 'skilled labour' that HMOCS officers actually possessed consisted of what Peel's first press release had called 'experience in the instruction of indigenous staff.'⁸⁴³ Just as we saw in the initial Devonshire Courses, which set out 'not to teach men to administer, but to introduce them to the knowledge that may help to make these men good administrators', what Peel called *experience in the instruction of indigenous staff* was the outcome of informally institutionalised training – in sumptuary codes and so-called character-building – that in practice could only accrue to middle and upper class white British people.⁸⁴⁴

There is no better microcosm of all this than the employment of the OSRB's Director, Mr Peel himself. Peel was endlessly frustrated with his own salary, his professional standing and even the furnishings of the Bureau's offices in Whitehall. Particularly notable is the frustration of every other government official who had to deal with this unlikable character. 'In February 1960,' one Colonial Office official bristled, 'Mr Peel sent us a progress report (copy attached at Appendix I) which, in the Department's view was unsuitable for distribution.'⁸⁴⁵ Dealing with Mr. Peel was compared to 'flogging a dead horse.'⁸⁴⁶ He had 'a habit of reopening matters which have already been considered exhaustively and settled in consultation with him'; he frequently 'went outside his terms of reference by writing direct to the Secretary of State suggesting that the Prime Minister might mention the Bureau in a forthcoming speech in terms which were quite unsuitable'; he took his complaints about the 'actual offices of the Bureau [being] very dingy' directly to establishment figures like Sir J. Rankine rather than to his Colonial Office superiors; and he was obsessively 'preoccupied with the question of his own status', loudly expressing 'dissatisfaction at being shown as a temporary administrative officer in the Imperial Calendar' and insisting that in the next edition, his salary would 'not be shewn and [...] the letters "i.d.c." will be added after his name.'⁸⁴⁷ He was, in short, 'not as co-operative with the Colonial Office as would ordinarily be expected.'⁸⁴⁸

However banal, these tensions and internal social hierarchies between the overseas colonial sections and the metropolitan Whitehall-based sections of the British imperial state are important. Noting these tensions and divisions helps to denaturalise the monolithic and

⁸⁴² 'The OSRB Publicity Policy', in letter from A. A. Dudley to Mr. Rogers, 16 October 1961, in 'Publicity Policy and Progress Reports' (1961 - 1961), TNA, OD 8/115.

⁸⁴³ Ibid.

⁸⁴⁴ 'Recommendations for the Improvement of the Second Course,' 1948, OUA, CW17.

⁸⁴⁵ 'Visit by Sir Hilton Poynton' (1960), TNA, CO 1017/673.

⁸⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁴⁷ Ibid. Although these letters and their prestige clearly meant a lot to Peel, I do not know what they spell out.

⁸⁴⁸ Ibid.

abstract appearance of the state, rendering state power instead as a contingent assemblage of shifting and often contradictory interests and priorities.

Defining eligibility: a process of racialisation

The semantics of return and origin loomed large throughout the drafting, and implementation, of the Overseas Service Aid Scheme. The OSRB, the Colonial Office, colonial governors overseas, and other Whitehall departments weighed in on how to define the eligibility of which colonial government staff could be designated HMOCS. The aim of the game was to create a criteria that would exclude the majority non-white staff of British colonial governments from the generous compensation, pension and resettlement initiatives created for white British expatriate officers.⁸⁴⁹ The inordinate care taken over this question materialised a huge volume of correspondence. Tracing the ad hoc making of this eligibility criteria through the archives allows us to unpack processes of racialisation therein.

From the OSRB's earliest beginnings, its constituency had been framed around 'officers returning to this country.'⁸⁵⁰ *This country* implicitly referred to the British mainland: a Britain being remade into the United Kingdom. *Officers returning to this country*, were presumed to be 'of UK-origin', and as a draft answer to a parliamentary question framed it, 'no difficulties are anticipated in respect of designated officers who are in the main of U.K. origin and are eligible to use the facilities of the Overseas Resettlement Bureau.'⁸⁵¹ 'However,' the officer continued:—

...in respect of non-designated overseas officers the position is more uncertain as it is impossible to estimate with accuracy how many of these officers will seek to enter Britain when the time comes for them to retire. It is thought that out of the 2000 non-designated officers in Kenya, 200 might wish to do so; 150 of these would be European of U.K. origin and the balance Asian.⁸⁵²

Moreover, eligibility was devised so that those from the Old Dominions would fit into the category of those 'of U.K. origin'. An official textbook from the time confirmed that 'some officers who had been recruited for the Colonial Services from, for example, Australia and New Zealand, under the Commonwealth Recruitment Scheme (started in the 1920s) were eligible for inclusion, though such eligibility does not apply to *new recruitment for independent*

⁸⁴⁹ The assumed correlation between white Britishness and a supported welcome home to the British mainland had appeared in earlier episodes. Firstly, in the aftermath of the Irish Free State's creation in 1922, when Southern Irish Protestants had "returned home" to England. Secondly, after the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947, when the majority of the Anglo-Indian population migrated to live in mainland Britain, many for the first time in generations. Niamh Dillon, *Homeward Bound: Return Migration from Ireland and India at the End of the British Empire* (NYU Press, 2022).

⁸⁵⁰ Miss Hayward to Mr Davies, 6 June 1958, in 'Employment Exchange Service', TNA, LAB 8/2357.

⁸⁵¹ Letter from the Officer Administering the Government of Kenya to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 9 January 1963, enclosed with 'Parliamentary Question - Retirement of designated and non-designated officers' in 'Eligibility of Officers for Registration' (196- 1963), TNA, OD 8/117.

⁸⁵² *Ibid.*

countries.⁸⁵³ White people born in the commonwealth were treated as returning, whereas people of colour born in the Commonwealth were not. Distinguishing who counted as an HMOCS officer and who did not became a way of talking about race without mentioning it. Importantly, this eligibility dilemma itself stemmed from officials' and departments' unquestioned commitments to preventing non-white British subjects from immigrating into the United Kingdom. Finicky queries around OSRB eligibility were unfolding in precisely the same time in which the British Cabinet, the Home Office, Colonial Office, and Commonwealth Relations Office were, from at least 1955 onwards, pulling what would become the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act. In short, officials tried to define eligibility in a way that could prevent non-white British colonial government staff from freely repatriating themselves to the UK as HMOCS.

Yet as the empire rapidly disintegrated, distinctions between expatriates and natives, and between natives and immigrants, were becoming uneven, messy, and full of contradictions. Moreover, even if race was now unspeakable in official reasoning and the letter of the law, officials still harboured 'marrow-deep certainty that racial differences [were] real and consequential', and used 'the busy repertoire of strange manoeuvring that we call racecraft' to launder racial categories through on one hand, the economic category of skilled or unskilled work, and on the other hand, through nationality and country-of-origin.⁸⁵⁴

As soon as an eligibility criteria emerged with the Overseas Service Aid Scheme, colonial governors and High Commissioners of colonies and ex-colonies with white settler populations complained to the Colonial Office. The majority of complaints thematised the unfair exclusion of high-ranking European employees of the Colonial Railway Corporations and the Imperial Cocoa corporations, institutions which straddled the blurry line between the colonial state and British businesses. The case-by-case complaints that streamed into the Colonial Office demonstrated the wholly mercantile nature of colonial state formation. White-settlers of so-called UK origin who had been recruited to their jobs directly in a colony rather than through the Colonial Office or the British Crown Agents, were by the letter of the law, *locally recruited* rather than *expatriates*. Therefore, on paper, these white-settlers were not eligible for the generous HMOCS retirement packages. As Mr. Peel pointed out to his colleagues at the Colonial Office, this raised the question of whether a 'number of people who are not members of HMOCS and who may not even be Public Servants but who consider themselves forced to return to the United Kingdom' as people who 'may well warrant sympathetic and helpful treatment from HMG in the matter of resettlement.'⁸⁵⁵ It was the context of Kenya, where the

⁸⁵³ Morgan, *Colonial Development: A Factual Survey*, 63.

⁸⁵⁴ Fields and Fields, *Racecraft*, 16.

⁸⁵⁵ Note from Hobden to Sweaney, 6 January 1961, 'Eligibility of Officers for Registration' (1960-1961), TNA, CO 1017/676.

loudest complaints and queries of this kind erupted.⁸⁵⁶ The 'particular case of one Mr. Vanni' proved particularly illustrative of how whiteness and Britishness were being queried by the contradictions at play.

Mr. Vanni was an Italian citizen. Mr. Hobden at the Colonial Office had 'established that he is a member of HMOCS', probably recruited to a position in the Kenyan Colonial Government within Kenya, rather than through the Colonial Office in London. On this basis, although Hobden was 'not sure that [Vanni] has ever been to the United Kingdom it would seem that he is eligible for registration with the Bureau' according to the existing terms of reference.⁸⁵⁷ But this directly contradicted the memo set out in 1959 by Mr. Sweaney, Head of the Overseas Service A Department, who had defined the OSRB as 'set up and organised to help the resettlement of returned UK people, *not immigrant local people from overseas*' and who had emphasised that 'the Bureau's contacts with employers have been on the basis that the people for whom they are acting are *U.K. people*.'⁸⁵⁸ Peel, meanwhile, emphasised to his Colonial Office managers that he found himself 'anxious to avoid claims from other Officers *recruited locally* for instance in Kenya, who will feel, as British subjects, that they have a better claim to our services than an Italian subject.'⁸⁵⁹

The 'particular case of one Mr Vanni' began a process of defining and redefining who counted as a genuine expatriate in the particular context of Kenya. This was openly discussed by the Colonial Secretary when he presented the Overseas Service Aid Bill to Parliament in 1961. In Kenya, Iain McLeod explained, there were:—

...a considerable number of people who are not, according to the definition, genuine expatriates and, therefore, would not qualify under HMOCS because, in a sense, they are Kenyans, instead of people who have come from this country, and would therefore be excluded from the benefits of this scheme. We have been trying to find a way round this difficulty, and I think that we have succeeded.⁸⁶⁰

The 'way round this difficulty' was called the Overseas Service (Kenya) Agreement, 1961. It created a procedure through which a Secretary of State in the service of the Government of Kenya could decide, using his discretion, that certain officers counted as designated officers on a case-by-case basis. 'The test is whether a man is designated by me with the agreement of the Treasury—not necessarily the country-of-origin', McLeod explained during the Bill's Second Reading.⁸⁶¹ The agreement was worded to ensure that people from East Africa – encompassing Africans but also Asians who had migrated to East Africa – could not be

⁸⁵⁶ For a very recent similar discussion of colonial service and expatriate status in Kenya, see Sarah Kunz, 'From Colonial Civil Servant to Expatriate at the Eve of Kenyan Independence', in *Expatriate* (Manchester University Press, 2023), 49–88.

⁸⁵⁷ Note to Mr. Sweaney, TNA, CO 1017/676.

⁸⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, emphasis added.

⁸⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶⁰ Iain McLeod, Overseas Service Bill (Second Reading), HC Deb, 24 January 1961, vol 633, c40.

⁸⁶¹ *Ibid.*

categorised either as designated officers or HMOCS officers, barring them from using OSRB services to resettle in the U.K.⁸⁶²

The traces of cases that emerge from the OSRB's correspondence demonstrate that the discretionary inclusion of certain officers into the Overseas Service Aid Scheme and for OSRB support depended upon differential processes of exploitation, expropriation and expulsion: processes of racialisation. Certain portions of colonial state personnel – portions racialised as white – were distinguished as *not* deserving exploitative wages (wages or compensation for lost UK-equivalent wages were topped up by the British Government), as *not* deserving of expropriation (OSRB candidates were helped with advice and handsome retirement packages towards buying a house in mainland Britain), and as *not* deserving any kind of expulsion (OSRB candidates were instead welcomed to resettle in mainland Britain, or in fact elsewhere in the remaining colonies of the British Empire.) Eventually, eligibility as a member of HMOCS was defined in relation to expatriate status, delineated by the home-leave arrangements and children's educational allowances written into an officer's initial contract.

Conclusion

Repatriation was Enoch Powell's preferred word for deportation. This chapter has examined repatriation not as the expulsion of foreigners from the British mainland, but instead as the repatriation of white British colonial servants – called 'UK people' in OSRB archives – to either the British mainland or elsewhere in the Commonwealth. It has pieced together a genealogy of welfare nativism, through which racist ideas about welfare entitlement and non-entitlement serve as rationales for maintaining and expanding Britain's mass deportation regime. I have dug into wider institutional histories around the end, and the beginning of the end, of Britain's Colonial Service. The chapter has drawn out a racial sensibility shared by Enoch Powell as well as the wider interwar generation, networks of influence and institutions he was part of.

During empire, economic processes of exploitation, expropriation and expulsion rendered racial difference through delineating certain groups of people as deserving or undeserving of labour protections, property rights, degrading living conditions, and legal-political rights of citizenship. During decolonisation, economic processes of exploitation, expropriation and

⁸⁶² The agreement read: '...who, if he came to East Africa for the purpose of taking up or obtaining employment or in the course of his employment, had not previously been in East Africa except for transient purposes and who was subsequently selected or recruited in East Africa for the service of the Government of Kenya, being so selected or recruited in the following circumstance, that is to say - (i) he was so selected or recruited within three years of his arrival in east Africa for the purpose or in the circumstance aforesaid; or (ii) he, having been in east Africa for a period exceeding three years before entering the service of the Government of Kenya, and having been employed during that period, was entitled under the conditions of such employment to financial assistance in respect of periodical leave of absence outside East Africa.' 'Eligibility of Officers for Registration', TNA, CO 1017/676.

expulsion harnessed by colonial states to drain wealth from colonies to imperial Britain were extended from the colonial setting to the arena of immigration control. Decolonization was, as Ian Sanjay Patel writes, 'not so much a choice as an adaptation to changing international realities, norms and values, most immediately at the level of racial equality, self-determination and anti-colonialism.'⁸⁶³ In the face of mounting international laws and diplomatic sensitivities outlawing racial discrimination, complicated and contradictory policymaking and initiatives were required to normalise, legalise, and make legible the entitlement of white Overseas Civil Servants to freely move, work, settle, resettle, and enjoy the spoils of empire while nonetheless practically limiting the same opportunities for non-white overseas civil servants. The ad hoc messiness explored in my material register a world in transition, a messy transition that today remains incomplete and ongoing.

Colonial development and welfare, like the rest of colonialism, were economic exercises, not a humanitarian undertaking. Although the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act had permitted the metropole to start directly funding expenditures in colonies, the notion that colonies should not be a burden on the imperial purse held strong throughout and beyond the end of empire. Decisions were, as much as possible, made to funnel wealth back to Britain. Barbara and Karen Fields argue that 'if [racist concepts] were merely an appendage of politics and economics, without intimate roots in other phases of life, their persuasiveness would accordingly diminish.'⁸⁶⁴ Accordingly, the enduring dictum that colonies should pay for themselves was intimately rooted into the scale of everyday social life through anxieties about the *dole mentality* as a dysgenic condition threatening not only individuals but entire territories.

The dictum that colonies should pay for themselves led to ex-colonies receiving an enormous bill to pay the premature retirement compensation and pensions to expatriate administrators. This £30million compensation bill, largely under-researched, stands in stark contrast to continuing anticolonial demands calls for reparations to be paid by former imperial powers to ex-colonies. The other half of the compensation and pension packages were paid for by Britain's Treasury. Although these spends were framed in Parliament as benevolent gifts of foreign aid, these spends were doubly generative for British capital. Firstly, the Overseas Service Aid Scheme would entreat ex-colonies to re-employ British Colonial Service personnel as experts and consultants for their programs of reform and development, thus keeping British mercantile relationships and trade opportunities at the centre of British ex-colonies' economies. Secondly, any spending on retiring HMOCS pensions would quickly trickle back into the UK economy, as those retiring officers returned.

⁸⁶³ Ibid.

⁸⁶⁴ Fields and Fields, *Racecraft*, 11.

More to the point, notions of the *dole mentality* and its mirror opposite – the patriarch who properly governs his own household – were integral parts of the ordinary racial sensibility through which Anglo-Saxon stock, English heredity and white Britishness were imagined and acted upon. Both notions could describe a family, or an entire colony. Devonshire Courses taught cadets to distinguish between various kinship, lineage and marriage arrangements to better administrate expropriative land policies and leverage political pressure points. Students Panchalingam, Cuttaree and Narayanan were treated by their extortionate landlord and their mocking university tutors as improper patriarchs, improper for sharing and overcrowding a household, and also for seeking Dr Lowing's assistance to protect their wives and children against imminent eviction. At the end of empire, the staff of the OSRB advocated for retired Colonial Servants to be given easier entrance to senior Home Civil Service positions and salaries reflecting their middle-age maturity and familial responsibilities. In each of these examples, the family operated as the basic unit through which state power and capitalist processes were not only organised but also made coherent and familiar. All in all, as many migration scholars argue, the family is where the border is made.

Enoch Powell's vision of social and political order and the proper pace of – demographic – change, holds not only 'more than a passing resemblance to the nativist resurgence which has spread across Britain and much of the world over the past decade': it also resembles the rationales, beliefs and values institutionalised within the Colonial Service and its circles of influence long before Powell's 'Rivers of Blood' moment.⁸⁶⁵ The 'practice of a double standard based on ancestry', which is to say, the practice of racism as defined by the Fields' sisters, is writ large across the banal exchanges and moments of these two tiny histories. Powell's incendiary speech thematised the 'constant flow not only of remittances amounting to many millions of pounds a year, but of [...] annual holiday[s] "back home" in the West Indies or in India or Pakistan' in ways that presented New Commonwealth immigration as the theft and fraudulence of the British mainland's scarce resources by decidedly un-British subjects with *back homes* elsewhere. But as we have seen in this chapter, throughout the 1950s and 1960s Colonial Civil Servants themselves, the British state and British imperialist enterprise more generally were busy funnelling a 'constant flow of remittances' and revamping empire's existing structures for extracting wealth for the neocolonial era: all amounting to untold millions more than those demonised by Powell, as well as taking plenty of 'annual holidays back home.'

Meanwhile, Powell's speech proposed that 'permanent settlement of population' be replaced with 'the temporary, albeit often long-term, intake of labour' to implement racial capitalism's fundamental logic whereby migrant labour is made cheap and highly exploitable by its simultaneous political exclusion from citizenship, welfare state provisions, and labour rights.⁸⁶⁶

⁸⁶⁵ Koram, *Uncommon Wealth*, 227.

⁸⁶⁶ Powell, *Rivers of Blood Speech*, 1968.

In the same decade, as we have seen, UK-born colonial servants were legally and financially distinguished as 'native inhabitants of this country', distinct from their non-white colleagues in Britain's former colonies, who, as the Stockwell Road incident shows, were in fact treated as 'immigrants' even if by Powell's definition 'they [were] not, and never will be immigrants.'⁸⁶⁷ These UK-born employees were delineated as 'native inhabitants of this country' by using the children in private schools back in England as evidence of expatriate status as 'temporary, albeit often long-term workers'.⁸⁶⁸ These workers were not exploited, were paid well, enjoyed labour protections and welfare state entitlements. They not only retained existing rights as British subject, they also prompted the legislating of new rights and entitlements.

By looking comparatively at the postwar migration of white and not white overseas civil servants in both the training up stage and the making redundant stage, we have toggled between the intimate, everyday scale of different individuals and the macro-scale of empire-wide policy changes. Colonial development and welfare became technical assistance and international aid. The 'localisation' of colonies' civil services became all-out transfers of sovereignty. Colonialism became neocolonialism in the former colonies, and welfare nativism-come-neoliberalism in the metropolises. At both the macro and the micro level, then, systemic economic inequalities were reproduced and adapted through racecrafted social facts about skilled work, technical competence, the respectable family, and about history itself.

⁸⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁶⁸ Ibid.

Conclusion

Harmondsworth opened in early 1970. Its construction materialised the making of Britain's mass deportation regime. Making, materialising and constructing are words many of us use to describe societal processes through which intangible things happen and come to exist. To make something is to create something, often out of other things. To materialise something sounds a little magic, conjuring up something out of nothing, the opposite of vanishing into thin air. To construct something is to build something, presumedly with plans, with an understanding of gravity and physics, and a team. What was involved in the making of Britain's mass deportation regime? Who was involved in its making? Did it suddenly exist, fully-formed and ready to go? Was it carefully prepared for, the master plan of a genius, evil or heroic? Or was it hastily assembled, without planning permission, pieced together out of odds and ends?

Harmondsworth's material existence as an actual set of buildings after 1970 became part of the mental terrain and political landscape in which Home Office officials rationalised and then materialised the expansion of deportation and detention contained within the 1971 Immigration Act. The hostel at Harmondsworth was not the singular causal factor, the trigger, or tipping point that crystallised the making of Britain's mass deportation regime. Its coming into existence, however, did something more active than simply reflecting developing capacities and infrastructures for deporting immigrants from Britain. Both the plans to open Harmondsworth, from 1968 onwards, and the drafting of the Immigration Bill, in 1970, were overseen and managed by W.J. Bohan of B2 division in correspondence with John Pakenham-Walsh, one of the Legal Advisors to the Home Office. Once a material site existed where immigrant families awaiting appeals could be detained away from criminals in police stations, prisons and remand homes, it became easier for the officials drafting the 1970 Immigration Bill to conceive of the deportation of entire families, finding ways to satisfy Enoch Powell's persistent letters.

Harmondsworth was a bridgehead, a strategic first base. It made expanding and taking further control possible. At the same time, it was also part of an existing genre – of colonial lock-ups, hostels, barracks – that officials could already write, read, and dream in. However much Harmondsworth altered the story of empire – or better put, the story of imperial and Commonwealth citizenship – the genre made that changing story seem familiar, coherent, and time-tested. This was a genre of binaries, categorising groups of people as either citizens or non-citizens, eugenic or dysgenic, respectable or disrespectable, deserving or undeserving. These binaries dilated in and out of every scale at which empire was imagined and acted upon: from entire colonial territories figured as dole-scroungers, to the intimacies of latrine maintenance and crop rotation distinguishing 'good farmers' from slum-dwellers in the Anchau

Scheme, via the shifting respectability politics, internal hierarchies and sumptuary codes at work within the Civil Service itself.

In other words, once Harmondsworth was a concrete reality, there was capacity – a 44 bed capacity – to rationalise and materialise even more capacious ways to fill those actually existing, already constructed buildings. Accordingly, the 1971 Act's various provisions made an increasing constituency of people detainable and deportable. 1971 was a moment in which Britain's mass deportation regime, long in the making, solidified into a set of statutory foundations. Harmondsworth, as a physical building rushed through a planning permission process, had made those statutory foundations imaginable. The 1971 legislation transformed Commonwealth citizens into 'non-patrials' indistinguishable in law from the rest of the world's foreigners, those who had never been part of the British imperial family.

But really, what does it mean to suggest that legislation transformed Commonwealth citizens into non-patrials, citizens into immigrants? To suggest that one fell swoop of legislation could actually transform Commonwealth citizens into immigrants or aliens is perhaps to grant much too much power to the state. Harmondsworth's material environment – its sparse furnishings, caged-in 'space outside for exercise', and industrial surroundings – were just as much part of transforming certain groups of people from rights-bearing citizens into detainable, deportable non-citizens as immigration law was. Colonial rule had fashioned a universe of social-yet-materialised facts about the racial attributes of colonised and differentiated populations. These social facts about race were ideas that established establishments like Harmondsworth. Harmondsworth, and the paltry 'space outside for exercise' that supposedly made detention suitable for women and children, materialised the idea that people racialised as non-white were already used to, and responsible for, the degrading material conditions, ill health, curtailed freedom of movement and political disorder resulting from colonialism. The geography of Harmondsworth, run by a private company on the isolated periphery of an airport, materialised what the 1969 Immigration Appeals Act wrote into law by creating the Immigration Appeals Tribunal. The tribunal dislocated people deemed to be immigrants from accessing the rights, protections and entitlements associated with British citizenship.

More importantly, after 1971, this separate sphere of administrative justice was one in which the Home Secretary was empowered to determine the Immigration Rules, with a minimum of parliamentary scrutiny, and a maximum of decentralised power. A documentation regime has since intensified, in which undocumentedness has become associated with illegality and criminality. There are now more ways than ever to be illegalised, to become undocumented, to be made legally precarious, to lose your 'immigration status'. In the Home Office's

documentation regime material facts, cases, and rights are unstable and ‘the law changes around people, and they are made illegal’, as Luke de Noronha has argued.⁸⁶⁹

For instance, in July 2023, the Immigration Rules were amended to allow the Home Office to *withdraw* asylum claims. Under this rule, Home Office officials can judge that an asylum claim has been ‘implicitly withdrawn’ if an applicant ‘fails to maintain contact with the Home Office, fails to provide up-to-date contact details or fails to attend reporting events.’⁸⁷⁰ Withdrawn asylum claims are *administrative* decisions, and as such cannot be appealed, just like *conducive to the public good* deportations. The material facts of a withdrawn asylum case will not be reconsidered and the claim will cease to exist. In some small way this new rule standardises and puts into writing the existing tendency for the Home Office to mislay casefiles, condemning thousands to tortuous waiting, and thousands more to live anxiously within the Home Office’s pinball, lottery logic. This new rule underlines how Home Office documentation regimes can void the material facts of a case, while policing veracity and documentedness. In other words, this rule – a single splinter in the so-called jungle of immigration rules – makes plain how the Home Office does history.

In the context of the ongoing hostile environment policy, and the aftermath of the Windrush records scandal, much literature on Britain’s postwar immigration system has concentrated on illuminating how successive legislation stripped people from former colonies of the right to move, settle and stay in the United Kingdom. Building on this work, this thesis has shown that everyday routines of public administration practically obstructed or voided the large majority of the empire’s subjects from exercising the rights and full protections of British subjecthood. Legally differentiating between citizens and migrants was an integral function of colonial states. So too was making and remaking new ways to allocate differentiated entitlements and protections, disentanglements and vulnerabilities to these unstable, changing legal identities. This thesis has identified the ways in which this citizen/migrant legal distinction produces the historically-produced *colonial* dimension of all modern states, no matter their location in empire’s geographies or timelines.⁸⁷¹

Focusing on deportation rather than on citizenship has allowed for a perspective on colonial rule that sees deportation as critical in the making, remaking and unmaking of this citizen/migrant distinction. Under the indirect rule policy, colonial rule did not govern colonised

⁸⁶⁹ Luke de Noronha, *Deporting Black Britons: Portraits of Deportation to Jamaica* (S.I.: Manchester University Press, 2020), 6.

⁸⁷⁰ Nadia O. Mara, ‘Briefing: Why and How Is the Home Office Treating More Asylum Claims as “Withdrawn”?’, *Free Movement* (blog), 26 July 2023, <https://freemovement.org.uk/briefing-why-and-how-is-the-home-office-treating-more-asylum-claims-as-withdrawn/>; See also, Home Office, ‘EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM TO THE STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN IMMIGRATION RULES PRESENTED TO PARLIAMENT ON 17 JULY 2023 (HC 1496)’, HC 1496 (2023). https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1170970/E02942553 - HC 1496 - EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM Print Ready .pdf.

⁸⁷¹ Radhika Mongia, *Indian Migration and Empire: A Colonial Genealogy of the Modern State* (Duke University Press, 2018).

populations as populations of rights-bearing citizens, but instead as differentiated subjects of decentralised regimes of 'tribal custom'. In this respect, a focus on deportation brings granular detail to the historically-contingent twists and turns of mobility control and criminalisation regimes in local contexts. In other words, while citizenship often seems like something abstract and perhaps universal, something thing-like that can be had and not had, deportation and deporting is more easily understood as a verb, actively *done* by a state to distribute citizenship and non-citizenship. This makes deportation a useful frame through which to connect migration control in the British mainland today with regimes of policing, criminalisation and labour control at work in the British Empire, despite the fact that the former ostensibly concerns international migrants while the latter concerns colonised people made vulnerable to a state's power to move or immobilise them.

To present the opening of Harmondsworth detention centre as emblematic of the making of Britain's mass deportation regime is to ask larger, looser questions not only about the extent to which legislation actually transforms the world around us, but also about the making of emblems and the scaling of examples within *how historians do history*. Asking what was involved in the making of Britain's mass deportation regime is tantamount to asking how Britain's formal empire relates to postimperial Britain. The relationship between Britain's empire and its contemporary legacies has been the subject of a fierce debate between historians over the last thirty years. Over the course of writing this thesis, the stakes of the so-called imperial history wars have risen. Meanwhile, the notion that Britain's systems of policing, prisons and immigration control have been shaped by empire's carceral systems in the colonies has become, if not mainstream, then at least commonplace in the classroom and on our streets. Likewise, there exists a growing understanding that Britain's mass deportation regime is an example of what many call 'internal colonialism.'⁸⁷²

But where can we go from *internal colonialism*? What does the 'production and reproduction of colonial relations' in ways that 'facilitate and legitimise slavery, exploitation, extermination' and repression actually look like in the context of today's mass deportation regime? The contribution of this thesis is not only to situate Britain's mass deportation regime as part of internal colonialism in the postimperial British mainland, but also to ask: how? *How* was colonialism internalised in mainland Britain at the end of empire, or in fact, during empire?

Often debates about the British Empire, its effects and its legacies, feel dominated by material facts, balance sheets and so-called moral reckonings. For some, the material facts of empire consist in the technological infrastructures of electricity, railways, modern communications, and more railways. For others, empire consisted of the selective construction of infrastructures

⁸⁷² I use James Trafford's definition of internal colonialism. Trafford, *The Empire at Home: Internal Colonies and the End of Britain* (London: Pluto, 2021), 9.

between the nodes necessary for the extraction of natural resources, the compulsion of migrant, exploited labour, and the transportation of military troops to suppress resistance. Anti-racist efforts to redress the systematic forgetting of Britain's imperial history have popularised an important narrative that colonial policing *came home* after empire. Unexpectedly, this thesis has slightly complicated this, showing that despite the well-resourced efforts of a specially created 'Overseas Service Resettlement Bureau', policemen 'prematurely retiring' from the colonies and returning to the United Kingdom did not come home into the British mainland's police because UK police salaries were comparatively low. Similarly, although John Pakenham-Walsh migrated seamlessly from the Crown Counsel of colonial Nigeria into the Home Office's Legal Advisors Branch in 1961, suggesting at first glance the tangible migration of institutional memory from a colonial legal regime into a postcolonial replica at the Home Office, this thesis has shown that his career was very much an exception. Few employees of the Colonial Civil Service were re-employed in the British metropole's Home Office and other parts of the Home Civil Service. Focussing on *how* – in these examples, on *how* colonial policing and colonial law 'came home' – is to focus on finding granular examples of the ways in which something as intangible as a logic or sensibility has had a tangible impact on the making of the modern world. To focus on *how* is to pay attention to how material facts themselves are socially constructed before being morally reckoned with.

My focus on bureaucratic work has foregrounded the wide margins of discretionary power written into imperial and colonial laws, legislation and legal systems. Making and remaking legal categories was an integral part of how colonial administrations secured and resecured power over land, labour, and political structures. Studying how these legal categories were made legible and illegible, and how they routed through embodied, affective notions of legitimacy and illegitimacy, is also important. The blurry nexus of legality and illegality, legibility and illegibility, legitimacy and illegitimacy has been at the heart of this thesis. My central claim that it is useful to think of the Home Office as doing history provides a new lens through which this blurriness becomes something worth examining.

This thesis has explored how administration – in colonies, in the metropole, and in the mental terrain of pervasive beliefs connecting them – nurtured and sustained an institutionalised way of thinking historically, of managing change, of situating itself and its subjects in time as well as in the world. Britain's mass deportation regime embeds an inherent logic of criminalisation, an imperialist way of thinking about the world's wealth and an eugenicist way of thinking about how change should happen. This thesis has examined this historical sensibility at work within the administration of colonial development writ large as well as within the Home Office in Britain's metropole. It has depicted the state's distinctions between developers and developed, between history-doers and done-tos. I have shown both how these distinctions came undone over time but also how they remained sticky, as constitutional decolonisation, and the long

moments leading to it, made a mess of British imperial policy's imagined timelines and embedded notions of timeliness.

This was, then, a historical sensibility that was not only constituted by empire but also by perpetuating it. It was a way of thinking about history that was made coherent and familiar by the carceral logic through which undocumentedness was increasingly associated with illegitimacy and illegality, and both with criminality. It was a way of thinking historically and about the passage of time that was embedded with eugenic ideas about proper and improper families, about who and what should and should not be allowed to reproduce. Time and again across my research I have found historical change imagined through implicit references to either eugenic improvement or dysgenic societal decline. Eugenics and the carceral archipelago built in order to contain and make use of the world's unruly poor were both produced by empire. Nonetheless, imperialism changed over time. So did the content of eugenic thought, the politics of the family, and systems of criminalisation. This imperialist, eugenicist, and criminalising historical sensibility has, likewise, changed and developed over time.

In some uncomfortable ways, I have written a thesis that does not describe how I think the world, and history, actually work. I began this project in 2018 with a strong conviction that histories of anti-deportation campaigning and movements were not my histories to tell, not mine to be paid to research. Instead I designed a top-down project focussed on state archives, alive to the kind of migration stories, professional work and institutional cultures that could explain my own white owning class privilege and utterly secure citizenship status. I looked for stories of colonial statecraft that might explain how empire had made a world I could live in more easily than most. Along the way, I overdetermined my path through the sources. At times my sources have swallowed me, leached into the structure of my sentences, shaping my writing to resemble that of the confident colonial administrator-historians I have been consuming. More than language, my top-down state archives have often limited what I could see, imagine, and think of. In focussing so heavily on how various parts of the British state made and remade a world full of borders, prisons, police and capitalist misery, I have tended to overestimate the state's power to determine how society and social relationships between groups of people can be settled, unsettled, and restructured by new laws and government policies.

In my real life, I think that change happens from below, driven by community power and people determined to build worlds and live lives beyond the state's terms and conditions. In my real life, I see the state as flailing, as well-equipped for violent surveillance and yet utterly unable to anticipate the sociality, conviviality and solidarity created and nurtured by communities

experiencing the sharpest end of racist state violence and ‘internal colonialism’.⁸⁷³ As I have written elsewhere with friends, movements against deportation and detention are ‘attempts to build community power and struggles to redefine community beyond the reach of the state’s legal categories’ of immigrant, criminal, citizen and non-citizen.⁸⁷⁴ These struggles are where people ‘learn about different ways of doing politics, form long term friendships, and fall in and sometimes out of love.’⁸⁷⁵

The ongoing challenge to resolve the messy tensions and power dynamics arising within these movements without recourse to the state’s way of seeing and believing is a revolutionary struggle. It is a struggle that is present, future and past all at once: it is here-and-now, it is oriented to a future that the state cannot anticipate, and it is part of a lengthy history spanning the ‘long moment of decolonisation’, histories that this thesis has only motioned towards.⁸⁷⁶ An important future direction for further research building on my inquiry into *how the Home Office does history* might therefore centre around *undoing how the Home Office does history*. Such research could connect histories of antiracist, anticolonial, anti-capitalist movements, and highlight the organisational cultures, sensibilities and practices with which these movements imagined, acted upon, and sustained life-worlds and ways of seeing beyond the Home Office’s way of seeing like a state.

When I began my research five years ago, I wanted to contribute historical detail to the powerful, growing movement to end deportation, detention and border violence in the UK and Europe. Around the time I started my PhD, it felt like the grassroots movement had succeeded in reducing the use of immigration detention, with Yarl’s Wood, Campsfield, Morton Hall and Dungavel signalled to close. There had been a huge victory in 2015, when the decade-long campaign to undo the ‘detained fast track’ system – of detaining, refusing and deporting asylum seekers within six weeks – had been won. In June 2017 the combined efforts of community organising, campaigning and litigation succeeded in overturning the draconian ‘deport now, appeal later’ clause of the 2014 Immigration Act, through which thousands of people had been deprived of an in-country right of appeal.⁸⁷⁷ Twenty-first century immigration politics, I believed, pivoted on the politics of exit: it was all about governmental attempts to deport people, and had been since at least the 1971 Immigration Act put an end to so-called

⁸⁷³ For an examination of the ‘wider ethics of ‘refusing race and salvaging the human’ and the ‘politico-ethical and humanistic implications of conviviality in anti-immigrant times’ see Luke de Noronha, ‘The Conviviality of the Overpoliced, Detained and Expelled: Refusing Race and Salvaging the Human at the Borders of Britain’, *The Sociological Review* 70, no. 1 (1 January 2022): 159–77.

⁸⁷⁴ Bobby Phe Amis et al., “‘Shut Them down’”: Non-Reformist Reforms in Anti-Detention Organising’, in *Border Abolition*, ed. Kathryn Medien et al. (London: Pluto, forthcoming).

⁸⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷⁷ ‘Supreme Court Rules “Deport First, Appeal Later” Policy Unlawful’, *DPG Law* (blog), 15 June 2017, <https://dpglaw.co.uk/supreme-court-rules-deport-first-appeal-later-policy-unlawful/>.

permanent immigration. My thesis, therefore, was squarely addressed to the historical development of Britain's mass deportation regime.

But from a standpoint in late 2023, the politics of exit has in some ways flipped. We now have a government fixated on the politics of arrival in ways I did not anticipate. We are living through a moral panic about 'small boats' arriving along the Kent coastline, a narrative repeating from the late 1960s. Today these small boats are hounded by futuristic drone surveillance technologies developed by the weapons industry, advanced enough to render photographic evidence with which migrants on half-sinking lifeboats could, under new legislation, be legally categorised as captains, and convicted as people-smugglers. Beyond this new legislation and these drones, other responses have included housing recently arrived asylum-seekers in repurposed disused army barracks, as well as on *Bibby Stockholm*, a large barge docked on the coast of Dorset, and across hundreds of hotels. In the barracks, on the barge, and in hotels, asylum seekers are accommodated in overcrowded conditions, without cooking facilities or the freedom to feed themselves, often without access to adequate sanitation, means of transport, and primary healthcare, in conditions 'akin to detention centres.'⁸⁷⁸ As this thesis has shown, barracks, hostels and convict ships were key parts of empire's global infrastructures for moving, controlling, exploiting, and confining enslaved, indentured, convicted and wage-disciplined labour.

Another response saw the Home Office propose the 'Rwanda Plan', through which asylum-seekers arriving in Britain would be immediately 'resettled' in Rwanda, where the Rwandan Government would process their asylum claim and, if successful, provide refugee protection within Rwanda. By decentralising the arbitration of asylum claims to the Rwandan state, the plan resembled indirect rule's systems of decentralised native courts in which violence and injustice were systematised and obscured from view. Altogether the scheme combined the logic of 'detained fast track' with the logic of the 'deport now, appeal later', all mixed together with the mid-twentieth century colonial ease of what were called population transfers, whether on the local scale of the Anchau Scheme, or on the world-historical scale of ongoing Nakbas and partitions. What Rwanda, the *Bibby Stockholm*, the barracks, and the hotels have in common is a determined attempt to segregate migrants from sharing neighbourhoods, building relationships, conviviality and community power with would-be neighbours, friends and families. Without meaning to underestimate the unbearable violence of these new sites, it is important to recognise them as a kind of evidence. They evidence something diffuse and hard to quantify: enough communities and publics in the British mainland have pushed back

⁸⁷⁸ Diane Taylor, 'Home Office Hotels for Asylum Seekers "Akin to Detention Centres" – Report', *The Guardian*, 16 September 2021, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/16/home-office-hotels-for-asylum-seekers-akin-to-detention-centres-report>. For details of conditions onboard the *Bibby Stockholm* for so-called 'non-detained' people, see 'Portland Port: Factsheet', GOV.UK, accessed 21 November 2023, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/asylum-accommodation-factsheets/factsheet-asylum-accommodation-on-a-vessel-in-portland-port>.

hard against anti-immigrant rhetoric and state policy: hard enough to compel the British state to utterly change tactic, to renew the politics of arrival, and to depend on extensive segregation and physical distance to prevent solidarity growing. What is crucial here is that the state is reactive, rather than leading a trajectory prepped with well-made plans. The state is flailing rather than in control.

This flailing, this reactivity, is what my thesis has described in a range of different moments and settings. The colonial state was not a monolith. It was not omniscient, and it often hardly had a plan, except for accommodating the private business interests of British enterprises in a territory. It was an assemblage of practices, institutions, contradictions, internal tensions, relationships, sensibilities, competing interests. This thesis has shown that the Home Office does history in ways shaped by multiple ways of doing history embedded across various parts of the state, including the Colonial Office, Oxbridge's Colonial Service Training, colonial administrators overseas, practitioners of colonial medicine, and civil servants in their unofficial capacities. To suggest that all of these institutions, over changing times and in different places, do history the way that the Home Office does history is to argue there exists some kind of state-mentality. There exists a shared sensibility in which policies, institutions, and practices that are resisted, refused and eventually outlawed by wider society nonetheless get lovingly refurbished by officials. Nonetheless this points us towards understanding the state *not* as an autonomous, bounded 'entity, agent, function or relation', but instead as a 'multilayered, contradictory, trans-local ensemble of institutions, practices and people in a globalized context.'⁸⁷⁹

The practices with which the Home Office historicises itself as an institution, and the everyday ways in which the Home Office engages in historical thinking are integral to the projection and performance of itself as an entity. Every time that the Home Office diagnoses problems or outlines internal reforms and changes, it projects itself as an agent of historical change capable of enacting historical change upon itself, on the social fabric of Britain, and of Britain's relationship and actions in the wider world. To engage meaningfully with the abolition of policing, borders and prisons we should not focus the entirety of our demands on the wholesale abolition of the Home Office as an institution, however *not fit for purpose* it is. Instead we should attend to undoing the policing and bordering practices and institutional structures in society beyond government. We can do this by building infrastructures of solidarity, of community safety and healing, organisational structures and practices that undermine the very notion that the Home Office has a purpose to be fit for at all.

⁸⁷⁹ Philip Abrams, 'Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State (1977)', *Journal of Historical Sociology* 1, no. 1 (1988): 58–89; Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta, *The Anthropology of the State: A Reader* (John Wiley & Sons, 2009), 6.

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