

# The Strategic Employment of Culture as a Resource of Soft Power

Analysis of the EU's Creative Europe Sub-Programme  
Culture as a resource for internal soft power

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## Abstract

In the study of international relations power has always been a central focus of theory, analysis, and debate. In the last thirty years, the concept of soft power has become prominent in these debates. This dissertation looks at the role of culture in the attainment of soft power and in particular it develops on Joseph Nye's insight that culture can be instrumentalised as a resource for soft power. While Nye's work has generated much constructivist scholarship on soft power, there has been little structured theorisation as to the nature of cultural soft power resources themselves. By adopting a power-as-resource perspective, this dissertation asserts that cultural resources can be built and deployed like any other material resources and, to illustrate this, establishes a theoretical framework to assess the key characteristics of strategic instrumentalization of culture as a resource thereby making an original contribution to the theoretical understanding of soft power. The dissertation then applies this theoretical lens to a case study to show how the framework provides a tool to evaluate empirical examples. The case study analyses the European Union's Creative Europe Sub-Programme Culture (CESPC), which at the same time allows the dissertation to provide new insight into the EU's instrumentalization of culture. To arrive at the theoretical framework, the dissertation builds on existing literature and adopts an understanding that the concept of soft power can be understood through the realist power-as-resource perspective and that soft power has an internal dimension in addition to the foreign policy dimension. It establishes four elements that need to be considered in the strategic employment of culture, specifically these are: cultural assets, communications mechanisms, narratives, and audiences. These elements include the ability of the agent to generate activity around culture and heritage, the ability to build arm's length networks through the creative and cultural sector, the ability to engage in mass communication strategies, and the ability to produce coherent narratives and build strategic audience groups in the cultural sphere. Exploring the internal deployment of soft power and using the previously developed theoretical framework, the dissertation examines how the European Union has instrumentalized culture in the case of the CESPC and evaluates to what extent this programme has the capacity to serve as a soft power resource. It does so by assessing the degree to which the EU's employment of culture through the CESPC satisfies the four elements identified in the theoretical framework. The dissertation's findings demonstrate that while the EU meets certain criteria within the theoretical framework and therefore evidently systematically instrumentalizes culture for power related purposes, it fails to meet other dimensions within the framework and hence fails to fully realize the potential of deploying culture as a soft power resource. Hereby, the dissertation shows the value of having a structured theoretical framework, with a power-as-resource perspective for the realm of culture, as a means to investigate soft power capabilities of international actors. Furthermore, the framework can serve as a systematic and coherent analytical tool for future case studies.

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## INTRODUCTION

It has been recognized in international relations that power is not only based on military and economic resources but that other resources produce power as well. Soft power, coined by Joseph Nye (2004), has become popularised as a concept that portrays this alternative type of power. The question to ask is what resources produce this sort of power? According to Nye culture, among other things, serves as a resource for soft power. At the same time, it is widely acknowledged in the study of the history of art that art is “a force in the power play of global politics” (Groys, 2009)<sup>1</sup> and has been widely discussed as a tool that helps political actors build their legitimacy and obtain loyalty from their subjects. In other words, art has been a resource for soft power. The term culture is used in this dissertation to incorporate art and other forms of creative practices. Today the patronage of culture by political actors continues to have political objectives. This dissertation will explore how specifically the use of culture constitutes a source of power for political actors. The first half of the dissertation engages with a theoretical evaluation of the soft power concept, while the second half applies the new understanding that is developed to the evaluation of the European Union’s Creative Europe Sub-Programme Culture.

The concept of power in the study of international relations is highly contested. There are debates between realists (Morgenthau, 1948) and liberals (Keohane, 1986) that disagree on whether politics is about power and conflict or cooperation and global improvement. Then there are perspectives that view power beyond the military and economic resources that liberals and realists focus on and power begins to be viewed as more ideational based often in discursive practices (Barnett and Duvall, 2005). Adding to these debates, the concept of soft power has inherited the same ambiguities as the concept of power (Feklyunina, 2015). Additionally, the concept of culture is itself complex and how it constitutes a resource for soft power opens a challenging discussion. Such a study requires, Hayden suggests, a look at disciplines such as “communication, persuasion, and culture from outside the sphere of international relations scholarship” (Hayden, 2011, p.28). While this dissertation is grounded in the study of international relations, it borrows from other disciplines as well.

Nye’s basic definition of soft power is that it is a power that co-opts rather than coerces. Generally, for a global actor, soft power is about having attractive qualities (cultural, political, and social) that persuade or influence others to behave in a way that achieves the outcomes that the actor wants. Scholars cannot agree on how to understand soft power. The approach to studying the concept also differs. Mattern (2005) looks at soft power as representational force; Hayden (2011) at

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<sup>1</sup> Groys, Boris (2009). *Art and Power*. MIT Press.



soft power and public diplomacy; Solomon (2014) discusses soft power and affect. While some say that soft power is based on some “unelaborated assumptions” about attraction, “influence, persuasion, and the supposed values of symbolic and cultural attributes” (Hayden, 2011, p.28; Mattern, 2005). Others say that it is difficult to understand what soft power resources look like (Roselle et al., 2014). Nonetheless, most studies of soft power have either focused on the empirical illustration or theorized through the ideational or relational lens how soft power works. There has been little theorising as to how soft power resources look like in a structured manner. The goal of this research is to help fill in this research gap by trying to unpack some of those “unelaborated assumptions” – specifically to elaborate what cultural resources are. Furthermore, it looks at both a theoretical perspective of soft power as well as an empirical study as literature on soft power up to this point has dealt with only one of these aspects at a time.

The dissertation sets of to provide a discussion of why the relational view of soft power is limited and why a realist understanding of soft power is more suitable. It highlights that relational or ideational studies of power are often subjective and lead to different outcomes. A realist notion of power that is adopted here is Morgenthau’s (1948) claim that political interest is defined as power, which removes the debates about varying ideational interests that often underpin discursive analyses of soft power. Furthermore, the stance adopted here is that soft power should be studied from the power as resource perspective. The claim is that all power transactions are underpinned by resources even when it comes to cultural resources. In addition to setting the soft power concept into the power as resource perspective, the dissertation unpacks how the concept has been understood lately to also have an internal dimension. After starting as a concept that was applied to the US foreign policy, the understanding of the term has evolved for some scholars (Edney, 2015; Callahan, 2015), particularly those studying China. The dissertation points out that in a globalising world, where sovereignty is ever more contested, the internal considerations for soft power are important. In the case of the European Union, which unlike its member state, does not have full internal sovereignty without the commitment of the members, developing internal soft power is essential.

After establishing the foundation of how soft power will be understood in this dissertation, the discussion shifts to looking at the relationship between culture and soft power. The objective is to create a theoretical framework that outlines in a systematic manner what the nature of cultural resources of soft power is in order to then be able to identify these and evaluate them in a structured and systematic manner in real-world examples. The research question asks what the nature of cultural resources of soft power is and how can these be identified? The framework builds on existing, often interdisciplinary, literature to identify four components that constitute cultural soft power resources.

These are drawn originally from discussions about communication, narratives, and audiences found in the existing literature on soft power, however, these are framed in a different manner in this research. Rather than looking at the interpretations by audiences of the resources of an agent of soft power, this dissertation looks at how the agent of soft power can attain resources for themselves. It claims that all persuasion and attraction that happens is ultimately based on resources that facilitate the interactions where persuasion or attraction can play out. The dissertation provides a theoretical elaboration of the elements that make up cultural soft power resources. These elements include – cultural assets, communication mechanisms, narrative, and audience. Cultural assets refer to the agent’s ability to produce cultural content and generate activity around culture. Communication mechanisms refer to two aspects. The first is the agent’s ability to communicate to the audience in a top-down and agent-centred manner at times using the cultural industry to do so. The second is the ability to set up networks that represent the agent’s interests but where the agent can remain at an arm’s length approach. The third element of cultural soft power is the narrative that is created. While ideational views of soft power evaluate how audiences interpret narratives, the view taken here is to examine the agent's command of narratives. Finally, the fourth element that makes up cultural soft power resources is the audience. Again, a relational view of soft power would interpret the relationship that is built between the agent and the subject and how the subject might perceive this relationship. The perspective taken in this dissertation is that it is the command of audiences and the ability to target them through cultural assets and communication approaches that constitutes an element of soft power. The theoretical part of the dissertation draws on literature from across several disciplines including communication and cultural policy. However, because the theory is fundamentally based on a realist conception of power, the interdisciplinary discussions are brought back to the realm of international relations.

Once the framework for the understanding of cultural soft power resources is established. The dissertation turns to the case study analysis of the European Union’s Creative Europe Sub-Programme Culture. The European Union is often discussed as an example of a soft power (Cross, 2013). Many of these discussions rest on the normative power (Manners, 2002) and assign the EU soft power because of its form of governance and the norms that it projects and represents. Based on the theoretical framework laid out in this dissertation, the EU’s cultural resources are examined. These are not understood in the dissertation to be cultural values or the cultural practices of its people, but rather the EU’s patronage of cultural action. The Creative Europe Sub-Programme culture is the EU’s largest domestic cultural initiative which provides incentive measures to the creative and cultural sector. The policy documents that underpin the programme as well as a sample of the projects that were funded by the EU between 2014 and 2019 are examined. The cultural soft power framework,

which the dissertation establishes, is applied to evaluate the way the EU operates in relation to the Creative Europe Sub-Programme culture. It highlights the powers that the EU has gained in the cultural realm despite not having a mandate from the member states over cultural policy. The evaluation shows how the EU is able to establish under its patronage cultural resources that represent the European dimension. Furthermore, the EU's ability to utilize the creative and cultural sector for both policy promotion as well as outreach to the European public is unpacked and illustrated. The discussions show that the European soft power lies in the resources that it builds for itself. The dissertation illustrates what these resources are.

## Chapter overview

The literature review begins with an evaluation of the concept of power in the study of international relations. It looks at how the concept has become understood the four faces of power (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Lukes, 1976; Barnett and Duvall 2005). The literature review then looks at the way the concept of soft power has been positioned within the wider debates on power. The literature review debates why the realist notion of power is more appropriate shows that it is less subjective than the relational perspective. In this light, it illustrates how the realist perspective is a more suitable method for understanding power, including soft power, in international relations.

The theory chapter builds on the realist understanding of soft power and turns its focus to culture as a resource for such power. It highlights that existing literature on cultural soft power resources has given some insight into what the nature of these resources is. However, it highlights that many of these studies tend to turn to the relational or ideational perspective of power. The theory chapter sets out to define cultural resources from a power as resource perspective. Meaning as resources that an agent of power can possess rather than how the subjects of power interpret these resources. Four elements of cultural resources are identified and elaborated on – assets, communication, narratives, and audience. The theory looks at how the agent of power can operate these elements. Once this framework is established, it becomes a useful prism through which empirical cases can be analysed.

The methodology chapter unpacks how the dissertation then sets off to examine the empirical case – the Creative Europe Sub-Programme Culture. It highlights how existing research on soft power has been split between looking at the conceptual elaborations or on the other hand have been done through case-centred studies and that this has limited understanding of soft power resources. The methodology chapter outlines the descriptive case study approach that has been selected and looks at why content analysis is suitable for the evaluation of the cultural policy documents of the EU and the projects conducted under the Creative Europe Sub-Programme Culture.

The case chapter introduces European Cultural policy and cultural programmes. It looks at how these have evolved both in the international realm and in the domestic realm. The case chapter highlights the importance of considering the internal dimension of European cultural policy and programmes in relation to its international soft power as well. It shows how the EU has adopted more and more cultural policies through the years in an attempt to build both internal and external soft power.

The analytical chapter then turns to study the internal cultural programme – Creative Europe Sub-Programme Culture – in more detail. It examines how exactly this programme builds soft power resources for the EU and where exactly the power of the EU sits. The analytical chapter has two parts. First, it looks at the policy documents that underpin the programme and the projects that were conducted as part of the programme. It looks at these through the cultural soft power framework established in the theory chapter and through the descriptive case study method to illustrate how the EU's cultural action can be understood. It illustrates how the EU has attained cultural assets, how it has established communication networks, and how it has controlled a specific narrative of the capacity building of the creative and cultural sector, while also viewing the sector as its primary target. The second part of the analytical chapter then goes on to discuss the finding by unpacking the limitations of existing views on civil society empowerment and normative Europe. It concludes that such perspectives neglect to see how soft power operates and where cultural soft power actually sits – namely in the control of cultural policy, cultural sectors, and those who practice creative and cultural production.

The dissertation concludes with final remarks on how the debate on soft power has viewed culture as a moral value and disregarded the way international actors have a large degree of control of the activities that occur in the cultural realm. It also highlights that debates on soft power that take the moral perspective on what is attractive are an exercise of ideological projection for the purposes of power rather than an objective evaluation of how soft power based on cultural resources actually works.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

### Introduction to the Literature Review

The notion of power has been central to the study of international relations (IR) from the discipline's beginning when realists argued that international politics is all about power (see E.H. Carr (1939, 2016)<sup>2</sup>; Morgenthau, (1948, 1978)<sup>3</sup>). There are a number of different perceptions of power, and it is agreed by scholars of IR that there is a "necessity of addressing the role of power in international interactions and the unsatisfactory state of knowledge about this topic" (Baldwin, 2013, p.273, see also Baldwin, 1979, p.162) and yet there are many attempts at a definition of power and in fact, the concept remains a contested one (Berenskoetter and Williams, 2007)<sup>4</sup>. Two dominant ways of understanding the concept are power-as-resources vs. relational power, where the first is the ability of an actor to do something because of the tangible and intangible resources they possess, while the second places power in the relationship between two actors. A debate ensues between these perspectives on power, which finds itself later in the study of soft power.

The literature review begins with an illustration of the way power has been understood in international relations. It first looks at relational power and unpacks the three faces of power. The literature review then examines how the concept of soft power has been evaluated by scholars within the faces of power discussions and points out through the realist critique why such an approach is limited. Looking closer at how soft power has been understood through the power as resource perspective, the review concludes that, while scholars claim there has been a strong focus on the resources of soft power, the reality is that this work is not sufficiently systematic and has a tendency to turn to the relational view of power, which leaves the concept in its ambiguous state. The literature review shows that more work needs to be done to truly understand the resources of soft power. While the relational perspective of power is given merit, the literature review shows how the realist way of seeing power can give a clearer picture of soft power and is a better way of evaluating the soft power of an international actor.

Additional two sections at the end of the literature review cover two separate discussions on soft power. Soft power is often still understood as a concept that is related to the state alone as well

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<sup>2</sup> Carr, E. H. (2001) [1939]. *The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919–1939*. New York: Perennial.

Carr E.H. (2016) *The Realist Critique*. In: Cox M. (eds) *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*. Palgrave Macmillan, London

<sup>3</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau (1978 [1948]) *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Fifth Edition, New York: Alfred A. Knopf,

<sup>4</sup> Berenskoetter, F. and M.J. Williams (2007). *Power in World Politics*. Routledge.

as only to a state's foreign policy. The final two sections of the literature review unpack these misconceptions by: first, showing that soft power does not only pertain to nation-states but can be held by any international actor in world politics; and second, showing that in an era of globalization and contested sovereignty, internal soft power is just as important as external soft power.

## Power

### Relational, Structural, and Systemic Power

In the relational study of power, there are a number of perspectives which either echo each other yet use different terms or build on each other. Power is often described as the ability by one actor to get another actor to do what it would not otherwise have done – coming from Robert A. Dahl (p. 202-203, 1957)<sup>5</sup> that has become the most widely accepted one (Baldwin, 2013).<sup>6</sup> Dahl sought to develop a method for studying power and says that for there to be power three conditions must be met. The first is a “time lag” between the agent of power’s actions and the subject’s response. Second, there needs to be a “connection, or an opportunity for a connection” between the agent and the subject. Third, the ability of the agent to get the subject to do something that they would have not otherwise done, which can be provoked through threat or incentive (Dahl, 1957, p.204). Dahl assumes that influence, power, control, and authority are interchangeable concepts in his works (Dahl, 1957, p.202). While Dahl’s definition of power established the broad parameters conceptualization of power in the study of politics, it was quickly expanded by scholars, for whom it was too narrow.

Bachrach and Baratz expanded on Dahl’s perspective in their 1962 work “The Two Faces of Power”<sup>7</sup> by saying that not only does A get B to do what A wants, but A also limits B from doing what B might have wanted to do because of the “power structures” where “human institutions [...] are ordered systems of power” (Bachrach and Baratz, 1967, p.947). However, Digeser highlights that while this generated debate it didn’t really add to “our conceptual map of power” (Digeser, 1992, p.978-979).<sup>8</sup> In response, Steven Lukes saw the need to expand on the understanding of power. Lukes’ provides a theory of the three faces of power (Lukes, 1976, 2005a).<sup>9</sup> He suggests that the first

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<sup>5</sup> Dahl, R.A. (1957). “The Concept of Power” in *Behavioral Science*, 2:3, July 1957.

<sup>6</sup> Baldwin, D. (2013). “Chapter 11: Power and International Relations” in *Handbook of International Relations* [Eds.] Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons. Sage Publications.

<sup>7</sup> Bachrach, Peter, and Morton S. Baratz (1962). “Two Faces of Power.” *American Political Science Review* 56:947-52.

<sup>8</sup> Digeser, P. (1992). “The Fourth Face of Power” in *The Journal of Politics*. Vol.54, No. 4 (Nov., 1992), University of Chicago Press, pp. 977-1007.

<sup>9</sup> Lukes, Steven ([1976],2005a). *Power: A Radical View*. Palgrave.

face or one-dimensional view of power, based on Dahl's power as direct influence, suggests that an actor has power when it is in control and has influence over the decisions and actions of the subject that take place. The question of what influence is remains open. The second face or two-dimensional view of power, which is based on Bachrach and Baratz's critique of Dahl's ideas, suggests that power is more than just control over action and decisions, but rather it is also about being able to set the agenda and exclude proposals from it. This view "confines itself to studying situations where the mobilization of bias<sup>10</sup> can be attributed to individuals' decisions that have the effect of preventing currently observable grievances (overt or covert) from becoming issues within the political process" (Lukes, 2005a, p.39). The third face or three-dimensional view of power is about persuasion and ideology. Here Lukes suggests that the "bias of the system is not sustained simply by a series of individually chosen acts, but also, most importantly, by the socially structured and culturally patterned behaviors of groups, and practices of institutions, which may indeed be manifested by individuals' inaction" (Lukes, 2005a, p.26). What one can see emerging in the study of power is a stronger focus on the relationship between agents and subjects that moves beyond the objective possession of material power resources by one actor.

The focus on the complexity of the relationships between two or more actors that express influence in intangible or non-material ways such as beliefs, attitudes, emotions, preferences, and predispositions and the study of "relational power" becomes important to scholars of International Relations (Baldwin, 2013, 273). Looking at relational power as non-material influence, Baldwin sets out to outline dimensions of such power. First, there is the scope of power, i.e. the specific aspect of actor B's behavior affected by A. Second, there is the domain, meaning how many subjects are influenced by an actor's power. The third dimension is the weight of power, which is the probability that the actor will be able to exert influence, hence the reliability of the actor's influence. Fourth is the cost of power, which are costs for both actors A to influence actor B but also the cost for B in being influenced. Cheaper power is more powerful. Finally, there are the means of exercising power as influence, which Baldwin places into four categories: first, symbolic means, which includes the use of normative symbols and use of information i.e. discourses, propaganda, narratives, etc., which result in influence on identities, interests and opinions; second, economic means; third, military means; and finally diplomatic means, including representation and negotiation (Baldwin, 1979, p.171; 2013)<sup>11</sup>.

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<sup>10</sup> Schattschneider, Elmer, E. (1960) *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*, Harcourt Brace College Publishers.

<sup>11</sup> Baldwin, D. (1979). *Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies*. *World Politics*, 31(2), 161-194.

Barnet and Duvall, while agreeing widely with Baldwin and expanding on the three faces of power, suggest that the “actor-oriented approach is incapable of recognizing social relations of constitution and how power inheres in structures and discourses that are not possessed or controlled by any single actor” (Barnet and Duvall, 2005a, 44). They, therefore, propose a taxonomy of power that both considers agency as well as structure. The taxonomy includes four ideas of power. The first is “compulsory power” or the direct control by one actor over another and includes not only material but also symbolic and normative resources. “Institutional power” refers to control over socially distant others with a focus on the formal and informal institutions that can mediate for an agent of power or are part of the agent’s resources and which create rules and constraints for others and often leads to those others creating a resistance. “Structural power” denotes the direct and mutual constitution of the capacities of actors where on one hand the structures allocate different capacities and advantages to different positions, and on the other hand, such structures also shape actors and their preferences and capabilities. Finally, there is “productive power”, which is the “production of subjects through diffuse social relations.” It works similarly to structural power, however instead of direct structural relations, productive power has more diffuse social processes and is the “constitution of all social subjects with various social powers through systems of knowledge and discursive practices of broad and general social scope” (Barnett and Duvall, 2005b, p.20; Barnet and Duvall, 2005a, 49-55).<sup>12</sup> In the final category of “productive power” Barnet and Duvall focus on “systems of signification and meaning” and looks beyond structures. They also make an important distinction between the direct power in the first three categories and the diffuse power of the last category adding through this a fourth face of power often referred to as the hidden face of power.

In productive power a discourse takes place in social relations where meaning is created and experienced in the Foucauldian sense (Foucault in Rabinow, 2001)<sup>13</sup>. These “discursive processes and practices produce social identities and capacities as they give meaning to them” (Barnet and Duvall, 2005b, p.21). Here Foucault’s understanding of power can give further insight into the way Barnet and Duvall’s “productive power” works. Digeser suggests that Foucault adds the fourth face of power to the debate (Digeser, 1992). For Foucault discourse, knowledge, and what he once called in an interview in 1976, the “‘regimes’ of truth” (Rabinow, 2001)<sup>14</sup> create their own diffused form of power

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<sup>12</sup> Barnett, Michael, and Raymond Duvall. (2005a). “Power in International Politics.” *International Organization* 59 (1): 39– 75

Barnett, Michael and Raymond Duvall (2005b). “Power in Global Governance” in *Power in Global Governance*. Barnett, Michael and Raymond Duvall (eds.), Cambridge Press.

<sup>13</sup> Foucault, Michel (2001). *Power*. Volume 3 of *Essential Works of Foucault: 1954-1984*. Eds. Paul Rabinow and James D. Faubion. Trans. R. Hurley et. al. The New Press.

<sup>14</sup> Interview is published in Rabinow, Paul (2001) – The footnote on page 133 states that the interview was originally “conducted in June 1976; published in Alessandro Fontana and Pasquale Pasquino, eds., *Microfisica del potere: interventi politici*. Trans. C. Lazzeri. Turin: Einaudi, 1977, pp. 3-28. [eds.]”



that isn't created only in structural power or actor-subject power relations alone, but can, according to him, be found everywhere. There is a truth regime in each society, shaped by discourses, and controlled by the few dominant "political and economic apparatuses" which results in ideological struggles" (Rabinow, 1984, p.72-73).<sup>15</sup>

Foucault's notion is similar to what Gramsci had proposed beforehand. In his theory of cultural hegemony, Gramsci explains that the power of the elite over the subjects occurs not only through political and economic coercion but also through ideology that is expressed through cultural institutions and that is formulated around a "common sense" or collective (Gramsci, 1980, p.125)<sup>16</sup>. For him, the agents or subjects need to have an ideological common basis if either is to gain power over the other (Fontana, 1993, p.28-29).<sup>17</sup> This too can be related to Barnett and Duvall's "productive power" and "structural power" (Barnett and Duvall, 2005b). Daldal suggests that the difference between Foucault and Gramsci is that "that the latter saw power relations in terms of binary oppositions (such as the leader and the led, the rulers and the ruled etc.)" while for Foucault "power, as well as the resistance it generates, are diffuse and not localized in some points" (Daldal, 2014, p. 149).<sup>18</sup> Similarly, Tarascio says that Foucault was concerned with "the ethic of truth as an individual position" and Gramsci was interested in the "politics of truth" and a "hegemonic struggle" (Tarascio, 2018, p.96)<sup>19</sup>

The above discussions of relational, structural, and systemic approaches to power show the complexities and contestation of the concept. These influences and perspectives of power have also found their way into the study of soft power.

### Joseph Nye's Soft Power

In a 1990(a) book, "Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power" (Nye, 1990a)<sup>20</sup> and 1990 article, "The Changing Nature of Power in World Politics" (Nye, 1990b)<sup>21</sup>, Joseph Nye first lays out the ideas of soft power. He first formulated the concept in order to explain an aspect of

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<sup>15</sup> Rabinow, Paul [eds.] (1984). *The Foucault Reader*. Vintage

<sup>16</sup> Gramsci, A. (1980) *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. 6th ed. London: Wishart Publications.

<sup>17</sup> Fontana, B. (1993). *Hegemony and power on the relation between Gramsci and Machiavelli*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

<sup>18</sup> Daldal, Asli (2014). "Power and Ideology in Michel Foucault and Antonio Gramsci: A Comparative Analysis" *Review of History and Political Science*. June 2014, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp.149-167.

<sup>19</sup> Tarascio, G. (2018). "The Complex Convergence: Gramsci and Foucault" in *International Gramsci Journal*, 3(1), 2018, 94-103.

<sup>20</sup> Nye, J. (1990a) *Bound to Lead. The Changing Nature of American Power*. Basic Books.

<sup>21</sup> Nye, J. (1990b). "The Changing Nature of Power in World Politics" in *Foreign Policy*. No.80, Twentieth Anniversary (Autumn, 1990), pp. 153-171.

American power that existed in addition to military and economic power. At a time when discussions were taking place amongst scholars about the decline in the US's power, Nye wanted to show that in addition to economic and military power, the US had another type of power that it still dominated in. By the 1980s the US had gone from being a creditor to a debtor nation, its share of world production had slipped by 10 percent and its oil export had dropped from 17 percent to 10 percent, and "its share of world monetary reserves dropped even more dramatically, from 50 to 9 percent" (Nye, 1990a, p.2). Nye points out that it was popular for thinkers like Immanuel Wallerstein, Paul Kennedy, Walter Mead, and others at the time to speak of the US as being in a position of imperial overstretch (Nye, 1990a, p.2-4). Not only did Nye disagree with these assertions of US decline, but for him, such discussions, which took into account only the economic and military aspects of power, were not enough to provide a complete image of the status of the US's global power. For him, military and economic power do not represent the total power of any political entity and it is not enough to study only the influence of and correlation between these two power elements. For Nye, other factors must come into play here and the US's power did not rest on hard power alone (Nye, 1990a).

In a world that was becoming, as Nye argues, ever more interdependent, soft power was important. In his first in-depth discussion of the concept in *Soft Power: The Means to Success* (2004), he defined soft power as "getting others to want the outcomes that you want... [it] co-opts people rather than coerces them... [It] rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others" and "the ability to attract" (Nye, 2004, p.5-6).<sup>22</sup> In Nye's revision of the concept in a 2008 article "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power" and in the 2011 book *The Future of Power*, he adds that it is "the ability to get preferred outcomes through the co-optive means of agenda-setting, persuasion, and attraction," which he also refers to as "soft power behaviours" (Nye, 2011, p.16; p.90)<sup>23</sup>. For Nye, there are specific resources that produce this power. "In terms of resources, soft power resources are the assets that produce [...] attraction" (Nye, 2008, p.95).<sup>24</sup> For him "the soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)" (Nye, 2004, p.11; Nye, 2011, p.84). The use of soft power resources are combined with communication or broadcasting mechanisms, such as public diplomacy, to determined soft power behaviours which ultimately lead to soft power outcomes, such as changed policies, attitudes, and preferences. Explaining how the soft power behaviours – attraction, persuasion and agenda-setting – work is important for understanding soft power. Nye's co-optive soft power

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<sup>22</sup> Nye, Joseph (2004). *The Means to Success in World Politics*. Public Affairs.

<sup>23</sup> Nye, Joseph (2011). *The Future of Power*. Public Affairs.

<sup>24</sup> Nye, J., (2008) "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power" in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 616, *Public Diplomacy in a Changing World* (Mar., 2008), pp. 94-109.

behaviours become a key means to achieve preferred soft power outcomes. He adds further complexity to the concept by saying that the success of soft power depends upon the “ability to attract and create credibility and trust” (Nye, 2011, p.91). Looking at this broad definition, the convolution of soft power as an analytical concept becomes clear. As Feklyunina says, “[Soft power] has inherited all the ambiguity associated with the broader concept of power” (Feklyunina, 2015, p.2). Further sections in the literature review will elaborate on the ways scholars have understood soft power in relation to the wider power debate and how the concept has been studied.

## Soft Power within the Broader Concept of Power Debate

With his concept of soft power, Nye didn't see to introduce a new face of power, but rather to identify an aspect of power that runs parallel to coercive power within all the faces of power. Scholars have widely different interpretations as to which approach to power best helps our understanding of soft power. Lukes links Nye's soft power to his third face of power, which states “the power to shape, influence or determine others' beliefs and desires, thereby securing their compliance” (Lukes, 2005a, p.486). Baldwin also says that those familiar with the “faces of power” debate will recognize that the concept of soft power is closer to Lukes' third face of power than to the second (Baldwin, 2013, p.289). Baldwin sees a connection between “Nye's concept of ‘soft power’ and Gramsci's idea of ‘hegemony’” and Lukes' third face of power (Baldwin, 2013, p.276). Nye himself acknowledges the Gramscian argument and Robert Cox's interpretation that such power is about “the ability to obtain a broad measure of consent on general principles” in order to secure the dominance of a state or class has over the subjects where Nye agrees that “soft co-optive power is just as important as hard command power” (Nye, 1990b, p.182). Gallarotti (2010a, p.25-26; 2011, p.29-30)<sup>25</sup> and Bilgin and Elis (2008, p. 13) see Nye's soft power as Luke's second and third face and hard power as the first face. Feklyunina suggests that “Nye's conceptualization of soft power is noticeably reminiscent of Lukes's ‘third face of power’”(Feklyunina, 2015, p.4). However, Feklyunina's operational analysis of soft power refers both to Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz's second face of power, by exploring the issue of the agent of power interacting with the structures or discourses of power that let them pursue their interests, as well as, Lukes' third face of power where she talks about the role “identity narratives” in shaping the interests of others i.e. the subject (Feklyunina, 2015, p.4). At the same time, she also acknowledges that Nye “suggests that soft power can be associated

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<sup>25</sup> Gallarotti, G., 2010a. *Cosmopolitan power in international relations: a synthesis of realism, neoliberalism, and constructivism*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Gallarotti, G., 2010b. *The power curse: influence and illusion in world politics*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Gallarotti, G., 2011. *Soft power: what it is, why it's important, and the conditions for its effective use*. *Journal of Political Power*, 4 (1), 25–47.

with other faces of power as well” (Feklyunina, 2015, p.4 cites Nye, 2011). Similarly, Kiseleva links Nye’s view of co-optation in soft power to Lukes’ third face of power – “the ability to shape others’ preferences and beliefs to one’s advantage through generation of consent that advances one’s interests” (Kiseleva, 2015, p.319). However, she also compares co-optation to Barnett and Duvall’s “structural power” where soft power “shapes others’ ‘self-understanding’ and ‘interpretive system’ through production of particular values and interests, which determine others’ behaviour and choice of actions” (Kiseleva, 2015, p.319). Lee sees this more as productive power, which is reminiscent with the fourth face of power, and says that if persuasion is to have an impact on actual policy change in the target, “the very first step is that the target (or receiver) should imagine the sender as embodying culture, political values, and their associated policies. [...] In other words, constitution (identification) must come before causation (persuasion) for soft power to work” (Lee, 2011, p.33-34).<sup>26</sup> Lee builds on Mattern’s where she says, “soft power depends on others’ knowledge of one’s alluring qualities” (Mattern, 2005, p.588).<sup>27</sup> Furthermore, for Mattern soft power is interpreted through the lens of representational power (Mattern, 2005). Others also believe that the concept is best understood through the fourth face of power and compare it to the work of Foucault while also drawing in both structural and relational power (see Digeser, 1992; Lock, 2009<sup>28</sup>). Soft power can be associated with the Gramscian ideas around ideological hegemony, “good” and “common sense” (Gramsci, 1975, p. 331),<sup>29</sup> which Zahran and Ramos do and say that Nye’s concept describes the “ideational aspects of the hegemonic project” (Zahran and Ramos, 2009, p.28).<sup>30</sup> Hall says the concept of soft power covers a number of power types including institutional power, reputational power, and representational power (Hall, 2010, p.208-211).<sup>31</sup>

Nye himself ties all three faces of power to the soft power concept, however, his explanation of this is very brief and not theoretically elaborate. In the first face, Nye sees “A us[ing]

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<sup>26</sup> Lee Y.W. (2011) “Soft Power as Productive Power” in Lee S.J., Melissen J. (eds) *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia*. Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy. Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

<sup>27</sup> Mattern, J.B. (2005). “Why ‘Soft Power’ Isn’t So Soft: Representational Force and the Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics” in *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.33, No.3, pp. 583-612

<sup>28</sup> Lock, E. (2009). “Soft power and strategy: Developing a ‘strategic’ conception of power” in *Soft Power and US Foreign Policy. Theoretical, historical and contemporary perspectives*. Eds Parmar Inderjeet and Michael Cox. Routledge.

<sup>29</sup> Gramsci, Antonio. (1975) *History, Philosophy and Culture in the Young Gramsci* ed. by Pedro Cavalcanti and Paul Piccone. Telos Press

<sup>30</sup> Zahran, G. and L. Ramos (2009). “From hegemony to soft power: Implications of a conceptual change” in *Soft Power and US Foreign Policy. Theoretical, historical and contemporary perspectives*. Eds Parmar Inderjeet and Michael Cox. Routledge.

<sup>31</sup> Hall, T. (2010). “An unclear attraction: a critical examination of soft power as an analytical category.” *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 3(2), 189-211.

attraction/persuasion to change B's existing preferences" rather than the hard power such as military and economic coercion where "A uses force/payment to change B's existing strategies." In the second face, soft power is when "A uses attraction or institutions so that B sees the agenda as legitimate" instead of hard power where "A uses force/pay to truncate B's agenda (whether B likes it or not)." And finally, in the third face, soft power is when "A uses attraction and/or institutions to shape B's initial preferences" while hard power would be for "A to use force/pay to shape B's preferences." Basically, actor A turns to the "soft power of framing [or agenda-setting], persuasion, and attraction" (Nye, 2011, p.91) with Nye's assumption that power is based on positive and co-optive abilities of actors to get what they want through the attractiveness of their tangible and intangible resources.

By looking at the above discussions of power by other scholars, it is clear that the concept remains ambiguous and contested. The next sections elaborate in more detail how soft power has been studied more precisely through relational or ideational lenses and point out the shortcomings in such approaches.

## Soft power through the relational and ideational power lens

The relational and ideational focus on soft power comes from a critique of the study of the subject through the power as resource perspective. This section explores some of these perspectives and illustrates how soft power has been interpreted through these lenses. It looks at the concept of attraction and persuasion and whether soft power is co-optive or coercive. The section concludes with an acknowledgement that soft power can be viewed through these lenses yet asserts that these perspectives ignore the capabilities and resources that underpin the social interactions that relational scholars focus on.

Talking about power in general, Lebow says that "recent constructivist writings differentiate power from influence, and highlight the importance of process. Habermasian accounts stress the ways in which argument can be determining, and describe a kind of influence that can be fully independent of material capabilities" (Lebow, 2005, p.552; Lebow, 2007, p.120-121<sup>32</sup>). Feklyunina in her examinations of soft power states that "by studying resources, we cannot say much about differences between divergent interpretations of the same actors by different audiences and their changes over time." She said that the focus should not be on resources but on the way the audiences "'read' an actor" (Feklyunina, 2015, p.3). While she says that resources are part of the analysis of

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<sup>32</sup> Lebow, R.N. (2007). "The power of persuasion" in *Power in World Politics*. Berenskoetter, F. and M.J. Williams (Eds). Routledge.

power, however, they are not enough to attribute power. She endorses Guzzini's view that the analysis of power cannot occur without considering the values and preferences of the audience, which "given weight not by themselves, but by shared understandings in social relations" (Guzzini, 2013, p.5; Feklyunina, 2015).<sup>33</sup> Baldwin, who like most other scholars critiques the ambiguity of Nye's concept, states that soft power is closely linked to existing research on relational power and suggests that "future research on soft power should be more firmly rooted in that literature" (Baldwin, 2013, p.289). Roselle et al. critique the fact that research has focused on "assets" or capabilities of soft power and paid less attention to "how such capabilities could have influence or impact" (Roselle et al., 2014, p.71). The reality is that many scholars have, since then, paid attention to the relational and ideational aspects of soft power. However, much of this research addresses different aspects of relational and ideational power relating to Nye's focus on attraction, persuasion and agenda-setting and often comes to conflicting conclusions, even with regards to debating the level of co-option and coercion of soft power.

## Persuasion

Nye says, "soft power shapes others' preferences" and it is about creating attraction (Nye, 2004, p.5-6). Lukes points out that Nye doesn't elaborate on this enough nor does he distinguish between "ways in which soft power can co-opt, attract and entice subjects to it; between the different ways in which it can induce their acquiescence. [...] with no distinction between modes of persuasion or ways of 'shaping preferences'" (Lukes, 2005b, p.487).<sup>34</sup> Although Nye does not fully unpack the workings of any of these elements in a theoretically precise manner, other scholars attempt to do this. Feklyunina, who emphasises the relational aspect of soft power, focuses on the role of the audiences, narratives, and identity in the workings of soft power. She raises the question of how to investigate the way in which actors can influence the subject's understanding and shape their preferences. For her, social constructivism provides the answer where the belief is that "interests are not pre-given or fixed, but shaped by their socially constructed identities, and that they evolve as their identities transform in the process of interaction with others and in response to both internal and external changes" (Feklyunina, 2015, p.4). She suggests that comparability between B's socially constructed identities and A's would result in a higher likelihood of having common interests. Soft power would be more present in this sort of relationship because there would be compatibility in their understanding of their identities, interests, and situations (Feklyunina, 2015, p.4). Here she highlights

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<sup>33</sup> Guzzini, Stefano (2013). *Power, Realism and Constructivism*. Routledge.

<sup>34</sup> Steven Lukes, "Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 33, no. 3 (2005): 477–493, at pp. 477–478.

that collective identity plays a key role in soft power, which has also been made by a number of scholars, e.g. Hayden (2012)<sup>35</sup> or Solomon (2014)<sup>36</sup>. For her, the “collective identity narrative,” which are not limited to ethnic or national markers, play a role in constructing “common interests” which is a key part of soft power (Feklyunina, 2015, p.5). In this understanding, it is not about having the same identity but by sharing commonalities where such an “identity narrative is accepted by target audiences” and agreement with the agent of power is made (Feklyunina, 2015, p.5). Lukes discusses a similar approach when referring to Kepel’s work on Muslim youths in Europe (see Kepel, 2004).<sup>37</sup> Kepel suggests that allowing these youths full democratic participation in institutions “especially those of education and culture – that encourage upward social mobility and the emergence of new elites” (Lukes 2005b, p.488<sup>38</sup> cites Kepel, 2004, p.249; Lukes, 2007, p. 98), then persuasion and agenda-setting work in subtle ways. This is about shaping the preferences and interests of young Muslims – “a way of inducing them to define themselves” in a way more favourable to the life of western Europe and a way for “Europe’s young Muslims [to] become the international vectors of a democratic project whose success they themselves embody” (Lukes, 2005b, p.488 cites Kepel, 2004, p.249, 295). In this case, soft power is about the ability to influence the actual “self-definition” or identities of the subjects or audience to become more like-minded (Lukes, 2007, p.94-95).

A rationalist would however disagree with such assumptions. In his assessment of persuasion, Walsh opposes the constructivist stance which assumes that persuasion occurs only because there are shared values, which are achieved by shifting the target’s normative beliefs to align more with those of the agent of power. Rather Walsh adopts a rationalist view and asserts that, in certain circumstances, persuasion can change the target’s beliefs about the efficacy or the rewards associated with available policy options (Walsh, 2005, p.642-643).<sup>39</sup> Lukes himself hesitates to use the term persuasion recognizing that it refers to either a rational or non-rational way of acquiring consent (Lukes, 2007, p.95). On the other hand, while supporting the constructivist view to focus on narratives and influence and not material capabilities, Lebow also critiques the narrow perspective that an argument works when there are shared norms or common worldviews. On the contrary, his approach is one that focuses on “rhetoric as the language of politics and considers the most persuasive

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<sup>35</sup> Hayden, C. (2012). *The Rhetoric of Soft Power. Public Diplomacy in Global Contexts*. Lexington Books.

<sup>36</sup> Solomon, T. (2014). The affective underpinnings of soft power. *European Journal of International Relations* 20(3): 720–741.

<sup>37</sup> Lukes, S. (2007). “Power the battle for hearts and minds: in the bluntness of soft power” in *Power in World Politics*. Berenskoetter, F. and M.J.Williams (Eds). Routledge. Kepel, Gilles (2004). *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West*. Trans. Pascale Ghazaleh. Harvard University Press.

<sup>38</sup> Lukes, S. (2005). “Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds” In *Millennium – Journal of International Studies*, 33, pp.477-493.

<sup>39</sup> Walsh, J.I. (2005). “Persuasion in International Politics: A Rationalist Account” in *Politics and Policy*. Vol. 33. No. 4, December. Pp.

arguments those that sustain or enable identities” (Lebow, 2007, p.121). The disagreement about what actually causes the persuasion is therefore contested and contingent.

## Attraction

In addition to persuasion, another key contested idea relating to Nye’s soft power is attraction. For Mattern, it is not only important to understand how attraction works for theoretical purposes but also to understand how soft power can be built and deployed on the practical level. “For actors who aim to deploy soft power, success will ultimately depend on knowing how exactly to make their ideas and themselves attractive to a target population.” (Mattern, 2005, p. 584). Nye says, “The production of soft power by attraction depends upon the qualities of the agent and how they are perceived by the target. What produces attraction for one target may produce revulsion for another” (Nye, 2011, p.92). When attempting to describe what qualities with positive attraction would be, Nye refers to several psychological studies,<sup>40</sup> which contend that “we like those who are similar to us or with whom we share group membership, and we are also attracted by physical characteristics as well as shared attitudes” (Nye, 2011, p.92). This raises the same questions discussed in the previous section.

Following on from this, Nye also assigns certain qualities to agents that make them attractive such as “benignity” – how the agent relates to others and appears to be sympathetic, trustworthy, credible – “brilliance” or competence – expressed in admiration and respect – and finally beauty or “charisma” – expressed in ideals, values and inspiration. Nye says, “these clusters of qualities are crucial for converting resources (such as culture, values, and policies) into power behaviour” (Nye, 2011, p.92). Nye’s approach to attraction is convoluted and allows Mattern to point out that “Nye assigns two ontological status of attraction – one as an essential condition and one as a result of social interaction” (Mattern, 2005, p.591). Kiseleva (2015) also picks up on this contradiction and highlights Nye’s dual treatment of the nature of attraction. On one hand, she suggests that he repeatedly talks about ‘universal’ values as self-evident attraction, while on the other, he talks about soft power success where there are “shared values or where countries’ values are attractive to others” (Kiseleva, 2015, p.318). Kiseleva also makes the argument that “the ‘natural’, immutable character of attraction

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<sup>40</sup> “Donna Byrne, Gerald Clore, and George Smearon, “The Attraction Hypothesis: Do Similar Attitudes Affect Anything?” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 51, no. 6 (1986): 1167-1170; Fang Fang Chen and Douglas Kenrick, “Repulsion or Attraction?: Group Membership and Assumed Attitude Similarity,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 83, no.1 (2002): 111-125; Alice Eagly, Richard Ashmore, Mona Makhijani, and Laura Longo, “What Is Beautiful Is Good, but ...: A Meta-analytic Review of Research on the Physical Attractiveness Stereotype,” *Psychological Bulletin* 110, no.1 (1991): 109-128.” Studies cited in: (Endnote 37 in Nye, 2011, p.257)



between states is less tenable; attraction rather amounts to the ability to persuade in a particular context at a particular time” (Kiseleva, 2015, p.318). Kiseleva proposes that soft power operates not because of the quality of values, which have a contingent nature, rather, she agrees with Mattern that soft power is about persuasion (Kiseleva, 2015). Hence, the discussion of attraction returns to a discussion of persuasion and communication.

Mattern says that “soft power, it seems, is rooted in communication” because “attraction is constructed through communicative exchange” (Mattern, 2005, p. 589, p.585). For Nye “persuasion is closely related to attraction. It is the use of argument to influence the beliefs and actions of others without the threat of force or promise of payment” (Nye, 2011, p.93). However, unlike in Nye’s view, for Mattern this process is not co-opted but rather coerced. She says that attraction achieved through persuasion “is a sociolinguistically constructed ‘truth’ about the appeal of some idea; an interpretation that won out over many other possible interpretations through a communicative process” (Mattern, 2005, p. 585). She disagrees with Nye and criticizes Jürgen Habermas’s<sup>41</sup> idea that persuasion is an effective strategy for gaining soft power or attractiveness because the audience is willing to participate in the process of persuasion. Rather Mattern says that “as a method of communicative exchange, persuasion functions through arguments, and arguments, in turn, rests upon evidence-based reasoning” (Mattern, 2005, p. 586). In the case of arguing, the actors don’t share the same understanding of evidence, rather they simply try to persuade one another over their point of view, they “*fight over it (verbally)*” (Mattern, 2005, p.586). The actors use what she calls “representational force” in order to destroy the validity of the other side’s argument. Because there is a force – sociolinguistic rather than physical force – it is like hard power because it is coercive (Mattern, 2005, p.586-587). Hayden agrees with Mattern’s analysis that soft power can be reminiscent of “representational force,” yet he points out that that communication-based power doesn’t need to be coercive. For example, he says that the rhetoric of Bush’s War on Terror “illustrates the coercive capacity,” however, there are other “symbolic activities” such as cultural exchanges or development that are not coercive but have soft power (Hayden, 2012, p.49). Zahran and Ramos would disagree with this distinction, as for them consent based on intellectual and moral leadership is the extension of coercion, and the two go hand in hand (Zahran and Ramos, 2009, p.23-24). Lukes, who sees Foucault’s interpretation of soft power as useful, also highlights that it is difficult to distinguish between “power as indoctrination” and free judgement in Nye’s agent-centred or in Foucault’s subject-centred view, where Foucault’s refuses to draw a distinction (Lukes, 2007, p.97). Hence, we

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<sup>41</sup> Habermas, Jürgen (1990). “Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification,” In *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, Cambridge, MIT. pp. 43-115.

are left with no clear understanding of how attraction works and no consensus on whether soft power is indeed co-optive or whether it is an extension of coercion.

The above discussions leave no clarity or agreement on the workings of soft power. They provide interesting insights yet give little understanding as to how the soft power of an international actor could systematically be evaluated. Hayden, however, does not see an analytical problem with Nye's lack of a specific depiction of attraction because what matters is that "the diversity of possibilities for attraction is understood as a capacity that states can recognize as strategically available to them [...] Rather than provide a prescriptive *topoi* of recipes for attraction – Nye declares it available to agents among the other tools of power" (Hayden, 2012, p.46). However, there is no clear elaboration from Hayden as to how attraction is to be strategically deployed if it is contingent and dependent on interpretation and social interactions. The question that Lukes asks "exactly how do agents succeed in winning the hearts and minds of those subject to their influence? How exactly do those with power shape the preferences of those subjects to their power?" (Lukes, 2005b, p.492-493; Lukes, 2007) remains unanswered. This implies that such an evaluation of power does not tell us much about the workings of power and how actor A actually acquires and has soft power. A different evaluation of soft power is needed than one that is based on contested interpretations by scholars of the relationship between the agents and subjects and the ideational basis which may or may not be influencing both actors. A focus on measurable resources of the agent can provide a better answer here.

## A realist critique

There are limitations to the ideational and relational lens of power. While such evaluations can provide interesting insights into particular contexts, they are not enough to evaluate how an international actor acquires soft power and possesses it. Social relations, which relational scholars evaluate occur on the basis of material events and actual perennial laws of nature, yet these are given little relevance. The realist critique of the four faces of power is provided here, and a realist view of power is offered as an alternative.

Isaac (1987)<sup>42</sup> directly critiques Dahl, Bachrach, Baratz, and Lukes and the debate around the three faces of power. He says that their view of power is in behavioural terms, "power in terms of empirical causation", power as "power over" rather than "power to", which does not distinguish between the possession and exercise of power. Alternatively, he proposes a "realist theory of power

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<sup>42</sup> Isaac, J.C. (1987). Beyond the Three Faces of Power: A Realist Critique. *Polity*, 20(1), 4-31.

as socially structured and enduring capabilities for action” (Isaac, 1987, p.4). While his work was written prior to the development of soft power, his critique of the relational approach, which scholars of soft power often turn to, is clear. First, he critiques the behaviourist approach that scholars of the three faces of power take. He begins with a critique of the first face which underpins all other faces by saying that “[a]ll of the contestants agree that power is an empirical relation of cause and effect, and none of them conceive of power as involving any necessary connections” what he later refers to as structural relationships (Isaac, 1987, p.8). When speaking about the second phase, he agrees that Bachrach and Baratz’s second face and structural power is important yet accuses them of not actually addressing structures of power but rather turning to the idea of a “mobilization of bias” “a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals, and institutional procedures” that would benefit one group over the other without answering the questions, “To what manifestation of social reality might the mobilization of bias refer?” (Isaac, 1987, p.11). Finally, Lukes’ third face is also ambiguous in the sense that it does not illuminate on the “systems and structural determinants” that he says constrain the agency of a subject leading Isaac to question the difference between the second and third faces of power. He rebukes Lukes idea of “A has power over B” rather than A has “power to” and B has “power to”, which ignores the powers that A or B possess. Concluding on this critique, Isaac says that Bachrach, Baratz, and Lukes “fail[] to develop the structural dimension of power to which they rightly point”, which isn’t an issue Dahl raises and therefore has no such limitation (Isaac, 1987, p.15).

The relational and ideational discussions of soft power above have shown that the evaluation of instances where soft power occurs are contingent on circumstances and subject to the bias of the researcher. This is further elaborated on in the sections below which unpack Nye’s view of soft power from the power as resource perspective. Isaac rejects the “understanding of natural laws as contingent empirical regularities and of causality as regular sequence of events.” Rather, a realist view is that there are fixed laws and causal mechanisms that are predetermined, where he illustrates with a simple example, such as copper conducts electricity while string does not. Applying this to the study of power means that there are fixed laws and patterns or mechanisms and the “primary object of theoretical analysis would not be behavioural regularities, but the enduring social relationships that structure them” where human activity has social preconditions and activities have material conditions (Isaac, 1987, p.17-18).

Isaac critiques the neo-Kantian dualism of Habermas, which he says “seems to rest on a sharp dichotomy between the real world of causal relations and an ideal world of autonomy.” This is echoed in the interpretation of soft power when there is discussion of the value of norms such as human rights and that these are attractive to some who want to escape authoritarian rule. The problem for Isaac

here is not the normative judgement that the theorist might hold but that there is a detached analysis of the “object interest from the analysis of actual power relations.” Isaac furthermore finds the same limitation with some Marxist approaches which “fail to bridge the gap between the real and the ideal [...] whereby those in a subordinate position are either actually or immanently in opposition to the existing system of power” (Isaac, 1987, p.27-28). The critique of power scholars is that they often judge some values as superior to others or prescribe at random more favourable values to one actor rather than another and such analyses hold a bias and depend on contingent events. This is particularly pertinent when thinking about the way scholars have judged the value of some soft power resources, which will be discussed further below.

In the study of International Relations, Morgenthau has identified the structure that Isaac is calling for. Morgenthau bases his theory on the perennial law of human nature and an assertion that interest for political actors is defined as power. Morgenthau says that political interests are defined as power (Morgenthau, (1949) 1985, p.5). Adding to this, he asserts that “interest is indeed of the essence of politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place” (Morgenthau, (1949) 1985, p.10).<sup>43</sup> Keohane, on the other hand, disagrees that international actors’ interest only rests in attaining power (Keohane, 1986, p.194) and says shared interests may lead to cooperation (Keohane, 1984, p.6).<sup>44</sup> However, Behr and Heath highlight that Keohane has not accounted for the way in how such varying interests come to be (Behr and Heath, 2009, p.335).<sup>45</sup> Behr and Heath do highlight that Morgenthau concurs with Max Weber’s observation that interests and not ideas dominate men’s action even though ideas do influence the dynamics in which interests operate (Behr and Heath, 2009 p. 11 cite Max Weber, 1926<sup>46</sup>). In order to understand this political power, there is a need to also focus on the political space rather than on other possible social relations.

Furthermore, to reduce some conflation that often occurs in ideational studies of power, Morgenthau focuses on politics and international relations is concentrates on the realm of the political and not on other social activities where there might be power relations such as forms of truth, knowledge, or discourse.

“When we speak of power [...] we have in mind not man’s power over nature, or over an artistic medium, such as language, speech, sound or color, or over the means of production

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<sup>43</sup> Morgenthau, H.J. and K.W. Thompspon (1985). *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. 6<sup>th</sup> ed. Knopf.

<sup>44</sup> Keohane, R.O. (1984). *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*.

<sup>45</sup> Behr, H. and A. Heath (2009). “Misreading in IR theory and ideology critique: Morgenthau, Waltz, and neo-realism” in *Review of International Studies*, 35, pp.327-349.

<sup>46</sup> Marianne Weber (1926). *Max Weber*. Tuebingen, J.C.B. Mohr. Pp. 347-8

or consumption, or over himself in the sense of self-control. When we speak of power, we mean man's control over the minds and actions of other men" (Morgenthau, (1948) 1978, p.32).

Realists oppose moral judgement, which is often found in works on soft power as we will see shortly below, where one scholar claims on behalf of an agent or an agent of power claims for themselves to have superior morality over another or that norms and ideas somehow change the underlying laws of nature. In his fifth principle of political realism, he asserts that a nation cannot assume itself morally superior to another nation as such assumptions "in the name of moral principles, ideals, or God himself" are a "moral excess and [...] political folly" from which only the objective view, that all nations are the same in their pursuit of power, can keep us safe (Morgenthau, [1948] 1985, p.13).

The conclusion drawn from the realist understanding of power is as Morgenthau says,

"The concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible. [...] A realist theory of international politics, then, will guard against two popular fallacies: the concern with motives and the concern with ideological preferences" (Morgenthau, (1948) 1985, p.5).

## Applying Realism to Soft Power

This section unpacks how the concept of soft power relates to realism and how it can be understood through that paradigm. There is a common misperception that realism is only about hard power. Although the Cold War context did narrow the focus of realism in IR down to material resources – military or economic (Morgenthau (1948); Waltz (1954, 1979)<sup>47</sup>, the actual premise of a realist understanding of power is broad. According to Morgenthau power can change over time. Meaning the interest remains in power, but the power capability may shift from military resources to intangible resources,

"[Power] Its content and the manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural environment. Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the

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<sup>47</sup> Waltz, K.N. (1954). *Man, the State and War*. Waltz, K. N. (1979) *Theory of International Politics*. London: Addison-Wesley.

Waltz, K. N. (1986) 'Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics', in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and Its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 322-45.

control of man over man. Thus power covers all social relationships which serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another” (Morgenthau, (1948, 1979), p.11).

While this aligns with Nye’s soft power, it is different in the way such power is evaluated or studied. Morgenthau says that although an actor can have influence over another through persuasion, this actor has no power unless he can compel and impose his will upon the latter ([1948] 1979, p.33). Keohane critiques Morgenthau by saying “his definition of power was murky, since he failed to distinguish between power as a resource [...] and power as the ability to influence others’ behaviour” (Keohane, 1986, p.11).<sup>48</sup> While this may in some respects be true, it is how realism studies power itself that is different and solves that problem. At this point, we can refer back to Isaac’s discussion, where he says the researcher needs to look at capabilities and resources rather than relational aspects of power and consider the agent’s “power to” do something rather than “power over” another (Isaac, 1987).

In the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the predominant focus was on military resources and that of nation-states. However, since increased globalization and decreased direct interstate military conflict between great powers, power is being expressed through different means than mere military and economic resources. Hence, power’s “content and the manner of its use” have been altered to include non-military resources. This is where Nye’s concept of soft power is relevant. As a key liberal scholar in IR, Nye began his first arguments about power as a debate between liberal ideas and realist thinking in a continuation of the ongoing tradition of having debates between the two dominant traditions in IR paradigms. “Nye’s primary concert at the [beginning of his formulation of soft power] was to repudiate arguments coming from realist quarters” (Kudryavtsev, 2014, p.1; see also Bakalov, 2019, p.131). As we have seen earlier these were directed at realists like Kennedy (1987),<sup>49</sup> who claimed that the US power was in decline because the US’s material capabilities were decreasing. Bakalov argues that Nye “criticis[es] realists, who arguably assume that power equals resources, Nye insists that ‘proof of power lies not in resources but in the ability to change the behaviour of states’” (Bakalov, 2019, p.131 cites Nye, 1990b, p.155). Bakalov further suggests that Nye, in opposition to realism, frames his concept of soft power, in relational terms and that for him power is located in “the interaction between actors, not in their individual properties [... and] according to this view, the power of an actor is not constant across relationships, but specific to each agent-target dyad” (Bakalov, 2019, p.132). On the other hand, Feklyunina, who offered a constructivist interpretation of soft power

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<sup>48</sup> Keohane, R.O. (1986). “Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics” in R.O. Keohane ed. *Neorealism and its Critics*. Columbia University Press.

<sup>49</sup> Kennedy, P., 1987. *The rise and fall of the great powers*. New York: Random House Inc.

earlier, sees that “Nye’s own conceptualisation shares some similarities with the power-as-resource approach” (Feklyunina, 2015, p.3). Feklyunina highlights that non-material factors were also important to realists like Morgenthau’s consideration of psychological factors or the focus on decision maker’s perception of power for neo-realists. Nye himself only critiques some realists and says that, “since [soft power] is a form of power, only a truncated and impoverished version of realism would ignore soft power. Traditional realists did not” (Nye, 2010, p.219). Amongst others, Morgenthau is one of these traditional realists. Nye recalls the realist E.H. Carr’s<sup>50</sup> description of “international power in three categories: military power, economic power, and power over opinion”, the subtlety of seeing power like this was lost with the neo-realists (Nye, 2011, p.82; see also Nye, 2010, p.220).

Overall Nye himself rebukes scholars that align soft power with one specific theory only, saying that “the concept fits with realist, liberal or constructivist perspectives” (Nye, 2010, p.219).<sup>51</sup> This dissertation acknowledges that there are other understandings of soft power, however, it chooses to look at the realist power-as-resource perspective in order to derive at a systematic and resource-based understanding of soft power. Similarly, Hayden says that “soft power reveals a complementary dimension to the strategic assumption of realist politics [...] At the same time, it broadens the scope for how international actors take inventory of their own strategic assets, and suggests new applications for cultural products, industries, and communicative competencies” (Hayden, 2011, p.6-7).

## Soft power resources

This section explores how Nye’s soft power has been evaluated through the power-as-resource perspective. It highlights that many of these studies still end up turning to a relational power perspective or only speak of cases that depict instances of resources being used, but do not provide a theoretical understanding of soft power resources. It concludes that more work needs to be done to understand soft power through the power-as-resource perspective.

For Nye “the soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)” (Nye, 2004, p.11; Nye, 2011, p.84). Nye’s weakness with regard to the elaboration on soft power resources is that he

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<sup>50</sup> Carr, E.H. (1940) *The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, London: MacMillan.

<sup>51</sup> Nye, J. (2009). “Responding to my critics and concluding thoughts” in *Soft Power and US Foreign Policy. Theoretical, historical and contemporary perspectives*. Eds Parmar Inderjeet and Michael Cox. Routledge.

doesn't provide a clear structure for how to understand them, but rather depends on arbitrary empirical illustrations to tell the reader what these resources may be. Baldwin says that "this amalgamation of the discussion of defining characteristics of soft power with empirical observations about it has generated needless confusion" (Baldwin, 2013, p.289). Ambiguity regarding soft power resources prevails. While Nye proposes that culture, values, and policies are the primary resources of soft power, he simultaneously claims that hard power resources can also produce soft power. Nye explains that "economic resources can also produce soft as well as hard power behaviour" – meaning "they can be used to attract or coerce" (Nye, 2011, p.85). Nye often connects soft power to intangible resources such as culture or values. However, as Baldwin critically observes, "the tangibility of resources is not an essential defining characteristic of soft power, but rather an empirical association" (Baldwin, 2013, p.289).<sup>52</sup> At another time, Nye says that "credibility is the crucial resource and an important source of soft power" (Nye 2008 p.100) adding further to the conceptual confusion.

Much of the confusion about the type of resources that produce soft power comes from the fact that first, the scholarship is divided into case-centred vs. concept centred studies and has no single method for studying soft power and second, it is difficult to differentiate between hard and soft power (Baldwin, 2016, p.165). Bakalov, who gives an overview of the soft power literature, shows that the literature on soft power and resources looks at either resources as measures of differentiation or employs a difference-in-degree distinction between soft and hard power (Bakalov, 2019, p.135). Patalakh (2016)<sup>53</sup> argues for resources as a differentiating factor between soft power and other types of power. Nye himself acknowledges that the wide use of the concept of soft power has led to "misuses of the concept as a synonym for anything other than military force" (Nye, 2011, p.81). And yet, "Nye's language of resources or assets has had a major impact on empirical studies" (Feklyunina, 2015, p.3). Most of these studies associate cultural and public diplomacy, mass media, or higher education with soft power (Feklyunina, 2015, p.3), which is already a misunderstanding. As Nye's work suggests, any hard or soft asset – "culture, values, legitimate policies, a positive domestic model, a successful economy, and a competent military" (Nye, 2011, p.99) – can produce soft power outcomes. Baldwin suggests that "future research on soft power should clearly distinguish between definitional matters and empirical ones" (Baldwin, 2013, p.289).

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<sup>52</sup> Baldwin, David A. (2013). "Power and International Relations" in eds. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, Beth A. Simmons (2013) *Handbook of International Relations*. Sage Publications.

<sup>53</sup> Patalakh, A., (2016). Assessment of soft power strategies: towards an aggregative analytical model for country-focused case study research. *Croatian International Relations Review*, 22 (76), 85–112.



## Values

Looking at Nye's discussion of values and their role in the soft power equation, one sees that there are some empirical examples given and an attempt to ascribe to these values some fixed characteristics, which lead to soft power outcomes. However, these characteristics are undermined by other empirical examples. For Nye the US, in the 80s and to a large degree today, has the biggest ability to attract others through its values. In the information age, the countries that will be most attractive according to Nye are those, "whose dominant culture and ideas are closer to prevailing global norms (which now emphasize liberalism, pluralism, and autonomy)" (Nye, 2004, p.32). Nye suggests that this is an opportunity for the US, Europe and other Western countries as the values of these countries are closer to "universal values" (Nye, 2004, p.11-14). Many have criticized Nye's views as having a Western-centric bias, or as Bakalov (2016) says liberal democratic bias, (see also Bilgin and Elis, 2008, Kiseleva, 2015). Others suggest that liberal political principles are the essence of soft power (Gallarotti, 2011, p.35). Lebow writes that "Nye takes it for granted that the American way of life is so attractive, even mesmerising, and the global public goods it supposedly provides so beneficial, that others are predisposed to follow Washington's lead. Like many liberals, he treats interests and identities as objective, uncontroversial and given (Lebow, 2005, p.552).<sup>54</sup> Following such criticisms of this "universality" stance, Nye asserts that values they are "not universal in some absolute sense, but many are similar to the values of others in an information age where more people want participation and freedom of expression" (Nye, 2011, p.87). While he may be right that some people are inclined to such values it again brings us to the relational evaluation of power, where the relationship of the audience to the agent needs to be taken into consideration. Furthermore, he contradicts himself by admitting that different values are attractive to different countries and groups. "Otherwise, there would be far more uniformity of views than now exists in global affairs" and highlights that there are different markers of identity, i.e. values, which command loyalty (Nye, 2011, p.87). Nye turns away from viewing power as a resource here and engages in the relational power perspective. Like Feklyunina, whose constructivist interpretation of shared identity narratives we encountered earlier, Nye asserts that shared or "similar" values are a key feature of successful soft power and that it is the lack of commonality that leads to lower soft power (Nye, 2011, p.87). Similarly, Green, who looks at values as a resource that can be promoted through mass media, turns to a "common identity" stance saying, "there needs to be a coming together of life experiences and a repertoire of collective interpretations of the world" and "there needs to be knowledge about the attraction before the

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<sup>54</sup> Lebow, Richard Ned (2005). Power, Persuasion, and Justice. Millennium. Journal of International Studies. Vol. 33, NO.3, pp. 551-581.

attraction can occur” (Green, 2012, p.7).<sup>55</sup> Hence, what we have are descriptions of values as resources that either carry symbolic meaning that isn’t empirically sound or are not theoretically elaborated on. It cannot be disputed that values are resources, yet the existing literature’s turn to the relational perspective leads to a failure to focus on a more robust elaboration of the resource and manner of its deployment for soft power purposes.

It would have made more theoretical sense to focus on the fact that values are a resource without the discussion of which normative character they should carry. For example, the shift away from studying US soft power and other liberal states like Japan (Watanabe and McConnell, 2008) to a focus on the soft power of states that are not traditionally described as liberal democracies (for Russian soft power see Kiseleva, 2015; Feklyunina, 2015<sup>56</sup>; Chinese soft power see (Callahan, 2015; Gill and Huang, 2006), and Nye’s own admission that terrorist organizations, which have soft power and recruit through anti-American sentiments (Nye, 2004, p.29), should have been a basis to eliminate discussions of normative values and based the discussion on the resource of value and the mechanisms that project it.

## Culture

Culture is another important resource for the workings of soft power. For Nye, “culture is the set of values and practices that create meaning for society. It has many manifestations. It is common to distinguish between high culture such as literature, art, and education, which appeals to elites, and popular culture, which focuses on mass entertainment” (Nye, 2004, p.95; 2008, p.11).<sup>57</sup> By stressing the importance of film, posters, high and popular culture, Nye certainly acknowledges the importance of cultural productions – media productions and artistic productions – in soft power. Nye talks about a Chinese activist who told him that by watching numerous US movies that included court cases, it encouraged the idea in some Chinese to use “lawsuits to assert rights. [...] If American objectives include the strengthening of the legal system in China, such films may be more effective than speeches by the American ambassador about the importance of the rule of law” (Nye, 2004, p.12). There is also some well-known and highly valued art such as the Bolshoi and Kirov ballet companies that Nye believes gave the Soviet Union some soft power (Nye, 2004, p.74). Pointing to European “art,

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<sup>55</sup> Green, M.R. (2013). Connecting attitudes, aspirations and values: Australia's media engagement in the Asia Pacific and apprenticeship in Soft Power, *The Journal of International Communication*, 19:1, 4-18

<sup>56</sup> Feklyunina, Valentina (2015). “Soft power and identity: Russia, Ukraine and the ‘Russian world(s)’” in *European Journal of International Relations*. Sage publications. pp.1-24

<sup>57</sup> Nye, Joseph. (2004). *The Means to Success in World Politics.* p.11

literature, music, design, fashion, and food” Nye says, “European states have a strong cultural attractiveness” (Nye, 2004, p.75).

Nye’s discussion of culture as a resource for soft power shows more potential than his discussion of values because it outlines the cultural assets that can serve as an element of the resource that is projected or promoted to a desired audience. He does understand that different cultural assets will have a different soft power impact on, for example, the “Muslim” and the “Western” world and acknowledges that the “Muslim society is not monolithic” but different aspects of US culture could be attractive to some but not to others within these societies, e.g. the attractiveness of music to Iranian youth vs. the religious leaders (Nye, 2011, p.84-85; Nye, 2004, p.86-88). Furthermore, he acknowledges how such assets will reach his target audience, the subject of power, which in this case are two-fold, the youth that like American music and the wider population in the foreign country. He says that despite 9/11 and the following War on Terror, Arabs “admired some aspects of American culture.” He highlights the mechanisms that would promote these cultural assets, calling for “cultural and educational exchanges that develop a richer and more open civil society in Middle Eastern countries” so that when the local people share US culture and “values such as family, religious belief, and desire for democracy” they become “indigenous surrogates” for American soft power (Nye, 2004, p.120-122). While the “shared values and culture” relational and subjective elements are present, nonetheless, the resources are clear and the way they are to be employed by the agent of power as well. First, cultural and educational exchange programmes will be set up from which indigenous surrogates will ensue, which can then be deployed as part of a civil society into the wider population of the target. The issue is that Nye’s discussions, as those of others who study resources of power, end up in constructivist corners focusing on how ideals and values are shaped, what subjective norm or notion of “shared values” they may carry.

What this ignores is a more systematic evaluation of the actual resources that underpin all these realities. These resources are made of both cultural assets, music or film, as well as mechanisms for their projection such as exchange programmes, universities, radio stations, etc. Without such assets and mechanisms none of the interaction, exchange of ideas, influence, and persuasion could actually take place. There is more work done on the mechanisms for the employment of soft power resources, which is discussed in the next section. Kroenig et al. (2010)<sup>58</sup> call for more research into topics such as culture and soft power. Like many, they highlight the fact that the state does not control all the cultural resources, which are important for soft power both conceptually and strategically,

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<sup>58</sup> Kroenig, M., M. McAdam, S. Weber, (2010). “Taking Soft Power Seriously” in *Comparative Strategy*, pp. 411-457.

hence theorizing about how to employ culture for soft power purposes has been difficult. They “invite others to analyze in future research the more expansive notions of soft power” (Kroenig et al., 2010, p.413). More literature on the way different scholars view culture as a resource for soft power is evaluated in the theory chapter, where the various views are brought together into one coherent framework to give the idea that culture is a resource for soft power more clarity and structure.

## Soft Power Mechanisms and Instruments

The one aspect of resource power that is elaborated on more in the literature are the mechanisms for employing resources such as culture and values. Resources of power do not just produce soft power on their own. Rather they must be instrumentalized, employed or promoted through some sort of means or mechanisms. Hayden highlights this aspect and says that “resources are not by their nature effective in a soft power transaction. They must be converted or translated in appropriate contexts” (Hayden, 2012, p.41). Nye writes that there are tools or mechanisms for “wielding” (Nye, 2004) or, as Hayden would say, “leveraging” (Hayden, 2011, p.9) soft power. In his later work, Nye briefly refers to these tools or mechanisms as “shaped resources” (Nye, 2011, p.99). Such mechanisms include “national intelligence services, information agencies, diplomacy, public diplomacy, exchange programs, assistance programs, training programs, and various other measures [i.e. broadcasting and information campaigns]” (Nye, 2011, p.99). One commonality between these varying mechanisms is that they are about the exchange and communication of information. Nye says “the ability to share information – and to be believed – becomes an important source of attraction and power” (Nye, 2004, p.31). In other examples of soft power, mechanisms are used in order to promote soft power resources by making them more visible or understandable to a chosen target audience. For Nye “public diplomacy tries to attract by drawing attention to [...] potential resources through broadcasting, subsidizing cultural exports, arranging exchanges, and so forth” (Nye, 2008, p.95). While soft power can simply arise from social, economic, and political realities, global actors also deliberately create communication strategies and campaigns in order to increase their potential soft power. Nye recalls when France created the Alliance Française to “popularize its culture and restore national prestige” and when the US government supported Hollywood during WWI to make films that put the US in “a positive light” (Nye, 2011, p.102). Broadcasting through radio, television, the internet and other information communication technologies (ICTs) has also been central to soft power. Televised wars like that between NATO and Serbia helped each side “frame the interpretation

of events in 2000” (Nye, 2011, p.104). New media tools such as Twitter or Facebook allow people to come together and play an “important role in transnational communication” (Nye, 2011, p.104).

Snow, similar to Nye, shows the role of public diplomacy in soft power is not only for spreading information but also building relationships. She says that the US Department of State’s mission for the undersecretary for public diplomacy is “to support the achievement of the US foreign policy goals and objectives, advance national interests, and enhance national security by informing and influencing foreign publics and by expanding and strengthening the relationship between the people and government of the United States and citizens of the rest of the world” (Snow, 2015).<sup>59</sup> Nye makes occasional comments about the importance of relationships and networks as facilitators of these relationships. However, just saying that it is beneficial for power when it is distributed through networks and is “less hierarchical in an information age” and in order to succeed leaders need to turn to co-optation where “two-way communications are more effective than commands” (Nye, 2011, p.100-101). Similarly, Jödicke, treats religion both as a resource and as a mechanism through which soft power can be created. “Religion, as social action,<sup>60</sup> can function as one cultural force that – without restriction to national territories – supports attraction, identification and solidarity. Transnational religious relationships or transnational religious proximity can enhance a country’s attractiveness and spill over into political issues” (Jödicke, 2017, p.2<sup>61</sup>). Hence, the ability to share information is an important aspect of soft power, which is underpinned by mechanisms such as a broad range of networks, cultural and educational programmes, but is lacking in the theoretical conceptualisation of soft power as a systematic evaluation of these fundamental resources of soft power. Nye’s conclusions – “These programs develop what Edward R Murrow<sup>62</sup> once called crucial ‘last three feet’ – face-to-face communication that are a two-way process characterized by the enhanced credibility that reciprocity creates” (Nye, 2011, p.106) tend to always gravitate towards the relational aspect of power and focus on credibility, which, as we have seen, is a subjective matter.

There are few instances where there is somewhat a more theoretical elaboration of these resources as for example when Nye (2011) speaks about public diplomacy. He outlines three main elements that soft power mechanisms, such as “public diplomacy”, should have. The first is for an actor to have information available daily to fill in any vacuum of information or respond to any crises. The second is about “strategic communications, which develops a set of simple themes much as a

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<sup>59</sup> Snow, Nancy (2015). “Global Powers of Persuasion” in The Journal of the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan, April 2015.

<sup>60</sup> For the term “social action” Jödicke cites Arnal, W.E. and McCutcheon, R.T., 2013. The Sacred is the Profane. The Political Nature of ‘Religion’. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

<sup>61</sup> Jödicke, A. (2017). Religion and Soft Power in the South Caucasus. Routledge

<sup>62</sup> US Broadcast Journalist; Director of United States Information Agency - parent of Voice of America

political or advertising campaign does. [...] A public diplomacy campaign plans symbolic events and communications to reinforce central themes or to advance a particular government policy. Special themes focus on particular policy initiatives” (Nye, 2011, p.105-106). And finally, there is the need to develop relationships, not so much as with the audience but with the networks that spread the information and are engaged in cultural and academic exchanges (Nye, 2011, p.106). This type of discussion elaborates more on the actual resources that are available to a state when it is devising a soft power strategy and understanding how to operate their soft power. The lack of precision makes scholars, like Kondo (2008),<sup>63</sup> raise a point about the ongoing challenges of understanding soft power and then how to operationalize it. He attributes the failure of governments to operationalize soft power to their advantage in part due “to the confusion caused by their inability to get a proper handle on the qualitative differences between hard power and soft power and between public diplomacy and propaganda” (Kondo, 2008, p.203). He adds also that it is because “insufficient awareness of the importance of this sort of power” (Kondo, 2008, p.203). However, the latter point is probably not true as every nation is concerned at least with their brand or their image which brings in security, economic benefit, and internal unity. However, his first point about the lack of understanding of how soft power works is probably more appropriate, but, even more likely, it is the lack of resources in many cases that are available to states to wield soft power. It is this that places them in a weaker soft power position. This is what needs to be theorized about.

## Propaganda

The debate between soft power and propaganda, as Kondo raised above, is one that surfaces occasionally. Often this debate, however, is connected to a political stance or a bias in the judgement of how one actor employs their soft power mechanisms. This means that one state may be engaged in public diplomacy, and it may be referred to as positive relationship building while another state doing the same thing will be accused of propaganda. Cull raises an important critique of the concept of public diplomacy that he says was a new terminology that simply replaced what was referred to previously as propaganda. He says that the way Americans could “condemn those wicked Russians for their propaganda and simultaneously flesh out the shiny new American term, public diplomacy, with benign meaning” (Cull, 2013, p.viii).<sup>64</sup> One can apply the same critique to the concept of cultural diplomacy. Interestingly the concept of soft power remains constant, but its connotation changes

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<sup>63</sup> Kondo, S. (2008). “Wielding Soft Power: The Key Stages of Transmission and Reception” in *Soft Power Superpowers: Cultural and national assets of Japan and the United States*. Yasushi Watanabe and David L. McConnell [eds.]

<sup>64</sup> Cull, N. (2013) “Forward” in Davis Cross, Mai’a K. and Jan Melissen (Eds). *European Public Diplomacy: Soft Power at Work*. viii

depending on who is evaluating it. For Liu the concept of cultural diplomacy assumes “a plus sum game of nurturing mutual understanding and mutual respect between cultures, it is the means to achieve the ends of building cultural pluralism” while the concept of soft power “still adopts a binary view of political cultures being incompatible with each other, thus tends to interpret cultural diplomacy as a zero-sum game to win hearts and minds” (Liu, 2017, p.90).<sup>65</sup> Liu brings to fore this argument when suggesting that China’s cultural diplomacy should not be viewed through the lens of soft power as it is not about a zero-sum game but more about a plus-sum game. Liu says that when China’s cultural diplomacy is framed in a zero-sum soft power framework, the reasons for this are Western cultural hegemony and Orientalism (Liu, 2017). Therefore, the judgement of an international actor’s actions as either benign cultural diplomacy or as power-hungry soft power will be made according to a bias of the observer depending on which side of an ideological divide they fall. In light of this, we can think of Guzzini’s comment that “Definitions of power as ‘structural power’ or ‘soft power’ are not politically innocent, nor are they intended to be. They redefine authorised and legitimate action and the call for responsibility or liability. There is a ‘power politics of power analysis’” (Guzzini, 2013, p.6). Similarly, Zahran and Ramos add that in a world where there is a struggle for hegemony, values and ideas are not universal but rather disputed, while the “idea of a soft power is not a neutral concept but part of this struggle,” and for them intellectuals like Nye are defined by the Gramscian concept of “organic intellectual”, whose work itself contributes to the hegemonic project (Zahran and Ramos, 2009, p.28-29).

Therefore, this dissertation does not make a moral judgement of soft power and the mechanisms that are employed to wield this power by any agent. Rather it assumes a world where there is a struggle for power and soft power is an extension of hard power. Nye himself acknowledges that world leaders like Hitler, Stalin or Mao all possessed soft power and says “it is not necessarily better to twist minds than to twist arms.” He says soft power is not a prescriptive but rather a normative concept, and it is wielded in both good and bad ways and for a variety of purposes (Nye, 2011, p.81).

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<sup>65</sup> Liu, X. (2017). Look Beyond and Beneath the Soft Power: An Alternative Analytical Framework for China’s Cultural Diplomacy. *Cambridge Journal of China Studies*, 12 (4)

## Concluding remarks

Although Nye states that “soft power is not a form of idealism or liberalism. It is simply a form of power, one way of getting desired outcomes” (2011, p.82), a lot of idealisms find their way into his development of the concept of soft power. The study of the concept has been captured by relational and ideational approaches, which have failed to articulate how international actors attain and retain soft power. Their analysis provides useful insights into particular historical moments, yet the conclusions that are drawn have a contingent nature and are reliant on particular empirical settings. In Morgenthau’s critique, such approaches to power are in truth “not so much theories as dogmas. They do not so much try to reflect reality as it actually is as to superimpose upon a recalcitrant reality a theoretical scheme that satisfies the desire for thorough rationalization” (Morgenthau, 1947,<sup>66</sup> in Behr and Heath, 2009, p.337). A point made by Isaac when he identifies in the theorisation process of the scholars of the three faces of power a mobilization of bias, which he wishes to expose while calling for a view of power that is not a “power over” approach but rather a “power to” approach (Isaac, 1987, p.31).

To avoid this mistake which “leads to the moralizing of theoretical analysis, and a failure to recognize the coherence and stability of social forms” (Isaac, 1987, p.28), this dissertation adopts a realist understanding of power. Like Morgenthau, the only assumption that is held as “historically universal [is] politics as a conflict of power” (Behr and Heath, 2009, p.336, footnote 33). To study this power it takes on a realist approach, which assumes that “power is better conceived as those powers distributed by the various enduring structural relationships in society and exercised by individuals and groups based on their location in a given structure” (Isaac, 1987, p.28). Meaning their power is defined through their power capabilities, measured in resources, which place them above or below others in the international system. This dissertation seeks to strip soft power of bias and present the reader with a view of soft power and how it operates based on the resources that underpin the social relations. This is not to diminish the work of relational and ideational scholars as it has its own merits, however, to have a systematic view of soft power a realist approach must be taken. Guzzini (2013) suggests that if we are to apply a reductionist understanding of influence through resources, that “[s]uch an approach assumes that by aggregating instances of influence in particular social interactions, one can get a comprehensive picture of authority relations in the international system” (Guzzini, 2013, p.67). However, this is not how resource power can be understood. It is not about the measure of instances of influence, but about the measure of the ability to even have instances of social interaction. Without these instances of social interaction, there can be no persuasion that

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<sup>66</sup> Morgenthau, H.J. (1947/1970). *Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade, 1960–70*. Praeger Publishers.



constructivists evaluate. Such instances of interaction are made possible by resources. Soft power is about attaining attraction, legitimacy, and credibility. Yet the ability to attain soft power in international relations is measured best by looking at resource rather than ideational or relational power.

## The Agents and Subjects of Soft Power in World Politics

Nye's original conceptualization of soft power focuses on a nation-state and places soft power in the realm of foreign policy, however, his writings quickly acknowledge that possessing soft power is not only reserved for nation-states. While the majority of scholarship still associates soft power with the foreign policy of nation-states, some of the broader soft power literature, that analyses empirical cases of soft power as well as evaluates soft power from a conceptual perspective, does acknowledge that soft power can be possessed by other actors in world politics than just the nation-state. This section will unpack what Nye and others say on the agents and subjects of soft power. This is relevant for the dissertation because it chooses to look at the soft power of the European Union.

In the 1990s Nye's focus is predominantly on the power of nation-states. He says that factors that matter to the powerful nations are shifting away from territory, populations, and military to "technology, education, and economic growth" (Nye, 1990b, p.179) and moving away from military and economic tangible power resources to intangible power resources such as "culture, ideology, and institutions" (Nye, 1990b, p.181). The soft power at this stage was projected toward the behaviour of "other people or nations" (Nye, 1990, p.178; Nye, 2004). These categories however are not elaborated on further and tends to include both the governments as well as the public that can pressure its domestic government to achieve outcomes favourable to the state exercising soft power (Nye, 1990b). By 2004 Nye acknowledges, "the United States is not alone. Others, both countries and non-state actors, also possess soft power" (Nye, 2004, p.73). He talks about the Soviet Union's soft power in Europe because of its resistance to Hitler, its soft power in the "colonized areas such as Africa and Asia because of its opposition to European imperialism", and its soft power in many parts of the world where Communism served as an attractive resource (Nye, 2004, p.73-74). He speaks of Europe, as a continent, saying that each state has its own soft power, but to compete with the US one needs to consider the entirety of the continent because "no single European state can hope to compete with the United States in size, but taken as a whole, Europe has a market of equivalent size, and a somewhat larger population" (Nye, 2004, p.74). He says that Europe is the US's main competitor in soft power. "European art, literature, music, design, fashion, and food have long served as global cultural magnets" (Nye, 2004, p.75). "Furthermore, the European Union as a symbol of a uniting Europe itself

carries a good deal of soft power” (Nye, 2004, p.77). There has since been a range of scholarly work focusing on the European Union’s soft power (see Haine, 2004<sup>67</sup>; Matlary, 2006<sup>68</sup>; or Melissen, 2007<sup>69</sup>). Hence, we see the focus is no longer solely on individual states as agents of power. The subjects of soft power are not only foreign nation-states, i.e. its leadership, government, and institutions, but also the populations of foreign countries. The majority of scholars who deal with soft power continue to focus on nation-states (see footnote for examples<sup>70</sup>).

Nye then turns to other forms of intergovernmental and international actors, such as the United Nations or World Trade Organization, who also have soft power. “Strictly speaking, they are the creatures of the states that formed them, but the diplomacy within different organizations takes on characteristics that reflect the unique procedures and culture of the organization” (Nye, 2004, p.90). Amongst these actors are also transnational and non-state actors, such as private organizations and NGO, including “multinational corporations or the Roman Catholic Church” (Nye, 2004, p.85). He says that nonstate actors have always been important in international politics but with the information age they have acquired more influence. Rogers (2017)<sup>71</sup> examines the soft power of NGOs when it comes to climate change. She writes that the ability of NGOs to act within the international system has allowed them to develop independent communication channels from states, and “Nye’s framework of hard and soft power is helpful in understanding how NGO behavior can be seen as a set of nuanced, coordinated actions that employ elements of soft and hard power” (Rogers, 2017, p.219). What is worth noting here is that not only has the “information revolution greatly enhanced NGOs’ soft power” (Nye, 2004, p.85), but Rogers indicates how NGOs use their soft power to influence how governments use their hard power (Rogers, 2017, p.224). Hence, not only have the agents of soft power shifted but also the targets or subjects of soft power are being redefined.

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<sup>67</sup> Haine J.-Y. (2004). “The EU’s Soft Power: Not Hard Enough?” in *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*. 5(1):69–77;

<sup>68</sup> Matlary J.H. (2006). “When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU Strategic Culture Possible?” in *Security Dialogue* 37(1):105–121

<sup>69</sup> Melissen, J. (2005). *New Public Diplomacy. Soft Power in International Relations*. Palgrave Macmillan.

<sup>70</sup> Examples of soft power studies focusing on nation states. For Japan see: Koichi Iwabuchi (2015) *Pop-culture diplomacy in Japan: soft power, nation branding and the question of ‘international cultural exchange’*, *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 21:4, 419-432

For Russia see: Peter Rutland & Andrei Kazantsev (2016) *The limits of Russia’s ‘soft power’*, *Journal of Political Power*, 9:3, 395-413, Vasile Rotaru (2018) *Forced Attraction?*, *Problems of Post-Communism*, 65:1, 37-48

For China see: Fijalkowski, L. (2011). “China’s soft power in Africa” in *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 05 April 2011, Taylor & Francis. Pp. 223-232. Voon, J. and Xinpeng Xu. (2019). “Impact of the Belt and Road Initiative on China’s soft power: preliminary evidence” in *Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics* 27:1, pages 120-131. Juyan Zhang, Yi Han. (2013) “Testing the rhetoric of China’s soft power campaign: a case analysis of its strategic ambiguity in the Six Party Talks over North Korea’s nuclear program.” *Asian Journal of Communication* 23:2, pages 191-208.

<sup>71</sup> Rogers, Katrina S. (2017). “Soft power, NGOs, and Climate Change: The Case of The Nature Conservancy.” In eds. Ved P. Nanda *Climate Change and Environmental Ethics*. Routledge.

Nye discusses how the targets of soft power have changed. The NGOs attract “followers” and “governments” as well as “business leaders” (Nye, 2004, p.85). “The soft power of corporate brands names has been familiar for decades” (Nye, 2004, p.85). In one case it is the public opinion of citizens or the consumer society that is the target of the soft power and in the other, it is the policy decision-makers. Soft power has branched out to be able to be possessed by all actors of world politics and the audience or target of the soft power is also a plurality of actors. This becomes even clearer when Nye begins to discuss the soft power of “malevolent organizations and networks” (Nye, 2004, p.90). “Soft power depends on a receptive audience even if the eye of the beholder is evil. Transnational terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda may be repulsive to the majority of the world, but they are clearly attractive to some extremists” (Nye, 2004, p.90). Even individual leaders can possess soft power. When evaluating the onset of the War on Terror, Nye refers to opinion polls of a plurality of Muslim majority countries, where “vast majorities had more confidence in bin Laden than in George W. Bush or Tony Blair” in a Robin Hood type of legendary tradition which gives soft power to the hero that represents the poor and disenfranchised (Nye, 2004, p. 91). Finally, he also describes religious institutions as having soft power (Nye, 2004, p.91). Since then some scholars have examined the soft power of religious actors in the political realm as large as the Catholic Church or smaller such as the Turkish Gülen Movement (see Haynes, 2012<sup>72</sup>; Jödicke, 2017<sup>73</sup>). Haynes examines Nye’s recognition that transnational non-state and often religious actors, such as Hezbollah, have soft power (Haynes, 2012, p.14). He then analyses the shift from secular states to religious non-state actors, e.g. the Roman Catholic Church or Al Qaeda, as carriers of soft power (Haynes, 2012, p.14). When exploring the subjects of soft power, Haynes says, “seeking to project soft power, religious actors may not restrict themselves to attempts to influence how ‘ordinary ‘people think and act. They may also try to influence state policies, including, in some cases, foreign policies” (Haynes, 2012, p.98). Jödicke (2017) looks at religious groups and soft power in the South Caucasus region and shows that non-state movements, like the Turkish Gülen movement, not only build soft power for themselves, but that they also serve to help the actual soft power of the state from which the movement originated. In Jödicke’s study this is the soft power of Turkey in Azerbaijan (Jödicke, 2017). It is important to note that “transnational non-state religious actors operating across state boundaries can be a successful complementary soft power tool,” but they also can create a challenge for both foreign and domestic governments as their soft power is not only directed at foreign states but as the “Erdogan-Gülen war” shows, “the active operation of transnational, non-state and/or informal religious actors raises a red

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<sup>72</sup> Haynes, J. (2012). *Religious Transnational Actors and Soft Power*. Routledge - Taylor and Francis Group.

<sup>73</sup> Jödicke, A. (2017). *Religion and Soft Power in the South Caucasus*. Routledge.

flag for the state, which is cautious of any alien and uncontrolled Islamic activism capable of mobilizing the masses” (Jödicke, 2017, p.141).

Scholars acknowledge that soft power is not only controlled by the state but also by the civil society (Nye, 2011, p.83).<sup>74</sup> “Soft power does not belong to the government in the same degree that hard power does” (Nye, 2004, p.14) and “many soft power resources are separate from the American government and are only partly responsive to its purposes” (Nye, 2004, p.15). Other scholars recognize that any given country has multiple actors who possess and create soft power while also have different interpretations of other’s soft power (Davydov, 2007<sup>75</sup>; Fan, 2008<sup>76</sup>; Roselle et al., 2014<sup>77</sup>). Scholarship has moved beyond Nye’s original focus and acknowledges that soft power can be related to any actor on the global stage. Furthermore, the focus is also no longer just on foreign audiences but has shifted to include transnational and domestic audience groups that range from ordinary citizens to specialists and government actors.

## Internal Dimensions of Soft Power

Studies of soft power, for the most part, are linked to foreign policy and see soft power as an externally facing power. This dissertation takes the concept of soft power beyond this formulation and explore soft power as an internal facing power as well. The case study of the dissertation focuses on the EU’s internal cultural dimension, so this section shows how scholars have highlighted the importance of the domestic realm of the soft power of international actors.

Considering the narrow US-centred context, Nye himself acknowledges that there is a need to further “explore both the nature of the concept, as well as empirical studies of policy examples and limitations” (2010, p. 226).<sup>78</sup> What the present research attempts to highlight is that the external workings of soft power are very closely linked to domestic processes. Specifically, that there is an internal or domestic dimension to soft power. The premise here is that an actor attempts to build soft power not only with foreign audiences but also with its domestic audiences. This internal soft power

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<sup>74</sup> Nye, J.S., (2011). *The Future of Power*. Public Affairs.

<sup>75</sup> Davydov, Y. (2007) ‘Zhostkaya i myagkaya sila v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniyakh’, *Ekonomika, Politika, Kul’tura*, 17, 1.

<sup>76</sup> Fan, Y. (2008). “Soft Power: Power of Attraction of Confusion?” in *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*. 4:2, pp.147-158.

<sup>77</sup> Roselle, L., A. Miskimmon, and B. O’loughlin (2014). “Strategic Narrative: A New Means to Understand Soft Power.” *Media, War & Conflict* 7, no. 1 (2014): 70-84.

<sup>78</sup> Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2010). “Responding to my critics and concluding thoughts” in Eds. Inderjeet Parmar and Michael Cox. *Soft Power and US Foreign Policy. Theoretical, historical and contemporary perspectives*. Routledge. pp. 215-227.

focuses on securing the survival of the actor internally by building legitimacy, attractiveness and loyalty from within. This means that if one considers the security dilemma in the international system in which the various international actors are competing for power and survival, the threat of survival in a globalized world is no longer simply external. Rather the preservation of legitimacy and power with the domestic audience is essential for securing the existence of the political actor in the international realm. For Nye's evaluation of the US at the end of the Cold War, loyalty and preference for the liberal democratic model was assumed as a given in the light of the "end of history" (Fukuyama, 1989)<sup>79</sup> and there was no need for him to evaluate whether and how the US was building and maintaining its support at home. However, the literature on soft power today has begun to shift the focus from just exploring the external aspect of soft power to also considering the internal or domestic dimension of soft power as well. The understanding of internal or domestic soft power is not uniform and does not have one set definition, but there is a clear consensus that the domestic audience is also a target of soft power.

The literature that currently evaluates soft power in the inward facing form is focused on the analysis of Chinese soft power with scholars like Kingsley Edney (2015)<sup>80</sup> looking at "regime security" as the end goal of internal facing soft power and William A. Callahan (2015)<sup>81</sup>, albeit having a critical stance, seeing soft power being "employed [by China] as a tool in domestic policy more than in foreign affairs" (Callahan, 2015, p.216).<sup>82</sup> Both of these ideas were discussed in the context of the "Soft Power in Hard States" workshop set up by Michael Barr and Valentina Feklyunina<sup>83</sup>, who are both recognized scholars of soft power and have been discussed in the literature review of this dissertation. Barr et al. highlight in the 2014 Special Issue in *Politics* on topic of soft power, which also reflects on their workshop, that "a number of common themes emerge from the articles" one of which is "the importance of domestic audiences" (Barr et al., 2015, p.213). Peter van Ham (2008)<sup>84</sup> in separate discussions of "place branding", which he uses to show the need for the constructivist understanding of soft power, also takes into account that "territorial actors [states and international organizations IOs] [...] vie for political authority and loyalty [...], embarking upon a quest for the hearts and minds of

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<sup>79</sup> Fukuyama, F. (1989). "The End of History?" in *The National Interest*. No. 16, Summer, pp. 3-18.

<sup>80</sup> Edney, K. (2015). "Building National Cohesion and Domestic Legitimacy: A Regime Security Approach to Soft Power in China" in *Politics*. Political Studies Association

<sup>81</sup> Callahan, W.A. (2015). "Identity and Security in China: The Negative Soft Power of the China Dream" in *Politics*: Vol 35 (3-4), pp.216-229. Political Studies Association

<sup>82</sup> Much of the literature references Chinese authors that speak about the understanding of domestic soft power, citation are included in this dissertation as reference, but unfortunately these texts have not been translated English, so have not been read by the author of this dissertation.

<sup>83</sup> The workshop was organized in Newcastle University in May 2014 and is written about in Barr, M. , Feklyunina, V. and Theys, S. (2015), "Introduction: The Soft Power of Hard States." *Politics*, 35: 213-215. Political Studies Association.

<sup>84</sup> Van Ham, P. (2008). "Place Branding: The State of the Art" in *Annals, AAPSS*, 616, March, pp.126-150.

people both at *home* and around the world” (van Ham, 2008, p.128, pp.126-149; italics not in original). For van Ham “public diplomacy can be compared with place branding since they both combine foreign policy goals with internal soft power strategies and objectives” (2008, p. 135). The following section explores how these scholars evaluated the internal or domestic dimension of soft power and outlines how the dissertation utilizes the concept to analyse the European Union.

The literature on China and soft power has extended the possible field of application of Nye’s original concept. Hongyi Lai highlights in his edited book *China’s Soft Power and International Relations* (2012)<sup>85</sup> a number of new perspectives for understanding Nye’s concept. One of them is a critique of Nye’s focus on soft resources as the foundations of soft power, “i.e. culture, values, and diplomacy” (Lai, 2012, p.3), and the suggestion that hard resources such as the economy, business, military as well as science and technology are also central to building soft power (Lai, 2012, p.4-11). But aside from this critique, the literature on China points out that the Chinese approach to soft power includes an internal dimension. Many scholars have picked up on the fact that China had understood the need to build a strong internal culture and institutions in order to strengthen its soft power externally, but also internally. Lai points out that President Hu Jintao reiterated during the July 2010 Politburo’s twenty-second group study session that the government had decided to “deepen the reform of cultural institutions in order to develop a thriving culture and enhance China’s cultural soft power” (Lai, 2008, p.12<sup>86</sup>). Callahan argues that the Chinese discussion of soft power is the opposite of Nye’s focus on soft power as a foreign policy tool and soft power “is employed as a tool in domestic policy more than in foreign affairs” (Callahan, 2015, p.216). He looks at the way the current Chinese president Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” discourse creates what Callahan calls the “negative soft power strategy” (Callahan, 2015, p.216-229). Callahan says that we cannot “limit our inquiry” into soft power just as a foreign policy tool and a more dynamic and complex view of soft power needs to be developed. Specifically, he suggests we consider not only “soft power as a ‘positive’ tool for ‘foreign policy’” but also as a “negative” tool for “domestic” politics and “what is under-researched is the theoretical dynamics of positive/negative and domestic/foreign” (Callahan, 2015, p.217-218). His work raises this important insight that soft power can also be directed at the internal audience. His analysis of China points out that China is facing an “identity dilemma”. Citing a Chinese scholar Y. Qin, Callahan states, “The heart of Chinese foreign policy this is not a security dilemma between great powers, but an “identity dilemma’ within China as people ask “Who is China?” and “What kind of

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<sup>85</sup> Lai, Hongyi (2012). “Introduction. The soft power concept and rising China” in Lai, H. (Ed.), Lu, Y. (Ed.). *China's Soft Power and International Relations*. London: Routledge.

<sup>86</sup> Lai cites “Hu Jintao: Shenhua whenua tizhi gaige, zengqiang Zhongguo wenhua ruan shili”(Hu Jintao: Deepen Reform of Cultural Institutions and Strengthen China’s Cultural Soft Power), [www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/2010/07-23/2422727.shtml](http://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/2010/07-23/2422727.shtml), accessed 5 December 2010.

world does it want?" (Qin, 2006, p.13<sup>87</sup> cited in Callahan, 2015, p.219). Therefore the 2012 declaration by president Xi Jinping on the "China Dream" is for the "great [domestic] rejuvenation of the Chinese nation", which is seen by Callahan as an "expression of the PRC's goals in domestic and foreign policy" (Callahan, 2015, p.221). For him, the process of Chinese soft power strategy is about portraying a positive China to the world but also about portraying a positive China to the Chinese people. He says that "before it can spread values abroad, soft power policy first needs to produce and police values at home" (Callahan, 2015, p.219) in an attempt to build unity. His judgement of how China goes about doing so is tilted towards a critique of China. Throughout his work, he is critical of the identity formation that China employs, which he says mobilises Chinese domestic audiences through the negative portrayals of other countries. And in this same light shows why the discourse of the "China Dream" is very popular within the PRC but hasn't gained such popularity abroad.<sup>88</sup> As we saw earlier in the literature review, positions like his are criticized for having bias by scholars like Liu, who says that China's intentions are misread and that its actions are shaped in response to Western cultural hegemony and Orientalism (Liu, 2017).<sup>89</sup> Nonetheless, according to Callahan, "Chinese soft power discourse generally works in domestic space to generate national identity and regime legitimacy" (Callahan, 2012, p.225). Identity formation "is seen as a tool in a global soft power battle that will produce clear winners and losers in a life-or-death, zero-sum struggle" (Callahan, 2015, p.225).

While Callahan focuses on the role of identity formation and the domestic strategy of soft power, where "the main audience for soft power activities, even those of China's brightest brand, is not outside China, but the PRC" (Callahan, 2015, p.226), Edney proposes that the domestic strategy of Chinese soft power is about external "regime security" (Edney, 2009). First, Edney, similarly to Callahan, acknowledges that since soft power has entered the political discourse in China around 2003, the goal of president Xi Jinping's "China Dream is in part motivated to increase soft power" and at this stage, he means external soft power. Edney's summary of Chinese and other literature shows "that the major objective of China's soft power strategy is to ameliorate the security dilemma generated by China's rising power" where soft power is the method by which to "achieve a 'peaceful rise' and reduce the kind of international fear, particularly in the US and in China's regional neighbours, that might trigger containment or balancing behaviour", i.e. it is to refute the "China threat"<sup>90</sup> thesis

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<sup>87</sup> Qin, Y. (2006), "Guoji Guanxi Lilun Zhongguo Pai Shengcheng De Keneng He Biran" ["The Chinese School of International Relations Theory: Possibility and Necessity"] *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi* (3), p.7-13.

<sup>88</sup> Callahan, 2018, p.226 cites Cai, M. (2013) "Zhongguo meng zhengzai fahui juda ganzhaoli [The China Dream is Exerting Enormous Appeal]", (7 December). Available from: [http://news.china.com.cn/txt/2013-12/07/content\\_30828033.htm](http://news.china.com.cn/txt/2013-12/07/content_30828033.htm) [accessed 15 January 2014]; and,

<sup>89</sup> Liu, X. (2017). Look Beyond and Beneath the Soft Power: An Alternative Analytical Framework for China's Cultural Diplomacy. *Cambridge Journal of China Studies*, 12 (4)

<sup>90</sup> Edney cites Li, M. (2009). "Soft power in Chinese Discourse: Popularity and Prospect" in M. Li [ed.], *Soft Power: China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics*, Langham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 21-43.

(Edney, 2012, p.259-260). Edney, however, does not only see China Dream internal soft power strategy being used for regime security abroad, but also acknowledges that “soft power has a relevance to domestic politics that is not present in Nye’s original formulation of the concept” (Edney, 2015, p.260). He highlights that literature chooses to focus on being critical of the “domestic weaknesses” or the perceived illegitimacy of Chinese soft power, and says that it doesn’t explore the “relationship between regime security and soft power” enough (Edney, 2015, p.260). By regime security, Edney means the more general understanding of “the condition where governing elites are secure from violent challenges to their rule” (Edney, 2015, p.261<sup>91</sup>). He notes that China today doesn’t face a violent challenge but rather a peaceful evolution where “two important sources of regime insecurity remain problematic for the authorities: lack of legitimacy and lack of national cohesion” (Edney, 2015, p.261). Edney explores how there have been many “elite” discussion of party legitimacy in China since the early 2000s and that one of the methods of building and enhancing regime legitimacy is to convey the positive international standing to the Chinese audience, but that also to achieve the “China Dream and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation requires cultural cohesion” (Edney, 2015, p.262<sup>92</sup>). Edney says that external soft power strategies are helping to create or enhance national cohesion. Similarly, to Callahan’s perspective, Edney sees that there is an interplay here between the foreign and domestic levels of soft power.

“To consider the possibility that [soft power] could enhance national cohesion, however, it is necessary to apply the concept [of soft power] to the relationship between domestic constituencies. In this sense the soft power of the political, social and cultural core of the polity encourages domestic interest groups and individuals on the margins to want the same outcomes, such as stability and national cohesion, as the authorities at the centre” (Edney, 2015, p.263).

Hence domestic cohesion and a domestic narrative become a central element of soft power. Edney furthermore says that domestic soft power is important for any society that faces challenges from radicalization and says that “an appealing narrative that can win over the mainstream society and prevent terrorists recruiting new members to their groups” is essential and “highlights [soft power] concept’s potential significance for state efforts to respond to domestic sources of instability” (Edney, 2015, p.263 evaluates Nye, 2011, p.19-22). Edney concludes that we need to “‘de-Westernize’ our

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<sup>91</sup> Edney cites Jackson, R. (2010). “Regime Security” in A. Collins (ed.), *Contemporary Security Studies* (2<sup>nd</sup> edn). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 185-201.

<sup>92</sup> Edney cites Xinhua (2013). “Liu Yunshan zai Beijing shi tiaoyan shi qiang diao yi xin jucuo kaituo wengua gaige gazhan de xin jingjie [On a Beijing Inspection Trip Liu Yunshan Emphasizes Using New Actions to Break New Ground on Cultural Reform and Development]”, *Renmin Wang* [online]. 8 June. Available from: <http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2013/0608/c1024-21795402.html> [Accessed 1 November 2014].



understanding of soft power” and that scholarship needs to look beyond the point of how power resources of states don’t conform with liberal norms, but rather examine the insecurities that lie behind soft power strategies (Edney, 2015, p.269; see also Rawnsley, 2012<sup>93</sup>). Barr et al. also conclude that “the articles [in the special issue on soft power in *Politics*] suggest that Western understandings of soft power are limited in their analytical purchase for authoritarian systems” (Barr et al., 2015, p.215). The current dissertation will take into consideration that the EU itself is using soft power for “regime security” which is facing Euroscepticism and a democratic deficit throughout.

Van Ham, who doesn’t use China as his case study, also explores the domestic dimension of soft power, focussing on examples that are in a way reflective of Callahan’s internal and external stance. He, however, doesn’t see domestic soft power as the negative projection of the external “positive” soft power, but rather says that internal and external soft power is utilized to create a stronger overall (soft) power for the international actor. Van Ham’s perspective is important as his evaluation of identity formation, place branding, and ultimately soft power show an interaction between the internal and external politics of actors. He shows how globalization, the growing global media, and the growing influence of international commerce have created challenges for the brand management of individual countries, where he explores countries like the US, Denmark, or Kazakhstan as well as the EU. These challenges, however, are not just for the brand facing external audiences but also about internal identity formation and the building of loyalty, which he recognizes as an internal process of soft power. For him, there are many tools of soft power such as place branding or public diplomacy and they “both combine foreign policy goals with internal soft power strategies and objectives” (van Ham, 2008, p.135). Specifically, about the EU he says, “the EU faces a serious branding challenge in working to develop emotional ties between the citizens of its constituent countries, as well as with the outside world” (van Ham, 2008, p.136). He emphasized the internal and external dimensions. First, he says internal identity formation is the basis for external action. Second, external action is not only directed at the foreign public but also serves the purpose to help internal audiences redefine themselves. He then goes on to cite the “British branding guru Wally Olins”<sup>94</sup>, who pointed out that corporations are turning towards “‘internal marketing,’ a process that is better known under the political guise of ‘nation branding’. [...] Olins claimed that, therefore, one of the key targets of the branding process today is internal” (van Ham, 2008, p.131-132). The point is that power “is not only about ‘selling’ products, services, and ideas and gaining market share and attention; it is also all about managing identity, loyalty, and reputation” (van Ham, 2008, p.132). He particularly

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<sup>93</sup> Rawnsley, G. (2012). “Approaches to Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in China and Taiwan”, *Journal of International Communication*, 18 (2), pp.121-135

<sup>94</sup> Olins, Wally (1999). *Trading Identities: Why Countries and Companies Are Taking on Each Others’ Roles*. Foreign Policy Centre.

highlights the context of globalization and the power of the global economic forces that are challenging existing place brands, which drives even nation-states to the “need to reengage popular support and understanding” (van Ham, 2008, p.129). He places importance on “the ‘high politics’ of security” and suggests that the “internal, identity-shaping face is especially important” (van Ham, 2008, p.130-131). Hence, the internal soft power strategy is an essential element of soft power that needs to be studied and understood as well.

## Applying the non-state and internal dimension to realism

Unlike the common misperception that Morgenthau’s theory relates to nation-states, this dissertation, in line with Morgenthau’s statements, applies this perspective of power to other international actors. In a misreading of Morgenthau, scholars like Keohane criticize Morgenthau’s focus on states and say that nonstate, intergovernmental organisations, transnational actors are also important in the contemporary international realm (Keohane, 1986, p.193). However, Morgenthau himself also saw the state as historically contingent and that this unit was created in European modernity (Behr and Heath, 2009, p.335). “Nothing in the realist position militates against the assumption that the present division of the political world into nation-states will be replaced by larger units of a quite different character” (Morgenthau, (1949) 1985, p.12). In his six principles of political realism, Morgenthau asserts that “the contemporary connection between interest and the national state is a product of history, and therefore is bound to disappear in the course of history” (Morgenthau, (1949) 1985, p.12). This is relevant for this dissertation because this understanding of the concept of power is applied to the European Union as an international actor. Burgess (2002)<sup>95</sup> description of the EU in terms of federalism, or a quasi-state, is closely applicable here.

Scholars like Jervis (1994, p.872)<sup>96</sup> assume that Morgenthau’s theory puts to the side domestic politics. However, Morgenthau says that there needs to be “domestic political order” (Morgenthau, 1960, p.38)<sup>97</sup> for there to be an actor on the international stage. Throughout his work draws comparisons between his discussions of international power politics to the domestic realm when, for example, referring to George Washington or *The Federalist* papers or even Western democracies, where he simply sees the power under some control through “constitutional safeguards”

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<sup>95</sup> Burgess, M. (2002). *Federalism and the European Union: The Building of Europe, 1950–2000*. London: Routledge.

<sup>96</sup> Jervis, R. (1994). “Hans Morgenthau, realism, and the scientific study of international politics”. *Social research*, 853-876.

<sup>97</sup> Morgenthau, H. (1960). *Politics Among Nations*, Alfred A. Knopf.

(Morgenthau, [1948] 1985, p.22). As Algosai (1965)<sup>98</sup> also points out the importance of inner stability in Morgenthau's theory and says that the existence of the unit such as a state "the struggle for power will be on the loose." He goes on to say, "Thus, the reason for internal stability is ultimately to be found in the existence of a society whose intergroup conflicts are neutralized by overriding loyalties [... that] are able to impose conformity on different groups (Algosai, 1965, p.230). Loyalties are shaped by both hard and soft power. In a globalized world of contested sovereignty, there is an even greater need to focus on internal loyalty.

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<sup>98</sup> Algosai, G.A.R., (1965). "The Theory of International Relations: Hans J. Morgenthau and His Critics" in *Background*, Feb., Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 221-256. OUP, Wiley, and The International Studies Association.

## THEORY CHAPTER

### Introduction

This chapter outlines how culture forms a strategic resource for soft power for international actors by proposing a *Theoretical Framework for the Strategic Employment of Culture as a Resource for Soft Power*. The chapter builds on the view that culture is a resource for soft power and that soft power is understood from the power as resources perspective. Roselle et al. highlight that “it is still difficult to identify soft power resources” (Roselle et al., 2014, p.74)<sup>99</sup>. Kroenig et al say, “While there is a voluminous literature on soft power, scholars have not articulated, in a practical sense, how governments can use soft power to their advantage, nor have they theorized the conditions under which soft power campaigns will be most likely to succeed” (Kroenig et al., 2010, p.413)<sup>100</sup>. The same criticism applied to the limited theorizing on how culture constitutes the soft power capabilities of international actors. While the literature that deals with culture and soft power exists, it is limited to certain aspects of culture or certain historical moments where instances of the use of cultural resources are evaluated. The scholarly works that do explore culture often focus on either cultural diplomacy or cultural industries (see Zamorano, 2016<sup>101</sup>; Schneider, 2010<sup>102</sup>). The literature that looks at soft power resources does not fully theorize on cultural resources but rather focuses on their empirical application in specific limited contexts (see Kurlantzick, 2007)<sup>103</sup>. Culture and soft power are touched upon in chapters of books on culture and power (see Singh, 2010)<sup>104</sup>. There is more offered on culture in *The Routledge Handbook on Soft power* (2017),<sup>105</sup> but much of this work is still focused on discourse or relational power (Ji, 2017<sup>106</sup>, Rawnsley and Ngac, 2017<sup>107</sup>; Hayden, 2017<sup>108</sup>), with only

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<sup>99</sup> Roselle, Laura, Alister Miskimmon, and Ben O’loughlin (2014). "Strategic Narrative: A New Means to Understand Soft Power." *Media, War & Conflict* 7, no. 1 (2014): 70-84.

<sup>100</sup> Kroenig, M., M. McAdam, S. Weber, (2010). “Taking Soft Power Seriously” in *Comparative Strategy*, pp. 411-457.

<sup>101</sup> Zamorano, Mariano Martin (2016). *Reframing Cultural Diplomacy: The Instrumentalization of Culture under the Soft Power Theory*, Culture Unbound. Volume 8, pp.166-186. Linköping University Electronic Press.

<sup>102</sup> Schneider, C.P. (2010). “Cultural Diplomacy” in *International Cultural Policies*. Eds J.P. Singh. Palgrave MacMillan.

<sup>103</sup> Kurlantzick, Joshua (2007). *Charm Offensive. How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World*. Yale University Press.

<sup>104</sup> Singh, J.P. [eds.] (2010). *International Cultural Policies*. Palgrave MacMillan.

<sup>105</sup> Chitty, N., Ji, L., G.D. Rawnsley, C. Hayden [eds.] (2017), *The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power*. Routledge.

<sup>106</sup> Ji, L. (2017). “Measuring soft power” in *The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power*. Chitty, N., Ji, L., G.D. Rawnsley, C. Hayden [eds.], Routledge.

<sup>107</sup> Rawnsley, G.D. and C. Ngac (2017). “Vietnamese cultural diplomacy: An emerging strategy” in *The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power*. Chitty, N., Ji, L., G.D. Rawnsley, C. Hayden [eds.], Routledge.

<sup>108</sup> Hayden, C. (2017). “Technologies of influence: The materiality of soft power in public diplomacy” in *The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power*. Chitty, N., Ji, L., G.D. Rawnsley, C. Hayden [eds.], Routledge.

one chapter truly evaluating agent's capabilities as resources (Brown, 2017)<sup>109</sup>. Hence, as discussed in the literature review and as we will see later in this chapter, there is an inclination in these studies towards the relational and ideational evaluation of soft power. By engaging with the existing literature and highlighting the limitations of the approaches that have been developed so far, this chapter sets out on the task to theorize about culture as a resource for soft power – a resource that contributes to the arsenal of soft power capabilities that can be possessed and employed by international actors. It does not negate that relationships and the interpretation of resources by target audiences are important, however, the approach taken here is to develop a structured framework for the understanding of the resources that underpin such relationships and make them possible in the first place. The framework helps gain a better understanding of what constitutes cultural soft power capabilities and provides a tool through which it is easier to take inventory of and evaluate the existing cultural soft power capabilities of international actors. The approach in this chapter aligns with Hayden's statement that, "soft power reveals a complementary dimension to the strategic assumption of realist politics [...] At the same time, it broadens the scope for how international actors take inventory of their own strategic assets, and suggests new applications for cultural products, industries, and communicative competencies" (Hayden, 2012, p.6-7)<sup>110</sup>.

Before the discussion about culture begins, it is important to outline the way that culture is understood within this dissertation. The long debate in scholarship about the concept of culture has brought forth a number of notions. Generally, terms that have been used by social thinkers to identify culture have been "'collective conscience' (Durkheim), 'orientations that guide action' (Parsons), 'class consciousness' (Marx), 'beliefs and conceptions' (Weber), 'mental structures' (Mannheim)" (Wuthnow, 1991, p.265)<sup>111</sup> or culture as identity (Cohen, 1993)<sup>112</sup> (for an overview of the concept of culture see also Münch and Smelser, 1992)<sup>113</sup>. The focus of this research is on the discipline of international relations and the discussion of cultural spheres and the cultural industry will remain in relation to the aesthetic arts and cultural heritage rather than anthropological conceptions. In his book on cultural policies and power, Singh (2010) recognizes that the anthropological or collective group sets of meanings understanding of culture "is reflected in the creative and aesthetic expressions regulating, sustaining, or at times, contesting the shared understandings of the meanings of cultures,"

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<sup>109</sup> Brown, R. (2017). "Alternatives to soft power: Influence in French and German external cultural action" in *The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power*. Chitty, N., Ji, L., G.D. Rawnsley, C. Hayden [eds.], Routledge.

<sup>110</sup> Hayden, C. (2012). *The Rhetoric of Soft Power. Public Diplomacy in Global Contexts*. Lexington Books.

<sup>111</sup> Wuthnow, Robert (1991). "Cultural Change and Sociological Theory" in *Social Change and Modernity*. Haferkamp, Hans, and Neil J. Smelser, editors. Berkeley: University of California Press, c1992 1991. P.265

<sup>112</sup> Cohen, Anthony P. (1993). "Culture as Identity: An Anthropologist's View" in *New Literary History*, Vol. 24, No. 1, *Culture and Everyday Life* (Winter, 1993) pp. 195-209 p.200

<sup>113</sup> Münch, R. and N.J.Smelser (1992). *Theory of Culture*. University of California Press.

yet like his volume, this dissertation addresses the “understanding of culture rooted in creative and aesthetic expressions, although the anthropological concept of culture often runs parallel to the generation of aesthetic expressions” (Singh, 2010, p.1). Therefore, in this dissertation, culture is understood within the aesthetic realm, from tangible and intangible cultural heritage<sup>114</sup> to contemporary creative productions, which can be produced by both political and private actors including the cultural industry.

### The four elements in the framework

This dissertation asserts that cultural assets, communications mechanisms, narratives, and audience are four important elements that make up the cultural soft power capabilities. These four elements manifest themselves in one way or the other in academic discussions on soft power. We may recall Nye identifying “high culture such as literature, art, and education, which appeals to elites; and popular culture, which focuses on mass entertainment.” (Nye, 2004 p.95; 2008, p.11).<sup>115</sup> He goes on to say that having cultural goods is not enough because such goods need to be publicized. Much of his work and that of others (see Hayden, 2011) speaks about public diplomacy as the key mechanism for bringing to light cultural assets. Nye says that “[p]ublic diplomacy tries to attract by drawing attention to these potential resources through broadcasting, subsidizing cultural exports, arranging exchanges, and so forth” (Nye, 2008, p.95). Less attention is given in his work to the cultural sector, the cultural policies, and the cultural industry that all play a key role in regulating and producing culture. As a communication strategy, Nye isolates as a relevant approach “strategic communication, which develops a set of simple themes much as a political or advertising campaign does” and “plans symbolic events and communications [...] to reinforce central themes or to advance a particular government policy” (Nye 2008 p.102). In addition to the method of broadcasting or communication, the narrative is important where Nye’s focus is on the need to have a central theme rather than many dispersed ones. Finally, there also has to be a target audience that the message is directed to and that is engaged with the cultural goods and the communications efforts that encompass them. Nye says, “it is crucial to understand the target audience” (Nye, 2008, p.103) and while this is true, the ability to command the target audience through cultural resources is where soft power lies. As we have seen, Nye mentions these four aspects only sporadically and without fully developing these ideas. What is

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<sup>114</sup> Intangible culture could be a national celebration that is unique to that particular country and forms a part of their cultural and creative expression. Intangible heritage can also be a form of dance or performative art. In Japan craft is considered an intangible culture, see Kida (2012).

<sup>115</sup> Nye, J., (2004) *Soft Power. The means to Success in World Politics*. Public Affairs; Nye, J., (2008) “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power” in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 616, *Public Diplomacy in a Changing World* (Mar., 2008), pp. 94-109.

needed is a deeper evaluation of these components. The next four sections unpack each one of these elements in a systematic way and outline their key characteristics which constitute cultural soft power resources.

The examination of the literature concludes that there are broadly four elements that provide soft power capabilities. First, the existence of cultural assets and cultural activity; second, their broadcasting, visibility, dissemination as well as infrastructures of networks conducive to exchange and interaction; third, a controlled narrative; and finally, the audience that is instrumentalized by the agent. These four categories are referred to as assets, communication mechanisms, narratives, and audiences here.

## Cultural Assets

Research on soft power and culture has highlighted a plethora of cultural assets that produce soft power. Important here is to differentiate between the all-encompassing ideas of cultural resources and cultural assets. Cultural assets make up an element or are a component of cultural resources of soft power. Assets range from cultural heritage to popular art, but also constitute tangible and intangible culture. Furthermore, cultural assets are also museums and archaeological and historic monuments and sites. This section explores how such cultural assets constitute a soft power resource. The section shows cultural assets are essential for creating opportunities for interaction, which is essential for wielding soft power. A relational perspective sees the relationships established within these interactions as their point of analysis, however, here the focus of the analysis is on the actual instances of interaction that cultural assets allow to create. It does not negate that assets carry meaning, but the section highlights that it is the control of these assets and the ability to employ them when necessary that gives an agent soft power. Cultural assets are conceived of here as the foundational element of the cultural resource of soft power. The control and abundance of assets is beneficial as it builds for the international actor power capabilities that can be deployed to balance cultural soft power of others in the marketplace of ideas, the cultural economy, and the sphere of cultural diplomacy and policy. Cultural assets serve a political actor in the realm of soft power in the same manner as military and economic assets serve an agent in the realm of hard power.

The use of cultural assets to assert a political unit's power outside its borders or for domestic nation or empire-building is not something new. It has been historically used across civilizations by various power structures. As Brown (2017) suggests many of these discussions are given little attention in English-speaking literature on soft power (Brown, 2017, p.38). We can think here about

the Greek civilization that employed cultural assets like arts, poetry, literature, philosophy, and language to export Greek culture across the Mediterranean and all the way to the edges of the Indian subcontinent. We can think about the Roman Church adapting Roman images and replacing them with Christian iconography to build its legitimacy both at home and its soft power abroad, which only until the Reformation began to be replaced with the idea of Europe (see Jakubowski et al., 2019)<sup>116</sup> Indeed, these practices were not limited to European settings, but were present all over the world. In India between the 9<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> century, during the process of regional Indianisation, the use of temples as symbols of power were spread throughout. "Indianisation was the produce of soft power as local rulers sought to imbue themselves with the prestige of Indian high culture, much like Parisian culture acted as a soft power centre for Europe and later Americanisation became a soft power process for world culture" (Dellios and Ferguson, 2011, p.20)<sup>117</sup> Kalinga architecture of North-East India's Orissa region illustrated the global power of the rulers with sites like the Hindu Konark Sun Temple using depictions of royals on the temple and delegations from distant lands on the side of the temple base (see Kumari, 1990)<sup>118</sup>. The political powers of these eras not only employed the arts, but their sponsorship created entire art forms for this purpose. Such practices were not limited to the Church, empires, dynasties, or contemporary nation-states, but included wealthy families like the Medici with their vast sponsorship of the arts in Renaissance Italy. All these practices were a means to building of soft power. In the context of the contemporary international system, these practices continue with nations, institutions, and private citizens involved in the employment of the arts and culture for soft power purposes. Those that have more capacity to employ cultural assets are the ones with stronger soft power capabilities.

### Activity Around Cultural Assets

The creative and cultural sectors are not static rather they are bustling with activity such as the production, admiration, exchange, dissemination, and preservation of culture. None of this would be possible if it were not for cultural assets around which this activity takes place. Therefore, cultural assets or goods are essential and often serve as the nodes through which the vast networks of cultural activity take place. For soft power purposes cultural assets also do not operate in a vacuum. Their employment for soft power purposes has to occur through the activity that is generated around them

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<sup>116</sup> Jakubowski, A., Hausler, K., & Fiorentini, F. (Eds.). (2019). *Cultural Heritage in the European Union*. Brill | Nijhoff.

<sup>117</sup> Dellios, Rosita and Ferguson, R. James (2011) "Sino-Indian soft power in a regional context," *Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies*: Vol. 9: Iss. 2, Article 2.

<sup>118</sup> Kumari, M. (1990). "Royal Iconology in the Temple Art of Simhachalam" in *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 51, pp.842-845.



by various actors. This section explores how cultural assets serve as the originators of cultural activity and the nodes without which cultural activity could not exist. It shows how such cultural activity leads to the production of soft power outcomes. The capacity to control cultural assets and to create activity around them results in the soft power capabilities for international actors. It is through these assets and the activity, which occurs around them, that agents also develop further capacity to build more control of future cultural soft power assets as well as build networks of participants, who inevitably not only become the producers of the culture but also the audience and the subjects of the agent's soft power.

Cultural assets are at the heart of a variety of activities, which of these activities make up soft power capabilities will be discussed here. Such activity includes the political realm, which is usually studied through the lens of cultural diplomacy as well as nation branding. However, activity around cultural assets is not limited to these two approaches, but rather the civil society, as well as the private sector and the cultural industry, are engaged in activities relating to cultural assets. This section examines how an international actor has control or can gain access to culture in order for the cultural assets, and the activity around them, to form part of their soft power capabilities.

### Cultural diplomacy

Political actors that have access to national culture can deploy this in various ways for soft power purposes. In cultural diplomacy this has been the case. Luke and Kersel's (2013) volume *U.S. Cultural Diplomacy and Archaeology: Soft Power, Hard Heritage*<sup>119</sup> examines in detail the way archaeology contributes to cultural political strategies and shows how activity around archaeology contributes to public or cultural diplomacy. "Historical accounts illustrate the use of archaeological investigations to build goodwill and diplomatic relations" (Luke and Kersel, 2013, p.15). They outline how archaeological projects enable governments to create projects in foreign lands, but also it allows those that take part in the projects – everyone from the local cook and driver to the archaeological team – to form a relationship through which cultures are exchanged. The archaeologists become "skilled diplomats" (Luke and Kersel, 2013, p.16). Therefore, the existence of heritage "play an integral role in the fostering of relationships based on the conservation, curation, and care of cultural property, both movable and immovable" (Luke and Kersel, 2013, p.8). Vorano (2016) explores how Inuit or indigenous art was used as a diplomatic tool to build soft power for Canada in the middle and late 20<sup>th</sup> century. First, Inuit art was given as gifts in diplomatic relations

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<sup>119</sup> Luke, C. and M. Kersel (2013). *U.S. Cultural Diplomacy and Archaeology: Soft Power, Hard Heritage*. Routledge Studies in Archaeology.

between leaders of Canada and other heads of states, e.g. at that time Princess and later Queen Elizabeth of the United Kingdom or to the Indian prime ministers Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi (Vorano, 2016, 314-315).<sup>120</sup> Importantly Vorano points out that Inuit art was not only used to foster external relations but also dealt with the internal “task of ‘nation making’ and its related question of sovereignty” (Vorano, 2016, p.318). Similar to Luke and Kersel, Vorano’s account highlights the importance of the artist in the entire process. He points out that while Inuit art is found in all “Canadian diplomatic venues around the world today, [it is] easy to overlook the fact that, in 1951, it was still very much a ‘new’ art form.” Had it not been for the artist James Houston, who travelled to the Arctic areas of Canada, exchanged his art with locals for their indigenous art, and brought it back to Quebec where the Canadian Guild of Crafts and the Hudson’s Bay Company become interested in the art form, the prominence of the art would have not taken shape (Vorano, 2016, p.318). Art does not exist without the artist, but the soft power work of the artist or art enthusiast cannot occur without the art either. The role of the cultural industry will be discussed further below.

The curator Kida (2012)<sup>121</sup> writes about the role that Japanese craft played in the relationship between the USA and Japan in the 1950s. Kida describes how it was the American interest in Japanese craft, which they initially even accepted as payment for food immediately after WWII, that led to the popularity of this intangible cultural asset that produced a plurality of cultural goods. He describes how American diplomats, such as John D. Rockefeller III, showed an interest in the traditional Japanese crafts, whose trade between the two nations increased significantly and also which became the subject of large exhibitions, such as “Japan” at the New York Museum of Modern Art Exhibition in 1954. Interestingly, Kida concludes that it was the “appreciative American attitudes [that] had the effect of awakening the Japanese to the value of crafts as a cultural resource, capable of becoming a source of soft power, and also caused a transformation in the perception of ‘tradition’ [at home, which was previously vied as old fashioned,] that led to the creation of “traditional crafts”” (Kida, 2012, p.393). Japanese craft served as the resource to help the Americans win the Japanese to their side, but also then in turn became a resource for the Japanese as well.

Such instances of interaction have often been evaluated for their emotive and symbolic value. Schneider, who talks about the values concerning US cultural action says, “With creative expression,

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<sup>120</sup> Vorano, Norman (2016). “Inuit Art: Canada’s Soft Power Resource to Fight Communism” in *Journal of Curatorial Studies*. Volume 5, Number 3, 1 October 2016, pp.312-338

<sup>121</sup> Kida, T. (2012). “Japanese Crafts and Cultural Exchange with the USA in the 1950s: Soft Power and John D. Rockefeller III during the Cold War.” *Journal of Design History*. 4 October 2012. Vol. 25. No. 4. Oxford University Press.

values or ideas tend to be communicated implicitly, rather than explicitly, and are communicated by touching the audience's emotions" (Schneider, 2010, p.101). Schneider also discusses the role of Jazz during the Cold War both at home in the US and abroad. It was not only an art form that allowed for personal expression, but it also was promoted by musicians not only to the elites but also to ordinary people, thereby allowing for critical voices and minority voices to be expressed at home and abroad, which gave the US an image of freedom even when the government itself was being criticized by those artists (Schneider, 2010, p.105). Another example is Inuit art used by the Canadian government as part of moving exhibitions in Communist Europe. Vorano says that "while Inuit art exhibitions and diplomatic gifts may demonstrate Canadian presence in the Arctic, and a host of other meanings, Nye's definition of soft power provides a useful way of understanding how these meanings may have become attractive and compelling to audiences around the world" (Vorano, 2016, p.318). Hayden, for example, says that Japanese anime cartoons have soft power on youth all over the world (2012, p.100-101). Schneider outlines various cultural events and arts that contribute to the building of positive political relationships such as music, audio-visual material on new media platforms, television shows and music competitions, music, film and other cultural festivals, but also workshops and research projects such as the Brookings Institutions Art and Culture Dialogue Initiative, which includes meetings, research, and spin out projects (Schneider, 2010, p.109). For Schneider, "Arts have an increasingly important role to play as they offer windows onto different societies and belief systems" and, furthermore, the key strength of arts and culture is to "tap into emotions, to communicate on more than a rational level, and to precipitate alternative ways of see the world" (Schneider, 2010, p.107). While it is true that the arts and culture cause emotive responses and carry meaning for different people in different ways. The soft power of an actor lies in the ability to actually have those cultural assets and then to be able to promote them to the audiences with whom they wish to have soft power or whom they wish to influence. Schneider gives the example of "rock music behind the Iron Curtain during the Cold War" and quoting the former US Ambassador of Hungary "rock and roll was the internet [...] it was the carrier of the message of freedom" (Schneider, 2010, p.101). The reality is that interpreting Jazz as freedom is very subjective. Music touches people's senses and emotions, but what was key here is not the subjective interpretation of the emotion and value that people associated with Jazz, but that it brought America to the people, people engaged with America, and in this engagement influence was happening, but without the engagement no influence could occur.

Brown (2017) gives an excellent account of the importance of "cultural action" and "cultural projects" for soft power, which aligns the most to the point being made in this section. Brown describes how nations have long created cultural capabilities for themselves, such as national cultural

institutes like the French Alliance Française or the German Goethe Institut, set up cultural ministries, ran cultural projects which included language courses, educational exchange programmes and the promotion of national art and heritage. To illustrate how these “cultural projects” work, Brown uses the example of Francophonie where France sets up language courses around the world, which are meant to make France more present and attractive in the minds of the subjects that speak to the language. Importantly Brown critiques the relational analysis of such “cultural projects” in relation to soft power saying that any ideational judgements are subjective and that such perspectives would be best referred to as “transaction mode of power,” meaning how resources translate into outcomes (Brown, 2017, p.44). For Brown however, it is important to see “cultural projects” and “cultural action” as “infrastructures” and a “framework of relationships”. In other words, these actions are the establishment of networks, “within which transactions can take place” (Brown, 2017, p.44). Such transaction, as we have seen with the example relating to archaeology above, do not only relate to the promotion of cultural assets, but can also be capacity building, which is the training of professionals, the building of venues, and the providing of material, which is needed for such infrastructures to be built and for transaction to be able to take place. In a similar manner, Lord and Blankenberg discuss the role of museums, “when it comes to soft power, museums are particularly strategic for international relations, whether as symbolic meeting places or as part of a network of relationships with other museums through loaning collections and exhibitions, as well as professional training and exchanges” (Lord and Blankenberg, 2016, p.22-23). Building the infrastructure, whether physical or in terms of a network, where interactions can take place, becomes a key component of soft power.

The claim that soft power capabilities lie in the ability to control the activity around cultural assets can be illustrated with an example where there is an absence of the control of cultural soft power assets and what this can do to the soft power of nations. The absence of cultural resources, which can be associated with an actor, and the absence of their deployment reduce the soft power of an actor. A multitude of examples come to mind here. The destruction of Jewish culture and heritage in Europe during the Second World War led to the adoption of The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict in The Hague in 1954 that placed the destruction of cultural heritage in the category of war crimes. Under this Convention, during the Yugoslav War Tribunals, the Serbian Generals, who attempted to remove Ottoman and Islamic heritage, were sentenced for their destruction of Stari Most Bridge and the town of Mostar in what is today Bosnia-Herzegovina. The erasing of others’ heritage is not only a war crime, but it is also an attempt to remove any assets that may be used as soft power resources. Soft power also comes from being able to claim possession of assets and from mobilizing these assets for one’s own soft power. Therefore,

while Mostar is of Ottoman and Islamic heritage, it is being adopted and deployed by the EU as its own asset (see Hausler, 2019)<sup>122</sup>. Within the Muslim communities in the West there has been a growing popularity to visit heritage sites like Mostar. Throughout these examples there is evidence of a battle over cultural assets. Behind this control of the asset is the control of the narrative. Hence, the power that will command the narrative around the town will have the city as a soft power asset. The narrative component of soft power is examined further below.

The events around Palmyra, Syria, are another example where heritage sites are used for soft power purposes. The advancement of Daesh and the threat of destruction of the town mobilized resistance from governments around the world. Russia used the recapture of the world heritage site in March 2016 as a show of its soft power. It flew in more cultural assets, the Orchestra of the St. Petersburg's Marrinsky Theatre, and staged a concert for the whole world to see. In the sense that soft power is an extension of hard power, the event was a display of Russia's military might through the use of soft power resources, but nonetheless the event, particularly the Russian orchestra, was also a reminder of Russia's soft power. Soft power is an extension of hard power. This event however would have had no impact, if mechanisms of communication were not available too. The event was publicized in Russia and around the world.

The above examples show that cultural assets, regardless of their form, are at the core of activity that brings actors together. These activities form physical and non-physical infrastructures where relationships can take place. Without the ability to create such activities and build such infrastructures, an actor does not hold a fundamental component of having cultural soft power. Different actors will have access to different cultural assets. Mobilizing their own or other's assets for their own interests is the key to attaining soft power.

### Cultural Industry as a Marketplace of Ideas

Scholars have noted that no agent has a monopoly on cultural resources. Roselle et al. say that "soft power resources are found both inside and outside of the public sector" (Roselle et al., 2014, p.73). The cultural and creative sector along with cultural industries are essential for the production of cultural goods. Power and Scott's volume *Cultural Industries and the Production of Culture* (2004)<sup>123</sup> examines in detail the different types of cultural goods that are produced. They don't focus only on

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<sup>122</sup> Hausler, K. (2019). " Cultural Heritage within the European Union's External Relations: More than a Policy Objective?". In Cultural Heritage in the European Union. Jakubowski, A., Hausler, K., & Fiorentini, F. (Eds.), Brill.

<sup>123</sup> Power, D. and A.J. Scott (2004). *Cultural Industries and the Production of Culture*. Ed. D. Power and A.J. Scott. Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.

the visual arts but also include jewellery, music, video games, film and television, new media and fashion design. The art market helps to produce the cultural assets essential for cultural soft power efforts. “The rapid growth and spread of these industries in recent decades is a reflection of the increasing convergence that is occurring in modern society between the economic order on the one hand and systems of cultural expression on the other hand” (Power and Scott, 2004, p.3 cite Lash and Urry, 1994<sup>124</sup>). Similarly, if we recall the discussion of Inuit art in the previous section, it was not only the effort of an individual artist and diplomats that accelerated the popularity and further production of indigenous art, but it was also the cultural industry. The artist, Houston, was able to tap into the Canadian and US art markets and make a success in marketing and sales of the Inuit art form. His first trip to the Arctic areas was in 1948, by 1951 the Inuit art business brought in \$6,200 CDN for the Canadian Handicrafts Guild in Montreal, by 1953 it was \$15,000 CND, and by 1968 one marketing branch reported \$600,000 CND in sales which continued to climb thereafter (Vorano, 2016, p.320). While art might form an economic agenda for artists, museums, and galleries, it is still used by the governments as “vehicles of soft power on a global stage” (Vorano, 2016, p.320). The question becomes about how political actors can take control of the creative industries to use these to their soft power advantage. The ability to do so effectively will result in more soft power capabilities.

Schneider says that “arts and culture in the US comprise one of the country’s most significant exports, enabling global domination in entertainment” and she also calls for US cultural diplomacy to receive more funding and personnel “to realize the potential of the creative arts in [both] the commercial and non-profit sectors to positively impact diplomacy” (Schneider, 2010, p. 110). She says that the problem for the US is that its cultural diplomacy is “the poor stepchild of the State Department” (Schneider, 2010, p.110). She does point out that during the Cold War the US spent a lot on cultural diplomacy, but then saw a sharp decline, yet as Hayden (2012) says this is slowly starting to increase again post the 9/11 events. Two factors are being ignored here. First, is the fast network of private individuals and philanthropists that are doing much of this work on behalf of the US (see Parmar, 2010).<sup>125</sup> Second, the US dominates the global cultural industry with its products, which also do the work on behalf of the US. As a hegemon, it can easily maintain an arm’s length approach and do its work through networks, which are discussed in the next section.

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<sup>124</sup> Lash, S. and J. Urry (1994) *Economies of Signs and Space*, London/Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

<sup>125</sup> Parmar, I. and M. Cox [eds.], (2010). *Soft Power and US Foreign Policy. Theoretical, historical and contemporary perspectives*. Routledge.

Davison (2006)<sup>126</sup> discusses soft power and the role of militainment, which are Hollywood movies that frame, in his study's case, the real Turkish city of Antalya as a bedrock for terrorism and stage fantasy wars where the US defeats the evil Turkish terrorists. While Davison's focus is on discourse analysis where he says that such framing of events, even if they are fictional, allows for "real Antalya" to be the "stage" for American power albeit through a fictitious invasion. The "Washiwood" foreign policy is played out here to portray a hierarchical relationship between America and the Muslim world where "Muslim spaces" are used as "strategic sites" for militaristic misinformation rather than portraying "inhabited spaces of life and residence, indeed of beauty and love" (Davison, 2006, p.469-470). While his discourse analysis is relevant here and may indeed explain how power plays out in the relational space. What is important to note here is the link between US state misinformation about the Muslim world and how this is reflected in the creative industries of Hollywood. The US in this case does not control the sector, as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told her Turkish counterpart Abdullah Gül in 2005 (Davison, 2006, p.467), yet it does not condemn such films either and provides support for its cultural industries in negotiations. Furthermore, it controls the information that it presents to its public about US security issues such as those relating to terrorism. This "presse[s] the forces of Washington and Hollywood closer together, with the powers that [assume] a national duty to reproduce for the audience the dominant militarism of America as entertainment" (Davison, 2006, p.485-486). Davison then goes on to describe the scenes in Turkish movies that present the same locations in a more beautiful light which is furthermore enhanced by the staging Turkey's largest film festival the Altin Portakal [Golden Orange] since 1967 in Antalya (Davison, 2006, p.479-482). Davison's focus on soft power is through the evaluation of discourse and we see is a battle in the marketplace of ideas in the film industry. However, we also see a battle for the spheres of influence, where one power has more dominance over that space than the other. Nye's "universal" norms don't prevail here as the most attractive rather norms of militarism do. Therefore, the soft power lays not in the quality of the narrative, but the ability to dominate the marketplace of ideas and dominate the cultural industries. The control of narratives and communication is an essential component of soft power, both of which are discussed further below.

Former Chinese President Hu Jintao says, "The only way to invigorate culture... is to promote innovation in its content and form, its structure and mechanism, and its means of dissemination" and pushes for "vigorously develop[ing] the cultural industry [and] create[ing] a thriving cultural market and enhance[ing] the industry's international competitiveness" (Hayden, 2012, p.181). Mingjiang points out the importance of the cultural industries for soft power saying the "deficit in cultural trade

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<sup>126</sup> Andrew Davison (2006) "The "Soft" Power of Hollywood Militainment: The Case of The West Wing's Attack on Antalya, Turkey", *New Political Science*, 28(4), pp.467-487.

is a clarion call for many Chinese officials and scholars” because in the mid-2000s China imported thousands of US, British, and Japanese books while only exploring a few dozen back to those countries (Mingjiang, 2008, p.297).<sup>127</sup> Chinese strategy, proposed by official and scholarly sources, is to increase “Chinese cultural products and actively promote them” via festivals, be part of decision-making in international debates, “cultivate international sales networks for Chinese cultural products” and support “major overseas-oriented cultural enterprises” (Heng, 2010, p.285)<sup>128</sup>. Chung (2017)<sup>129</sup> explores in more detail how governments make use of the cultural industries for soft power purposes. Chung gives examples of how states in Asia have used policies relating to the cultural industries to their advantage. The Japanese government, including trade bodies in Japan, used “Cool Japan” as a marketing strategy to “nationalise its content industry in the global market” (Chung, 2017, p.144) allowing people around the world who consume the Japanese cultural goods to associate them with Japan. Chung goes on to describe how the governments of Hong Kong and Singapore employ various cultural policies relating to the cultural industries to regulate the flow of Chinese and Japanese goods into their markets and at the same time promote their own gaming and film industries. He says that as the governments of Hong Kong and Singapore “facilitate nation-building through massive policy plans in creative industry development”, the consumers in fact are being tugged not only by Singapore’s and Hong Kong’s soft power, but by Japanese and Chinese soft power, which is also being established through policies relating to the regional cultural industries (Chung, 2017, p.154).

The Singapore and Hong Kong examples show that the cultural and creative industries have are essential for building internal loyalty and legitimacy for nation-states, i.e. internal soft power. Historically, the building of the nation-state relied on the use of cultural assets to build internal identities. National monuments, art and architecture all served this purpose. In the Soviet Union, the use of Socialist Realism was spread through from monuments in urban centres to literature and cinemas to increase love for and pride in Communist values, the Union, and its way of life. In the United Kingdom, wartime posters during WWII by graphic designers like Abram Games not only informed the population and the soldiers of their duties, but called for unity, patriotism, and commitment to the war effort while leaving a legacy of patriotism long after the war (Games, 2019).<sup>130</sup> In the era of globalization, cultural policy has shift strongly towards the regulation of the creative and

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<sup>127</sup> Mingjiang, L. (2008). “China Debates Soft Power”, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Volume 2, Issue 2, Winter, pp. 287–308.

<sup>128</sup> Heng, Y-K., (2010). “Mirror, mirror on the wall, who is the softest of them all? Evaluating Japanese and Chinese strategies in the ‘soft’ power competition era”, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 10(20), pp.275-304.

<sup>129</sup> Chung, P. (2017). “Soft Power and Cultural Industries. Cultural policy and itner-Asian regional flows in Hong Kong and Singapore.” In *The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power*. Chitty, N., Ji, L., G.D. Rawnsley, C. Hayden [eds.], Routledge.

<sup>130</sup> Games, N. (2019). *Abram Games. His Wartime Work*. Amberley Publishing.



cultural industries in relation to the economy. While this subject is broadly covered in cultural and media studies (see McGuigan, 2004)<sup>131</sup>, it has found its way less into IR's study of soft power. Creative industry policies that regulate the quota of domestic vs. foreign content are widely applied throughout the world. Furthermore, trade agreements for cultural products is also not just economic but highly political.

Therefore, while cultural assets are not all in the hands of the states, there is a way for states and other international actors – through either policies and legal frameworks, PR campaigns, and sponsorship – to take control of elements of the cultural industries and instrumentalize the assets produced in these industries to their own soft power advantage. It is the control of the cultural marketplace that results in the control of the marketplace of ideas. Sometimes cultural assets result in unexpected or uncontrolled outcomes. Van Ham (2008)<sup>132</sup> in his discussion of place branding speaks about the negative impact of the *Borat* movie on Kazakhstan, which in turn prompted the government of Kazakhstan to ban the film after its release in 2006. More recently however, a sequence to the film was released in 2020, but this time the Kazakh Ministry of Tourism adopted one of the famous catchphrases “very nice” from the movie to become the slogan in the ads it produced for the global audience by the ministry. The impact of the Charlie Hebdo cartoons on the image of Denmark is also highlighted by van Ham (2008). However, with the most recent episode between Turkey and France regarding the Charlie Hebdo cartoons precisely shows that the governments do have control of the narratives that are associated with cultural assets. Macron and Erdogan both contributed largely to the escalation of events. Communication and the control of the narrative are therefore central to the deployment of cultural assets. These are discussed further below.

### Concluding remarks on assets

It is a sign of power, namely soft rather than hard power, if an agent has control and can employ cultural assets to their advantage. The agent does not produce all these assets, but their sponsorship, adaptation, control through policy creation, and the ability to manage activity around assets, is a sign of the agent's soft power. Such capabilities differentiate a strong soft power from a weak one. Discussions of the symbolic value of cultural assets and the discourses that are produced around them are important in that they illustrate how particular historic moments unfolded, however, to measure the soft power of an international actor, their capabilities to employ their cultural resources is what says more about their overall soft power. In the balance of hard power, it is about

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<sup>131</sup> McGuigan, J. (2004). *Rethinking Cultural Policy*. Open University Press.

<sup>132</sup> Van Ham, P. (2008). “Place Branding: The State of the Art” in *Annals, AAPSS*, 616, March, pp.126-150.

the acquiring and controlling of military assets while in the balance of cultural soft power it is about acquiring and control of cultural assets.

## Communication

The literature review section on “Soft Power Mechanisms and Instruments” highlighted the importance of “broadcasting” (Nye, 2004; 2011) of soft power resources. There is also a strong emphasis by scholars on communication and information sharing in the soft power equation with Nye calling these mechanisms “shaped resources” (Nye, 2011, p.11). In the cultural realm, on one hand, this implies making the cultural assets visible through communication, but, on the other hand, it also means the communication that occurs between actors. The discussions show that specific activities or mechanisms, such as various forms of diplomacy, training programs, information campaigns, and exchange programmes helped make resources visible and produced information flows. There are two approaches to communication that are stressed by scholars. There is the two-way communication approach and there is the top-down communication approach. The top-down flow of information is where the agent projects a message and the audience passively receives it. The second, two-way approach, is form is built within relationships and the flow of information passes two or multiple ways in the communication networks that are established between agents and audiences or between the audiences with the agent remaining at arm’s length. The actors involved in communication are broad, ranging from institutions, artists, archaeologists, curators, government departments, diplomats, ordinary people or civil society groups and so on. Scholars disagree on which approach is better for soft power. Nye suggested that a two-way communication effort is more successful (Nye, 2011, p.100-101), but also emphasized the importance of information campaigns, particularly those that reinforced central themes (Nye, 2011, p.105-106). Zaharna (2007)<sup>133</sup> is critical of traditional public diplomacy approaches, which she thinks Nye endorses, and that consists of “daily communication explaining policy decisions; political campaigns built on a few strategic themes; and long-term relations with key individuals” (Zaharna, 2007, p.214). She doesn’t find this the most effective method. On the contrary, she claims that NGOs have been able to create soft power better. She says, “scholars have attributed the rise of non-state actors to technology, state sponsorship and political

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<sup>133</sup> Zaharna, R.S. (2007). “The Soft Power Differential: Network Communication and Mass Communication in Public Diplomacy” in *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*. Vol.2, pp. 213-228. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers

dynamics,” yet she asserts that the “reason for the soft power differential stems from the mode of communication,” which, in the NGO’s case, is focused on network (two-way) communication (Zaharna, 2007, p.214). This section looks at both the top-down and the two-way communication approaches and asserts, unlike many scholars who prefer the two-way approach for soft power, that the command of both of these approaches is what gives an actor better cultural soft power capabilities as both of these approaches are essential components of cultural soft power resources.

### Two-way approach

The two-way communication stands in opposition to what is often described as propaganda. The two-way communication can include public diplomacy efforts that are concerned with engaging with the foreign public, as well as, the presence of communication network, where the agent remains at an arm’s length to the process. Many scholars of soft power consider this approach of communication to be more conducive to building soft power and often make a judgement that it is more democratic. This section elaborates on those approaches. This section indeed asserts that two-way communication is an essential component of cultural soft power resources. However, it is the capacity to construct such networks and communication approaches that constitutes soft power capabilities first and foremost, while the value of the content of the information passed through these networks is contingent on historic moments and therefore secondary to the understanding of cultural soft power resources.

Speaking about cultural diplomacy, Zamorano explains there are a number of different modes of communication, which range from the spreading of language, the exchange of arts and literature, establishing networks between cultural departments, government-backed foreign cultural institutions, e.g. British Council, Goethe Institute, Confucius Institutes, etc..., and university exchange programmes. Yet within these activities, there are several national models and traditions of cultural diplomacy (Zamorano, 2016, p.172), which relate to communication approaches. There are the centralized models of France and the decentralized models, “based on the arm’s length principle”, as in Britain, and third there is the US model in which, as Zamorano agrees with Nye, cultural diplomacy has been dismantled (Zamorano, 2016, p.173 cites Nye, 2008, p.98). According to him, the latter’s cultural diplomacy has been replaced by an array of marketing and other institutions that are not directly associated with the state. He refers to this as multilateralism and transnational communication. He also says that public diplomacy and nation branding took over some of the roles that previously was assigned to cultural diplomacy in the third model. For example, the US funds Voice

of America, but not through its cultural diplomacy branches (Zamorano, 2016, p.173-174). The question arises as to which method is best for producing soft power?

Zamorano (2016) believes that soft power is possible without the mass communication or propagandist approach, but rather can be created through partnerships between the agent and the subject. Schneider (2010) provides a similar critique of mass communication and calls for network communication approaches. She cites examples where the US commissioned infomercials to be played on television channels in the Middle East, but which received hardly any distribution. Polls of both locals and Americans showed on one hand that the locals felt they are not understood by the US while, on the other hand, US polls showed that Americans admired little about Muslims. For Schneider, both provided proof that a relationship-building mechanism could have overcome some of these challenges (Schneider, 2010, p.106). In the network approach, the two-way exchange of information is also essential for credibility which is in turn “directly related to its value and persuasiveness” (Zaharna, 2007, p.220). For Zaharna the network approach is most effective for building soft power,

“The mass communication approach — the dominant approach in public diplomacy used by nation-states — is inherently information-centred in that it focuses on information production and dissemination. Mass communication is used to wield soft power. The network communication approach, which has been created and employed by advocacy NGOs, is inherently relations-centred in that it focuses on message exchange, relationship-building and network creation. NGOs are using network communication to create soft power. Creating soft power is more strategic today [...]” (Zaharna, 2007, p.221-222).

Castells described how communication networks challenged the old traditional forms of political communication (Castells, 1996).<sup>134</sup> For him, these are essential for the democratic process and the preservation of the Habermasian<sup>135</sup> notion of the public sphere, which “is a terrain of cultural engagement in which ideational materials are produced and confronted by various social actors [...] the global civil society and the political institutions” where opinions are reflected and suitable policies considered (Castells, 2008, p.91). Furthermore, for Castells, governments must facilitate the

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<sup>134</sup> Manuel Castells (1996). *The Rise of the Network Society. The Information Age: Economic, Society and Culture*, Vol. I (Cambridge MA: Blackwell, 1996), p. 469.

<sup>135</sup> Goode, L. (2005) “Chapter One ‘Excavations: The History of a Concept’” in Jurgen Habermas: *Democracy and the Public Sphere*, London, Pluto.

construction of networks and partnerships and in this context public diplomacy was not propaganda (Castells, 2008, p.91)<sup>136</sup>.

In their evaluation of US public diplomacy and soft power in Spain during Franco's regime, Cull and Rodriguez conclude that it was the relationship-building networks, such as "leader programmes and educational initiatives" that the US implemented in Spain that were "impactful forms of soft power" (Cull and Rodriguez, 2015, p.11).<sup>137</sup> When it comes to cultural assets, we can recall here the work of Luke and Kersel relating to archaeology where they say cultural diplomacy "is increasingly focused on engaging with foreign audiences rather than selling messages, on mutuality and the establishment of stable relationships instead of mere policy-driven campaigns" (Luke and Kersel, 2013, p.14-15). While acknowledging that in practice it may be hard to differentiate between the two, Cull and Rodriguez say that public diplomacy, in theory, differs from propaganda because it engages the public in a two-way exchange and is more long-term (Cull and Rodriguez, 2015, p.3). If we recall the above discussion of Japanese craft and soft power, Kida stressed the long-term impact the cultural exchange, which the US encouraged of Japanese crafts, had on both the American and Japanese audience. "It is thus evident that America was both attempting to foster a feeling of amity towards Japan in its own population, through a process of cultural exchange that introduced them to aspects of Japan's culture such as crafts and architecture, and also trying to foster pro-American sentiment in the Japanese population, drawing it into the liberal democratic camp" (Kida, 2012, p.393). Ultimately relationships were built between top level officials as well as within the art world and general population.

Parmar (2010)<sup>138</sup>, who also emphasises the important role of networks for soft power, has a different evaluation of propaganda in relation to networks. By looking at education programmes under Ford Foundation, Kissinger's Harvard Seminar and the Salzburg Seminar, he shows how seminars work to overcome the propaganda aspect of public diplomacy in order to reach global elites. The seminars "engaged their participants in total dialogue, disputation, argument and debate. They appeared to be authentic educational programmes designed for two-way exchange and learning – and were, thereby, not seen as condescending propaganda or, even, any kind of propaganda, or as the 'best' kind of propaganda" (Parmar, 2010, p.116). An evening at the Boston Symphony Orchestra, saw

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<sup>136</sup> Castells, M. (2008). *The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, and Global Governance*. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616, 78-93.

<sup>137</sup> Cull, N.J. and F.J. Rodriguez (2015). "Introduction: Soft Power, Public Diplomacy, and Democratization" in *US Public Diplomacy and Democratization in Spain. Selling Democracy?* Rodriguez, F.J., L. Delgado, and N. Cull [eds.]. Palgrave Macmillan.

<sup>138</sup> Parmar, I., (2010). "Challenging elite anti-Americanism in the Cold War: American foundations, Kissinger's Harvard Seminar and the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies" in *Soft Power and US Foreign Policy. Theoretical, historical and contemporary perspectives*. Eds Parmar Inderjeet and Michael Cox. Routledge.

the Harvard seminar organisers employ cultural assets “dispelled the participants’ initial ideas about the shallowness American culture” (Parmar, 2012, p.107).<sup>139</sup> Singh says that the network communication approach, “embody forces of domination rather than allowing for agency or empowerment” (Singh, 2010, p.6; see also Luke, 2010<sup>140</sup>), which stands in strong opposition to what Zaharna or even Nye speak about when they highlight the empowerment of the civil society. The various views on propaganda again show us that judgement of the meaning of the action is subjective, but what remains constant is the interest in power. Trends to engage the public have been observed and promoted as best practice in the field of both public and cultural diplomacy and commonly referred to as “new” forms of public or cultural diplomacy (Melissen, 2005). The result is that participants in the networks become willing or unwilling carriers of the agent’s messages. For Luke and Kersel, the usefulness of archaeologist is that they “move between the upper echelons of government and the local communities (e.g., museums, chambers of commerce, law enforcement, farms, teahouses, and women’s groups)” and such “networks and relationships are extremely useful in creating favourable impressions abroad and in deepening an understanding” of the agent of power (Luke and Kersel, 2013, p.13). Government or other actors’ commitment to support such networks pays off in the long run. Rather than a short-term reactive responses, the “long-haul” investment into the grassroots work and the relationships, which listen and understand their audiences and adjust their policies accordingly are more effective in getting desired outcomes (Melisse, 2005, p.9-22). The relation-centred network approach thus allows for information to be exchanged and co-produced effectively. Further, the involvement of the participants in the network in the creation of the information makes it more credible as it reduces barriers in communication and increases participation and ownership of the message, argues Zaharna (2007).

The building of relationships and networks that facilitate two-way communication is therefore an essential component of soft power. The relational or ideational aspect of power is indeed important to understand how ideas play out in these relationships, how they influence an audience, and which idea may be more influential at one time or another. However, this is not to be confused with the argument being made here about the construction of networks and relationships as an approach to communication. The argument here is that the ability to construct network communication rather than a propagandist type of communication can serve as a resource for soft power better. In this sense, the mode of communication as well as the ability to build such communication mechanisms is a resource and can be viewed through the power as resource

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<sup>139</sup> Parmar, I., (2012). *Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations*, Columbia University Press, cites Collier, P. and D. Horowitz, (1976). *The Rockefellers, Hold, Renehart, and Winston*, p.88.

<sup>140</sup> Luke (2010). “Chapter 3” in *Global Cultural Policies and Power*. Eds. J.P. Singh. Palgrave MacMillan.

perspective. The network approach does not per se remove the agent from the network, but rather it positions the agent at arm's length, yet still allowing for the necessary influence to take place. Scholars, however, also point out that the network can challenge the ability of the agent to control and possess the network (Hayden, 2012, p.52). Zaharna says that unlike mass communication where the source needs to sustain the communications campaign, networks can develop their own momentum and technological development is no longer just controlled by the overarching power but is now employed by networks and a variety of non-state actors (Zaharna, 2007, p.221-222). If the network continues to act in the interest of the agent of power, then it is useful for the agent's soft power, but if the network becomes autonomous and doesn't serve the interest of the agent, then it is no longer a resource for the agent but an actor on its own. Nonetheless, the ability to build a network and play an influential role in it remains a key element in the hands of the agent of power. Being able to create a network that then goes on to do the work of the agent is a beneficial resource to have albeit at times difficult to control. Therefore, in contrast to Zaharna, who praises networks as neutral soft power mechanisms, for Parmar networks, which seem to be independent of the agent, can work for the benefit of the agent:

“Ford – inextricably linked with the official makers of US foreign policy, major American corporations and prestigious universities – claimed to be acting non-politically, non-ideologically and independently of the state. Yet, its outlook as demonstrated by its own archival records, shows that Ford operated with a rather formal notion of ‘independence’ of the state, behind which lay a philosophy saturated with Gramsci’s concept of state spiritedness. In practice, the Ford Foundation was a strategic part of an elite state-private network, a power elite, that united key elements of a Cold War coalition – a historic bloc – behind an imperial hegemonic project” (Parmar, 2010, p.117).

Similarly, in his evaluation of French and German cultural action in the 20<sup>th</sup> century points, Brown highlights that due to the engagement of the governments with their diaspora, “societies sprung up” in foreign countries committed to promoting links between their home countries and the foreign ones. “Much of this activity was funded by business, which saw cultural links as opening the way for exports and investment as well as a way of promoting Germany – this close relationship between cultural and economic promotion was also seen in France (Brown, 2017, p.39).

The aim here is not to blame any party for having an interest in power and building networks that facilitate that power, but rather to show that such networks are an essential component of cultural soft power resources. The ideational debates are important, but they stand in opposition to the realist notion of power supported in this dissertation. When discussing culture and power, Singh

points out that the discussions of constructivist constitutive norms, discursive consciousness, or “meta-power of representation” debates “should not be confused with [Nye’s] soft power, which deals with persuasion and attraction.” He adds that “[s]oft power specifies [...] interests prior to interactions. Soft power merely allows these interests to converge, a conversion to ‘our way of thinking’ via the instrumentality of public or cultural diplomacy” (Singh, 2010, p.8). Even Zaharna argues that controlling communication, even through networks, is what builds power:

“The underlying dynamic has shifted from a focus on information as a product, to communication as a process. This shift is significant, because it means a parallel shift from message content to message exchange. In this new terrain, those who master and facilitate message exchange command communication power” (Zaharna, 2007, p.217).

Therefore, the possession of capabilities to build and sustain arm’s length networks by sponsoring cultural seminars, professionals, or exchange programmes is a key component of cultural soft power resources. The less one has the ability to do so, the less soft power potential the agent of power has.

### Top-down approach

Another mode of communication that is available to agents of power is the top-down approach. This can be traditional cultural diplomacy, where the cultural action is clearly associated with the agent of power; mass communication where the agent makes the subjects aware of themselves through mass media; and the use of the cultural industries for the promotion of the agent’s brand. Scholars have associated these three forms of top-down communication with soft power. Yet, as with many previously discussed points, the focus is overwhelmingly on discourse analysis and ideational and relational ideas of power (see Hayden, 2012). This section explores the resources that underpin the top-down form of communication between agent and subject and shows how the command over such resources is a necessary component of cultural soft power. Actors that have more command of such resources have more command over their cultural soft power.

Schneider, critique top-down cultural initiatives, not so much due to propaganda, but because it is often only to address a specific problem as a “rapid response tactic” (Schneider, 2010, p.103). She points to an example where the US opened a library six times in South East Asia in the 1960s as a response to crises, but it shut the library when everything was stable again. Her conclusion is that “the ‘put out the fire’ approach to cultural diplomacy violates a basic principle of effective cultural outreach: it should form part of a long-term relationship that continues unabated through political ups and downs” (Schneider, 2010, p.103). On the other hand, Singh says that “exhibiting cultural



products is a major component of cultural diplomacy,” which is the “projection of soft power to persuade people in other countries to appreciate one’s cultural values” (Singh, 2010, p.12). The broadcasting or exhibiting of cultural assets occurs through a variety of activities. In contemporary globalized contexts, this has also overlapped with nation branding efforts. In his analysis of Japan and China, Hayden (2012) shows how both states have employed culture to produce methods of communication to the audience both at home and abroad. Hayden shows how the Japanese government has understood the instrumental value of culture and communicates on cultural resources, such as manga, anime, J-pop, or J-fashion, in deliberately created campaigns and cultural initiatives such as an annual International Manga Award (Hayden, 2012, p.100-102). In addition to pop culture, which some countries have actively chosen to promote, nations have set up cultural institutions. For example, the Japan Foundation, an independent administrative institution under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan deals with the dissemination, promotion, and exchange of Japanese culture similarly to the British Council, the Alliance Francaise, or the Confucius Institute. Nation branding becomes a key aspect of the utilization of culture for soft power purposes. Hayden describes how the former Minister of Culture of Japan, Taro Aso, argued for an aggressive branding programmes to leverage the cultural assets for soft power purposes (Hayden, 2012, p.113). As we have seen in earlier discussions, China openly pursues a mass communications approach in its construction of soft power for both its internal and external goals. Nation building and nation branding is all coupled with traditional public diplomacy efforts. Nye outlines the wide successes of US public diplomacy where the government influenced the production of cultural goods such as Hollywood films, radio, language exchange programmes as well as other cultural centres and libraries (Nye, 2008, p.98-99). While some of this work includes relationship building, it can still be described as one-way communication where the actor projects and promotes their cultural assets in order to build their soft power paying less attention to the element of “listening” that is more prevalent in “new public diplomacy” (Cull, 2008<sup>141</sup>; Melissen, 2005).

Domestically, the presence of national cultural museums, monuments, and national celebrations use cultural heritage or other creative products to build the nation. In the debate between primordial and constructivist scholars of nationalism (see A.D. Smith (1998)<sup>142</sup> and Anderson (1983)<sup>143</sup>, there is an agreement that culture underpins the existence of nationalism, which is, in fact,

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<sup>141</sup> Cull, N. (2008). “Public Diplomacy: Seven Lessons for its Future from its Past” in Jolyon Welsh and David Fearn, eds. *Engagement: Public Diplomacy in a Globalized World*, pp. 16-29. Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

<sup>142</sup> Smith, A.D. (1998). *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism*. Routledge.

<sup>143</sup> Anderson, B., (1983) *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Verso.

the soft power that a nation brings to its people. Smith's ethno-symbolic analysis of the nation and nationalism theorises that that national bonds of allegiance are based on cultural resources and these are made real through mass awareness of such cultural foundation (Smith, 2009).<sup>144</sup> For Smith and other scholars of nationalism, the "relationship between the rise of modern nations and the role of the visual arts in that process" is clearly correlated (Smith, 2013, p.1-2<sup>145</sup>, see also Smith, 2009). In the contemporary context, governments have employed the cultural and creative industries to do some of the nation building and branding activities for them. A state will not be able to only employ public and cultural diplomacy as that way the relationships that are built are primarily with other diplomats, specialists in the field, and a narrow group of audiences. The cultural industries are essential for spreading information about the international actor to a wider public. An international actor that has developed the capabilities to intervene into the cultural industries, has acquired stronger soft power resources.

For the US, as for other countries, the cultural industry sometimes autonomously does the work that aligns with the interest of the state. "American corporate and advertising executives, as well as the heads of Hollywood studios, [are] selling not only their products but also America's culture and values" (Nye, 2008, p.98; see also Pells, 1997, xiii<sup>146</sup>). However, the government cannot rely on an independent market or on building long-term relationships alone. Active government strategic communication and the utilization of the cultural industries for this purpose are essential for soft power. Nye says,

"Developing long-term relationships is not always profitable in the short term, and thus leaving it simply to the market may lead to underinvestment. While higher education may pay for itself, and non-profit organizations can help, many exchange programs would shrink without government support. Private companies must respond to market forces to stay in business. If there is no market for broadcasting in Serbo-Croatian or Pashtu, companies will not broadcast in those languages. And sometimes private companies will cave in [to political policies of the foreign actor]" (Nye, 2008, p.105).

Chinese influence on Hollywood is widely acknowledged and the use of film for soft power building as well (see Su, 2010<sup>147</sup>; Mingjiang, 2008, Kokas, 2017<sup>148</sup>). There we see a "shifting the balance of global

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<sup>144</sup> Smith, A.D. (2009). *Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism. A Cultural Approach*. Routledge.

<sup>145</sup> Smith, A.D. (2013). *The Nation Made Real*. Oxford University Press.

<sup>146</sup> Pells, R. (1997). *Not like Us*. New York: Basic Books.

<sup>147</sup> Su, W. (2010). "New Strategies of China's Film Industry as Soft Power" in *Global Media and Communication*, 6(3), pp.317-322). Sage Publications.

<sup>148</sup> Kokas, A. (2017). *Hollywood made in China*. University California Press.

media capital, so that Hollywood is increasingly building its products in China and for the Chinese film market first [...] highlight[ing] a movement by the Chinese central government to overcome its perceived lack of influence on global commercial culture, known in Chinese policy circles as a “cultural trade deficit” (Kokas, 2017, p.2). As we have seen earlier, this was linked to Chinese President Hu Jintao’s speech from 2007 outlining the need for China to step up its soft power by bringing innovation and liberalisation to the cultural sector (Su, 2010, p.317). One could understand such actions through the Gramscian perspective where cultural capital and media capital are a reflection of the global cultural and ideological hegemonic struggle, however, the focus here is on the underlying material resources and the command of such resources that ultimately gives an actor soft power. This is relevant for smaller nations like South Korea. Kim’s volume *South Korean Popular Culture and North Korea* (2019)<sup>149</sup> speak broadly of the way South Korean popular culture, referred to often as the “Korean Wave” has impacted the region and the globe, as well as, influence defectors from North Korea. Kim gives an example of when 3,500 South Korean defence troops were stationed in northern Iraq, the South Korean government signed a broadcast agreement with the Kurdistan government’s Kurdistan Satellite Channel to broadcast South Korea’s globally popular *Winter Sonata* TV Drama in order to “generate positive feelings” for the soldiers present in Iraq. The government then signed more broadcast agreements with the Arab world to provide them with free Korean TV dramas and even paid for the Arabic subtitles for the *Winter Sonata*, whose airing in Egypt resulted in the Korean Embassy in Egypt receiving thousands of fan letters (Nye and Kim, 2019, p.12)<sup>150</sup>. Having command of the cultural market results in command of the communication that flows through the market, which forms an essential component of soft power resources. Command of communication in the media market is also a perspective that is reflected in the study of mass communication.

For media studies, scholars like Zaharna the mass communication approach is not ideal for soft power. She links the concept of public diplomacy with Lasswell’s<sup>151</sup> mass communication model to say that when a “source is represented by an identifiable autonomous political entity” and it is the one that designs the message and communication initiative according to its desired outcome and with limited participation from the target audience, the “mass communication’s persuasive effect rests in its control over message and medium” (Zaharna, 2007, p.217). For Zaharna this approach is not successful because there is little interaction between the source of the message, which reflects the

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<sup>149</sup> Kim, Y., [ed.] (2019). *South Korean Popular Culture and North Korea*. Routledge.

<sup>150</sup> Nye, J. and Y. Kim (2019). “Soft power and the Korean Wave” in *South Korean Popular Culture and North Korea*. Y. Kim [ed.], Routledge.

<sup>151</sup> Lasswell, H.D. (1948) ‘The Structure and Function of Communication in Society’, in Lyman Bryson (ed.), *The Communication of Ideas* (New York: Institute for Religious and Social Studies), p. 37 [reprinted in W. Schramm and D. F. Roberts (eds), *The Process and Effects of Mass Communication* (Urbana IL: University of Illinois Press), pp. 84-99, with the model at p. 84.

“culture of its sponsor,” and the audience, which can therefore easily misinterpret the intended meaning (Zaharna, 2007, p.219). This is similar to the point made about the need to “listen to the public” made by public diplomacy scholars Melissen (2005) and Cull (2008). However, Nye acknowledges that both strategic communication campaigns and mass communication are also essential for soft power. For Van Dyke and Vercic<sup>152</sup> (2009) there is an acknowledged convergence between public relations and public diplomacy that can be understood as strategic communications. For them, strategic communication and soft power programmes are aligned (Van Dyke and Vercic, p.822-823). Nye highlights the importance of “strategic communication, which develops a set of simple themes much as a political or advertising campaign does” and “plans symbolic events and communications [...] to reinforce central themes or to advance a particular government policy” (Nye 2008 p.102). He opposes propagandistic overinvolvement such as the censorship of unfavourable content, as in the case when America tried to stop Al Jazeera from broadcasting Osama bin Laden’s videotape in 2001, but he does propose, “A better response would be to prepare to flood Al Jazeera and other networks with American voices to counter bin Laden’s hate speech” (Nye, 2008, p.101). Examining Chinese scholarship, Mingjiang points out that mass communication and mass media are essential for soft power. He highlights the fact that global news media is dominated by four Western news agencies (Associated Press, United Press International, Reuters, and Agence France-Presse), and the US alone controls 60 to 80 percent of TV and movie theatre content, which results in “Western dominance in media and mass communications [and] has resulted in their ‘cultural hegemony’ or ‘media imperialism’ (Mingjiang, 2008, p.294). Therefore, for those scholars like Zaharna, who are coming from the perspective of the Anglo-American sphere, the locus of global hegemony, of course, the need to discuss mass communications in relation to soft power is smaller because the cultural market does much of the work for the US in terms of communicating its messages and mass media is also dominated by their content. For international actors, their ability to adopt policies that give more control of the way cultural industries and mass media communicate their cultural assets to their desired audiences is a key to building soft power. Warren (2014)<sup>153</sup> discusses the importance of controlling how mass communication channels communicate cultural assets to the domestic audiences in order to build internal soft power to strengthen internal sovereignty. While his focus is on the effect of communication on the audience, “emotionally charged messages to *induce* voluntary compliance with state rule”, where the “[s]tate capacity is premised – at least in part – on the

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<sup>152</sup> Van Dyke, M.A. and D. Vercic (2009). “Public Relations, Public Diplomacy, and Strategic Communications: An International Model of Conceptual Convergence” in *The Global Public Relations Handbook* ed. Krishnamurthy Sriramesh and Dejan Verčič. Abingdon: Routledge.

<sup>153</sup> Warren, T. (2014). *Not by the Sword Alone: Soft Power, Mass Media, and the Production of State Sovereignty*. *International Organization*, 68(1), 111-141. doi:10.1017/S0020818313000350

normative power of communication” (Warren, 2014, p.112), Warren also acknowledges the role of mass communication in this process as it builds the capacity to produce “influence, while at the same time generating powerful economies of scale in the development of political loyalties” (Warren, 2014, p.113). Warren also reminds us that the study of nationalism has always drawn attention to the way elements associated with soft power, such as “images, narratives, and other symbols”, have historically been used to build political loyalties (Warren, 2014, p.117). However, the state or any single actor does not have a monopoly on culture or communication channels. Therefore, there is “a complex ecology of rival producers” and particularly in the “context of contested sovereignty”, Warren emphasizes the importance of mass communication in such contexts, “we would therefore have no reason to expect that a decrease in [mass communication] would increase the ‘market share’ of the state’s production of influence, relative to the influence of its challengers” (Warren, 2014, p.120). Hence, while his focus is on the affective underpinnings of the messages, it is clear that command of mass communications is also a component of soft power resources. Mass communication could be the use of mass media such as films, radio, news, and social media to draw promote an actor's cultural assets. Warren emphasised the need to strengthen mass communication, including within the cultural industries, because “the economies of scale [matter] in the marketplace of ideas” (Warren, 2014, p.111). An agent of power however cannot compete or balance the soft power of others in the marketplace of ideas if it is not dedicating resources to be present in the marketplace place of ideas by strengthening its market share of the media and creative and cultural industries through the appropriate policies and cultural action.

What we have seen in the discussions above is that not only a network communication approach is important to establish. The agent of power at times has to make themselves more visible in the international realm. Particularly in the age of globalisation and a global cultural industry, the need to participate in such an industry cannot be left only to the private sector alone. The political actor can utilize the creative and cultural industries to their soft power advantage.

## Narrative

The examination of the narrative component in the theoretical frameworks for the strategic employment of culture as a resource for soft power, similarly to the above discussion about communication and cultural assets, requires an interdisciplinary approach. The literature available for culture and soft power originates in or borrows from several academic disciplines. The study of media

and communications (Thussu, 2010)<sup>154</sup>, public diplomacy (Cull, 2013)<sup>155</sup>, cultural diplomacy (Ang, Isar, and Mar, 2015)<sup>156</sup>, cultural studies (Clarke, 2014)<sup>157</sup>, and of course international relations (Nye, 2004) have all dealt with the concept of culture and soft power. The complexities of the concept of soft power combined with an interdisciplinarity nature of its study make getting a grasp of the concept and its resources more difficult particularly when it comes to culture, which is in itself a complex term. This section aims to highlight some of the debates concerning the notion of the narrative in relation to soft power. The goal here is to highlight how this is an essential component of cultural soft power, yet to take the notion of the narrative out of the constructivist literature and to show how the narrative in relation to soft power can be understood through the realist resource as power perspective within the IR discipline.

The quality or content of the narrative and the response of the audience to a narrative are indeed important elements to the understanding of why, in a specific historic context, an agent was able to influence the behaviour of the subject. For Hayden soft power is a “rhetorical procedure” where “*communication forms* are expected to contribute to influence, and [...] *messages* [...] are purported as viable to outcomes” (Hayden, 2012, p.27). Feklyunina (2015) conceptualises that soft power works through “narratives of collective identities and common or compatible interests”, which that actor “cannot choose to resort to soft power in any particular moment, but that soft power is always at work, shaping the psychological milieu of the relationship – increasing, decreasing or even disappearing together with the evolution of identities and interests” (Feklyunina, 2015, p.4). Hence, for her it is both the “projection and acceptance of collective identity narratives” that makes up an important mechanism of soft power (Feklyunina, 2015, p.6). Kiseleva (2015) speaks about the persuasive nature of narratives surrounding identity and hegemony and the impact that such discourses have on soft power. Solomon says, “Material factors do not naturally emit meaning, but are made meaningful through people’s description of them” (Solomon, 2014, p.726).<sup>158</sup> He bases his discourse analysis study of soft power in the affect and aesthetics literature and illustrates that it is not just about the agent constructing the narrative, but it is about dynamics of emotion that is felt by the audience (Solomon, 2014). Mattern’s (2005) socio-linguistic perspective sees soft power embedded in language where through “representational force”, or the power of language, one

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<sup>154</sup> Thussu, D. [ed.] (2010). *International Communication: A Reader*. Routledge.

<sup>155</sup> Cull, N. (2013). “Foreword” in *European Public Diplomacy. Soft power at work*. M.K.D. Cross and J. Melissen [eds.]. Palgrave Macmillan.

<sup>156</sup> Ang, I., Isar, Y. R., & Mar, P. (2015). “Cultural diplomacy: beyond the national interest?” in *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 21(4), 365-381.

<sup>157</sup> Clarke, D. (2014). Theorizing the role of cultural products in cultural diplomacy from a cultural studies perspective. *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 22, 147-163.

<sup>158</sup> Solomon, T. (2014). “The affective underpinnings of soft power”, *European Journal of International Relations* 20(3), pp. 720–741.

narrative wins over another, which to her is a coercive process rather than a co-operative one. Audience reception of narratives is also important to Kroenig et al. (2010). Nye also suggests that “narratives become the currency of soft power” (Nye, 2011, p.104). From these various positions, one can see that the narrative can be studied from several perspectives. What is essential for the realist notion of soft power resources, is that a narrative is important. An agent of power does need to reflect on the content of the narrative as constructivists recognize, however, the right policies need to be in place to construct a narrative in the first place. Soft power requires attention to be given to the narrative. Narratives that emerge around cultural assets and are transmitted via various modes of communication are central in the analysis and understanding of soft power. Being able to command an identifiable narrative means that the agent possesses this aspect of the resource of soft power. This is closely linked to the control of the communication as well as the action around cultural assets. In addition to controlling the message of the narrative, the ability to manage the breadth of its reach is also important. These abilities are the strategic resources of soft power. The understanding and strategic engagement with narratives as resources by the agent of power is central. “Political leaders have long understood the power that comes from setting the agenda and determining the framework of a debate” (Nye, 2008, p.95). While narratives have caught the attention of constructivists in IR (see Browning, 2008)<sup>159</sup>, they are not given much attention to by realist or liberal scholars of IR. Narratives are widely studied in media and communication studies (see Berger, 1997)<sup>160</sup>. Some scholars have brought the focus of narratives into the study of IR, e.g., Antoniadis, Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle (2010<sup>161</sup>; 2013<sup>162</sup>; 2014<sup>163</sup>), by looking at the concept of “strategic narrative”.

## Strategic Narratives

“Strategic narratives are an important tool which must be considered alongside material resources as a determinant of whether [...] powers are able to shape a new [international] system” (Antoniades et al., 2010, p.1). For Antoniadis et al. strategic narratives play a key role in the realist notion of the struggle for power, which has evolved to include non-material forms of power following the Cold War. However, instead of conceiving the strategic narrative within realist ideas of the balance

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<sup>159</sup> Browning, Christopher S. (2008) *Constructivism, narrative and foreign policy analysis: a case study of Finland*. Bern; Oxford: Peter Lang.

<sup>160</sup> Berger, A.A. (1997). *Narratives in Popular Culture, Media, and Everyday Life*. Sage Publications.

<sup>161</sup> Antoniadis, A., Miskimmon, A. and B. O’Loughlin (2010) *Great Power Politics and Strategic Narratives*. Working Paper. Centre for Global Political Economy, University of Sussex.

<sup>162</sup> Miskimmon, A., B. O’Loughlin, L. Roselle (2013). *Strategic Narratives. Communication Power and the New World Order*. Routledge.

<sup>163</sup> Roselle, L., A. Miskimmon, and B. O’loughlin (2014). "Strategic Narrative: A New Means to Understand Soft Power." *Media, War & Conflict* 7, no. 1 (2014): 70-84.

of power, they identify it as a “balance of identity” and propose an analysis of the content of the messages (Antoniades et al., 2010, p.11-16). Miskimmon, Roselle, and O’Loughlin (2013; 2014) develop Antoniades’ ideas further to include a more structured understanding of strategic narratives. They call for an examination of strategic narrative by “asking what means and methods of persuasion and influence are likely to work under what conditions, and to a focus on those conditions of communication and interaction” (Roselle et al., 2014, p.71). “The point of the strategic narratives is to influence the behaviour of others” (Miskimmon et al., 2013, p.3). For them, the strategic narrative can be studied through four elements – the “formation and projection” and the “reception and interpretation” of narratives (Roselle et al., 2014, p.74-75). The section in this dissertation on communication comes close to the “projection” element and this section will explore the “formation” of the strategic narrative, while the reception and interpretation” is not what is examined. Their key insight, which is useful for this research, is that there can be a strategic employment of narratives, which is essential for achieving soft power aims. The role of strategic narratives ties in directly with the presence of cultural (soft power) assets and communication approaches, which were discussed in the previous sections, and all of this fits into the power as resource perspective. Roselle et al. say:

“Soft power assets are always on display. That said, there may be times when communication *about* soft power assets and narratives may be used strategically. Soft power assets can be promoted and publicized to target audiences for instrumental purposes [...] just as hard power resources can be used instrumentally to influence a target actor’s behaviour” (Roselle et al., 2014, p.73).

Similarly, for Nye the information age has brought on a “scarcity of attention” in which “editors and cue-givers” can guide our attention, and their capacity to do so is “a source of power for those who can tell us where to focus our attention” (Nye, 2008, p.100). This goes beyond Hayden’s call for communication mechanisms (Hayden, 2012, p.9), which is missing the strategic narrative aspect. Nye is closer to Roselle et al., who highlight that “narratives are even more important for ordering the chaos” and “strategic narrative [are] a power resource” (Roselle et al., 2014, p.74-76).

The aim here is to highlight that the management of narratives is important and the ability to do so is what gives the agent of power soft power capabilities. Szostek, rightly suggests that there are limitations in viewing particular “universalistic ideas, culture, and values”, (Szostek, 2017, p.380)<sup>164</sup> as resources of soft power. He illustrates how in the relationship between Ukraine and Russia, some Ukrainians will be attracted to resources like the Russian Church or media and other Ukrainians

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<sup>164</sup> Szostek, J. (2017) The power and limits of Russia’s strategic narrative in Ukraine: the role of linkage. *Perspectives on Politics*, 15(2), pp. 379-395.



repelled by them, but the narratives that they encounter from the governments and their everyday interactions may change their perceptions. He dismisses the strategic importance that cultural assets as the Church or the media may have for soft power on the basis that they can be understood by different people in different ways. However, his focus on the strategic narrative is relevant. He says because Ukrainians encounter relationships both with Russian and Ukrainian aspects of life, a narrative that pits one against the other does not work. While he makes an important illustration about narratives, he misses the importance of how cultural assets can be used and focuses more on the interpretation by the audience of their everyday encounters with narratives. Scholars like Szostek or Golan et al. (2018)<sup>165</sup>, who look at how the Catholic Church as a public diplomacy actor engages strategic narratives, examine the way the audience receives the strategic narrative, i.e. looking at what Roselle et al. called reception and interpretation. While these are valuable and necessary viewpoints to understand how persuasion works, the aim here is to understand what constitutes a resource of soft power for an agent of power rather than how ultimately these resources translated into outcomes and why. Hence, the command of a narrative is important, and any empirical study must look at how an agent commands the strategic narrative before engaging with the content and reception of that strategic narrative. Miskimmon et al. also see that strategic narratives align with the realist notion of power referring to Morgenthau's "The Principles of Propaganda" where the "medium of military pressure" is linked to the "medium of propaganda" (Miskimmon et al., 2013, p.91-92 cite Morgenthau, 1970, p.324<sup>166</sup>). Thinking of culture, this means that the cultural asset needs to be accompanied by an identifiable narrative that is communicated through the various communication mechanisms. The ability to curate the information and the narrative is what gives it direction to ensure it is in line with the interests of the agent of power.

## Credibility

Propaganda is raised as a concern by some scholars (see Zaharna, 2007; Nye, 2008) because it is seen by many as detrimental to soft power and the credibility of the agent. However, this understanding of propaganda is biased. The definition of propaganda given by Lasswell "the expression of opinions or actions carried out deliberately by individuals or groups with a view to influencing the opinions or actions of other individuals or groups for predetermined ends and through psychological manipulations" where propaganda itself is value neutral – meaning neither good nor

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<sup>165</sup> Guy J. Golan, Phillip C. Arceneaux & Megan Soule (2018): "The Catholic Church as a public diplomacy actor: an analysis of the pope's strategic narrative and international engagement", *The Journal of International Communication*. Routledge.

<sup>166</sup> Morgenthau, H.J. (1970). "Principles of Propaganda" in *Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade, 1960-1970*. Pall Mall.

bad (Ellul, 1973, p.xii).<sup>167</sup> Therefore, any agent spreading a message is engaging in propaganda. The strategic message is no different than an advertisement campaign. Not all products are good for people, but an advertisement can make them seem appealing due to the narrative that it commands. Snow (2015)<sup>168</sup>, who points out the parallels between public diplomacy and advertising highlights that the former undersecretaries of state for public diplomacy and public affairs for the US Department of State were “advertising legends” and also served as senior communications advisers to President George W. Bush. In reference to propaganda, Cull says that public diplomacy “did evolve into a distinct set of practices that in the mind of its practitioners (if not its paymasters) had its own non-propagandistic mores privileging exchange and listening rather than crude self-assertion” (Cull, 2013, p.vii). The focus in this dissertation is on the paymasters, whose soft power capability lies in the ability to manage narratives and their interest is defined as power.

However, Nye says that “without underlying [...] credibility, the instruments of public diplomacy cannot translate cultural resources into the soft power of attraction” (Nye, 2011, p.107). “Even the best advertising cannot sell an unpopular product. A communication strategy cannot work if it cuts against the grain of policy. Actions speak louder than words” (Nye, 2011, p.106). Szostek when illustrating how the strategic narrative works, highlights that “credibility is not an objective property of a source of a message, but a receiver perception” (Szostek, 2017, p.403). Nye’s illustrates that the “exaggerated claims about Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction and ties to Al Qaeda may have helped mobilize domestic support for the Iraq War, but the subsequent disclosure of the exaggeration dealt a costly blow to British and American credibility” (Nye, 2011, p.104). It is not clear, with whom this credibility was lost and how did it actually impact the US soft power, i.e. the ability to employ soft power resources to become attractive. The US is still very attractive despite all the destructive and human rights violations that it conducts at home and abroad because it is able to command its cultural assets, dominates communication mechanisms, and has a clear strategic narrative. The only challenge to its attractiveness is not its credibility, but the fact that other powers or actors will be able to dominate soft power resources, spread their assets, communicate their messages, and command the narrative better than the US will.

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<sup>167</sup> Harold Dwight Laswell inspired the definition given in Ellul, Jacques (1965). *Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes*. Trans. Konrad Kellen & Jean Lerner. Vintage Books, New York

<sup>168</sup> Snow, Nancy (2015). “Global Powers of Persuasion” in *The Journal of the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan*, April 2015.

## Audience

The discussions above have shown that literature on soft power prefers to look at the audience's perception of the agent's narratives, resources or assets, and actions. This section however highlights the need to look at the audience, who undoubtedly play a key role in the soft power equation, through a different approach. What is missing from the above literature is a systematic discussion of how the audience is utilized in a soft power strategy. There is mention of the various national audiences when mass communication is discussed and attention is given to the engagement with civil society when network communication is discussed (Zaharna, 2007; Schneider 2007). However, the act of building an audience and rationalizing its use has largely been left out of the conceptualization of or theorizing on the concept of soft power. In line with Hayden's brief discussion on the rationalization of the audience, this section outlines steps for understanding how agents of power identify and utilize the audience within soft power strategies.

## Demographics

As the dissertation has previously pointed out, the literature on soft power discusses both domestic and foreign audiences rather generally. Various demographics are mentioned at times. Nye, for example, speaks of regions and countries and often generalizes the public by identifying groups such as the Chinese, the Arabs, etc. His generalizations sometimes have some distinctions, for example, he says Muslim society is not monolithic and distinguishes between the religious and political elite and the citizens, and radicals and moderates (Nye, 2011, p.84-85; Nye, 2004, p.97) or distinguishes between European elites and the wider population (Nye, 2004, p.38). In these contexts, Nye often refers to polling populations as a method of classifying the wider public and contrasting it against the ruling class or elite. However, more nuanced distinctions rarely take place in Nye's work when it comes to understanding the demographics of foreign publics. Although, Nye did criticize President Bush for "ignor[ing] the problem of multiple audiences" (Nye, 2010, p.5).<sup>169</sup> In Hayden's discussion of Chinese soft power strategies, he points out that for local strategists the audience is split into domestic and foreign constituencies and "the only significant difference is in *how* audiences are addressed" and not who makes up the foreign or domestic audience more broadly (Hayden, 2012, p.195, italics not in original). Towards the beginning of his *The Rhetoric of Soft Power*, Hayden does say that he will attempt to outline "*what* audiences are deemed significant within a strategic [...] calculus" (Hayden, 2012, p.27). Throughout the book, however, a detailed and structured discussion

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<sup>169</sup> Nye, J. (2010). "Responding to my critics and concluding thoughts" in *Soft Power and US Foreign Policy. Theoretical, historical and contemporary perspectives*. Eds Parmar Inderjeet and Michael Cox. Routledge.

of the type of audiences and how these can be identified and classed does not actually appear. In the analytical studies of China, Venezuela, US, and Japan different audiences are mentioned, e.g. “global audiences” (p.94); fans of Manga (p.102); “international visiting dignitaries”; “impoverished children” (p.138); and so on (Hayden, 2012). However, these are mentioned in an ad hoc manner and can be very broad, such as a global audience. Further, as Hayden recognizes, it is unclear how some, such as the fans of Japanese Manga, can actually influence political outcomes or do they simply make cultural resources popular but not politically effective (Hayden, 2012, p.100-103). What this implies is that the goal and the audience group need to match. The simple fact of the existence of cultural goods and their consumption and popularity amongst various audience groups does not automatically translate into a strong soft power capability.

There is a reflection about various audience groups in Taverner’s (2010)<sup>170</sup> work on military information campaigns. He divides the audience into four categories: the first “adversary audience and within that, the key individuals and agencies that influence and shape the thinking of the enemy’s leadership”; the second, is the broader audience in the region of the enemy state; the third group to be “targeted” is the global audiences and “international opinion”; and finally, the “domestic public opinion” (Taverner, 2010, p.142-143). In the discussion of the pop-culture audience, Huat (2012)<sup>171</sup> shows in detail how fans of the same pop-culture differ significantly even if they are, broadly speaking, one group. Huat shows that there are different “layers of audience communities” when it comes to exposure to the same cultural assets of East Asian pop-culture. He points out that each sub-groups of fans, in some cases specifically categorized as “sub-fan groups”, has a different function and impact – some are simple consumers, some are foreigners, some are locals, others have small fan clubs, and all interact differently with the cultural asset. For some, the cultural asset, such as the Taiwanese singer Chang Hui-mei, are mere entertainment, but for others, he speaks for political causes such as the independence of Taiwan from China (Huat, 2012, p.108). The Korean television star Song Seung-heon, managed to inspire hundreds of fans from across several nations to write letters to the Korean government in a campaign to support him when he dogged military conscription by falsifying medical records, while also highlighting the wide reach of Song’s ability to spread a favourable image of Korea (Huat, 2012, p.109-110). Huat points out that the Korean fans respected their government’s military conscription, in other cases debates could break out about significant political issues. Pop-culture then can become political and can have significant implications for soft power. This shows that

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<sup>170</sup> Taverner, Angus (2010). “The military use of soft power – information campaigns: The challenges of application, their audiences and effects” in *Soft Power and US Foreign Policy. Theoretical, historical and contemporary perspectives*. Eds Parmar Inderjeet and Michael Cox. Routledge.

<sup>171</sup> Huat, C. (2012). *Layers of Audience Communities*. In *Structure, Audience and Soft Power in East Asian Pop Culture* (pp. 103-118). Hong Kong University Press

cultural industries, even when dealing with a specific type of cultural product, i.e. pop-culture in this instance, cannot be seen to have a monolithic audience group. Huat's work shows very well how sub-groups have a different function and impact on political images and narratives that is ultimately created when cultural assets are at the centre. What becomes apparent is that a soft power campaign needs to consider in a strategic way which audiences are targeted. It needs to be clear in identifying audience groups and tailoring its campaign to those groups. The groups themselves will differ depending on the agent of power and the outcome that is being aimed at. Large categories such as "global audience" or foreign and domestic audience, which appear throughout the soft power literature, are too generalized to produce truly effective soft power strategies. Various groups of people play a multitude of roles in society and politics, therefore, to group a range of communities, social, political, economic, and other groups together into single large categories negates reality on the ground. It is also not how agents of power construct their soft power campaigns and strategies. Soft power campaigns, as we saw earlier with Kim's (2019) discussion of South Korea's TV dramas or the Harvard Seminars (Parmar, 2010), are clearly targeted at specific audience groups. Understanding how agents of power do this and to what extent they command this process, also reveals the strength of the soft power resource that they have.

## Spaces

The usual categories such as age, gender, religion, political affiliation, a specific consumer base, etc. could assist in identifying demographic groups and tailoring soft power campaigns to them. Audiences are also found and can be reached in specific spaces. Media studies scholarship provides a wide discussion of audiences. There is a body of literature that looks at the way that spaces create audience groups. For example, Boyles (2017)<sup>172</sup> speaks about the way that cities or urban areas have their own communities. While this is similar to Anderson's "imagined communities" (Anderson, 1991), it is not the same. For him, the community, particularly the nation is socially constructed, and the media reinforces these constructions. However, in Boyles's perspective, which she links to Yi-Fu Tuan's (1979) "fields of care" concept, it is a specific geographical space, that can be as specific as a street corner, within which communities are constructed. She says that media reinforces the "*fields of care*, in which residents are tied to the city by both geographic space and emotional attachment" (Boyles, 2017, p.945). While this concept comes from the constructivist perspective, Tuan, who proposed the concept "fields of care" which suggests that geographies are mental construction,

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<sup>172</sup> Boyles, J.L., (2017). "Building an audience, bonding a city: digital news production as a field of care" in *Media, Culture and Society*. Vol. 39(7), pp. 945-959.

however, does not deny the positivist perspective where spaces are set “fields of care” and can be perceived as already defined entities. Fields of care are not the same as “man’s sense of place” (Tuan, 1979, p.387).<sup>173</sup> Spaces, therefore, have their own communities. This becomes useful when it comes to the identification of an audience, which can then be identified by spaces. Therefore, aside for considering the demographic which the soft power strategy is directed towards, it is also important to consider the spaces and the communities of spaces within which it will play out.

The importance of gaining access to audiences located within certain spaces is highlighted by scholars who analyse the relationship between international and local laws and how these limit and expand access to audiences. For example, “street performers, parade organizers, neighbourhood festivals [...] depend on public space as a primary performance or distribution venue and so rely on licensing and permitting policies to gain access to their audiences and markets” (Rosenstein, 2010, p.26). Those are very localized scenarios, but the exchange of culture in the international sphere is also highly regulated. As part of international negotiations, culture is always an element of bargaining. Countries want to see their cultural goods distributed for both political and economic purposes but are keen to limit the political influence and market domination of foreign cultural goods. For example, in the mid 1990s France was campaigning for stricter rules in the European Union regarding television quotas in order to prevent Hollywood from dominating, however, Germany and Britain opposed the French. In June 1996 the EU ended limits on non-European programmes (Chao, 1996, p.1127).<sup>174</sup> Such considerations are diplomatically balanced through laws pertaining to cultural diversity and intellectual property rights (see Hazucha, 2014).<sup>175</sup> On the other hand, UNESCO encourages the preservation and exchange of culture and the development of cultural diversity through suggested changes and standards in international law and in particular influences changes in the World Trade Organization relating to the cultural industries (see Hanania, 2014).<sup>176</sup> Access to spaces and therefore audiences are strictly controlled. This analysis applies not only to physical spaces but also to digital spaces since the technological revolution. “The entire commercial, nonprofit and informal cultural sector—including audiences, artists, museums, performers, presenters, scholars, archives, universities, and presses—is seriously impacted by the regulation of media outlets, the Internet, and digital technologies, and by intellectual property and copyright law” (Rosenstein, 2010, p.25). The

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<sup>173</sup> Tuan Yi-Fu, (1979). “Space and Place: Humanistic Perspective” in eds. S. Gale and G. Olsson, *Philosophy in Geography*. D. Reidel Publishing Company, Holland. Pp. 387-427.

<sup>174</sup> Chao, Tina W. (1996). “GATT’s Cultural Exemption of Audiovisual Trade: The United States May Have Lost the Battle but not the War” in *University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law*. Vol. 17, Issue 4, 1127

<sup>175</sup> Hazucha, B. (2014). “Cultural diversity and intellectual property rights: Friends or foes?” in Hanania, L.R. eds. *Cultural Diversity in International Law: The Effectiveness of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions*. Routledge

<sup>176</sup> Hanania, L.R. eds. (2014). *Cultural Diversity in International Law: The Effectiveness of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions*. Routledge.

control of spaces, digital or physical, is therefore the control of people. Luke and Kersel (2013) go so far as to call such control of legislation and culture hard power, “[L]egislative efforts like the 1983 Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act (U.S. implementation of legislation of the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property in the U.S.), the more recent application of the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA), Archaeological Resources Protection Act (ARPA)” are “hard power initiatives in the current cultural diplomatic toolkit” (Luke and Kersel, 2013, p.4).

This resonates with the previously discussed point about the marketplace of ideas and indicates that spaces form their own marketplaces. Access to marketplaces of ideas can be in this sense be hindered by governments and laws that block or control the flow of information making an “uneven playing field and a disadvantage” to the actor attempting to change attitudes (Kroenig et al., 2010, p.414). Therefore, Kroenig et al. suggest that, “in case of market failure due to government censorship, or other barriers, steps to overcome the market failure may be necessary before soft power can be effectively exercised (Kroenig et al., 2010, p.414-415). The control of spaces and the access to people therefore may be hard power as Luke and Kersel suggest, but the influence of the hearts and minds of the audiences in those spaces is soft power. Nonetheless, in order to be able to implement a soft power strategy, the ability to access and audience is an important consideration that needs to be taken into account. Furthermore, each space can have its own community with a distinctive “field of care” that also needs to be taken into consideration when selecting cultural initiatives as strategic tools. In the analysis of how agents’ soft power resources, their ability to manage access to spaces is part of their soft power capability.

### Rationalizing the Audience – target or vehicle

A soft power strategy can include the utilization of an audience group, such as the civil society of a foreign country, to change their opinion and hope that in turn they will put pressure on their own government to change their policies or perspectives. Nye writes that “public diplomacy is an important tool in the arsenal of smart power<sup>[177]</sup>, but smart public diplomacy requires an understanding of the [...] role of civil society in generating soft power” (Nye, 2008, p.108). In more previously illustrated situations in this chapter, we have seen the agent can act at an arm’s length approach when a soft power strategy is employed in a manner where funds are given out to non-state cultural organizations which work with civil society or the network in which it operates. In this sense, the audience, both the non-state actor and the network or civil society, are the vehicle for a strategy

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<sup>177</sup> A combination of hard and soft power.

which allows for the agent to maintain an arm's length approach. For example, Nye describes that the "development of a long-term strategy of cultural and educational exchanges that develop a richer and more open civil society" serves the role that it is "not Americans but indigenous surrogates" who carry on the work of American soft power abroad (Nye, 2004, p.122). Similarly, Luke and Kersel outline the cultural diplomacy programmes that the US has been engaged in since the Cold War. Their emphasis is also on the exchange between non-state "ambassadors" of US values and the connection of such subjects with the target audience in order to spread US values in a soft way, "sponsoring events that prompted engagement of citizens in non-political settings represented a cornerstone of soft diplomacy" like the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 also referred to as the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961, a "commitment to cultural policy funding and study abroad programs"<sup>178</sup> (Luke and Kersel, 2013, p.5-6). The "people-to-people exchanges [...of...] U.S. and foreign participants should exchange ideas, knowledge, practical applications, and, most importantly, people" (Luke and Kersel, 2013, p.6-7). "Whether archaeologists realize it or not, they are very much embedded agents of U.S. soft power and unofficial, long-term cultural diplomats" (Luke and Kersel, 2013, p.13).

While in the era of interstate war, citizens were drawn into army battalions, now, when interstate military conflict is less prevalent, mechanisms of soft power recruit citizens into ideological battalions and weaponized them for the purpose of building soft power and destroying the other's soft power capabilities. Evidence of an agent's ability to rationalize and command various audience groups, is a reflection of their soft power capabilities. However, it is important to note that audiences are not static entities and their interaction with cultural initiatives may change over time.

## Concluding remarks

The discussion above showed that viewing culture through the prism of the four components – assets, communication, narratives, and audience – in a way that is not concerned with the ideational or relational lens of power, but rather concern with the resources that are being constructed, allows for a better understanding of the soft power capabilities an actor may have. It shows that soft power is not just an attribution, but rather something that an agent of power actively builds up by acquiring various cultural soft power tools. Soft power in this sense is not the measure of normative values, but rather a measure of visible capabilities. It is through these capabilities that an agent of power makes themselves known and present in the lives of their chosen audiences, and it is through these

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<sup>178</sup> Such initiatives coincided with the heightened tensions between the US and the Soviet Union (Luke and Kersel, 2013, p.6), which also speaks to the importance of strategic deployment of soft power tools when the political reality calls for it similarly to hard power deployment.



capabilities that relationships can be established and influence, which relational scholars examine, can be exerted. Actors in world politics are engaging their cultural resources in one way or another, and those with the most power to do so are the ones that have the most soft power capabilities. Looking at resources in a structured way gives essential insight into an actor's soft power. The above framework gives an overview of what components of the cultural actions of an agent of power can be studied in empirical cases.

## METHODOLOGY CHAPTER

### Introduction

The aim of the dissertation is twofold. First, it is to develop a theoretical framework for the understanding of culture as a resource for soft power within the power-as-resource perspective. Second, to apply the theoretical framework, developed in the first part, to the analysis of a case study – the Creative Europe Sub-Programme Culture. The research question of the dissertation therefore is also twofold. The first question is – what are the main characteristics or elements that constitute cultural resources in a soft power strategy available to international actors? The second question is – to what extent is the EU’s instrumentalization of culture via its Creative Europe Sub-Programme Culture (CESPC) able to generate cultural resources with the characteristics needed for the wielding of soft power?

This chapter sets out the methodological principles and methods that underpin the following chapters in this dissertation. Firstly, there is a brief discussion of the existing methodological approaches that have been previously used to study soft power. In this context, there is an elaboration of how this dissertation bridges the gap in existing methodological approaches. Second, the chapter again briefly touches on the rationale of using the power-as-resource rather than relational approach and the implications for methodology. Thirdly, the chapter illustrates how the theoretical framework influenced what methodology and methods will be undertaken in the empirical study of soft power in this dissertation and this methodology is elaborated on. Finally, the chapter describes the dataset, data collection, and the methods used in the analysis of the case study.

### Study of Soft Power

#### Conceptual vs. case-centred approach

Soft power has been studied either through an empirical or a conceptual approach, yet the link between the two approaches is often missing. In his evaluation of soft power Ivan Bakalov looks at the methodological approaches that have dominated the study of the topic in international relations. He says that while the concept is increasingly recognized and important in the field, “soft power scholarship has drifted into separate streams: concept-driven and case-centred studies” and

this has not been healthy for the understanding of the concept (Bakalov, 2019, p.129)<sup>179</sup>. Hall says that with soft power, “Nye has identified a field of analysis, but much work remains to be done, both theoretically and empirically, to specify the pathways which run through it” (Hall, 2010, p. 211). Hendrik W. Ohnesorge (2020)<sup>180</sup> discusses the research gap in soft power scholarship picking up on Nye’s own point that there is a need to “explore both the nature of the concept, as well as empirical studies of policy examples and limitations” (Ohnesorge, 2020, p.16 cites Nye, “Responding to My Critics and Concluding Thoughts,” p.226). The approach in this dissertation, to bring both empirical and conceptual aspects together in one study, echoes Bakalov’s understanding that when there is a divide, as in the majority of soft power studies, between the empirical and the conceptual, it “limits the permeability of new knowledge across the divide and stymies the progress of the nascent research programme” (Bakalov, 2019, p.130). More of this call to bridge the gap between the two approaches has been highlighted in the literature review (see Hayden, 2011). He goes on to say that,

“Researchers employing the concept as a tool in empirical investigations (case-centred research) rarely go beyond a brief discussion of the seminal texts of Nye and generally neglect the conceptual work of others, while those who engage in the more abstract conceptual issues related to soft power (concept-driven research), for the most part, remain nonchalant about the findings accrued through empirical applications of the concept” (Bakalov, 2019, p.134).<sup>181</sup>

The dissertation addresses this rift in the research and employs a dual approach by bringing together a conceptual study of soft power with a case study approach. The dissertations and its evaluation of the EU’s Creative Europe Sub-programme Culture case could have been limited to merely an empirical approach in which the conceptual understanding of soft power could have been borrowed from existing research. For example, it could have used the representational, institutional, or reputational power lens (see Hall, 2010; Mattern, 2005). However, the reason why this dissertation developed its own theoretical framework for soft power, before turning to the empirical case of the EU, is because of the limitations in exiting conceptual studies on soft power. As the literature review has shown, various aspects of soft power have been studied, e.g. the concept of power in relation to soft power is unpacked, the role of discourse and narratives has been widely addressed, the interpretation of culture by the audience has been looked at, and there are individual cases studies of governments’ soft power strategies. However, while there is wide agreement in that research with

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<sup>179</sup> Bakalov, Ivan (2019). “Whither soft power? Divisions, milestones, and prospects of a research programme in the making” in *Journal of Political Power*, 12:1, 129-151

<sup>180</sup> Ohnesorge, Hendrik W. (2020). *Soft Power. The Forces of Attraction in International Relations*. Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

<sup>181</sup> Bakalov (2019) suggests that two scholars have combined the empirical with the conceptual, see Valentina Feklyunina (2008, 2012, 2016); Giulio Gallarotti (2010a,b).

Nye's assertion that culture is a resource for soft power, there are few studies that create an overarching conceptual understanding or build a theoretical framework to illustrate how culture more broadly serves as a strategic resource of soft power. Culture is already an ambiguous concept and with the lack of elaboration as to how culture serves as a resource, the concept of soft power itself remains even more ambiguous. The Theory Chapter, therefore, takes on this limitation and proposes a theoretical framework to help understand how culture can become a resource of soft power in its strategic employment. The Case Study chapter then uses this theoretical framework as a tool to analyse the strategic employment of culture in a more holistic manner within a specific empirical example.

### Methodology and relational vs. power-as-resource perspective

In addition to the rift between the conceptual and the empirical approaches in the study of soft power, there is a debate around whether to look at soft power through the relational or through the power-as-resource perspective. As we have seen from the previous two chapters, different scholars have looked at the concept through a different lens and this has inevitably impacted their methodological approaches in their research. Feklyunina acknowledges the role of resources, but by taking on Guzzini's perspective of power<sup>182</sup>, says that "by studying resources, we cannot say much about differences between divergent interpretations of the same actor by different audiences and their changes over time" and "this view of soft power has significant methodological implication," which "are shifting our investigations to the interpretivist perspective" (Feklyunina, 2016, p.776-777). For others, the power-as-behaviour lens is preferred and the interpretivist lens is applied to look at how different resources generate different behaviour (Bakalov, 2019, p.132). However, scholars like Bakalov also argues that Nye's concept cannot be studied through a Foucauldian lens because Nye's take on soft power is actor-centric and puts the agent and subject relationship at the forefront, "thereby leaving aside the considerations about the production of subjectivity within overarching structures of power as Foucault suggests. [...] Nye's underlying understanding of power – an ability to obtain preferred outcomes by affecting others – which is: (1) actor-centric (not structural); (2) relational (not proprietary); (3) strategic (not contingent)" (Bakalov, 2019, p.132). Ji, who summarizes the methodological approaches that have been applied to the study of soft power says that there have

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<sup>182</sup> Feklyunina (2016, p.776) quotes Guzzini "resources are given weight not by themselves, but by shared understandings in social relations" and power as a "relational phenomenon dependent on the specific encounter of people with their values and preferences in their historical context" (2013, p.5).

been two main methodological approaches – the first looks at agent, capability, outcome, which she calls the “power conversion strategy”, while the second approach looks at the subject, resource, interpretation (Ji, 2017, p.76).<sup>183</sup> In both cases the studies are audience-centred and resources are measured for their quality and attractiveness. Nye does not clearly state that soft power should be viewed through either a power-as-resources or relational power distinction. His approach does not shift only to the constructivist methodology. As we have previously seen, constructivist methodological studies of soft power have generated much debate as they tend to interpret similar aspects of soft power in different ways. What is missing from Ji’s summary of the two approaches is an agent and resource-centred study. Bakalov recognizes the difficulty in establishing a conceptual framework that would negate the importance of resources. “After all, an agent cannot perform an action unless the enabling resources for that action are available” (Bakalov, 2019, p.132-133). Hence, while many studies focus on the relational aspects and apply a constructivist methodology to the evaluation of soft power, the importance of resources cannot be neglected and a different methodology for studying resources must be taken up.

A structured theorization of soft power that sees the concept of soft power on par with capabilities is missing and therefore appropriate methodologies also not prevalent. Kroenig et al. point out that the importance of cultural resources in soft power strategy cannot be ignored even if these are not fully all under the control of the state (2010, p.413). While Roselle et al. specifically highlight that “it is still difficult to identify soft power resources” (Roselle et al., 2014, p.74). What is clear is that there is a debate as to how to study soft power and all this has significant implications for the methodologies that are adopted. This dissertation adaptation of the power-as-resource perspective and establishment of a theoretical framework informs the methodological approach taken in the analytical half of the dissertation. Without such a theoretical framework the study of soft power has been left with endless viewpoints on what constitutes soft power resources, which make data collection, analysis, comparative studies and discussions overwhelmingly chaotic. A theoretical framework and its application as an analytical tool to the evaluation of a case study is an attempt to bring a methodological rigour to the study of soft power, which can also be easily be applied to future studies.

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<sup>183</sup> Ji, L. (2017). “Measuring soft power” in *The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power*. Chitty, N., Ji, L., G.D. Rawnsley, C. Hayden [eds.], Routledge.

## Descriptive Case Study Approach

A case study is a research strategy as well as an empirical inquiry that evaluates a phenomenon within its real-life context. “Case studies allow you to focus in-depth on a “case” and retain a holistic and real-world perspective” and the “need for case studies arises out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena” (Yim, 2018, p.12).<sup>184</sup> The case in this dissertation is the EU’s CESPC and the complex phenomena are soft power and the nature of cultural resources that wield it. “A case study is highly *focused*, meaning that considerable time is spent by the researcher analysing, and subsequently presenting, the chosen case, or cases, and the case is viewed as providing important evidence for the argument” (Gerring, 2017, p.28).<sup>185</sup> The argument, in this case, is that cultural resources that wield soft power have four distinct elements and that all four elements need to be met in order for culture to established itself as a resource for soft power and increase the soft power capabilities of an actor.

The case study approach can be exploratory, descriptive, explanatory, or instrumental. While the exploratory and explanatory case study approaches seek to explore a phenomenon or explain why it occurs, the descriptive and instrumental approach facilitates generalization and understanding of that phenomenon. In the case of the exploratory and explanatory case studies, the causal relationship is investigated. In such case studies, “the goal is to shed light on a causal argument” and particularly in the exploratory case studies “to identify a new hypothesis” where “the researcher begins with a factor that is presumed to have a fundamental influence on a range of outcomes” (Gerring, 2017, p. 63;65-66). On the other hand, the “instrumental case study is the study of a case [...] to provide insight into a particular issue, redraw generalizations, or build theory. In instrumental case research, the case facilitates understanding of something else” (Mills et. al., 2010, p.288).<sup>186</sup> In this dissertation there is no hypothesis made about the impact of the cultural resources nor is the case used to understand wider outcomes about the theory of soft power. The goal of this study is to illustrate how elements of cultural resources, which were outlined in the theoretical framework, can be identified and described in a real-world case as in the case of the CESPC. The case study approach is appropriate because it allows for an in-depth understanding of these resources rather than just a nominal overview of them. Therefore, this dissertation uses the descriptive case study approach. Yim points out that “many descriptive case studies deal with the “how” of a situation, whereas many explanatory case

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<sup>184</sup> Yin, R.K. (2018). *Case Study Research and Application: design and methods*. Sixth edition. Sage.

<sup>185</sup> Gerring, J. (2017) *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*. 2d ed. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>186</sup> Mills, A.J., Durepos, G. and Wiebe, E. (2010). “Instrumental Case Study” in *Encyclopedia of Case Study Research*. Sage.

studies deal with the “why” of a situation” (Yim, 2018, p.15). The “how” is what this dissertation is looking at. Mills et al. say that “exploratory and descriptive case studies tell a story (what happened and how), but they do not pinpoint causality (why it happened) beyond identifying the chronology of events” (Mills et al., 2010, p.137). Hence, this dissertation is not explaining “why” resources cause soft power, rather “how” cultural soft power resources look like and “how” they are utilized by an international actor. The difference between choosing an exploratory case study vs. the descriptive case study according to Mills et al. is that in the descriptive case study the in-depth assessment is “based on an articulation of a descriptive theory” (2010, p.289), which in this case is the theoretical framework which was established prior to the case study research. “If a descriptive theory cannot be developed easily before a case study, then the researcher may want to consider whether the case is more of an exploratory case study” (Mills et al., 2010, p.288). They further add that the benefit of such an approach is that it allows the researcher to see a specific case “through the theory-driven lens” (Mills et al., 2010, p.288).

The value of a descriptive case study can be in the generalizable lessons about structures or events that it provides, which can easily be consulted for application in future studies (Yim, 2018, p.14). The study within this dissertation describes how cultural resources can be identified and studied in a structured manner and illustrates in practice an analytical framework that can be used for the study of future cases. This approach has not been taken in previous research within the study of soft power. The case study therefore does not only show the application of the theoretical framework to the analysis of a particular case, but also reveals more about the case as well as showing how other cases can also be studied through the same methodology and methods. No causal relationship between resources and soft power are analysed in the case study, these relationships are in part discussed in the theoretical chapter, nor is the impact of resources analysed. Rather there is an identification and description of these resources in a real-world example, which is derived using the case study. That is why the descriptive case study approach is the most appropriate to use here. Gerring says, “Where the goal is to describe, there is no need to worry about more complex desiderata that might allow one to gain causal leverage on a question of interest” (Gerring, 2017, p.56). The descriptive case study can also provide information for future investigators, which “can consult it for any generalizable lessons” (Yim, 2018, p.12). The dissertation seeks not only to offer more insight into the way soft power resources are created and what elements constitute a cultural resource of soft power, which it then illustrates particularly through the case of the CESPC, but rather it offers insight into the EU’s cultural programmes more broadly in a manner which has not been done before. Furthermore, the case study provides a generalization on how international actors utilize or fail to utilize culture in a manner that allows cultural resources to carry real soft power potential. Such

lessons can be used to understand the way other actors fail or succeed to produce cultural soft power capabilities. The case study approach allows for this type of research to be conducted. Gerring concludes that descriptive case studies are “less problematic from a methodological point of view. They do not make clearly defined causal arguments, and as such are not subject to problems of causal inference. Of course, they are likely to make a multitude of small causal claims, but these are ancillary to an overall argument that is descriptive in nature” (Gerring, 2017, p.62).

## Case Study Design and Methods

The next several sections explain in detail the planning and methods of the case study. Yim says that questions arise within a case study as to “(a) how to define the ‘case’ being studied, (b) how to determine the relevant data to be collected, or (c) what to do with the data, once collected” (Yim, 2018, Chapter 1). Those elements are outlined below. First, there is a look at the selection of the case and then at the data or evidence chosen for collection. Finally, the methods of analysis of this data are outlined and discussed.

### The selection of the case

This section explains the reason for the selection of the CESPC case, however, the case itself is described in detail in the Case Chapter. Mills et al. say that, “[t]he selection of cases should be based on the research question, whether descriptive, exploratory, or explanatory, and may be driven by empirical or theoretical considerations” (Mills et al., 2010, p.63). The research question being twofold – what is the nature of cultural soft power resources and how do these resources look like in a real-world example (which has already been defined as the CESPC, but the reason for choosing the CESPC for the question is outlined here)? Therefore, while the theoretical framework describes the nature of resources in theory, the real-world analysis can give more insight into how these resources look like in an empirical example. Hence the selection of the case is directly linked to the research question and aims to address both the theoretical and empirical considerations as pointed out in earlier discussions.

The case should be selected on the basis of what the case study is attempting to achieve. Gerring, who organizes his case topology according to this logic, describes how cases are chosen (Gerring, 2017, p.40-41). For the descriptive case study, he says that a study that has one or more cases is “typical” and a study that has more than two cases is “diverse”. In his topology the case-



selection criteria would position our case as “typical” where he says the criteria for selection of the case is that it is the “mean, mode, or median of D [the descriptive features]” (Gerring, 2017, p.41). In this dissertation, the case, the CESPC, falls into this category because it is a *typical* cultural programme funded by an international entity. It is a programme through which a political actor employs and instrumentalizes culture for set political and socio-economic goals. This is open and public information. A case like this allows for an evaluation of an actor's instrumentalization of culture and would allow an illustration of the theoretical frameworks claims about cultural soft power resources. The dissertation's main goal is to explore the strategic use of culture by international actors and the CESPC is a typical example of such a programme. The typicality is in the fact that it is a programme that receives funding from a political actor, is outlined in the actor's policies, and that it is directed at the wider population that the actor is striving to wield soft power with.

In the EU's own words, “Creative Europe is the European Commission's framework programme for supporting the culture and audiovisual sectors.”<sup>187</sup> The Creative Europe Sub-Programme Culture (CESPC) is the strand of the programme that focuses on the culture sector. The EU's Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA) states that it is a funding scheme that is meant to encourage the “cultural and creative players to operate across Europe, to reach new audiences and to develop the skills needed in the digital age.”<sup>188</sup> “The Culture sub-programme helps cultural and creative organizations to operate transnationally and promotes the cross-border circulation of works of culture and the mobility of cultural players” (EACEA, 2020).<sup>189</sup> Furthermore, because the dissertation focuses on internal aspects of soft power, as outlined in the literature review, the EU offers a good case because the internal unity and solidarity with the integration project is a challenge that the EU is consistently addressing.

The selection of the case is important for the case study research design. The case study will give in-depth insight into a particular phenomenon. “Researchers need to select cases that give a maximum amount of information about the research objective at stake” (Mills et al., 2010, p.61), which as pointed out above, the selection of the CESPC allows because the CESPC is a flagship cultural programme for the EU and it is a clear example of the employment of culture by an international actor. Furthermore, the selection of the case is guided by the amount of data that is available. Mills et al. say, “[w]ith a descriptive research question, the cases selected should give maximal information about the specific features and characteristics of a particular social phenomenon” (Mills et al., 2010, p.61). To give a maximum amount of information about soft power resources, the CESPC is an appropriate

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<sup>187</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/creative-europe/node\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/creative-europe/node_en)

<sup>188</sup> [https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/creative-europe\\_en](https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/creative-europe_en)

<sup>189</sup> [https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/creative-europe/actions/culture\\_en](https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/creative-europe/actions/culture_en)

case because a vast amount of data is openly available both about the policies behind the programme and about the projects that represent the practical application of the CESPC. “By investigating such a case in depth, a detailed and elaborate description of the phenomenon is reached” (Mills et al., 2010, p.61).

Although the CESPC is a cultural programme of a single entity (the EU), there is a high variety of elements included. This means that it has a large budget, many actors, different cultural histories and audiences, numerous cultural organizations, spread across and open to an entire continent of a plurality of voices and opinions. It also remains a purely cultural project although of course it is linked by the EU to economic, political and social goals. The suitability of this case is that although the EU case shows high variety, it allows to identify all four elements and seemed like the most comprehensive study where evidence is readily available. Due to the availability of information and evidence, the CESPC allows for the case to be investigated in depth in order to produce what Mills et al. call “a detailed and elaborate description of the phenomenon” (Mills et al., 2010, p.61), which in this case are the cultural soft power resources described through the four elements identified in the theoretical framework.

### Selection of the Evidence

The research is underpinned by a theoretical framework, which assumes that cultural resources when employed by an actor to wield soft power have four distinctive elements contained within the resource – the assets, the communication, the narrative, and the audience. The goal of the case study is to illustrate these theoretical claims through a real-world example. The CESPC is the case chosen and the evidence needs to show how this case illustrates the four elements of cultural soft power resources. In order to do so there needs to be a consideration of what the CESPC is. The CESPC is a cultural programme initiated by the EU and provides funding for operators in the creative and cultural sectors. It is designed and implemented by the EU. EU’s policies outline the CESPC’s design, and the projects, which were selected by the EU for funding under the CESPC, show the CESPC’s practical implementation. Therefore, the evidence used in this dissertation comes from the policy documents that underpin the CESPC and the data available on the projects of the CESPC that are found in an EU database or digital archive. Both sources are discussed in detail further below.

The documentary evidence will reveal how the EU has chosen to address the four elements in the soft power strategy while the data on the projects will show what selection of projects the EU has chosen to implement the CESPC in practice and how these align with the four theoretical categories. The EU does not explicitly state that it is implementing a four-part soft power strategy, but rather the

EU's instrumentalizing culture is evaluated in the dissertation and the case study will show to what degree the EU has managed to instrumentalize culture in a way that builds its cultural soft power capabilities and what the EU has ignored in this process.

Sources of evidence are easily available and accessible with the EU regarding its cultural programmes. Data collection from these sources, however, needs to be more systematic to make sense of the data and to provide the actual evidence relating to the research and case study objective. Gerring says that "choosing a case implies a method of analysis (though it does not entirely determine the method of analysis)" (Gerring, 2017, p.51, 137). The case selection process not only leads to a selection of evidence but also influences the method of analysis that will be applied and has implications for research design. The categorizing and sorting of the information and data from the sources chosen in this dissertation into meaningful information occurs according to the methods of analysis described below. The depiction of how the necessary data is extracted from the evidence is also outlined. The final evaluation of the data and evidence will show how reminiscent the evidence and data are with the criteria in the theoretical framework. These analytical methods are guided by the criteria established in the theoretical framework and the selection of the case.

## Documents

### Documentation as Evidence and Data Set

Using documentation such as policy papers is part of case study research and "provides researchers with a range of contextualized, naturally occurring materials when direct observation is impossible" (Raptis, 2010, p.322).<sup>190</sup> In the case of the EU's CESC, the project is simply too large to look at how the policies impact the whole continent. Therefore, to observe the policies of the EU relating to culture and to understand the intentions of the EU in its employment of culture, the policy documents of the EU relating to culture must be consulted. The EU has a large range of policy documents that relate to culture, however, there are several documents that are central to its cultural policy in general and to the CESC specifically. Three types of these documents were selected as evidence in this case study. These include the European Agenda for Culture (EC, 2007)<sup>191</sup> (hereafter "Agenda" or "Agenda for Culture"), which was valid from 2007 to 2013 and the A New European

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<sup>190</sup> Raptis, H. (2010). "Documentation as Evidence" in in Encyclopedia of Case Study Research. Eds. Mills et al. Sage.

<sup>191</sup> European Commission (2007). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a European agenda for culture in a globalizing world. COM (2007) 242 final. Brussels, 10.05.2007.

Agenda for Culture (EC, 2018)<sup>192</sup> (hereafter “New Agenda” or “New Agenda for Culture”). These illustrate the overall approach that the EU is taking towards culture as an institution. The first Agenda for Culture was published on 10 May 2007 by the European Commission. It was produced at the same time as Creative Europe’s predecessor Culture Programme 2007-2013 was taking off. It serves as the background document for such programmes and awards, including European prizes, European Capitals of Culture, Europe for Citizens and Erasmus and encourages the implementation of cultural policy and action both for internal and external EU goals. The New Agenda for Culture was published in 2018 against the backdrop of the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Treaty of Rome giving even stronger emphasis to the role of culture and heritage, stressing initiatives like the 2018 European Year of Cultural Heritage.

The next document is the Regulation on Creative Europe which outline the establishment and purpose of Creative Europe (EC, 2013)<sup>193</sup> (hereafter the “Regulation” or “Regulation on Creative Europe”), which was released on 11 December 2013 establishing Creative Europe and is aligned with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It outlines the European Union’s overarching goal with the Creative Europe programme, which is to support the cultural and creative sectors. The various linkages between the Creative Europe Programme and EU policies, such as The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the European agenda for culture in a globalizing world, and other policies such as the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expression are outlined in the first part of the document. The rest of the document outlines the structure, objectives and priorities, as well as working methods of the Creative Europe programme. There are general articles in the documents that pertain to the entire Creative Europe Programme and others that deal specifically with the Culture Sub-Programme (CESPC), the case study of the dissertation.

The final set of documents are those relating to the Cooperation Projects under the CESPC, which will be the sample of projects that are being evaluated in this dissertation as the real-world example of EU’s application of its cultural policies into practice. These documents are the European

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<sup>192</sup> European Commission (2018). “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committees and the Committee of the Regions. A New European Agenda for Culture” COM(2018) 267 Final Brussels 22.05.2018.

<sup>193</sup> EC, (2013). Regulation (EU) No 1295/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing the Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020) and repealing Decisions No 1718/2006/EC, No 1855/2006/EC and No 1041/2009/EC. Official Journal of the European Union. 20.12.2013.

Commission's Guidelines for the CESPC's Cooperation Projects (EC, 2014<sup>194</sup>; EC, 2018b)<sup>195</sup>. They were both based on the Regulations on Creative Europe. Broadly speaking they are guidelines for those applying for grants from the Creative Europe programme in order to give an overview of who and what kind of projects are eligible, what kind of budget is available, and what the overall objectives are. The 2014 Guidelines were the first guidelines to accompany the CESPC cooperation projects. The 2018 Guidelines were the most recently available guidelines when the research into them for this dissertation was being conducted. These latter guidelines are also reflective of the New European Agenda for Culture which the Commission adopted on May 16<sup>th</sup>, 2018. The 2018 Guidelines reaffirm, as did the New Agenda, that "Creative Europe [...] will play a direct role in supporting the New Agenda and the implementation of actions therein" (EC, Creative Europe Guidelines, 2018, p.3). The Creative Europe Guidelines focus specifically on Smaller and Larger Scale Cooperation Projects within the CESPC. The Larger Scale Cooperation Projects are the ones that are evaluated in the second part of the Analytical Chapter.

The above documentation, therefore, allows an overview of EU's general policy towards culture, its intentions and goals for Creative Europe, and its plan and criteria for the CESPC's Cooperation Projects. The documentation allows insight into a wide understanding of the EU's approach to culture and then specific insight into one of its flagship programmes more broadly as well as into specific implementations of this programme more precisely. It takes a view from the broad to the specific when it comes to understanding EU's instrumentalization of culture.

The data set is derived from the above documentation. The data set is the text of the documentation, which is categorized through the content analysis approach described below.

## Methods of analysis – Content Analysis

### Content Analysis as Methodology

The evidence selected are documents and descriptions of projects presented in a digital database. To evaluate this evidence the content analysis method is used. Stan defines content analysis as follows:

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<sup>194</sup> European Commission (2014). Creative Europe Culture Sub-Programme. Support for European Cooperation Projects. Guidelines.

<sup>195</sup> European Commission (2018b). Creative Europe Culture Sub-Programme. Support for European Cooperation Projects 2019. Call for Proposals EACEA 34/2018. Guidelines.

“Content analysis is a tool of qualitative research used to determine the presence and meaning of concepts, terms, or words in one or more pieces of recorded communication. This systematic and replicable technique allows for compressing many words of text into fewer content categories based on explicit rule of coding in order to allow researchers to make inferences about the author (individuals, groups, organizations, or institutions), the audience, and their culture and time” (Stan, 2010, p.225-226).

And adds further that “[c]ontent analysis is possible whenever there is a physical record of communication” (Stan, 2010, p.226)<sup>196</sup> as is the case with the documents and the database in this dissertation. In addition to being an appropriate method to evaluate texts, the choice for content analysis is driven by the theoretical framework which underpins the dissertation. The theoretical framework calls for the categorization of evidence into four categories. This calls for the use of some sort of categorization or coding in the method of analysis of the evidence. When speaking about the analytical categories through which data can be evaluated, White and Marsh, citing Krippendorff, highlight that “the analytical constructs may be derived from (1) existing theories or practices; (2) the experience or knowledge of the experts; and (3) previous research (Krippendorff, 2004, p.173)” (White & Marsh, 2006, p.27). In the case of this dissertation, the categories of content – assets, communication, narratives, and audience – are derived from the theory outlined at the beginning of the dissertation. Therefore, the evidence and content provided in the documents and in the database will be grouped into four categories to illustrate – assets, communication, narratives, and audiences. Categorizations is a major element of content analysis (Chenail, 2008, p.72).<sup>197</sup> Hence, content analysis lends itself well to address the objective of the study while also being an appropriate method for analysing documents and database records.

Content analysis is “a group of formal and especially statistical techniques,” which were traditionally used to analyse propaganda texts during WWII, but that have “expanded to include the study of a range of qualitative issues, including stylistic, thematic, and ideological aspects of texts, as well as other media and genres (e.g. photography and advertising)” (Calhoun, 2002, p.92) According to White and Marsh<sup>198</sup> it is a flexible research method and can be applied to qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods (White & Marsh, 2006, p.22). In content analysis “[d]ata are coded with coding protocols decided either before or during analysis” (Stan, 2010, p.227). In the case of the dissertation, some of the coding protocols have been decided before the data collection because they are guided

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<sup>196</sup> Stan, L. (2010). “Content Analysis” in Encyclopedia of Case Study Research. Eds. Mills et al. Sage.

<sup>197</sup> Chenail, R. (2008). “Categorization” in The Sage Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods.” Eds. L. Given. Sage.

<sup>198</sup> White, M.D., & Marsh, E.E. (2006). Content Analysis: A Flexible Methodology. Library Trends 55(1), 22-45.

by the four categories of the theoretical framework. These codes will be used to collect data from both the documents and the EU database on the projects. However, the analysis of the description of the projects will require more coding during the analysis. For example, the overarching category “narrative” will reveal the types of narratives or themes the projects are promoting. Each theme will be a “code” of its own and will require categorization for the “narrative” category to be understood and analysed in more detail. The next two sections look closer at how the content analysis of the documents and the project database will take place.

Content analysis will not only thoroughly illustrate what cultural resources of soft power look like when evaluated through the lens of the theoretical framework, but the dissertation also aims to evaluate to what degree the EU can successfully generate cultural soft power resources via its CESPC initiative. Content analysis will allow for a study of the large data set that the CESPC holds, yet in a systematic manner as it will allow for the data set to be evaluated through an analytical framework that dictates the values that each analytical category should have. Finally, the content analysis approach and the step-by-step protocol that the case study approach facilitates, will allow for this study to be replicated on other cultural initiatives of international actors in world politics.

The choice to look at the resource rather than a relational lens to study soft power dictated the choice of analytical approach. If this dissertation was about the impact each project had on the audience, then another approach, such as interviews of the audience or discourse analysis, would have been appropriate. However, because this dissertation focuses on the resources that are being produced, the categorization and content analysis approach allows to draw a wider picture of the whole CESPC cultural initiative. Only such a systematic, yet simple and structured approach, allows to capture the breadth of the CESPC.

## Content Analysis of Documents

The analysis of the documents is conducted through qualitative content analysis. Where the content of the EU documents is interpreted by the researcher. Julien says, that in the case of the analysis of “written words” in the form of “official reports and policies of an organization; such an analysis may identify the stated priorities of that organization as well as reveal implicit political perspectives. Thus, content analysis is useful for identifying both conscious and unconscious messages” (Julien, 2008, p.120).<sup>199</sup> The goal of the dissertation is to show both the explicit and the

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<sup>199</sup> Julien, H. (2008). “Content Analysis” in *The Sage Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods.* Eds. L. Given. Sage.

implicit actions of the EU when it comes to the instrumentalization of culture. The main objective for the content analysis of the documents is to understand “how” the EU addressed these four elements within its policy documents. The overarching questions in the document analysis are:

- What do the documents show about how has the EU addressed “assets” in the CESPC?
- What do the documents show about how has the EU addressed “communication” in the CESPC?
- What do the documents show about how has the EU addressed “narratives” in the CESPC?
- What do the documents show about how has the EU addressed “audiences” in the CESPC?

Therefore, the purpose of the content analysis of the documents is to collect data related to the nature of these four categories within the documents and present how the EU policies intend to build cultural assets, communication mechanisms, narratives, and audiences. The categorization or presentation of the document data and its analysis will be broken down into four sections, each dealing with the four above-mentioned themes.

## Projects

### Data Set

In August 2019, the time when the data set was last updated for this dissertation, and starting from the year 2014, when Creative Europe began, there were 2724 projects registered as getting funding under the Creative Europe programme in the Cross-sectoral, MEDIA, and Sub-Programme Culture (CESPC). This number has increased since then as Creative Europe is an on-going initiative that has been extended until 2027. This information on these projects is available on the European Commission’s European Web-Portal for Creative Europe.<sup>200</sup> It is the information in the database that will be analysed as part of this research.

Out of the 2724 projects under Creative Europe, 912 fell into the CESPC. Within the CESPC, there are a number of strands of projects, which include the category “Cooperation Projects”, “Literary translation projects”, “Networks”, and “Platforms”. At that time of the research, the Cooperation Projects made up 425 of the 912 projects within the CESPC. The reason for selecting the “cooperation projects” as the focus of this research is because these are the projects that deal with various forms

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<sup>200</sup> European Commission’s project database for the Creative Europe Programme: <https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/creative-europe/projects/>



of aesthetic arts and cultural heritage, which is the focus of the research, while the other categories are beyond the scope of this dissertation.

In the CESPC, the cooperation projects are divided into two groups. The smaller scale and the larger scale cooperation projects where the EU funds up to 60% of the smaller scale projects and up to 50% of the larger scale projects. Of the 425 cooperation projects, 85 were from the category that is referred to by the EU as “Larger scale cooperation projects”.<sup>201</sup> The choice to focus on the larger scale cooperation projects was because they received more funding from the EU and the financial backing speaks to their importance in the overall initiative especially in the context of Creative Europe which is a funding scheme. The large cooperation projects receive up to 2 million Euro each, while the smaller cooperation projects only receive up to 200,000 Euro each.<sup>202</sup> Hence, in total the smaller projects can receive up to 68 million euros from the EU, while the 85 larger projects have the potential to receive 170 million euros. Therefore, even though there is a smaller number of projects in the larger cooperation category (340 smaller scale projects to 85 larger scale projects), they have more than twice as much potential funding behind them (68 million to 170 million respectively). The 85 projects receive significant funding and are a good sample of what the EU might consider one of the more substantial or impactful projects to which it dedicates more funds.

### Content Analysis of Project Database

The method to evaluate the data on the Larger Cooperation Projects of the CESPC followed the theoretical framework on cultural soft power resources: a) cultural assets, b) communication mechanisms, c) narratives, and d) audience engagement. These four categories formed the analytical framework for analysing the data derived from the EU’s database European Commission’s Web-Portal for Creative Europe.<sup>203</sup>

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<sup>201</sup> “This category includes projects that: - shall involve an eligible project leader and at least five other eligible partners having their legal seat in at least six different countries taking part in the Creative Europe – Culture Subprogramme. Either the project leader or one of the partners must have its legal seat in one of the countries referred to in paragraphs 1 or 3 of section 6.1.; - are the subject of an application requesting an EU grant of no more than EUR 2 000 000 representing maximum 50% of the total eligible budget.”

[https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/sites/eacea-site/files/2\\_guidelines\\_coop2019\\_eacea\\_34\\_2018\\_en\\_0.pdf](https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/sites/eacea-site/files/2_guidelines_coop2019_eacea_34_2018_en_0.pdf)

<sup>202</sup> The projects are explained in more detail in the Chapter dedicated to their analysis. For a detailed overview of the most recent guidelines of the Creative Culture European Cooperation Projects see: European Commission (2018). Creative Europe Culture Sub-Programmes. Support for European Cooperation Projects 2019. Call for Proposals EACEA 34/2018. Guidelines.

<sup>203</sup> European Commission’s project database for the Creative Europe Programme: <https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/creative-europe/projects/>

The projects are like messages or modes of communication for the research through which the EU's choices, strategies, and preferences can be heard and read. Krippendorff, who outlines the content analysis method, says that "communications, messages, and symbols differ from observable events, things, properties, or people in that they inform about something other than themselves; they reveal some properties of their distant producers or carriers" (Krippendorff, 1989, p.403).<sup>204</sup> In this same light, one can see that while the content analysis allows the researcher to be informed not about the CESPC projects, but rather about "their distant producer," namely the EU, and the choices the EU has made in its cultural strategy. Analysing just the policy documents showed an aspect about the EU's intentions, but the analysis of the CESPC projects allows for a more thorough picture of the EU's strategic employment of culture to unfold.

In the analysis of the project database, the "how" is applied to ask: "how" do the projects, which the EU has selected, reflect the four components of cultural soft power resources? The overarching questions in the project analysis are:

- How do the CESPC projects deliver on "assets"?
- How do the CESPC projects deliver on "communication"?
- How do the CESPC projects deliver on "narratives"?
- How do the CESPC projects deliver on "audiences"?

The database entries for each project will be examined through these four questions to understand how each project individually contributes to the building of these elements of soft power resources. This will produce a lot of data and needs to be further categorized and grouped in order to give an overview of the CESPC more holistically rather than one project at a time. Therefore, further content analysis is needed.

Outlining the steps of content analysis, Holsti says that in a data set the content data needs to be placed into *categories* (e.g. subject matter, value, attributes) into which content data may be "coded" (Holsti, 1969, viii-ix).<sup>205</sup> Holsti then goes on to say that "*units* (e.g. words, themes, paragraphs) may be placed in the categories" (Holsti, 1969, ix). The use of keywords within each category represents these units. And finally, Holsti also says that "*systems of enumeration* (e.g. frequency, space, intensity) may be used to describe attributes of documents" (Holsti, 1969, ix). In this case, this was the frequency of each category was presented in the charts. This manner of

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<sup>204</sup> Krippendorff, K. (1989). Content analysis. In E. Barnouw, G. Gerbner, W. Schramm, T. L. Worth, & L. Gross (Eds.), *International encyclopedia of communication* (Vol. 1, pp. 403-407). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Retrieved from [http://repository.upenn.edu/asc\\_papers/226](http://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/226)

<sup>205</sup> Holsti, Ole R. (1969). *Content Analysis for the Social Science and Humanities*. Addison-Wesley Pub. Co.

categorization, systematic grouping, and counting allowed for an overall picture to be drawn about the CESPC projects. While the category “assets” reveals more of a statistic about what types of cultural assets that were produced and the category “audience” drew up a picture of the audience types, the content analysis of the “narrative” category as well as the “communication” category allowed for a broader picture and a deeper evaluation of the quality of the cultural resource to be drawn up.

#### Further categorization of the CESPC projects

When discussing categorization, Chenail says that once the initial categorization is complete “the analytical process continues as researchers next look for patterns that run through and across the system of categories. The result of this categorization of the categories can lead to the creation of themes, constructs, or domains” (Chenail, 2008, p.72). This is what needs to occur with the project analysis in some of the four overarching categories. Simply showing that there are assets, communication approaches, narratives, and audiences in the cultural projects is a given as that is the main purpose of the projects, i.e. to create cultural assets that have a theme or narrative that communicate these themes and have an audience they are trying to reach. Therefore, once the data from the database about the projects is grouped into four categories, we simply get a picture of what these categories look like in practice, but further coding is needed to reveal more about the quality of each of these four categories. For example, when looking at assets, the original categorization is meant to reveal what kind of cultural assets the projects produce. To get a larger overview of these assets, the asset types will be coded into categories, such as music, theatre, performance, etc. A quantitative analysis will then be applied to show how often each type of asset was produced to give a more detailed overview of the types of cultural assets within the overarching “asset” category.

The category of “narratives” extracts all the data on narratives from the project database, but this too needs further categorization in order to make sense of the data. In order to do so each narrative, which is understood as the theme of the project, will be described through a keyword or sets of words, and then this data will also be analysed through a quantitative method. The quantitative analysis of the narratives will not only give a better overview of the narratives, but also how often narratives are repeated and which appear more often than others, i.e. to show how diverse the plurality of narratives is.

In the category “audiences” in order to understand which audience groups are targeted and whether there is a preference for one type of group or the other, these audience types also will be coded. Additionally, audience numbers are important to evaluate the reach of the projects, so this data will also be identified where available. The goal is to “make meaning of the various bits of information collected in the field [i.e. in the database]” (Chenail, 2008, p.72). The reason for applying

a quantitative approach to the second stage of analysis of the records on the projects is because the goal of the dissertation is not to understand why the narratives exist or why there is a choice of one asset over another, but rather to show “what” is happening in a descriptive manner. For this Julien says that the “quantitative content analysis can be helpful in answering “what” questions” (Julien, 2008, p.120).

Content analysis is particularly applicable for the analysis of the “narrative” category. Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach, and Zilber point out that there can be two approaches to narrative analysis – one of contextualization and the other of categorization (1998, p.12). From the categorization perspective, they say that content analysis, which allows for a systematic qualitative method, is suitable. It allows for grouping and categorization of a great number of data and suits the purpose when “the research is primarily interested in a problem or a phenomenon shared by a group” while the contextualization or “holistic approach”, which uses an interpretive method, is preferred when a single “person,” or in our case that would be single CESPC project rather than the CESPC as a whole, “is what the study aims to explore” (Lieblich et. al, 1998, p. 12).

## Data Collection Method

This section summarises how and what type of data was collected for the 85 larger scale cooperation projects (hereafter “projects”). It must be said first that some of the projects were still on-going whilst others had been finalized at the time of the research. However, all these projects are discussed because the project proposals had already been accepted by the EU and funding had been granted to them. The themes and aims of the projects had already been defined. The goal was to see what the EU funds and supports as this dissertation is evaluating the EU’s choice of strategy.

The data about each project, as explained above, was extracted and produced via content analysis from the project database on the European Commission’s Web-Portal for Creative Europe. This portal provides a record of each project that the EU has funded. In the record, one can see an overview of each project including a summary of the what the project is meant to achieve, the artistic or creative methods employed, the funding it received, the contact information of the main coordinator and the partnering organizations that ran the project. In most cases there is also a link to the projects’ websites, where available. The summary description of each project on the portal was what served as the basis for the data collection on the projects. Furthermore, the portal provided a document in the form of an excel spreadsheet, which gave an “overview of projects funded by the European Commission under the Creative Europe Programme”, with the name “Creative Europe Project Overview”. This document gave an overview of all the Creative Europe Projects, but it was

possible to filter and sort through the excel document<sup>206</sup>, so the 85 large cooperation projects could be isolated from the whole data set. Once this filtering was applied the data for the 85 large cooperation projects remained visible. The data for these projects was collected and evaluated. Each project has its own “Result Platform Project Card” on the Web-Portal with data on the project summary, the coordinator and partners, while the above mentioned excel document had additional information such as start and end date, activity type, funding amount and participating countries.

The data collected categorized into four sections, which have been dictated by the dissertation’s theoretical framework. The data itself was presented in keywords or phrases as described in the section above. The descriptions of the data in keyword format meant there was no lengthy explanation of each project as this data could already be found in the EU documents. However, the goal of the data collection in this dissertation was to present it in such a way that content analysis was facilitated and could be conducted in a systematic way. The full table of data presented in keywords can be found in Appendix 1. The choice of keywords themselves are explained and elaborated on in the Analytical Chapter. The below table shows an example of how the data collected is presented (data for six projects is displayed here):

<b>Name of Project</b>	<b>Asset</b>	<b>Communication</b>	<b>Narrative</b>	<b>Audience</b>
<b>Orpheus &amp; Majnun / Orfeo &amp; Majnun</b>	participatory art; community art;	workshops for community workers; public spaces;	intercultural dialogue; European values;	local communities;
<b>Connecting Emerging Literary Artists</b>	literature;	workshops to train literature industry professionals;	literature talent development; training authors in the literature industry;	translators; authors; publishers;

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<sup>206</sup> Next to the link to the Excel document the EU writes, “You can save the list as an Excel file, so that you can apply your own filtering and sorting” which speaks to the fact that they would like easy access to this information that can be used for research purposes. <https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/creative-europe/projects/ce-projects-compendium/>

<b>From Conflict to Conviviality through Creativity and Culture</b>	interdisciplinary art; public spaces;	skills training; workshops; conferences residencies;	European identity; conflict; intercultural dialogue;	refugees; migrants;
<b>Opera Vision</b>	opera;	digital platform for opera; TV broadcasting; opera theatres;	digitalizing opera; promoting opera;	
<b>ATLAS OF TRANSITIONS. New geographies for a cross-cultural Europe</b>	performing arts;	workshops; performances; festivals; network of universities;	cross-cultural dialogue; shared public space; radicalisation; migration; interaction between European citizens and newcomers; audience development in underrepresented groups;	migrants; refugees; local communities;
<b>European Art-Science-Technology Network for Digital Creativity</b>	digital arts; interdisciplinary art;	large network of digital artists;	synergy between research, creation, and pedagogy; growing digital art sector;	digital art professionals and educators;

Additional charts will be used in the Analytical Chapter to present the data in the different categories. This was to reveal more patterns in the entire data set, i.e. across the entire set of large-scale cooperation projects in the CESPC initiative, so that more conclusions could be drawn based on this data through the content analysis method.

## Limitations

The reliance on the project description or project summaries that were provided on the EU Web Portal could be criticized as not being truly reflective of the content of the projects or that the projects unfolded in a more complex manner that can be captured in those descriptions. Instead of gathering data and interpreting the project descriptions, the actual artwork or the visual or performative cultural output of each project could have been analysed through the content analysis or textual analysis approach, in which the work would have been described by the author of this dissertation and then analysed. Scholars have pointed out the possibility of content analysis of the visual because the approach deals with the message that the sender is sending to the receiver (White & Marsh, 2006, p.27) and has been applied to the analysis of visual images (see Bell, 2001).<sup>207</sup> However, the goal in the dissertation is not to delve deeper into each project after its production, but rather, first and foremost, to see what the EU chose to fund prior to the projects actually taking place. It is an investigation into the types of projects that the EU had selected for funding. The summary description of each project encapsulates what content and project type the EU found acceptable to give funding to under the CESPC initiative. For this reason, the cultural output itself is not evaluated, but only the description that is provided for each project that was primarily EU facing in order to attain funding. Although, as already stated earlier, to get a more complete analysis of soft power potential of cultural productions in EU cultural initiatives, the individual projects, their output, and the reception of the output by the audience, would also be an aspect that could be analysed. However, in this dissertation it is about the EU cultural soft power resources and what these capabilities look like.

In the content analysis method that Ole R. Holsti (1969) stressed the importance of the “who”. In the case of this research the “who” was the EU, however, the cultural organizations behind each project and what potential they have as to being carriers of soft power strategic resources could have been analysed more. Furthermore, Holsti talks about the “effect”, however, the effect on the audience is not evaluated in this research. The impact on the audience is necessary to measure to get a full picture of how soft power played out in a given historic moment, such as when the CESPC projects were actually implemented and received by audiences, but this goes beyond the scope of this research project. “Content analysis alone is seldom able to support statements about the significance, effects or interpreted meaning of a domain of representation. [...] Claims about the

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<sup>207</sup> Bell, P. (2001) Content analysis of visual images. In T. Van Leeuwen and C. Jewitt (Eds.), Handbook of visual analysis. Pp. 10-34. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

effects of what is shown raise questions which need to be addressed by further, different kinds of research” (Bell, 2001, p.13). In light of this, the dissertation provides a good basis for future research that can delve deeper into the evidence and provide a relational or ideational analysis of the CESPC. However, the content analysis and agent-focused approach reflecting power as resources that is adopted here will provide a broad picture of the EU’s engagements with culture through its flagship Creative Europe programme.



## CASE CHAPTER

### The EU, the internal dimension, and gaining access to culture

In the *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a European agenda for culture in a globalizing world* it is written that “the EU, is and must aspire to become even more, an example of a “soft power”.”<sup>208</sup>

#### Introduction

This chapter discusses the background to the EU’s engagement with culture. The goal is to show where the case study of this dissertation – the Creative Europe Sub-Programme Culture – fits into wider EU cultural policies. The goal is also to show how the case study, which focuses on the internal cultural policy and action of the EU, is relevant for analysis of the EU’s soft power capabilities.

The chapter begins with an explanation of how the European Union is defined in this dissertation. It then moves on to briefly examine the EU’s external cultural action, which is overwhelmingly the focus in the literature on soft power and the EU. The chapter begins with a brief overview of what kind of external cultural action the EU is engaged in. It shows how the EU was first represented by a network of national cultural institutions, but then adopted its own public diplomacy approach by creating its own agency – European External Action Service – which put forth its own cultural strategy. This was supplemented only in 2016 and an EU cultural strategy for international relations. This section gives an overview of the ways in which the EU has instrumentalized culture in order to grow its external soft power.

The chapter then looks at how the EU has gained cultural competencies domestically since the beginning of the cooperation project. This section examines the various political challenges that prompted the EU to start considering the instrumentalization of culture to strengthen its survival. The overarching strategy was to influence the EU’s population to increase the EU’s legitimacy and gain their support for the integration project. This section examines some of the policies and cultural

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<sup>208</sup> European Commission (2007. *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a European agenda for culture in a globalizing world* [SEC (2007) 570]. COM(2007) 242 final. Brussels, 10.05.2007.

programmes, which the EU adopted in this regard. It shows how the Creative Europe Sub-Programme culture evolved out of these processes. The chapter concludes with an account of Creative Europe, and its Larger Cooperation Projects under the Sub-Programme Culture, as these are the focus of analysis in the Analytical Chapter.

Overall, the chapter sets the scene for the analytical chapter by arguing that culture is utilized by the EU as a resource for soft power and that the internal dimension does matter for the overall evaluation of soft power.

## The European Union

This section examines how the European Union (EU) is being understood within this dissertation. When referring to the European Union, the focus is on the institutional structures, i.e. the Commission, the Parliament, the Council, etc., which collectively make up one institution, the EU, and act as a unified regional political power which for some manifests as “an unfinished federal quasi-state” (Pelinka, 2011, p.21)<sup>209</sup> or for others can be likened to “federalism” (Burgess, 2000)<sup>210</sup>. The institution exists because it is an alliance of member-states, yet it has been granted power by these members and therefore acts as a power which, on many occasions, particularly in relation to the economy, overrides national laws. Nonetheless, the EU depends on the support for integration by the member-states as well as on the loyalty of the citizens of its member-states.

For Pelinka in a globalized world, “where the economy has become more and more transnational” democratic states are losing their power because the economy has grown beyond their control and the “transnational economy asks for a transnational polity” (Pelinka, 2011, p.22-23). Therefore, Pelinka concludes in 2011 that in its character the EU is a quasi-state with a Single Market, yet it is “still underdeveloped in all aspects of foreign and foreign security affairs” (Pelinka, 2011, p.23). In the year 2000 Burgess, in his evaluation of the EU and his support for the building of a federal Europe, backed the progressive evolution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy which existed at the time saying there was a need for the EU to have a common security framework if it were to become a project of federalism (Burgess, 2000, p.277). Within a decade, in December 2010, the EU formed the European External Action Service (EEAS) to deal with the EU’s security and foreign affairs. Even though the EEAS does not put forward or implement policy itself, it has become more and more

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<sup>209</sup> Pelinka, A. (2011). “The European Union as an Alternative to the Nation-State” in *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, March/June 2011, Vol. 24, No. 1/2, The End of the Nation-State (March/June 2011), pp. 21-30

<sup>210</sup> Burgess, M. (2002). *Federalism and the European Union: The Building of Europe, 1950–2000*. London: Routledge.

active in representing the EU as one body in the international system. In the realm of culture, the EU also has no overriding mandate, however, it has made inroads into the governance of the field.

The literature on European integration shows that the understanding and definition of the Union has been split between “supranationalism” and “intergovernmentalism” (Bakardjieva-Engelbrekt et al., 2019).<sup>211</sup> For the purpose of this dissertation, the two views and political approaches are understood to be present, i.e. economically the EU is acting as a supra-nation, while in the context of security it is still within the framework of intergovernmentalism. Yet the goal of the EU is understood to be “in the pursuit of a federal Europe,” where, as in Burgess words, “federal ideas have seeped into every central institution of the EU, whether supra-national or intergovernmental” (Burgess, 2002, p.273). Hence, regardless of the different descriptions, the dissertation views the EU as an institution that exists as a quasi-state actor in the international system in the sense that it has a strong level of external sovereignty and is an actor with a clear domestic realm and audience. This dissertation asserts that the EU “is dominant, institutional representation of the community of people, which enjoys recognition by the community of other nations, and which, by means of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power and legitimized representation, governs a community of people” (Surowiec, 2017, p.36)<sup>212</sup>.

The institution, on one hand, needs to present a cohesive image of the EU to the rest of the world, while, on the other hand, internally the EU, as a membership organization, needs to solidify its existence by increasing loyalty towards itself, which it does through various policies (Rumford, 2000).<sup>213</sup> The internal factor is the focus of this dissertation. The goal is to unpack how the EU builds and maintains influence among its domestic constituency in order to secure its survival. In this respect, it is no different than a national state securing its internal influence over the various actors and the citizens that exist within its borders. When referring to the internal audience of the EU, the dissertation focuses on the ordinary citizens that live within the EU and have an impact on the politics of the member-states and their support for future integration. The analysis, therefore, looks at the way the EU as an institution can influence the hearts and minds of its citizens in order to grow its internal soft power, i.e. its legitimacy and attractiveness.

Furthermore, the notion of the EU as a distinctive actor in the international system and a quasi-state is reinforced when considering the EU’s approach to culture. For Isar, the 2007 European Agenda for Culture makes “precise references to Europe in distinction to any particular ‘Other’” (Isar,

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<sup>211</sup> Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, Antonina, Karin Leijon, Anna Michalski and Lars Oxelheim, eds. (2019). *The European Union and the Return of the Nation State*. Interdisciplinary European Studies. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.

<sup>212</sup> Surowiec, P. (2017). *Nation Branding, Public Relations, and Soft Power*. Corporatising Poland. Routledge.

<sup>213</sup> Rumford, C. (2000). *European Cohesion: Contradictions in EU Integration*. Springer.

2015, p.501)<sup>214</sup>. Furthermore, he continues, culture is now seen as an “asset” and the EU’s achievements and traits are “a form of cultural capital [...] that the supranational entity can now deploy in the concert of nations, as if it were a nation-state writ large” (Isar, 2015, p.501<sup>215</sup>).

#### EU - external cultural policies and actions

On the premise of the argument that in order for an international actor to have soft power externally it needs to have soft power internally (see literature review), the following section examines how the EU has employed culture in its external policies. It concludes that in order to progress with its soft power externally, there needs to be a common EU cultural area. It, therefore, shows that the analysis of the EU’s internal cultural programmes, such as the Creative Europe, is vital to the understanding and evaluation of the potential of the EU’s overall soft power in world politics.

The EU’s European Agenda for Culture in 2007 stated that the external cultural action of the EU had a clear purpose “to achieve the EU’s strategic objectives of prosperity, solidarity and security, while ensuring a stronger presence on the international scene” (EC, 2007, p.3). This was to occur through “public diplomacy, including cultural events” and with the purpose “to convey important messages in third countries about Europe” (EC, 2007, p.7). This section outlines some of the resources that the EU has adopted towards building external soft power through culture. It looks at the European Union National Institutes of Culture (EUNIC), then the European External Action Service (EEAS), and finally the most recent initiative *Towards an EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations*.

#### EUNIC: multidimensional networks

The Consortium of the National Cultural Institution (CICEB) was founded by seven nations in Brussels in 1997. This was a platform where national cultural institutions worked together to promote European culture abroad. The project was renamed European Union National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC) in 2006. Today:

“[EUNIC] has 36 members from 27 countries that are based in over 150 countries with more than 2,000 branches and thousands of local partners. [...] EUNIC’s mission is to promote

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<sup>214</sup> Isar, Y. R. (2015). ‘Culture in EU external relations’: an idea whose time has come?. *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 21(4), 494-508.

<sup>215</sup> Isar cites Herzfeld, M., (2005). *Cultural intimacy. Social poetics in the nation-state*. 2nd ed. New York, NY: Routledge.

European values and to contribute to cultural diversity inside and outside of the EU through collaboration between European cultural institutes. EUNIC's aim is to expand the role of culture in Europe and to strengthen cultural dialogue, exchange and sustainable cooperation worldwide" (EUNIC, n.d.)<sup>216</sup>

Brix describes EUNIC as a "close cooperation of member institutes working outside of the EU to increase the impact of their cultural work by making better use of European soft power assets" (Brix, 2011, p.167).<sup>217</sup> EUNIC is an active network with its members encouraged to implement shared projects. Such activities include cultural exchange focusing on language, art and architecture, and the environment. The EUNIC clusters are focused primarily on networking and collaboration in order to encourage knowledge exchange but also allow locals in foreign countries to engage in activities, which might not have otherwise been available to them. For example, Fisher describes a project in South Africa, "Studio", which was attended by local architecture students, who learned know-how from European architects (Fisher, 2013, p.139)<sup>218</sup>. The EUNIC network includes embassies, government ministries and local cultural organizations. The participants are both policymakers and practitioners in the cultural sector.

The challenge for the EU with an initiative like the EU is that national cultural institutions lead these efforts and therefore represent the interests of the member states rather than the EU. Although EUNIC's website says that the network operates at "arm's length from national governments and national bodies and ministries" (EUNIC, n.d.). Fisher highlights an argument made by other scholars, such as Batora and Mokre (2008)<sup>219</sup>, that the members of EUNIC often compete against each other – "A competition-driven logic has been increasingly taking root in the work of national cultural institutes" as they try to garner the attention of and be attractive to the local cultural audiences in foreign capitals (Fisher, 2013, p.139). Fisher illustrates this through the European Day of Languages, which was organized by EUNIC and took place in Warsaw in 2010. The multitude of languages is an obstacle in the creation of unity and yet coming together to share literature and language across Europe has historically also been its bond. However, he points out that national interests are strong and unavoidable. For example, during such events, the British Council used the "Britain is GREAT"

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<sup>216</sup> EUNIC, (n.d). Who we are. <https://www.eunicglobal.eu/about> [last accessed April, 2020].

<sup>217</sup> Brix, Emil. (2011) "European Coordination of External Cultural Policies" p.161-170 in Batora, Jozef and Monika Morke (eds.) Culture and External Relations: Europe and Beyond. p.167

<sup>218</sup> Fisher A. (2013) "A Network Perspective on Public Diplomacy in Europe: EUNIC." In: Cross M.K.D., Melissen J. (eds) European Public Diplomacy. Soft Power at Work. Palgrave Macmillan

<sup>219</sup> He refers here to Jozef Batora and Monika Mokre's 2008 papers for a EUNIC sponsored conference. J. Batora and M. Mokre (2008) "International Cultural Relations in and of the European Union Perspectives of EUNIC," Background Papers, New Paradigms, New Models. Culture in the EU External Relations , Ljubljana (May 2008):13–14.

campaign to try to attract foreign students to the UK, who contributed an estimated £14.1 billion to the economy in 2008-2009. From this, Fisher concludes that the European identity is in competition with national interests (Fisher, 2013, p.140). Duke also points out that the EU and the member-states differ in important ways in the approaches they take to public diplomacy. While member-states focus more on nation-branding and language, the EU, like other international bodies, focuses on broader and more globalized issues, such as migration or human rights (Duke, 2013, p.116).<sup>220</sup> For Brix, such cooperation still stresses the national aspects of European culture and that there is little readiness for the EU members to create an EU common public space (Brix, 2011, p.167). Although the EUNIC clusters have an arm's length principle as part of the eligibility criteria for membership this in fact remains hardly the case. The bodies that participate or make up the clusters such as embassies, cultural attachés, and generally the national cultural institutes are first and foremost linked to their respective governments. Regardless of the critique, the public and cultural diplomacy activities of the EU, such as EUNIC, lead to the creation of what Fisher refers to as multidimensional networks.

For Fisher, the “collaborative network” and the relationships become the key units of analysis. Here, diplomats are the key nodes who receive and give information and build bridges. “This means shifting the focus from measuring only how many people a message was delivered to [to] recognizing the complex multidimensional network of relationships within which [public diplomacy] operates” (Fisher, 2013, p.140-143). His work shows that the existence of these multi-dimensional networks gives the EU an advantage in its capability to leverage soft power. EUNIC's main members have more resources than local cultural organizations in foreign countries, yet the local organizations have more knowledge of how to reach the local audience. By partnering with EUNIC, the local organizations receive resources and the European organizations in return get specific knowledge and skill to more efficiently be able to reach the desired community. Brix says that such initiatives create a common cultural space, between the EU and its partners worldwide, from which the EU can benefit (Brix, 2013, p. 147). Nonetheless, EUNIC still was not purely serving the EU. The European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy 2004-2009, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, said these European projects need more “guidance” (Fisher, 2013, p.147), which can be read as meaning to have more input and control from the EU.

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<sup>220</sup> Duke, S. (2013). “The European External Action Service and Public Diplomacy” in Cross M.K.D., Melissen J. (eds.) *European Public Diplomacy. Soft Power at Work*. Palgrave MacMillan.

## EEAS: Public and Cultural Diplomacy – Collective infrastructure and image

The European External Action Service (EEAS), which is responsible for the EU's foreign policy, was founded quite late, arising out of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. It became officially the public diplomacy agency of the European Union (Cross, 2015, p.342)<sup>221</sup>. The establishment of the EEAS was essential for the EU's soft power. Cross says that for soft power to be built and preserved there needs to be the right infrastructure in place, and she believes that with the EEAS the EU "has the infrastructure in place to project its policies and image," and that this makes up the EU's "arsenal" (Cross, 2015, p.343-344). By infrastructure, Cross means the EEAS has 139 delegates globally, plus it is supported by the embassies of the Member States as well as the numerous programmes that it runs such as ERASMUS MUNDUS, Jean Monnet, European Neighbourhood Programme (ENP), Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Eastern Partnership, etc. (Cross, 2015, p.351). Additionally, as we will see below, the infrastructure also had an internal formation by bringing together internal institutions to build a stronger external capability.

Before the introduction of the EEAS, the EU's foreign public or cultural action resembled something more like "consumer oriented" information points (Duke, 2013, p.117). EU's public diplomacy was passive rather than strategic (Lynch, 2005)<sup>222</sup>. The introduction of the EEAS was supposed to address this problem by introducing an overarching communication structure, which brought together all the staff and sections of the Commission's external services that were responsible for public diplomacy. The EEAS was meant to coordinate between the Council (the body that sets the agenda for the EU), the Commission (the body that creates EU legislation), and the EU delegations (these represent the EU abroad). The EEAS brings together the Security Policy and Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) structures whose decisions are made by the Council. The EEAS is responsible for the 140 delegations of the EU, which are present in countries or regions, as well as the African Union and United Nations and consist of mostly the EU Commission's Directorate-General Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO) staff (EEAS, n.d.)<sup>223</sup>. Batora's study of the EEAS's organizational structure led him to conclude that the EEAS has an "interstitial organization," where it works in between other institutions and brings them together (Batora, 2013, p.603-604)<sup>224</sup>. Quickly

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<sup>221</sup> Cross M.K.D. (2015) "The Public Diplomacy Role of the EEAS: Crafting a Resilient Image for Europe." In: Spence D., Batora J. (eds) *The European External Action Service. The European Union in International Affairs series*. Palgrave Macmillan

<sup>222</sup> Lynch, D. (2005). "Communicating Europe to the world: what public diplomacy for the EU?" ECP Working Paper no.21 (November 2005): 31.

<sup>223</sup> EEAS, (n.d.). Organisation. [http://eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/organisation\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/organisation_en.pdf) [last accessed April 2020].

<sup>224</sup> Batora, Jozef (2013). "The 'Mitrailleuse Effect': The EEAS as an Interstitial Organization and the Dynamics of Innovation in Diplomacy" in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2013, Volume 51. Number 4. pp. 598-613

the EEAS evolved and actively set up external communication strategies to increase EU visibility abroad (Soproni and Horga, 2016)<sup>225</sup>.

In Cross's evaluation of soft power and the EEAS said, "[a]s the EEAS moves beyond its first few years, conveying the message that Europeans are solidly committed to sustaining EU integration will likely prove the most important EU public diplomacy achievement" (Cross, 2015, p.353). She refers to this as the "resilient image" which is based on ideas of integration (Cross, 2015). Isar also points out that the "narrative" of the "collective self-representation" became an essential resource the EU was seeking (Isar, 2015, p.501). Importantly, for both Cross and Isar, this external image is closely linked to what is happening within the EU. In Isar's case, it is through external cultural diplomacy that an internal "narrative" can also be built (Isar, 2015, p.495). These discussions are reminiscent of China's internal and external soft power dimensions, and the way the two are linked, put forward by Callahan (2015)<sup>226</sup>. Internally, the EU had been working on developing a common narrative built around the European identity, which will be explored further below (see Shore, 1993<sup>227</sup>; Burgess, 2002; and Sassatelli, 2009<sup>228</sup>). What is important for the argument of the concept of soft power in this dissertation is that internal self-perception was not only important for internal cohesion but also for external relations.

Bringing culture into the EU's foreign policy in a formal way has only happened very recently. The 2007 European Agenda for Culture made mention of culture in relation to foreign objectives, but it was only "[i]n February 2014, [that] a cultural advisor to the Secretary's Office of the EEAS was appointed" (Higgott and Van Langenhove, 2016, p.2).<sup>229</sup> According to Isar, the first time the EU used the term "cultural diplomacy" in an official EU document was in a report in the Parliament's Culture Committee on the cultural dimension of the EU's external actions in March 2011. This is also the report that called for a single cultural strategy and against fragmentation – for "full and efficient use of cultural resources and budgets" and for the EEAS "to coordinate the strategic deployment of the cultural aspects of external policy" (Isar, 2015, p.502). After several years of preparatory work, the

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<sup>225</sup> Soproni, L. and I. Horga (2016). "The EU's Voice Beyond its Borders: The European Union's External Communication", CES Working Papers, ISSN 2067-7693, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi, Centre for European Studies, Iasi, Vol. 8, Iss. 3, pp. 490-504 (p.496).

<sup>226</sup> Callahan, W.A. (2015). "Identity and Security in China: The Negative Soft Power of the China Dream" in *Politics*: Vol 35 (3-4), pp.216-229. Political Studies Association

<sup>227</sup> Shore, C. (1993). "Inventing the 'People's Europe': Critical Approaches to European Community 'Cultural Policy'" in *Man Dec.*, New Series, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp.779-800.

<sup>228</sup> Sassatelli, M. (2009), *Becoming European. Cultural Identity and Cultural Policies*. Palgrave Macmillan.

<sup>229</sup> Higgott, R. and Van Langenhove, L. (2016). "Towards an EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations: An Initial, Critical but Constructive Analysis". *European Leadership in Culture, Science and Innovation Diplomacy (EL-CSID)*. Institute for European Studies.



EU concluded in reports in 2011 and 2014<sup>230</sup> that there is a “need to tighten the links between culture and diplomacy” (Higgott et al. 2016, p.2). Thereafter, in 2016 the EU produced a joint communication *Towards a European Strategy for International Cultural Relations* (EEAS, n.d.).<sup>231</sup> Today, this strategy is representative of the direction of the EU’s external cultural relations. The EU had built a tool to engage in external cultural soft power building.

### Towards an EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations

The challenges that have faced the EU in its external cultural policy so far have been the national interests of Member States and the fact that externally there was a perception of the EU as being culturally imperialistic and Eurocentric. For example, when commenting on the way that Europe saw its mission to help “less favoured” countries in the 1973 Declaration on the European Identity, Sassatelli says, “What emerges is clearly the difficulty of avoiding the contradictions of Eurocentrism, its resurfacing in the hierarchical vision of the relationship among countries, re-enacting the idea of Europe’s *mission civilisatrice*” (Sassatelli, 2009, p.40). There has also been some criticism of the work of the EUNIC with third countries. “According to Katharina von Ruckteschell-Katte, President of EUNIC sub-Saharan Africa, the European cultural institutes have to revisit the fact that when they approach a local partner, they have often already decided what to do, and have brought their own agenda, without taking the prospective partner’s thoughts and expectations into consideration” (IFA report, 2013, p.16).<sup>232</sup> This critique and challenge to EU success in the building of external soft power was not ignored. Already prior to the policy *Towards an EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations* (Strategy for ICR), the EU ought to align its cultural policies with UNESCO’s various policies on culture, in order for both the external and the internal challenges to be mitigated. Alignment with UNESCO “seeks avoiding tensions over competencies with Member States” (Figueira, 2017, p.82).<sup>233</sup> Therefore the cultural policies that the EU produced mirrored in many ways what UNESCO also focused on, such as cultural exchange, preservation of heritage, celebration of diversity, etc. Furthermore, “in the EU

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<sup>230</sup> See: European Parliament’s Resolution on the cultural dimensions of the EU’s external action (2011); 2014 EP Preparatory Action ‘Culture in EU external relations’ (2014). <http://cultureinexternalrelations.eu/>

<sup>231</sup> EEAS (n.d.). Culture – Towards an EU strategy for international relations. 05/01/2017.

[https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/culture/18306/culture-towards-eu-strategy-international-cultural-relations\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/culture/18306/culture-towards-eu-strategy-international-cultural-relations_en) [last accessed April 2020]

<sup>232</sup> IFA Report, “European external cultural relations – Expectations from the outside.” Brussels, 12 December, 2012.

<sup>233</sup> Figueira, C., (2017), “A Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Towards an EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations, by the European Commission, 2016.” *Cultural Trends*, 26(1), pp.81-85.

context [...] terminology associated with harmonization and free exchange may more often find its way in the policy process” (Baumgartner, 2007, p.485-486)<sup>234</sup>.

For Figueira, the Strategy for ICR was an accumulation of a decade of work by EU officials, Member States, and the civil society, based on the 2007 European Agenda for Culture, aligned with UNESCO, and overwhelmingly focused on peace and jobs (Figueira, 2017, p.82). Higgott et al. say “the good news is that there is now a strategic vision that outlines the EU’s ambitions and points to some strategic priorities and to some tools and mechanisms that will be deployed to enhance international cultural relations” (Higgott et al., 2016, p.3-4<sup>235</sup>). Referring to Nye and his claim that culture is a resource for soft power, Figueira says, “we can see [in the Strategy for ICR] a hint at the use of culture as one of the instruments with potential to achieve soft power for the EU” (Figueira, 2017, p.82). As Higgott et. al. say, the various cultural tools included the “private sector actors, notably philanthropic organizations, corporate sponsors and private higher education providers” were seen as instruments for “enhancing European influence and attraction” (Higgott et. al., 2016, p. 2). Figueira adds that an “instrumental view of culture consistently underlies EU policy and action” (Figueira, 2017, p.85). On the other hand, Isar argues that the EU has moved “beyond the ‘soft power’ calculus” and that “the ‘objective of EU action must be to support the cultural activities, goods and services of developing countries themselves rather than supporting those of Europe” (Isar, 2015, p.500). The European Union, already before the issuing of the Strategy for ICR, in its preparatory work, clearly identified that culture was a resource for soft power. “Europe as a political body must fully deploy its ‘soft power’ not only across the continent, but also beyond its borders [...]”. Albeit adding, “[...] to make it a respectful and respected international partner, promoting a new global model of society based on ethical, aesthetic and sustainable values” (EU, 2014).<sup>236</sup> While the EU does place value on partnerships, networks and exchange, and the development of the creative and cultural industries in third countries, nonetheless, when seeing these actions through the realist lens, the EU’s soft power strategy represents self-interest in a battle for the spheres of influence in a globalized world. “[W]hile the Mogherini strategy [(the Strategy for ICR)] argues it is aimed at promoting *diversity*”, the interpretation could be that “real aim is to promote the EU vis-à-vis the influence of the other great players in the contemporary global search for influence – the USA and China” (Higgott et al., 2016, p.6). Mogherini, the head of the EEAS at the time, herself said in 2014 that the EU is a “cultural

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<sup>234</sup> Baumgartner, F.R. (2007), “EU Lobbying: A View from the US”, in: *Journal of European Public Policy* 14: 3, pp.482–488.

<sup>235</sup> See also, Carta, C. and R. Higgott (eds.) (2020). *Cultural Diplomacy in Europe. Between the Domestic and the International*, Palgrave Macmillan.

<sup>236</sup> European Union (2014). *Preparatory action ‘culture in EU external relations’. Engaging the world: towards global cultural citizenship*. Brussels: European Union.

superpower” (Higgott et al., 2016, p.2). Having depicted the EU’s growing cultural competencies in its foreign policy, there is a need to consider the internal element, which Isar (2015) and Cross (2015) had pointed, in the construction of EU’s cultural soft power.

## Origin of Culture in EU Policies – Gaining Access

### The first signs of culture

The instrumentalization of culture for political purposes with the aim of achieving a united Europe goes back to the Marshall Plan. J.P. Burgess (2002b)<sup>237</sup> points out that WWII did not only lead to an economic catastrophe but also a cultural and social one and that economic reconstruction through the Marshall Plan was “only meaningful against the backdrop of a European collectivity” (Burgess, 2002b, p.476). In this context, he says that just as “investment, loans, grants and transfers were the primary tools for putting Europe back on its feet” economically, there was a “need to cultivate a European identity in the name of European harmony” to address the cultural crisis (Burgess, 2002b, 476-477). Overwhelmingly though the first treaties of post-War Europe dealt with peacebuilding, economic agreements, and internal politics and not directly with cultural policy. Due to cultural strains of the war years, culture was not focused on within these early EU documents, although it was very much a part of thinking behind the US Marshall Plan (Miller and Yúdice, 2002, pp.44-45). However, Cull (2013)<sup>238</sup> points out that there was a lot of cultural activity in support of European integration after War and during the establishment of the original European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. This included: the establishment of the International Institute on Intellectual Cooperation where the French poet Paul Valéry emphasised “using artists and intellectuals to overcome the differences”; the “establishment in 1950 of the European Broadcast Union to facilitate the exchange of radio and television materials between member states [...] thereby strengthen[ing] the shared cultural experience”; or the creation of the Eurovision network in 1956 (Cull, 2013, p.ix). The European integration was also supported by cultural efforts “conducted under the auspices of the US European Cooperation Administration (the agency that administered the Marshall Plan) and the US Information Agency” (Cull, 2013, p.ix; see also Cull, 2012, p.2<sup>239</sup>). Aside from

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<sup>237</sup> Burgess, J.P. (2002). “What’s so European about the European Union? Legitimacy between Institution and Identity” in *European Journal of Social Theory*, 5(4): pp.467-481. Sage Publications.

<sup>238</sup> Cull, Nicholas. (2013) “Forward” in Davis Cross, Mai’a K. and Jan Melissen (Eds.) *European Public Diplomacy: Soft Power at Work*. p.ix

<sup>239</sup> Cull, N. (2012). *The Decline and Fall of the United States Information Agency: American Public Diplomacy, 1989-2001*. Palgrave Macmillan.

various European “grassroots” cultural activities to support European integration (ibid) and the US efforts to unify and utilize Western Europe against the Soviet threat, there were specific circumstances within Europe that made the heads of the European project start working towards a cultural policy.

There was a call for more cultural solutions to help the people of Europe buy into the ever-growing community and integration project. In 1957, the Treaty of Rome led to the creation of the European Economic Community. The 1970s saw a major recession and the oil crisis. Unemployment and inflation grew within Europe. Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the European community. The European society was experiencing insecurity and questioning the good of European integration. A common emotional bond was needed in Europe to solidify the European project (Sasatelli, 2009, p.42). In 1973, in order to try to overcome the lack of an emotional bond and to grow the popularity for the European integration project, the Foreign Ministers of the member-states signed the *Declaration on the European Identity*<sup>240</sup>, also referred to as the Copenhagen Declaration. Burgess, exploring the process of institutional construction of the European Union, highlights how culture was instrumentalized in the form of identity to build legitimacy (Burgess, 2002b, p.467-468). As von Bogdandy suggests, the leaders of the project saw “citizens’ identification with the supranational organization as necessary to its expansion into a viable political community,” and he says the “term ‘identity’ is attractive [...] because it allows for the concealment of normative premises” (von Bogdandy, 2005, p.295-296).<sup>241</sup> The declaration states, “The European identity [...] will] evolve as a function of the dynamic construction of a United Europe” (EC, 1973, p.4). The declaration states that the Nine share a common heritage and should “establish themselves as a distinct and original entity” (EC, 1973, p.4). These identity debates were overwhelmingly dominated by the “great narrative” of a “common origin”, which as von Bogdandy shows were supported with cultural ideas and images which associated European nations with ancient Greece. He points out that the draft of the European constitution had a picture that symbolized ancient Greece, which was important because of the positive image of ancient Greek heritage, which also “is maintained, in no small part, by the entertainment industry” (von Bogdandy, 2005, p.299-301). Although the final draft of the proposed constitutional treaty removed the Greek “myth”, the treaty still refers to the “cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe,” and it was clear that ideas of a shared European culture

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<sup>240</sup> European Commission (1973) “Declaration on European Identity,” in General Report of the European Commission. Brussels. European Commission. See also: Bulletin of the European Communities. December 1973, No 12. Luxembourg: Office for official publications of the European Communities. "Declaration on European Identity", p. 118-122. European Union 18/12/2013  
[Online source] [http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/02798dc9-9c69-4b7d-b2c9-f03a8db7da32/publishable\\_en.pdf](http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/02798dc9-9c69-4b7d-b2c9-f03a8db7da32/publishable_en.pdf)

<sup>241</sup> Von Bogdandy, A. (2005). The european constitution and european identity: Text and subtext of the treaty establishing constitution for europe. *International Journal of Constitutional Law*, 3(2 & 3), 295-315.

were emerging in European policies providing it with “formative power” based on cultural elements (von Bogdandy, 2005, p.301).

### Formalizing internal and external cultural strategies

The politics of EU identity construction sought not only to achieve internal influence and loyalty but also external political goals. The declaration starts with:

“The Nine Member Countries<sup>242</sup> of the European Communities have decided that the time has come to draw up a document on the European Identity. This will enable them to achieve a better definition of their relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs” (EC, 1973).

Here we see a linking of internal cultural aspects with external policies. The declaration goes on to say, “Europe must unite and speak increasingly with one voice if it wants to make itself heard and play its proper role in the world” (EC, 1973, p.2). The instrumentalization of culture in external affairs entered into the policy realm classically associated with international power: “The concept of European identity, child of the 1973 *Declaration on European Identity* – [...] appears explicitly in the Maastricht Preamble [discussed further below], and yet in an unlikely context: the common foreign and security policy” (Burgess, 2002b, p.478).

In 1975, a move towards the “People’s Europe” was made in the Tindemans Report, in which the Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans wrote, “The European identity will not be accepted by the outside world so long as the European States appear sometimes united, sometimes disunited” (Tindemans Report, 1975, p.15). The reality was that in the context of the economic crisis of the 1970s the member-states were not ready to tackle the issue of disunity too fast. However, Tindemans’ proposals did eventually become reality including the Monetary Union and the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Slowly culture became a key mechanism through which issues of identity and unity were meant to be addressed. “Since 1977 the Commission, with the steadfast support of Parliament, had developed a ‘cultural policy’ which ha[d] helped to boost people’s awareness of a European cultural identity. This policy was given formal recognition by the Heads of State or Government at the Stuttgart and Milan European Councils in 1983 and 1985 respectively” (CE, 1988, p.11).<sup>243</sup> The first two priorities of these new cultural policies were: one, to improve communication among the member

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<sup>242</sup> Countries included Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands

<sup>243</sup> Commission of European Communities (1988) “The European Community and Culture.” Brussels. EU publication. p.11

states and their people; and two, to create a European identity. The EU's focus shifted from economic integration towards uniting European citizens by awakening their European identity (Sassatelli, 2009, p.39). The EU needed to establish more legitimacy and overcome the two crises that it faced: "first is the famous 'democratic deficit, the lack of democratic control mechanisms, [...] second is the general lack of popular support for the EU as a forum for deliberation on matters of European concern" (Burgess, 2002b, p.468). Due to the democratic deficit, Shore asserts that in the European Community, the "concepts of 'culture' and 'identity' have been appropriated by European officials and policy-makers since the 1980s in their attempts to popularise the EU and forge a European public" (Shore, 2000, p.7).<sup>244</sup>

The 1992 Maastricht Treaty was the first European treaty to mention European culture to be part of its internal and external action to meet the needs of the Union. The treaty established the major measures of European Citizenship and the Monetary Union. The Maastricht Treaty for the first time gave "the EU limited competences for culture. Before this, official EU cultural programming was a limited and unorganized set of small-scale projects for which the Commission could find small amounts of funding" (Isar, 2015, p.500). The cultural focus of this treaty, according to Sassatelli, was "an attempt to create a bond between individuals and the European Union" (Sassatelli, 2009, p.42). The treaty stated that it was "a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe" (EC, 1992, Article A, p.6). The focus on culture at this stage was to preserve European cultural heritage, help disseminate European culture to its people, and support "non-commercial cultural exchange," but it would do so by "respecting [...] national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore" (EC, 1992, Article 128, p.30).

The use of culture and cultural assets – tangible and intangible – was becoming apparent. Culture became a resource central to the EU's efforts to build legitimacy and secure institutional survival. As Littoz-Monnet says, culture received a "political imperative. If the EU was to succeed as an entity, European citizens should be made aware of their belonging to a common culture" (Littoz-Monnet, 2012, p.509).<sup>245</sup> Externally, "[t]he Community and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and the competent international organizations in the sphere of culture" (Maastricht Treaty, 1992, Article 128/3, p.30). The link between the internal and external interest, as in earlier treaties, was again featured in this treaty. A more unified Europe can "assert its identity on the international scene" (Maastricht Treaty, Article B, p.7). Culture was clearly "a possible supportive means of strengthening common European interests internally and externally" (Brix, 2011, p.162).

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<sup>244</sup> Shore, C. (2000). *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*. Psychology Press.

<sup>245</sup> Littoz-Monnet (2012) "Agenda-Setting Dynamics at the EU Level: The Case of the EU Cultural Policy." *Journal of European Integration*, 34:5, 505-522,

The Maastricht articles on culture were adopted by the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, which was ratified and put in place by 2009 and was designed to give the EU governing bodies more power. As Bozóki, the former Hungarian Minister of Culture, said in a speech, the Maastricht Treaty “legalized” culture and was reinforced again into the EU legal framework by the Lisbon Treaty (Bozoki, 2007).<sup>246</sup>

It is important to note that, unlike in the economic realm, the “EU has no mandate to lead or control policies in the cultural sector,” (Brix, 2011, p.162) but could only encourage and supplement existing national cultural activity. Scholars point out that this is problematic for building a common European identity and a common European cultural dimension because it allows nation-states to reinforce their national history and culture (Brix, 2011; Bozoki, 2007). Despite this duality of identities and the challenges it can pose to the EU, the EU’s goal for the employment of culture was taking concrete shape.

### First signs of cultural governance

Policy discussions were reflective of the intention to utilize culture, but the EU had to implement these policies if culture were to become a useful resource. Hence, it began to develop mechanisms through which it could actually have input into the governance of culture keeping in mind that the “principles of subsidiarity”<sup>247</sup> (EC, Agenda for Culture, 2007, p.4) still needed to be respected. It set up committees, put forward reports and agendas in order to outline how it would specifically get involved in culture. Following the expression of frustration by some European bureaucrats that wider cultural questions were being managed through too many ministerial and other stakeholder meetings, the ad hoc “Committee On a People’s Europe” was set up in 1984 by the European Council to address the needs raised in the discussions of the People’s Europe. The Committee issued two *Adonnino Reports* (CPE, 1985a,b).<sup>248</sup> These outlined significant steps towards a European

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<sup>246</sup> Bozoki, Andras (2007). “Cultural Policy and Politics in the European Union” Speech, European Commission, Brussels.

<sup>247</sup> The principle of subsidiarity is defined in Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality. “The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality govern the exercise of the EU’s competences. In areas in which the European Union does not have exclusive competence, the principle of subsidiarity seeks to safeguard the ability of the Member States to take decisions and action and authorises intervention by the Union when the objectives of an action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but can be better achieved at Union level, ‘by reason of the scale and effects of the proposed action’. The purpose of including a reference to the principle in the EU Treaties is also to ensure that powers are exercised as close to the citizen as possible, in accordance with the proximity principle referred to in Article 10(3) of the TEU.” [europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/7/the-principle-of-subsidiarity#:~:text=In%20areas%20in%20which%20the,rather%20than%20the%20Member%20States](http://europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/7/the-principle-of-subsidiarity#:~:text=In%20areas%20in%20which%20the,rather%20than%20the%20Member%20States).

<sup>248</sup> Committee on a People’s Europe (1985a). “Report from the ad hoc Committee on a People’s Europe (First Adonnino Report)”. Bulletin of the EC 3-1985. Commission of the European Communities. Committee on a People’s Europe (1985b). “Report to the European Council (Second Adonnino Report).” A 10.04 COM 85, SN/2536/3/85.

implementation of cultural policy and making the European project less distant to its people. While the first report focused on integrating people's lives by simplifying border controls and recognizing academic degrees; the second report focused on cultural policy like cultural cooperation, exchange, town twinning schemes, youth programs, and information campaigns (Bozoki, 2007). In the first report suggestions for symbolic tools, like the European flag and "community emblems" for sporting events were made, as well as for "a competitive European audio-visual industry and a European Academy of Arts, Science and Culture" were made (CPE, 1985a). These were the first applicable steps taken to create the European community by using creative and cultural means. In the section on "Culture and Communication," the Second Adonnino Report states explicitly that it is "through action in the areas of culture and communication, which are essential to European identity and the Community's image in the minds of its people, that support for the advancement of Europe can and must be sought" (CPE, 1985b, p.10). The Adonnino proposals to create a common European culture began to be implemented by the Delors Commission in 1985 by the "Working Program for the Creation of a People's Europe". Numerous symbolic elements were introduced and cultural initiatives put in place. These were similar to the tools that a nation-state traditionally uses, such as the flag, national anthem, passports, drivers' licenses, and number plates (Shore, 1993, p.788-791). At the same time, the supra-national level of the European community was emphasized through sporting events, educational exchange, and naming some European cities "Cultural Capitals of Europe", beginning with Athens as the first such city (Sassatelli, 2009). Additionally, to these pan-European events, there began to be an implementation of small-scale projects in the creative and cultural industries, the first of which were called Kaleidoscope, Arianne, and Raphael (discussed further below). The European community then went through another stage of enlargement and the creation of the Internal Market through the Single European Act, which Bozoki says again created insecurity among the people of Europe about the European project, who now needed "to be convinced to accept, or at least tolerate" it (Bozoki, 2007).

Originally, there was pushback from member states against the EU's extension into cultural policies, but when by the 1990s the member-states were confronted with the opening of physical borders, development in technology and digitalization that also increased transborder flows, and the growth of the internal single market, European countries called for and adopted EU law, first, relating to export, then aligning it to UNESCO policies, and eventually creating a cross-border art market (Thatcher, 2019, p.19).<sup>249</sup> Nonetheless, until 2006, procedures at the EU-level for the coordination of cultural promotion had largely been shaped by member countries. Then leading bureaucrats from the

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<sup>249</sup> Thatcher, M. (2019). "Direct and market governance paths for the creation of an EU political identity: cultural heritage policy." *Comparative European Politics* 17(4), pp. 585-602.



culture directorate of the EU commission tried to mainstream culture, including into other EU policy areas (Brix, 2011, p.163). Building on the results of an EU commissioned report on the Economy of Culture in Europe (EC, 2006)<sup>250</sup>, the first European Agenda for Culture was proposed. This report drew attention to the fact that in European economic policy culture had been ignored as a vital tool in contributing to growth. “It show[ed] how culture drives economic and social development, as well as innovation and cohesion. [...] [the cultural] sector’s growth in terms of jobs out-performs the rest of the economy. [...] The study also illustrates how culture promotes European integration” (EC, 2006). A further main realization stated in this report was that “culture can contribute to ‘seduce’ European citizens to the idea of European integration” (EC, 2006).

The European Commission published its first overarching strategy in the European Agenda for Culture on May 10<sup>th</sup>, 2007 (EC, 2007).<sup>251</sup> The content was strongly influenced by the Lisbon and Maastricht Treaties. “There [was continued] acknowledgement that culture is an indispensable feature to achieve the EU’s strategic objectives of prosperity, solidarity and security, while ensuring a stronger presence on the international scene” (EC, 2007b, p.3). The agenda continued to highlight the external and internal objectives. It stated that “the Commission has also recently begun to reinforce its public diplomacy, including cultural events [...] to convey important messages in third countries about Europe [and] its identity” (EC, European Agenda for Culture, 2007b, p.7). The Agenda explicitly links this external action back to the EU’s own citizens. Referring to the approval in June 2006 of the Commission’s proposal “Europe in the World” by the European Council, the agenda states, “Recent opinion polls clearly show that, under the pressure of globalization, the great majority of Europe’s citizens [...] want Europe to be more present in the world, with an external policy which well reflects its values” (EC, 2007, p.7). Most interestingly, the Agenda clearly stated that culture contributes directly to the EU’s influence with actual reference to soft power: “The EU is, and must aspire to become even more, an example of a ‘soft power’ founded on norms and values such as human dignity, solidarity, tolerance, freedom of expression, respect for diversity and intercultural dialogue” (EC, European Agenda for Culture, 2007, p.3). Although the understanding of soft power that is reflected here is linked to values, the importance of soft power resources in strategic thinking to achieve political goals is not missed. In May 2018, the EU Commission put forward a New Agenda for Culture<sup>252</sup>

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<sup>250</sup> European Commission (2006). The Economy of Culture in Europe. Study prepared for the European Commission (Directorate-General for Education and Culture) October p.1

<sup>251</sup> Commission of the European Communities (2007). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a European agenda for culture in a globalizing world. p.3

<sup>252</sup> European Commission (2018). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A New European Agenda for Culture. Brussels.

as part of its “Strategic framework”, which came into effect in 2019. The New Agenda outlines three strategic objectives: the first, “social dimension – harnessing the power of culture and cultural diversity for social cohesion and well-being”; the second, “economic dimension – supporting culture-based creativity in education and innovation, and for jobs and growth”; and third, “external dimension – strengthening international cultural relations” (EC, New Agenda, 2018, p.2-6). What has been seen with the above discussions is that the EU had systematically made culture into a political tool for its internal and external objectives. These were accompanied by concrete cultural action.

Along with the Maastricht Treaty, the following cultural programmes took place in the EU in the 1990s: “‘Kaleidoscope’ focused on visual arts, ‘Arianne’ on literature, reading and translation, and ‘Raphael’ on cultural heritage” (Bozoki, 2007). As Kandyla says, these were the first “incentive measures,” i.e. funding programmes for actors within the creative and cultural industries that the EU had provided (Kandyla, 2015, p.50).<sup>253</sup> The amount of money that the EU devoted to cultural programmes began to rapidly increase from that point on. The three above-mentioned programmes ran from 1992 to 1999 and their total budget was €78 million. Then in the year 2000, there was the “Culture 2000” programmes, which ran from 2000 to 2006 and had a budget of €240 million. This focused on increasing European cultural activity and visibility both within and outside the EU. The subsequent programme “Culture Programme 2007-2013”, which had a budget of €400 million, continued to try to increase cooperation mainly within the EU but also with its neighbours. The current program “Creative Europe”, which runs until 2020, also includes the media and audiovisual areas, has a budget of €1.46 billion (EC, Strategic Framework, n.d). These cultural programs focus mostly on internal action, specifically building EU identity through the exchange of cultural goods, building networks through artist mobility programs, and increasing EU legitimacy and soft power in the process. In addition to cultural exchange and dissemination, these programmes were all focused on the financial contribution of the cultural industry to the EU economy in line with the aforementioned The Economy of Culture in Europe report. The Creative Europe programme and particularly its sub-programme culture are the subject of the next analytical chapter.

### Concluding remarks on the internal-external nexus

Already with the EUNIC initiative, the external work of the EU also helped build more robust internal mechanisms. Fisher says that the European participants give and receive information, they become more aware of their own European identity. “These factors behind the European

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<sup>253</sup> Kandyla, A. (2015). “The Creative Europe Programme: Policy-Making Dynamics and Outcomes” in Cultural Governance and the European Union. Eds. E. Psychogiopoulou. Palgrave MacMillan.

collaborative approach to public diplomacy at the project level, also underpin the multidimensional network of relationships that facilitate collaborative action at the organizational level in Europe.” And just like with the cultural policies, there are “two dimensions to EUNIC activity, one dimension takes place within the EU and the other takes place outside the EU” (Fisher, 2013, p.140-146). Duke similarly states that “in the case of the EU the internal aspects of public diplomacy are very much part of the construction of the identity and narratives that are employed externally.” (Duke, 2013, p.114) Most importantly, the “political dimension to the EU, stem[s] from loyalty to the European project” (Cross, 2015, p.353), which is internal. This is the work that internal soft power has to do. It has to continue to convince the public of the EU to support and participate in the integration project. How Creative Europe builds up these soft power resources, is discussed in the Analytical Chapter.

## ANALYTICAL CHAPTER

### Introduction

In the Theory Chapter of this dissertation a theoretical framework for the strategic employment of culture as a resource for soft power (hereafter “the cultural soft power framework”) was developed. It outlined key characteristics of cultural soft power resources and showed how these are important for agents of power. Through the lens of the cultural soft power framework, this chapter analyses a specific case where culture is being instrumentalized by the EU. This exercise not only shows how the cultural soft power framework is a useful tool for evaluating cultural soft power resources of a particular agent in a particular instance, but also gives insight into the cultural soft power resources of our specific case – the EU and its Larger Cooperation Projects of the Sub-Programme Culture of the flagship cultural programme Creative Europe (hereafter “CESPC”).

After the introduction which outlines the chapter and gives an overview of what Creative Europe is and where the Larger Cooperation Projects sit within the programme, the chapter is divided into four parts, each reflecting one of the four components of the cultural soft power framework – assets, communication mechanisms, narratives, and audience. Each of these four parts is dedicated to presenting different findings on the data gathered about the CESPC in order to show how this cultural initiative aligns with what was established in the cultural soft power framework. Each of the four parts has an elaboration of the findings from the documents that underpin the CESPC, as per selection outlined in the Methodology Chapter; and each of the four parts has an elaboration of the findings from the data collected on the actual cultural projects that were implemented and produced under the CESPC. Finally, the chapter will conclude with a discussion that reflects on the manner in which the research on the EU has framed the analysis of its cultural resources in a way that doesn’t elaborate on the soft power resource that it has acquired through the CESPC. The discussion looks at the literature that relates the EU’s cultural policies to identity formation and then to the commodification of culture. It highlights that such debates are limited and ignore the power perspective. The discussion on normative power interpretation of Europe shows how this carries the same flaws that liberal scholars apply to soft power when linking it to particular normative claims. The discussion concludes with an emphasis on how the EU has instrumentalised culture and particularly the CCS in order to attain a cultural soft power resource.

We will see throughout that the CESPC is meant to strengthen the economy through the creative and cultural sector (CCS). While the economic factor is not dismissed, this section shows that

in fact the CESC is giving the EU the capabilities to construct cultural soft power resources. It is doing this systematically by: i. building up cultural assets that are identifiable with the EU and circumventing the principle of subsidiarity by operating through the CCS; ii. establishing a vast set of networks under its patronage and promoting the dissemination of EU-level culture; iii. promoting themes that generate the construction of the CCS; iv. instrumentalizing the CCS to carry out the soft power work on the EU's behalf. The EU's cultural action under the CESC is therefore an example of how a political actor can attain soft power capabilities, which it can use to strengthen its existence, balance against the soft power of the member-states, and other global superpowers.

## Background on Creative Europe

Creative Europe, which is a cultural initiative run by the European Union, is a framework programme for the EU<sup>254</sup> and at face value serves to finance and stimulate the growth of the cultural and creative sectors (hereafter "CCS") in the EU. This programme, like other cultural programmes, sits within Article 167 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and is there to "support, coordinate or supplement" the work of the member-states in respect of the principle of subsidiarity<sup>255</sup> and without stepping over the national competences. Referring to clause 5<sup>256</sup> in the article, scholars describe cultural initiatives as Creative Europe and its various predecessors as "incentive programmes" (Barnett, 2001; Sassatelli, 2005; Primorac et al., 2017). Overall, the Creative Europe programme is supposed to implement the European Agenda for Culture (EU, 2007)<sup>257</sup>, now the New Agenda for Culture (2018), which are unpacked in detail below. The European Agenda for Culture is directly linked to the overarching strategy of the EU, which at the time of the research was Europe 2020 as well as the EU Global Strategy. Creative Europe runs from 2014-2020 (recently been extended to 2027) and succeeds the Cultural Programme 2007-2013 as well as the Audio-Visual

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<sup>254</sup> Framework Programme is a program that is part of the Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF) of the EU which outlines key projects of the EU and dedicates larger sums of money to the projects. For more on this Framework see: European Commission (2011). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, "A Budget for Europe 2020", COM(2011) 500 final, 29.6.2011

<sup>255</sup> The principle of subsidiarity was first outlined in Article 128 of the Maastricht Treaty – The Treaty of the European Union – and later adopted as Article 167 in the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. It allows the EU to only take cultural action in support of the member-states. It prohibits harmonization of regulation in cultural affairs and the primary responsibility for cultural policy remained at the level of the individual member-states.

<sup>256</sup> Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 167 (5) "the European Parliament and the Council acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt incentive measures, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States".

<sup>257</sup> European Union, (2007). "Resolution of the Council of 16 November 2007 on a European Agenda for Culture" Official Journal of the European Union. 287, 29.11.2007, p. 1–4

Programme and the two Media Programmes. In fact, Creative Europe brings the three strands together under one umbrella. For the purpose of this research, only the culture strand, the Creative Europe Sub-Programme Culture (CESPC), which was preceded by the Cultural Programme 2007-2013 Sub-strand Culture, will be explored.

The EU allocated a budget totalling € 1.801 billion to Creative Europe. This spending has increased by 37% from the previous funding between 2007-2013. The rationale given in the European 2020 strategy, which outlines the major funding initiatives and the overall direction of the EU, is “to promote smart, sustainable and inclusive growth” (EC, 2011, p.2).<sup>258</sup> One of the core aims of Creative Europe, which is outlined in the *Communication from the Commission on Creative Europe*, is the stimulation of the European economy, which during the publication of the communication in 2011 was coming out of the 2008 financial crisis (EC, 2011, p.2). Furthermore, in the estimates of the EU, the CCS contributed around 4.5% of the European GDP in 2008 and formed 3.8% of the EU’s workforce (TERA, 2010).<sup>259</sup> The predominant focus on economic stimulation is also made clear by the method by which the EU evaluates the successes of the previous Cultural Programme 2007-2013. The *Communication from the Commission on Creative Europe* lists statistics of the number of artists and creative professionals that benefitted in their career development from the funding provided by the Cultural Programme (EC, 2011). While these documents present a strong focus on the economy in relation to the previous Cultural Programme 2007-2013 as well as in the discussions of Creative Europe, these programmes were nonetheless also understood as socio-political tools too.

In light of this, the *Communication from the Commission on Creative Europe* discusses the impact that funding had on growing partnerships, networks and increasing cooperation (EC, 2011). The EU’s Guidelines for the Cooperation Projects under CESPC also include non-economic aims: “In addition to the specific features of the scheme [i.e. the economic aspects] and in compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, the supported projects shall contribute in creating European added value<sup>260</sup>

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<sup>258</sup> European Commission (2011). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, "Creative Europe – A new framework programme for the cultural and creative sectors", Brussels, COM(2011) 786 final, 23.11.2011

<sup>259</sup> TERA Consultants, (2010). "Building a Digital Economy: The importance of saving jobs in the EU's creative industries", March, 2010, TERA Consultants.

<sup>260</sup> “European added value: European added value is additional to the value created by actions of individual Member States. It may result from different factors, e.g. coordination gains, legal certainty, greater effectiveness or complementarities. It reflects broader European relevance and significance of the action with a view to presenting models and mechanisms which can be applied not only regionally or nationally but also EU widely. European added value can be created through for example: promotion of best practices, economies of scale, networking, etc.” European Commission (2018). Creative Europe Culture Sub-Programmes. Support for European Cooperation Projects 2019. Call for Proposals EACEA 34/2018. Guidelines, p.33.

as defined in Article 5 of Regulations No 1295/2013” (EC, 2018, p.4; see Appendix 2, Article 5).<sup>261</sup> In summary, the European Added Value, which is quite vague, cover transnationalism, cultural education and exchange, cooperation, solutions for global problems, growth in the economies of scale and maintaining of a critical mass, and the levelling of the playing field for all countries and regions involved in the initiative (see Appendix 2, Article 5). All of this requires additional analysis, which is presented in the analytical sections below. Additionally, the Guidelines on Creative Europe outline the objectives and priorities of the programme, which include non-economic indicators. Creative Europe has "two general policy objectives: safeguard, develop and promote cultural and linguistic diversity and Europe's cultural heritage and strengthen the competitiveness of the European cultural and creative sectors"(EC, 2018, p.3)<sup>262</sup>.

The method through which artists and cultural organizations of the EU can access Creative Europe is through the Creative Europe Desks, which were established in each Member State in accordance with the Regulations on Creative Europe (EC, 2013)<sup>263</sup> and replaced the previous Cultural Contact Points in many cases. The role of these desks, as outlined in the Regulations, is to provide information and promote Creative Europe in each Member State, while in return also collecting data on the projects that participate in the programme and ensure that communication is both ways. This seeks to ensure that information about Creative Europe is widely available and disseminated among the European public; to assist citizens and organizations with their application to Creative Europe while assisting the Commission in the monitoring and evaluation of the projects, and to help cross-border cooperation within the cultural and creative sectors (EC, 2013, Article 16).<sup>264</sup>

The Case Chapter showed that, throughout the years, the objectives and priorities of EU projects changed and evolved. Creative Europe initially began as primarily a project to stimulate the transnational flow of culture and artists as well as the economy. However, Creative Europe itself also evolved from the time of its initiation. There have been two sets of Guidelines issued for the project and the European Agenda for Culture was updated, while the EU also developed a policy towards cultural international relations. In light of this Creative Europe’s objectives and priorities have had various additions and amendments. First, there has been an increased focus on evolving and developing new skills for cultural professionals. These are communication skills and particularly those

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<sup>261</sup> European Commission (2018). Creative Europe Culture Sub-programme. Support for European Cooperation Projects 2019. Call for Proposals EACEA 34/2018. Guidelines.

<sup>262</sup> European Commission (2018). Creative Europe Culture Sub-Programmes. Support for European Cooperation Projects 2019. Call for Proposals EACEA 34/2018. Guidelines.

<sup>263</sup> European Commission (2013). Regulation (EU) No 1295/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing the Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020) and repealing Decisions No 1718/2006/EC, No 1855/2006/EC and No 1041/2009/EC. Official Journal of the European Union. 20.12.2013.

<sup>264</sup> See Appendix 2

linked to the use of digital technology and marketing. Second, there is an increased focus on audience development. A further addition is the "legacy to the European Year of Cultural Heritage, raise awareness of common history and values, and reinforce a sense of belonging to a common European space" (EC, 2018, p. 4). These objectives and priorities and specifically those of the case study of the dissertation – the Larger Cooperation Projects – are examined in more detail throughout the following sections.

## Cooperation Projects

The cooperation projects under CESPC are divided into two groups: The Smaller Scale and the Larger Scale Cooperation projects and the EU funds up to 60% of the smaller scale projects and up to 50% of the larger scale projects. The maximum budget request from the EU for the smaller projects is EUR 200,000 and for the larger projects it is EUR 2,000,000. The budget allocated for these projects comprised EUR 44,659,000 for 2018 where smaller cooperation projects received EUR 17.8 million out of this sum. The eligibility criteria for participation in the Creative Europe programme for smaller scale cooperation projects is that three of the partners within a given project need to have their "legal seat in at least three different countries" while the larger scale project participants need to be from six different countries. Activities that qualify for the Sub-Programme in Culture for Creative Europe do not include audio-visual media, such as film, music, animation, etc. as these have their own category within Creative Europe. There can be audio-visual elements, but they cannot be the main cultural product of the Culture sub-strand of Creative Europe. The eligible activities "are ancillary to activities dedicated to the non-audio-visual cultural and creative sectors<sup>265</sup>" (EC, 2018, p.13). The information about the projects that have been awarded grants within Creative Europe is available on the European Union's Creative Europe Web-Portal database.<sup>266</sup> Summary reports of each project are written by the beneficiaries and disseminated through the European Union's website. This information is used as the basis for empirical research within the Project Analysis section.

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<sup>265</sup> "Cultural and creative sectors means all sectors whose activities are based on cultural values and/or artistic and other creative expressions, whether these activities are market or non-market oriented and whatever the type of structure that carries them out and irrespective of how it is financed. These activities include the development, the creation, the production, the dissemination and the preservation of goods and services which embody cultural, artistic or other creative expressions, as well as related functions such as education or management. The cultural and creative sectors include inter alia architecture, archives, libraries and museums, artistic crafts, audiovisual (including film, television, video games and multimedia), tangible and intangible cultural heritage, design, festivals, music, literature, performing arts, publishing, radio and visual arts" (Art. 2 of the Regulation establishing the Creative Europe Programme).

<sup>266</sup> Creative Europe Culture Sub-Programme Database: (<http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/creative-europe/projects/>)



## Key Findings

### Assets

The cultural soft power framework concluded that the actor that can control and deploy cultural assets and can generate cultural activity is the actor that can have more soft power. Furthermore, in the globalised world the cultural industry is an important arena for soft power efforts and influence into the industry is a soft power capability. Evaluation of the various EU policy documents (hereafter “documents”) and the CESPC projects (hereafter “projects”) has shown that the EU has created for itself a broad reach into the CCS and is encouraging the production of cultural and creative output or cultural assets. This section will give an overview of how the documents encourage such production and will then illustrate, through the descriptions of the projects, how the EU’s policies are brought into action. The section further highlights that the EU is concerned with the sustainability of the CCS or cultural industry, but that this interest is not only benefitting the CCS but resulting in the EU gaining competencies over the CCS despite the principle of subsidiarity. Through this, the EU has established many cultural projects under its name.

### Cultural assets and the European added value

The examination of the CESPC documents easily confirms that the EU is encouraging the production of cultural assets. Already in its overarching document, the 2007 Agenda for Culture, it is stated that the goal of the CESPC’s predecessor programme Cultural Programme 2007-2013 was to stimulate creativity, “help thousands of cultural organisations to create and implement cultural and artistic projects” and promote “artistic and literary creation” (EC, 2007, p.4). Additionally, the New Agenda added as one of its main strategic objectives the importance of preserving “cultural heritage as a shared resource” (EC, New Agenda for Culture, 2018, p.2). The production of cultural and creative goods is referenced throughout the documents of the CESPC. The Guidelines give examples of the type of cultural output that is in the mind of the EU. The Guidelines mention activities of “artistic creation, including co-creations and co-productions”, performances, exhibits, and tours. The Guidelines add that the output can be “new or avant-garde works” or cultural heritage (EC, CESPC Guidelines, 2014, p.4-5). There is also emphasis on venues and artistic communities, such as “concert halls, opera houses, theatres, festivals, orchestras, music groups, theatre groups, etc.” (EC, CESPC Guidelines, 2014, p.4-5). The Regulations also say that the CESPC is to support “international touring, events, exhibitions and festivals” (EC, Regulations on Creative Europe, 2013, Article 12) emphasizing the activities that take place around cultural assets.

The examination of the projects shows a clear implementation of the EU's goal to produce cultural assets and generate a wide range of activities. Examining their nature, reveals that the EU is able to reach far and wide into the CCS and encourage the work of a variety of cultural organizations with a wide variety of artistic output. Chart 1<sup>267</sup> shows a list of the type of output that was created across the projects as well as showing how often each type of cultural output was produced.

- The “urban space” category in Chart 1 refers to projects that produced art with the use of urban spaces. This included projects like “Future DiverCities - Creativity in an Urban Context”, “Human Cities\_Challenging the city scale”, and “THE PEOPLE’S SMART SCULPTURE”. These projects either placed art into urban spaces or incorporated urban landscapes and objects to make them the central focus of their work. For example, “THE PEOPLE’S SMART SCULPTURE” focused on the redesign of urban spaces with the goal of creating smart cities that draw in social participation, work on empowerment and integration in these changing urbanities.
- Opera - Three projects, including “European Opera Digital Project”, “YOUNG OPERA MAKERS Programme by enoa”, and “Opera Vision”, produced opera. The first and third were engaged in producing an online digital platform for opera house around Europe to display their concerts. The second looking training young opera professional.
- Fashion – “UNITED FASHION”, which brought together a number of fashion designers and fashion organizations from across Europe.
- Literature – The project “Transbook Children’s Literature on the Move” encouraged the production and dissemination of literature for children transnationally.
- Women – The project “Women’s Creativity Since the Modern Movement (MOMOWO)” worked with female architects, civil engineers and designers to bring their work to the fore.
- Animation art – Two projects “EUROPE COMICS” and “Euranim” with the latter focusing encouraging the work of animation artists with video mapping. The latter also produced video games and dealt with the subject of architecture.
- Dance – “DNA Departures and Arrivals” and “Dance on Pass on Dream on” both produced dance, however, the first project deals with the training of dance

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<sup>267</sup> To get a general overview of the types of cultural assets that the projects produced, the description for each project in the EU’s database was studied. On the basis of these description, each cultural activity and output was classified through the use of keywords, such as theatre, photography, playwrights, literature, music, and so on. This information is presented in Chart 1. This serves the purpose of giving an overview and a clearer picture of what kind of cultural production and activity these projects were performing.

professionals, while the latter deals with providing access to dance for more senior citizens.

- Science – Two projects: The first, “European Digital Art and Science Network” is a network between cultural institutions and key scientific institutions such as ESA-European Space Agency, CERN, or ESO-European Southern Observatory, among others. The goal of this project is to build a network, which “aims to link up scientific aspects and ideas with approaches used in digital art. Fostering interdisciplinary work and intercultural exchange [...] There is also strong emphasis on art’s role as a catalyst in processes of social renewal.”<sup>268</sup>

What can be seen from this is that although each art form or cultural asset has only one or two projects, the 85 projects produced a plurality of creative and cultural content that the EU is engaged in a wide variety of cultural activities across the entire CCS. This shows that the EU’s reach into the creative and cultural sector is broad and covering all possible art forms, cultural production types, and activities. What is particularly interesting is how the projects emphasise European cooperation and how they facilitate transnational cooperation.

The projects created Europe-wide exchanges for artists, highlighted the European dimension, and drew in the audiences into their work. Some examples of this work are the “WE ARE EUROPE” project that brought together 1200 artists and speakers from across Europe to “promote the emergence of a European political awareness” (Appendix 1, row 34)<sup>269</sup>. The “European Opera Digital Project” helped build relationships between national broadcasters, however, bringing them to a common European platform, which it describes as having a “truly European nature” (Appendix 1, row 4). The “CORNERS – turning Europe inside out” project is specifically focused on highlighting the peripheries of the EU. Their “goal was to meet local audiences, organizations, and active citizens, to connect with them and work together in order to bring the corners of Europe into the centre of the European cultural map” (Appendix 1, row 14). The “EEEmerging, Emerging European Ensembles Project” wanted to bring to the fore European classical music written before 1800 as a “quintessential European artform of international significance – bringing all European countries, and its peoples, together with one common musical heritage, and a common language” (Appendix 1, row 20). The “EUROPA VOX” project brought together “a selection of 400 European bands gathering European

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<sup>268</sup> European Digital Art and Science Network (2014-2017). Creative Europe Project. [last accessed: 10.10.2019] <https://ars.electronica.art/artandscience/en/> [last accessed: 10.10.2019]

<sup>269</sup> Throughout this chapter the larger cooperation projects of CESCO initiative are mentioned and named. All the references for these projects can be found in Appendix 1 – this includes the links to their EU Web-Portal online database page as well as the website for each project (where available). Hence, in-text references and footnotes are not given for the projects within this chapter.

youngsters” to “promote European musical diversity” (Appendix 1, row 43). The “BeSpectACTive” project aims to bring together “performing artists on the European scale, performing across 8 different European cities and drawing in over 1000 European citizens into workshops” (Appendix 1, row 13). In one way or another European-ness and the transnational character is brought out in the projects.

What became apparent when looking at the projects is that they don’t have a particular European theme, but rather encourage European cooperation. They don’t celebrate the EU as an institution or commemorate any of its historical moments, something that can usually be found in national art, they nonetheless reflect a European dimension. The CESPC specifically intended to give funding to “special actions designed to make the richness and diversity of European cultures more visible and to stimulate intercultural dialogue and mutual understanding” (EC, Regulations on Creative Europe, 2013, Article 13). It encourages “[t]ransnational exchanges of artefacts with a particular European dimension” (EC, CESPC Guidelines, 2014, p.5). And more precisely CESPC is to provide funding to “actions and activities with a European added value in the cultural and creative sectors” (EC, Regulations on Creative Europe, 2013, Article 5). The European added value, “shall be ensured”:

(a) there must be a “transnational character [in] actions and activities” of participants and the encouragement of “knowledge of cultures other than [the citizen’s] own;”

(b) there must be transnational cooperation of creative and cultural participants, who are also “focused on stimulating more comprehensive, rapid, effective and long-term responses to global challenges” (EC, Regulations on Creative Europe, 2013, Article 5).<sup>270</sup> The emphasis on the European dimension is highlighted throughout the documents and guidelines on which the CESPC is based and the selection of the projects that were granted funding by the EU reflect this in their work. The interest in soft power is also emphasized as the projects should “contribute to a positive image of the EU” (EC, CESPC Guidelines, 2014, p.13).

## Communication

The cultural soft power framework highlighted that it was important to have both components – the top-down and the two-way – in the communication infrastructure. What the data on the CESPC showed is that the EU is not engaged in a clear top-down communication campaign or that the projects are reaching wide numbers of audiences, but rather that the CESPC is primarily engaged with the CCS itself. Scholars, who look at the EU’s cultural policy often direct their view, to the way the programmes

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<sup>270</sup> See Appendix 2 for the full content of Article 5.

impact social cohesion and identity development (Moreira, 2002<sup>271</sup>; Pantel, 2005<sup>272</sup>; Sassatelli, 2002<sup>273</sup>; Shore, 2006<sup>274</sup>) but what the data on the projects shows is that the projects that were selected for funding by the EU worked within the CCS itself. The networks that were established were within the sector while reaching professionals in the CCS beyond just the immediate beneficiaries of the CESP.

### Top-down

The look at the CESP for top-down communication mechanism adds emphasis to the European dimension discussed above. Not only are the CESP projects to emphasize a European dimension in their work, but they are also to highlight that they have been funded and supported by the EU. The EU emphasizes “communication and dissemination,” and says that “beneficiaries of the projects supported by the Programme [must] ensure the communication and dissemination of information concerning the Union’s funding [that] they have received and the results obtained” is done (EC, Regulations on Creative Europe, 2013, Article 19). The EU stresses, as part of the selection criteria, that each CESP project needs to show how they “will make visible” the support of the EU during the project and beyond (EC, CESP Guidelines, 2014, p.13). The EU clearly dictates that “[t]he beneficiaries of the Culture Sub-programme shall use a logo which shall be established by the Commission. The Commission shall establish details for the use of that logo<sup>275</sup> and shall communicate them to the beneficiaries” (EC, Regulations on Creative Europe, 2013, Article 7). Combining these instructions to the beneficiaries with the European added value and the “positive image of the EU” illustrated in the previous section, it is clear that the EU intends to utilize the CESP projects to engage in a top-down communication style towards the European public as a patron and supporter of the arts.

The top-down communication is also an encouragement to disseminate the cultural assets that are produced under the CESP across Europe. In the section on the Award Criteria of the 2014 Guidelines, one of the four main criteria is “communication and dissemination” which makes up 20 points out of 100 that can be awarded to a project when it is being assessed to receive funding under

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<sup>271</sup> Delgado Moreira, J. M. (2000). “Cohesion and citizenship in EU cultural policy”. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38(3), 449-470.

<sup>272</sup> Pantel, M. (2005). *Unity-in-diversity: cultural policy and EU legitimacy*. In *Legitimacy and the European Union* (pp. 56-76). Routledge.

<sup>273</sup> Sassatelli, M. (2002). “Imagined Europe: The shaping of a European cultural identity through EU cultural policy”. *European journal of social theory*, 5(4), 435-451.

<sup>274</sup> Shore, C. (2006). “In uno plures’(?) EU Cultural Policy and the Governance of Europe” *Cultural Analysis*, 5(2006), 7-26.

<sup>275</sup> This text and emblem can be viewed: [https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/about-eacea/visual-identity\\_en](https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/about-eacea/visual-identity_en)

the CESPC (EC, CESPC Guidelines, 2014, p.13). The Guidelines explain that “this criterion evaluates the project’s approach to communication of its activities and result” and within this the way that knowledge and experiences are shared with the CCS and across borders, while also stressing the importance of maximizing the “impact of the project results by making them available as widely as possible at local, regional, national and European level, so that they have a reach beyond those directly involved in the project and an impact beyond the project’s lifetime” (EC, CESPC Guidelines, 2014, p.13). While encouraging the projects to disseminate their creative work, the EU only makes the project data available in the database on the Web-Portal database. There is no centralised location where all projects are promoted by the EU. Nowhere in the documentation or communication was it stressed that the work of the projects should be publicized by the EU in any way beyond the Web-Portal. The project organisers were meant to do this on their own. Their work reflected this but what this data revealed was that the capacity of each project to reach wider audiences was limited. By studying the data available on the projects, it can be seen in Table 1, column “audience numbers”, that the numbers were not available for each project and that they differ significantly.

What particularly interesting is that many of these projects listed included in the numbers the provided the audience from within the CCS itself. Projects like “NE©XT Accelerator” said that they potentially reached one million artists. Other projects like “Urban Heat” reached 2000 artists and 100 creative industry support workers; or EUROPAVOX which reached 40 media institutions, 200 music professionals, and 1500 bands. What was being revealed through this data is that the target audience was not just the EU public but the CCS itself. While the CESPC is a funding or incentive programme for the CCS, what was beginning to emerge from the data collected was that the EU was laying particular value to working specifically with the sector rather than just using it to create cultural assets that can be spread to the wider population. It was the outreach to the sector that was important. Furthermore, the development of partnerships across the CCS was central.

#### Two-way – networks

Network communication was emphasized by a variety of scholars (Zaharna, 2007<sup>276</sup>; Parmar, 2010<sup>277</sup>) as a key mechanism for the building of soft power. One of the main tasks of the CESPC is to encourage the building of networks across the CCS. Within the CESPC, the construction of networks is a criterion that must be fulfilled by every project in order for that project to receive funding from

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<sup>276</sup> Zaharna, R.S. (2007). “The Soft Power Differential: Network Communication and Mass Communication in Public Diplomacy” in *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*. Vol.2, pp. 213-228. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers

<sup>277</sup> Parmar, I., (2010). “Challenging elite anti-Americanism in the Cold War: American foundations, Kissinger’s Harvard Seminar and the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies” in *Soft Power and US Foreign Policy*. Theoretical, historical and contemporary perspectives. Eds Parmar Inderjeet and Michael Cox. Routledge.

the EU. The smaller scale projects have to have at least three partners who have “their legal seat in at least three different countries”, while the larger cooperation projects have to have at least six partners with “their legal seat in at least six different countries” (EC, CESPC Guidelines, 2014, p.4). One of the four award criteria for the cooperation projects is the “quality of partnerships”. In this criterion, the EU gives value to the organisation and coordination of the projects, but furthermore, it wants to see how the projects will engage the participants not just in coordination, administration, or moving across borders, but rather the partnership is about “creating network possibilities, building partnerships and contacts” that encourage mobility and creative synergies (EC, CESPC Guidelines, 2018, p.5). The CESPC is therefore designed to bring together cultural and creative organisations through transnational projects of cooperation.

The evaluation of the CESPC projects reflects the network character of the programme. In 85 projects there were at least six participating organisations resulting in the participation of at least 510 partners. However, the EU database showed that many of the projects had more partners than six. The types of institutions that these projects reached were very broad and diverse. The quality and nature of these networks vary from project to project. Some of the beneficiaries were:

- **Large and small concert houses**, such as the Palais des Beaux Arts SA in Brussels, the Opera de Lillie, France, the Finnish National Opera, or the smaller Grafenegg Kulturbetriebsgesellschaft in Austria.
- **Orchestras**, such as the International Youth Foundation Trust from the UK.
- **Universities**, such as the University of Amsterdam or the University College Dublin.
- **Regional public bodies**, such as the Upplands Vasby Kommun (municipality) from Sweden or the municipality of Stadt Osnabruck in Germany.
- **National cultural institutions**, such as the Goethe Institut.
- **Museums** - Larger national museums such as Denmark’s largest cultural history museum – National Museet – or the Museo Nacional Centro de Arte Reina Sofia in Madrid while also including small museums such as the Museum of Contemporary Art in Novi Sad, Serbia.
- **National arts organizations** like the Arts Council Malta.
- **Non-governmental cultural organizations, associations or social enterprises**, such as the Fundatia Alt Art Perntu Arta Alternative from Romania, which is an organization that organises artistic projects to address urban contemporary life; or the Procurarte in Portugal, which is a cultural association “for the development and dissemination of creative industries, through the creation of critical and constructive projects in the

field of arts, culture, creativity and innovation” while also democratizing culture as a means to develop audiences.<sup>278</sup>

- **Theatres** such as the less known Aktionstheater Panoptikum Gemeinnutzige in Germany or the largest theatre in Sibiu Romania, the Teatrul National Radu Stanca.
- **Smaller art producers or sector specialists** - such as the technical partner Noho in Ireland, who describe themselves as a “specialist producers of captivating digital experiences for museums, corporate, and broadcast clients” and who are a team of animators, designers, video editors, writers and developers who create “visualisations using animation, realtime 3D or immersive, interactive applications and environments.”<sup>279</sup>
- **Publishers and media organisations**, such as the Rencontres Audiovisuelles from France, which engages in cultural programming, education, and innovation in the cultural industry.

Additionally to the beneficiaries, other networks were established too. For example, The “Community as Opportunity – Creative Archives’ and Users’ Networks” project, where the beneficiaries were a regional public body, a university, a research centre, brought together a total of 17 archival institutions across 11 European countries intending to work together to ensure visibility of their archives among their network, preserving cultural heritage and also working with the wider public (Appendix 1, row 17). The “European Bookfairs’ Network (Aldus)” project, which was led by editor associations and one book fair organiser, as its core activity built a business-to-business network of European book fair professionals to help facilitate their cooperation at a European level, with the network intending to “foster targeted mobility between professionals, joint events and knowledge transfer” (Appendix 1, row 48). From these examples, we can see that the large cooperation projects built a plurality of networks that do not only include creative and cultural actors or the immediate beneficiaries. Their work in the CCS allows the projects to build large artistic networks. For example, “PLATFORM shift+” allowed European artists to participate in an educational and creative learning programme including 4 large international and 11 national “Creative Forums” with TED-like talks and hand-on-workshops on various digital topics held by digital experts from all over the world (Appendix 1, row 21). The broad establishment of networks from small and large operators is characteristic of the CESPC.

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<sup>278</sup> Procurta, Portugal: <http://www.procurarte.org/manifesto.html>

<sup>279</sup> <http://www.noho.ie/>



## Narratives

Reading reflections on previous cultural programmes from two widely cited scholars Shore, (2006) and Sasatelli, (2002) there is a focus in their work on the official motto of the EU which is “united in diversity”, which the EU adopted in 2000.<sup>280</sup> Such studies often site the articles that talk about cultural identity and diversity and this leaves one to assume that the focus of the EU may be on cultural factors that unite the citizens of Europe and on something that creates some kind of common European themes in the cultural programmes. As we have seen in the assets section, there was actually no particular European theme in these projects. Looking more closely at the themes engaged with across the projects, what became visible is that the EU was not selecting many projects that looked at aspects of specific historic European culture, but rather their interest was in the projects that promoted the development of the CCS itself.

## Themes within the projects

To give a better overview of the themes within each project (some projects addressed more than one theme), the content analysis approach was applied to the information available on each project in the EU database.<sup>281</sup> The list of themes is given in Table 2 Narratives.<sup>282</sup> Only a small number of themes were repeated, but what became apparent is that while the main theme of each project was different, the themes still had some commonalities.<sup>283</sup> Some projects specifically focused on European cultural heritage or content, that was different from the European dimension or European cooperation, that was discussed earlier. The “Trauma and Revival” project focused on the Cold War and wanted to create cultural dialogue while producing a variety of cultural content such as exhibiting reproductions of photographs, posters, and other material from the Cold War as well as having musical performances. Other projects focused on “norms” included projects that concerned themselves with topics such as human rights, marginalized groups, multiculturalism, and other similar ideas. For example, the “Borderline Offensive” was a project between the European beneficiaries and artists from the Middle East. The project engaged in intercultural dialogue and supported these events

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<sup>280</sup> European Union Motto: United in Diversity: [https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/motto\\_en](https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/motto_en)

<sup>281</sup> The themes identified for each project were then coded with the use of keywords or phrases. These keywords or phrases for each project are illustrated in the “narratives” column in Appendix 1.

<sup>282</sup> What the data shows is that the 85 projects have a total of 173 themes that have been identified in this dissertation. This shows that some projects had multiple themes. Only 8 of these themes are repeated multiple times (between 2 and 10 times per theme) while, in total, there were 143 unique themes with some small overlap in some instances. What can also be seen in Table 2 is that these 173 themes could be further categorized or coded and placed into three broad groups – Europe, norms, and CCS.

<sup>283</sup> In 85 projects, the European theme appeared 35 times, the theme focused on norms appeared 38 times, and a focus on the CCS was identified 100 times.

through comedy productions and performances. But the theme or the focus that was most predominant among the projects was actually a focus on the CCS itself. For example, The “CREATIVE LENSES” project “seeks to make arts and cultural organisations more resilient and sustainable by improving their business models and developing their long-term strategic and innovation capacities.”<sup>284</sup> The “IN SITU ACT” project helps artists understand how to work in public spaces with the development of new skills and the use of new media. It ran training modules for young professionals, ran workshops, and set up a think tank to reach out to key “influencers in urban and territorial development.”

The author of this dissertation attended a number of seminars of the UK-based Creative Europe Desk, which were run to inform the public of the Creative Europe initiative. After a usual presentation of the Creative Europe initiative and some introduction to the way applications for funding could be filed to the programme, the audience were given time to ask questions. Just as the presentation, these questions were all focused on funding. There was no discussion of common European culture or common European themes. In the networking that followed the official event, the participants spoke of their projects, but there was a predominant focus on wanting to work transnationally. This experience is very reflective of what is visible in the projects that the EU supports through the CESPC, the main focus is on the CCS and its transnational cooperation or European dimension. Similarly, in one of Sassatelli’s interviews with an EU official, she was told that the focus for the EU is more about cooperation than on the European theme. She then focused on the grassroots cultural production and how this shaped identities within the context of unity in diversity (Sassatelli, 2008, p.119<sup>285</sup>). What is picked up in this research is that the EU was interested in establishing a CCS under its name and was facilitating its growth and development. This is also reflected in the documentation behind the CESPC.

### Creative and Cultural Sector

The support for the CCS is dominant in EU’s documents. While the programme is an incentive programme for the sector, the predominant focus on the “capacity building” of the sector cannot be assumed before-hand as cultural projects are often seen as having a wider cultural impact. The Agenda for Culture spoke of the EU’s desire to “promote capability building in the cultural sector” (EC, Agenda for Culture, 2007, p. 9). The CESPC specifically was about “providing cultural and creative players with skills, competences and know-how that contribute to strengthening the cultural and

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<sup>284</sup> Creative Lenses (2015-2019). Creative Europe Project. <https://creativelenses.eu/about-us/>

<sup>285</sup> Sassatelli, M. (2008). “The Arts, the State, and the EU” in *The State and the Arts. Articulating Power and Subversion*. J. Kapferer (ed.), Berghahn Books.

creative sectors, including [...] testing new business and management models” (EC, Regulations on Creative Europe, 2013, Article 12; EC, CESPC Guidelines, 2014, p.3). Moreover, the CESPC Guidelines outline some examples of the kind of activity the programme wishes to support. Such activities focus on building the skills of cultural professionals, business and organisational strength, and can be done in the format of workshops and training sessions. Hence, the EU does not only hope to stimulate the production of specific creative or cultural assets, but it also emphasises the importance of strengthening the capacity of the operators in the CCS (EC, CESPC Guidelines, 2014, p.4). It continues to outline how the sector will be supported in building “skills” through a project on “Finance, Learning, Innovation and Patenting for Cultural and Creative Industries” and furthermore give the sector support through the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT); The Digital Competence Framework and European Entrepreneurship Competence Framework (EntreComp); and the Interreg programmes which contribute to internationalization (EC, New Agenda for Culture, 2018, p.8). Specifically, it is aiming to use the CESPC to “strengthen the competitiveness of the European cultural and creative sectors” (EC, Regulations on Creative Europe, 2013, Article 3). In light of this, the projects themselves reflect a strong focus on themes relating to the building of the capacities of the CCS rather than other cultural European themes or the norms that Europe is often associated with, even though there were projects to address these as well.

What we saw in the Theory Chapter is that the cultural industry itself is a great source for the production of cultural assets that can be appropriated by the nation-state as in the case of Cool Japan (Chung, 2017)<sup>286</sup> We will see in the discussion section that literature on EU cultural policy highlights that the measures taken by the EU to strengthen the cultural economy are reflective of the commodification of culture. While it is true that culture has become commodified, its commodification does not only serve an economic purpose. As we saw in the Theory Chapter, in a globalised world, the cultural industry is a dominant tool for political powers to leverage their soft power potential. Therefore, the CESPC’s stated focus on the economic development of the CCS gives insight in the EU’s desire to stimulate the cultural industry perhaps not only for economic integration, but also to acquire soft power capabilities. In light of this, the EU uses the CESPC projects as the training centres for building a stronger CCS for itself. In light of this, the EU does support the work of this project not only transnationally in the EU, but the projects can be done in cooperation with countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy, from the Swiss Confederation, European Free Trade Association and party to the European Economic Area Agreement, as well as countries that

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<sup>286</sup> Chung, P. (2017). “Soft Power and Cultural Industries. Cultural policy and itner-Asian regional flows in Hong Kong and Singapore.” In *The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power*. Chitty, N., Ji, L., G.D. Rawnsley, C. Hayden [eds.], Routledge.

are acceding, candidates or potential candidates to the European Union (EC, Regulations on Creative Europe, 2013, Article 8). Among the objectives of the EU is the “promotion of culture as a vital element in the Union's international relations” (EC, Agenda for Culture, 2007, p.7). One of the CESPC’s objectives is “to support the capacity of the European cultural and creative sectors to operate transnationally and internationally” (EC, CESPC Guidelines, 2014, p.3)

Project such as “CARAVAN NEXT – Feed the Future: Art moving cities” highlight this internationalisation. It provided training for art professionals skills in audience development and local community engagement. The project involved 30 associated partners and about 100,000 citizens spread across 16 European countries, while disseminating and sharing the acquired skills, gained experiences with other cultural organisations in 5 countries outside of Europe including the US, Armenia, Morocco, South Korea, Australia and Taiwan (Appendix 1, row 35). The CCS is used as a mechanism to reach beyond the European borders but with the EU as the patron of such cultural initiatives.

## Audience

The cultural soft power framework identified a number of elements related to the audience that are essential to consider when building soft power resources. The in the evaluation of the projects and the documents, it is visible that the EU makes a shift from what is referred to as “audience building” to “audience development” (Potschka et al., 2013)<sup>287</sup>. This shift was based on a report *Audience building and the future of Creative Europe Programme* (2012),<sup>288</sup> which however still referred to the term of audience building, but highlighted the fact that audiences needed to be more involved in the creative processes. We see the EU adopting this in their policies. What the data on the audience from the projects shows is that audiences are broad, but that the CCS is a central focus as well.

Similarly to the 2014 Guidelines, the 2018 CESPC Guidelines also put a strong emphasis on audience development by focusing on “engaging [audiences] in new and innovative ways” in order to “improve access to culture and creative works in the Union and beyond” (EC, CESPC Guidelines, 2018, p.4). However, there is a shift in terms of how the audience development is defined. It no longer just stands for “bringing people and culture closer together”, but rather it “is about doing something with

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<sup>287</sup> Potschka, C., M. Fuchs & A. Królikowski (2012) “Review of European Expert Network on Culture's audience building and the future Creative Europe programme”, *Cultural Trends*, 22(3)-4, 265-269,

<sup>288</sup> Bamford, A, and M.Wimmer (2012) *Audience building and the future Creative Europe programme*. European Expert Network on Culture (EENC). Anne Bamford, director of the Engine Room at Wimbledon College of Art, University of the Arts London, and Michael Wimmer, director of the Austrian consultancy Educult. (Potschka, 2013)

audiences, rather than doing something for them” (EC, CESPC Guidelines, 2018, p.5). What is highlighted here is the drawing in of the audience into the production and participation within projects. The audience becomes part of the projects. The Guidelines emphasize that it is important to look beyond the CCS and outline that audience participation “should be an integral part of the project – through involving audiences in programming, production, participatory art, physical dialogue, social media interaction, volunteering or creative partnerships with other sectors (health, education, retail, etc.)” (EC, CESPC Guidelines, 2018, p.5). The strong emphasis on drawing audiences into the cultural production process, is also reflected in the New Agenda for Culture. Audience development is outlined as a key objective of the CESPC, which is “to contribute to audience development by helping European artists/cultural professionals and their works reach new and enlarged audiences and improve access to cultural and creative works in the European Union [...] and to improve the experience and deepen the relationship with current and future audiences” (EC, CESPC Guidelines, 2014, p.3). There is an emphasis on evaluating and monitoring the audiences reached. Table 1 shows an overview of the types of audiences that were targeted by the projects.<sup>289</sup> There is a wider range of audience groups across all age groups and different professions and countries.

Scholars often highlight that there is a commodification of culture that is happening at the level of the EU cultural policy (Schlesinger, 2015<sup>290</sup>; Primorac et al., 2017).<sup>291</sup> However, the EU’s move to incorporate the audience in the projects goes beyond the consideration of the audience as a consumer. For example, the New Agenda suggests “using participatory arts to promote understanding, empower people, and increase self-confidence” (EC, New Agenda for Culture, 2018, p.3). The New Agenda also wants to reach younger people more robustly by incorporating cultural teaching in education. Potschka et al. say that two of the key seven factors of audience building and types of interventions that this includes are the education of arts and collaboration between the arts and the education sector, which is evidently adopted here by the EU (Potschka et al., 2013, p.267). The importance of Europeans being able to participate in cultural activity is emphasized in the New Agenda as it states that “cultural capability [i]s the guiding principle” (EC, New Agenda for Culture, 2018, p.3). The idea of “cultural capability” becomes essential to the EU as it wants to ensure that the EU citizens are able to realistically participate in the creative and cultural production and consumption processes. The New Agenda references Amartya Sen and his “capability approach” where capabilities

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<sup>289</sup> The keyword or phrases were applied by the author in as described in the content analysis methodology.

<sup>290</sup> Schlesinger, P. (2015) “Some reflections on ‘Creative Europe.’”: Cultural Base. Social Platform on Cultural Heritage and European Identities. Cultural Base.

<sup>291</sup> Primorac, J., Koržinek, N., & Uzelac, A. (2017). “The Place and Role of Culture in the EU Agenda. Policy Implications of the Culture Sub-programme of the Creative Europe Programme”. *Medijska Istraživanja. Media Research*, 23(1), 5-23.

are functions that an individual is able to truly achieve within their level of freedom and economic position (Sen, 1999).<sup>292</sup> The important shift here in the EU's intention for building cultural resources is that it no longer is solely focusing on the capabilities of the CCS, but also now working on increasing the capabilities of the wider public. However, the tool to reach this public and the actor that is supposed to provide the incorporation of the wider public into the creative process is the CCS. Much of what has been discussed in the previous sections, shows that the EU is targeting the CCS, which includes artists as well as other professionals within the sector. The consideration of the space or spaces which the EU targets with the CESPC is varied. However, what is evident is that the EU is constructing a cultural space that is promoted through its work with the CCS. This space is meant to grow and draw in further audiences. Kandyla, referring to documents by the EU Parliament and Council, says that the "role of culture" was to develop "a cultural area common to the European people as the key aim of cultural cooperation" (Kandyla, 2015, p.50).

### Concluding remarks

International powers know that control of the creative industry is a source for power. Therefore, it is not primarily important to reflect on the values that one is spreading, although those do play a role, it is about the ability to have control over cultural goods, their production, and that these become associated with the agent of power. The collection of data on the CESPC projects and the documents showed that the EU is funding projects specifically to strengthen the CCS. It is bringing attention to the EU not through European themes that may be repelled by the member states or other audiences, but it is using the European dimension to highlight its presence in the creative and cultural assets and activities that are being produced. The EU is using the "capacity building" narrative to build not only the CCS, but its access to a cultural soft power resource. The EU is able to produce cultural assets, activities, networks and target specific audiences. The findings are discussed below in relation to existing literature on the EU, its cultural policy, and show how this literature has not fully illustrated where the EU's soft power capabilities actually lie.

### Discussion

European cultural policy<sup>293</sup>, as outlined in part in the Case Chapter, developed slowly, but with time gave the EU competencies to have some input into the cultural realm. The predecessor cultural

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<sup>292</sup> Sen, A. (1999). *Development as Freedom*. Alfred A. Knopf

<sup>293</sup> Cultural policy was replaced with the term cultural action in 1998 in the EU (Barnett, 2001, p.414). These two terms are used interchangeably here.

programmes to Creative Europe, such as Kaleidoscope, Ariane and Raphael, Culture 2000, European Cities of Culture, and the Cultural Programme 2007-2013, were evaluated in the literature through the perspective of their ability to construct a European identity, while in other literature, the shift towards the commodification of culture was highlighted. Unpacking this literature here, it will be shown that such considerations neglect the question of power in the international system and focus more on the question of subjectivities, identities, and a critical view of the political economy. There is less attention given to hard and soft power. However, considering the EU's reach into the cultural realm through the CESC, the soft power lens gives useful insight into the EU's power capabilities based on cultural resources.

The EU's cultural policies have long been evaluated in the scholarship but primarily for their impact on identity. Shore a long-time critic of EU cultural policy questions the legitimacy of using cultural policy to build an EU identity (Shore, 1993<sup>294</sup>). He points out that with the Committee of the People's Europe (1984) the "concepts of 'culture' and 'identity' [became] appropriated by European officials and policy-makers since the 1980s in their attempts to popularise the EU and forge a European public" (Shore, 2000, p.7)<sup>295</sup>. His focus was particularly on comparing EU cultural policies with that of the nation-states where he believed the EU could not achieve what nations had achieved in terms of building a "European consciousness". Shore states that "globalization may have eroded the powers of nation-states as sovereign political entities but the national principle and national identity remains central to the conferral of political legitimacy in most modern democracies" (Shore, 2000, p.9). According to him, "the European Union has utterly failed in establishing a European identity as an alternative to various national identities" (Shore, 2000, p.10). His work is widely cited but as an anthropologist, his focus is on subjectivity and not on the measure of power in international relations. His primary focus is on policies as extensions of the political arm of nation-building. Sassatelli took another approach to evaluating the European identity in her widely cited studies. Her analysis is also on the construction of the European identity and the institutional attempts to "reawaken" a European collective and the emerging subjectivities. However, she highlights the importance of looking at the economic and integration policies of the EU and seeing how culture complimented them (Sasatelli, 2002).<sup>296</sup> She critiques the debates that look at the EU's cultural policy as an attempt to build a national homogeneous culture while being confronted with the challenges of globalisation. Her critique of this is that the EU identity has been seen as a normative comparison with the nation-state

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<sup>294</sup> Shore, C. (1993). Inventing the 'People's Europe': Critical Approaches to European Community 'Cultural Policy'. *Man*, 28(4), new series, 779-800.

<sup>295</sup> Shore, C. (2000). *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*. Psychology Press.

<sup>296</sup> Sassatelli, M. (2002). "Imagined Europe: The Shaping of a European Cultural Identity Through EU Cultural Policy" in *European Journal of Social Theory*, Vol. 5, Issue 4, pp. 435-451

(Sassatelli, 2009).<sup>297</sup> On the other hand, her work examines the EU's cultural motto of "unity in diversity", which was adopted for culture in the year 2000, and the European Cities of Culture from the constructivist perspective. She highlights that the EU has engaged grassroots cultural activity through its various incentive programmes (Sassatelli, 2008, p.118). She disagrees with the scholars who see the European identity as something patchy and hollow (Smith, 1995). She says that rather than being a challenge to the national identities, the European identity runs parallel to them. Her viewpoints are particularly relevant when she says that it is the European level cultural activity that cuts across the national borders and is by its transnational nature European (Sassatelli, 2008, p.121). This is what we are seeing also with the vast activity that the EU is engaged in through the CESPC. This activity runs parallel to the activity of the nation-states. Sassatelli's points are interesting, however, they turn to focus on identity and particularly on the "recipients" of cultural policies. Sassatelli focuses on the EU's "attempt to create a bond between individuals and the European Union" (Sassatelli, 2009, p.42). This focus on the audience or the subjects of power is the same that occurs in the soft power literature. This is similar to how soft power scholars like Feklyunina or Solomon looked at the way subjects interpret their relationship to the agent of power. Instead, we have to think here of the discussions of Brown's (2017) work in the Theory Chapter, who said soft power is not measured by the "transaction mode of power," where the outcomes of actions need to be looked at, but rather it is about the ability to create "cultural projects" and "cultural action" (Brown, 2017, p.44). As long as the agent of power can establish "infrastructures" and "frameworks of relationships" through the cultural policies, then the agent has power has created the capabilities to have soft power. The existing studies of how cultural policy impacts subjectivity generally (see McGuigan, 2003)<sup>298</sup> and in relation to the EU (Shore, 2000) does not tell us about the actual resources of the agent of power. The plurality of activities that the EU is able to establish with the CESPC are reflective of the infrastructures that build power and therefore the power of the EU is in the ability to generate cultural activity, which the EU has achieved. However, the EU's soft power doesn't just rest with sponsoring some cultural events. Rather, it is the nature of its ability to control cultural action that is interesting and shows how it tries to establish more entrenched cultural soft power capabilities.

### From commodification to soft power

Literature concerned with the EU's cultural policy did not only evaluate it through the lens of identity. As with other literature on cultural policy, the studies of the EU's cultural activity began to

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<sup>297</sup> Sassatelli, M. (2009), *Becoming European. Cultural Identity and Cultural Policies*. Palgrave Macmillan.

<sup>298</sup> McGuigan, J. (2003) "Cultural Policy Studies" in *Critical Cultural Studies. A Reader*. Lewis, J. and T. Miller (eds.). Blackwell Publishing.



shift its focus to the “commodification of culture”. As Dave O’Brien (2014)<sup>299</sup> points out that “cultural policy is crucial to both economy and society in modernity” (p.1). “The emergence of modern capitalism was connected to the rise of the sovereign state, which was concerned to deliver a docile and healthy labour force [... and the] idea of fitness to perform expanded to include education and hence culture” (Miller and Yúdice, 2002, p.5). Cultural policy became aimed at the increase of participation and consumption in order to have a positive impact on economic growth. In recent developments culture and creativity is seen as an important factor that influences economic participation, innovation, and productivity. The emphasis on what is referred to as cultural industries, creative industries or the creative economy is no longer only central to the national state. “Culture as a driver of economic growth has become the dominant [focus] for both national governments and international organizations such as the EU and United Nations” (Bell and Oakley, 2015, p.5)<sup>300</sup>. And the promotion and encouragement of commercial creativity is a central consideration in contemporary cultural policy. This shifted focus was in connection to the UK government policy relating to the “creative economy” – where culture was seen as a solution to economic problems experienced by de-industrialised cities in the UK (Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005)<sup>301</sup>. O’Brien reflects on how the “UK’s Department for Culture, Media and Sports (DCMS) attempted to map the forms of economic activity that were associated with cultural practices [... These were] industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skills and talent, which have a potential for job and wealth creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property” (O’Brien 2014, p. 5-6). The DCMS created via their survey a link between cultural industries and economic value – they established thirteen sectors of culture that have economic and social value. This in turn led to cultural policies that supported the funding of those sectors. The encouragement of creativity also became a central aspect of cultural policy. O’Brien concludes that “creativity has actually become a form of capital in its own right” (2014, p.6). State-sponsored cultural policy evolved to encourage the production of cultural goods that no longer just have symbolic value for identity building and glorification of the state, but that have economic value.

Concerned with the EU’s cultural policy, Schlesinger (2015)<sup>302</sup> says there was a call for a shift to look at the economic instrumentalization of culture. This shift was reflective of the general trend

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<sup>299</sup> O’Brien, Dave (2014). *Cultural Policy. Management, value, and modernity in the creative industries.* Routledge.

<sup>300</sup> Bell, David and Kate Oakley (2015). *Cultural Policy. Key ideas in Media and Cultural Studies.* Routledge.

<sup>301</sup> Hesmondhalgh, D. and A.C.Pratt, (2005). “Cultural Industries and Cultural Policy”, *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 11:1, pp. 1-13.

<sup>302</sup> Schlesinger, P. (2015) “Some reflections on ‘Creative Europe.’”: *Cultural Base. Social Platform on Cultural Heritage and European Identities:*  
<http://culturalbase.eu/documents/6.%20SCHLESINGER.%20Creative%20Europe.pdf>

in cultural policy studies. As the cultural policies and programmes of the EU evolved, e.g. Culture 2000 or Cultural Programme 2007-2013, these began to look significantly like incentive programmes (Primorac et al., 2017).<sup>303</sup> Scholarship then begins to highlight how the shift in the policy has moved the EU away from viewing culture for its many purposes for social integration and identity building towards a commodification and commercialization of culture (Primorac et al., 2017). For such scholars, the “creative economy” narrative “overshadowed identity narratives” (Schlesinger, 2015, p.3). Primorac et al. (2017) outline the policy implications of the changing position of culture in relation to the EU’s broader agenda, which for them is economic. Specifically, they assess the CESPC and critique the economic instrumentalization of culture and say that the economic focus takes away from the wider goals of the cultural programme (Primorac et al, 2017, p.14). The challenge with the literature that looks at the so-called commodification of culture is that it sets out to critique the nature of the political economy which reduces culture to an economic tool rather than something with broader value and impact for people. Barnett, who sees the economy behind much of the EU’s cultural policy, says the scholarship on EU cultural policy should move “beyond the mode of ideology-critique [and [r]ather than focusing critical attention on general statements about the content of the European identity, greater attention should be paid to what policies actually set out to do” (Barnett, 2001, p.407)<sup>304</sup>. Barnett’s outline of the intention of EU’s policies is useful. He highlights the fact that the EU developed its cultural policy because it was historically pushed both by the nation-states and the CCS, on one hand, by calls for non-interference, and on the other hand, by calls for funding through “incentive measures”. He highlights the fact that the leading principle of subsidiarity meant different things to different actors and furthermore rests on a definition of how the different actors define culture (Barnett, 2001, p.415). He then turns to Foucauldian governmentality to evaluate subjectivities that came about as a result of the various ways that culture was commodified. He says that the policies actually enforce Foucauldian governmentality. His evaluation of the EU’s cultural policies through this lens lead him to concern himself with citizenship, ethics, politics of representation and questions of authority, accountability and legitimacy (Barnett, 2001). Again, in this literature, as with the soft power literature, we see a shift towards the critical or post-modern evaluation of cultural action. It misses the point that is highlighted in more empirical studies of soft power, which is namely that the cultural industry is a vital tool for soft power. The report on *The Economy of Culture in Europe* itself stated that, “culture can contribute to ‘seduce’ European citizens to the idea of European

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<sup>303</sup> Primorac, J., Koržinek, N., & Uzelac, A. (2017). “The Place and Role of Culture in the EU Agenda. Policy Implications of the Culture Sub-programme of the Creative Europe Programme”. *Medijska Istraživanja. Media Research*, 23(1), 5-23.

<sup>304</sup> Barnett, C (2001). “Culture, policy, and subsidiarity in the European Union: from symbolic identity to the governmentalization of culture” in *Political Geography*, 20, pp. 405-426.

integration” (EC, 2006). Yet, following this report much of the discussions, policies and programmes relating to culture focused on the economic benefit of culture. Indeed, as we saw the documents of the CESPC reflect an interest in the growth of the CCS themselves.

The importance of the cultural industry for soft power, however, cannot be missed here. The EU’s focus on the development of the CCS can be understood not merely as an economic one, but one that gives it soft power capabilities. While most of the soft power literature focuses on the international cultural industry and how this has given countries like China, who have strict policies particularly towards the film industry, some capabilities to balance against the US’s cultural soft power resources (Mingjiang, 2008<sup>305</sup>; Vlassis, 2016<sup>306</sup>), we can see that for the EU the cultural industry is something that it wants to influence on the domestic level as well. As Kandyla points out the “first cultural strategy,” namely the first version of the Agenda for Culture (EC, 2007), was presented as the “implementation of the EU 2020 Strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth” (Kandyla, 2015, p.49). Creative Europe itself is based on Articles 167 (5) for Culture but also Articles 173 (3) for Industry and 166 (4) for Vocational Training of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (Kandyla, 2015, p.49-50). Therefore, at face value, it seems that the cultural link to the economy had the ultimate goal of bringing to the fore the economic benefit of culture. However, when we view politics as an interest in power, this is not the only way in which the EU’s cultural action can be understood. The linking of culture to the economy served the political purpose of giving the EU access to legislation over the creative and cultural industries (Littoz-Monnet, 2012).<sup>307</sup> The EC’s Directorate General for Culture, Youth and Education replaced its initial focus on culture for culture’s sake by reframing culture as a key factor of economics. “The ‘creative frame’ present[ed] culture as an asset, in terms of its potential to promote growth and competitiveness” (Littoz-Monnet, 2012, p.508). Because market integration is the driving force of the EU, by framing culture in economic terms it was possible to shift some control away from the member-states to European institutions. Littoz-Monnet explains how such reframing of the political issues allowed for better “agenda-setting,” which allowed some actors to “get more power and others to lose control” (Littoz-Monnet, 2012, p. 505-507). Controlling or having access to the CCS is essential for regulating the production of cultural assets and the generation of cultural activity that is so fundamental as a component of cultural soft power resources. The EU’s

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<sup>305</sup> Mingjiang, L. (2008). “China Debates Soft Power”, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Volume 2, Issue 2, Winter, pp. 287–308.

<sup>306</sup> Vlassis, A. (2017). “Soft power, global governance of cultural industries and rising powers: the case of China”, *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 22:4, p.481-496.

<sup>307</sup> Littoz-Monnet (2012) “Agenda-Setting Dynamics at the EU Level: The Case of the EU Cultural Policy”, *Journal of European Integration*, 34:5, 505-522,

functioning on the principle of subsidiarity did not allow it to legislate over culture, but the economic shift gave it access to the CCS.

The portrayal of the cultural programmes as being about cultural exchange and mutual cooperation for EU member-states and creative and cultural stakeholders, disguises what is, in reality, a much more strategic approach for the EU. Thatcher points out that scholarship that focuses on the construction of an identity of the EU looks at “‘imagined communities’ through a host of means such as symbols, commemorations, and myths. [However, his] study suggests that EU is following a different trajectory, in which its political identity is strongest when linked to market making” (Thatcher, 2019, p.26). For him, in the case of the EU there is an “indirect creation [of political identity] through market governance” (Thatcher, 2019, p.3). Kandyla says that any interpretation of the EU’s activities as intercultural dialogue misses the actual main aim of Creative Europe because if there is intercultural dialogue it is a “biproduct” and therefore there is a lack of mention of it (Kandyla, 2015, p.57). What we saw with the CESPC projects is exchange and transnational operations, but no mention of intercultural dialogue. On the contrary, the Creative Europe programme was actively engaging in “capacity-building” which stresses “professionalization, transnational cooperation and networking” (Kandyla, 2015, p.57) all relevant to the building of EU cultural resources in a strategic manner. The “incentive programmes” attracted a particular type of stakeholders – namely the CCS itself. Although art professionals protested against culture being instrumentalized, “[they] also acknowledge that focusing on the instrumentality of culture [is] the most efficient path for obtaining more funds for the sector” (Litzo-Monnet, 2012, p.519). The incentive programmes successfully attract creative and cultural professionals and it is this access to the CCS by the EU that is particularly interesting in the understanding of EU’s cultural soft power capabilities and objectives.

The support by the EU’s CESPC for the CCS is seen as either an economic stimulus or a building of transnational relationships to foster identity building misses the political implications of the EU’s patronage of the CCS and cultural activity. Recognising the power of the CCS to influence politics, communication, and engagement with the wider EU public is an important aspect of the EU’s patronage that needs to be considered. As scholars point out there is no single European identity (see Smith, 1995; or Shore 2000), hence the discussions of identity and the EU are subjective. The usefulness of culture for the economy is not being denied here, but the patronage by the EU of the CCS through the CESPC also serves the purpose of power. The evaluation of how patronage of art has historically resulted in power (soft power) for the patron is however broad in art history (see for example, Paoletti and Radke, 2005)<sup>308</sup>. In more contemporary history there are discussions of the US’s

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<sup>308</sup> Paoletti, J.T. and G.M. Radke (2005). *Art, Power, and Patronage in Renaissance Italy*. Pearson. Prentice Hall.

patronage of arts particularly during the Cold War as a way to balance against communism (see Mathews, 1976)<sup>309</sup>. Domestically, patronage is central to the existence of the cultural institutions and programmes in the US. Discussing American patronage that is linked to commodification or commercialization of culture, as may be the case with the EU, Mulcahy and Carsten's (2003)<sup>310</sup> says that culture may have problems of being truly representative. They recommend that the US government "complement the efforts of the private institutions" rather than duplicate their activities (Mulcahy and Carsten, 2003, p.72). What is interesting about the EU is that it does support already existing initiatives on the ground. It does not duplicate their efforts. In the case of the CESPC the EU provides 50% of the funding for each project, while the rest comes from the CCS and other sponsors. The vast web of already existing CCS that the EU works with is particularly important to highlight. The EU does not remain without influence in the CCS and is incorporating it into its own politics rather than just stimulating it as a commodity for the potential consumer. Balfe, who examines patronage extensively, says that patrons "as investors [...] assume a degree of control over the 'product' that the 'demand side' of supportive audiences cannot match" (Balfe, 1993, p.1). Gelabert, who examines the EU's patronage of the arts, says that since the abolition of market barriers in 1992, the EU may be perceived by its citizens as a "vast economic machine and a large capitalist market", however, there was also an emergence of a "European momentum" (Gelabert, 1993, p. 288-303)<sup>311</sup>. Balfe adds that those who fund the art "are paying the piper, they assume that they can call the tune; audiences can only respond to whatever the piper plays" (Balfe, 1993, p.1)<sup>312</sup>. The tune for the EU with the CESCP is the focus on the CCS and its ability to engage in cultural activity and build robustness to operate. The question is what impact does this have on the EU's soft power capabilities?

### EU's soft power

The EU has often been discussed as a "normative power" (Manners, 2002)<sup>313</sup> with values and norms that shape the power of the Union. However, as the discussions in the previous chapters have shown, the measure of the value of norms is subjective, soft power resources cannot be evaluated on the value of norms. It is not dismissed here that the preference of the audience for one norm or the

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<sup>309</sup> Mathews, J.D.H (1976) "Art and Politics in Cold War America", *The American Historical Review*, Volume 81, Issue 4, October 1976, Pages 762–787

<sup>310</sup> Mulcahy, K.V. and L. Carsten (2003). "American Cultural Patronage: the limits of privatization" in *Revista Transilvana de Stiinte Administrative*, IX, pp. 63-73.

<sup>311</sup> Gelabert, E. (1993) "The Arts and Culture under the European Community" in *Paying the Piper: Causes and Consequences of Art Patronage*. J.H. Balfe (ed.). University of Illinois Press.

<sup>312</sup> Balfe, J.H. (1993) *Paying the Piper: Causes and Consequences of Art Patronage*. University of Illinois Press.

<sup>313</sup> Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, no.2 (2002): 235-258.

other allows the agent of power to change their narrative to reflect the interests of the audience in order to be more influential with them. However, what precisely gives power to the agent is not the value and norms but rather the ability to control the cultural assets and regulate the activity that can carry any potential values or norms for the audience. This section looks at the challenges with looking the wrong way when trying to understand the EU's soft power potential, which some claim is to be found in the value and norms. It concludes that the CESPC showed that the EU was less interested in presenting norms and more interested in building a CCS that operates with an EU dimension. The EU is more interested in building its soft power resources and instrumentalising culture to attain a soft power resource as well as to entrench its economic hard power.

In the aftermath of WWII, Europe was referred to as "civilian Europe" (Duchêne, 1972<sup>314</sup>) to overcome the challenges of seeing the EU as anything related to military power. This was an idea that civilian means would be the approach of Europe rather than hard power to address political challenges. In the context of the post-Cold War era the concept of "normative power" (Manners, 2002) was applied to the EU. Normative power distances itself from the material discussions of civilian power and focuses on the "attraction" of norms (Manners, 2002, p.238-244). There were claims that the EU is interested "to pursue the spread of particular norms rather than self-interested geographical expansion or military superiority" (Diez and Manners, 2007, p.173). While the EU was a different actor to the nation states, there were claims that it "represents a new kind of power in international politics [that] is not much disputed" (Diez and Manners, 2007, p.173). However, it may be a new type of actor, but that it represents a new type of power can be disputed. Diez and Manners believe that "the EU as a normative power [...] is different from pure self-interested hegemony" (Diez and Manners, 2007, p.174). Manners' main study is the EU's support for the abolishment of the death penalty without any obvious material gains (Manners, 2002, p. 252-253). Normative power in their eyes belongs to at times to the USA and the Vatican. They say that normative power diminishes when there is military force, yet at the same time they say that the US's "Manifest Destiny" is reflective of the US's normative power – particularly highlighting its ability to set up institutions after the First and Second World War. Realists from Carr through to Mearsheimer have dismissed these institutions as self-interested and Hardt and Negri (2000)<sup>315</sup> see them as part of the Empire. Diez and Manners themselves point to the Monroe Doctrine, yet dismiss the relevance. The Monroe Doctrine can be understood clearly in realist terms as a balance of power where the US gained Latin America into its sphere of influence from the "Old World". They say however when American exceptionalism comes into play then the US is no

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<sup>314</sup> Duchêne, F. (1972) "Europe's Role in World Peace", in R. Mayne (ed.) *Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead*. Fontana .

<sup>315</sup> Hardt, M. and Negri, A. (2000) *Empire*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

longer a normative power. Normative power is when there is not exceptionalism. They differentiate between Europe of colonialism, nationalism, world war and the holocaust as those had their claims in exceptionalism (Diez and Manners, 2007, p.181). Yet, they contradict themselves in their own writing. What they miss to see is that the EU does not need to engage in military power because its nation-states deploy their militaries around the world. Furthermore, the EU through its member states still has the support of NATO whenever it needs military power. One could argue that the EU does have an element of exceptionalism, particularly when thinking how leaders like Macron like to link Europe's exceptionalism to Enlightenment as the pinnacle of human achievement dismissing the existence of other great civilizations with their own great achievements. While they say that their concept of normative power is different to that of soft power because it specifically rests on the shaping of norms. If employing norms is normative power, then it is not different from soft power because the deployment of norms is a resource in soft power according to Nye as well. The challenge in the normative power concept comes in the assumption that hard power doesn't matter when clearly the EU is a hard power, which has military capabilities through its member-states and NATO, and is one of the top three leading global economies along with China and the US. Hill outlines that because the EU doesn't have a specific military force even despite the presence of the European Security and Defence Policy and that's why it is often considered as a soft power, however, to him the economic muscles that the EU has, such as economic sanctions, give it hard power (Hill, 2010, p.189-190). Manners and Diez dismiss Nye's concept of smart power. They don't discuss the economic aspect of hard power. They say that when the military comes into the picture a power is no longer a normative power because normative power is not a foreign policy tool but rather a discursive practice (Diez and Manners, 2007, p.179). The same subjectiveness of the evaluation of the EU and its power is present here as we saw with the evaluations of soft power. Nye's claim that those closer to universal values will have more soft power is reminiscent of the normative power claims made by those studying the EU. In the EU Manners says it is values like democracy, liberty, and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law and even highlights the EU's pooling of sovereignty and principle of subsidiarity (Manners, 2002, p.243, 252-3) (Manners, 2007, p.176) that is attributed to normative power.

In fact, aside from the realist critique of normative power (see Hyde-Price, 2006<sup>316</sup>), if we look at the EU's actions within the CESPC, it is less interested in the promotion of norms than it is in the construction of a robust CCS. Furthermore, the pooled sovereignty and principle of subsidiarity clearly suggested the EU should not have a cultural mandate. However, the cultural activities with the CESPC

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<sup>316</sup> Adrian Hyde-Price (2006) "Normative' power Europe: a realist critique", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13:2, 217-234

show that the EU has gained for itself the competencies in the cultural sector and that these stretch beyond the principle of subsidiarity. It can be suggested that the participants have their own desire and belief in the European project and European integration. Higgott et al. believe that in fact a more coordinated approach to EU cultural policy was called for by a plurality of actors including the member states, civil society, and the European Parliament representatives (Higgott and Van Langenhove, 2016, p.2)<sup>317</sup>. There was a call by the CCS for incentive programmes. Despite the incentives that the CESPC provides, Isar believes that participants' motivation is "a genuine commitment to [...] a strong sense of shared European-ness" (Isar, 2015, p.498)<sup>318</sup>. Indeed, there are historic examples of the civil society working on European integration (Cull, 2013). However, that is exactly where the power of the EU and its cultural action lies. The CESPC supports the activities that are a display of European integration. Integration that is reflective of the EU's power grab and not of any particular norms. It injects itself into the culture of Europe through the work of the CESPC, yet this is not built on the creation of norms but rather on the bringing of CCS into its power capabilities. Shore had criticized the EU's top-down approach as elitist. His view was that "the EU's attempt to create a 'European culture area' in an age of globalization appears rather like trying to close the door after the horses have bolted" (Shore, 2000, p.25). Shore further believed that "globalization may have eroded the powers of nation-states as sovereign political entities but the national principle and national identity remains central to the conferral of political legitimacy in most modern democracies" (Shore, 2000, p.9) and that to "inject" ideas into the masses from top-down in the manner of "Jacobinism" or Leninism doesn't work in his eyes (Shore, 2000, p.20). Here we see a contradiction in his claims. On one hand, he sees the erosion of the national sovereignty, yet on the other hand, he does not see that the EU's participation in culture is a contributor to that challenge to the power of nation-states. In fact, what one can see is that the EU has had some success in creating a common EU cultural sphere. Furthermore, this action no longer reflects just the top-down elitist approach criticized by Shore but rather perhaps allows for, as Sassatelli called it, "grassroots" creation of an EU culture with many stakeholders and the civil society involved both in the production of policy as well as with the cultural programmes (Sassatelli, 2009, p.195). Isar also criticizes Shore's perspective that all cultural mobilization is top-down and agrees with Sassatelli. Isar says that "European cultural and political actors themselves" demand and EU-wide cultural governance and that "[Shore] takes the Foucauldian notion of governmentality a bit too far" (Isar, 2015, p.497). In fact, when we relate this to the EU's soft power capabilities, it is evident

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<sup>317</sup> Higgott, R. and Van Langenhove, L. (2016). "Towards an EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations: An Initial, Critical but Constructive Analysis". European Leadership in Culture, Science and Innovation Diplomacy (EL-CSID). Institute for European Studies.

<sup>318</sup> Isar, Y. R. (2015). 'Culture in EU external relations': an idea whose time has come?. *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 21(4), 494-508.



that the EU has taken an approach to intervene into the cultural realm through the sponsorship of grassroots creation of European integration and through this has managed, despite the arm's length approach, to insert itself from the top-down. Sasatelli says that in such a case "the classical distinction between institutional (top-down) or grass-roots (bottom-up) action loses interpretive grasp, as does possibility even the distinction between local and European [...] the style of the policy is precisely to displace these two fundamental, analytical distinctions" (Sasatelli, 2008, p.118). The EU's ability to do so is what constitutes its soft power capabilities and allows it to actively create a major component of its soft power resources. Civil society has been recognized as an important element in the soft power equation. It is the EU's ability to gain power to exert influence on the CCS which is reflective of the CESPC, which the studies of identity and the critical views of the commodification of culture miss.

### The cultural soft power resources gained through the CESPC

It is clear that the EU has acquired a competence through the CESPC to generate cultural assets and activity. What about the other three components that make up the cultural soft power framework – communication, narrative, and audience? We can begin our focus on the narrative. Soft power scholars claim that these either have to be "collective identity narratives" (Feklyunina, 2015) or we need to consider the emotional dynamics that are created (Solomon, 2014), or indeed these have to have a strategic consideration (Szostek, 2017; Roselle et al., 2014, p.75), but in this sense also carrying messages that are credible (Zahrana, 2007). What we see with the CESPC is that there is some degree of focus on the norms and there is some focus on particular European themes, however, that is not the main concern for the EU. Against the normative power Europe claims and against the claims that the EU uses programmes like the CESPC to build a collective identity, the CESPC shows that the EU is interested in building the CCS. The strategic narrative is focused on the "empowerment" of the sector, on its durability and capacity to operate. It can be suggested that such a narrative is for the economic benefit of the EU and that indeed linked "indirect creation [of political identity] through market governance" (Thatcher, 2019, p.3). However, the focus on the "empowerment" of the CCS is about the building of a soft power resource under the patronage of the EU. Agreeing with Miskimmon et al.'s critique that "[i]nternational relations (IR) scholars have not fully incorporated the communication of narratives into broader theoretical arguments about [...] the construction of order in the international system" (Miskimmon et al., 2013, p.1), and so the recognition of realist power considerations behind narratives are missed. The overwhelming focus on normative power Europe distorts the picture that the EU's focus is on resources and not on norms.

Hill says that that “[s]oft power is associated more with the European Union (EU) than with any other actor, as the EU has a track record of using the relevant instruments and an ideology that celebrates the values inherent in the concept” (Hill, 2010)<sup>319</sup> For Hill both “civilian power” and “normative power” are linked to soft power, however, he highlights that these were underpinned by strong hard power resources in relation to their economic power over former colonies or allowing new members to join the EU (Hill, 2010, p.184). And the EU grew as a strong power which became attractive to others as there could be the incentive to become an economic partner with the Union, there was a “lack of soft/hard distinction” (Hill, 2010, p.185). What is missed here that soft power resources underpin hard power. The EU uses soft power resources, but to underpin hard power, but these are not just based on normative ideas. Hill, in his evaluation of EU’s external soft power, highlights that hard power doesn’t work without soft power – “the barrel of a gun always needs to be accompanied by wider social and political measures” (Hill, 2010, p.193). The CESPC is such a social or cultural measure. Therefore, the narrative that accompanies the CESPC is focused on the EU’s contribution to this cultural measure. The CCS becomes a tool for the EU that is built in part through the projection of a narrative that focuses on its empowerment as a sector. It is not so much about projecting values to the wider audience. The empowerment of the CCS is linked to the commodification of culture, but the interpretation of this is not what critical scholars offer as a way to draw in the CCS to be part of the capitalist structures of the world, but rather it serves the EU’s hard power interests, i.e. the strengthening of the economy. Therefore, as Hill suggests, soft power is an extension of hard power that is underpinned through soft power resources. By establishing this partnership between the EU and the CCS, the EU is able to also circumvent the principle of subsidiarity and acquire the CCS as a soft power resource that it can employ for its interests. The EU’s further ability to manage the CCS is supported through specific communication mechanisms that it has set up. The Agenda for Culture has a specific section on “New Partnerships and Working Methods” – this section stresses the importance for the EU to have “dialogue with the cultural sector” as well as the “setting up an open method of coordination [(OMC)]”, which is a mechanism to help stakeholders involved in the EU cultural agenda and the various cultural programmes to work together more efficiently. The OMC involves the ministers of member states, the civil society and a variety of EU bodies. It builds a network amongst these actors, who, within this process, specifically work on European cultural objectives and harmonisation. Furthermore, in this section of the Agenda, the Commission states that it is “committed to pursuing a structured dialogue with the [cultural] sector”

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<sup>319</sup> Hill. C. (2010) “Cheques and balances. The European Union’s soft power strategy” in *Soft power and US foreign policy: theoretical, historical and contemporary perspectives*. Parmar and M. Cox (eds). Routledge studies in US foreign policy. Routledge

and highlights its work with organized cultural civil society groups<sup>320</sup> that have emerged (EC, Agenda for Culture, 2007, p. 11). The Agenda points out that the nature of the CCS is heterogeneous, including “professional organisations, cultural institutions with different degrees of independence, non-governmental organisations, European and non EU networks, foundations, etc” and therefore communication has been difficult particularly between “the cultural industries and other cultural actors” which has “diminish[ed] the voice of the cultural sector at the European level” (EC, Agenda for Culture, 2007, p. 11). While emphasizing the voice of the CCS at the European level and encouraging a better dialogue between itself and the different actors, the EU is in fact also placing itself into the existing CCS.

### The top-down partnership with the CCS

The OMC structure shows that the work with the CCS goes beyond just the interest in creative and cultural assets and activity that is to help the EU’s economic hard power. The Agenda encourages a “mapping of the sector in order to identify and better understand the full range of its stakeholders”, “set up a ‘Cultural Forum’ for consulting stakeholders”, have artists and intellectuals who serve as “European level cultural ambassadors” while also “exploring the opportunity and feasibility of an on-line virtual European forum allowing for the exchange of views, artistic expression and reaching out to citizens” (EC, Agenda for Culture, 2007, p.11). The EU seeks to establish a communication mechanism that runs between itself and the CCS. The purpose of this communication mechanism is to impact on policymaking. To have this influence on policy, where the interest for the EU is further integration, is facilitated through the EU’s instrumentalisation of the CCS. The EU states that it gives policy actors at the national level the opportunity to regularly participate in a “European process” giving them more importance both at the national level and creates an additional stimulus for policy actors (EC, Agenda for Culture, 2007, p. 12). More specifically it also “allows the actors in these policy fields to have a voice at the European level which they would not otherwise have” (EC, Agenda for Culture, 2007, p. 12). Overall, the EU specifically states that it seeks “enhanced coordination and harmonisation” (EC, Agenda for Culture, 2007, p. 13). While the two-way communication is stressed here, in fact, the EU has gained entrance into the cultural policy by drawing in the CCS. Specifically, the OMC legitimised this power grab. The OMC was adopted in the year 2000 at the Lisbon European summit and applied to various sectors of governance. In the realm of culture, as Psychogiopoulou points out, the OMC was created in part with the demands of the representatives of the CCS stressing the importance of the presence of the

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<sup>320</sup> An example of one of these cultural civil society organization is Culture Action Europe: <https://cultureactioneurope.org/about-us/>

civil society in the EU's cultural activity and the creation of the OMC in the realm of culture was, according to the EU, a response to this demand, however, it was met with resistance by the member-states (Psychogiopoulou, 2015, p.39).<sup>321</sup> The main point of concern for the member states was the way that projects were selected for funding and evaluated without the input of the states, so in response, the EU stressed the importance of involving local cultural actors in the process (Psychogiopoulou, 2015, p.40). In light of the involvement of the civil society Psychogiopoulou sees the OMC as knowledge sharing and policy learning primarily to share national good practice, rather than seeking to promote uniformity, rather it builds up interest in coordination rather than harmonisation. Despite the socio-cultural differences of member-states, they can learn from each other but not standardize (Psychogiopoulou, 2015, p.45). What she has missed is that the EU involved the CCS, the civil society, to allow for influence into the national cultural policy debates. Similarly, Cohen and Sabel point out that the introduction of the OMC approach into EU governance structures was to "encourage an integrated approach to economic development regionally" and to serve as a function of "social inclusion" where the EU funds "municipal level public-private partnerships whose members are drawn from NGOs and the relevant statutory authorities (the welfare department the training service, and so on)" (Cohen and Sabel, 2003, p.347)<sup>322</sup> The OMC is interpreted by such scholars as a response to the wide criticism that this is a sort of "governmentalization" of culture at the EC level. These is a focus on how art and culture can be seen as a resistance to the European project, and that subordinate cultures, who are effected by the EU cultural treaties but are at a remove from those signing them, will not be reflected equally in the process (Braman, 2010, p.38-39). Hence, they see the OMC method as a legitimate way to give power to the civil society in participating in the policymaking arena. The focus on the empowerment of the civil society diverts the view from the agent of power. By operationalising the CCS, the EU had gained competence in cultural policymaking. In fact, the EU itself says that it is monitoring "the number of Member States making use of the results of the open method of coordination in their national policy development" (EC, Regulations on Creative Europe, 2013, Article 18). Büchs points out that despite the OMC operating as a soft law mechanism, it is can be argued that soft law is "more suitable than hard law for operating within a context of diversity in which different policy solutions are required in different member states [...] it may be more effective than hard law and induce long-lasting policy learning (instead of just superficial behaviour change) because it has the potential to influence deep-seated values and attitudes" and this "policy learning" has been

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<sup>321</sup> Psychogiopoulou E. (2015) "The Cultural Open Method of Coordination". In Cultural Governance and the European Union. Psychogiopoulou E. (eds). Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics. Palgrave Macmillan

<sup>322</sup> Sabel C.F., and J. Cohen (2003) "EU and US Sovereignty and Solidarity" in Governing Work and Welfare in New Economy: European and American Experiments. J. Zeitlin and D.M. Trubek (eds.), Oxford University Press.

identified in the field of OMC studies as the most effective way the EU has been able to influence member states (Büchs, 2009, p.3).<sup>323</sup> This control of the distribution of power through soft power mechanisms, was further enhanced by other legal measures. Primorac et al. point out that the EU took member states to court if they didn't comply with the regulations of the internal market in the cultural realm. "The European Court started opening the first cases questioning different elements and provisions of national cultural policies that were considered not to be aligned with the provisions of European policies and regulations, in particular in the area of free movement of people, goods and services, state aid or tax rules" (Primorac et al., 2017, p.6). The scholarship that focuses on civil society empowerment, misses the strategic use of the EU of the CCS through its very empowerment. The establishment of the OMC "made a significant step forward in creating circumstances for a better coordinated policy-making in the field of culture" (Primorac et al., 2017, p.7) allowing the EU to acquire the soft power resources that it may need. The work with the CCS has "formed more or less resilient alliances in an effort to circumvent the blockages on the development of cultural action built into Article 128<sup>324</sup> in the application of the subsidiarity principle at the level of the member-states" (Barnett, 2001 p.421). Additionally, Potschka et al. (2013), who evaluated how the EU incorporates wider audiences into its cultural programmes, say that an agency which collects data and identifies trends, which the EU does in the case of the CESPC, is "overstepping the merit of the EU and infringing on sovereignty" (Potschka, 2013, p.269). The partnership that the EU has established with the CCS serves the power interest of the EU despite the perspective that it is empowering the CCS.

### Audiences and Spaces

The cultural soft power framework showed cultural activity where the audience is clearly identified and rationalises produce soft power resources while considering the spaces in which audiences can be found is also important. Looking at the engagement of the CESPC with the wider public, we saw that this was sporadic and different. It does not mean that the EU is not interested in getting the cultural assets disseminated, on the contrary, it is. However, its efforts to support the dissemination of cultural assets to the wider public are less than the support to build networks between the CCS itself. The analysis of EU's cultural projects and the focus on the impact this has on

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<sup>323</sup> Büchs, M. (2009) "The Open Method of Coordination – Effectively preventing welfare state retrenchment?" in European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Vol. 13, Special Issue No. 1, Article 11, 2009, Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1562473>

<sup>324</sup> Principle of subsidiarity in culture Article 128 of the Maastricht Treaty was replaced with the previously mentioned Article 167 of the TFEU.

audience perceptions (Fage-Bulter, 2020<sup>325</sup>) or identity (Sassatelli, 2009) has diverted from attention from the actual primary audience of the CESPC. The CESPC is primarily targeting the CCS. The CCS serves both as the audience and the space in which the EU is interested. The debates about the CCS in the context of EU cultural policy are often framed on one hand in governmentality (Shore, 2000) or in empowerment (Psychogiopoulou, 2015). Additionally to this, soft power is tainted with the liberal perspective, so any network communication or empowerment is viewed as cooperation. The EU's empowerment of the CCS is therefore critiqued through commodification, but not taken further to link such action to a realist notion of power.

The realist critique has hardly been applied to the notion of the empowerment of people in literature. Empowerment is often seen as a liberal idea, where it is about “*potentia*, [... where] challenges must be overcome and projects that be achieved – peace, prosperity, democracy, and development. The way to reach these goals, idealists insist, is to empower individuals, groups, and states” (Ringmar, 2007 p.197). He further adds that empowerment occurs due to institutions. He says the difference in societies that are better at “reflecting on potentialities and better at actualising them” are distinguished by “the presence or absence of certain kinds of institutions. It is institutions in the end that determine the degree to which social actors are empowered” (Ringmar, 2007).<sup>326</sup> Such a view doesn't allow any empowerment strategies adopted by international actors to be viewed through a realist lens. In light of soft power, the EU does attain soft power with the CCS, but it is precisely because they have “empowered” them as a resource in their (soft) power strategy. The CCS becomes a tool for the EU's attainment of power, not with the CCS, but among the member states and as an international actor. However, its utilisation of the CCS to do so is the soft power resource that it has.

The Foucauldian notion of governmentality (2004)<sup>327</sup> or Barnett and Duvall's (2005)<sup>328</sup> fourth face or productive power could be brought up here to show that it is through discursive means because language and social construction was used to subvert the CCS to operate on behalf of the EU. However, while this lens of analysis can be applied to the use of language in the policy documents and how these directives then manifest themselves in the actions of the CCS actors that are producing the projects, that is not the point being made here. It is not here about the “standardisation of

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<sup>325</sup> Fage-Butler, A. (2020). “Audience perspectives on the European dimension in Aarhus 2017 events: impacts of EU cultural policy”. *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 26(2), 150-165.

<sup>326</sup> Ringmar, E. (2007). “Empowerment among nations” in *Power in world politics*, F. Berenskoetter and M.J. Williams (eds). Routledge.

<sup>327</sup> Foucault, M. (2004) “Governmentality”, in *The Essential Foucault*, P. Rabinow and N. Rose (eds), The New Press, pp. 229–45.

<sup>328</sup> Barnett, M. and Duvall, R. (2005) “Power in International Politics”, *International Organization*, 59 (1): 39–75.

populations” or the “discursive formations that naturalise normality” (Lipschutz, 2007, p.229<sup>329</sup>), but rather it is the EU’s ability to build soft power for itself, which occurs on the basis of resources first and foremost. There are two perspectives of civil society offered by Colas (2002)<sup>330</sup>, one is that the civil society emerged as a resistance to “capitalist modernity” and the second that as a resistance to the growing power of the state (Colas, 2002, p.43-47). Lipschutz looks at what the global civil society and says that it is produced out of those who are seeking to “resist or moderate the expansion of the market into various realms of social life” (Lipschutz, 2007, p.225). Gaventa, who looks at levels and spaces of power, argues similarly to that of Sassen (2002)<sup>331</sup> or Keck and Sikkink (1998)<sup>332</sup>, who are scholars of global governance, say that there are multiple levels of decision-making and power where the subnational, national and supranational are all levels at which interactions between civil society, nations, regional and international powers, is contested and shaped (Gaventa, 2007, p.210). These accounts are focused on ethical or moral considerations. These discussions are of the power of the civil society as either neo-liberal efforts to weaken the state, efforts to re-establish state legitimacy or have emerged from demands for greater ‘voice’ from below” (Gaventa, 2007, p.213). They are not wrong to say that the civil society has acquired power in the political processes. If applied to the CESP then the civil society’s presence in the OMC is there to challenge the power of the EU and that it is there to also voice any concerns about the commodification of the CCS. Civil society in such perspectives allows local actors can transform politics even at an institutional and global level, particularly with the use of new digital technologies (Sassen, 2004)<sup>333</sup>. However, that is not the point of the argument here and not the way the civil society can be viewed. Hayden had said, “For soft power to ‘work,’ it renders the audience of soft power efforts as *targets*, susceptible to campaigns of ‘attraction’ and yet empowers them with a valuable potential of political agency” (Hayden, 2011, p.5). The CCS is a civil society that the EU constructs through incentive measures in order to use that audience group to balance its power against the nation-states and potentially international powers. There are pro-EU and anti-EU publics and the EU, through soft power measures like cultural incentive programmes, is attempting to construct its own public loyal to the EU’s institution. Whether the citizens made a rational choice (i.e. seeing the economic incentive) or their ideas were shaped through discursive power and they sought empowerment through or against institutions, is secondary, what is clear is the result. The result is that the EU was able to bring into its power the CCS that helps it in

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<sup>329</sup> Lipschutz, R.D. (2007) “On the transformational potential of global civil society” in Power in world politics, F. Berenskoetter and M.J. Williams (eds). Routledge.

<sup>330</sup> Colas, A. (2002) *International Civil Society*, Cambridge: Polity.

<sup>331</sup> Sassen, S. (2002) “Global Cities and Diasporic Networks: Microsites in Global Civil Society”, in H. Anheier, M. Glasius and M. Kaldor (eds), *Global Civil Society*, Oxford University Press, pp. 217–40.

<sup>332</sup> Keck, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998) *Activists Beyond Borders*, Cornell University Press.

<sup>333</sup> Sassen, S. (2004). Local actors in global politics. *Current sociology*, 52(4), 649-670.

its quest for Europeanisation. Walker presents a critique of non-liberal regimes “empowering” groups and presenting them as authentic civil society actors (Walker, 2016)<sup>334</sup>. He says that since the Cold War the West has been interested in “integrating non-democratic regimes into the liberal international order” (Walker, 2016, p.49). He typically divides the world into the West and the rest and dismisses foreign media, the support for foreign language and cultural programmes, and support for NGOs by non-Western governments as illegitimate, while on the other hand Western “pro-democracy” NGOs are legitimate (Walker, 2016, p.57). What we in fact see is that the European CCS is a regime-backed group. It represents the EU's interest both in the policy arena against the power of the member-states as well as allowing the EU the ability to use the CCS to create a European dimension in cultural action across the continent. This is no different when any government is sponsoring NGOs, language or cultural programmes, in foreign countries. They do it out of their national self-interest. The soft power resources is in the ability to back the civil society and to rationalise them both as the target of ones power and as the vehicle to carry soft power messages. Normative claims distract from the understanding of how soft power resources operate. Duchêne's “civilian power” is closer to what is being discussed in relation to the instrumentalization of the civil society. During his time, Duchêne said that the European Community had a chance “to demonstrate the influence which can be wielded by a large political co-operative formed to exert essentially civilian forms of power” (Duchêne, 1973, p.19). In fact, the civilian forms of power are soft power resources. When evaluating normative implications of soft power, Nye himself said that he has treated soft power as a “descriptive rather than a normative concept” and illustrates this with a fitting example to the argument being made in this dissertation:

“If I want to steal your money, I can threaten you with a gun, or I can swindle you with a get-rich scheme in which you invest. I can also persuade you that I am a guru to whom you should hand over your estate and that I will save the world. The third means depended upon attraction or soft power, but the result remains fraud and theft” (Nye, 2007, p.169).<sup>335</sup>

Only that the argument in the dissertation is that the power lies in being able to act the guru. Because the get rich scheme described in his example is also attractive, but in either case it is about the ability to present oneself in front of the other as something that the other will engage with only in the guru's case the offer is something cultural. Even though even that is backed by hard power resources such as financial incentives. Finally, Morgenthau makes an interesting evaluation of legitimacy and power. For, when an actor takes action that “can invoke a moral or legal justification for its exercise, [it] is

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<sup>334</sup> Walker, C. (2016). The Authoritarian Threat: The Hijacking of" Soft Power". *Journal of Democracy*, 27(1), 49-63.

<sup>335</sup> Nye, J. S. (2007). “Notes for a soft-power research agenda”. *Power in world politics*, 162-172.



likely to be more effective than equivalent illegitimate power, which cannot be so justified. That is to say, legitimate power has a better chance to influence the will of its objects than equivalent illegitimate power” (Morgenthau, [1948], 1979, p.34). The EU has made itself legitimate in the realm of culture by empowering the CCS.

### Concluding remarks

The viewing of soft power as something that can be found in norms or values is limited. The focus on such an analysis of empirical studies only gives us insight into a particular moment in time. However, when looking at the way an agent of power is able to set up interactions, relationships, modes of communication between itself and the subject, we see more about the soft power capabilities that an agent possesses. The example of the CESPC shows that the sponsoring of the production of cultural assets and generating cultural activities allows the EU to build soft power. How it happens though is where the analysis differs from existing evaluations of cultural soft power resources. The agent of power strategically uses cultural assets, communication mechanisms based on networks and relationships, to establish a top-down approach to get their message across. The message in the case of the EU is the Europeanisation, which it passes to the CCS through policy documents backed by incentive programmes. The audience first and foremost is the CCS. The audience is not a passive recipient of soft power messages. The instrumentalization of the audience is what gives further soft power capabilities to the EU. Through the CESPC the EU has acquired control of a civil society group which it uses to influence national laws and which acts on its behalf in the cultural realm by promoting projects with a European dimension. Europeanisation in this manner is not based on the EU’s norms and values, but on its ability to put in place the right soft power resources and therefore to be able grow its overall power.

## CONCLUSION

The dissertation set out to answer a question that arose out of the literature on soft power. The question of how soft power resources look like (Roselle et al., 2014). The dissertation highlighted that the shift in the study of power to look at relational or ideational perspectives of power, has diverted our attention from where power actually lies, namely in resources. By turning back to the realist notion of power and applying it to the concept of soft power, the dissertation provided a more structured understanding of how soft power can be evaluated. The lack of concrete theorization in the literature on what constitutes cultural soft power resources was taken on as the problem that needed to be addressed. The objective was to provide a structured framework that would allow for an understanding of cultural soft power resources. A further objective was that such a framework could then be used as a lens through which empirical cases could be evaluated. The question that was being answered was – what is the nature of cultural resources of soft power and how do agents come to have such soft power?

The dissertation has shown how the study of soft power through the normative lens, and the analysis of power based on constructivist or discourse analysis methodologies, is limited in the understanding of how power operates. Drawing on Morgenthau's perspective that political interest is defined as power, it applies this perspective to the cultural realm. The patronage of culture by international actors is a political act that is done out of self-interest. Cultural politics like all politics is interested in power. This dismisses any normative claims that are made in relation to how soft power is based on some universally attractive resources. Furthermore, because power is understood as based on resources in this dissertation, cultural resources become essential to understand not in the way that audiences interpret them but in the way that resources themselves are constituted and what leads an international actor to possess such resources. On the basis of this thinking, the dissertation established the theoretical framework for the strategic employment of culture as a resource for soft power. It served the purpose to illustrate how agents of power use culture strategically showing where the resources rest. The cultural soft power framework showed that the ability of an agent to generate activity around cultural assets is essential for them to be able to engage with the audience and to build relationships. The view here was not that the ideas that are exchanged in the relationship matter, but that the ability to set up such relationships by generating activity around cultural assets is what matters. Brown (2017) correctly referred to the ability to set up such interactions as the ability to build soft power infrastructure. It is within this infrastructure where soft power sits, but without the infrastructure there can be no soft power. Furthermore, the framework showed that it is not just the establishment of networks through the generation of cultural activity, but it is also about the

ability to utilize the cultural industry to one's advantage. In a globalized world, the cultural industry has the ability to move across borders easier than national cultural policy. The ability of the agent of power to use the industry to one's advantage also constitutes an important component of power. Finally, in contrast to viewing audiences in the soft power equation from the perspective of their interpretation of soft power resources, but rather viewing audiences as a resource for soft power the dissertation showed how the control and management of audiences is important for soft power. Overall, these discussions highlighted that values and norms are subjective and any interpretation of them as having more impact in one case than another is contingent on particular historic contexts. While the dissertation showed that studying resources of soft power remains constant – either an agent can acquire them or not. They do not depend on the audience's interpretation of their value. If an actor can generate activity, spread culture by means of cultural policy through various communication methods, then they are able to establish soft power. This is all done not for normative purposes but rather for the interest in power.

The self-interest, in the case of the EU is not only the survival in the international realm, but also in the domestic realm where its existence is challenged by the member states and the citizens. Previous discussions in literature of the EU's cultural policy have focused on the establishment of an identity, with scholars like Shore declaring that, "the European Union has utterly failed in establishing a European identity as an alternative to various national identities" (Shore, 2001, p.10). On the other hand, scholars of EU cultural policy have taken a critical view of the way it has led to the commodification of culture (Primorac et al., 2017). What has been given less attention to is the way that EU's cultural action has given it soft power. This has further been challenged by perspectives that see European soft power through the normative power lens. The study of the CESPAC and the policies that underpin it allowed this dissertation to show that the EU has established soft power capabilities. It has done so through its intervention into cultural governance where it has no official competence due to the principle of subsidiarity. The dissertation outlined how the incentive project of the CESPAC allowed the EU to practice art patronage and create cultural assets that carry forward the European dimension. Additionally, it illustrated how the EU established a vast network of cultural operators and creative producers all acting within the realm of the EU's cultural action. It identified that the EU's strategic narrative was not directed as such towards the wider public, but rather to the creative and cultural sector itself. The narrative was that the EU was there to fund and support the sector. Identifying the narrative or the direction that the EU promoted by looking at the policy documentation and also by understanding what kind of projects the EU funded, it could be established that the EU's primary soft power audience was the CCS itself. Contrary to the focus on identity formation or on the commodification of culture in other literature, the dissertation showed that in fact the EU was building

up soft power resources. Additionally, it showed that the CCS has not been identified in literature as being instrumentalised for the EU's soft power purposes because the lens that is often applied to the sector is one of civil society. The study of civil society has been predominantly focused on the power it has to challenge the state or use international institutions to improve its own position. However, what was illustrated in the dissertation is that the EU backs the CCS in order to build its own soft power. The "empowerment" of the CCS has allowed the EU to reduce the resistance from member states to allow the EU to have some input into cultural programmes. Furthermore, the EU's support for the CCS through programmes like the CESPC has allowed the EU to use the CCS to influence the cultural laws of member states even if it is through soft law. Finally, the seal of the EU as the patron of the vast cultural activity that the CESPC generates allow the EU to have control and influence through that culture. The dissertation does not dismiss that the EU is also trying to improve the CCS for economic purposes. On the contrary that speaks to the EU's interest in power. Its cultural policies for soft power purposes as well as its cultural policies for the attainment of more economic means are reflective of the way the dissertation views soft power as namely an extension of hard power. International actors operate through both hard and soft power resources. Additionally, the dissertation also does not dismiss that cultural resources may be perceived by different audiences in different ways, however, what we saw in the case of the CESPC, is that the EU was able to gain the control over culture and guide the CCS to produce the resources that it wanted. Therefore, in this case the EU has power over soft power resources despite what is thought of these resources.

This dissertation has given further insight into the way audiences, often in the case of the civil society, are operationalised for power purposes. It asserts that viewing some actors as good and others as bad has distracted from the fact that all powers that can instrumentalise the civil society do it for power purposes and not for any claims proposed by the idealists. What is interesting to see is that in the era of globalisation where culture has been drawn into the market through concepts like the "creative economy" (Bell and Oakley, 2015), culture is often seen as a commodity while citizen participation in the cultural sector is promoted as something that builds the individuals capability in context of Sen's (1999) "capability approach". The empowerment of individuals to participate in culture is viewed by the liberals as some worth striving for. The claim here is not that cultural participation is not positive for individuals, but empowerment of citizens by agents of power is not just a selfless act. While some may see this through the Gramscian lens of hegemony through market forces, such empowerment of the civil society can also be seen through the realist lens. What the evaluation of the CESPC showed and what the theory chapter outlined, is that civil society groups are instrumentalised in the balance of power calculation. Access to such audiences and their control through culture is an essential element of soft power capabilities. The market or mass culture provides

easy access to circumventing national laws as we saw with the CESPC. The EU did not sponsor a particular set of European themes in the CESPC, but rather it focused on sponsoring the CCS under its patronage and influence. As in classic realist assumptions, the territory and the population become a resource. In this case, they are attained through soft power. The realisation that “mass culture, by contrast [religious communities, political communities, or labour collectives] creates communities irrespective of any shared past” (Groys, 2009), has allowed actors to take control of populations irrespective of their location. Such control of populations through culture is an essential soft power resource that political actors can possess. This is not to assert their hegemonic ideology over the people, but rather this is to instrumentalise the audience like a resource that can be used against other international or local adversaries who are also maximising their power capabilities.

The question of morality may arise in such discussions. Is it really the case that the empowerment of cultural actors is part of a soft power strategy where interests are aligned with power rather than spreading benevolent norms? Here we have to remind ourselves of Morgenthau’s fifth principle of political realism with which I wish to complete this dissertation.

“All nations are tempted – and few have been able to resist the temptation for long – to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in the moral purposes of the universe. To know that nations are subject to the moral law is one thing, while to pretend to know with certainty what is good and evil in the relations among nations is quite another. There is a world of difference between the belief that all nations stand under the judgment of God, inscrutable to the human mind, and the blasphemous conviction that God is always on one’s side and that what one wills oneself cannot fail to be willed by God also.

The lighthearted equation between a particular nationalism and the counsels of Providence is morally indefensible, for it is that very sin of pride against which the Greek tragedians and the Biblical prophets have warned rulers and ruled. That equation is also politically pernicious, for it is liable to engender the distortion in judgement which, in the blindness of crusading frenzy, destroys nations and civilizations – in the name of moral principle, ideals, or God himself.

On the other hand, it is exactly the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from both that moral excess and that political folly. For if we look at all nations, our own included, as political entities pursuing their respective interests defined in terms of power, we are able to do justice to all of them. And we are able to do justice to all of them in a dual sense: We are able to judge other nations as we judge our own and, having judged

them in this fashion, we are then capable of pursuing policies that respect the interests of other nations, while protecting and promoting those of our own. Moderation in policy cannot fail to reflect the moderation of moral judgment” (Morgenthau, 1948, p.13).

Chart 1: All asset types and the number of projects that produced these assets




Table 1: Projects and their audience types and numbers

Project Title	Audience Type	Audience Numbers
Towards 2020: Skilling Musicians & Engaging Audiences	Youth: Musicians; Non-audience 30s and 40s of Orchestra;	
European Digital Art and Science Network	Scientists	381 artists; 45 cultural professionals
European Opera Digital Project	North America; global	3096324 view
The Faces Behind the Nose - Promoting Hospital Clowning as a Recognized Genre of Performing Arts	Hospitals;	300 artists
Corpus - European network for performance practice	Arts and Performance; global	
COLLAB ARTS PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMME: Art in social and community contexts	Youth; Children; people with disabilities; Traveller; Roma; LGBT; seniors; neighbourhoods; marginalised groups;	652 artists; 9,140 participates; 1,185,000 audience;
[DNA] DEPARTURES AND ARRIVALS	Youth; Choreographers; Research;	1154 Training candidates; 102 Research candidates; 314 artist; 44000 spectators; 1200 research participants;
SMALL SIZE, PERFORMING ARTS FOR EARLY YEARS	Children; non-audience children 0-6;	
Sharing a World of Inclusion, Creativity and Heritage	Museum visitors; museum workers;	



Human Cities_Challenging the city scale	Urban residents	
Big Bang - an Adventurous Music Project for Children	Youth; Children;	1500 artists; 125000 children; 500 child musicians
Be SpectACTIVE!		
CORNERS - turning Europe inside out	Uninvolved artists; artists from remote regions;	115 artists
Transbook, Children's Literature On The Move	Children's literature industry; Children;	779 literature professionals; 1200 students;
THE PEOPLE'S SMART SCULPTURE	Involving people in urban spaces	
Community as Opportunity - Creative archives' and users' network	Youth; General public;	
Women's creativity since the Modern Movement	Women: architects, civil engineers and designers; Youth	
Artecitya	Cultural NGOs; urban planners; architects;	
eeemerging, Emerging European Ensembles Project	Eastern Europe; Central Europe	
PLATFORM shift+	Youth;	
Ceramics and its dimensions		
Young European (Cultural) Audience Development !	Youth; Marginalized citizens	
IMAGINE 2020 (2.0) - Art, ecology & possible futures	Civil society; scientists; social scientists;	
CONNECTING Early Medieval European COLLECTIONS		
FOLLOW THE VIKINGS		
LPM 2015 > 2018 - Live Performers Meeting	Turkey - women and migrants;	2310 artists;

EUROPE COMICS	global comics audience; internatiolization	
EUBO Mobile Baroque Academy: Pathways & Performances	Turkey - Baroque orchestra;	10,000 live audience; 1,000,000 concert broadcast and recordings audience via radio;
Boosting careers of animation young artists with video mapping	animation students; graphic design students;	95,000 audiences; 400 young artists and staff;
Flâneur - New urban narratives	local residents;	
POWER OF DIVERSITY	Youth; Russia	196 young adult music performers;
Urban Heat	urban communities;	2000 artists; 80,000 audience; 100 creative industry support workers;
WE ARE EUROPE	electronic music	1,200,000 festival- goers; 1200 artists;
CARAVAN NEXT - Feed the Future: Art moving cities	marginalized communities; local communities; United States; Armenia; Australia; Taiwan; Morocco; South Korea;	100,000 citizens;
NE@XT Accelerator	youth;	1,000,000 emerging artists potential access; 1000 institutions;
EU COLLECTIVE PLAYS!		
an Orchestra Network for Europe - ONE® is more	youth;	
CREATIVE LENSES	creative and cultural sector professionals	
ULYSSES	youth	

Advancing Performing Arts Project - Performing Europe 2020	Arab world;	
European Orchestra LABORatory II		
EUROPAVOX	Youth	40 media; 200 music professionals; 1500 bands
MUSIC UP CLOSE NETWORK: connecting orchestral music to young audiences	Youth	
RISK CHANGE	target groups; civil society; migrants;	
IN SITU ACT	young art professional	
Future DiverCities - Creativity in an Urban Context	artists	
European Bookfairs' network	publishers; readers;	
Trauma & Revival	Russia; curators	
INTERFACES		
smARTplaces - A European Audience Development Project		
Shared Cities: Creative Momentum		
DANCE ON, PASS ON, DREAM ON	senior citizens;	
YOUNG OPERA MAKERS Programme by enoa	young opera professionals;	
I Will Be Everything...	artists; children;	5,000 audience; 3,000 school children;
Reading for Enjoyment, Achievement and Development of yOuNg people	teenagers; teachers; librarians;	
Re-Imagine Europe		

Women Equal Share Presence in the Arts and Creative Industries	women;	
BORDERLINE OFFENSIVE: laughing in the face of fear	Middle East; Jordan; Turkey; Palestine; Syria; Lebanon	
Innovation Network of European Showcases	music industry workers;	
CreArt. Network of Cities for Artistic Creation	artists;	
UNITED FASHION	Macedonia; Balkan states;	
Orpheus & Majnun / Orfeo & Majnun	local communities;	
Connecting Emerging Literary Artists	translators; authors; publishers;	
From Conflict to Conviviality through Creativity and Culture	refugees; migrants;	
Opera Vision		
Fabulamundi. Playwriting Europe: Beyond borders?	refugees; asylum seekers; immigrants;	
ATLAS OF TRANSITIONS. New geographies for a cross-cultural Europe	migrants; refugees; local communities;	
European Art-Science-Technology Network for Digital Creativity	digital art professionals and educators;	
Europe Beyond Access	disabled artists	
Centriphery	artists;	
WE ARE EUROPE	authors; journalists; artists; curators; Hong Kong; Bogota;	
Life Long Burning – Towards a sustainable Eco-System for Contemporary Dance in Europe	dance professionals;	
Future Songwriting	children; youth;	

Audience DEvelopment STrategies for cultural organizations in Europe	policy makers; cultural organizations;	300 cultural organizations staff; 1200 new participants; 50,000 cultural organizations;
Our Many Europes	museum professionals; general public	2,000,000 europeans;
European ARTificial Intelligence Lab	AI professionals, artists, and public;	
European Digital Treasures: Management of centennial archives in the 21st century		
Create to Connect -> Create to Impact	artists; researchers; curators;	
MAPPING - A Map on the aesthetics of performing arts for early years	early years children (0-6); children's arts industry professionals;	
The BIG BANG PROJECT - An Adventurous Music Project for Children	youth; music professionals; students;	
Be SpectACTIVE!	performing arts professionals;	
Dancing Museums - The democracy of beings	local communities; art researchers;	
European Music Market Accelerator	music sector professionals;	
RESHAPE - Reflect, Share, Practice, Experiment		150 arts professionals; 70 arts professionals; 15 arts professionals;

EMERGENCE From shared experience to new creativity: Living Heritage/Reframing Memory	Taiwan;	1000 artists and professionals; 3000 students and emerging performacne creators; 430,000 public audience members; potential reach of 50,000 students;
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Table 2: Narratives and themes

Narratives	Recurrences	Broad Theme
access to musical instruments	1	CCS
access to opportunity for music training	1	CCS
architecture and urban collaborations	1	CCS
archives	1	CCS
art and artificial intelligence	1	CCS
Art and Science	1	CCS
art democracy – democratic collaboration between artists, researchers and curators	1	CCS
art democracy – participatory art	1	CCS
art research on new collaboration between communities and art on participatory art	1	CCS
artists professional development and skill training	5	CCS
artistic development in children	1	CCS
audience development	10	CCS
audience development for theatre through digital technology	1	CCS

audience development in underrepresented groups	1	CCS
audio-visual art	1	CCS
baroque music	1	CCS
business growth	1	CCS
career development	3	CCS
changing the image of the classical music sector	1	CCS
children audience growth	1	CCS
children's literature	1	CCS
comics	1	CCS
communicating artificial intelligence to the general public through art	1	CCS
connecting youth to orchestra	1	CCS
cooperation between art, entrepreneurs, journalists, and authors.	1	CCS
cooperation in the arts sector	1	CCS
creative writing encouragement in youth	1	CCS
cultural exchange	1	CCS
curation	1	CCS
dance education	1	CCS
development of contemporary music	1	CCS
development of creative and cultural sector	2	CCS
development of dance artists	1	CCS
development of digital art sector	1	CCS
development of economic returns of digitized archives	1	CCS
development of fashion industry	1	CCS
development of music for children and youths	1	CCS
development of opera sector	1	CCS
development of orchestral music	1	CCS

development of the cultural and creative industry	1	CCS
development of the performing arts and artists skills	1	CCS
development of the sustainable performing arts industry	1	CCS
development of visual artist industry	1	CCS
dialogue between artists in the periphery and the centre of art production	1	CCS
digitalization	2	CCS
digitalization of theatre	1	CCS
digitalizing opera	1	CCS
dissemination of playwrights	1	CCS
employment	4	CCS
encourage youth music participation and performances	1	CCS
encouraging reading	1	CCS
entrepreneurship	1	CCS
ethnography	1	CCS
highlight and promote younger generation of artists	1	CCS
impact of creative industry on wider economy	1	CCS
Incorporation of creative professionals and NGO in urban planning	1	CCS
increasing music education in schools	1	CCS
innovation	2	CCS
innovation in arts	1	CCS
interdisciplinary art, electronic culture	1	CCS
lifelong training for music industry professionals developing innovative business models	1	CCS
literature	1	CCS



literature talent development	1	CCS
mature dancers	1	CCS
museum best-practice	1	CCS
museum development	1	CCS
museum strategy development	1	CCS
museums as part of the community	1	CCS
music	1	CCS
music education for the youth	1	CCS
music heritage	1	CCS
music industry development	1	CCS
musical careers	1	CCS
musical education for children and youths	1	CCS
musical training	1	CCS
new audiences	1	CCS
Opera	1	CCS
Orchestra	1	CCS
orchestra audience development	1	CCS
participation	1	CCS
performance art	2	CCS
performance arts education	1	CCS
performing arts development	1	CCS
playwright	1	CCS
presentation of artwork	1	CCS
professionalization and innovation of cultural operators towards professional practices	1	CCS
promoting opera	1	CCS
relationship between museums, dance, and local audiences	1	CCS
research informed art	1	CCS
research on performance arts for early years children	1	CCS
social innovation through art and research	1	CCS

sustainable creative economy	1	CCS
synergy between research, creation, and pedagogy	1	CCS
technology and entrepreneurship	1	CCS
theatre companies	1	CCS
training artists to become more business smart	1	CCS
training authors in the literature industry	1	CCS
training fashion designers in business skills	1	CCS
training in video mapping	1	CCS
training playwright professionals	1	CCS
visibility of cultural heritage in archives	1	CCS
1945-1968	1	Europe
1990s Europe	1	Europe
ceramics heritage	1	Europe
civic reconstruction of Europe	1	Europe
Cold war	1	Europe
common history	1	Europe
connecting art to economic, political, and social realities in Europe	1	Europe
connecting the Arab world with European performing arts	1	Europe
cultural heritage	2	Europe
cultural memory	1	Europe
dance heritage	1	Europe
Early Medieval Europe	1	Europe
East West relations	1	Europe
envision a democratic and sustainable future for Europe.	1	Europe
EU and neighbouring countries	1	Europe
Europe and neighbouring communities	1	Europe
European identity	1	Europe

European narratives	1	Europe
European urban spaces	1	Europe
European values	1	Europe
highlight music diversity in Europe	1	Europe
interaction between European citizens and newcomers	1	Europe
literary heritage	1	Europe
local myths	1	Europe
medieval music	1	Europe
performing arts at European heritage sites	1	Europe
relationship between Russia and EU	1	Europe
remote regions	1	Europe
shared history	1	Europe
shared memory	1	Europe
Viking archaeological sites	1	Europe
Viking heritage	1	Europe
visibility of European heritage, history and culture	1	Europe
visibility to national book communities at European level	1	Europe
age	1	Norms
citizenship	1	Norms
climate change	2	Norms
collective identity building	1	Norms
community empowerment	1	Norms
conflict	1	Norms
confronting intolerance, stereotypes, prejudices, and social fear	1	Norms
cross-cultural dialogue	1	Norms
disabled artists	1	Norms
Disadvantaged audiences	1	Norms
education	1	Norms
Environment	1	Norms

gender inequality	1	Norms
generational dialogue	1	Norms
globalization	1	Norms
Health	1	Norms
identity	1	Norms
inclusiveness for senior citizens	1	Norms
integration	1	Norms
intercultural dialogue	3	Norms
marginalized youth	1	Norms
micropolitical change	1	Norms
migrant integration through art	1	Norms
migration	4	Norms
multicultural integration	1	Norms
multiculturalism	1	Norms
nationalism	1	Norms
New urban narratives	1	Norms
radicalisation	1	Norms
representation of the marginalized groups	1	Norms
rising social and political challenges	1	Norms
shared public space	1	Norms
social and cultural change in the 21 <sup>st</sup> century	1	Norms
socio-ecological challenges	1	Norms
Turkey – women and migrants	1	Norms
UN sustainable cities	1	Norms
women's emancipation in architecture, civil engineering and design	1	Norms
women professionals in creative and cultural sector	1	Norms

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