

**Japanese Cinema Goes Global: Cosmopolitan Subjectivity and
the Transnationalization of the Culture Industry**

Yoshiharu Tezuka

**Department of Media and Communications
Goldsmith College, University of London**

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Declaration

I declare the work presented in this thesis is my own.

Abstract

This thesis investigates the Japanese film industry's interactions with the West and Asia, the development of transnational filmmaking practices, and the transition of discursive regimes through which different types of cosmopolitan subjectivities are produced. It draws upon Ulrich Beck's concept of "banal cosmopolitanization" (2006) – which inextricably enmeshes the everyday lives of individuals across the industrialized societies within the global market economy.

As has often been pointed out, modern Japanese national identity since the 19th century has been constructed from a geopolitical condition of being both a "centre" and a "periphery", in the sense that it has always seen itself as the centre of East Asia, while being peripheral to the flow of Western global processes. Contrary to the common belief that defeat in the war sixty years ago radically changed the Japanese social structure and value system, this sense of national identity and of Japan being "different from the West but above Asia" was left intact if not ideologically encouraged by the American Occupation policy through the preservation of many pre-war institutions (cf., Dower 1999; Sakai 2006). In a world that was to become dominated by a hierarchical logic of "the West and the rest" established against the backdrop of the Cold War, Japan and its culture effectively found itself in a privileged but ambiguous position as part of but not part of the 'West', something which was solidified by the international success of Japanese national cinema in the 1950s. But all this was to change with the process of globalization in the late 1980s and 1990s.

The main goal of this thesis is to analyse the ways in which globalization brought about a historic rupture in a national filmmaking community and discover the significance of this process. It shows how economic globalization undermined the material and discursive conditions that had sustained the form of national identity that had resulted from the process described above and gave rise to forms of cosmopolitan subjectivity which reveal a very different way of thinking about both Japan's position in the world and the sense of identification that younger filmmakers have towards it. This is illustrated through extensive interviews conducted with many filmmakers and producers in the Japanese filmmaking community.

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Note on Romanization and Translation.

In the thesis, Japanese names are put in the Western order, i.e. given name first then family name, since it is customary to put names in this order in English writing in Japan. Chinese, Korean and other Asian names are put in the usual East Asian format, i.e. family name, then given name, unless someone is well known by the Western order of names.

I have adopted the Hepburn System for romanization of Japanese. All translations of Japanese materials are mine, unless stated otherwise in the bibliography.

Preface

This research concerns the cultural consequences of economic globalization and the emergent cosmopolitan subjectivity, or, what is sometimes referred to as “really” or “actually existing cosmopolitanism” (cf., Malcomson 1998; Beck 2006) in the context of Japanese filmmaking communities. The questions raised by this process touch me personally and I would like to explain what motivated me towards undertaking this research.

I am a Japanese native and I arrived in Britain in 1984 to be trained as a filmmaker at the National Film and Television School. After graduation, I remained based in London and I have worked in both the Japanese and British film, and TV and advertising industries.

The mid-1980s to 1990s was a period of economic and cultural globalization, which radically stretched the sphere of individual experiences virtually and physically. I was often making TV documentaries about Japan, its people and culture etc, for British television at a time when Japan’s economic power was becoming a source of bewilderment and anxiety for the Western public in the late 1980s. Then, after Japan’s economy faltered in the late 1990s, I was often producing TV commercials in Eastern Europe for Japanese clients who loved locations with a high European feel and low production costs – an unbeatable combination for Japanese advertising projects. My moves between Japan and the West were motivated by economic as well as cultural considerations. I had been spending much of my time chasing commissions and jobs throughout these years, but I

decided I would like to pause for a while and to make sense of these experiences.

Bruce Robbins (1998) draws our attention to the first entry under “cosmopolitan” in the Oxford English Dictionary. It begins with a quote from John Stuart Mill’s *Political Economy* and says: “‘Capital,’ Mill wrote in 1848, ‘is becoming more and more cosmopolitan’. Cosmopolitanism would seem to mimic capital in seizing for itself the privilege (to paraphrase Wall Street) of ‘knowing no boundaries’.” (1998: 248) The complicity of cosmopolitanism with capitalism has been an age old truism and in the latest round of globalization, it was again “capital” or neo-liberalism which propelled globalization and a certain kind of cosmopolitanism. Though it was not my personal aspiration to be a “capitalist cosmopolitan” (Calhoun 2002: 103), I was fully aware that I was searching for opportunities in the capitalist system as it was rapidly globalizing.

I left Japan for a British film school because the conditions in the Japanese film industry appeared grim, and the future looked much brighter in the West. The Japanese studio production systems had collapsed in the 1970s, and, there were a few years in the early 1980s when the independent sector was invigorated by young filmmakers. In this short period I worked on numerous low or no budget independent films as a cinematographer. The working conditions on such independent films were usually harsh. Safety regulations were barely observed and production companies often had no insurance, but this didn’t worry me until one day I suffered the consequences. I was shooting a dangerous action sequence for a youth film about motorbike gangs when the bike on which I was filming crashed into twenty other motorbikes speeding towards us. The accident resulted in a spinal injury and many

broken bones and I was tied to a hospital bed for four months.

In the orthopedic ward, lying beside me in the same room, were other young men whose backs had been crushed by steel frames or who had fallen from high on a building while working on a construction site. It felt as if I was in an industrial human dumping ground. I was twenty-two then and this experience gave me time to think about my future.

Arjun Appadurai said that “the image, the imagined, the imaginary - these are all terms that direct us to something critical and new in the global cultural process: imagination as social practice” (1996: 31). According to Appadurai, the imagination “can become the fuel for action” (ibid.: 7). Indeed, as a filmmaker I was brought up on the French “Nouvelle Vague” and the American “New Wave” and so forth. I felt so much more affiliation with these cinemas and my future looked just so much better in the West in my imagination. So I started planning my escape from Japan.

I first looked at film schools in the United States. The American Film Institute (AFI) was said to be running the best professional training programs in the world but the National Film and Television School (NFTS) in Britain also came to my attention. I found out, to my surprise, that these two schools operated with rather different politics and philosophies which reflected two different cultural traditions within the West. To put it simply, the contrast between the two schools reflected American commercial culture on the one hand and European public culture on the other. Personally, the choice of the NFTS was the obvious one since it offered me far

better financial support and autonomy over the planning of my education. However, soon after I arrived in Britain, I was made to realize that things were changing very quickly and very drastically under the Thatcherite revolution. Today, the NFTS no longer operates in the way it did when I was there.

It used to be taken for granted that cultural industries were nationally organized and that cultural productions needed to be locally embedded in order to be meaningful. Culture was understood as being something rooted within the national framework and it was the depth of a particular cultural tradition that endowed the national cinema with universal appeal as an art form.

However, the last two decades of economic globalization have significantly undermined the national basis of such an understanding of cultural production and its value. On the one hand, the cosmopolitanism of capital has freed certain individuals from the national frameworks and engaged them in new forms of transnational cultural production and hybridization. But, on the other hand, it has significantly undermined the local capacity for the production of meaning and individuals have been subjected to the new constellation of power which has subjugated them according to certain criteria that have formed under the regime of transnational capitalism.

During the process of this research, I have spent a great deal of time talking with many of my contemporaries in the Japanese film industry and analyzing their experiences of this period of global change. This research is therefore an attempt to understand their experiences in conjunction with my own as someone who

has spend many years living abroad and working in the media industry.

Introduction

Something happened in the last part of the twentieth century which radically changed the relationship between the West and the rest, and among the “rest” between Japan and Asia. Radical claims about an epochal shift from modernity to postmodernity were made and debated, and, in this context, Japan was sometimes highlighted as the nation that “had for nearly three centuries ‘experienced life at the end of history’” (Alexandre Kojève cited in Miyoshi and Harootunian 1989: xiii). However, these drastic claims are “less convincing than Anthony Giddens’s *accentuated modernity* thesis (1990), by which he means the globalization of modernity’s transformative dynamics” (McGuigan 2006: 4, italics in original).

In the widely acclaimed book *Global Transformations* (1999), David Held et al. mapped out the globalization debate by identifying three different camps of theorists – the “hyperglobalist”, the “skeptical”, and the “transformationist.” According to Held et al., the “hyperglobalist” tends to exaggerate the extent to which “traditional nation-states have become unnatural, even impossible business units in a global economy” (e.g., Omae 1995: 5), whilst the “skeptical” position argues that globalization is a myth and defends the validity of the national framework from the view point of the political left. These two perspectives are thus diametrically opposed. But, the “transformationist” thesis offers a third perspective:

At the heart of the transformationist thesis is a conviction that, at the dawn of a new millennium, globalization is a central driving force behind the rapid social, political and economic changes that

are reshaping modern societies and the world order. (Held et al., 1999: 7)

According to the proponents of this view - such as Anthony Giddens, Manuel Castells, and Ulrich Beck - "contemporary processes of globalization are historically unprecedented such that government and societies across the globe are having to adjust to a world in which there is no longer a clear distinction between international and domestic, external and internal affairs" (ibid.: 7).

My approach in this thesis will follow the spirit of this transformationist view to investigate the ways in which transnational filmmaking practices have been conducted in the Japanese film industry from the post-World War Two period to the present. The goal is to illustrate how the subjectivities of the Japanese filmmakers, and their relationship to the West and the rest (of Asia), were transformed through the process of globalization during the last part of the twentieth century.

The prevalence and normalization of what Ulrich Beck called "banal cosmopolitanism" (2006: 10) is one of the most significant side effects of the economic globalization that is re-shaping individual subjectivity. According to Beck, in the societies in which our everyday life is largely sustained by producing and consuming goods and symbols from and for many different parts of the world, being cosmopolitan becomes ordinary, if not compulsory. Furthermore, the awareness of this connectedness and mutual dependence should undermine hitherto "banal nationalism" (Billig, cited in Beck 2002: 28) giving a chance for a cosmopolitan perspective to develop. Potentially, banal cosmopolitanization enables individuals to

recognize the otherness of others and gives them a disposition to interact with otherness positively. And most significantly, banal cosmopolitanization is a social reality which could transform the subjectivity of the mass population in the age of globalization. Cosmopolitanism in this sense is no longer just a philosophical and political ideal in the Kantian sense (I will discuss this topic further in Chapter Two), but it is something actually existing as a social practice of everyday life.

I will attempt to show, in the specific context of the post-war Japanese film industry, how different generations of Japanese filmmakers engaged and interacted with the structural opportunities and limitations posed by global forces, and how their subjectivity has been shaped by their transnational experiences and has changed as a result. I shall start the empirical part of this research by examining, comparing and contrasting two well-known events in post-World War Two history that brought the Japanese film and media industry onto the world stage – the internationalization of Japanese cinema in the 1950s and the globalization of Japanese film finance in the 1990s.

When the film *Rashomon* (Kurosawa, 1950) won the Golden Lion at the Venice film festival in 1951, just at the end of the American military occupation, it signaled both Japan's return to the international community after the war, and triggered the internationalization of Japanese cinema. Just thirty-odd years later, the acquisition by Japan's electrical giant, Sony, of Columbia Pictures, heralded the globalization of Japanese film finance on the eve of the end of the cold war. In retrospect, this was an event that marked the beginning of the conglomeration of media corporations and an era of the global culture industry – what Miller et al. have

called *Global Hollywood* (2000). By juxtaposing these two historic events and the case studies of individual players who were involved in them, I will show why and how globalization in the 1990s was qualitatively a very different phenomenon from internationalization in the 1950s for Japanese filmmakers and the Japanese film industry. In other words, I will be arguing that the process of globalization involved a historic rupture, and brought about new and unprecedented conditions for individuals in the Japanese film industry.

As numerous historians and cultural theorists have pointed out, modern Japanese national identity was produced under the geopolitical condition of being both “centre and periphery” (Sugimoto 1998) through the Westernization and modernization process from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. For a long time, “Japan has been the only non-Western country that has achieved and even surpassed the level of economic and technological development attained by industrialized Western countries” (ibid.: 85). Contrary to the common belief that the defeat in the war sixty years ago changed Japan’s social structure and cultural value system radically, the fundamentals of national identity - Japan being “different from the West but above Asia” - was kept intact, if not reaffirmed by the American Occupation policy which preserved many pre-war institutions (cf., Dower 1999; Sakai 2006). The discourse of Japan’s cultural uniqueness and superiority over other Asian countries was ideologically encouraged for the maintenance of western “democracy” in the East and the Southeast Asia region in the context of the cold war politics. The international recognition of the Japanese national cinema – following the success of *Rashomon* – effectively re-established the Japanese film industry’s leading role in Asia and its privileged position in a world dominated by the logic of

“the West and the rest.” However, all this was to change in the process of economic globalization and consequent cosmopolitanization.

The core of the argument I will put forward in this thesis is that the process of globalization changed the material and discursive conditions that had underlined the essentialist discourse of Japanese cultural uniqueness and identity. Now, as we enter the twenty-first century, it is important for Japan and others to recognize this change. I will show the ways in which numerous individuals in Japanese filmmaking communities are variously linked to transnational networks, and how they profess their cosmopolitan views and values in a world in which Japan is no longer so different from the West and is certainly not above Asia.

Chapters One to Three map out the theoretical and methodological terrain of the research. Chapter One traces the development of academic and lay discourses from Cultural Imperialism to various globalization, hybridity and cosmopolitanization theories. The long debate between political-economists and cultural studies writers over whether cultures of the world are being homogenized or heterogenized through TV and screen trades now seems to be synthesised to a view that can be summarized as: “the other side of cultural hybridity is transcultural convergence.” (Nederveen Pieterse 1995: 50) Cultural heterogenization through hybridity is actually bringing about cultural convergence on a global scale. With an eye to the global spread of neo-liberalism and the emergence of the global culture industry in the last part of the twentieth century, I will reconsider the claims made by the old-school leftists such as Herbert Schiller’s Cultural Imperialism thesis, and Adorno and Horkheimer’s ideas in “The Culture Industry” (1972). I will put the

alleged “transformative” potential of globalization and hybridity in question and examine the way power operates in the global age through what Kevin Robins has called “structures of common difference” (1997) with an example from the Asian film industry. Then, in the last section of this chapter, I will examine Ulrich Beck’s “cosmopolitan perspective” (2006), and the bio-political management of the cosmopolitan subject in the global age.

Chapter Two continues the discussion about cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitanization. I shall explore the difference between the normative philosophical cosmopolitanism of the Kantian tradition and the contemporary approach to cosmopolitanism in the social sciences, which is variously referred as “discrepant” (Clifford 1986), “actually existing” (Robins 1998) or “really existing” (Beck 2006) cosmopolitanism. Then, after a brief discussion on the cosmopolitanization of national cinema and industry with reference to the British case, I shall move on to develop distinctions between different types of “actually existing” cosmopolitan subjectivity by adopting Manuel Castells’ distinction between “three forms and origins of identity building.” (2004: 7)

Castells defines three different ways collective identities could be formed in relation to the dominant social power. Social actors can either legitimize or resist the dominant social power to form an identity, or alternatively, they can invent a new category as a third way. In Castells’ classification, these three forms of identity formation are named as Legitimizing, Resistance, and Project Identity. Here, following Castells, I shall develop concepts of Legitimizing, Resistance and Project Cosmopolitanism as tools to analyze how cosmopolitan subjectivity is formed in

relation to the dominant national power and identity.

Chapter Three discusses the methods, methodological issues and epistemological status of my empirical research. Ulrich Beck called for the development of “methodological cosmopolitanism” (2006:24), and this research intends to respond to his call by investigating the transnational experiences of Japanese filmmakers and the ways they construct their “narrative of the self” (Giddens 1991). As Anthony Giddens has pointed out, a “distinctive feature of modernity, in fact, is an increasing interconnection between the two ‘extremes’ of extensionality and intentionality: globalizing influences on the one hand and personal disposition on the other.” (1991: 1) Put briefly, the self becomes the intersection of the global and the local. Hence we can investigate globalization locally through analyzing individual stories of the self. The thesis is based on a series of in-depth interviews with Japanese filmmakers. I discuss my approach to these interviews and my relationship to my interviewees, invoking the concepts of “cinematic truth” and “shared ethnography” developed by the iconic filmmaker Jean Rouch.

Chapters Four to Seven are the main body of the thesis based on the empirical research. Chapter Four, “The Internationalization of Japanese Cinema: How Japan was Different from the West and Superior to Asia”, investigates Japan’s interaction with the West (mostly America) and Asia in the pre-globalization phase from 1945 to the 1970s. With case studies from the Japanese filmmaking community, this chapter aims to demonstrate how the Occupation and the post-war re-modernization process inscribed in Japan its own otherness against the West on the one hand, and a superiority complex over its Asian neighbours on the other.

Encouraged by the international success of *Rashomon*, the producer of Daiei Co., Masaichi Nagata, initiated the formation of the “Federation of Picture Producers in Asia” with the Hong Kong producer Run Run Shaw in 1954, which re-established Japan’s leading position among Southeast Asian film industries.

Chapter Five, “ The Globalization of Film Finance: The Actually Existing Cosmopolitanisms of Japanese Film Producers”, will show how the Globalization of Japanese film finance was something very different from “the internationalization of Japanese cinema.” While the previous “internationalization” threw back the oriental-to-be-looked-at-ness to the Western gaze through film exports, many Japanese producers in the “globalization” phase sought integration through direct financial investments into the film industries in the West, and as a result, disarticulated their assertion of cultural “uniqueness.”

This chapter argues that what was called *Kokusaika* (the Japanese configuration of economic globalization) in the mid 1980s to 1990s was about the end of Japanese cultural exceptionalism and the beginning of attempts to integrate Japanese particularity into the emerging global economy within the post-cold war constellation of powers. In practical terms, *Kokusaika* was a consumption-based project that purported to open the Japanese market for foreign goods, symbols, and labour. Thus *Kokusaika* was not designed to promote Japanese culture and industry. Instead, it attempted “to open the Japanese mind to other cultures and values as well as transform Japanese systems to meet internationally accepted norms and standards” (Itoh 2000: 39). Therefore, on the one hand *Kokusaika* was an ambivalent and contradictory process for the national government and industries. And on the other

hand it provided opportunities for Resistance Cosmopolitans – independent film producers and distributors – who attempted to carve out a niche within the national culture.

Chapter Six, “Global America? : Transnational Film Production from *Shogun* (1980) via *Lost in Translation* (2003) to *Grudge 2* (2006)”, investigates, first of all, the transition of the discursive regimes between the “before and after” in the globalization phase through a comparative case study of two Japanese-American co-productions, *Shogun* (1980) and *Lost In Translation* (2003). This comparative case study highlights the fact that a radical transition of discourse occurred. The discursive regime governing individuals in the Japanese filmmaking community clearly shifted from “national” to “transnational” or “cosmopolitan” between the two productions.

In this chapter, I also discuss a new technology of self-discipline used to regulate the cosmopolitan subject in the transnationalized culture industry through a case study of the re-make of the Japanese horror film, *Grudge 2* (2006) how cosmopolitanism could sometimes “degenerate into a set of strategies for the biopolitical improvement of human capital” (Cheah 2006: 495) and become impossible to distinguish from neo-liberal globalism.

Chapter Seven, “Pan-Asian Cinema?: The End of Japan-Centred Regional Cosmopolitanism,” investigates the changing dynamics of Asian regionalization and Japan’s relationship with Asian film industries, particularly with Hong Kong and mainland China. In the context of so-called “Japan’s return to Asia” (Iwabuchi 2002)

in the 1990s, Japanese media companies have invested heavily into cultural production in Asia. And the exchange between the Japanese and Hong Kong film industries has been reinvigorated in the process of the globalization of film finance after nearly twenty years of dormancy since the “Golden Age of Japan-Hong Kong Interchange in the 1960s.” (Yau 2003) This time, however, the balance of power has tipped and their relationship is different.

Japan’s relative decline and China’s rapid economic ascent in the early twenty first century has changed the dynamics of Asian regionalism. To put it succinctly, in the wake of a truly hybrid form of regionalism in East Asia, “flying-geese-style Japanization is out, ‘beyond Japanization’ is in” (Katzenstein, 2006: 2-7). The chapter shows that in a world in which Japan is no longer perceived to be different from the West, nor above Asia, “Asia” is simply bigger than any single nation-state, and becoming an “Asian” director, producer, or actor/actress, is one step closer to becoming “global”.

Chapter One

From Cultural Imperialism to Cosmopolitanism via Globalization: The Spread of Modernity and Neo-Liberal Hegemony.

'History' itself is often equated with the history of the West, and the story of modernization is hard to disentangle from the story of Westernization, and, in the twentieth century, from the story of Americanization (Morley 2006: 41).

Introduction

In this chapter I will look at how the discourses of globalization, unlike discourses of Cultural Imperialism (which provoke nationalist sentiment and affirm national identity), shape and produce cosmopolitan forms of subjectivity, and give rise to a new disciplinary regime which regulates cosmopolitan subjects. Caught up in the vicissitudes of national identity, we thus see the emergence of different types of cosmopolitan subjectivities in the process of globalization.

Cultural Imperialism thesis claims that the hegemonic culture, the American or Western, is homogenizing the rest of the world, but this line of arguments became very un-fashionable in British Cultural Studies in the last part of the twentieth century. Following Michel Foucault, John Tomlinson suggests that we should think of Cultural Imperialism as a set of "discourses" which operate within a

political power field rather than as a simple academic “theory” (1991: 9). Following and extending Tomlinson’s suggestion, I will treat the Cultural Imperialism thesis, as well as globalization theories, as sets of discourses and will draw attention to the differences and similarities between the two.

In doing so, I shall re-visit and evaluate some of claims made by the Cultural Imperialism argument with an eye to the global spread of neo-liberal marketization in the last part of the twentieth century. My aim here is to question and re-examine some of the axiomatic understandings of cultural globalization, which appear to be, in part, “promoting the rise of the informal empire of the USA and tending to support the growing neo-liberal hegemony of our times” (Morley 2006: 4). As I write, at the beginning of the 21st century, it has become axiomatic to say that “modernity is inherently globalizing” (Giddens 1990: 177), hence “globalization today is only partly westernization. Globalization is becoming increasingly decentered - not under the control of any one group of nations, still less of the large corporations. Its effects are felt as much in Western countries as elsewhere” (Giddens 1999: 31). Consequently, it has also become axiomatic to point to Japan as a prime example of a non-Western global centre acting as a source of cultural power (e.g., Iwabuchi 2002). However, I argue in this chapter that concepts such as media power and the core-peripheral power differential between the Anglo-American cultural zone as represented by Hollywood and the rest of the world, are still in need of being taken very seriously.

First, I shall trace the historic development of the discourse of Cultural Imperialism and the threat of cultural homogenization. Second, I shall critically

examine the discourse of globalization, understood as a force behind cultural heterogenization through hybridization. I will argue, following Kevin Robins, that the process of globalization represents neither a straightforward cultural homogenization nor heterogenization, but that what “globalization in fact brings into existence is a new basis for thinking about the relation between cultural convergence and cultural difference” (1997: 42). This insight - “the other side of cultural hybridity is transcultural convergence” (Nederveen Pieterse 1995: 50) - leads us to examine what Ulrich Beck has termed a “banal” and “really existing cosmopolitanization” (2006: 19). I will discuss how economic globalization, according to Beck, is shaping our reality in such ways that it brings about cosmopolitan subjectivity as a side effect. Finally, in the last section of this chapter, I will explore the part that the media is playing in shaping this cosmopolitan subjectivity. I will do this through presenting a discussion firstly of Arjun Appadurai’s (1996) observations about the special power peoples’ imaginations gain as a result of media consumption in the age of globalization, and secondly through a discussion of mass media as a new system of surveillance and as a disciplinary regime that controls cosmopolitan subjects. Drawing on Michel Foucault’s (1979) critique of the nineteenth century prison project of “Panopticon control”, Zygmunt Bauman has called this global technique of surveillance and bio-political control of the subject the “Synopticon” (1998).

It will be seen from this analysis how academic and lay discourses have shifted from Cultural Imperialism to focus on globalization, as the concepts of modernity and modernization have been reconsidered and reformulated. This chapter maps out the theoretical terrain that informs the subsequent chapters of empirical research and analysis in which I will examine historical changes in the ways

subjectivity is constructed in the Japanese film industry.

From Cultural Imperialism to Cultural Globalization

In academia and elsewhere, the globalization of film culture and its industries is most often talked about within the context of Hollywood's domination of all other national cinema industries: what is commonly referred to as the "Hollywoodization" of global culture and which is a part of a wider phenomenon known as "Americanization." Indeed, at the beginning of the new century, Hollywood appears to be ubiquitous and all-pervasive. It dominates not only multi-screen cinema complexes worldwide, but also other forms of media as well: magazines, newspapers, billboards, shop windows, TV sets and computer screens. In 1998, the 39 most popular films across the world all came from the US (Miller et al., 2001: 4). Meanwhile the condition of the industry in other major filmmaking countries declined: 'the percentage of the box office taken by indigenous films was down to 10% in Germany, 12% in Britain, 26% in France, 12% in Spain, 2% in Canada, 4% in Australia' (ibid.: 4) and 25-30% in Japan (Motion Picture Producers Association in Japan [MPAJ]).

Such talk of the domination of culture everywhere by the sounds and images produced in Hollywood, in America, or in capitalist cultures generally, is usually informed by a theoretical position known as the Cultural Imperialism thesis - or its revised version, known as the Media Imperialism thesis (cf., Boyd-Barrett 1977, 1998; Lee 1980). In the classic formulation, Herb Schiller claims that "the United

States exercises mastery over the global communication/cultural sphere” (2000: 49). In his seminal book *Mass Communications and American Empire* (1969), he traced the long history of American dominance within a series of different media and the role of the US government in supporting this dominance. When Herbert Hoover was the president of the Board of Trade in the 1920s, he spotted the potential of Hollywood as a form of advertising for exporting the “American way of life” and US consumer products abroad. Then in the 1940s, the head of the *Time Life* magazine conglomerate Henry Luce argued in his book *The American Century* (1941) that the USA’s potential to influence, if not control, imagery and opinion overseas was, in fact, the new quintessence of its power. To put it in short, according to Schiller, in effect, the “media are American” (Schiller, cited in Morley 2006: 32).

However, in the 1980s and 1990s, the weaknesses of the Cultural/Media Imperialism thesis were exposed by researchers who studied: (1) how audiences responded actively and differently to various forms of American TV drama (e.g., Ang 1985, 1996; Liebes and Katz 1990); (2) the complexity and multi-directionality of regional and international flows of media texts (e.g., Mattelart et al. 1984; Sinclair 1992; Sreberny-Mohammadi 1996); and (3) “glocalisation-from-below” strategies deployed by local (i.e. non-Anglo-American) filmmakers and other media content producers (e.g., Klein 2004).

In this section I shall outline a history of lay and academic discourses of Cultural Imperialism and examine how these were later superseded by discourses of globalization. In the book *Cultural Imperialism* (1991), John Tomlinson suggests that as an academic discourse, the term “Cultural Imperialism” does not have a very long

history. He says it “seems to have emerged, along with many other terms of radical criticism, in the 1960s and endured to become part of the general intellectual currency of the second half of the twentieth century” (Tomlinson 1991: 2). However, a lay discourse related to fears of cultural domination by a foreign power and of its homogenizing effects can be identified much earlier than this. In fact, it can be found from more or less the very beginning of the history of cinema, since cinema was “the last machine” (Chapman 2003: 52) of the Victorian age which made culture portable and the world radically smaller.

A series of revolutionary technological inventions in the Victoria era - the telephone (1876), the internal combustion engine (1876), the phonograph (1878), the electric light bulb (1879), wireless telegraphy (1894), and cinema (1895) - enabled a dramatic increase in international communication and trade (Chapman 2003: 53-4). The interconnectedness of the world in those days was remarkable. As Hirst and Thompson (1996) have demonstrated, as part of their “globalization skeptic” thesis (Held et al. 1999), it is possible to argue, in terms of international trades, that the world was even more economically interdependent and integrated at the beginning of the twentieth century than it is today.

By the 1920s, through the international trade in feature films the domination of cinema by Hollywood films had begun in those countries in which cinema was part of the cultural life of its inhabitants - i.e. mainly European nations. There, “American movies occupied as much as 80% of the screen time in those countries that had no established quotas against American imports to protect their own film production industries” (Maltby 1995: 126). In reaction to this fact, by the

late 1920s the governments of most film producing nation-states in Europe - but not that of Japan - had put in place protectionist mechanisms against this American “cultural invasion” (cf., Dickinson and Street 1985; Street 1997: 6-8) and a strong sentiment against what came to be called Cultural Imperialism could be found in many parts of the world. For example, in support of the British Cinematograph Films Act (1927), which restricted imports of American films, a Conservative MP wrote in an impassioned letter to *The Times* on January 25th, 1927:

Children and young men and women, who pour nightly into the cinemas in the UK, perpetually see stories of divorce, of running away with other men’s wives, distorted home life, burglaries, murders, revolvers, produced as a matter of course by all and sundry... evidence of police, judges, school teachers, all accumulates to prove the disastrous effect of this on the rising generation (Viscount Sandon, cited in Street 1997: 8).

In 1929 in Japan, the cultural critic Koushin Murobuse wrote in his book *America*:

Where could you find Japan not Americanized? How could Japan exist without America? And, where could we escape from Americanization? I dare to even declare that America has become the world, Japan is nothing but America today (Murobuse 1929, cited in Yoshimi 2001: 167).

Though it may appear to be exaggerated seen from today's viewpoint, his argument was a "crude statement of cultural imperialism." (Yoshimi 2001: 167) The Japanese sociologist Yoshimi (*ibid.*) indicates that a major wave of Americanization swamped Japan in the 1920s, with Hollywood films being its main agent.

Thus, feelings of resentment, grievance, and self-victimization associated with what today we call Cultural Imperialism, evidently already existed in the 1920s when America as a nation-state was still ascending as the world's new hegemonic power. What British and Japanese testimonies indicate is that, for them, their national space being inundated with foreign media texts was experienced as the imposition of "culture" by Americans to "exalt and spread the value and habits of foreign culture at the expense of native culture" (Bullock, cited in Tomlinson 1991: 3). However, what these third-world-like outcries from the elites of the great power nations of Britain and Japan indicate is the complexity of the concept of "culture" and the ambiguous relation it has with nation-states and their ruling classes. As Tomlinson points out, "culture" cannot be understood as a straightforward cohesion or imposition, which the term "imperialism" implies. It is very hard to argue, for example, that those "children and young men and women, who pour nightly into the cinemas in the UK" were coerced to go to the cinema or did not enjoy watching the American films. Therefore, one cannot help feeling that there is something patronizing about those who deplored the spread of American films and culture within certain segments of local society.

According to Curran and Park (2000), what is normally called the Cultural Imperialism thesis in media and communication studies, emerged as a critical

discourse related to modernization theories in the late 1960s. Modernization theories saw the world only from a Western perspective and “assumed the developing world should imitate the West. [They] argued that good communication was the key to ‘the most challenging social problem of our time – the modernizing of most of the world’” (Lerner, cited in Curran and Park 2000: 3). In their book *De-Westernizing Media Studies* (2000), Curran and Park discuss how modernization theorists, such as Daniel Lerner, concluded that, “the connection between mass media and political democracy is especially close” (Lerner 1963: 342). For Lerner, the modern communication system eases the transition from tradition to modernity. “The diffusion of new ideas and information...stimulates the peasant to want to be a freeholding farmer...the farmer’s wife to want to stop bearing children, the farmer’s daughter to wear a dress and to do her hair” (1963: 348). He also insists that this communication system matures the political system because it informs people about what is happening in society as a whole. It thereby encourages them to have opinions about public affairs and educates them to be participating subjects. However, Curran and Parks bring forward a counter-argument that this “was not how ‘modernization’ in fact took place in many pro-Western developing countries” (2000: 3). They maintain that, in most cases, “the media system was directed towards maintaining control rather than educating for democracy”, and “modernization” in this context merely fosters “dependency within an exploitative system of global economic relations. It promotes American capitalist values and interests, and erodes autonomy of local [national] culture in the process of global homogenization” (Curran and Park 2000: 3).

The Cultural Imperialism thesis was largely discredited and became hugely

unfashionable in cultural studies in the 1990s for a number of reasons. One of the major defects of how arguments around Cultural Imperialism were developed relates to the way it understood media audiences and the consumption of media texts. Discourses surrounding the notion of Cultural Imperialism ignored the active nature of audience reception and the hermeneutic process of appropriation that is an essential part of understanding the consumption of symbols. For example, a well-known study by Liebes and Katz (1990) examined the reception of the TV show “Dallas” among different ethnic groups in Israel. It demonstrated that different ethnic groups negotiated meanings according to their own cultural backgrounds and understood the program in different ways. Therefore, the reception and appropriation of symbols such as media texts are complex social processes, which leave a certain degree of autonomy for an audience to construct meanings according to their own contexts. Hence John Thompson convincingly argued:

The electronic invasion of American films and TV programs would serve to extend and consolidate a new imperial regime only if it could be reliably assumed that the recipients of these programs would internalize the consumerist values allegedly expressed in them; but it is precisely this assumption that must be placed in doubt (Thompson 1995: 173).

Secondly, the Cultural Imperialism thesis had placed “too much emphasis on the role of consumerist value and ha[d] neglected the enormous diversity of themes, images and representations which characterized the output of the media industry” (Thompson 1995: 170). It entirely discounted and ignored the reflexivity of

symbol creators and the complexity of the power play within media organizations. Thirdly, the Cultural Imperialism thesis assumed that the production of media texts happened predominantly in the core Western countries and that flows of media texts and communications were uni-directional from the core West to other parts of the world, designated as peripheral. But, this “core-periphery” model of cultural imperialism became empirically unsustainable with the de-centering effect of globalization in the 1990s. For example, Sreberny-Mohammadi (1996) argues that global flows of media texts are multidirectional and she points out that the idea that the West dominates the rest of the world actually obscures the complexity and the real dynamics which comprise the interactions between different cultures. John Sinclair (1992) shows that it is overly simplistic to think that Hollywood is the only centre of production and global flows of media texts all originate there. There are other “non-anglophone centres of international media production and trade based on what might be called ‘geolinguistic regions’: Bombay for the Hindi film industry; Hong Kong for Chinese genre movies; Cairo for Arabic films and television; and Mexico City for film and television production in Spanish” (1992: 99). Within the literature there was also talk of “reverse colonization” with reference to “the export of Brazilian television programmes to Portugal, and the Mexicanization of southern California” (Curran and Park 2000: 4), which suggests an ironical “winner loses” situation; “the very success of the West resulting in its loss of social advantage” (Tomlinson 1997: 145).

In a new era of complex globalization, the Cultural Imperialism thesis is now unfashionable in some quarters and is even derided as a “conspiracy theory.” However, in the world in which trade in TV and film is largely dominated by

Hollywood producers in which “only one of whom - Sony - is neither Anglo-American nor European” (Morley 2006: 35), the concept of media power and the centre-periphery power differential between the Anglo-American cultural zone represented by Hollywood and the rest of the world needs to be taken seriously. Moreover, we should be aware of the fact that, today, it is simply not helpful to think of even the only non-Anglo-American or non-European company in Hollywood - Sony - as “Japanese” (Sinclair 2007: 137). This is because, as John Sinclair rightly points out, Sony “is a prime example of a truly ‘global’ corporation, made so through what Lash and Urry call ‘international horizontal integration’” (1994: 130, cited in Sinclair: 137). Sony famously went through a very pricey process of “de-Japanization” for it to stay in Hollywood and become “a truly ‘global’ corporation” (cf., Griffin and Masters 1996; Negus 1997; Nathan 2000), while another Japanese electronics giant, Matsushita’s, buyout of MCA failed utterly and they withdrew from the operation. Fredric Jameson observed:

It does seem to me that fresh cultural production and innovation... are the crucial index of the centrality of a given area and not its wealth or productive power. This is why it was extraordinarily significant when the ultimate Japanese moves to incorporate the U.S. entertainment industry – Sony’s acquisition of Columbia Picture and Matsushita’s buyout of MCA – both failed: it meant that despite immense wealth and technological and industrial production, even despite ownership itself and private property, the Japanese were unable to master the essentially cultural productivity required to secure the globalization process for any given

competitor (Jameson 1998: 67).

It seems to me that these Japanese failures signify and support Herb Schiller's point in "Not Yet the Post-Imperial Era" (1991). In this essay Schiller updated his argument that the key change that has happened in the process of globalization today is that "national (largely American) media-cultural power has been largely (though not fully) subordinated to transnational corporate authority" so that if "American national power no longer is an exclusive determinant of cultural domination" and if it is "transnational corporate cultural domination" that is now the key issue, nonetheless, that domination still bears a "marked American input" (Schiller 1991:13-15).

Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, the ownership of Hollywood studios changed hands. Today Japanese, Europeans, Australians and Canadians also own parts of Hollywood, so that Hollywood is no longer simply an American institution. Hollywood became global and media ownership across the world converged into the hands of a few transnational media conglomerates. Robert McChesney (2000), who succeeded Schiller as the leading proponent of the Cultural Imperialism thesis in the late 1990s, states that we are seeing the creation of a global oligopoly; this happened to the oil and automobile industries earlier in the twentieth century and it is now happening to the entertainment industry. The global media market has come to be "dominated by the same eight transnational corporations, or TNCs, that rule US media: General Electric, AT&T/Liberty Media, Disney, Time Warner, Sony, News Corporation, Viacom and Seagram, plus Bertelsmann, the Germany-based conglomerate" (McChesney 2000: 260).

David Hesmondhalgh, the British author of *The Cultural Industries* (2002), states that the Schiller-McChesney tradition is part of North American political economy work, which has been “extremely important in cataloguing and documenting the growth in wealth and power of the cultural industries, and their links with political and business allies” (2002: 32-3). This tradition emphasizes the strategic use of political and economic power by capitalists, and assumes that the owners of media companies have total control over the media operation. Hesmondhalgh argues that although this work is sometimes dismissed as a “conspiracy theory”, it is wrong to do so because there is “no doubt that such strategic uses of power by businesses are common” (ibid.: 33). However, Hesmondhalgh suggests that there is a real weakness in this approach, in that it underestimates the contradictions and resistances within the media system by emphasizing only the concerted strategies of big businesses (ibid.: 33):

In my view, the processes of concentration, conglomeration and integration relentlessly catalogued by the Schiller-McChesney tradition are extremely important. But McChesney and others rarely comment on how such issues of market structure affect the *organization* of cultural production and the making of texts on an ordinary, everyday level. (Hesmondhalgh 2002: 34, italics in original)

In other words, the Schiller-McChesney tradition underestimates the power of the market over cultural production. Moreover, it entirely discounts the agency of

“symbol creators – the personnel responsible for the creative input in texts, such as writers, directors, producers, performers” (Hesmondhalgh 2002: 34). I agree with Hesmondhalgh that this is a fundamental weakness of the Schiller-McChesney tradition – and probably, of the political economy approach in general. It tends to neglect the reflexivity of those who work in the culture industries, and underestimate their agency to negotiate with, and construct the industrial structure in turn.

Therefore, one of the main aims of the present thesis is to provide nuanced accounts of individual experiences of globalization within the film industry and to make a contribution to a group of literatures variously called “the culture industry” (Adorno and Horkheimer 1972), “cultural industries” (Garnham 1990; Hesmondhalgh 2002), and the “creative industries.” To do so, in the latter chapters, I will provide case studies of a “project of the self” (Giddens 1991) narrated by a new generation of Japanese film producers which illustrates the ways they interact with radical structural changes brought by economic globalization in the late 1980s and 1990s.

In their recent book, *Global Culture Industry* (2007), Scott Lash and Celia Lury argue that with the globalization of media industries “things have changed” (2007: 3) and Adorno’s worst nightmares have come true. In his essay “Rethinking creative production away from the cultural industries” (2006), Keith Negus aptly documents the transition of academic discourses in British media and culture studies from a focus on Adorno and Horkheimer’s (1972) critical concept of “the cultural industry” to a plural and a descriptive concept of “cultural industries” (Garnham 1990), followed by yet another transition to a celebratory concept of the “creative industries”, which is more in tune with neo-liberalism. As Negus indicates, often

there is “uncritical and even celebratory reasoning associated with notions of ‘the creative industry’” (Negus 2006: 197). There, what is tacitly implied is that the market mechanism itself is creative – a viewpoint that I am critical of. Therefore, for the subtitle of the present thesis, I have chosen the old term “the culture industry” purposely in order to retain a critical edge against this type of celebratory discourse about the “creative industry” under the global spread of neo-liberalism.

According to John Tomlinson, who suggests that it is best to think of the concept of Cultural Imperialism as one “which must be assembled out of its discourses” (1991: 3), there are four main ways of talking about Cultural Imperialism in academic debates and elsewhere (ibid.: 19-28). He does not intend to create an exhaustive list. The four ways are:

- 1) Cultural Imperialism as “media imperialism” - domination by transnational media conglomerates.
- 2) Cultural Imperialism as a discourse of nationality - domination by American/Western culture over local cultures.
- 3) Cultural Imperialism as the critique of global capitalism - domination by capitalist culture, consumer culture, so called McDonaldization.
- 4) Cultural Imperialism as the critique of modernity – the global spread of modernity.

Tomlinson observes that the main claim of the Cultural Imperialism thesis common to many variations is that capitalism, America, or the West is a “homogenizing” cultural force, and that “the spread of capitalism [or American or Western culture] is the spread of a “culture of consumerism: a culture which involves

the commodification of all experiences” (ibid.: 26). Additionally, Tomlinson believes that there has to be a sense of domination by a powerful agent to justify the use of the word “imperialism”. However, there is some difficulty in seeing that consumer cultures are actually “imposed” on developing or non-Western countries. Thus, Tomlinson maintains, the grounds for a neo-Marxist critique of consumerism as a cultural ill in a wider sense is not without ambivalence. It presupposes that a capitalist culture of consumerism is “inherently incapable of providing meaningful and satisfying cultural experience” (ibid.: 26), and tends to regard those local subjects who were seduced by the capitalist, American or Western culture as regrettable cases of “ideological dupes.”

The final way of talking about Cultural Imperialism on his list - as a critique of modernity - has more explanatory power and bridges to globalization theory (ibid.: 26). The critique of modernity is not about the domination of one country over another. Thus, this discourse actually goes beyond the scope of what was hitherto called the Cultural Imperialism thesis. Tomlinson further suggests that the first three ways of talking about cultural imperialism can ultimately come together as a critique of modernity because mass communication, the nation-state and capitalism are all distinctive features of modernity. For Tomlinson, the “various critiques of cultural imperialism could be thought of as a (in some cases inchoate) protest against the spread of (capitalist) modernity.” (1991: 173) Thus, it was natural that talk of Cultural Imperialism was superseded by the globalization debates in the 1980s through to the 1990s.

We may conclude from Tomlinson’s critique that discourses of Cultural

Imperialism were inchoate forms of talking about modernity and modernization. Additionally, this spread of modernity - globalization - is transforming power relations between the core West and the rest of those nations who are on the periphery. Therefore it is no longer appropriate to talk about their relationship in terms of domination and subjugation - the line of argument which I shall critically examine in the next section. I will close this section with his remark:

For, though the world has changed from one in which it was possible to think of a simple division between 'imperialist' and 'subordinate' cultures, there remains a sense of legitimate protest in these critical discourses. We may think of protests against cultural imperialism as claims for a human level of cultural experience in a globalised system.

(Tomlinson 1991: 177-8)

So, what is globalization and how does it transform our life? And where does power lie in this new paradigm?

Modernity and New Global Structure of Common Difference

[Globalization] is more than a diffusion of western institutions across the world in which other cultures are crushed... We are speaking here of emergent forms of world interdependence and planetary consciousness [and] the way in which these issues are approached and coped with ... will inevitably involve conceptions and strategies

derived from non-western settings (Giddens 1990: 173).

The dominant strain of global mass culture, according to Stuart Hall, 'remains centred in the West... and it always speaks English'. Though responding to cultural differences, 'it is wanting to recognize and absorb those differences within the larger, overarching framework of what is essentially an American conception of the world' (Hall 1997: 33, cited in Curran and Park 2000).

In contrast to the spirit of skepticism displayed in the epigraph above, Anthony Giddens famously stated that "modernity is inherently globalizing" (1990: 177). According to him, "modernity refers to modes of social life or organization which emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently became more or less worldwide in their influence" (ibid.: 3). Now, globalization, as we have seen in the last section, is understood to be something different from physical or cultural imperialism that transforms power relations between the West and the rest. Giddens argues that although it is undeniable that there are significant inequalities and power imbalances existing among nations, "globalization today is only partly Westernization. Globalization is becoming increasingly de-centered - not under the control of any group of nations, still less of the large corporations. Its effects are felt as much in Western countries as elsewhere" (1999: 31). Thereupon, Giddens concludes that globalization involves "the declining grip of the West over the rest of the world" (1990: 52) as the institutions of modernity that first arose there have now become ubiquitous.

Starting from Anthony Giddens' theory of globalization, in this section, I will discuss the putative homogenization and heterogenization of global culture through various forms of cultural mixing and indigenization – the processes known variously as cultural hybridity, bricolage, creolisation, or glocalization-from-below and so forth. Even Stuart Hall, who is normally skeptical about optimistic views of globalization, as we have seen in the above epigraph, once stated that, “‘hybridity’ is transforming British life” (1995: 18). Like Hall, many post-colonial theorists including Homi Bhabha and Paul Gilroy regard “hybridization” as an exciting aspect of globalization, which undermines the dominant national culture and transforms the cultural life of metropolitan centres by creating new differences.

But at the same time, “some unexciting caution” (Hannerz 1996, cited in Morley 2006: 40) is necessary before we celebrate the newness of such hybrid cultural differences created by globalization. Because, as I will show in this section, it is not only immigrants, diasporas and common local populations who are mixing their home cultures with the dominant American/ Western culture, but also transnational capital and the culture industry that are hybridizing. Based on an anthropological study which examined Caribbean aspirations for Miss Universe beauty contests, Kevin Robins identified the emergence of new global “structures of common difference” (Robins 1997: 43). This “new global cultural system promotes difference instead of suppressing it, but selects the dimensions of difference” (Wilk, cited in Robins 1997: 43). Later in this section, I will argue, following Robins, that the globalizing hegemony is to be found in these “structures of common difference,” which celebrate particular kinds of difference - they are normally the marketable cultural differences that are hybridized in dialogue with western modernism - while

submerging, deflating or suppressing other kinds of difference. I shall provide a brief illustration of how this operates in the film industry with discussion of the so-called “Asianization of Hollywood.” (Klain 2004). The globalization of film industries provided opportunities for many Asian filmmakers, including some Japanese, to get their work seen internationally, and to work in and for the major Hollywood studios. Here, I shall pose a question that will be explored empirically later with the Japanese case study, which is whether such “global opportunities” are empowering Asian filmmakers or damaging the local capacity to produce films with locally specific meanings? How do such “global opportunities” shape the subjectivities of the filmmakers?

Anthony Giddens famously defined globalization as essentially “action at distance” (1994: 96). By this he means that a major characteristic of modernity is its tendency to create distance between the elements of life which were hitherto organized within the local community, but which are now organized globally. Thus, in modern life, people tend to communicate over long distances, conduct their business at a distance and fall in love and form families at a distance. Globalization creates complex networks which connect locals to global centres, as well as connecting locals to other locals.

Globalization can thus be defined as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa. This is a dialectical process because such local happenings may move in an obverse direction from the very

distanciated relations that shape them. *Local transformation* is as much a part of globalization as the lateral extension of social connection across time and space (Giddens 1990: 64, italics in original).

In the present phase of modernity, which Giddens calls “late-modernity”, a monogamous tie between culture and locality is broken. Modernity “tears space away from place by fostering relations between ‘absent’ others, locationally distant from any given situation of face-to-face interaction” (Giddens 1990: 18). Place becomes increasingly “phantasmagoric: that is to say, locals are thoroughly penetrated by and shaped in terms of social influences quite distant from them” (ibid.: 19). For Giddens, and many theorists inspired by him such as Ulrich Beck, David Held, Roland Robertson, Kevin Robins, and John Tomlinson - this is the central characteristic of globalization; that is, the ways of living hitherto anchored in locality and tradition become “dis-embedded. Therefore, there is a ‘lifting out’ of social relation from local contexts of interaction”, which is “re-embedded” (Giddens 1990: 21) in the far distance with different social and cultural contexts. Transportation and communication systems - the train, the automobile, the airplane, the telephone, the fax, the internet, and satellite systems etc - are very important to this development. As Tomlinson indicates, the global modernity that is understood in this sense is a kind of “time-space transformation” through “deterritorialization” (1999: 48) with the mass media and popular culture acting as significant dis-embedding/re-embedding mechanisms.

Hence, globalization is not only about the rise of transnational capital and the

eroding power of nation-states. As Kevin Robins puts it, “globalization is ordinary.” (1997: 12). We all are exposed to, and increasingly aware of, the consequences of globalization in everyday life. Ulrich Beck called this permeating ordinariness of globalization “banal cosmopolitanism” (2006: 10); and Tomlinson called it “the mundane experience of deterritorialization.” (1999: 113)

There was once this English man who worked in the London office of a multinational corporation based in the United States. He drove home one evening in his Japanese car. His wife, who worked in a firm which imported German kitchen equipment, was already home. Her small Italian car was often quicker through the traffic. After a meal which included New Zealand lamb, Californian carrots, Mexican honey, French cheese and Spanish wine they settle down to watch a programme on their television set, which had been made in Finland. The program was a retrospective celebration of the war to recapture the Falkland Islands. As they watched it they felt warmly patriotic, and very proud to be British. (Williams 1983: 177).

In the above passage, Raymond Williams illustrates a typical Western bourgeois life style and the contradictory nature of national identity in the globalized world. In some ways, it is possible to argue that the globalization of culture has taken the form of a global spread of the Western bourgeois lifestyle, but it is hard to cast this as “Cultural Imperialism” because the Western bourgeois lifestyle is highly eclectic and cosmopolitan. To a large degree and over a long period of time, it is undeniable that every corner of the world has become more similar because of the

spread of modernity. For example, it is only a century or so ago that the common Japanese people started wearing Western clothes. However, the process of global homogenization is far from progressing in an obvious or linear way. On the contrary, one obvious and immediate effect of globalization through deterritorialization is not cultural homogenization but “hybridization” (Robins 1997: 18). The anthropologist Jan Nederveen Pieterse reflected on the significance of such cultural intermixture:

How do we come to terms with phenomena such as Thai boxing by Moroccan girls in Amsterdam, Asian rap in London, Irish bagels, Chinese tacos and Mardi Gras Indians in the United States, or Mexican schoolgirls dressed in Greek togas dancing in the style of Isidora[sic] Duncan? How do we interpret Peter Brooks directing the Mahabharata, or Ariane Manouchkine staging a Shakespeare play in Japanese Kabuki style for a Paris audience in the Theatre Soleil? (Nederveen Pieterse 1995: 53)

Within post-colonial and cultural studies, the term “hybridity” normally indicates a category at “the edge or contact point of diaspora, describing cultural mixture” (Hutnyk 2005: 79) in which immigrants meet the host culture; or vice versa, the indigenous population meets and adopts imported culture brought over by immigrants or the mass media. This “hybridity” is subversive in the context of diasporic cultural politics, and may be emancipatory for the indigenous population which adapts the imported culture and appropriates and re-produces it within its own cultural context. Homi Bhabha has spoken of “hybridity” as “camouflage” (1994: 193) and “heresy” (1994: 226), and, for him, it is a “third space” for the creation of

new identities. Salman Rushdie famously wrote of “the transformation that comes of new and unexpected combinations of human beings, cultures, ideas, politics, movies, songs...Melange, hotchpotch,...a bit of this and a bit that is how newness enters the world” (1991: 394). The discourse of “hybridity” in postmodern and post-colonial literature emphasizes the power and autonomy of those who confront the dominant culture and create new “differences.” However, according to Negri and Hardt, the optimism of these theorists underestimates the capacity of power to accommodate, manage or even capitalize on such new “differences.” They said:

[P]ower has evacuated the bastion they [postmodern and post-colonial theorists] are attacking, and circled around to their rear to join them in the assault in the name of difference (Hardt and Negri 2000: 138).

Many examples of this can be found in the post-war and recent histories of the Japanese film industry, which I will explore in later chapters. But for now, I shall discuss Christina Klein’s (2004) paper on the globalization of Chinese cinema and film industry called “Martial arts and the globalization of US and Asian film industries.”

This paper is important to a study of Japan because currently something similar to what happened to the Chinese is also happening to Japanese cinema and the film industry. In this paper, Klein argues: “today we are seeing a partial erosion of the boundaries that once separated Hollywood from local Asian film industries” (Klein 2004: 361). These phenomena became visible through a series of events, such as the box office success of hybridized martial arts films like *Crouching Tiger*,

Hidden Dragon (Ang Lee 2000) and *Hero* (Zhang Yimou 2002); imports of major Martial Arts stars, like Jackie Chan and Jet Li; and the import of directors and choreographers like John Woo for large budget Hollywood productions. Klein argues that this is not a simple case of Cultural Imperialism, but a two-way process that is hybridizing both the Hollywood and Asian film industries. It is not just that the Asian film industries have started producing films more like slick Hollywood entertainment, but also that production practices in Hollywood have changed in order to accommodate the audience's demands for new types of action entertainment, as a result of the fact that the audience base for Hollywood films outside the US has broadened significantly. Foreign income has always been important for Hollywood, increased significantly during the 1980s and 1990s. The studios' film rental income from abroad rose from around 35% in the early 1980s (Segrave 1997: 228) to over 50% in 1994 (Balio 1998: 60; Segrave 1997: 288). Therefore, Klein argues, "this dependence on the overseas market has profoundly affected the form and content of Hollywood movies... The globalization of audiences has had a denationalizing effect on the US film industry" (2004: 363). She says that Hollywood has been transformed and is in need of new differences, which will cater for audience tastes that have been broadened by globalization - that is, the deterritorialization of film industries on both sides of the Pacific.

Criticising the Cultural Imperialism thesis, Klein maintains that it does not make sense to be for or against globalization (2004: 362). Instead, following Ien Ang, she urges that we attend to the "contradictory loss and opportunities" that the globalization of media systems allows and argues that we must explore the ways in which globalization has "actively and differentially responded to and negotiated

within concrete local contexts and conditions” (Ang 1996: 148, cited in Klein 2004). In order to understand the complex and contradictory dynamics of today’s global culture, Klein further states that we must abandon the fiction of pure, homogeneous cultures that are corrupted by foreign influences (Morley and Robins 1995: 7, cited in Klein 2004) and recognize the capacity for strategic manoeuvring among people who operate outside the established centres of media production (Appadurai 1996: 31, cited in Klein 2004).

From this perspective, the “Hollywoodization” and hybrid films which Asian film industries produce today is a “strategy on the part of the local Asian film industry to go global themselves - to remake themselves so that they can compete more successfully with imported Hollywood movies and thus reclaim a greater domestic share of their own domestic market” (2004: 374). Klein quotes Zhang Yimou, the director of *Hero* who sees the film as a “commercial action film” and has been very clear that *Hero* was a showcase for “the future of Asian cinema” that lies in “well-crafted commercial productions” (2004: 375). Therefore, although Klein recognizes that there is a power imbalance between Hollywood studios and Asian film industries in terms of their ability to shape the current transformation, she concludes that: “it is a mistake to see Asian film makers and industries merely as passive victims - or as being on the brink of death” (2004: 379). There is no doubt that “differences” are commodified, but, according to Klein, it is all intentional and part of a larger “strategy” by Asian filmmakers.

Klein is absolutely right to recognize that the “Hollywoodization” of Asian cinema and film industries was an intentional and strategic move on the part of Asian

filmmakers. But if so, its counterpart, “Asianization” of Hollywood also needs to be recognized as a strategic move by transnational capital in Hollywood. Close examination is necessary to understand how the two strategies play against each other in the locus of film production. As Klein has recognized, the power imbalance between Hollywood and Asian film industries in economic terms is “huge” to say the least. For example, the budget for the Japanese original of the film *Ringu* (*The Ring*, Hideo Nakata 1998) was approximately one million US dollars while the estimated budget of the Hollywood re-make of *The Ring* (Gore Verbinski 2002) was 48 million (IMDB pro – *The Ring*). As another example, the director Takashi Shimizu was paid less than 30,000 US dollars for the Japanese original of *Juon* (*Grudge*, Shimizu 2000), since the film was a Japanese low-budget affair. However, his fee for the Hollywood re-make *Grudge 2* (2006) was said to be beyond one million (Fukushima interview 2006; Yanagijima interview 2006).¹ And, needless to say, Japan holds the biggest market and richest film industry in East Asia. Therefore, an additional issue that is in need of close examination in order to better understand the dynamics of the globalization of film industries is how this “huge” global-local power differential is shaping the subjectivity - i.e. cultural affiliations, value and agency - of Asian filmmakers, and how this is affecting the Asian film industries’ capacity to address locally specific issues and to produce locally specific meanings as a result. I shall address this issue of “Hollywoodization” of local film productions and the emptying out of local meanings further in chapter six, with case studies of American film productions in Japan.

¹ I interviewed the Japanese line producer of *Grudge 2*, Satoshi Fukushima on 11th August 2006, and the cinematographer Katsumi Yanagijima on 6th August 2006. Although Fukushima was not allowed to disclose the actual budget figures to me by his contract, he did not deny these estimations.

The move by well-known art house directors such as Zhang Yimou away from “art film” to “commercial action movies” signifies the decline of “art film” production and distribution in a wider context. Before, art house film distribution was the only route for Asian filmmakers to gain international recognition, hence many “art films” were financed for the sake of privilege, but this is no longer the case. Also, many national governments encourage this “move towards market competitiveness by redirecting resources away from the production of art films, which hold little appeal for local viewers, and towards higher-quality commercial fare” (Jazmines 2002; Wu 2002, cited in Klein 2004: 375). Therefore, while hybridized Asian films are enriching and heterogenizing the highly commercialized American film culture, the hybridization of Asian film cultures is only happening within a limited bandwidth of tastes due to the fact that hybridized Asian films are aimed at American audiences, as well as local audiences whose tastes have been cultivated by Hollywood films. At the time of writing in the early twenty-first century, some Asian film industries are successfully regaining local audiences back from Hollywood. However, at least in the Japanese case, this has been achieved through further marginalization of smaller independent productions that were politically and aesthetically more challenging.² Therefore, despite the flourishing of hybrid Asian film productions, the overall effect of globalization for Asian film

² In 2006, Japanese films achieved over 50 % of the domestic market share the first time in over twenty years. Four hundred and seventeen Japanese films were released theatrically earning 107,944 million yen in the box office, and 28 Japanese films earned over 1,000 million yen (MPAJ). However, the problem for independent filmmaking in Japan is that it was the consortiums of the major studio and TV broadcasters who produced most of those 28 successful films. These 28 films earned 77,190 million yen (71% of total earnings) and left only 30,754 million yen to share among the other 389 films (ibid.).mm

cultures is convergence, if not homogenization, of a kind, because the process of globalization systematically selects and promotes the kinds of differences that are acceptable for global audiences and excludes other kinds of differences.

As Nedeveen Pieterse (1995) indicates, there is in fact no contradiction or incompatibility between hybridization and transnational convergence. Pieterse points out that “the other side of cultural hybridity is trans-cultural convergence” (1995: 50). He reconsiders some examples of hybridization, which I have quoted earlier in this section, and he concludes that the “Mexican schoolgirl dressed in Greek Togas dancing in the style of Isidora[sic] Duncan, mentioned before, reflects transnational bourgeois class affinities, mirroring themselves in classical European culture. Chinese tacos and Irish bagels reflect ethnic crossover in employment patterns in the American fast food sector. Asian rap refers to cross-cultural convergence in popular youth culture” (ibid.: 50).

Finally, Kevin Robins sums up this debate on the homogenization and heterogenization of global culture by introducing a concept of global “structures of common difference” (1997: 43). According to Robins, we should not think of globalization in terms of homogenization in the old way, because globalization has brought out “new forms of universal culture, new kinds of particularism, new hybrid developments” (ibid.: 42) that have been transforming our cultural experiences to a significant degree. However, what globalization in fact brings “into existence is a new basis for thinking about the relation between cultural convergence and cultural difference” (ibid.: 42). Very importantly, he locates the operation of globalizing power in these “structures of common difference.” Robins concludes by quoting the

anthropologist Richard Wilks, who studied “The Local and Global in the Political Economy of Beauty” (1995) in the Caribbean country of Belize:

The new global cultural system promotes difference instead of suppressing it, but selects the dimensions of difference. The local systems of difference that developed in dialogue with western modernism are becoming globalized and systematized into structural equivalents of each other. This globalized system exercises hegemony not through *content*, but through *form*. In other words, we are not all becoming the same, but we are portraying, dramatizing, and communicating our differences to each other in ways that are more widely intelligible. The globalizing hegemony is to be found in what I call structures of common difference, which celebrate particular kinds of diversity while submerging, deflating or suppressing others. (Wilks 1995: 124 italics in original)

In the process of this selection of cultural difference and resulting cultural convergence through hybridization, Robins maintains that while “*forms*” of communication converge, “*contents*” of communication diversify. Thus he stresses that the structure of common difference selects difference through “*forms*”, and power resides in “*forms*” rather than “*content*.”

Here I think it is useful to apply this concept of the “structures of common difference” and their operation to the “Asianization of Hollywood.” As we have seen, the Asian films that became global successes adopted and adapted the “forms” of

entertainment that had been commercially successful in the US almost strategically. In doing so, the global success of Asian films diversified and broadened the range of the media “content” that Hollywood studios were willing to finance and distribute. However, this did not mean that the success of Asian films had an impact on the mode of Hollywood production and the “forms” of text it circulated. As a matter of fact, one of the major consequences of their success was the convergence of “forms” of films produced in Asian film industries into a narrower range of “forms” that are intelligible and enjoyable by audiences whose tastes have been shaped by Hollywood entertainment (I shall look at these structures of common difference in more detail in Chapter Four).

The structures of common difference create a division between a certain kind of “elite” difference that can be included in global modernity and other kinds of difference that are to be excluded. In his critique of current cultural studies discourses, John Hutnyk argues that “syncretism and hybridity are academic conceptual tools providing an alibi for a lack of attention to politics, in a project designed to manage the cultural consequences of colonization and globalization” (2005: 92). He draws attention to the de-politicization of various concepts in cultural studies, the notion of “hybridity” in particular. He cites Hardt and Negri (2000) and points out that from the standpoint of many in deprived parts of the world, concepts such as “hybridity, mobility and difference do not immediately appear as liberatory in themselves” (Hardt and Negri 2000: 154). Hutnyk questions whether the use of the term “hybridization” could offer something more than an uncritical celebration of difference within an equalization of cultures. If not, he argues, it would just confirm Adorno’s worst fear of a market which sells “fictitiously individual nuance” (Adorno

1991: 35) in a standardized world where each product must claim to be “irreplaceably unique” (Adorno 1991: 68). Even worse, as Rey Chow (1998) suggests, it could mean that these concepts serve to “obliterate” the question of politics and histories of inequality, thereby occluding “the legacy of colonialism understood from the viewpoint of the colonized” (Chow 1998, cited in Hutnyk 2005: 96). Chow continues:

The enormous seductiveness of the postmodern hybridite’s discourse lies... in its invitation to join the power of global capitalism by flattening out past injustice in a way that accepts the extant relation of power and where ‘the recitation of past injustices seems tedious and unnecessary’ (Chow 1998: 156, cited in Hutnyk 2005: 96).

Therefore, without attendant political projects, Hutnyk concludes that the concept of hybridity only serves those whose differences are included within the system, otherwise it works as a cover up for historic, as well as newly emerging, forms of polarization and inequality.

Bearing this insight in mind, although the popularity of hybridized Asian cinema provides opportunities for some Asian filmmakers, it is possible to argue that those exceptional successes work to obliterate the historic disparity of power between the West and the rest and the changing dynamics between Japan and the rest of Asia - as well as to cover up the newly emerging polarization between those who are considered to be “globals” and the “locals.” I shall explore this question of the

historic power disparity and changing dynamics of interaction between the Japanese and other Asian film industries (mainly Hong Kong) in Chapters Four and Seven.

Banal Cosmopolitanism and New Global Bio Politics

As we have seen so far, globalization intensifies interactions between distant places and cultures. Through the phenomenon of hybridization, it also transforms the ways we think about cultural diversification and cultural convergence. It nurtures a deeper economic and political interdependence that is a pre-condition of a new cosmopolitan subjectivity.

In this section, I shall firstly discuss what Ulrich Beck calls “actually/ really existing cosmopolitanization” (2006: 19). Then, I shall consider two contrasting views on how the media is a part of this cosmopolitanization of our social reality: Arjun Appadurai’s (1996) observations about how people’s imaginations are gaining special powers through media experience in the global age, on the one hand; and Zygmunt Bauman’s (1998) observations about how the mass media is functioning as a form of bio-political technology to discipline and control cosmopolitan subjects in the global age, on the other hand.

Cosmopolitanization is, according to Ulrich Beck, an unintended cultural consequence of economic globalization. The process of globalization poses global threats and opportunities at the same time; or rather, for Beck, global threats themselves are the opportunity for the formulation of cosmopolitan consciousness.

Based on his *Risk Society* (1992) thesis, Beck argues that “threats create society, and global threats create global society” (2000: 38). As a positive side effect of globalization, Beck speaks of the emerging possibility of constructing a “cosmopolitan society”, in which a “rooted cosmopolitan” consciousness prevails among its members. In this cosmopolitan society, the “rooted cosmopolitans” make local commitments, and within this process, the otherness of others is treated as “both different and equal” (Beck 2003: 26). Like Immanuel Kant, Beck defines cosmopolitanism as a way of combining the universal and particular, national and world citizenship. However, unlike Kantian philosophy, for Beck, cosmopolitanization is not an ideal or a goal to which enlightened subjects aspire, but it is a social reality that is emerging as an inescapable but contingent consequence of globalization.

Ulrich Beck defines cosmopolitanization as “internal globalization from within the national society” (2002: 17), which transforms experiences and the consciousness of the subject based on a “dialogical imagination,” as opposed to “monological imagination” of national society. Having a “dialogical imagination” means having “internal others” in one’s own life, that is to acknowledge and respect the “coexistence of rival ways of life in the individual experience, which makes it a matter of fate to compare, reflect, criticize, understand, [and] combine contradictory certainties” (ibid.: 18). This is a challenge as well as an opportunity that we face in the age of globalization.

Most post-national theories assume that “transnational social space emerges only as a result of deliberate action ... they assume the existence of

purposive actors and institutions. The theory of *World Risk Society*, by contrast, does not make this assumption” (2000: 38-9). According to Beck, in *Risk Society*, it is no longer possible to ignore or “externalize the side-effects and dangers of highly developed societies” (ibid.: 38). Furthermore, it is this awareness of risk that produces cosmopolitan dispositions and subjectivity, and makes people reflexively interact with the perceived risk of global catastrophes. Additionally, Beck argues that “transnational social space also comes about conflictually and mysteriously through unintended, denied or ‘repressed’ threats, ‘behind people’s back’, as it were” (ibid.: 39). Therefore, the trajectory towards transnational social reality is far from being a linear progression without contradictions, paradoxes and ambiguities. Rather, it is a dialectic process between the cosmopolitan tendency and its enemies. Finally, this dialectic process has first emerged as unconscious and passive cosmopolitanism – what Beck calls “banal cosmopolitanism.” Banal cosmopolitanization “shapes reality as a side effect of world trade or global danger (climate disaster, terrorism, financial crisis)” (2004: 134). In this way, we became “latent cosmopolitans” without our knowing or explicitly willing it. In the process, “my existence, my body, my life, became part of another world, of foreign cultures, religions and histories and global interdependence risks” (ibid.: 134).

Based on and extending the British sociologist Michael Billig’s concept of *Banal Nationalism* (1995), Beck develops the concept of “banal cosmopolitanization” and argues that today “banal cosmopolitanism appears to be displacing banal nationalism – involuntarily and invisibly, and throughout the world” (2002: 28). By banal nationalism Billig means that there are mundane ways in which we almost unconsciously and repeatedly “show our colors renewing our national

identity and demarcating it from others through a host of every day routines” (Billig 1995, cited in Beck 2002: 28). In today’s world under globalization, however, Beck argues that everyday nationalism is “constantly circumvented and undermined and we experience ourselves integrated into global processes and phenomena” (Beck 2002: 28) – This is reminiscent of Raymond Williams’ illustration of a typical Western bourgeois life in the previous section: an English couple whose everyday life was surrounded and sustained by foreign goods and symbols but “felt warmly patriotic, and very proud to be British” as they watched a program about Falkland Islands war on a TV set made in Finland (Williams 1983: 177). Probably, Williams’ original intention was just to show how nationalism became contradictory in modern life. However, I believe it is certainly possible to take his point further and argue that banal cosmopolitanism is displacing banal nationalism for the sake of the material and symbolic well-being of our every day life in the age of economic globalization.

At the same time, Beck warns us that “the basic fact that human experiential space is being subtly changed through an opening to cosmopolitanization should not lead us to assume that we are all becoming [ethically conscious] cosmopolitans” (2004: 154). Cosmopolitanism in the real world is often “distorted” (2004: 135). It usually occurs as a forced and unintentional side effect. Therefore, “it is quite another question whether this side effect then becomes conscious - leading to a cosmopolitan perspective – or even produces global public space” (2004: 144). Thus, banal cosmopolitanism is merely a latent cosmopolitanism and the transformation of this into a conscious cosmopolitan perspective hinges on an individual’s capacity for imagination.

Like Beck, Arjun Appadurai (1996) argues for a theory of historic rupture by globalization and points to the centrality of the mass media in the constitution of transnational collective imaginations and subjectivity. *In Modernity at Large* (1996), Appadurai takes “media and migration as its two major, and interconnected, dialectics and explores their joint effect on the *work of the imagination* as a constitutive feature of modern subjectivity” (1996: 3, italics in original). According to Appadurai, “the imagination in the post-electronic world plays a newly significant role... Ordinary people have begun to deploy their imaginations in the practice of their everyday lives” (ibid.: 5). The images of the Western modernity disseminated globally through the mass media fill people in the periphery with a desire for “possible ways of life” in the global centres, a desire upon which many people actually do act and make moves toward these ways of life in reality. Appadurai argues:

One of the principal shifts in the global cultural order, created by cinema, television, and video technology (and the ways in which they frame and energize other, older media) has to do with the role of the imagination in social life. Until recently, whatever the force of social change, a case could be made that social life is largely inertial, that traditions provided a relatively finite set of possible lives, and that fantasy and imagination were residual practices, confined to social persons or domains, restricted to special moments and places. In general, imagination and fantasy were antidotes to the finitude of social experience. In the past two decades, as the deterritorialization of persons, images, and ideas has taken on new force, this weight has

imperceptibly shifted. More persons throughout the world see their lives through the prisms of the possible lives offered by mass media in all forms. That is, fantasy is now a social practice, it enters, in a host of ways, into the fabrication of social lives for many people in many societies. (Appadurai 1996: 53-4).

Now, media experiences inspire people and encourage them to move in order to take part in global modernity, instead of providing them with merely an escape in which to take momentary refuge from the harshness or boredom of everyday reality. However, as Appadurai notes, this is not necessarily a “cheerful observation”, and it does not imply that the world is now a happier place just because there is more choice for more people due to economic globalism as a result of which there has been a consequential decline of traditional lifestyles and values. Instead, what he emphasizes is that “even the meanest and most hopeless of lives, the most brutal and dehumanizing of circumstances, the harshest of inequalities are now open to the play of the imagination” (ibid.: 54), which is fabricated by the global culture industry. Nobody, not even “child laborers, women who toil in the fields and factories” and so on (ibid.: 54), can any longer see their lives just in terms of the given-ness of things. Regardless of rich and poor, today we all have to construct our lives out of what we can imagine and desire largely founded on representations provided by the transnational culture industries.

In this sense, globalization excludes nobody. As a consequence, many move from the South to the North, and from the East to the West, some as jet-setting businesspersons and some as illegal immigrants. Those who do not move adopt lives

based on ideas from the North in the South, and the West in the East, and vice versa. Today, as part of the banal cosmopolitan landscape, we find populations from the South living in cities in the North, and the lifestyle of the West in rural villages in the East.

There are a number of other theorists who, like Beck and Appadurai, point to the imperatives and contingency of cosmopolitan society but, in general, their visions are hardly utopian. As in the case of Beck's vision, it is more likely to be the risk and fear of living in a dystopia rather than the ideal and hope of living in a utopia that brings about cosmopolitan consciousness. The media plays a crucial role in the shaping of cosmopolitan subjectivity, but it is a mistake to assume that experiences mediated through film, TV, music and the internet etc. will automatically bring about empathy for distant others and shape an ethically conscious cosmopolitan subject. Moreover, as Zygmunt Bauman (1998) warns us, the ideological effects of the global "culture industry" as described by Adorno and Horkheimer (1972) are still in need of serious consideration.

Bauman argues that the rise of mass media equates to the rise of a new system of surveillance and disciplinary control of the subject in the global age. For him, globalization divides populations more than it unites them. Globalization means a new and expanded horizon of freedom for some, but for many others, it is a new form of polarization which brings consequences that are more cruel than ever before. Globalization is the polarization of rich and poor on a global scale. The world is divided between those who move across the borders and those who don't, between a globally mobile class and a locally trapped class (Bauman 1998: 2-4). The top and

bottom segments of this new hierarchy are very mobile, the top being the global jet-setting class and the bottom being refugees and illegal immigrants. A large segment in the middle, however, are virtual travellers who are not necessarily physically mobile but who routinely cross borders in their mediated experience (through film, TV and the internet). In the post-work society, that is the post-Fordist industrialized North, in which the master-slave dialectic has broken down and “capitalism is doing away with work” (Beck 2000: 58), riches no longer require the service of the poor hence they are “segregated and separated on earth, the locals (poor) meet the globals (riches) through the regular televised broadcast of heaven” (Bauman 1998: 54). In Bauman’s dystopian vision, local life becomes a form of prison without walls, in which only those who are unable to move would stay. Millions of locals constantly watch those few who are globally successful, so that the locals hold onto the illusion that they are not yet excluded from the rich world of the globals, while knowing, in the back of their minds, that their chances of moving out of the locality to join the world of global riches are about as good as those of winning the lottery.

Bauman calls this “Synopticon” control - the term was coined by the sociologist Thomas Mathesen who aptly pointed out that the introduction of Foucauldian “panoptical power represented a fundamental transformation *from a situation where the many watch the few to a situation where the few watch the many*” (Bauman 1998: 51 italics in original) for power to produce the modern subject. The Panopticon control replaced the pre-modern *spectacle* with modern *surveillance*. Now, in contrast, Synopticon power “impresses itself upon the *populus* through letting the commoners watch in awe, fear and admiration its own pomp, wealth and

splendour” (ibid.: 51-2 italics in original) like pre-modern *spectacle*, but this time through the electronic and mass media. Bauman states:

[T]he rise and rise of mass media - television more than any other - that leads to the creation, alongside the Panopticon, of another power mechanism which, coining another apt phrase he [Mathieson] dubs the Synopticon.

The Synopticon is in its nature global; the act of watching unites the watchers from their locality... It does not matter anymore if the targets of the Synopticon, transformed now from the *watched* into the *watcher*, move around or stay in place. Where they may be and wherever they may go, they may - and they do - link into the exterritorial web which makes the many watch the few. The Panopticon *forced* people into the position where they could be watched. The Synopticon needs no coercion – it *seduces* people into watching. And the few whom the watchers watch are tightly selected. (Bauman 1998: 52, italics in original)

In the Synopticon, “locals watch globals” (ibid.: 53). The mass media, in this view, manipulates people’s fear and shame of exclusion by appealing to fundamental existential anxiety. Locals are compelled to keep watching celebrities, following what is happening in the global centre, so they will not have to feel that they have been left behind and excluded from all the joys of living. They keep watching, disavowing the fact that they were probably already excluded from the very beginning. This very pessimistic view on the effect of the electronic and mass media

by Bauman makes a stark contrast to Appadurai's. However, their views are not necessarily contradictory since Appadurai readily acknowledges that: "Of course, many viewers may not themselves migrate. And many mass-mediated events are highly local in scope" (1996: 4). He further qualifies his claim by suggesting that:

[T]he work of imagination, viewed in this context, is neither purely emancipatory nor entirely disciplined but is a space of contestation in which individuals and groups seek to annex the global into their own practices of the modern (ibid.: 4).

To put it briefly, globalization brings about the "cosmopolitanization" (Beck 2006) of everyday life and through this process shapes the cosmopolitan subject. The electronic and mass media play key roles in this process, on one hand as a mechanism in the production of this subject, and on the other hand, as a technology to regulate it. In Chapter Six, I shall come back to the concept of the Synopticon and show how bio-political control of the cosmopolitan subject works in the global age through a case study of Japanese filmmakers' interaction with Hollywood in the re-making of Japanese horror films for global distribution.

Like the theories of globalization proposed by Beck, Appadurai, and Bauman, what I am putting forward in the present thesis is a theory of rupture based on my empirical investigation into the post-war and more recent history of the Japanese film industry. I will argue that the "globalization" in the late 1980s and 1990s was qualitatively different experience for Japanese filmmakers and the industry from the "internationalization" of the 1950s. I will illustrate how their

relationships to the West and Asia were transformed through this process at the end of the last century. Finally, the notion of “really existing cosmopolitanism” (Beck 2006) is a key concept which I will deploy for my analysis of this transformation. Hence, I shall talk more about this concept in Chapter Two.

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Chapter Two

National Identity and Cinema Transnationalized: Different Types of Actually Existing Cosmopolitanisms

A timeless global culture answers to no living needs and conjures no memories. If memory is central to identity, we can discern no global identity-in-the-making, nor aspirations for one, nor any collective amnesia to replace existing 'deep' cultures with a cosmopolitan 'flat' culture. (Smith 1995: 24)

One fundamental theoretical reason why the choice between cosmopolitanism and nationalism as alternative vehicles of universalism remains so contentious is that the putative thematic opposition between these terms has always been unstable... I suggest that this opposition is even more volatile today with the loosening of the hyphen between nation and state in globalization. (Cheah 1998: 22)

Introduction

In the post-enlightenment world, in which reason is no longer seen as the universal faculty of judgment of justice (cf., Rorty 1998: 47), the binary opposition between "cosmopolitanism" and "nationalism" is particularly unstable. In reality,

cosmopolitanism often works simply as an extension of nationalism that operates beyond national borders. Moreover, as Pheng Cheah and others suggest, there is no theoretical reason why nationalism and cosmopolitanism have to remain incompatible (Cheah 1998: 20-41). Therefore, contrary to what the scholar of nationalism, Anthony D Smith, suggests in the first epigraph above, I believe it is entirely possible to talk about “deep” cosmopolitanism which shapes the individual sense of the self as well as collective identities.

Following a brief discussion about the historic construction of Japanese national identity, the first section of this chapter examines the recent revival of academic interest in cosmopolitanism. It traces the development of a new academic discourse on cosmopolitanism that is different from classic Kantian cosmopolitanism. Ulrich Beck calls this new cosmopolitanism “really” or “actually existing cosmopolitanism” (see also Robbins 1998: 1-14).³

In the second section, I shall consider the effect of neo-liberal economic globalization on national cinemas and identities, and illustrate how this development brought about the cosmopolitanization of the film industry in the British case. The transnational successes of British cinema in the late 1990s prompted many other national governments and industries, including those of Japan, to follow the British model in an attempt to replicate what became seen as a successful format for the creative industries in the global age. I will follow the developments of the debate on national cinema in the British context, with a focus on examining how classic

³ In the book *Cosmopolitan Vision* (2006) Beck uses two terms “actually existing cosmopolitanism” and “really existing cosmopolitanism” interchangeably and I believe there is no difference between them. Here I mainly use the term “actually existing cosmopolitanism”.

concepts of national cinema as the showcase of national essence became problematic.

Then thirdly, I shall propose three different types of actually existing cosmopolitanism according to three different ways in which cosmopolitan subjectivity is shaped in relation to the nationally dominant culture, as well as foreign cultural powers. Adopting and adapting Manuel Castells' distinction between different ways identity is constructed in relation to the dominant institutions of society (2004: 8), I shall introduce the concepts of Legitimizing, Resistance, and Project Cosmopolitanism, as tools for analyzing actually existing cosmopolitanism in the Japanese film making community: Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism gives legitimacy to the nationally dominant culture beyond its national boundaries as it defines itself against the otherness of foreign culture and Resistance Cosmopolitanism resists the nationally dominant culture often by forming alliances with a foreign power. Finally, by means of what Anthony Giddens calls a "reflexive project of self" (Giddens 1991: 53, 32, 35), Project Cosmopolitanism constructs a new hybrid identity, which redefines "their position in society and by doing so, seeks the transformation of overall structure" (Castells 2004: 8).

As Castells rightly reminds us, "[h]ow, and by whom, different types of identities [or, cosmopolitan subjectivities] are constructed, and with what outcomes, cannot be addressed in general, abstract terms: it is a matter of social context" (2004: 10), it must also be situated historically. Thus, our discussion about the rise of cosmopolitan subjectivity and the transnationalization of the culture industry must refer to the specific social and historic context of Japan and its filmmaking

community.

I have argued in Chapter One that the discourse of globalization produces forms of cosmopolitan subjectivity, and gives rise to new disciplinary structures which control the cosmopolitan subject. I have made this argument based on my reading of cultural and social theories developed mostly in the West. Now, a question: can I apply this concept of “actually existing cosmopolitanization” to a non-western society that is, at least on the surface, very un-cosmopolitan? Does it make sense to talk about the empirical “cosmopolitanization” of a society like Japan where “the hyphen between nation and state” is still so tight that the notions of nationality, ethnicity and culture are commonly understood to be one and the same (cf., Sugimoto 1999: 82)?

My answer to these questions is “yes”. I believe social reality in Japan is changing as a consequence of globalization. Globalization is transforming people’s social relations and making them responsive to various foreign cultures and othernesses both within and outside of the national borders. At the same time, globalization is exposing the myth of Japanese cultural uniqueness, and causing a so-called “third identity crisis.” In order to examine this process I will take “specimens” (Alasuutari 1995: 63, 155) of “actually existing cosmopolitanisms” from the Japanese filmmaking community.

Here, a “specimen” means “*part of the reality being studied*” (Alasuutari 1995: 63 italics in original). I share Alasuutari’s view that in qualitative research, “the case-analysis is *related* to the broader population” (ibid.: 156 italics in original).

Thus the word “*extrapolation* better captures the typical procedure in qualitative research” (ibid.: 157 italics in original) than *generalization*. He states: “*Generalization* is in fact the wrong word in this connection. That should be reserved for surveys only. What can be analyzed instead is how the researcher demonstrates that the analysis *relates* to things *beyond* the material at hand” (ibid.: 156 italics in original).

In the past, Japan has made a historic opening to the outside world three times. Aoki Tamotsu (1999), the anthropologist who probed the transfiguration of *Nihonjinron* - a discourse around questions of the quintessential Japanese national character - suggests that each time Japan made an opening the Japanese were faced with a major identity crisis. The first occurred in the late nineteenth century during its first modernization process in the Meiji era following 250 years of seclusion. Awestruck by advanced Western technologies, and fearing Western imperialism, Japanese leaders at the time were determined to make themselves an imperial power in their own right. This led to the militarization of society and the wars.

The second identity crisis came following defeat in World War Two and the subsequent US military occupation. However, following economic success from the 1950s through to the 1980s, the Japanese regained their confidence and this was reflected in the popularity of *Nihonjinron* in this period. The projects of *Nihonjinron* set out to explore the essential uniqueness of Japanese culture in relation to Western universalism without indicating any sense of “backwardness”. Aoki identified the period between 1964-1983 as a period focused on the “recognition of Japan’s positive uniqueness” (ibid.: 84). Chie Nakane’s study on Japanese collectivism and

vertical society and Eshun Hamaguchi's *Nihon rashisa no saihakken* (Rediscovery of Japaneseness) are exemplary works in this tradition. Added to these, were books like Ezra Vogel's *Japan as Number 1* (1979), which held up the Japanese system as a model for the US to follow. Together they urged Japanese, as well as Western, readers to accept Japan as an exception to Western universalism - a unique, singular instance of non-Western modernity, in the context of the cold war power struggle between the West and East - a point which I shall return to and explore more fully in Chapter Four.

Then, the third wave of opening, and the third identity crisis, overcame Japan when neo-liberal economic globalization - the so-called *Kokusaika* (which literally translates as internationalization) - accelerated from the mid 1980s onward. Aoki identifies this period from 1984 to the present day as the period of transition "from the unique to the universal" (1999: 134). Francis Fukuyama famously declared this social milieu as encompassing "the end of history" (1992), in which there was no alternative to the American led liberal democracy and free market economy. Within this way of thinking, the "essential cultural uniqueness of Japan" and the reclusive nature of the Japanese market are seen as major obstacles that have prevented foreign businesses from flourishing there. Hence the Japanese mentality needed to be transformed, and cultural barriers eliminated, should Japan desire to be part of the free trade democracy that was the universal principal of the global age.

In her book titled *Globalization of Japan*, political scientist Mayumi Itoh takes up a culturalist stance that is tinged with neo-liberal ideology, and asserts that "the *sakoku* (secluded nation) mentality constitutes the core of Japan's barriers to

kokusaika [internationalization]” (2000: 13). She contends:

The pervasive Japanese attitude of exclusiveness and parochialism stems from two powerful roots: (1) the country's geographic isolation as an island nation; and (2) the Tokugawa Shogunate's policy of seclusion (*sakoku*) from 1639 to 1868. That combination of natural and voluntary isolation created a uniquely homogeneous culture and parochial mentality. The *sakoku* mentality still lingers and underlies the modern Japanese way of thinking and behaving. (Itoh 2000: 13, italics in original)

Itoh traces the origin of what she calls *sakoku* (the reclusive nation) mentality to the first opening of Japan 150 years ago. She insists that the Japanese mentality has not really changed, or has only changed very superficially because these historic openings of the country did not occur voluntarily from within, but were imposed from the outside. For Itoh, Japan has never been the agent of its own history. Moreover, “the Japanese government has no such zeal for its own internationalization and is only reluctantly pursuing it due to external pressure”. She continues:

While a superficial internationalization, or quantitative *kokusaika*, as exemplified by the glut of foreign goods in the daily life of the Japanese and the unprecedented number of Japanese tourists going abroad, has made certain progress, *kokoro no kokusaika* (internationalization of the mind), or qualitative *kokusaika*, has not

taken root in the hearts of Japanese. This is so despite the fact that former prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone declared the creation of *kokusai kokka Nihon* (an internationalized Japan) at the Japanese Parliament in 1984. (Itoh 2000: 180 italics in original)

For Itoh, these changes in the daily life of the Japanese, i.e. a significant increase in the consumption of foreign goods or travel abroad, cannot constitute a real change of Japanese subjectivity, because the “Japanese government is only reluctantly pursuing it [internationalization policy] due to external pressure” (ibid.: 180). However, one problem with this view is that it equates government policy with national subjectivity, and does not recognize the pleasure involved for the Japanese subject in consuming such foreign goods and symbols. It ignores the empirically well-documented enthusiasm of Japanese consumers for foreign goods and symbols, or dismisses it as trivial. Therefore, it is unconvincing to say that this unprecedented intensification of the flow of goods and symbols across national boundaries during the third opening of Japan has had no significant effect on the constitution of Japanese subjectivity. I will return to this issue of the effects of *kokusaika* in the 1980s and banal cosmopolitanization on Japanese national identity in Chapter Five.

As was discussed in Chapter One, and contrary to Itoh’s view, Ulrich Beck has argued that economic globalization is significantly altering the construction of society across the industrialized world. Globalization has given rise to a social condition which has shaped the individual into a cosmopolitan subject through everyday practices - and he calls this process banal cosmopolitanization.

Beck stresses that the term “banal cosmopolitanism” signals that “existing forms of cosmopolitanism came into the world not as noble achievements that had been fought for and won with all the glittering moral authority of the enlightenment, but as profane deformations carrying the obscurity and anonymity of side effects” (2004: 135). In this post enlightenment paradigm, we cannot assume that cosmopolitanism is automatically morally superior, good, or even emancipatory. Actually existing cosmopolitans include many different types of people who habitually cross national and cultural borders physically or virtually, developing a sense of multiple belongings to accommodate contradictions and rival ways of life within their own lifestyles. Cosmopolitanism here signals an empirical phenomenon that is shaping our social reality rather than pointing to an ethical and political ideal.

Thereupon, Beck calls for sociological investigations. Since cosmopolitanism is no longer just a philosophical ideal or political utopianism, the experience of “cosmopolitanism” should be investigated sociologically as part of our empirical social reality. And, my intention here is to respond to Beck’s call by investigating the experiences of actually existing cosmopolitans in the Japanese filmmaking community. In Chapter Four to Chapter Seven of this thesis, I shall analyze how the experiences of these Japanese filmmakers relates to a wider social experience, and how their agency engages with a new industrial structure that is emerging under the transnationalization of the culture industry.

Cosmopolitanism vs. Nationalism

Something has happened to cosmopolitanism. It has a new cast of characters. In the past the term has been applied, often venomously, 'to Christians, aristocrats, merchants, Jews, homosexuals, and intellectuals.' Now it is attributed, more charitably, to North Atlantic merchant sailors, Caribbean au pairs in the United States, Egyptian guest workers in Iraq, Japanese women who take *gaijin* lovers. (Robbins 1998: 1 italics in original)

In the wake of expanding marketization and reactive nationalism as a consequence of economic and cultural globalization, there has been a revival of interest in cosmopolitanism. David Harvey suggested that cosmopolitanism "is now portrayed by many (most eloquently by Held [1995]) as a unifying vision for democracy and governance in a world so dominated by a globalizing capitalism that it seems there is no viable political-economic alternative for the next millennium" (2000: 529). This normative, or, philosophical cosmopolitanism signifies an ideal, a political and an ethical vision for the global age; "it sets itself up commonly as a 'third way' between rampant corporate globalization and reactionary traditionalism or nationalism" (Calhoun 2002: 90). On the other hand, however, there are those who express unease with these cosmopolitan ideals because they feel there is a sense of "hubris" about the concept (e.g., Hall 2006).⁴

⁴ In a video interview screened at the 2006 annual conference of Association of Social Anthropologists in the UK, of which the theme was "Cosmopolitanism and Anthropology", Stuart Hall declared that he was hesitant to call himself "cosmopolitan". He explained this was because of "hubris" associated with the term. The interview was carried out by Pnina Werbner. The conference was held April 10th-13th, 2006 at the University of Keele, UK.

The idea of a “world citizen-cosmopolitan” has its origin in ancient Greek philosophy (cf., Malcomson 1998: 233) but many contemporary debates take their point of departure from Kantian cosmopolitanism as a vision of perpetual peace:

The people of the earth have entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and it is developed to the point where a violation of laws in one part of the world is felt everywhere. The idea of a cosmopolitan law is therefore not fantastic and overestimated; it is a necessary complement to the unwritten code of political and international law, transforming it into a universal law of humanity.
(Kant [1795] 1991: 107-8)

In the Anglo-American world contemporary discussions on cosmopolitanism were sparked by Martha Nussbaum’s polemical essays on patriotism and cosmopolitanism (1994, 1996, 1997). Her cosmopolitanism was “constructed in opposition to local loyalties in general, and nationalism in particular. Inspired by the Stoics and by Kant, Nussbaum presents cosmopolitanism as an ethos, ‘a habit of mind’, a set of loyalties to humanity as a whole, to be inculcated through a distinctive educational program emphasizing the commonalities and responsibilities of global citizenship” (Harvey 2000: 530). Her version was uncompromisingly universalist, enlightened and enlightening, more or less a classic vision of cosmopolitanism.

However, Nussbaum and her “unmodified” Kantian cosmopolitanism (Hollinger 2002: 229) was criticized by her respondents (see Nussbaum 1996) who

claimed that she was merely articulating an ideology which supported the vision of a “global village” for the new liberal managerial class. It was “hard to differentiate her arguments from those rooted in Adam Smith’s neo-liberal moral subject cheerfully riding market forces wherever they go or, worse still, those embedded in the globalizing geopolitics of US national and international interests” (Brennan, cited in Harvey 2000: 530). For the same reason, Harvey also criticized David Held (1995) for his “eloquent plea for a new form of cosmopolitan governance and democracy [that] has as much to do with making the world safe for capitalism, market freedom, and social democracy as it has to do with any other conception of the good life” (2000: 560).

Moreover, there is something oppressive in this “unmodified” Kantian cosmopolitanism, which positions itself against local attachments, patriotism or nationalism. By being so uncompromisingly universalist, rational, morally high-grounded and unsituated, it almost cuts itself off from a source of emotion and caring. It is often forcefully argued that for someone to feel strongly and care about something, that “something” has to be a particular “something”, culture, place, or group of people, rather than an abstract notion of humanity. In this view, the world and humanity as a whole are too big, distant and abstract for an individual to feel strongly about them. Therefore this impetus needs to start from something small, closer and more particular in order to extend the same feeling and care for otherness towards the larger community (cf., Rorty 1998: 45-58; Robbins 1999: 6). However, the categorical either/or logic of “unmodified” Kantian cosmopolitanism tends to sever this extension from a particular to a universal feeling and excludes non-cosmopolitans as parochial, treating them as irrational and backward.

That it is elitist and is complicit with interests of wealthy capitalists are the two most commonly cited objections to cosmopolitanism. For example, Marx's ambiguity about cosmopolitanism is well known, and a strong causal link between bourgeois cosmopolitanism and capitalism was shown in the famous passage in the Manifesto of the Communist Party (MCP):

The need for a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere.

The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of reactionists, it has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed.... (Marx [1848] 1973: 71)

Marx not only denounced cosmopolitanism but also dismissed nationalism as an ideological instrument of the state-apparatus. The aphorism "The working men have no country" (ibid.: 84) indicates the inability of bourgeois nation-states to command the loyalty of their proletariat via global exploitation. Believing that nationalism was already becoming obsolete, Marx called for socialist internationalism through working class solidarity. However, "Marx's teleological argument about socialist cosmopolitanism [internationalism in Marxist term] is often dismissed for ignoring the continuing disparity between the working classes of different countries, a fact

illustrated by the break up of the Second International” (Cheah 1998: 28).

Another major criticism of conventional thinking about cosmopolitanism is that humanity as a whole is too abstract a concept for an individual to make a substantial sacrifice for, therefore it is useless as a code of ethical behaviour or a mode of political mobilization. For example, Bruce Robbins argues: “for a tradition that would include Gramsci and Fanon, though in each case with interesting complications, cosmopolitan identification with the human race serves as the thin, abstract, undesirable antithesis to a red-blooded, politically engaged nationalism” (Robbins 1998: 4). If so, is there a better, or, a new way of thinking about cosmopolitanism that is not so thin and abstract, but can be more fully red-blooded?

In the Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins collection, *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and feeling beyond nation (1998)*, an attempt was made to “connect the notion of a species-wide community to actual politics, to the complex possibilities and restraints found on the ground” (Hollinger 2002: 230). There, for example, K. Anthony Appiah argued in his much discussed essay “Cosmopolitan Patriots” that “you can be: cosmopolitan - celebrating the variety of human cultures; rooted - loyal to one local society (or a few) that you count as home; liberal - convinced of the value of the individual; and patriotic - celebrating the institution of state (or states) within which you live” (1998: 106). Those writers who made contributions to this volume and proposed new ways of thinking positively about cosmopolitanism faced the task of unravelling the contradiction between universalism and particularism - “the contradiction between the needs of the ethnos and the needs of the species” (Hollinger 2002: 231) - rather than ignoring it. What they attempted to achieve, I

believe, was precisely in line with what Beck called the “both/and” principle of post-enlightenment modernity and Beck, Giddens and Lash (1994) call this new paradigm “reflexive modernity”, in which “reflexivity” takes over from “rationality”. Herein, modern subjects begin to reflect on their own process of modernization, becoming aware of the limitations of “rationality” and realizing that “we are living in the *age of side effects*” (Beck 1994: 175 italics in original), According to Beck, what is “realistic” about realistic cosmopolitanism is that whereas “universalism, relativism and nationalism are based on the either/or principal, cosmopolitanism rests on the both/and principle” (Beck 2006: 57). Beck further states:

Realistic cosmopolitanism should not be understood and developed in opposition to universalism, relativism, nationalism and ethnicism, but as their summation or synthesis... It is impossible to imagine a practically tenable, realistic cosmopolitanism without universalism *and* relativism *and* nationalism *and* ethnicism – provided that each is understood in specific way! (ibid.: 57-8 italics in original).

In “The Cosmopolitics – Today” (1998), while searching to undo the tangled threads of cosmopolitanism and nationalism, Pheng Cheah argues that: “one fundamental theoretical reason why the choice between cosmopolitanism and nationalism as alternative vehicles of universalism remains so contentious is that the putative thematic opposition between these terms has always been unstable” (1998: 22). In the original Kantian vision, according to Cheah, the antonym of cosmopolitanism is “not nationalism but statism”. A popular sense of national belonging developed in Europe only after the time of Kant. Thus, Cheah contends

that “Kant’s cosmopolitanism signifies a turning point where moral politics or political morality needs to be formulated beyond the polis or state form, the point at which ‘the political’ becomes, by moral necessity, ‘cosmopolitical’” (ibid.: 23). Therefore, Kant’s vision of the cosmopolitical, rightly asserted in the name of common humanity, is not anti- or post- nationalist. It should be understood as a pre-nationalist attempt to provide a vision of the ideal institutional framework for regulating the anarchic behaviour of absolutist states after the break up of the vast religious political communities of the medieval period. Cheah suggests that these states acted “much like corporations in a market”, they “related to each other and to individuals according to utilitarian principles of self-help and self-interest, without any cohering normative principles or moral purpose to regulate their actions” (ibid.: 24).

Hence, Pheng Cheah demonstrates that “cosmopolitanism and nationalism are not logical antagonists” (1998: 36). He cogently argues that the “tightness or laxity of the hyphen between nation and states is an important historical factor in the evaluation of the aims and their compatibility with normative cosmopolitanism” (ibid.: 31). This point is important because we have witnessed how globalization has created conditions in which the erosion of state power has loosened the hyphen between nation and state. The hyphen that had been kept very close together since the time of Marx’s writing is loosening everywhere, including Japan. Hence, there is now scope for conceiving of nations and nationalism in radically different ways that cut across state boundaries.

In these circumstances, strategic alliances between cosmopolitanism and

nationalism, the universal and the particular, are now possible and often necessary. Cheah concludes: "...if transnational networks can be politically effective only by working through popular nationalism, then it may be more appropriate to describe such activity as nationalisms operating in a cosmopolitical force field rather than mass-based cosmopolitanism" (ibid.: 36). Put in other words; non-abstract, locally rooted and red-blooded cosmopolitanism is possible by working through popular nationalism. However, this cosmopolitanism would look very much like nationalism operating in a cosmopolitical field, hence it needs to be handled with much caution.

In the same volume, Richard Rorty (1998) examines the antagonism between cosmopolitanism and nationalism further. He questions the way conflicts between national/local loyalty and global justice are normally understood. "Should we describe such moral dilemmas as conflicts between loyalty and justice, or rather ... as conflicts between loyalties to smaller groups and loyalties to larger groups?" (Rorty 1998: 47). In Kantian moral philosophy, it is understood that justice springs from reason and loyalty from sentiment. Neo-Kantians (such as Nussbaum) say that only reason "can impose universal and unconditional moral obligation, and our obligation to be just is this sort. It is on another level from the sort of affectional relations that create loyalty" (ibid.: 47). However, Rorty does not agree with this. Because for him, moral dilemmas are "the result not of conflict between reason and sentiment but of conflict between alternative selves, alternative self-description, alternative ways of giving meaning to one's life. Non-Kantians do not think that we have a central, true, self by virtue of our membership in the human species – a self that responds to the call of reason" (ibid.: 48).

In the non-Kantian account of the matter, which Rorty recommends, this conflict between reason and sentiment is flattened to a conflict between one set of loyalties and another. The conflicts arise between different moral identities in a plurality of selves within individuals, and this dilemma cannot be solved by privileging reason over sentiment as the higher human quality. Therefore, Rorty suggests that “if we cease to think of reason as a source of authority, and think of it simply as the process of reaching an agreement by persuasion, then the standard Platonic and Kantian dichotomy of reason and feeling begins to fade away. That dichotomy can be replaced by a continuum of degrees of overlap of belief and desires” (ibid.: 55). Moving on from the early modernity of the enlightenment period to the state of reflexive modernity, cosmopolitanism becomes more about a heightened awareness of one’s own multiple identities and multiple affiliations to different groups of people, along with ways of negotiating loyalties between them. In this line of thinking, cosmopolitanism is about attitude, sensitivity and the capacity to accommodate and negotiate with others and reach agreements, rather than about a school of thought with moral principles.

In the same spirit, Amanda Anderson has argued that: “...a too rigorous or bold universalism seems at odds, for the cosmopolitan, with the requisite moral task of developing a delicate inter-subjective competence within a culturally diverse horizon” (Anderson 1998: 275). Drawing on a psychoanalytic insight of Julia Kristeva’s that “only strangeness is universal” (1993: 21), Anderson puts emphasis on “a delicate inter-subjective competence” based on tact, sensibility and judgement (phronesis) for the cosmopolitan, which are the qualities that are traditionally seen as entirely foreign to the language of universalism.

The question is, however, why and how do these cosmopolitan sensitivities and competencies arise and develop? According to Beck, “cosmopolitan sensitivity and competence arise from the clash of culture within one’s own life” (2006: 89). Importantly, globalization brings about many instances of this “clash of culture” in anybody’s life, almost without exception. Despite his own caution – “living between borders or in a diaspora is not an automatic guarantee of openness to the world” (ibid.: 89) – Beck often hesitates in his writing but appears not pessimistic about the possibility that the cosmopolitanization of reality will engender reflexive subjects who are endowed with a cosmopolitan sensitivity and competence.

The cosmopolitan constellation qua domain of experience and horizon of experience means the internalization of difference, the co-presence and coexistence of rival lifestyles, contradictory certainties in the experiential space of individuals and societies. By this is meant a world in which it has become necessary to understand, reflect and criticize difference, and in this way to assert and recognize oneself and others as different and hence of equal value. The cosmopolitan outlook and sensitivity opens up a space of dialogical imagination in everyday practice and in relevant sciences. (Beck 2006: 89)

However, what sort of “cosmopolitan constellation” might result and to what extent it can succeed is, as Beck rightly points out, “a completely open empirical question to which...no adequate answer has yet been offered” (ibid.: 89). Hence, Beck calls

for sociological investigations.

As we have seen, the new cosmopolitanism can be said to be “a strategic bargain with universalism” (Malcomson 1998: 234). Additionally, it attempts to work together with universalism as well as communalism and particularism. At the same time, however, it is against strong versions of Western universalism as well as strong cultural relativisms and essentialisms. It takes an inclusive approach by adopting the “both/and” principle of post-enlightenment “reflexive modernity” (Beck, Giddens, Lash 1994) rather than the “either/or” principle of the first enlightenment modernity. This new approach to cosmopolitanism is a very delicate enterprise with many contradictions, to say the least. Probably because of this, the use and definitions of the concept of new cosmopolitanism in existing literatures are often decidedly elusive, indeterminate and fluid.

Thereupon, Skrbis et al. (2004) have criticised this tendency, arguing that the word “cosmopolitanism” is too often used as an empty signifier; and they argue further that “cosmopolitanism, while usefully co-opted into contemporary social commentary, is a concept heading for a crisis unless we develop a sense of agreement on its analytical dimension” (Skrbis et al. 2004: 131-2). In other words, they have made a “modernist” call for a better theoretical definition of cosmopolitanism.

When cosmopolitanism is presented as a form of a social vision, it is true that the concept tends to emerge, and is often deliberately described by commentators, as an “empty signifier” (Laclau 1996: 36-39) which is what Skrbis et

al. complain about. In those instances, “cosmopolitanism” is presented as a constitutive lack, an impossible object which lacks adequate or direct representation. It is an idealized object that can exist only beyond the horizon of the signification system of differences. In the words of Laclau, it is “...a positive impossibility, with a real one to which x of the empty signifier points” (ibid.: 40). This intellectual strategy is designed to leave the category of cosmopolitanism open, free from premature foreclosure by any set of academic discourses, while pointing in a certain direction towards the horizon. Pollock et al. have argued, for example:

Cosmopolitanism may instead be a project whose conceptual content and pragmatic character are not only as yet unspecified but also must always escape positive and definite specification, precisely because specifying cosmopolitanism positively and definitely is an uncosmopolitan thing to do. (Pollock et al. 2002: 1)

On the one hand, this open-ended approach enables cosmopolitanism to stand for almost any given reality and aspiration. On the other hand, however, it brings with it the danger that the meaning of cosmopolitanism will collapse and render the concept analytically useless by making it mean “all things to all people” (Skrbis et al. 2005: 132). Thus, I take Skrbis et al.’s point that there is a danger that we may be left with a hollow shell of meaning surrounding the term cosmopolitanism, unless we start using the word with more substance and specificity. Nevertheless, I do not think calling for a better, more “modernist” theoretical definition is the right way forward. This is because, first, it would undermine the basic premise of the enterprise that is strategically contradictory in spirit. Secondly, discussions that aim for a more

“modernist” theoretical definition of a concept that is decidedly “not-simply-modernist” would most likely be futile. Finally and thirdly, rationally defining “what it is” is far less important than debating “what it ought to be” within a specific social and historic context as a political project.

Therefore I would argue that the only way to avoid notions of cosmopolitanism becoming empty of meaning in this “not-simply-modernist” framework is to fill the empty signifier with meanings by situating cosmopolitanism in particular social and historic contexts. This does not mean to suggest that philosophical/normative cosmopolitanism can be reduced to sociological cosmopolitanization. On the contrary, what I am saying is that sociological investigation into cosmopolitanization is not meaningful on its own without the accompanying philosophical/ normative question of “what it ought to be” to make it a political project. I believe this analysis is important for the trajectory of globalization because even in the age of “reflexive modernization” (Beck, Giddens, Lash, 1994), in which human rationality is characteristically displaced by reflexivity and its trajectory is shaped mostly by unintended consequences, the possibility of a certain level of agency is still not denied. In this respect, my reading of “reflexive modernization” is counter to that of Bruno Latour when he states that:

‘reflexive’ means...that the unintended consequences of action reverberate throughout the whole of society in such a way that they have become intractable. Thus, ‘reflexive’ does not signal an increase in mastery and consciousness, but only a heightened awareness that mastery is impossible and that control over actions is now seen as a

complete modernist fiction. (Latour 2003: 36)

While Latour is right to say that “reflexive” does not mean an increase in mastery, “reflexive” also does not mean a loss of control, since “reflexive” is really about acquiring a “heightened awareness” of uncontrollability. What this awareness does to the reflexive subject is indeterminate at a minimum, if it does not actually increase the desire and drive for control.

To sum up, the new cosmopolitanism makes sense only as a quasi-universalism that is actually a culturally situated ideal or principle with reflexive awareness about its particular social and historic contexts but with an increased desire and drive for universality. I contend that the concepts of actually existing cosmopolitanism and banal cosmopolitanization are viable tools for describing the socio-economic opening of Japan and its concomitant identity crisis, as well as acting as “empty signifiers” which point to a certain direction in the horizon to guide the trajectory of globalization in the context of Japan’s historic relationship with the West and neighbouring Asian countries.

Globalization and Cosmopolitanization of National Cinema

The British context offers a valuable example to explore how globalization is giving rise to a dialectical tension between national and cosmopolitan ways of conceiving of the national film industry and culture. The British film industry has the longest history of interacting with Hollywood and has thus had a long struggle to

retain its cultural identity. Furthermore, the success of British cinema in the late 1990s resulted in a tendency amongst cultural policy makers across the world, including Japan, to look to the British film industry as an exemplary model of the creative industries in the global age. For example, the “Cool Britannia” discourse and cultural policies of the Tony Blair government in the late 1990s were adopted as “Japan’s Gross National Cool” by the Koizumi administration (cf., McGrey 2002) in the early twenty-first century. As part of this push, the Japanese government created a new cultural-economic institution called the *Visual Industry Promotion Organization* which was modelled after the UK Film Council (Uchiyama 2002: 157-8). The Koizumi administration was unashamedly pro-American and aspired to make Japan being a little Britain of East Asia.

As a consequence of its long historical interaction with Hollywood, and its shared cultural heritage with the United States, the British film industry became highly cosmopolitanized in a number of ways. First, among non-American film industries it is by far the best integrated into the global capital base of Hollywood. Secondly, the British film industry has a long history of providing platforms for non-English speaking filmmakers to make their first English-language films, particularly those filmmakers of European origin. Thirdly, during the 1980s, British television (mainly through Channel 4), provided finance and a platform for an innovative, often multi-culturally-oriented film production environment. Fourthly, for the ten years between 1996 and March 2006, UK tax relief was available for 100% of a production’s budget, regardless of UK expenditure, and “British” film nationality was bestowed on films without cultural testing. This tax arrangement encouraged many foreign producers to come to Britain to work as well as many

British producers to work in foreign locations with foreign filmmakers, because all of those films were accorded “British” nationality (and tax shelter funding). As a consequence, what is legally acknowledged as British cinema was radically cosmopolitanized – *Brother* (Takeshi Kitano 2000) was shot in the US by a Japanese director; *Hotel Rwanda* (Terry George 2004) was shot in South Africa (standing in for Rwanda) by an Irish director; *Diarios de Motocicleta* (The Motorcycle Diaries, Salles 2004) was shot in locations across South America by a Brazilian director; *Bride and Prejudice* (Gurinder Chadha 2004) was shot in India by a British-Asian director; and *The Constant Gardener* (Fernand Meirelles 2005) was shot in Kenya by a Brazilian director. Yet these films are all officially counted as British and given British nationality and tax shelter funding.

Conventionally speaking, however, the term national cinema is reserved for films that may be somehow categorized as alternatives to the avowedly commercial enterprises of the Hollywood majors. Tom O’Regan, for example, describes the concept of national cinema as: “...constitutionally fuzzy. National cinemas are simultaneously an aesthetic and production movement, a critical technology, a civic project of state, an industrial strategy and an international project formed in response to the dominant international cinemas (particularly but not exclusively Hollywood cinema)” (1996: 45). In other words, the term national cinema is meaningful only with reference to international cinema and is often associated with discourses of nationalism and myths of national unity (Hill 1992: 14-5). Therefore, it is best to understand the concept and practice of national cinema as a project which negotiates and extends national feeling in the arena which Cheah and Robbins call a “cosmopolitical force field” (1998: 36).

The normative understanding of the binary relation between Hollywood and national cinema was questioned in a polemical essay on British national cinema called "But Do We Need It?" by Geoffrey Nowell-Smith. This essay appeared at a crucial moment in British cultural politics in the mid 1980s, when the Thatcher government was in the process of drastically reducing state subsidies for the arts and abolishing cultural protectionist measurements, such as the screen quota system for British cinema.⁵

The hidden history of cinema in British culture, and in popular culture in particular, had been the history of American films popular with the British public. The strength of American cinema was never just economic...[and] the basic reason for Hollywood's dominance was artistic and cultural. American cinema set out in the first place to be popular in America where it served an extremely diverse and largely immigrant public. What made it popular at home also helped make it popular abroad. The ideology of American cinema has tended to be far more democratic than that of the cinema of other countries. This in part reflects the actual openness of American society, but it is above all a rhetorical strategy to convince the audience of the virtues and pleasures of being American. Translated into the export arena,

⁵ Nevertheless, the British independent film and television production sector was thriving in the mid 1980s because of financing available from the newly established Channel 4 and its culturally diverse programming policy. This was a paradox, or what Beck called an "unintended consequence of re-modernization", given that the original intention of the Thatcher government had been to create a flexible labour market and competition within the British broadcasting industry (cf., Paterson 1990; Woodward 1990; MaCabe 1992: 22-3; Hill 1999: 53-70).

this meant a projection of America as intensely – if distantly – appealing. When matched against American films of the same period, their British counterparts come across all too often as restrictive and stifling, subservient to middle class artistic models and to middle and upper-class values. (Nowell-Smith 1985: 152)

Andrew Higson took the debate further in his seminal essay “The Concept of National Cinema” (1989) by criticising the tendency to “reduce national cinema to the terms of a quality art cinema, a culturally worthy cinema steeped in the high-cultural and/or modernist heritage of a particular nation-state, rather than one which appeals to the desires and fantasies of the popular audience” (1989: 36). He invoked Tony Bennett who argued and demonstrated that the impact of American popular culture in post-war Britain, in many respects, has been “positive, particularly in making available a repertoire of cultural styles and resources...which, in various ways, have undercut and been consciously mobilized against the cultural hegemony of Britain’s traditional elites” (Bennett, cited in Higson 1989: 40). Higson argued that the definition of British cinema almost always involved “the construction of an imaginary homogeneity of identity and culture, an already achieved national identity, apparently shared by all British subjects... Proclamations of national cinema are thus in part one form of ‘internal cultural colonization’” (1989: 44). Therefore, he proposed to shift the focus of the study of national cinema to “the point of consumption, and on the use of films (sounds, images, narratives, fantasies) ... [to analyze] how actual audiences construct their cultural identity in relation to the various products of the national and international film and television industries, and the condition under which this is achieved” (ibid.: 45-6). Higson’s argument vibrated

with the dual crises in: 1) the academic discipline of film studies, which had traditionally privileged textual analysis of art films; and 2) the British film production sector, which had hitherto been dependent upon state financial support and protectionist mechanisms.

In the early 1990s, John Hill responded to Nowell-Smith and Higson in a slightly different time with a different political and economic conjuncture. This time, Channel 4's support for both feature film production and workshop activities (funding the training of minority filmmakers and their film productions) was in severe decline and national lottery funding for the arts was yet to come. The threat to British cinema, or in fact the concept of a nationally supported public media system in general, was in even greater danger than in the mid-80s. In his response Hill observed "the importance of being able to argue successfully the case for why a national cinema is necessary or desirable has thus become all the more urgent" (1992: 10). He argued for the value of a home-grown cinema to the cultural life of a nation. He stressed the importance of supporting indigenous filmmaking for localities to be able to retain the capacity to produce social meanings and criticize those meanings in their own cultural context. His defence of public support for the British cinema was analogous to the defence of public broadcasting. "While historically the actual practice of public service broadcasting may have had its shortcomings, the principles which have underlain it still remain worth defending (especially when, as at present, under attack)" (ibid.: 14). Hill's main points are:

It is quite possible to conceive of a national cinema, in the sense of one which works with or addresses nationally specific material,

which is nonetheless critical of inherited notions of national identity, which does not assume the existence of a unique or unchanging 'national culture', and which is quite capable of dealing with social divisions and differences. (Hill 1992: 16)

An example of a form of British national cinema which has been critical of the inherited notion of national identity is Black British films. Invoking Paul Willeman's essay "The National" (1989), Hill points to the "strikingly British" character of Black British films in the 1980s such as *My Beautiful Laundrette* (Stephen Frears, 1985), *Passion of Remembrance* (Sankofa Workshop 1985) or *Handsworth Songs* (John Akomfrah 1986). What is noticeable about these films is not only "the expanded sense of 'Britishness' which they offer but also their sensitivity to social differences (of ethnicity, class, gender and sexual orientation) within an identifiably and specifically British context" (ibid.: 16). Therefore, Hill contends, "the 'genuinely' national cinema can, in fact, neither be nationalist nor homogenising in its assumptions about national identity if it is to address successfully the complexities of nationally specific social and cultural configurations" (1992: 16-7). These home-grown films are desirable, if not essential, for the health and richness of the cultural life of a democratic nation-state. However, for those who would support this perspective, a problem lies in the fact that such filmmaking, which examines national life critically, is often not commercially viable in a marketplace dominated by Hollywood films; hence the need for public support of national cinema. In Hill's view, the state remains the main agent in the cosmopolitical field for the promotion of the well being of local cultures and diversity.

In this debate, neither Higson nor Hill are arguing in support of national cinema as representative of a unified national identity. Both of them are arguing for a vision of national cinema that is open, inclusive and sensitive to differences and complexity. In this sense, both positions are interwoven with a certain cosmopolitan impulse and intent, but the former is more liberal whilst the latter is more egalitarian. The liberal cosmopolitan argues for the positive effects of the permeation of external differences into, and deconstruction of, the national space which has been traditionally imagined as already unified and occupied by a hegemonic class, while the egalitarian cosmopolitan argues for an awareness of and sensitivity towards internal differences already existing within national borders. The egalitarian kind of cosmopolitan stresses the viability and importance of the borders and framework of the nation-state, because, politically speaking, egalitarianism without borders is utterly impractical and meaningless.

For the construction of a cosmopolitan society and vision, the right amounts of both liberalism and egalitarianism are necessary. However, what happened during the period in question in British cultural politics was a rapid shift from the cultural egalitarianism symbolized by the policies of Channel 4, to the economic liberalism symbolized by the ascendancy of financial wizards who fund film productions with combinations of tax shelter schemes across the world. A point Hill put forward so strongly, the desirability and necessity of public support for the British national cinema and industry, has come to realization by way of Lottery funding and new tax laws for film investments set up by the new Labour government in the late 1990s, however, with very different intentions and outcomes.

British film policy in the 1990s was very different to its predecessors. Both John Major's Conservatives and the subsequent new Labour government deployed sets of free-market oriented, culturally anti-protectionist film policies. In 1991, for example, the British Film Commission (BFC) was formed to market UK production expertise and locations by providing overseas producers with a free information service to promote local talent, locations and subsidies. As well, a new network of urban and regional film commissions was established (Miller 2000: 38-9) and the London Film Commission was formed in 1995. Then in 1998, the government opened a British Film Office in Los Angeles in an attempt to augment and facilitate traffic between Hollywood and Britain. The BFC announced the new government's outlook on cinema: "set firmly at the top of the agenda is the desire to attract more overseas film-makers [sic]" (ibid.: 39). Meanwhile, the success in the US and internationally of British films like *Four Weddings and a Funeral* (Mike Newell 1994), *Trainspotting* (Danny Boyle 1996), and *Bean* (Mel Smith 1997) encouraged British filmmakers to target international audiences rather than to work with materials and issues specific to the British audience. The aim of British film policy was to attract foreign investment into the UK, and to export British films whenever possible. It appears that policy makers as well as filmmakers of this period were less concerned about the importance of "supporting indigenous film-making for local places to retain the capacity to produce social meanings and criticise those meanings in their own cultural context ... for the health and richness of cultural life of a democratic nation-state" for which Hill argued so strongly.

Unlike traditional film policies such as the screen quota, the Eady levy, and

the film bank, which aimed to protect the domestic film production sector and to promote quality filmmaking (cf., Dicknson and Street 1985; Hill 1999 31-52), British film policy of the 1990s focused primarily on promoting tourism as well as positioning Britain as a site of production for foreign, mainly American, productions. The new policies were designed with economic regeneration in mind and they aimed to generate jobs for British film workers and inward investment. In pursuing these aims the major British strength was the language and common cultural heritage that was shared with the United States, while marginally differentiated “modern-hybrid Britishness” - for example, *Notting Hill* (Michel, 1999) and *Bridget Jones's Diary* (Maguire, 2001) - kept Britain and Britishness very slightly exotic and attractive in the international market.

A cultural consequence of this economic development was a radical cosmopolitanization of British cinema and the film industry as discussed before. Today, it has become very difficult to argue that the body of films called “British films” consists of a unified field of representation, which produces a monolithic British national identity as so many foreign producers and filmmakers are working in Britain, while at the same time so many British film producers are working with foreign filmmakers abroad. Under current legal definitions any film which spends more than 70% of its budget in Britain, or pays out the same amount to British nationals, or which is made under the European treaty, or under bilateral co-production agreements, is designated as British. This has led to an amazingly wide range of films being produced as British, which includes some important works with cosmopolitan intent (Davies and Wistreich 2005: 110).⁶

⁶ However, it appears that, for the British government, this outcome was not

What the British experience shows is that cosmopolitanism (Hollywood) and nationalism (national cinema) are no longer necessarily in an antagonistic relationship. They tend to work together to drive globalization further forward. Additionally, the British case shows that even in the global age, the national government can remain a powerful agent in determining the course of cosmopolitanization, although its actions may often have unintended consequences. With the emergence of what Miller et al. called *Global Hollywood* (2000) – which I shall discuss in detail in Chapter Five – national cinema works with Hollywood to negotiate a position for itself within the global framework. While Hollywood's runaway productions drop colossal amounts of cash which generate local jobs, local film industries provide cheap labour, exotic backgrounds, and other consumable differences for global audiences. Today, the zeitgeist of national cinema is to say that if you cannot beat the enemy, then join them.

In these circumstances, the outlook for Hill's modernist stance in defence of the public sphere and his call for filmmaking that is specific to the local context is bleak, to say the least. It appears that the production and examination of cultural identity through locally specific filmmaking is now devolved to smaller categories, such as the Scottish, the Irish, and the Welsh, on one hand, or transferred to transnational categories such as Islamic, Asian or gay and lesbian on the other. Some of these smaller categories are publicly supported through regional funding agencies such as Scottish Screen, but in general a much lower level of public support has been

intentional. The government has introduced cultural testing for British nationality from May 2006, and tax relief will be limited to the percentage of the actual budget spent within Britain rather than being based solely on the amount of the budget as a whole (UK Film Council Website).

available for alternative filmmaking after the structural changes of Channel 4 in 1993, and then the closure of the BFI Film Board in 2000 (cf., Gibson 2002).

The boom in British film production and concomitant cosmopolitanization in the early years of the new millennium will take some years of cultural and economic evaluation before film historians can write about it conclusively. But it appears certain that the process of cosmopolitanization will not be easily reversible.

The Formation of Different Types of Cosmopolitan Subjectivity

Following Beck, I have argued that globalization produces a cosmopolitan subjectivity, but also warned that actual cosmopolitanization does not necessarily lead the subject to ethically responsible cosmopolitan outlooks. Nevertheless, what Beck did not discuss was whether only one type of cosmopolitan subjectivity would be produced or whether several different types of cosmopolitan subjectivity were taking shape. Nor does he examine whether, if plural types of cosmopolitan subjectivity are being produced, what the nature of their differences is and how we can distinguish one from the other. Other writers have, however, given a lead that enables this issue to be addressed.

In his discussion of *The Power of Identity* (2004), Manuel Castells points out “...it is easy to agree on the fact that, from a sociological perspective, all identities are constructed. The real issue is how, from what, by whom and for what [?]” He further states:

The construction of identities uses building materials from history, from geography, from biology, from productive and reproductive institutions, from collective memory and from personal fantasies, from power apparatus and religious revelations. But individuals, social groups, and societies process all these materials, and rearrange their meaning, according to social determinations and cultural projects that are rooted in their social structure, and in their space/time framework (2004: 7).

Castells emphasizes that “the social construction of identity always takes place in a context marked by power relations” (2004: 7-8) and the same thing is true for the construction of cosmopolitan subjectivity. My use of the term “subjectivity” is almost synonymous with Castells’ use of the term “identity” – the source of “meaning for the actors themselves, and by themselves, constructed through a process of individuation” (Giddens, cited in Castells 2004: 7). The main reason I choose the term “subjectivity” over “identity” is that, to me, the term “identity” refers to the way the self is constructed through belonging to a group and accepting common ideals, as in the case of “national identity”, whereas I use “subjectivity” to emphasise the importance of individual differentiation (which I see as the characteristic of “cosmopolitan subjectivity”) from the uniformity of a group. Otherwise, these two terms are interchangeable in my use here. What I am concerned with is the way in which an individual thinks about her/himself and constructs her/himself to make sense of his/her own life and achieve social recognition.

In this section, I shall propose three different types of actually existing cosmopolitanism defined by the different relationships the cosmopolitan subject constructs with the nationally dominant culture and power and through which they interact with their social structure and reflexively construct their own selfhood. I base these ideal types of the cosmopolitan subject on Castells' categorization of identities, which distinguishes three different forms and origins of identity building.

These are:

1) *Legitimizing identity*: what is introduced by the dominant institutions of society to extend and rationalize their domination vis-à-vis social actors (2004:8).

2) *Resistance identity*: what is generated by those actors who are in positions/ conditions which are devalued and/or stigmatized by the logic of domination, thus building trenches of resistance and survival on the basis of principles different from, or opposed to, those permeating social institutions of society (ibid.).

3) *Project identity*: which is when social actors, on the basis of whatever cultural materials are available to them, build new identities that redefine their position in society and, by doing so, seek the transformation of the overall social structure (ibid.).

To put it succinctly, Legitimizing Identity is produced by the dominant institutions of society to legitimise and extend their power, whereas Resistance

Identity is produced by marginalized groups to resist domination and make their life bearable. Project Identity can be developed out of either Legitimizing or Resistance Identity as a third way—it produces new, often hybrid, categories of identity and attempts to transform social relations.

Castells suggests that these different types of identity building processes lead to different outcomes in constituting society. Legitimizing Identity “*generates a civil society*; that is, a set of organizations and institutions, as well as a series of structured and organized social actors, which reproduce, albeit sometimes in a conflictive manner, the identity that rationalizes the sources of structural domination” (2004: 8 italics in original). Most commonly, it is nation-states that function as the framework of this legitimization.

The second type of identity building, Resistance Identity, can, according to Castells, lead to the formation of communes, or, communities, and this is probably the most important type of identity building for generating social change. “It constructs forms of collective resistance against otherwise unbearable oppression, usually on the basis of identities that were, apparently, clearly defined by history, geography, or biology, making it easier to essentialize the boundaries of resistance” (ibid.: 9). Castells describes the process of Resistance Identity building as “*the exclusion of the excluders by the excluded*” (ibid.: 9 italics in original). Excluded groups build a defensive identity in terms of the dominant institutions/ ideologies, reversing received value judgments while reinforcing their own boundaries. Again, most commonly, nation-states are the framework against which Resistance Identity is struggling.

Identity building based on Project Identity is a self-reflexive process, and “produces [a] *subject*” (Castells 2004: 10 italics in original). While Legitimizing and Resistance Identities are in dialectical relation and are mutually dependent, Project Identity is self-referential and has its own narrative structure. In my reading, Castells’ Project Identity is closely akin to Giddens’ theorization of “the self as a reflexive project” (1991). Here, being a “*subject*” means being capable of constructing one’s own narrative and identity, being capable of building a new and different life. According to Castells, Project Identity can be developed out of either Legitimizing or Resistance Identity, but at the present conjuncture it is more likely to develop out of Resistance Identity. For instance, new Project Identity can be formed “when feminism moves out of the trenches of resistance of women’s identity and women’s rights, to challenge patriarchalism, thus the patriarchal family, and thus the entire structure of production, reproduction, sexuality, and personality on which societies have been historically based” (2004: 8).

Castells concurs with Giddens when he argues that “the reflexivity of modernity extends into the core of the self. To put it another way, in the context of post traditional order, the self becomes a reflexive project” (1991:32). For Giddens, “self-identity is not a distinctive trait, or even a collection of traits, possessed by the individual. It is the self as reflexively understood by the person in terms of her or his biography” (Giddens, 1991: 53); and for him, this is an inescapable consequence of modernity:

[O]ne of the distinctive features of modernity is an increasing

interconnection between the two extremes of extentionality and intentionality: globalizing influence on the one hand and personal dispositions on the other... the more tradition loses its hold, and the more daily life is reconstituted in terms of the dialectical interplay of the local and the global, the more individuals are forced to negotiate lifestyle choices among a diversity of options....Reflexively organized life-planning...becomes a central feature of the structuring of self-identity. (Giddens 1991: 1, 5)

The process of constructing a Project Identity involves the production of new subjects, which transforms power and social relations. Giddens appears to assume that this transition towards reflexive modernity is more or less an inevitable and automatic process under globalization, a point with which Castells disagrees, arguing that the process is far from automatic. According to Castells, this is because “the network society is based on the systematic disjunction between the local and global for most individuals and social groups. ... Therefore, reflexive life-planning becomes impossible, except for the elite inhabiting the timeless space of flows of global networks and their ancillary locales” (2004: 11). In other words, Castells reminds us of the new social polarization and inequality that globalization creates along with its transformative potential. As Castells suggests, Project Identity is more likely to develop out of communal resistances - thus out of Resistance Identity than Legitimizing Identity - and the analysis of the processes, conditions and outcomes of the transformations of communal resistance into transformative subjects is a crucial task of social science. I shall discuss the issue of the possible emergence of Project Identity further in Chapter Five when I look empirically at cases within the Japanese

film industry.

Using the above distinctions as defined by Castells, along with theories of reflexive modernization and the subject by Giddens (cf., Giddens, Beck and Lash 1994) as a theoretical base, I propose three different ideal-types, or schematas, of cosmopolitan subjectivity. I call them Legitimizing, Resistance and Project Cosmopolitanism or Outlooks.

Cosmopolitanism as I use it here means the desire and propensity of individuals towards otherness, rather than referring to schools of thought or political principles. Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism legitimizes and is legitimized by the national framework, while Resistance Cosmopolitanism resists this national framework in order to define itself. A Legitimizing Cosmopolitan desires to extend his/her national horizon across cosmopolitical fields, and thus is in antagonistic relations with foreign otherness, while a Resistance Cosmopolitan desires to form strategic alliances with foreign otherness in order to resist the nationally dominant culture and power. Project Cosmopolitanism subsumes self/other differences and conflicts by reflexively constructing its own narrative structure. In what follows, I shall illustrate what I mean by Legitimizing, Resistance and Project Cosmopolitanism using Japanese examples set within this particular historical context.

The Legitimizing Cosmopolitan Outlook is most typically observed amongst the Japanese social elites who were the driving force of post-war democratisation and its accompanying rapid economic development. Its presence is, however, not limited

to this generation or class. Today, this type of cosmopolitanism has been popularized and is widespread across all strata of Japanese society.

Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism is basically an extension or enlargement of nationalism into the international arena. This does not mean Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism is necessarily insensitive to others. However, in reality, this is often the case as a result of its position of being legitimized by the powerful nation-state. Additionally, despite their apparent zeal for Western technology and European high culture, Legitimizing Cosmopolitans in Japan often also experience a deep-seated anxiety about the loss of Japaneseness, and an unshakable inferiority complex.

A positive side of Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism is exemplified by those who espouse and legitimize the ideals of Japanese post-war democracy such as the political thinker, Maruyama Masao (1914-1996), or, the Nobel Prize-winning author Oe Kenzaburo (b. 1935). These authors spread the message of pacifism to the world drawing on the Japanese experiences of Hiroshima and Article Nine of the Japanese peace constitution. However, there is also a darker side to Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism, because, as was discussed earlier in this chapter, it works with the same materials as nationalism.

On the other hand, the controversial author, playwright and an ultra-right wing activist, Mishima Yukio (1925-1970) is a good, although certainly extreme, example of the other side of Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism. Mishima is probably the most widely read Japanese author of the 20th century, due in part his dramatic ritual suicide – by harakiri - in 1970. In the words of John Nathan - Mishima's biographer -

Mishima was a “true internationalist” (Nathan 1970). He was an extensive traveller, spoke fluent English and read Latin and lived in a specially designed Rococo house in Tokyo, which was ostentatiously furnished with Greek statues and marble fountains. Yet, despite the fact that he was deeply into Western aesthetics and European high culture, and his life’s ambition was to achieve recognition in the West, he was a nationalist who contended: “If there were no Emperor, how would we have proof of our continuity? ... Our society gets broader in space, but it ignores time. We have no bridge to relate us to the future anymore. The Emperor should be our source of glory” (Mishima, in Nathan, 1970).

Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism is a form of internationalism, which views nationalism and national identity as a precondition for expansion into the field of cosmopolitanism. I shall discuss its operation further in Chapter Four with a case study of Nagata Masaichi, the proponent of the post-war internationalization of Japanese cinema. Legitimizing cosmopolitanism was the dominant mode of cosmopolitanism before globalization in the 1980s accelerated dissolution of national borders between cultural industries.

In contrast, Resistance Cosmopolitans define themselves against the dominant class and mainstream culture within Japan rather than against foreign otherness. Resistance Cosmopolitans are most commonly found among the generation who spent their formative years in the economic high growth era between the 1960s and 1970s. At this time the intense and rapid growth of the Japanese economy was underpinned by highly oppressive education and labour systems that were often described as “examination hell” and “corporate slavery” for the life of

“economic animals.” By the mid-1970s, over 90% of the Japanese population considered themselves “middle class” according to various government statistics, and it was this ideology of a racially, culturally and financially homogeneous national society that sustained the highly oppressive but very efficient system throughout the era of high economic growth (cf., Yoshimi and Kang 2001: 69).

Resistance Cosmopolitanism surfaced in reaction to this internal homogenization when Japan achieved a high level of material wealth in a relatively short period of time. We can find many examples of Resistance Cosmopolitanism amongst independent filmmakers in the 1980s. Resistance Cosmopolitans tend to find emotional escape in and a sense of shared alliance with Western popular culture, music, films, fashion and so forth. Like American popular culture in the post-war British context, the impact of Western popular culture in Japan has been “positive, particularly in making available a repertoire of cultural styles and resources ... which, in various ways, have undercut and been consciously mobilized against the cultural hegemony of [Japanese] traditional elites” (Bennett, in Higson 1989: 40, my substitution of “Japanese” for “British”). For the generation of Japanese who did not have direct experience of the war and occupation, their relationship to the West is less antagonistic and less burdened with inferiority complexes than that of previous generations, thus such an emotional and imaginary alliance with aspects of Western culture was forged as emancipatory.

Resistance Cosmopolitanism surfaced in the Japanese filmmaking community as the mass production system of the studio majors faltered and shifted towards a more flexibly-specialized system. In inverse proportion to the decline of

Japanese national cinema produced by the conventional film industry, low and no budget independent films flourished in the 1980s (cf., Rayns 1984; Okubo 2006). The spirit of Resistance Cosmopolitanism of this era is exemplified by independent filmmaker Yamamoto Masashi (b. 1956), who took his first shoe-string-budget 16mm feature film *Yami no Carnival* (*Carnival in the Dark*, 1982) to the Forum section of the Berlin International Film Festival.

Carnival in the Dark (1982), a film which follows the journey of a young woman one night through the Tokyo underground world, which is infested with repressed sexuality and violent fantasies, became an instant festival success and was circulated widely to European art cinemas (Okubo 2006). The film was a harbinger of such Japanese cult hits as, *Gyakufunsha Kazoku* (*Crazy Family*, Sogo Ishii 1984); *Akira* (Katsuhiro Otomo 1988); and *Tetsuo* (*The Iron Man*, Shinya Tsukamoto 1989).

On his return from Europe, Yamamoto declared that he was an international filmmaker and his intention was to make films for international art-house audiences. He contended that a quality art film could reach a far bigger audience internationally than any domestically produced commercial films produced by the major studios, which were consumed only domestically in Japan. He became aware of the international potential of Japanese cinema as an art-house form and the networks of independent filmmakers being forged through international film festivals outside of Japan (Asai interview 2006).

Thereupon, Yamamoto made his next project *Robinson no Niwa* (*Robinson's Garden*, 1987), in acute awareness of the Western gaze. For this film, Yamamoto

imported the American independent filmmaker Tom DiCillo, who lensed *Stranger than Paradise* (Jarmusch, 1984), as his cinematographer (Asai interview 2005).⁷ The story revolves around a young Japanese woman who runs a guesthouse and lives among foreign workers, travellers, drug dealers, junkies etc. in a seedy part of cosmopolitan Tokyo. One day, by accident, she discovers a “desert island” - a ruined building surrounded by green land - in the middle of this concrete metropolis. She moves into the “island” to live in nature like “Robinson Crusoe”; eventually she buries herself in it. In a conversation, Yamamoto said that he invited Tom DiCillo because he wanted to achieve an un-Japanese look and perspective for this story. However, he also admitted that he did not want to work with Japanese cinematographers because those who were trained in the Japanese film industry were too conservative for him. In an interview he gave to the Japanese media, Yamamoto proclaimed that “idiots have no boundaries” (Yomota 1999: 201). According to Yamamoto’s philosophy, once middle-class pretensions are dropped, we are all the same human beings. Therefore, national boundaries and cultural differences are not at all the big deal they are usually made out to be by elites and middle-class Japanese. Hence for “idiots” like himself and his fellow filmmakers, there is nothing which prevents them from going anywhere he wants and making any kind of film he wants by working with the people he wants.

One of the most chaotic of the Japanese independent filmmakers, Yamamoto was born an only son to visually disabled parents. He was brought up as the only one in the family to “see things” (Yomota 1999: 194). His films are always driven by

⁷ Producer of *Robinson’s Garden*, Takashi Asai, interviewed by Yoshi Tezuka July 28th, August 10th and 17th in Tokyo.

strong feelings against the Japanese elitist social order and middle class. They are infused by fantasies of transgression and chaos created by the socially dispossessed; punks, junkies, prostitutes and foreigners. Resistance Cosmopolitans define themselves against the social order imposed by nationally dominant power and culture, usually defensively, but sometimes aggressively, and occasionally even self-destructively, as was the case of some Japanese independents in this period.

As Castells theorizes, Project Identity can develop from either Legitimizing or Resistance Identity but it is more likely to emerge from Resistance Identity in the present conjuncture because of the legitimization crisis in national society and its patriarchal conventions. Project Cosmopolitanism is distinct from Legitimizing or Resistance Cosmopolitanism in that the Project Cosmopolitan is reflexive and defines his/herself by his/her own narrative, which subsumes constitutive differences. The Project Cosmopolitan actively constructs the self with the intention of transforming social relations, and s/he is highly aware of the constructedness of his/her own identities and the ways in which a life in reflexive modernity demands a multiplicity of identities. For this reason, for the Project Cosmopolitan, the constitutive difference of the self, the conflict between sameness and otherness, exists within rather than outside of the boundary of the self. Thus Project Cosmopolitanism is usually based on hybrid and hyphenated identities of one kind or another.

The Project Cosmopolitan subject is creative. Although the narrative of the self that the Project Cosmopolitan subject constructs is inevitably shaped by social norms and conditions, the Project Cosmopolitan actively seeks to transform the

social structure from within. They negotiate with the dominant power by constantly monitoring and reconstructing their trajectory of the narrative of the self, so that mutual accommodation is possible, and by doing so they shape a new social reality – although admittedly often in unexpected ways – like some of the Korean-Japanese filmmakers I will discuss later. Therefore, unlike Resistance Cosmopolitans, Project Cosmopolitans are not necessarily antagonistic to existing national systems in obvious ways. Project Cosmopolitans are reflexive actors who actively work to “structurate” (Giddens 1984) their own social conditions, which in turn shape their agency through “unintended consequences” (Beck 2002).

Nevertheless, contrary to what Giddens assumed and as Castells indicated, the development of Project Identity as an agent of social change is far from automatic, and the likelihood of Project Cosmopolitanism actually developing in any particular society is not guaranteed. As I shall show in Chapter Five with the case studies of Japanese film producers, empirically speaking, either Legitimizing or Resistance Identity developing into a collective form of Project Identity is more of the exception than the rule, even though each individual becomes highly reflexive in his or her own way in the process of globalization.

Having said this, however, there are rare examples of Project Cosmopolitanism that have actually developed in the Japanese film industry. For example, the production of the film, *Tsuki ha Dotchi ni Deteiru* (All Under the Moon, 1993), demonstrates the Project Cosmopolitanism of Korean-Japanese film producer Lee Bon-u and his collaborators. *All Under the Moon* (1993) is a romantic comedy about the life of a cynical Korean-Japanese cab driver (Kishitani Gro) who

finds himself in bed with, then falling in love with, a newcomer to Japan, a Filipino bar hostess (Ruby Moreno). This scenario deconstructs the myth of Japan being a homogeneous society very successfully and with much humour. The film swept all the major Japanese film awards in 1993 and became the year's biggest independent hit. It took in over four hundred million yen at the box office with attendance figures reaching three hundred and fifty thousand (Lee, cited in Maruyama 1998: 110).

All Under the Moon (1993) was made by a group of Korean-Japanese filmmakers - author of original novel (Yan Sogiru b. 1936), director (Sai Yoichi b. 1949), scriptwriter (Chong Wishin b. 1957) and producer (Lee Bong-u b. 1960). The production synopsis written by the producer Lee to attract investment for the project describes how:

This project has risen from our fundamental understanding of cinema, that is, cinema is a message at the same time as being a form of entertainment and an industry...We aspire to show the cry of the soul and the power of social minorities. However, this is not a 'social problem film', which prosecutes social injustice against ethnic minorities in Japan. On the contrary, this is a film with great entertainment value. (Lee et al, 1994: 32)

Clearly for Lee et al., an aim of the project was to make an impact, culturally and commercially, while working within the structure of the mainstream Japanese film industry and remaining within the tastes of mainstream audiences. They did not simply seek to legitimize or resist existing structures. Instead, their aim was to carve

out a space for themselves in the heart of the Japanese national film industry and culture. The director, Yoichi Sai, states: "I hate the term 'Korean living in Japan' (*zainichi kankokujin*), to begin with. I want them [his films] to be seen as Japanese films. After all, if an American appeared as the hero in a Japanese film, would you call it a *zainichi* American movie? Of course not" (Sai 1994, cited in Schilling 1999: 67). Both Lee and Sai make their way forward very carefully, so as not to be ghettoized as minority filmmakers. They have made sure they are there to stay on the central stage of Japanese national cinema. In a country in which cultural and ethnic homogeneity have been taken for granted for such a long time, their hybrid and hyphenated identity - as Korean-Japanese who are here to stay - problematizes the essentialist notion of national cinema and identity, and transforms the understanding of social relations between the Japanese and foreigners.

The transformation of images of Korea and Korean people in the Japanese media in the years following the film's release was very unexpected for many commentators. After the success of *All Under the Moon*, Lee Bon-u and his company Cine Qua Non dedicated themselves to the distribution and screening of films from other Asian countries. With the benefit of hindsight, it can be said that their work in the 1990s prepared the way for a major break-through of Korean cinema and culture in Japan in the early twenty-first century.

For an independently produced film, with a budget of about 140 million yen, *All Under the Moon* was a big commercial success grossing 400 million yen at the box office. However, because the film was distributed through one of the Japanese majors - Shochiku Youga kei - there was hardly any return to Lee's production

company. This was because theatres retained 50% of the gross income initially, and Shochiku, the distributor, then took off 60% of the remaining funds after deducting all distribution expenses - the exact amount of which is highly opaque. Then, Lee's company had to recover their advertising and production costs from what was left of the box office take, leaving very little income remaining from the theatrical release. Lee only managed to recover the production costs for *All Under the Moon* through consequent video and TV sales, despite such a massive box office success (Lee, cited in Maruyama 1998: 110-111).

From this experience, Lee learnt that there is virtually no way for small independent productions to operate profitably and sustainably within the existing film exhibition and distribution structures, in which the oligopoly of the studio majors controls the exhibition sector through their distribution syndicates. It became clear to Lee that if they were to survive as independent producers with a degree of autonomy, they needed to have their own cinemas (cf., Lee 2003).

From this point on Lee and his company Cine Qua Non have focused on developing their own exhibition outlets. Lee opened a small two-screen cinema (132 + 129 seats) Cine Amuse East/ West in Tokyo in 1995 as a joint venture with the music publisher Amuse Entertainment (Maruyama 1998: 111-112). Importantly, the screens in Cine Amuse East were not only dedicated to Japanese films but to Asian films in general. Following a boom in Hong Kong filmmaking in the mid 1990s, Cine Qua Non distributed many Chinese, Hong Kong and Korean films, and prepared the way for the major breakthrough of Korean films such as *Swiri* (Kang Je-Gyu 1999) and *JSA* (Park Chan-Wook 2000) in Japan.

The craze for Korean culture among millions of Japanese female fans in the 2000s, which was also partially ignited by the Korean TV drama *Winter Sonata* (2002) and the leading actor Bae Yong-jun, was entirely unimaginable before the success of those earlier Korean feature films and the transformation of cultural conditions in the 1990s. The causal relationship between these developments in cinema and this wider cultural phenomenon of Korean-philia is complex. Even more complicated is the relationship between this phenomenal Korean-philia and the development of a new sense of anti-Korean nationalism in Japan as well as a new anti-Japanese nationalism in Korea (cf., Mouri 2004; Iwabuchi 2004).

Although the trajectory of globalization is contradictory and the transformation of social relations happens mainly through unintended consequences, the emergence of highly reflexive actors, such as these Korean-Japanese filmmakers, points to a new direction on the horizon. Cosmopolitanization of our social reality is without doubt in progress, even in a country like Japan where the hyphen between the nation and state is historically so tight that the homogeneity of the nation was upheld as a national characteristic in and of itself.

Chapter Three

Research Method and Epistemological Issues: Where and How to Begin Investigating the Cosmopolitanization of Reality?

What cosmopolitanism is cannot ultimately be separated from what cosmopolitanism should be. Cosmopolitanism is no longer a dream but has become a social reality, however distorted, which has to be explored. (Beck 2006: 44)

Introduction

Ulrich Beck contends that sociology is conventionally founded upon “methodological nationalism” based on an epistemological “national outlook”. But these national frameworks for social science are now rapidly becoming obsolete. That is to say “methodological nationalism” can no longer adequately describe our society in the global age. According to Beck, the “national outlook” subscribes to the conviction that “‘modern society’ and ‘modern politics’ can only be organized in the form of national states. Society is equated with society organized nationally and territory delimited by states” (Beck 2006: 24). Hence, when the perspective of the social scientific observer is determined by this conviction, he criticises it as “methodological nationalism” (ibid.). In his view, the development of a new “methodological cosmopolitanism” is a necessary task in order to describe and achieve an understanding of an increasingly transnationalized society in a global

age.

I believe “methodological nationalism” forms a tacit and unstated epistemological basis not only in sociology but also in the cross-disciplinary research field of media and cultural studies to which this present thesis intends to make a contribution. For a long time, for example, the media systems and cultural industries were naturally assumed to be nationally organized along the nation-states’ borderlines, and national cinema was supposed to represent the quintessence of national culture. Therefore within the discourse of Cultural Imperialism breachings of states’ boundaries by heavy trafficking of foreign media texts were considered cultural invasions of an unwelcome kind. However, as we have seen in the previous chapters, the “national outlook” of this kind became obsolete, even an obstacle, for an understanding of the process and phenomena of globalization in view of its transformative aspects. Hence I believe Beck’s call for the necessity of developing “methodological cosmopolitanism” is apposite. In any case, what it is important for the purpose of this thesis is to clarify what I understand “methodological cosmopolitanism” means and how I intend to translate this into an operational research method with which to describe the process of cosmopolitanization in the Japanese filmmaking community.

Like Max Weber’s “methodological individualism” ([1922], 1968), what I understand Beck means by “methodological cosmopolitanism” amounts to the claim that social phenomena must be explained by showing how they result from individual actions that were motivated by cosmopolitan desires and their unintended consequences, which in turn must be explained with reference to how globalized

social conditions produce such cosmopolitan desires and reflexive actors as well as their unintended consequences. Admittedly, the development of methodological cosmopolitanism is in the incipient stage and what I aim to achieve in this present thesis cannot be too ambitious. According to Beck, “cosmopolitan sociology” is about to take shape. And, the “question that methodological cosmopolitanism must *now* answer is: Where and how to begin? How can we pose the questions concerning the cosmopolitanization of reality so that it becomes possible to answer them in a systematic way?” (2006: 76 italics in original)

In this chapter I will first provide my provisional answers to the above questions. Then I shall discuss my method for data collection - in-depth interviews and library research - and the epistemological framework of analysis. My research techniques and ethical and epistemological understandings about the relationship between a researcher and his/her object of study were largely formed through my training as a documentary filmmaker. I come from a school of filmmaking that is highly sensitive to the self-reflexive nature of the filmmaking process and the constructed nature of documented “reality.” Rather than aim at recording the so-called “objective truth” through un-intrusive observations of seemingly objective “reality”, in this tradition of the self-reflexive filmmaking, filmmakers aim to capture what the iconic ethnographer, Jean Rouch, termed “cinematic truth” (coined by the Russian filmmaker Dziga Vertov originally) through the self-reflexive provocation of “reality.” I shall explain how I adopted and executed this documentary approach for the present academic investigation, and its epistemological status and limitations.

Where and how to begin?

I'm very influenced by Clifford Geertz, especially when he says that 'all we can do is to tell stories about the stories that people choose to tell us'. This doesn't mean to say that one story is just as good as another. One does have a responsibility to try to be insightful about the social world, not just to tell a series of micro-narratives, however fascinating they may be in themselves. As Levi-Strauss says somewhere, 'the ethnographer does have the responsibility, as he put it, of 'enlarging' a specific experience to the dimensions of a more general one (Morley 2007: 82).

David Morley, who provided the above quotation and who takes a practical and non-dogmatic approach to methodological issues, which I find very appealing and which has influenced me in much the same way as Morley was influenced by Geertz. My answer to the question of where and how I begin this investigation into the cosmopolitanization of reality is to start from specific individual stories that "people choose to tell us" about their national boundary-transcending and national boundary-effacing experiences within specific historic contexts. My intention is to "enlarge" a specific experience to the dimension of a more general one by juxtaposing these formative stories of the self - "narratives of the self" - constructed under different social milieu in the different conjunctures in the process of globalization. To put it more specifically, in Chapter Four to Chapter Seven of this thesis, I will present the narrative of the self from key individuals in the Japanese filmmaking community in different socio-economic conjunctures in post-war history.

I will focus on their transnational experiences and how they think their sense of self was shaped by these experiences. I will then juxtapose, compare and contrast the different processes of subjugation and subjection which are spoken in these narratives before and after globalization in the 1980s and 1990s. By doing so, I aim to “enlarge” individual accounts to a wider insight about changes in the social world they inhabit.

Responding to Beck’s proposition I shall pose sets of questions concerning the cosmopolitanization of reality. These questions provide a framework that will help me to study the cosmopolitanization of the Japanese filmmaking community systematically. The questions are as follows:

1) What constitutes Japanese national identity, as a social and historical construction? How was this challenged or reinforced through the post-war modernization/ westernization process? What were the consequences of the Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism we identified among Japanese filmmakers as they defined themselves against the West and Asia during the internationalization of Japanese cinema in the 1950s?

2) How, and why, was globalization in the 1980s qualitatively a very different phenomenon from the preceding internationalization for the Japanese film industry? What happened to national identity? Why and how did Resistance Cosmopolitanism emerge as the most active type of cosmopolitanism at this juncture?

3) How differently are cosmopolitan subjects produced in the Japanese filmmaking community before and after globalization in the 1980s? What is the new mode of subjectification in the age of *Global Hollywood* (Miller et al., 2000)? In what way has Japan's relation to Western "otherness" changed?

4) How differently has Japan interacted historically with Asian "otherness" compared to Western "otherness"? How was this change manifested both before and after globalization in the 1980s? In what ways are Japanese filmmakers involved in the cosmopolitanization of Asian film industries on a regional level?

These four sets of questions correspond to the next four chapters of this thesis - Chapter Four to Chapter Seven - and each set of questions will be empirically investigated in each chapter. Combined together, these chapters are designed to illustrate the process of cosmopolitanization in the post-war to the present conjunctures in the Japanese filmmaking community.

Method of Data Gathering and Interpretation

[For the ethnographic filmmaker, Jean Rouch,] the camera must announce its responsibility for the events taking place before it ... He observes that 'Very quickly, I discovered that the camera ... was not a

brake but an accelerator. You push people to confess themselves ... The task is not to film life as it is, but as it is provoked'. The camera provokes subjects to reveal themselves, by making them aware of the fact that they are being filmed and by turning them into actors of themselves. He then films reality as it is created by his presence, a new reality that reveals a new kind of 'cinematic truth' (Morley 2007: 118-9).

In discussions about methodological issues that have arisen within academic media and cultural studies in recent years, David Morley suggests that "we should look far more attentively than is usual in academic circles to what literary and artistic practices can offer us as methodologies for understanding the social and cultural world in which we live" (2007: 88). To support his case, Morley invokes Clifford Geertz's "counter-intuitive comments on the important role of the imagination in science and of organizational principles in the arts, in relation to what he calls the 'extravagant' nature of quantum mechanics as opposed to the 'methodical' nature of Italian opera" (ibid.).

I have stressed this countless times: when the filmmaker records on film the action or deeds that surrounded him, he behaves just like an ethnologist who records his observation in a notebook; when the filmmaker then edits the film, he is like an ethnologist editing his report ... (Rouch 2003: 270)

In this light Jean Rouch's methodical approach, as an ethnographic filmmaker,

to “the power relations between the subject and object of the research process, and [to the] problematic nature of the relationship between the fictional and the factual” (Morley 2007: 88) offers an exemplary case for academic researchers to reflect upon. Rather than drawing a clear boundary between the observer and the observed, Rouch’s radical empiricism focuses on their interaction and interplay – and Rouch often “inserts himself as one of the participants in the scene we witness through his camera... [In this way], we are invited not simply to observe others but to observe an observation of others” (ibid.: 118). Thus audiences are constantly reminded that what they are seeing is not unmediated “objective” reality as such, but a form of “reflexive”, or “heightened” reality that was dialogically constructed between the observer and the observed – in Rouch’s films, “real” persons often act in front of camera to present what they consider to be their “real” self in their life.

The sociologist, Edgar Morin who collaborated with Rouch on *Chronicle d’un été* (1960) - an ethnographical film on Parisian life - gives this theoretical account of their approach:

We know that there is strong kinship between social life and the theatre, because our social life personalities are made up of roles that we have incorporated within ourselves. It is thus possible, as in a sociodrama, to permit each person to play out his life before camera (Morin 2003: 232).

Chronicle d’un été (1960) is an “experiment in cinematographic interrogation” (ibid.). The film attempts to find out “How do you [a certain people in Paris] live?”

And it is, to me, an exemplary study of modern selfhood through cinematic means.

In my view, carrying out in-depth interviews for academic research is not so very different from filming this type of reflexive documentary film – Rouch calls it “Shared Cine-Anthropology” (2003: 45). The process of interviewing was dialogical and I aimed to construct an inter-subjective perspective between the interviewees and myself. During the interviews I tried to see things from their perspective and did my best to encourage them to reveal themselves and to tell me who they believed they “really” were - as professionals, as persons, and as cosmopolitans, or, as patriots. A major difference from filmmaking was that I did not have a camera. I only had a small tape recorder as an “accelerator” to prompt my interviewees to reveal themselves.

Jean Rouch once commented on the diminution of the power of his camera in the First World with reference to his experience of filming of *Chronicle d'un été* (1960) – filming his own tribe, the French, in metropolitan Paris, at a time when the Algerian war was at its height and the demise of the French empire was on the horizon:

In the Third World we came from a rich country, with lots of equipment... people there were perhaps a little overawed, so we could enter [their] lives more easily – [in Paris] we can get only short interviews, we can't see into people's everyday lives (Rouch, cited in Morley 2007: 118).

There were instructive scenes in *Chronicle d'un été (1960)*, in which Rouch's interviewers, on Parisian streets in 1960, find it difficult even to stop people to get an answer for a short question – "Are you happy?" So, in the overdeveloped countries where there is an excess of technology and people's time is in short supply, his "accelerator" did not work very well. And I suspect the camera would be an even less effective "accelerator" in Tokyo in the twenty first century.

Because many of my interviewees were busy professionals in the film industry, some of them high profile, it generally took me weeks if not months to set up an initial meeting. I normally asked for one hour in a quiet room, because I wanted to record the interviews, but for them, being able to set aside one hour for me was not an easy task. However, once we met, all of my interviewees gave me a lot more time than originally arranged. Some of them literally ended up spending hours with me and then told me to come back another day so that he/she could finish off his/her story.

In general, I explained to interviewees that I was doing a PhD thesis for the University of London about the globalization of film industries and transnational filmmaking practice, and I would like to hear about their personal experiences. Most people I contacted were cooperative and I found they actually liked to talk about themselves when they found somebody who would listen and appreciate their life's achievements. I felt they were open to my questioning about their cosmopolitan intents and my nationalist provocations. And I believe that the fact that I was Japanese and also a filmmaker, having travelled all the way from England to meet them in order to write about them for an academic book obliged them to share some

of their personal stories.

Besides, often during the interviews, I sensed that there was an urge for something akin to what Mary Louise Pratt called “autoethnography” (1992: 7) in “us” that was driving our conversation. By “autoethnography” Pratt means a text and a practice in which “people undertake to describe themselves in ways that engage with representations others have made of them. Thus if ethnographic texts are those in which European metropolitan subjects represent to themselves their others (usually their conquered others), autoethnographic texts are representations that the so-defined others construct *in response to* or in dialogue with those texts” (1992 italics in original). I found the impulse among my interviewees to engage with discourses about “us Japanese” and “Japanese cinema” constructed by others, and their individual differentiation from it, was often strong enough that I did not really need a camera to prompt them into a state of “cinematic truth.”

Still, in terms of the epistemological status of the accounts given in this thesis, I have to announce my responsibility over the events which took place in front of me and the things that were said to me, in the same way as Rouch does with his camera. In other words, I acknowledge here that the knowledge which I am about to present in this thesis is a form of the situated knowledge that is partial. And this partial knowledge has a certain socio-politico positionality. This is because whatever I will write is a product of an inter-subjective-perspective which I have attained through the research process as an academic researcher with a certain personal background and political interests. In this connection, Morley emphasises the importance of sincerity towards his/her object of study and the methodological implications about

the ways a trust relation would shape a research outcome:

Well, questions of methodology and of ethics are often intertwined, perhaps particularly so in the case of qualitative research... The most important thing is the way you treat them [interviewees and objects/subjects of ethnographic study] and their space, what attitude you take towards them, whether you're patronizing, whether straightforward, whether they feel you're honest with them, or that you're trying to exploit them, whether you're prepared to expose something of your own life to them, as much as you're getting them to expose their lives to you. Fundamentally, the question is whether your respondents feel that you are acting in good faith and that you are engaging in a reciprocal, rather than an exploitative, or 'extractive' relationship with them – and you don't need a PhD in order to be able to tell when someone is trying to rip you off (Morley 2007: 72).

With reference to the "truth" of the research outcome which a researcher shares with his/her respondents, Morley has drawn our attention to the fact that "Rouch's own preferred term for his style of cinema is not 'cinema vérité' but 'cinema sincerité'" (ibid.: 122). I agree with Morley and Rouch that being sincere to one's object/subject of study⁸ is probably the best, if not the only, way to get closer to anything that is worthy of being named as "truth" of any kind.

⁸ What social scientists call "object of study" documentary filmmakers usually call "subject of the film."

In the process of this research, I have recorded in-depth interviews with 23 interviewees (Two interviews were with a group of three and Two were with two people; repeat interviews with the same interviewees are not counted separately). They were mainly Japanese producers, but also included other professionals such as directors, cinematographers, distributors, sales agents, film festival directors and critics. I carried out six, recorded interviews in Tokyo in July and August 2005, ten interviews in Tokyo in August 2006, and three repeated interviews with one interviewee in London in the winter of 2006 to 2007. Full details are provided at the end of this chapter.

Also, I carried out non-recorded, more casual interviews with numerous key individuals from the Japanese film making communities. I gave all of them a brief outline of my PhD research, and told them that the content of the conversation might be used in my thesis. These interviews took place mostly during major European film festivals and markets over a cup of coffee, drinks or a meal. I saw these interviews as a chance to get a franker perspective and to discover their personal feelings about what they were doing in an international context. I attended the Cannes Film Festival and Market in 2002, 2003, and 2004; International Film Festival Rotterdam 2004 and 2007; and Berlin International Film Festival and Market in 2006 for these interviews.

Film producers of one kind or another constitute the majority of my interviewees. This was due to my particular focus on the individual experiences of film producers rather than any other occupational categories. The main reason for this attention to film producers was the centrality of their role in the flexible

economy and transnational networks. What used to take the whole organizational machinery of major film studios to achieve is now routinely done by independent producers from much smaller companies through the use of the network economy. Unlike film directors whose work represents the artistic integrity of film production, or the company executive who stands for its financial interests, the film producer's work is neither thoroughly artistic nor financial but includes both. The producer organizes, manages and trades on the creative talents of all other people involved in the production process. Hence the professional domain of the film producer is a domain in which culture meets economics and negotiates – this is where economic globalization is most likely to meet cultural resistance, as well as where cosmopolitanism most likely prevails over parochialism.

I have chosen my interviewees for their experiences in, and knowledge about, the Japanese transnational filmmaking practices such as foreign location filming, international co-productions and foreign direct investments etc. By investigating their transnational practices and individual experiences - and ultimately their “narratives of the self” - my intention is to gain insights about how the conventional “national outlooks” (Beck 2006: 24), which sustained the notion of national cinema and industry, are becoming problematic for these self-reflexive actors, and how “actually existing cosmopolitanism” is emerging, hopefully, giving a rise to new “cosmopolitan outlooks” (ibid.).

Therefore, the main aim of the in-depth interviews is not only to obtain factual information but also to gain phenomenological insights about what it was like for him/her to be in transnational situations as a person with a particular sense of self.

In other words, I was very much interested in how my interviewees talked about their experiences and how they would make “cultural distinctions and classifications” (Alasuutari 1995: 63) about their transnational experiences as a certain kind of person.

In the textbook *Researching Culture* (1995), Pertti Alasuutari states: “as a methodological approach the study of cultural distinctions is quite simple. The only premise is that the researchers distance themselves from what is concretely stated in the texts. The attention is fixed on how it is stated and how the views or ideas expressed are being produced through different distinctions and classifications” (1995: 65). Thus in the study of cultural distinctions, the researcher is studying the ways interviewees construct reality and how interviewees’ cultural norms and values manifest themselves rather than examining the “truthfulness” of the statements. The focus is on the ways an interviewee constructs the narrative through her/his speech and how s/he positions her/himself within the narrative world s/he constructs. Then what the researcher has to do is to examine the normative rules, and moral values, of the world the interviewee has talked about - right and wrong, good and bad, beautiful and ugly - to access the culture of the interviewee, bearing in mind questions such as, how does s/he position her/himself in the world s/he is describing? Where is the boundary? Who is “us” and who is “them” and so forth?

I had a number of key questions in my mind when I set out for these in-depth interviews, such as: How do they identify themselves either as a cosmopolitan or a “Japanese,” or where do they position themselves in between? And, because I had chosen my interviewees for their rich experiences in the transnational field, my

ultimate question was: What kind of cosmopolitan is s/he and how is their individual agency shaping and being shaped by socio-economic conditions?

What I found at an early stage of this research, however, was that most people do not feel comfortable identifying her/himself as a “cosmopolitan” because of the sense of “hubris” associated with this term (cf. Hall 2006). And this was certainly true with many of my interviewees. Still, in my view, many of them provide typical examples of what Beck and others termed “actually [or really] existing cosmopolitanism” (e.g., Bruce Robbins 1998: 1) and I refer to them as cosmopolitans of one type or other, because they are agents of various forms of transnational activities.

For a better understanding of their subjectivity and interaction with the socio-economic conditions of filmmaking, some conceptual distinctions between different types of cosmopolitanisms will be useful. Thus, in Chapter Two, I have introduced a way to distinguish different types of cosmopolitanism according to the sense of the self and attitudes towards otherness, and how cultural values are articulated in accounts of transnational experiences - “Legitimizing”, “Resistance”, and “Project” cosmopolitanism.

Library Research

With regards to the use of secondary materials, library research has been an important part of my fieldwork in Japan. There are, broadly speaking, five different

kinds of source materials I have used. These are:

1. Academic sources from a number of disciplines - mainly sociology; media studies; film studies; and cultural studies. Most of these are written in English by Western academics or Japanese /Asian academics trained in the West.

2. Book-length studies of Japanese film history, or individual directors and stars – which are usually written by Japanese film critics and journalists. This category includes studies of a particular genre or a particular trend in the film industry; but because film studies is not an established academic discipline in Japan these books are more journalistically oriented than Western film studies literature.

3. Book-length interviews with film producers, directors, actors, and their autobiographies. It is a feature of the Japanese publishing industry that there is a profusion of these book length interviews and autobiographies of successful individuals. I found them very useful and quoted from these books extensively. Even relatively young producers in their 40s, people like the J-Horror movies producer, Ichise Takashige - book title: *Hollywood de Katsu (Winning in Hollywood)*, or, the Korean–Japanese film producer, Lee Bong-u - Book title: *Tsuki ha docchi ni deteru o meguru 2,3 no hanashi (Two, Three Stories concerning All Under the Moon)* have already published their biographical accounts.

4. Cinephile magazines and film industry trade magazines. I have found a great number of useful interviews, production reports, film festival and box office reports etc. in *Kinema Junpo*. Other cinema and film industry magazines I consulted were

Eiga Satsuei (Cinematography) and *Eiga TV Satsuei Gijutu* (Film and TV Filming Technique). They often had informative production reports from a cinematographer's perspective.

5. Non-film specialist magazines. There are a number of general magazines in which I found useful articles such as *Sekai* and *Chuo Kouron*. Business and economics magazines, such as *Boss* and *Zaikai* also had articles on the film industry from time to time.

My library research was mainly conducted in the National Diet Library and National Film Centre Library in Japan. *Kinema Junpo* was my most frequently consulted source magazine for all periods of Japanese film history. Besides, I extensively relied on the search engine produced by the National Institute of Informatics (CiNii) to list magazine articles that were relevant to my topic. I used CiNii's key word search facility in-putting words such as "Japanese cinema"; "film industry"; "co-production"; "internationalization"; "globalization"; "film investments"; "Hollywood"; "Asian cinema"; "Hong Kong stars"; and "Korean boom". The CiNii database contains 10,285,923 (30/09/06) papers and magazine articles; and it normally returned more than 100 articles for each of my key word searches.

My use of secondary materials, such as book length interviews and accounts by individuals from the filmmaking community, should make it clear that I treat such accounts as representations, rather than as transparent reports. Nevertheless, I believe it is possible to use these materials judiciously to provide

some facts and evidence for certain arguments about the condition of transnational filmmaking practices.

A Final Comment

Finally but not least important, here I would like to say a few things about my personal background and relationship to my object of study. Much of the information and my framework of understanding about the Japanese filmmaking communities came from my long-standing involvement with people in these communities. From the late 1970s to the early 1980s, I worked in the incipient independent sector of the Japanese film industry as a cinematographer. Then, I came to study at the UK Film School in the same year as the Edinburgh International Film Festival organized the first major screenings of new Japanese films (Rayns 1984). In a way I was a part of the globalization trend in the 1980s. After that, I became a keen observer of the reception of Japanese films in European film festivals and commercial cinemas in Britain, and often acted as a contact person for those Japanese filmmakers attending the screenings.

So, I have had access to many key players in the Japanese film industry because of these personal associations and it has provided me with a sort of partial insider's perspective and understanding. However, I have no intention of claiming that what I present in this thesis is a "real" insider's knowledge of the Japanese film industry. My perspective is simply that of a native observer of Japanese cinema and industry in Britain and what I am hoping to achieve in this thesis is to provide an

example of a cosmopolitan perspective that is situated and hybrid by nature.

Chapter Four

Internationalization of Japanese Cinema: How Japan was Different from the West and Superior to Asia

With the end of the war – which to the Japanese of that period really meant the end of a way of life – the coming of the Occupation, the resultant restrictions, and the related difficulties within the industry, one might think that the films of the period would have, at best, merely reflected the confusion of the era. That they reflected something much more is another proof of the often amazing resiliency of the Japanese people and of their ability to fashion something uniquely Japanese from the most diverse of foreign ideas. (Anderson and Richie [1959] 1982: 174)

Introduction

Two days after the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, on September 10th 1951, Akira Kurosawa's *Rashomon* won the grand prize (Golden Lion) at the Venice Film Festival. This victory came as a big surprise to American-occupied Japan (Anderson and Richie [1959] 1982: 233) and when the news spread Kurosawa became a national hero overnight. This was a key event, which helped to restore national confidence among the war-defeated Japanese (Sato 1995b: 233). *Rashomon* was internationally distributed by RKO, a Hollywood major company, and received

an American Academy Award the following year. Most importantly, this event symbolized Japan's return to the international community, and kick-started a phase of internationalization of Japanese cinema and its film industry.

The international success of *Rashomon* put Japanese critics under pressure to explain why *Rashomon*, a film largely ignored by domestic audiences and critics alike, was so highly praised in the west (Lee 2004: 136). Donald Richie (1972: 93) states that Japanese critics "decided" that *Rashomon's* success was due to its "exoticness" and that it was this that "foreigners" liked to see in Japanese films, though in his analysis he implies that mere reference to "exoticism" is not a satisfactory explanation.

Evaluating the artistic merits of *Rashomon* is not my goal here. Rather, the points I want to make are that: firstly, the success of *Rashomon* not only made Japanese filmmakers/producers very self-conscious about the Western gaze, but also made them increasingly aware of their standing among neighbouring Asian countries. The export potential of Japanese films was dramatically enhanced by *Rashomon's* success and it also extended Japan's sphere of influence within East and Southeast Asia. Secondly, it urged notable Japanese filmmakers/producers, such as Masaichi Nagata, the president of Daiei, the company which produced *Rashomon*, consciously to pursue self-Orientalist strategies.

Many writers have pointed out that consciously representing and constructing the self as essential otherness against the West has been the core strategy which has constituted Japanese cultural and national identity in the modern

age (e.g., Sakai 1989:115-6; Ivy 1995: 48; Iwabuchi 2002: 7). For example, Iwabuchi writes that:

Japan is represented and represents itself as culturally exclusive, homogeneous and uniquely particularistic through the operation of a strategic binary opposition between two imaginary cultural entities, 'Japan' and 'the West'. This is not to say that 'Asia' has no cultural significance in the construction of Japanese national identity. Rather, the complicity between Western Orientalism and Japan's self-Orientalism effectively works only when the Japanese cultural power in Asia is subsumed under Japan's cultural subordination to the West; i.e., when Japan's peculiar position as the only modern, non-Western imperial/colonial power tends to be translated with a great skew towards Japan's relation with the West. (2001: 203).

While Japan's construction of its national identity through an unambiguous comparison of itself with 'the West' is an historically embedded project, Japan's modern identity has, he cogently argues, always been "imagined in an asymmetrical totalizing triad between 'Asia', 'the West' and 'Japan'" (ibid.: 203). In other words, it was this double bind of being "both a centre and a periphery" (Sugimoto 1999: 86) that historically shaped and constituted the Japanese subject position.

Bearing this constitutive double bind of Japanese national subjectivity in mind, the first task of this chapter is to show how people in the Japanese film industry reacted to defeat in the war and the subsequent American Occupation, and to

examine how these experiences shaped their sense of national selfhood, and by extension, their Legitimising Cosmopolitanism. It is the commonly accepted view that defeat in the war and the resultant American Occupation was the most radical change the Japanese people had experienced since the opening of the country in the mid 19th century. The shift from pre-war militarism to post-war democracy was no doubt a radical change. However, there remains a crucial question about the residual continuity of the pre-war social structures and mentality in post-war Japan. Did the Occupation really create such a significant historic disjuncture as is commonly believed? Was it really “the end of a way of life” as Anderson and Richie suggest in the epigraph of this chapter?

I will argue against this common assumption. Although the defeat and the Occupation did, indeed, inscribe an indelible mark in the Japanese psyche, I argue that the industrial structures and the mentality of the people in the post-war Japanese filmmaking community exhibited a strong sense of continuity from those of the pre-war period.

What was radically different for Japan as a result of the Occupation and consequent developments was that the country was inserted into the new symbolic order that was emerging in the context of the cold war: now, Japan was part of the free and democratic “West”. According to Lacan, human subjectivity is split and any unified identity is illusory: “Because identity depends for its unity on something outside itself, it arises from a ‘lack’, that is a desire for a return to the unity with the mother which was part of early infancy but which can only be illusory ... The subject still longs for the unitary self and the oneness with the mother of the imaginary phase,

and this longing, this desire, produces a tendency to identify with powerful and significant figures outside itself” (Woodward 1997: 45). Perhaps, this Lacanian theory could be applied to a nation and a national identity, and could therefore be deployed to explain how “America” became symbolic of Japan’s constitutive “lack”, in the terms described above.

By examining some cases of early Japanese international co-productions in the 1950s, such as Toho’s *Madam Butterfly* (Carmine Gallone 1954), it will be seen how the impulse for self-Orientalism was inscribed and made irresistible to this generation of Japanese producers. Rey Chow’s (1995) account of self-Orientalism is useful here. She explains how non-Westerners who have been the objects of the Western gaze return their “to-be-looked-at-ness,” not in passive form, but as a form of self-affirmation. I combine this analysis with a case study of the internationalization strategy used by Masaichi Nagata, the president of Daiei who produced *Rashomon*. It will be seen how the relationships he established with the American and Asian film industries (both in political and psychological terms) reveal how his Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism was inextricably enmeshed within a sense of self-Orientalism directed towards the West, as well as a Japanese oriental Orientalism directed towards Asia. (Iwabuchi points out that “Japan constructed an oriental Orientalism against an ‘inferior Asia’” as it was “necessary for Japan to be able to construct its national identity in a modern and West-dominated world order” [2002: 8]).

The international success of *Rashomon* whetted Nagata’s appetite and he sent his filmmakers to learn about the latest filmmaking technologies in the US. He

imported the latest colour filmmaking technologies for *Jigokumon* (*The Gate of Hell*, Teinosuke Kinugasa 1953) with the explicit goal of winning prizes, and he succeeded in winning the Grand Prize at the Cannes Film Festival 1954. *Jigokumon* was then an early example of the conscious hybridization of local media “content” with global technological “forms” and, as such, provided a formula for other internationally successful Asian films in the coming years.

I also shall discuss how Nagata and the Japanese film industry in general sought to regain a position of leadership amongst the Southeast Asian film industries using their Euro-American success as leverage. I argue that this apparent resurgence of Japanese cultural influence and power in Southeast Asia was not so much to do with the revival of Japanese imperialism but more to do with the US administration’s integration of Japan into its anti-communist strategy. The old constitutive double bind of Japanese national identity - being different from the West and above the rest of Asia - was maintained, if not reinforced, by the constellations of power that emerged out of cold war politics in the pre-globalization world.

Masaichi Nagata and Shaw Brothers’ Run Run Shaw established the Federation of Picture Producers in Asia, and they launched the Southeast Asian International Film Festival in 1954. Run Run Shaw was very keen to modernize the Hong Kong film industry using Japanese technologies, and hired many Japanese directors and technicians to work in their Hong Kong Studios in the late 1950s and 1960s. The film historian Kinnia Yau Shuk-ting calls this period “the golden age of Hong Kong-Japanese cinematic interchange” (2003). However, this interchange between the two film industries was generally not spoken about, and was perhaps

even hidden, until recently. Most of these Japanese filmmakers were working under Chinese names, and it was difficult for them to talk about this aspect of their work before the advent of globalization in the late 1980s as within the paradigm of national cinema and Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism, a stigma was sometimes attached to such transnational practices.

In the last section of this chapter, I will discuss the career of the Japanese “New Wave” director Nagisa Oshima and the emergence of Resistance Cosmopolitanism in the 1960-70s. Oshima was an anti-establishment filmmaker who made films to purposefully break taboos within post-war Japanese society. His hard-core rendition of a crime of passion, *Ai no Corrida* (*In the Realm of the Senses*, 1976) was shot entirely in Japan with a Japanese cast and crew but it was technically a French film because the French producer, Anatole Daumon, financed the film. The production of *Ai no Corrida* was consciously structured to challenge Japanese censorship laws and the strict border controls of the nation-state. It was a precursor to other similar endeavours, which showed the politically subversive potential of transnational practices in the age of globalization.

The overall aim of this chapter is to show how the Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism of Japanese filmmakers operated in such a way as to allow them to occupy a particular position within the international order of the pre-globalization world and to illustrate that the internationalization of Japanese cinema was very much a part of the post-war national rebuilding project. In the following pages, I shall start the chapter by posing a question about the putative rupture between pre- and post-war Japan and Japanese film industry. My contention is that the pre- and

post-war Japanese film industries were very much continuous but that they became discontinuous as a result of the transformation of subjectivity, and the concomitant structural changes, which occurred as part of globalization process in the last part of the twentieth century.

The Occupation, Japanese National Cinema and Industry

The Japanese were the most alien enemy the United States had ever fought in an all-out struggle. In no other war with a major foe had it been necessary to take into account such exceedingly different habits of acting and thinking. (Benedict 1946: 1)

[M]easured by the standards of modern civilization, they [Japanese people] would be like a boy of twelve as compared with our development of forty-five years. (The General Douglas MacArthur, cited in *Embracing Defeat*, by John W. Dower 2001: 404)

During the Occupation, Japan was in no position to determine its own future without negotiating with the overwhelmingly powerful Other. Still, American domination was not entirely one-way, and did not always have the intended effects, as John W. Dower (2001) demonstrated in his Pulitzer-winning account *Embracing Defeat*. Dower suggests that we should understand the design and re-building of post-war Japan in the Occupation period as more akin to “the collaboration between administrators and occupied people” (Dower, cited in Tanigawa 2002: 6).

According to the Japanese historian, Kenji Tanigawa, the regulation of the production and distribution of films was central to the GHQ/SCAP's (General Head Quarter/ Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers) mass re-education program (Tanigawa 2002: 6); and cinema was a key instrument in making this unlikely "collaboration" between those who occupied and those who were occupied possible.

A purported goal of the Occupation was to re-educate the Japanese population and to liberate them from a "feudal" and militaristic mentality - and ultimately to rebuild Japan as a democratic country. Therefore, the production of traditional sword plays – *chanbara* – and period dramas in general, was banned more or less altogether because they were seen as a symbol of the Japanese feudal mentality. The GHQ's film policy operated through a three-tier system which consisted of:

a) The supervision and pre-production censoring of film scripts by the Civil Information & Education (CEI) office which aimed to encourage the Japanese industry to produce films that promoted democracy, individual freedom and human rights.

b) Censorship of unsuitable films by the Civil Censorship Division (CCD). Unsuitable films included: 1) films which encouraged militaristic tendencies; 2) films which related to revenge; 3) films which related to statism; 4) films which related to patriotism and exclusionism; 5) films which distorted historic facts; 6) films

which condoned racism and religious persecution; 7) films which praised feudalistic loyalty and belittled human life; 8) films which condoned suicide, directly or indirectly; 9) films which condoned the repression and exploitation of women; 10) films which praised brutal violence; 11) films which condoned the exploitation of children; and, 12) films which violated orders of the GHQ and the Potsdam declaration.

c) The dissemination of suitable American films by the Central Motion Picture Exchange (CMPE) (Sato 1995b: 163-70).

These are “the resultant restrictions, and the related difficulties within the industry” that were mentioned in the epigraph of this chapter by Anderson and Richie ([1959] 1982). But what they did not mention was that the Japanese film industry had been controlled even more tightly by the Japanese military regime before the end of the war. Under the Film Law of 1939, all film scripts were censored, and the military authority rationed film stock, thus cooperation was compulsory if filmmakers were to keep working. During the war, the majority of liberal and leftwing filmmakers had been converted and worked on military propaganda (cf., High 2003: xiii-xiv; Sato 1995b: 45-107).

As a result, self-control had already been institutionalized and deeply internalized by Japanese filmmakers well before the Occupation army arrived. Therefore, for this generation of Japanese filmmakers, there was nothing really new about the strict supervision and control that was imposed by the GHQ. Nevertheless,

what was radically different about the American regime was that now the same Japanese filmmakers were pressed to make films about democracy and individual freedom, instead of about Japanese spirituality and patriotism. In practical terms, the most difficult constraint for Japanese filmmakers was that they were no longer allowed to make *chanbara* (sword plays) or period dramas.

According to the Japanese film historian, Kyoko Hirano, who has extensively examined the effects of the GHQ's film policies, the high technical standards and over-all effectiveness of Japanese war-time propaganda was recognized by the CEI (1998: 41-42). As well, the GHQ was keen to utilize the pre-existing structures and resources of the Japanese industry, because outcomes were viewed as being likely to be far more effective if the voices creating them came from inside Japan, so that the process was not seen as an imposition from the outside, in other words for exactly the same reasons as the GHQ decided to preserve the role of the Emperor. Thus, the CEI, and particularly David Conde who was in charge of the cinema and theatre section, was compelled to nurture the Japanese film industry in order to produce "democratic" and "enlightened" indigenous films rather than flooding the market with American products (Hirano 1998: 18, 60-67).

In her study, Hirano was interested to find out whether, and how, the social and cultural values portrayed in Japanese films changed before and after the war and throughout the Occupation period. She concludes from her analysis that the values and outlooks expressed in Japanese films changed only superficially despite the radical changes in the political context of production. The "essential values" underlying the characters and narratives didn't change very much. Moreover, she

finds that Japanese films made both during the war and in the Occupation period are “surprisingly apolitical” (1998: 20-21).

According to her observations, in most Japanese wartime propaganda films, what were considered in the West as functionally essential components of propaganda are often obscured or entirely absent. They contain barely enough information (such as who is the enemy, and what constitutes the threat) and insufficient rationalization about why Japanese people must fight, to constitute effective propaganda in the Western sense. The tone of the films is hardly jingoistic, nor are the soldiers heroic in any usual sense of the word. Instead, the Japanese propaganda works on an emotional level by showing soldiers suffering and making sacrifices for the emperor and his national community (ibid.: 20; cf., Sato 1995b: 7-8).

Similarly, most post-war “democracy films” failed to portray what constitutes “democracy” in any substantial way (cf., Standish 2005: 165-8). This includes a widely acclaimed masterpiece *Waga seishun ni kuinashi* (*No Regrets for My Youth*, Kurosawa 1946). This film depicts two central characters, an aging university professor and his daughter, who resist repression under the pre-war military regime. They suffer greatly but never yield to the pressures of militarism. Peter High states that this scenario is merely a “wishful fantasy” (2003: 322).

Thus, according to Hirano (1998) and others, Japanese filmmakers invested much more in the emotional content of the drama than in conveying a political message in either wartime propaganda or post-war “democracy” films. The romantic

emphasis on the irrational rather than rational aspects of the human condition in Japanese cinema was consistent, as were the apolitical and subservient attitudes of Japanese filmmakers towards the dominant authorities. For Hirano, this constitutes the “essence” of Japanese cinema, which did not change despite the radical change of the political context and social values. At its core, there is a deep sense of political resignation tacitly expressed in both pre- and post- war Japanese films.

The continuity of pre- and post-war Japanese cinema and film industry is also clearly evident from a structural viewpoint. Unlike in Germany, no Japanese studio executives or filmmakers were expelled permanently from the industry for their wartime activities. Thirty-one wartime studio managers and company executives were temporarily banned from working in October 1947 by the agent of the Japanese government (Chuo koshoku tekihi shinsa iinkai – The central committee for the investigation into the suitability to public posts) formed under the GHQ. However, many of them were treated “lightly”, for example Masaichi Nagata, the president of Daiei, soon lodged a successful appeal to be allowed to return to work and the ban against him was lifted in May 1948. Other studio executives’ expulsion orders were lifted in October 1950 (Tanaka 1976c: 221-222). Therefore, it was the case that the same filmmakers under the same executives in the same studios who had been making war propaganda were making “educational” and “democratic” films after the war. The issue of the responsibility of individual members of the film industry during the war years was never vigorously pursued (High 2003: 506-7).

Still, some Japanese film workers took post-war ideals more seriously than others. Some of them even adopted philosophical attitudes to their own wartime

pasts. In his autobiography, the film director Akira Kurosawa states his thoughts and feelings:

I was not against militarism during the war. To my shame, I wasn't brave enough to actively protest against it... It is really embarrassing but this is something I have to admit ... Thus, I am not in a position to criticize matters relating to the war. And I am very aware that postwar democracy and freedom were not something we fought for and won, but they were given to us. Therefore, I thought we needed to re-learn and to re-start, in earnest, in order to be worthy of these ideals... Traditionally, we Japanese were taught to be selfless; being selfless was a virtue and to think about the self was vice. We were accustomed to this traditional thinking and never had any doubt about it. However, without establishing the self, there is no democracy or freedom. (Kurosawa 1990: 268-9)

Kurosawa wrote numerous explicitly propagandistic scripts and directed films on Japanese spiritualist themes during the war. In the immediate aftermath of the war he made a fascinating "democracy" film - *No Regrets for My Youth* (1946) - which I mentioned above. He was troubled by the question of self-identity, and the validity of transposing Western modernity into the Japanese context. Although he felt that concepts such as individual freedom were alien to traditional Japanese thinking, he accepted and welcomed them like many other Japanese intellectuals of the time.

The film director Mansaku Itami wrote about the issue of wartime

responsibility just before he died in 1946. Tuberculosis had forced him to retire from directing during the Pacific War, thus he was not directly involved with any wartime propaganda. Rather than focusing on individual responsibility, Itami widened the circle of guilt to include the entire Japanese population. This was because, he said: “the fact I never wrote a single pro-war script doesn’t mean I consistently harboured anti-war convictions. It was just I was sick and so was never given the opportunity to work on material of that sort” (Itami, cited in High 2003: 508). As far as he was concerned, the blame should not be put on individuals, because there was no physical escape, no personal agency available to any individual in wartime conditions. In his view, it is only possible to think of responsibility as a collective burden, which rested on the Japanese people and nation as a whole.

Similarly, Peter High, who analysed Japanese wartime filmmakers and their work, wrote with empathy for those who desired to “keep working and thereby to redeem [their] worth from the remorseless flood of time”. He asked: “Who among us today could say we would not have done the same under similar circumstances?” (2003: 514) Nevertheless, Itami continued to raise the alarm:

What is to be done with a people who can so easily wave off the past with the casual assertion that ‘we have all been hoodwinked’? They are bound to be fooled, time and time again. In fact, the nation has already started wolfing down a new set of lies. The deception, this time as always, is of our own making. (Itami, cited in High 2003: 510-11)

Itami had probably already sensed the advent of a “new set of lies” of far greater magnitude under the American Occupation. With astounding prescience, he describes the mentality that would generate such “lies”: “the impulse to wall off the past from the present, to place history in sanitary isolation from the concerns of the present day” (High 2003: 511). Drawing on this remark by Itami, High concludes his analysis by stating: “One falsehood, born in the immediate post-war moment and yet continuing into the present day, was the notion of virtual noncontiguity of pre-war and wartime Japan with post-war Japan. Yet, one need only look at the *modus operandi* of present-day Japanese bureaucracy, for instance, to see how little has changed, despite the flurries of purges and reshufflings” (ibid.). Therefore, the purported radical disjunction between the pre-war and post-war Japanese mentality is invalid, to say the least.

A New Set of Lies – Post-war National Subjectivity.

The outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula in June 1950 was a god-given opportunity for Japanese politics as well as the national economy as it kick-started the postwar era of rapid economic growth. American military procurement requirements created special demands that were worth billions of dollars and the Japanese stock exchange index rose by 80% from the time of the outbreak of the war to the end of 1951. American aid and military demands bolstered the Japanese economy and the Japanese GNP recovered to pre- World War Two levels by 1955 (cf., Morris-Suzuki 1984: 208, 225, 262). Japanese sovereignty was restored in 1952 with the enforcement of the San Francisco peace treaty. However, in

the eyes of the international community, Japan remained a client state of the United States of America and it continued to prosper.

The example of post-war Japan is said by many to be the most spectacularly successful case of the application of modernization theory. In the context of cold war politics, “democracy” and “modernization” often became just other names for Western imperialism and colonization (Curran and Park 2000: 3-5). By the end of World War Two, the efficiency of classic models of imperialism and the management of colonies was held in dispute, “not because of a general acknowledgement that they signified domination, exploitation, and oppression but because of the alibi that they were no longer, if ever, profitable” (Harootunian 1993: 200). Thus, this new method of control, which incorporated modernization programs brought by the West but which did not involve physical presence and territorialization, and still produced “a friendly state,” became a far preferable option. From this perspective, Japan’s willingness to take up a subject position in the modernization/democratization narrative provided by the American Occupation, was the key to the success of achieving such control. The preservation of the role of Emperor Hirohito, and the interpellation of the new democratic subject through the pre-war imperial system were the main mechanisms for launching modernization programs in Japan. However, the inherent contradictions that had to be accommodated to do so had grave consequences for post-war Japanese subjectivity.

In *Embracing Defeat*, John Dower argues that the “emperor and the general [MacArthur] had presided as dual sovereigns through the years of defeat and occupation” (1999: 555). The acquittal of the Emperor’s wartime responsibility and

the preservation of his role was a matter of cultural life and death for the Japanese after their unconditional surrender. Dower demonstrates that various American and Japanese political actors co-produced the post-war Japanese constitution and many social institutions that accompanied it. The reinstatement of the Emperor as a symbol of the nation was one example of this complex interplay.

The popularity of General MacArthur was documented everywhere in the Japanese press of the time. He saved, and stood by, the Emperor. By doing so, General MacArthur commanded the same godlike reverence as the Emperor from the Japanese public. As a result, the Occupation was amazingly successful in being seen as emancipation from the old Japanese militarism rather than as outright domination by a foreign power.

During the war, the Japanese media called the Japanese people “the children of the emperor.” During the Occupation it became customary for the Japanese media to call themselves “the children of General MacArthur.” When the General was divested of his post as the highest commander in the Far East (as a result of his overly hawkish opinions about the Korean war), the liberal *Asahi* newspaper featured a column full of emotion headlined, “Lament for General MacArthur”:

We have lived together with General MacArthur from the end of the war until today.... When the Japanese people faced the unprecedented situation of defeat, and fell into *kyodatsu* condition of exhaustion and despair, it was General MacArthur who taught us

the merit of democracy and pacifism and guided us with kindness along this bright path. As if pleased with his own children growing up, he took pleasure in the Japanese people, yesterday's enemy, walking step by step toward democracy, and kept encouraging us.

(Asahi news, translated by and cited in Dower 1999: 548-9)

Within the modernization narrative constructed by America, a subject position that Harootunian called "America's Japan" was taken up enthusiastically by the Japanese during the Occupation and continued to have resonance even after the Occupation ended. The "America's Japan" narrative constituted Japan and the Japanese people as both an elite nation-state and an elite race that held unique positions within the drive towards modernization. In this regard, Japan is in a unique and exceptional position that is very different from any other non-Western country, let alone other Asian countries. This discourse makes Japan into a kind of "echo to America's Narcissus" (Harootunian 1993: 207) and the formation itself was mainly constructed by American Japanologists and "Japan knowers" first.

Among them, the most influential was the American ambassador to Japan, E. O. Reischauer. He argued that to separate Japan from the "poorly developed counties" of Asia it had so recently colonized and plundered during the Pacific War, affirmed Japan's own decision to identify with the First World rather than the Third World. These countries, he argued, "cannot be considered to be like Japan, which was able to accelerate the modernizing process while being conscious of the modernization of the West in the world" (cited in Harootunian 1993: 208).

Another prominent scholar in this vein was Robert Bellah, who claimed that he had found a form of pre-modern rationality that was a “functional analogue to the Protestant ethic” in the Japanese religious experience of the Tokugawa period (1985: 2). He applied Parsonian theory to the Japanese modernization process and explained its success by pointing to the pre-existence of stable traditional and core values.

These sorts of views suggest that Japan is endowed with a unique history and culture but does not represent the Other to the West. These views often emphasize the roles that a strong tradition, with core cultural values and a strong sense of identity play in creating stable social norms which nonetheless remain capable of integrating novelty, and thus supporting the process of capitalist modernization. Continuity and consensus, rather than conflict and rupture, were put forward as the ingredients for modernization and progress. Seen in this light, “America’s Japan” was an ideological device of the cold war, which provided other developing countries with a model of social change without the conflict and struggle that had been present in communist revolutions. At the same time, it provided the governments of Japan and developing countries around the world with a justification for the “status quo and to eliminate the realm of criticism that once belonged to the space of culture” (Harootunian 1993: 215-6). Nevertheless, the efficacy of “America’s Japan” as an ideological device was somewhat doubtful, because it overly-emphasized the historic and cultural uniqueness of the Japanese character, making the Japanese success story alienating rather than inspiring for other developing countries.

Harootunian suggests that this vision of “America’s Japan” became “Japan’s Japan” and transferred to the Japanese discursive space once it was recognized in the 1970s that the goals of modernization had been reached, and Japan’s economic status was established internationally. This appropriation of “America’s Japan” was called *Nihonjinron* - the theories of Japanese uniqueness (cf., Dale 1986; Yoshino 1992, 1997; Aoki 1999; Sugimoto 1999) - and Harootunian calls this “Japan’s Japan.” *Nihonjinron* was debated feverishly throughout the 1970s and 1980s in Japan. One of the main characteristics of *Nihonjinron* is that it constructs Japanese culture and people as unique, as if no other cultures in the world are “unique.” Within its tenets Japan alone is a historic exception that stands outside a universal (Western) paradigm of progress. It therefore regards Japan as superior to Asia, on a level at least equal to the West, but different from both.

Nevertheless, of course the Japanese–American relationship was never a partnership between equals as far as the Americans were concerned as was made blatantly clear by General MacArthur at the American Congress in May 1951. He was asked whether he thought the Japanese could be trusted to maintain a free democratic society. General MacArthur’s answer was yes and then he praised Japanese innocence and malleability in a typically patronizing manner. It was MacArthur’s intention to argue that “the Japanese could be trusted more than the Germans” (Dower 1999: 550), and here was the way he put it:

Well, the German problem is a completely and entirely different one from the Japanese problem. The German people were a mature race.

If the Anglo-Saxon was say 45 years of age in his development, in the sciences, the arts, divinity, culture, the Germans were quite as mature. The Japanese, however, in spite of their antiquity measured by time, were in tuitionary condition. Measured by the standards of modern civilization, they would be like a boy of twelve as compared with our development of 45 years.

Like any tuitionary period, they were susceptible to following new models, new ideas. You can implant basic idea there. They were still close enough to origin to be elastic and acceptable to new concepts.

The German was quite mature as we were. Whatever the German did in dereliction of the standards of modern morality, the international standards, he did deliberately. He didn't do it because he stumbled into it to some extent as the Japanese did. He did it as a considered policy in which he believed in his own military might, in which he believed that its application would be a shortcut to the power and economic domination that he desired...

But the Japanese were entirely different. There is no similarity. One of the great mistakes that was made was to try to apply the same policies which were so successful in Japan to Germany, where they were not quite so successful, to say the least. They were working on a different level. (MacArthur, cited in Dower 1999: 550-551)

When news of this reply reached Japan, a mere five words in this passage drew obsessive attention: "LIKE A BOY OF TWELVE". A biographer of General MacArthur, Rinjiro Sodei, has observed, "these words in their starkness awakened people to how they snuggled up to the conqueror. Suddenly, many felt unaccountably shamed" (cited in Dower 1999: 551). MacArthur's statement was taken as a description of the colonial relationship and of Japanese dependency on the American colonizer. Therefore, it stirred up feelings akin to an inferiority complex in the Japanese people who did not see themselves as colonial subjects. From this point on, the Japanese warded off the experience of the Occupation in their memory, in a very similar manner to which they had denied the memory of their own wartime aggressions.

Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism and Self-Orientalism

The Negro is just a child.

(Fanon 1967: 27)

During the Occupation, there was a short honeymoon period in which the Japanese fantasized about themselves being "children" of Western modernity. However, as they were made blatantly aware by that famous speech, the Japanese were not considered to be modern subjects who belonged to "the same" modernity as Americans by the Americans themselves. The resultant humiliation and disillusionment inscribed a deep sense of impotence and fear within Japanese subjectivity as, in the post-colonial power field within which Japan located itself,

Western universalism defined the worth of all non-Western cultures.

This simultaneous recognition of the superiority of the West and the impossibility of being accepted as the “same” by the West created a tension within the constitution of Japanese identity. As Naoki Sakai put it: “Japan’s uniqueness and identity are provided only insofar as Japan stands out as a particular object in the universal field of the West. Only when it is integrated into Western universalism does it gain its own identity as a particularity. In other words, Japan becomes endowed with and aware of its ‘self’ only when it is recognised by the West” (1989: 105). In such circumstances, and with such a frame of mind, the only route left to a non-Western subject is to affirm oneself as having an “otherness” that is worthy in the eyes of the West, thus resorting to self-Orientalism.

Instructive in this sense is the case of Masaichi Nagata, the president of Daiei, one of Japan’s major film studios. His internationalization strategy and his relation to the Western Other followed the international success of *Rashomon*, which as we have seen coincided with Japan regaining its national sovereignty - the end of the Occupation - and its return to independent relations with the international community. The national priority at the time was to produce goods for export so that the nation could re-build its economy and recover from the devastation of the war. In this politico-economic context, Nagata saw the internationalization of Japanese cinema as a duty, which should be carried out as a national project. In his own work which pursued these goals he deployed conspicuous self-Orientalist strategies.

I propose thinking of these practices of producing and circulating

self-othering, self-Orientalist representations as a type of Legitimizing Cosmopolitan activity with a centrifugal force. Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism presents national and cultural difference to the international field as aspects of what becomes an essentially unique and worthy kind of otherness for the Western gaze. Paradoxically, it seeks recognition from the West of the particularity of their culture as an exceptional case. By doing so, practitioners of Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism often aim to enhance their reputation and marketability in national and regional markets by drawing on their international reputation. In other words, their practice legitimizes and expands the national category. They do not consciously problematize the national category.

As discussed in Chapter Two, I have developed the concepts of Legitimizing, Resistance and Project Cosmopolitanism based on Manuel Castells' distinction between Legitimizing, Resistance and Project Identity (2004: 6-12). Identities here are understood to be "sources of meaning for the actors themselves, and by themselves, constructed through a process of individuation" (ibid.: 7). Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism is based on Legitimizing Identity in which practitioners define themselves against the otherness of foreigners, and legitimize their own national particularity within the international field. Here, "cosmopolitanism" is conceptualized in a very different way from the classic Kantian "cosmopolitanism" based on universal reason, which detaches the cosmopolitan subject from any parochial ties and particularity; and sets it against nationalist sentiment and communalism. Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism is a type of "actually existing cosmopolitanism" (cf., Beck 2006; Robbins 1998: 1) and it works with nationalism and patriotic feeling rather than opposing them. In this new paradigm, as

Richard Rorty suggests, cosmopolitanism is about “a larger loyalty” (1998: 45) that is an extension of parochial attachment and feelings rather than about universal “justice” based on enlightenment rationality.

The international success of *Rashomon* was enthusiastically equated with national victory in public discourse of the time (cf., Nagata 1951a; 1951b; Izawa 1952). However, the director of the film himself was never comfortable with the Orientalist gaze that was allegedly behind its success. He remarked: “I would have been still happier, and the prize would have had more meaning, if I had made and been honoured for something showing as much of present day Japan as *Bicycle Thieves* showed of modern Italy” (Kurosawa, cited in Anderson and Richie [1959] 1982: 13).

Clearly, one of the reasons why *Rashomon*'s victory at the Venice Film Festival created such a frenzy in the Japanese film industry had to do with the fact that it was a period Samurai piece which involved sword fights - *chanbara* - and a rape scene. As I have discussed above, the production of traditional sword play stories, *chanbara*, was strictly banned by the CEI and the CCD since they were regarded as barbarous and a source of encouragement for feudalism - although this ban was gradually eased by 1950 (Hirano 1998: 113). Thus, from a Japanese viewpoint, sending period films to a Western international film festival was not a good idea because it represented the old Japan, and did not show new, democratic and modern post-war Japan. In fact, it was not a Japanese person who had selected *Rashomon* for submission, but the head of Italifilm in the Tokyo office, Giulliana Stramigioli, who had viewed a number of possible Japanese entries and chosen

Rashomon (Anderson and Richie, [1959] 1982: 231; Kurosawa 1990: 343).

Giulliana Stramigioli was an Italian Japanologist born in Rome in 1914. She studied Japanese art and religion in the pre-war Kyoto University from 1934 to 1937 and came back to Japan as a representative of Italifilm after the end of the war. It was in this capacity that she was asked by The Motion Picture Association of Japan to help in deciding which film to send to the Venice Film Festival. According to an interview she gave to *Kinema Junpo* – the oldest cinema magazine in Japan – she liked *Rashomon* very much because she thought it would be “topical” for the international audience, as it was very “unique” and “typically Japanese” at the same time (*Kinema Junpo* 1953: 79). However, Nagata and Daiei were not at all confident or initially keen to submit the film. Daiei only agreed rather reluctantly to provide a print and promotional materials but refused to pay for any of the ancillary costs. In the end, it was Stramigioli herself who paid for costs such as translation and sub-titling necessary for the entry. Moreover, the director of the film, Kurosawa, was not even informed about the film’s submission (Kurosawa 1990: 343) and nobody from Japan was present when *Rashomon* won the Grand Prix at the festival.

What we can learn from the above anecdote is that before the spectacular success of *Rashomon*, people in the Japanese film industry were not keen to present period films to foreign (Western) audiences, fearing that these films represented Japanese culture as barbarous and feudalistic. They preferred to show modern Japanese life – in fact, one year previously, the Motion Picture Association of Japan wanted to send a modern love story called *Mata au hi made* (*Until We Meet Again*, Tadashi Imai 1950) to the Cannes Film Festival. They decided not to in the end

because it was pointed out, much to their embarrassment, that the story of the film resembled perhaps too closely that of a certain Roman Rolland novel (Noborikawa 1955: 30). Moreover, nobody in the Japanese film industry thought the export of Japanese cinema was a viable business possibility. After the success of *Rashomon*, however, Nagata initiated various campaigns promoting the internationalization of Japanese cinema.

Masaichi Nagata's film company, Daiei, was born as a result of the wartime re-organization of industries. Hence Daiei was a less established company than its rivals Shochiku and Toho. However, because Daiei had not collaborated with the military regime in important ways and as Nagata was making only "films about monster cats and raccoons" (Tanaka 1962: 112), he was not punished as severely as other Japanese studio executives. Nagata managed to have his expulsion from the film industry lifted in June 1948, only six months after it had been initiated. This gave him a tremendous advantage over his rival studio executives - Shiro Kido of Shochiku and Iwao Mori of Toho - who were expelled from the film industry as war criminals and not readmitted until October 1950. Luckily for Nagata, his official re-entry into the industry also enabled him to travel to the US, and Hollywood, in August 1949 when he became the first individual from the Japanese film industry to do so after the war.

This first encounter with America and American people made a very strong impact on Nagata. Later, he told his biographer that when he arrived in New York, about half way through the itinerary of this trip, and found himself on his own in a large hotel room, he was filled with a feeling that he could not control, and could not

stop crying:

I was moved by an emotion that I could not explain, and I could not help crying. I would say that I was sorry and ashamed of my ignorance. I had no idea about this enormous gap between Japan and America. Everything is just so different in every aspect. It is not that I was amazed or envious of the grandeur of the American material culture; but American people, and their ways of thinking astonished me. Why did Japan fight a war against such amazing people? The feeling was overwhelming that I was ashamed of being Japanese. So, I made a resolution. For the rest of my life, I shall make my best effort to build friendly Japanese-American relationship, because I love both countries. And, this has not changed in the slightest since. (Nagata, cited in Tanaka 1962: 119)

Nagata visited Los Angeles, Detroit, New York, Washington, Chicago and San Francisco in this 35-day trip. He visited the Hollywood studios, as well as independent companies. He met Samuel Goldwyn. There, totally unexpectedly, Nagata was offered a contract that would make him the Japanese agent for Goldwyn's films as well as for animations by Walt Disney studios (Tanaka 1962: 120). Nagata gladly accepted the contracts. However, according to Kumamoto, the Japanese-American lawyer who read the contract for Nagata, it was an unbelievably bad deal for Daiei. In short, "all the profit goes to the Americans. Daiei won't make a penny. It was work for nothing. So, I advised him not to sign the contract but he signed it all the same" (Kumamoto, cited in Midorikawa 1987: 171).

From Nagata's viewpoint, he signed the contract for the sake of securing Japanese-American "friendship" (Tanaka 1962: 120), something which was, for him, priceless. On his return to Japan, the Japanese media gave a great deal of space to his report about Hollywood and his "friendship" with the Americans. His announcement that he had become the Japanese agent for both the Disney and Goldwyn production companies was seen as a proof of his cosmopolitan status. Nagata's office became very popular with distinguished Japanese politicians and business people who were about to visit the US the first time; everybody wanted a letter of introduction from Nagata to his friends in Hollywood. Thus, in the end, the deal his lawyer thought "unbelievably bad" did not seem that bad for Nagata after all.

Anderson and Richie describe Nagata as "a businessman's businessman" with a reputation for being "a maker of the most uninteresting and most financially successful pot-boilers" ([1959] 1982: 231). However, when it came to his dealing with Westerners and international matters, he made many "unbelievably bad" business decisions. His enthusiasm for internationalization - the promotion of Japanese films abroad; co-productions; the formation of international associations and so forth - suggests that these projects stood for something more important than money for him. Nagata was definitely not a rational character, driven simply by financial interests. These bad decisions were probably, at best, his way of making cultural distinctions as a Legitimizing Cosmopolitan, who represented Japanese cultural differences in the international field. Or, at worst, he suffered from a severe Western inferiority complex, and felt compelled to take up whatever opportunities he was offered by his Western counterparts.

During this first visit to the US, Nagata learned two important lessons. First, he saw the latest American filmmaking technologies used in Hollywood and consequently understood the wide gap between Japan and the US technologically. This motivated him to import new technologies and to improve upon the technical standards of Japanese filmmaking. While in the US he purchased the latest Mitchell camera and a set of lenses – which would be used to photograph *Rashomon*. Also, Nagata learned about the development of multi-layer colour negative film technology that was still in an experimental stage in the US. Secondly, his trip made Nagata realize the scale and potential of the international film trade. In America he learned that “Japan made up only one percent of the market for the American film industry internationally. This only one percent of the American box office equals to 40 percent of the entire Japanese domestic market” (Nagata, cited in Tanaka 1962: 122), and made him realize “how small the Japanese film industry is” (ibid.).

After this experience, Nagata set up *Eiga sangyo shinkou shingikai* (the Film Industry Promotion Board) which represents the film industry to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and he was elected secretary in 1950. In the same year, he was also elected president of *Nihon eiga gijutsu kyokai* (the Japanese Association of Cinematic Technology). In this capacity his remit was to improve upon the technical standards of Japanese films. Nagata employed a senior member of the Association, Michio Midorikawa, who would later win the Grand Prix at Cannes with the colour cinematography of *Jigokumon* (*The Gate of Hell*, Kinugasa 1953) as his personal technical adviser.

Often, Nagata publicly stated “it would be a mistake to produce films specifically for export purposes. *Rashomon* was not made for export. We just have to make films which reflect genuine Japanese spirit and culture” (e.g., 1951b: 89). In theory, everyone in the film industry at the time seemed to agree on this point. In practice, however, everybody simply contradicted themselves. After all, it was just not possible to “make films which reflect genuine Japanese spirit and culture” once they became aware of the gaze of the Western Other.

For example, in 1952 Nagata hired the American film writer/director, Paul Sloan, to work in Japan through his connection with Samuel Goldwyn. Sloan directed a film that was a love story titled *Itsu itsu mademo (Until Forever)* about an American GI who fell in love with a Japanese girl whose family wanted her to marry a rich Japanese man. The heartbroken soldier was sent to Korea, got wounded, and returned to Japan just in time for an earthquake that was to kill the girl he loved (Anderson and Richie [1959] 1982: 233). This production had a major problem in that it took six months longer than originally scheduled to film and cost much more than anticipated. To add insult to injury, the film flopped in Japan and never found a foreign audience (*ibid.*: 233; cf., *Eiga nenkan* 1953: 62-3).

International co-productions in the 1950s were initiated either by Western or Japanese film companies. On the one hand, filming in Japan was popular for Hollywood and other Western film companies who were searching for exotic locations. They also wanted to find ways to release funds they had earned with their previous films in the Japanese market, which had been frozen because the foreign exchange controls of the time set a limit on the amount of earnings foreign

companies could send back home. On the other hand, Japanese companies were keen to initiate co-productions because introducing Japanese customs and culture to the outside world was seen as the national project of the time as a result of which they hoped to enter international markets. The first type of Western initiated co-production includes low grade affairs such as *Tokyo File 212* (Stuart McGowan 1951) and *Geisha Girl* (George Breakston 1952) as well as more sophisticated big budget ones such as *Three Stripes in the Sun* (Richard Murphy 1955) and *The Tea House of The August Moon* (Daniel Mann 1956); *Sayonara* (Joshua Logan 1957). The second type of Japanese initiated co-production includes films such as Daiei's *Istu itsu mademo* (*Until Forever*, Paul Sloan 1952); Toho's *Cho-Cho Fujin* (*Madam Butterfly*, Gallone 1955); and Shochiku's *Wasureenu Bojo* (*Typhoon Over Nagasaki*, Yves Ciampi 1956).

What is most interesting about these co-production films of the 1950s is the fact that regardless of which partner initiated the project, Western or Japanese, the movies all shared more or less the same story line; they are all about a white male protagonist who comes to a foreign land - Japan - and falls in love with a Japanese girl, often with a tragic ending when the beloved Japanese girl dies. There is also a reversed version in the French art film, written by Marguerite Duras and produced by Anatole Daumon, *Hiroshima Mon Amour* (Alain Resnair 1959), at the very end of the 1950s, in which the female protagonist spends a night with a Japanese male character.

As Edward Said (1978) famously points out, the Orient has always been linked in the Western imaginary to a feminine, weak and infantilized nature that is

dominated and colonized by the masculine West in various historic representations. The power differentiation between the core West and the peripheral East has produced such representations of the gender divide; in turn, the representation of the feminine East and the masculine West naturalized and sustained the core-periphery relation between the West and East.

Puccini's opera, *Madam Butterfly*, is probably the best-known example of such an Orientalist representation. According to the American film scholar Kay Carter, the signifier of the Oriental woman as a symbol of the idealized object of love first appeared in cinematic form in the 1915 version of *Madam Butterfly* (Sydney Olcott 1915). Since then the signifier of the Oriental woman as the idealized object of love has repeatedly reappeared in cinematic representations up to and including the present day (Carter 1975, cited in Masuda 2004: 126).

Japan's esteemed film importer, Nagamasa Kawakita, saw Puccini's *Madam Butterfly* for the first time at the national opera house in Hamburg in the 1920s as a foreign student (Kawakita 1957: 174). It was a formative moment for Kawakita, who later became an archetypal Legitimizing Cosmopolitan of his generation. When he saw this production, Kawakita was shocked and infuriated by what he saw on the stage that purported to represent Japanese culture. He wrote: "what was allegedly presented as a Japanese woman on the stage, her costume and make-up, was a hodgepodge of Chinese, Indian and Mongolian, that was something entirely absurd" (ibid.). He perceived this as a serious national humiliation. From this moment on, producing *Madam Butterfly* with a "genuine Japanese actress and showing the real Japanese costume and real Japanese woman" (ibid.) became his

long-cherished project.

According to his biography, on the web page of the Kawakita Memorial Foundation for Film Culture, which commemorates the Kawakita family's achievements and contribution to the internationalization of Japanese cinema, Kawakita studied at university in Beijing and Germany. Having experienced European culture, he felt a strong need to promote international understanding between the East and the West. Thus, when he returned to Japan in 1928, Kawakita established Toa Trade Co., to distribute European films in Japan. (*Kawakita kinen eiga bunka zaidan* website) Kawakita was the key foreign contact person for the pre-war Japanese film industry. For instance, he set up Japan's first international co-production with Germany, *Atarashii Tsuchi* (*The New Earth*, Arnold Fanck 1937), and during the war he was also in charge of *Chuka Denei* (China Film) in Shanghai. After WWII Kawakita was temporarily expelled from the film industry as a war criminal but was reinstated as an executive of Toho, one of the major Japanese film studios, in 1950. In the post-war years, he and his wife Kashiko became well known on the international film festival circuit, not only due to Kawakita's status as Japan's biggest film importer but also, broadly, as cultural ambassadors of Japanese cinema.

It is interesting to consider why it was the mistaken signifiers - actresses, make-up and costumes - of Japanese culture rather than the story of *Madam Butterfly* itself that infuriated him so much. After all, the subjugation of a Japanese woman by the Western male happens in the storyline regardless of the verisimilitude of the signifiers. Nevertheless, as a highly educated cosmopolitan Japanese male, he seemed to unquestioningly accept the artistic value of *Madam Butterfly*, including

the storyline, due to its status as a “world famous opera” (Kawakita 1957: 174). He does not notice the violation of the individual woman. He is only concerned and upset that the “real” Japanese culture was not presented and was being misunderstood. It is often this combination of gender insensitivity and an essentialist understanding of “culture” which implicates Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism in self-Orientalism. Since female subjugation by the male was considered perfectly acceptable at the time, Kawakita did not see the subjugation of the Orient by the West in *Madam Butterfly* clearly, but it nonetheless left him feeling strongly shaken emotionally.

Toho's 1955 co-production of *Madam Butterfly*, with the Italian director/producer Carmine Gallone, was the fruit of Kawakita's long-cherished project. In this version of *Madam Butterfly*, the Toho producer Iwao Mori, supervised the shooting script and director's plan to make sure the historic, cultural and artistic details were presented correctly. Filming took place in Cinecitta Studios in Rome, so Toho shipped out all the costumes, wigs and props along with thirty crew and cast members including the main actress, Kaoru Yachigusa, and sixteen female dancers from the Takarazuka revue troupe (Mori 1955: 34-37). The Japanese team, led by Mori and Kawakita, closely supervised the entire process of the production so that no embarrassing mistakes about Japanese customs and culture would be involved. In this way, the “real Japanese *Madam Butterfly*” (Kawakita 1954: 174) was produced.

Contrary to what had been the initial anticipation of the Japanese, what Mori found surprising in this Japanese-Italian collaboration was that the Italian production team sincerely wanted “real” Japanese customs and culture in the

production of *Madam Butterfly* as well (1955: 36). There were many occasions during filming when the Japanese and Italian sides differed in their opinion about how performance, sets, costumes and make-up should be rendered. However, Mori states that the Italian producer/director Gallone always adopted Japanese opinions in the end. At first he thought this was because the Italians just wanted to keep their Japanese partners happy. But eventually he found out that being a “real Japanese” *Madam Butterfly* was to be the selling point of this film and Gallone sincerely believed Italian audiences would like to see “real” Japanese culture. Therefore Mori concluded that it would be a mistake to assume that Westerners always wanted to see “Japonism” - the Western idea of Japanese culture - and re-produce their own idea of Japan. After the success of films such as *Rashomon*, *Jigokumon* and *Seven Samurai* Mori believed Western audiences had matured sufficiently in order to become interested in “real” Japanese culture (ibid.: 36).

Obviously, neither Kawakita nor Mori were fully aware of the complexity of, and the complicity between, the Western Orientalist gaze and self-Orientalism. Kawakita and Mori had no intention of consciously re-producing and naturalizing pictures of the subjugation of the Orient by the West. Rather, what they wanted to do was to present a “real” object - a “genuine” Japanese woman who embodied Japanese culture - for the Western gaze; as if they believed that if only “real” Japanese culture was presented, “real” Japaneseness would command respect and the subjugation by the West would cease. What Kawakita and Mori failed to realize was that, by presenting a “real” object, they underlined the credibility of the object of the Western gaze rather than subverting it. They simply helped to essentialize the otherness of the Orient by providing a “real” Japanese woman to embody *Madam*

Butterfly. Additionally, the qualifications of Mori and Kawakita to present a representation of the “real” Japanese woman and culture were taken for granted by the Italians and the world at large.

Among recent critical reconsiderations of Said’s Orientalism, Rey Chow’s explanation of self-Orientalism is useful in order to understand the reactions of people in the Japanese film industry towards this phase of internationalization. In the book *Primitive Passions: Visuality, Sexuality, Ethnography and Contemporary Chinese Cinema* (1995), she analyses the films of the Chinese Fifth Generation filmmakers by applying Mary Louise Pratt’s concept of “auto-ethnography.” By “auto-ethnography” Pratt refers to what she sees as the “instance in which colonized subjects undertake to represent themselves in ways that engage with the colonizer’s own terms” (1992: 7). Chow argues that when people who have been objects of the Western gaze return this gaze by using the same tool (film), they inscribe their subjectivity by asserting this “to-be-looked-at-ness,” not in passive form, but as a form of self-affirmation (Chow, cited in Lee Ji Yeon 2004: 5). Thus, Chow points to the shortcomings of Said’s concept of Orientalism, which limits its focus to the passivity of others and positions them solely as spectacle.

As we have seen, Kawakita’s and Mori’s situation demonstrates Chow’s point well. These Japanese filmmakers were far from passively letting “Japan” remain an object of the Western gaze. They were actively engaged in constructing differences in relation to the West as a form of national self-affirmation for their culture. These international co-productions were primarily meant to be commercial ventures. However, these filmmakers were also strongly driven by their national

pride. In this way, the Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism drive and self-Orientalism had close strategic links to each other. As was the case for Kawakita, for those who have been objects of the Western gaze, self-affirmation by means of self-Orientalism became a strong impulse which often overrode any economic rationale.

In fact, not surprisingly, most of these international co-productions were commercial failures. *Madam Butterfly* had no great financial success, though there was a certain initial curiosity value which drove people into the cinema when it was released. According to Anderson and Richie, the Japanese audience, however, was “confused by Italian ideas on Japanese behaviour, architecture, and landscape gardening, being particularly mystified and somewhat upset by Kaoru Yachigusa’s apparently being able to speak Italian” ([1959] 1982: 247).

Similarly, the much publicized French-Japanese co-production *Wasureenu Bojo* (*Typhoon Over Nagasaki*, Yves Ciampi 1956) between Shochiku and Pathe films failed even more miserably. The film is another story about a white male (Jean Marais) who comes to Japan and falls in love with a Japanese girl (Keiko Kishi); then the girl gets killed, this time by a typhoon. This film was specifically produced to open Shochiku’s new flagship cinema located in their grand headquarters building and it was the most expensive film ever made in Japan. The film cost Shochiku at least fifteen times what it cost to produce their average feature film, and it was a complete commercial disaster (Masumoto 1988: 307-320).

Despite such heavy financial losses, Anderson and Richie sensed that “there was a general feeling that not all was lost” ([1959] 1982) among the people in

Shochiku and other film companies who were involved in these international co-productions. This seemingly irrational enthusiasm within the Japanese film industry for international co-productions puzzled and amused these most acute of Western observers of the Japanese film industry. They wrote:

It seems strange that they should both pay vast sums which they knew there was little hope of recovering from the limited rights assigned. But as they did purposely take such losses, one can only somewhat weakly suggest that the saving of face was somewhere involved. (Anderson and Richie [1959] 1982: 248)

As I have argued, the irresistible impulse for self-Orientalism probably lay beneath the “saving of face”. Once inscribed, this impulse to affirm ones’ own otherness for the Western gaze was so strong that it became almost priceless.

From an economic viewpoint, in the end the internationalization of Japanese cinema in the 1950s was probably not much more than a short-term spike in the number of film exports and co-productions. Far from Nagata’s earlier bullish prediction that Japanese films should be “earning an income of between three to five million dollars within five years” (Nagata 1953b: 34), film exports plunged to \$884,000 in 1955 from a peak of \$1,200,000 in 1953, and then recovered only to \$1,259,000 in 1956, \$1,328,000 in 1957, and \$1,722,000 in 1958 (*Eiga nenkan* 1960: 252-253). Nevertheless, the significance of the phenomenon can not simply be measured in economic terms. It was the moment Japanese filmmakers became aware of the Western gaze for the first time, the moment from which they have never since

managed to escape.

Technology and Japan's Oriental-Orientalism in Asia

I have known, and I still know, Antilles Negros who are annoyed when they are suspected of being Senegalese. This is because the Antilles Negro is more "Civilized" than African, that is, he is closer to the white man. (Fanon 1967: 26)

The anthropologist Richard Wilk studied the local history and political context of beauty pageantry in the Caribbean country of Belize. He points out that a contest like the Miss Universe pageant "formalizes a particular set of distinctions and places them in the foreground, while moving others into the background. It reifies and emphasizes particular kinds of hierarchy based on time and geopolitical space, as it groups people according to some kind of physical biological characteristics, at the expense of others. The competition is exactly what Bourdieu (1984) understands as a practice that 'classifies and classifies the classifier'" (Wilk 1995: 125). As I discussed in Chapter One, Wilk and Kevin Robins argue that "the global structures of common difference" (1997) select particular kinds of difference that were developed in dialogue with Western modernity and globally promoted. This global system is a common code, which exercises hegemony not through *content*, but through *form*.

Caribbean and African holders of Miss Universe franchises, according to Wilk, have periodically argued that the pageant unfairly favours light-skinned

women with European features, concealing a neocolonialist racist agenda beneath a façade of objective standards. Nevertheless, these Caribbeans and Africans come back each year for the Miss Universe contest (Wilk 1995: 132). It seems that they cannot resist participating in a contest that they know will not treat them on equal terms, in the same way as those Japanese self-Orientalists could not help presenting cinematic representations of their women as the embodiment of their culture in international film festivals. I believe this homology between beauty pageants and film festivals, as part of a global system to select and value particular kinds of elitist differences above others, is appropriate.

This emphasis on the global operation of power through *form* rather than *content* is important; because historically, it had been normally *content* that was privileged over *form* and not the other way around. For example, the central motto of the Japanese push towards modernization since the opening of the country in the mid 19th century: *Wakon Yosai* (Japanese spirit with Western technology) presumes that what matters is the identity of *content* – the Japanese spirit; and the use of the Western technological *form* is only instrumental and is superficial. This type of spiritualist discourse, wittingly or unwittingly, has a tendency to neglect to examine the effect of Western technologies on the “spirit” of the non-Western culture in question during the course of modernization.

As a prominent advocate of internationalization as well as technological innovation, Masaichi Nagata successfully adapted this 19th century motto of *Wakon Yosai* and produced *Jigokumon* (*The Gate of Hell*, Kinugasa 1953) - a film that had Japanese traditional *content* with the latest Western technological *form*. For Nagata,

internationalization and technological innovation depended on each other; the use of the latest Western technology was essential for Japanese films to compete in foreign markets; and in turn, the international reputation and income derived from the foreign market were essential to domestic innovations (Nagata 1951b; 1957a: 135-144).

Jigokumon was the first Japanese film photographed in Eastman Color. It was a glittering epic set in a tenth century Japanese court, about a noble woman who rejects the courtship of a powerful warlord and sacrifices her life for her husband. When Jean Cocteau, who was the head of the jury of the Cannes Film Festival in 1954, saw this film, it was reported that he was very excited and persuaded all the other jury members, who were less than impressed by the film, to award it the Grand Prix. For Cocteau the film manifested the aesthetic of Japanese tradition – having the appearance of a *Noh* play with the ring of true authenticity (Midorikawa 1987: 207). The following year, *Jigokumon* also received the Best Foreign film Award and aptly received the Special Award for Color and Costume Design at the US Academy Awards.

The director of *Jigokumon*, Teinosuke Kinugasa, however, was less than pleased, if not suspicious, about this praise received abroad. For Kinugasa, *Jigokumon* was not a film he was particularly proud of. He only gave a short comment to the Japanese press when he received the Grand Prix. He said to the press that *Jigokumon* was an “empty film” and that he did not understand why the film was given the prize (Suzuki 1990: 115; Midorikawa 1987: 205). Similarly, Japanese film critics decided that the foreign success of *Jigokumon* lay entirely in its exoticism and

in the beauty of its colour photography. Consequently, the film was neither commercially nor critically successful in Japan.

Like Anderson and Ritchie, many accused Nagata of producing films “specially for export” (Anderson and Ritchie [1959] 1982: 231) and charged him of deploying “Japonism” or self-Orientalism. In fact, Nagata himself was aware of this criticism and sometimes admitted that was more or less what he was doing. For example, he wrote:

Certainly, the Japanese feeling of structure is bizarre and complex for foreigners. So, for foreign audiences, we have to keep a story simple and deal with complexity through characters. Thus, all those films, *Rashoman*, *Jigokumon* and *Ugetsu*, which won the Grand prize and best film awards, had only two or three main characters. These films give me real satisfaction (Nagata 1957b: 122-3).

For Nagata, this second success with *Jigokumon* was something he was even more proud of than his first success with *Rashomon* - because *Jigokumon* was the fruit of his conscious efforts and long-term investment in technology (Suzuki 1990: 112-115).

The first Japanese feature film to be made in colour, *Karumen Kokyo ni Kaeru*, (*Carmen Comes Home*, Keisuke Kinoshita 1951) was produced by Shochiku and shot in Fuji Color, in the year in which the topic of the internationalization of Japanese cinema was on everybody’s lips. Fuji Color was in no way perfect, being

rather flat and particularly poor in red. Besides this, it was enormously expensive and impossible to use with artificial lights (Anderson and Richie [1959] 1982: 233).

Nagata and his technical adviser, Midorikawa, had experimented with colour cinematography for some time but had decided that Japanese film stock was not yet usable (Midorikawa 1987: 269). Nagata sent Midorikawa to the US in 1952 to research the latest developments in colour film technology. During his visit to Eastman Kodak's laboratory, Midorikawa was offered an opportunity to test their new colour film stock (ibid.: 188-190). Having decided that the first Daiei colour film would be on Eastman Kodak, Nagata sent his team of filmmakers to the US in early 1953: the director Kinugasa, the cameraman Sugiyama and the lighting technician Ryu. They spent five weeks in the Warner Brothers studios and were trained in all aspects of colour cinematography (ibid.: 270; Suzuki 1990: 113). A set of new technologies (studio lighting, film laboratory, make-up, set and costume design and so forth) had to be transplanted for colour cinematography to develop successfully in the Japanese film industry.

Thus, Daiei developed the colour cinematography techniques used in *Jigokumon* in dialogue with the latest American technology. As such it is a clear example of how, as Wilk and Robins suggest "the global system of common differences" selects a particular kind of difference that is developed in dialogue with Western modernity. I argue that the international success of *Jigokumon* had a lot to do with this combination of traditional Japanese *content* alongside the use of the latest Western technological *form*. The Japanese settings, the self-sacrificing virtue of the female protagonist, the costumes, make-up and so forth made *Jigokumon*

different from the cinema of the West, while the use of Eastman Color film stock gave *Jigokumon* a distinctive feel of Western modernity. In other words, *Jigokumon* was a representation of an elitist non-Western “difference” that was recognized as a type of high culture – “Noh play” in the words of Jean Cocteau – combined with the visually pleasurable popular media form of colour cinematography. Before *Jigokumon*, the only colour films the audiences had seen were big budget Hollywood productions shot in three-strip Technicolor. Thus, the fact that *Jigokumon* was shot in colour itself signified its high entertainment value, as well as the probably exotic nature of the cinematic representation it contained. In this way it was the colour technology (*form*) that made the otherwise inaccessible foreign cultural content enjoyable for the wider Western audience. Moreover, as I will show in the following discussion, it was this feel of modernity and technological excellence in Japanese cinema that underlined and supported the Japanese drive towards oriental-Orientalism in relation to the Southeast Asian film industries.

Following its success in the West, the popularity of Japanese cinema was rising in Southeast Asian countries. Kinnia Yau Shuk-ting, who has studied the history of interactions between the Japanese and Hong Kong film industries, suggests that after the success of films such as *Rashomon* and *Ugetsu* in the international film festivals, people in Hong Kong came to have a better opinion about Japanese films (Yau 2003: 113). According to Yau, only five Japanese films were shown in Hong Kong in 1952 but this increased to over twenty the next year; and 196 Japanese films were imported to Hong Kong between 1949 and 1959 (*ibid.*). Similarly, other observers point to the significant effect of the distribution of *Rashomon* by the American major RKO in Southeast Asian countries (Ikeda 1954: 141). This was the

first time after the war that a Japanese film was shown widely in Asia; and importantly, *Rashomon* was shown alongside, and treated as equal to, the Hollywood films RKO was also distributing.

Having seen the potential of the Asian market for Japanese films, Nagata initiated the formation of the Federation of Picture Producers in Asia (FPA)⁹ in partnership with the Chinese producer Run Run Shaw of the Shaw Brothers in 1953. Seven territories - Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaya, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand - initially participated in the federation; the constitution of which stated that:

[T]he objectives of the Federation... shall be to promote the interest of the motion picture industry in the countries or territories of Asia-Pacific; to elevate the artistic standard of motion pictures; and to ensure the dissemination and interchange of culture in the area through motion pictures, thereby contributing to the development of friendly relations among the participating nations. (*Eiga nenkan* 1954: 40-42)

The next year, the federation organised the first Southeast Asian Film Festival in Tokyo. MPPA (the Motion Picture Producers' Association of America) and MPEA (the Motion Pictures Exporters' Association of America) backed this regional initiative and provided moral and material support as well as becoming

⁹ Later, FPA changed its name to Federation of Motion Picture Producers in the Asia Pacific (*Eiga nenkan* 1954).

mentor figures to the federation and festival.

Yau argues, however, that the post-war Japanese film industry's relationship to Asian countries was far from a simple friendship based on mutual business interests, and that this relationship needs to be understood in the historic context of colonial relations (2003: 116-118). She points out that Nagata had initially proposed the formation of the Federation of Film Producers of Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere and a film festival to consolidate the activities of filmmakers in Asia during the Japanese imperial period (*ibid.*: 121; *Eiga nenkan* 1954: 40). She therefore sees the formation of the post-war federation as an extension of the colonial ideal held during this time. According to Yau "the Japanese not only wanted to form an organization for the Asian film industries that was comparable to the European and American organizations and start a film festival comparable to the Venice and Cannes film festivals in Asia, but also the Japanese wanted to change their wartime image through the formation of the Federation and film festival" (Yau 2003: 121). Thus, she suggests, that the Japanese motivation behind the formation of the FPA and the film festival was to regain regional hegemony drawing on their technological and economic superiority over other Asian countries.

Yau is right to point out that there was a strong continuity and similarity between the pre-war discourse of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and the way the Federation of Picture Producers of Asia (FPA) was conceived of and operated. For example, Nagata gave an interview to the Japanese media about the significance of the Asian Federation for the Japanese film industry and stated:

Cinemas in Asia are dominated by American and European films everywhere. But we, myself and Mr. Run Run Shaw [the vice-president of the Federation], believe that Asians should make their own Asian cinema. To achieve an autonomous Asian film industry, Mr. Shaw will distribute Japanese films in Asia to start with. Mr Shaw owns over 120 cinemas in Hong Kong and Singapore and he will distribute 40 Japanese films this year and maybe 100 the next year. We will replace the Western domination of Asian cinema to Japanese domination first; then we will develop local Asian production capacities. (Nagata 1954: 77-78)

In the interview, Nagata appeared to assume both the acceptance of Japanese films in the region because of their putative Asian cultural proximity and of Japanese leadership because their economic and technological superiority that was comparable to that in the West. These assumptions make his vision more or less analogous to the discourse of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.

However, there is also a striking difference between the two. Unlike the discourse of pre-war *Asianism* which articulated the spiritual commonality of Asian people and set it in opposition to the West as a whole, the Federation of Picture Producers of Asia (FPA) was specifically set up with the political goal of subsuming the Asian film industries within a Western sphere of influence while setting them against the perceived rising tide of communism. In the same interview, Nagata explains:

It was unanimous among the members that the federation does not accept communist groups. Thus, we do not accept politically ideologically biased films for the film festival, either. This is because our world is divided into two camps: the Democratic world and the Communist world. Sitting on the fence is not ethical. Therefore, it was unanimously agreed that we should make our stance very clear. This federation is formed by the seven democratic nations in Asia for our democratic value; thus we cannot accommodate films made by producers who are not democratic. (Nagata 1954: 78)

Nagata had made three trips to the US by the time of this interview. After his first trip in 1949, he travelled again in 1951 and 1953. Thus Nagata was well informed about the political climate in the American film industry and well aware of the anti-communist investigations in the early 1950s – what is often called “the Inquisition in Hollywood” (cf., Maltby 2003: 284). Probably he was also well aware of changes in American perceptions about Japan in the cold-war context. The image of this former enemy was changing rapidly, as the discourse of what Harootunian called “America’s Japan” (1999) prevailed. Japan was being included in the democratic “West” as a trustworthy member and as a bastion against the communist East.

Therefore, in my view, the formation of the Federation of Picture Producers of Asia (FPA) was not simply a resurrection of the pre-war Japanese imperialist ideal. It is better understood as a key process in which people in the

Japanese film industry were “interpellated” (Althusser 1971) to identify with the subject position of “America’s Japan.” Through this process, the Japanese subject was marked and subjugated as part of the West, at the same time as being positioned above the rest of Asia in the cartography of the cold war. This did not present any contradiction for Legitimizing Cosmopolitans such as Nagata, whose ultimate goal was to affirm their own national identity, since American foreign policy at this time was largely conducive to Japanese national interests - until the occurrence of the US-Japan trade conflict in the later period.

The first Southeast Asian Film Festival was held in Tokyo in 1954 with participation by six territories – Hong Kong; Japan; Malaya; the Philippines; Thailand; and Taiwan - after Indonesia dropped out of the event for political reasons (Shiraishi 1954: 16). The Grand Prix of the festival – the Golden Harvest (incidentally, Raymond Chow took the name of his production company from this award) - went to Daiei’s *Konjiki Yasha* (*Golden Devil*, Koji Shima 1954) and the Shaw Brothers’ *Song of Romance* (Wong, 1954) won a special acting prize. The Motion Picture Producers Association of America (MPPA) sent as their representative director/producer Frank Borzage who brought with him the latest Mitchell Camera as a special prize for the film that would “contribute the most for the deepening of the Western understanding of Asian culture” (*Kinema Junpo* 1954: 28). After much consideration on the part of the jury, this prize was given to the Thai film *Santi-Vina*, which was shot in Eastman Color.

The first film festival was considered a success within the Japanese film industry (*Kinema Junpo* 1954) and the vice-president of the federation, Run Run

Shaw, announced that he would host the second in Singapore the following year. Subsequently, the film festival functioned as a key event for the interchange of ideas and practices between the Asian film industries in the 1950s and 60s. It continues to be held annually in different locations in the Asia–Pacific region to this day, having changed its name to the Asian-Pacific Film Festival.

The Golden Age of the Hong Kong - Japanese Cinematic Interchange

I have suggested that the main mode of transculturation in the internationalization phase of Japanese cinema was film export and import. In the pre-globalization world, it was naturally assumed that both national cinema and the national industry were discrete entities with clearly defined borders: national film industries produced national cinemas and they influenced each other by exporting and importing films, except when they decided occasionally to co-produce films. However, I have to make a qualification here.

Although the main mode of interchange was indeed film export and import, this does not mean that other forms of transculturation, such as direct foreign investment or the exchange of filmmakers and technicians between film industries did not happen or was not active in the internationalization phase. As we will see in this section, in fact, such transnational exchanges between the Hong Kong and Japanese film industries was common in the 1960s. However, the main point that I want to stress is this: the moral code of the pre-globalization world remained strictly nationalistic, despite these lively transnational practices. Before the discursive shift

that occurred in the globalization phase, transnational practices that could blur and re-draw national borders were frowned upon as against the national interest.. Therefore, although various forms of transnational filmmaking were actually practiced in this phase, any real crossing of borders stayed under the surface.

In other words, Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism was so ideologically dominant that other types of cosmopolitanisms were suppressed. In the Japanese national paradigm, cosmopolitan individuals or *kokusaijin* (the term often used in the Japanese media for “internationalists”) had primarily to be grounded nationally and be seen to be patriots before they could be allowed to act honourably in the cosmopolitical field. Similar to Kwame Anthony Appiah’s conceptualization of “Cosmopolitan Patriots”, the Japanese Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism entertains “the possibility of a world in which everyone is a rooted cosmopolitan, attached to a home of his or her own, with its cultural particularities, but taking pleasure from the presence of other, different, places that are home to other, different, people” (1998: 91). However, contrary to Appiah’s “Cosmopolitan Patriots”, the Japanese Legitimizing Cosmopolitans of the time failed to imagine “that in such a world not everyone will find it best to stay in a natal patria, so that the circulation of people among different localities will involve not only tourism (which the cosmopolitan admits to enjoying) but migration, nomadism, diaspora” (ibid.: 91-2). The multiple rootings, commitments and nationalities, along with nomadic movements, were not considered preferable ways of living even for those who considered themselves cosmopolitan at the time.

Japanese cameraman Tadashi Nishimoto spent a large part of his life

working for Run Run Shaw in the Hong Kong film industry, and his experience shows how such transnational practices could not be openly acknowledged in historical accounts of the time. I will consider Nishimoto in detail shortly.

The regional core-periphery relationship that was formed between Japan and other Asian film industries was based on the fact the Japanese possessed more advanced forms of technology. Further, the hierarchical nature of this relationship provoked complex psychological interactions among Asian filmmakers. Through the formation and running of the Federation of Picture Producers in Asia and the Southeast Asian Film Festival, Run Run Shaw made various contacts with people in the Japanese film industry. Initially, the Shaw Brothers presented the Japanese film industry with good export opportunities. They dubbed Japanese films into Mandarin and Cantonese in Hong Kong and distributed them in bulk to be shown in Chinese diaspora markets across Southeast Asia. For the Shaw Brothers, this was a good way to keep their friendship with Japanese producers, as well as a cheap way to fill gaps in their own production schedules (Ikeda 1954: 140-141).

Then, the Shaw Brothers co-produced two films based on classic Chinese stories with Japanese companies in the mid 1950s: *Yokihi (Princess Yang Kwei-fei*, Kenji Mizoguchi 1955) with Nagata's Daiei and *Byaku fujin no yoren (Madam White Snake*, Shiro Toyoda 1956) with Toho. In these co-productions, although Shaw Brothers paid 30 % of the production budget, the creative role which the Hong Kong partners played was very limited. Creative control of the production was almost entirely in the hands of the Japanese. For example, *Princess Yang Kwei-fei* was directed by the Japanese director, Kenji Mizoguchi, with an entirely Japanese crew

and cast and shot in the Tokyo Daiei Studio, despite the fact that it was a Chinese period costume drama. In the original agreement, Shaw Brothers was supposed to supply five actresses, a hairdresser, a costume person, a historical adviser, a fight director, a set designer, and so forth (*Eiga nenkan* 1955: 63). However, in the end, only three credits were given to the Chinese in the finished film – the producer, Run Run Shaw, the script-writer, Tao Qin and a historical adviser. In the case of *Madam White Snake*, the film carried no Chinese credits at all apart from Shaw Brothers as the co-production company. To explain why Run Run Shaw kept such a low profile in these co-productions, Yau suggests that the main motivation behind Shaw Brothers' approach to the Japanese film industry was to gain access to Japan's advanced filmmaking technologies (2003: 151). Thus, Run Run Shaw accepted a secondary role in these co-productions in order to gain access to knowledge about producing films for international film festivals and markets.

In the process of the internationalization of Japanese cinema, Toho's monster movie *Godzilla* (Ishiro Honda 1954) became a US box office success and Daiei's *Jigokumon* (Kinugasa 1953) an art house success. These successes established a reputation in the US for Japanese technology - special effects and colour cinematography - as world-class (*Kinema Junpo* 1956). Therefore, it is very plausible that Run Run Shaw kept a low profile in order to gain access to Japanese technologies and learn about producing films for Western markets. There is much evidence to suggest that Run Run Shaw was very keen to learn from Japan. For example, he brought many Japanese filmmakers and technicians to Hong Kong to transplant Japanese technologies to his studios in the 1960s, and sent his Chinese filmmakers to be trained in Japanese studios.

Princess Yang Kwei-fei was nominated for the Golden Lion at the Venice festival and *Madam White Snake* won an Honourable Mention for technical excellence at the Berlin International Film Festival - giving Run Run Shaw first-hand experience of the international circuit. This, therefore, was the beginning of what Kinnia Yau Shuk-ting calls the “golden age of Hong Kong–Japanese cinematic interchange” (2003:139) which continued until the early 1970s.

The basis of the Hong Kong-Japanese Cinematic Interchange remained unchanged throughout the 1960s; Hong Kong producers looked up to Japan as the source of the latest filmmaking technologies and modern life-styles in general. Another major Hong Kong film company, the Cathay Organization, co-produced a number of romantic tourist films – with a similar oriental-Orientalist narrative in which the Japanese male protagonist falls in love with a local Chinese girl - such as *Honkon no yoru* (*Night at Hong Kong*, Yasuki Chiba 1961), *Honkon no hoshi* (*Star of Hong Kong*, Yasuki Chiba 1962), *Honolulu-Tokyo-Hong Kong* (Yasuku Chiba 1963), and *Bankoku no yoru* (*Night at Bangkok*, Yasuki Chiba 1966) with Toho. However, the Shaw Brothers remained the ubiquitous key player in this interchange as they continued to distribute many Japanese films in Asia and employed many Japanese filmmakers and technicians to work in their Hong Kong studios during the 1960s.

Central to this Hong Kong-Japanese interchange of filmmakers was Tadashi Nishimoto, the Japanese cameraman who was hired by Shaw Brothers in 1960 to shoot a grand scale colour production *Yang Kwei-fei* (1962) for a master

Chinese director, Li Han Hsiang (Nishimoto 2004: 19). Run Run Shaw had first “borrowed” Nishimoto from his Japanese employer Shin-Toho in 1957 to improve the quality of colour cinematography in his Hong Kong film studios. Shin-Toho agreed to loan out Nishimoto for the sake of their friendship formed through the Southeast Asian Film Festival (ibid.: 3-4). Then, Shaw Brothers called Nishimoto back again for “an extremely handsome tax-free salary” (ibid.: 106) to Hong Kong when the company was just about to start filming *Yang Kwei-fei*. This Chinese epic was based on the same story as the earlier co-production with Daiei about a woman of matchless beauty who caused the collapse of a Chinese dynasty. It was the first film of a series of similarly extravagant period films featuring legendary Chinese beauties: *The Empress Wu Ze Tian* (Li Han Hsiang 1963) and *Wang Zhao Jun* (*Beyond The Great Wall*, Li Han Hsiang 1964). Shaw Brothers was about to make their first solo venture into the international film festival circuit using the same self-Orientalist formula as *Jigokumon* (*The Gate of Hell*, Kinugasa 1953).

Through Nishimoto, many Japanese filmmaking technologies that had been developed in dialogue with the Americans were transplanted to the Hong Kong film industry. Using the same global form, Run Run Shaw submitted Chinese “content” to the selection process of the “global system of common differences” (Robins 1997). To Run Run Shaw’s great pleasure, Nishimoto’s cinematography in their own version of *Yang Kwei-Fei* (Li 1962) earned the Shaw Brothers their first international recognition by winning the Special Technical Award for colour cinematography at the Cannes Film Festival in 1962. Then, Nishimoto introduced Cinemascope to the Hong Kong film industry in the next Chinese beauty film, *The Empress Wu Ze Tian* (Li Han Hsiang 1963). He brought over Toho Scope – a version

of Cinemascope invented by Toho – from Japan, and helped to win *The Empress Wu Ze Tian* a nomination for the Golden Palm at the Cannes Film Festival in 1963.

As well as transferring these Japanese technologies, Nishimoto trained a generation of Chinese filmmakers and technicians. He also became a key contact person between the two film industries. He photographed such epoch-defining Hong Kong films as King Hu's *Come Drink With Me* (1966), Bruce Lee's *The Way of The Dragon* (1972), and Michael Hoi's *Mr Boo! Games Gamblers Play* (1974).

Originally, Nishimoto's contract was only for one year, and he intended to work in Hong Kong only for this long. However, after all these international successes Shaw Brothers did not let him go easily, and eventually, he ended up spending the rest of his working life in Hong Kong. Nishimoto used the Chinese name "Ho Lan-Shan" for film credits so that his existence was hardly known to Japanese film historians until the recent publication of his autobiographic interviews (2004).

Through Nishimoto, numerous Japanese directors and technicians came to Hong Kong to work for the Shaw Brothers in the 1960s. According to Yau's research, Japanese directors made 31 films for them between 1966 and 1971 (Yau 2003: 173). However, all of these Japanese film directors, except Umeji Inoue, used Chinese names for the credits and many Japanese technicians were simply un-credited. The reason for this identity cover-up was usually explained as being due to anti-Japanese feelings prevalent amongst Hong Kong film audiences. However, Yau argues that is probably not true or at least not the whole story. She points out that if the popularity

of Japanese films and stars in Asia in the 1960s is taken into consideration, it does not make sense to ascribe anti-Japanese feeling as the reason for this identity cover-up. Based on an interview with Chua Lam (蔡欄), who was a key production executive at Shaw Brothers at that time, Yau suggests that covering-up the identity of the Japanese hired hands had more to do with Shaw Brothers' saving face. According to Chua, as the number one Chinese film studio, the Shaw Brothers needed to preserve their pride as well as their status in the Asian film industry, thus they wished to underplay their dependency on Japanese sources (2003: 159).

The only exception to this rule was the prolific and fast-working Japanese director Umeji Inoue. His was the only Japanese name credited amongst all the 31 films the Shaw Brothers produced with Japanese directors. This was because Inoue was an established action/ musical director and his name had a certain commercial value for them. Another important reason for this exception was that Inoue himself did not mind using his own name, because he felt he was above the slander often associated with Japanese directors working in reduced circumstances in the Asian film industry (Inoue 1996: 119).

Shaw Brothers hired Japanese directors mainly for two reasons. Firstly, the company wanted to rationalize production costs and schedules by using Japanese directors. They realised that Japanese directors often worked much faster than Hong Kong directors. The Japanese directors would often shoot two, sometimes even three films, during their three-month stay in Hong Kong; this pace was twice as fast as the average Hong Kong director. Secondly, the company was just about to launch their brand of action movies and they wanted ideas and techniques. Previously, Shaw

Brothers had bought and distributed over 200 Japanese action movies mainly made by Nikkatsu across Southeast Asia, and they were very popular. Hence the company was looking for a Japanese director who could give them input as to how to shoot action films (Nishimoto 2004: 152; Inoue 1996: 123; *Kinema Junpo* 2005: 158-164).

The use of a Chinese alias was convenient not only for Shaw Brothers but also for these Japanese directors and technicians. This is because the Japanese film industry was rapidly declining in the 1960s and many of the Japanese recruits to Shaw Brothers were hard up and hungry for work. For instance, Nishimoto's old company Shin-Toho went bankrupt in 1961 and Nagata's Daiei eventually went down in 1971. For many of the Japanese recruits, going to work in Hong Kong meant being in reduced circumstances thus they preferred not to publicize the fact that they were working there.

Most of the Japanese film professionals were discreet about their work in Hong Kong. For example, Nishimoto was not invited and did not wish to attend the party that the Shaw Brothers hosted to celebrate *Yang Kwei-fei's* winning the Special Technical Award at the Cannes Film Festival. Nishimoto himself was not at all keen to publicize the fact until one Chinese and one Japanese paper (*Asahi Shinbun* 29th May 1962) revealed that the cameraman who had won the prize was Japanese and Shaw Brothers reluctantly admitted the fact (Yau 2003: 159). Therefore, although the interchange between the two film industries in the 1960s was active and creatively fertilizing, there was a stigma attached to it for both sides. Thus the story of this interculturalism was scarcely told and hardly known about until the recent rise in research interest in the regionalization of Asian cultural industries.

It is also worth noting that Umeji Inoue, the only Japanese director who was not discreet about his identity, was reprimanded severely for being unpatriotic and acting against the interests of Japanese cinema. According to Inoue's own account, in 1971, the president of Shochiku, Shiro Kido, and the president of Toho, Isao Matsuoka, investigated why Japanese films were no longer exported to Southeast Asian countries as much as they used to be. They came to the conclusion that that it was to do with Inoue making so many very popular films for Shaw Brothers in Hong Kong. Kido was outraged at Inoue for having given all their trade secrets to the Hong Kongese and having improved the quality of Hong Kong films. Inoue was called to Kido's office and pressured to stop working for Shaw Brothers. As a freelance director, Inoue had no choice but to give in. He states:

I did not want to be seen as an enemy of the Japanese film industry.

I knew the conditions of the industry were worsening day by day but as someone who was brought up with Japanese cinema, I felt I should do my utmost to prolong its life even for a little while.

(Inoue 1996: 122).

"The golden age of the Hong Kong–Japanese cinematic interchange" ended in the early 1970s. Yau ascribes this ending to the decline of Shaw Brothers and other general structural changes in both the Japanese and the Hong Kong industries (2003: 175, 201). The Japanese film industry continued to decline throughout the 1970s and 1980s and the fortunes of the two film industries were reversed. I will discuss the transformation of the Japan-Hong Kong relationship through the process of

globalization in Chapter Seven.

The Emergence of Resistance Cosmopolitanism

[O]ur generation is a fatherless generation. When I look at our fathers' generation, who, defeated in war, did not accept responsibility and who even in the post-war period continued to lie, I feel that we are a generation of orphans. (Oshima 1993: 132)

The discourse of internationalization within Japanese cinema petered out in the 1960s as the Japanese film industry declined. Japanese annual cinema attendance peaked in 1958 at 11.5 billion, but was reduced to less than half of this, 5.1 billion, by 1963 and then further reduced to 3.1 billion by 1968 (Motion Picture Producers Association of Japan [MPJA]). The most common explanation for this rapid decline was, as the sociologist Shunya Yoshimi points out, the increasing prevalence of television as the overarching national media. Yoshimi states “whereas in the US it is Hollywood movies that have been most closely associated with the national identity, in Japan it is TV” (2003: 460). Japanese cinema was displaced from its previous position in the national media and popular mass entertainment.

As cinema was ousted from its position in mainstream entertainment, a number of “New Wave” Japanese directors emerged in the 1960s, as happened in many other major film producing countries. There were the “Shochiku New Wave” directors: Nagisa Oshima (1932 -), Masahiro Shinoda (1931 -), Yoshishige Yoshida

(1933 -) and others such as Shohei Imamura (1926), and Susumu Hani (1928 -) who started making auteurist films which befitted the political culture of the 1960s. Many of these “New Wave” films purported to serve the young generation with alternative aesthetics and resistance politics, setting themselves in opposition to the dominant culture of the post-war middle class society. Among them, Nagisa Oshima is a filmmaker particularly worthy of attention as an example of what I call Resistance Cosmopolitanism.

Unlike Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism which serves to maintain and extend the power of the national culture beyond the national borders, Resistance Cosmopolitanism is based on “Resistance Identity” (Castells 2004: 9). Resistance Identity defines itself against the dominant group within the nation-state and “constructs forms of collective resistance against otherwise unbearable oppression, usually on the basis of identities that were, apparently, clearly defined by history, geography, or biology, making it easier to essentialize the boundaries of resistance” (ibid.). Resistance Cosmopolitanism is the opposite to Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism. Because Resistance Cosmopolitanism is based on minority identity within the national framework, those working within this discourse tend to form strategic alliances with outsiders - with the Resistance Cosmopolitans in other nation-states - in order to resist the nationally dominant group in their own nation-state.

Oshima is a filmmaker who spent the early part of his career exposing the distortions of post-war developments and the “lies” of his father’s generation. Many of Oshima’s early films deal with characters who exist on the margins of society, in

which the harsh reality of life constitutes a shadowy part of the era of high economic growth, and his films are made with a clear political consciousness which desires social change. Oshima left, or was fired from, his employer Shochiku after a dispute over the company's shelving his *Nippon no yoru to kiri* (*Japan's Night and Fog*, 1960), a film about a group of student activists who were involved in the struggle against the renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty.

His political engagement and way of allying himself with Japanese social outcasts and outsiders was most clearly articulated in two subsequent films – a short documentary and a photo collage : *Wasurerareta Kougun* (*Forgotten Imperial Soldiers*, 1963) and *Yunbogi no nikki* (*Yunbogi's Diary*, 1965), both of which he made outside the Japanese film industry. The documentary *Wasurerareta Kougun* was made for television and aired on the 16th of August 1963, one day after the 18th war memorial day. In this program, Oshima exposed a taboo topic in post-imperial Japan as his camera followed a group of disabled ex-Japanese soldiers, who were Korean nationals living in Japan. They fought the war as Japanese, were wounded and became severely disabled. However, because they were re-classified as Korean subjects after the war, they lost all their pension entitlements as Japanese war veterans and received no compensation. As a result, they were reduced to having to beg on the streets for survival.

Yunbogi's Diary is a 25-minute photo collage made entirely independently. The film consists of snap shots of children in South Korea, which Oshima photographed in the summer of 1964 when the campaign against the signing of the Japan-Korea Basic Treaty was at its height. The sound track consists of two

voice-overs from two different sources. The first voice narrates, in first person form, the diary of a boy called Li Yunbogi who lives in appalling poverty in post war South Korea. Then, the second voice occasionally addresses the boy in the photographs as “You”. This second voice, which presumably comes from “us”, the filmmaker himself and the Japanese audience, expresses a strong empathy for the boy in the photograph who patently symbolises all the Korean boys living in deprivation. The same dry tone of voice (by the same narrator) was used to create a sense of authority in the narration of *Wasurerareta Kougun (Forgotten Imperial Soldiers)* which closed the film by posing a question: “Is this really fine by us Japanese, is this really good enough?”

The aggressive and straightforwardly didactic style of *Wasurerareta Kougun* is often criticized (e.g., Sato 1999: 102) and his critics have argued that Oshima’s real interest is to expose Japan’s social taboos rather than to do something about the plight of those with whom Oshima chose to form strategic alliances. Ryo Ginshitsu, who has researched transformations in the representation of “Zainichi” (the Korean subject in Japan) in post-war Japanese cinema, argued forcefully that the ultimate aim of post-war social reformist films by Japanese filmmakers (including Oshima) was to articulate the Japanese “national problem”. In these films, therefore, the representation of “Zainichi” is used only instrumentally to articulate this “national problem” and does not directly signify “Zainichi” themselves as whole persons with their own issues (Ryo 2003: 84) Nevertheless, the issue of Japanese-Korean post-imperial relations drove Oshima to make another important film for his career: *Koushukei (Death by Hanging, 1968)* which earned him international recognition for the first time.

Koushukei (Death by Hanging 1968) is probably Oshima's most accomplished feature film in his early period. The film is based on a real incident involving a Korean youth who was arrested in 1958 and executed in 1962 for the alleged murder and molestation of two Japanese high school girls. This film, which plays within the tradition of the absurd, explores the state's power to constitute crime, criminals and eventually justice, by exterminating the criminals.

Koushukei was Oshima's 12th feature film as a director but the first to catch the eye of international film festivals and Western film critics. The film was screened in the market section in Cannes in 1968 because the film festival was disrupted by the student revolution that occurred in France that year. It was here that the film found a French distributor: Argos film, the company owned by producer Anatole Dauman who had co-produced *Hiroshima Mon Amour* (1959) with Nagata's Daiei ten years earlier, and would go on to produce *Ai no Corrida (In the Realm of the Senses)* for Oshima a few years later. Dauman was one of the few Western producers who had experience in dealing with the Japanese film industry and of handling Japanese materials in the European art-house market.

Oshima travelled to Europe in 1969 and spent two months attending film festival screenings and giving interviews. Since the triumphs of the early fifties there had not been any noteworthy Japanese successes at international film festivals for many years. Additionally, prior to Oshima's arrival the only Japanese films known to European critics were those by Mizoguchi, Ozu and Kurosawa. Thus, according to Oshima (1975: 24), when he presented his films in Europe, European audiences tried

to understand his films in the context of these old masters of Japanese cinema but were left with incomprehension. He gave numerous interviews to Western journalists and film critics who asked him the same questions repeatedly: "Who is the director you respect the most?"; "What about, Mizoguchi? Ozu? Kurosawa?" Oshima's answers to these questions were always the same: He did not respect any director in particular; he did not have any favourite film; and nor did he did think much of Mizoguchi, Ozu, or Kurosawa.

He appeared as a defiant revolutionary character, about whom Western journalists of the time loved to write. However, Oshima admits in his later writing that this blatant denial of his inheritance from the previous generation of Japanese directors had a lot to do with the sense of alienation he was feeling with Western discourse about Japanese cinema (1975: 29). According to Oshima, for him and for his generation their cinematic experience was closely tied to the social and cultural conditions of a particular time and place, therefore it seemed impossible and futile to talk about his favourite films and his complex relation to the previous generation of Japanese filmmakers with people abroad who had very limited knowledge about this context (ibid.). Thus, he became widely understood as a rebel by Western film journalism, but probably without much understanding as to what he was actually rebelling against.

For Oshima, the biggest discovery of his two-month trip to Europe was of the existence of a certain genre of Japanese films that had been totally neglected by the mainstream media but appeared to be popular throughout Europe: Japanese erotic films (Oshima 1969: 68-70). At first, Oshima was very surprised to see that the

cinema next door to the hotel he was staying in Paris was showing *Kinpeibei* (*The Notorious Concubines* 1969) by Koji Wakamatsu, who would act later as the Japanese producer of *Ai no Corrida* (*In the Realm of the Senses*, 1976). In the cinema *Kinpeibei* was advertised as a classic Chinese story about a man who had many concubines and it did not mention the name of director or the fact that the film was Japanese. At first Oshima felt simply indignant about the way the film was treated but he soon learnt that another Japanese sex film, *Kinjirareta Tekunikku*, was shown under the title “Unknown Sex” in Paris and that this film was mentioned in *Cahiers du Cinema*. When he traveled on to Holland for another screening of his films, he found *Onna Ukiyoburo* (Ida 1968) was screening as “Women in the Bath” (Oshima 1969: 70). Although these Japanese films were generally treated as mere exploitations having no artistic value, it was a revelation to Oshima that in Europe there was a market for erotic films made in the Orient.

According to Oshima, it was Anatole Dauman who approached him with the idea of making a series of hard-core art-house films (Higuchi 2002: 261) but it is evident that Oshima took up the project with great enthusiasm. *Ai no Corrida* (1976) is Oshima’s re-telling of a real incident in pre-war Japan; the film is set on the eve of the war with China. It portrays a crime of passion, concerning a woman called Abe Sada who castrated her lover after she choked him to death during passionate love-making.

On 21 May 1936, Sada Abe was found wandering the streets of Tokyo with a knife, a rope and her lover’s castrated penis in a carefully folded bag. She claimed that the owner of the penis, her

dead lover Kichizo Ishida, would have wanted her to possess it so that she was able to pleasure herself with him even in the event of his death... Sada had committed the ultimate act of possession which had stemmed from a deadly two month relationship centred around the subjugation and domination of both participants. (Allsop 2004: 103)

In post-1968 France, new modes of expression were explored in an environment in which censorship of hard-core sexual imagery had been lifted. In a way, *Ai no Corrida* was Oshima's follow up to Bernardo Bertolucci's earlier provocative masterpiece *Last Tango in Paris* (1972). However, what probably motivated Oshima's Resistance Cosmopolitan spirit most was the opportunity this transnational project presented to challenge state authority by breaking the Japanese national taboo on portraying explicit sex without breaking Japanese state law.

In fact, Oshima was very outspoken about why he made this film; he wanted to challenge the Japanese censorship law and the state's authority as well as restrictive practices in the film industry. Perhaps even more importantly, *Ai no Corrida* challenged the symbolic structure of Japanese patriarchal authority by exposing the male protagonist's "average-size penis and numerous shots of it in its flaccid state" (Standish 2005: 265). In deconstructing this discursive construction, the relation of the "phallus" to any particular physical penis, or, the symbolic to actual father, involves an irreducible dis-equivalence. The actual penis as a male physical organ can never approximate the "phallus", the symbolic patriarchal authority, just as the actual father can never conform to the epic proportions of the

symbolic father. Following Lacan, Kaja Silverman points out that the “ideal paternal representation to which those two signifiers refer remains determinedly abstract and diffuse, finding expression less through individual human agents than through the institutional supports with which it is finally synonymous. Those supports include not only the patriarchal family, but the legal, medical, religious, technological, and educational systems, and the dominant political and economic organization...” (1999: 353). Those institutional supports include censorship in the Japanese case. Therefore, Isolde Standish (2005: 265) was probably right to suggest that it was the “average-size penis” of the male protagonist and “numerous shots of it in its flaccid state” in *Ai no Corrida* that upset the sensibility of the Japanese censors more than anything else.

The strategies used in the production of *Ai no Corrida* deployed interesting tactics to circumvent the infamous Japanese obscenity law No 175. The film was financed by French funds and foreign film stock was imported into Japan. The film was then shot in Japan using Japanese actors and technicians and when this was completed exposed but undeveloped negative was sent abroad for processing and editing. This was possible because *Ai no Corrida* was technically a French production. Within conventional modes of internationalism, each nation-state is sovereign and thus Japanese obscenity laws cannot be applied to French films. The cultural and financial identity of a particular piece of cinema is naturally assumed to be one and the same in this paradigm and hence a hybrid object like *Ai no Corrida* can slip through state control. “Oshima saw this as a potential revolutionary system of film making that would free [Japanese] directors from the rigidities of the industry and the constraints of censorship laws at one stroke” (Standish 2005: 261). Mainland

Chinese filmmakers in the post-Tiananmen (1989) period, such as Zhang Yimou, Chen Kaige, and Tian Zhuangzhuang, used the same strategy of working with foreign financing to avoid state control only this time it was Japanese companies which, at this later date, became the main providers of the funding and post-production facilities for these filmmakers.

In this way, the globalization of film funding can be liberating for filmmakers. However, in an essay titled "Perspective of Japanese Film" (1992), Oshima discussed another aspect of his shift from national to transnational production in the context of the globalization of the film industry in the late 1980s. He talks about difficulties, or the near impossibility of raising finance for his films in Japan, in which foreign, mainly American, films eat away at the box-office share of Japanese films.

Films conceived in the multiracial United States can become global films just as they are. Their expansive investments in production are possible because of a firm belief in this fact. I don't work under these conditions.

However, even if I cannot attract large audiences everywhere in the world, I can make films that are sure to attract audiences everywhere, even if they are small. Although the number in each country will be small, they will add up to a certain total worldwide. That is what makes it possible for me to make my next film. This is how I would like to make the international films....

(Oshima 1992: 15-6)

Oshima suggests that many art-house filmmakers, regardless of their national origins, share more or less the same view. He has “confirmed this in conversations with Wim Wenders, Bernardo Bertolucci, Paolo Taviani, Theo Angelopoulos, Jim Jarmusch, Mrinal Sen... Chen Kaige and Lee Jang ho” (ibid.) as well as others. According to this view, for non-mainstream filmmakers at some point in the 1980s, working on international projects became almost compulsory rather than a matter of choice and cultural privilege.

From *Ai no Corrida* onward, Oshima became very conscious of the international market and he became dependent on his international reputation. Consequently, he never returned to subject matters that dealt with contemporary issues specific to Japan. In his earlier career, Oshima had made 18 feature films that were politically charged, and engaged with issues relevant to Japanese social conditions between 1959 and 1972. However, after *Ai no Corrida* he managed to make only four films that were aimed at international audiences. These are: *Ai no Bourei* (*Empire of Passion*, 1978), *Merry Christmas Mr. Lawrence* (1983), *Max Mon Amour* (1986), and *Gohatto* (*Taboo*, 1999). Over time Oshima became dramatically less productive, and increasingly politically irrelevant in comparison to his earlier days.

Conclusion

As we have seen, the internationalization of Japanese cinema was almost

accidentally given impetus by *Rashomon*'s success at the Venice Film Festival in 1951. However after this initial success, it became almost immediately subsumed under a national project of rebuilding the war-defeated nation using an export-oriented economy. Film production was closely supervised and censored by GHQ/SCAP during the Occupation and traditional sword play - *chanbara* - and period films in general were banned as they were said to convey feudalistic Japanese values and were thus considered un-democratic and un-civilized. Therefore, it came as a great surprise to Japanese film producers when they discovered that it was the period films that had the best potential for export success as Japanese cultural products.

Not everyone was comfortable with this scopophilic gaze, but for many Japanese producers, like Masaichi Nagata of Daiei, the self-Orientalist impulse was simply too irresistible not to respond to. Rey Chow (1995) explains this complex interplay between the Western gaze and self-Orientalism as a form of active self-affirmation of "to-be-looked-at-ness" by the colonial subject. In this way, the internationalization of Japanese cinema as a project of Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism was inextricably enmeshed with self-Orientalism. The case study of Nagata has shown how strongly the Japanese Legitimizing Identity of the time was shaped by, and defined against, America as its constitutive lack.

In line with the Japanese motto of modernization "Wakon Yosai" (Japanese Spirit with Western Technology), Nagata invested a great deal of time and money in mastering the latest Western filmmaking technologies. The use of the latest Western technology was what many believed distinguished Japanese cinema from being

merely the simple exotica of a backward country. It meant Japanese cinema had not only a different aesthetic from the West but also a feeling of modernity. In other words, Japanese cinema was unique internationally because it was different, but not behind, the West due to its advanced understanding and use of technology. Japan was thus constructed within the popular imagination as technologically coeval to the West while remaining culturally different.

The flip side of Japan's self-Orientalism in its relation to the West is what Iwabuchi (2001) called oriental-Orientalism, a form of superiority complex against Asians. The Japanese have identified themselves more with the West than with their Asian neighbours because of their allegedly unique capacity to adopt Western modernity, and this has resulted in the assumption that they were in Asia but above Asia.

Nagata's Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism drove him to extend his, and the Japanese film industry's, sphere of influence over Asian countries. In this capacity Run Run Shaw of Shaw Brothers provided a crucial link between Japan and Asia, first through film distribution, and then by employing many Japanese filmmakers to modernize his Hong Kong film studios. However, these transnational practices were left largely unspoken, if not discreetly covered up, until recent inquiries by a new generation of researchers. In the pre-globalization world, each national film industry was assumed to be discrete and sovereign, and its membership was by birth rather than by choice. Therefore, such practices, which cross and blur the borderlines of the national body were seen as "abject" (Kristeva 1982); there was a stigma attached to working against the interest of one's own national industry.

As a reaction against the post-war re-modernization program, Resistance Cosmopolitanism emerged within the declining Japanese film industry during the 1960s and 70s. The crossing and blurring of borders between national cinemas was a conscious strategy deployed by Resistance Cosmopolitans such as Oshima to avoid state control and censorship. Still, Resistance Identity in the pre-globalization world was mutually constitutive against and in relation to Legitimizing Identity. They formed a binary opposition, and both identities were deeply embedded in and largely framed by what Beck calls the “national perspective” (Beck 2006). Nevertheless, their transnational and cross-borderline practices can be seen as signals for the coming of the age of globalization.

Chapter Five

The Globalization of Film Finance:

The Actually Existing Cosmopolitanisms of Japanese Film Producers

Japan Goes Hollywood, they bought a piece of “America’s soul”.

(Newsweek, 9th Oct.1989)

After Japanese cinema peaked in around 1960 in terms of both the numbers of films made and the numbers of tickets sold, it went into a swift decline. Six large film companies employed a studio system, four in 1971,... [T]hey ceased production and clung to life only through film distribution. This helps to explain why directors from the preceding generations, like [Akira] Kurosawa and [Nagisa] Oshima could not raise financial support domestically and had to rely on foreign producers to continue directing. (Yomota 2003: 77)

Introduction

For the down-and-out Japanese film industry of the 1980s, globalization and the arrival of the information age were a mixed blessing. All the big Japanese hardware companies suddenly became interested in film and other “software” businesses, but, ironically, these Japanese companies were least interested in Japanese film per se. As part of the rise of Global Hollywood, these Japanese companies were widely buying

into the American and European film industries – besides the well publicised \$3.4 billion purchase by Sony of Columbia Pictures and Matsushita's purchase of MCA-Universal for a massive \$6 billion, there was: "\$600 million of Japanese investment in Walt Disney Corporation; JVC's investment of \$100 million in Largo Entertainment; [and] Pioneer Electronics' acquisition of a ten percent share in Carolco Pictures" (Morley and Robins 1995: 150). These acquisitions and mega-mergers in the 1990s made Hollywood into a global institution owned by multinationals within which Japanese capital played a substantial role (McChesney 2000: 260). What did this massive outflow of Japanese capital and inflow of foreign films mean for Japanese filmmakers, audiences and the indigenous film industry?

The number of foreign films imported into Japan annually remained constant at between 200 and 250 films throughout the post-war period up to the early 1980s. In this same period the percentage of box office revenue generated by foreign films increased from around 30% in the 1960s to nearly 50% in the early 1980s (Motion Picture Producers Association of Japan [MPAJ]). However, the number of foreign films suddenly jumped to over 500 in 1989, and their box office share increased to 60% by the early 1990s (MPAJ).

This apparent domination of Japanese cinema by foreign films cannot plausibly be explained by theories of Cultural Imperialism in their classic sense, however. First of all, the increase in film imports diversified Japanese film culture, rather than homogenizing it. A wide range of films, such as European art-house, American independent, and world cinema became available in Japan. Secondly, the agents of this expansion in foreign film imports were Japanese independent

distributors who were driven by the “pull” of globalization, rather than by the Hollywood majors who propelled the “push” of globalization (cf., Lull 2006: 44-6). Politico-economic factors were obviously very important – e.g. US pressures to open the Japanese market by demolishing its “cultural barriers” and so forth. However, Japanese film culture was far from being over-determined by the politico-economic conditions and overrun by Hollywood in any simplistic way. Hence, in my view, it is quite apt to suggest that Japanese film culture was “cosmopolitanized” as a “side effect” (Beck 2006: 18) of economic globalization.

As I discussed in Chapter Two, Ulrich Beck observed that “banal cosmopolitanization” (2006: 18-9) is taking place as a significant “side effect” (ibid.) of economic globalization. It will be seen how this ‘banal cosmopolitanization’ subjugated Japanese filmmakers and shaped them into various forms of “actually existing cosmopolitans.” I shall illustrate this through a number of case studies of the new generation of Japanese producers.

For the Japanese film industry, economic globalization in the latter part of the twentieth century was a very different project from the “internationalization” of the 1950s. As was examined in the previous chapter, the internationalization of Japanese cinema was a production-based national project that purported to promote Japanese culture through the export of Japanese films. It was also a project that was largely driven by Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism, which sought the recognition of Japanese cultural “uniqueness” by Western universalism. In contrast, the “economic globalization” or what was then called “*Kokusaika*” (which literally means internationalization in Japanese) in Japan in the late 1980s referred to:

[T]he switch from export-led to domestic demand-led economic growth, the gradual diminution of Japan's 'uniqueness', and the sharing of the burdens of maintaining free trade and a growing world economy together with the United States and the European Community. (Higashi and Lauter 1990: 6)

Kokusaika (I use this term to indicate the Japanese configuration of economic globalization) was about the end of Japanese cultural exceptionalism. It signalled the beginning of attempts to integrate the sense of Japanese particularity within the global political economy, as the new, post-cold war, constellation of power was emerging along with the global spread of neo-liberalism. In economic terms, *Kokusaika* was a consumption-based project that purported to further open the Japanese market to foreign goods, symbols, and labour. Thus, *Kokusaika* was not designed to promote Japanese culture or industry. Instead, it "attempts to open the Japanese mind to other cultures and values as well as transform Japanese systems to meet internationally accepted norms and standards" (Itoh 2000: 39). Therefore, *Kokusaika* was an ambivalent and contradictory process for the Japanese government as well as for its industries. However, for Resistance Cosmopolitans in the filmmaking community – including independent film producers and distributors – it provided timely opportunities to carve out niche spaces within the hitherto homogeneously imagined national culture and film industry.

The Japanese government deployed the *Kokusaika* policy to ease a trade conflict that had emerged with the US (Higashi and Lauter 1990: 6). Besides this

external pressure to open the Japanese mind and market however, there was also an internal drive within the Japanese film industry for renewal and diversification in the 1980s. The tradition of Japanese filmmaking that had carried on from the pre-war industry became largely discontinuous as the studio production system came to an end in the 1970s. This combination of the end of the studio tradition and the emergence of the politico-economic milieu of *Kokusaika* provided openings for a new generation of independent film directors and producers to appear (cf., Rayns 1984: 7; Okubo 2006: 2; Yomota 2003: 77). Many of these young Japanese directors started their careers by self-financing their own super 8 and 16mm films and screening their films in European international film festivals, while many of the independent producers started their careers as distributors of European art-house and American independent films.

This generation of independent filmmakers developed, and was driven by, a different type of cosmopolitan outlook than that of the Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism of the studio generation. For the previous generation, the allegorical equation of Japanese cinema to the national way of life was relatively unproblematic. In contrast, for the post-studio generation, un-reflective identification with, and legitimization of, the national way of life was not an attractive option. First of all, many of these filmmakers came from the fringes of a fragmented filmmaking community. Thus their social positions were precarious and their films often stood for resistance to the mainstream Japanese way of life. Secondly, the discursive regime of *Kokusaika* – in a Foucauldian sense – discouraged ostentatious legitimizations of nationalism and national culture, so these were downplayed. Thirdly, the discourse of *Kokusaika* mobilized various social apparatuses to form

something resembling a “truth regime” which encouraged and facilitated the new generation’s aspiration to become part of the emerging transnational networks of film makers and financiers by learning from and meeting “internationally accepted norms and standards” (Itoh 2000: 39) in the film business. Thus paradoxically, Resistance Cosmopolitanism was encouraged by the nation-state. Fourthly, to be part of this transnational network and be seen to be “global”, individuals’ professional identity as film directors, producers and distributors etc. had to be in the foreground while their national identity had to be pushed into the background.

The first case study in this chapter illustrates how *Kokusaika* manifested in the film industry through a study of the *mini-theatre* boom in the 1980s along with the film distributor Masato Hara, and his company Herald Ace, who led this trend. The *mini-theatre* boom banally cosmopolitanized Japanese film culture in two important ways. First, it facilitated “a nascent cosmopolitanism” (Delanty 2003: 127) of young female audiences. Secondly it collapsed the conventional segregation of screen space between foreign films and Japanese films. The *mini-theatre* boom encouraged young entrepreneurs, such as Takashi Asai and Lee Bong-u, to start up new film distribution companies, and more established distributors, such as Hara, to undertake international film productions.

The second set of case studies will explore the nature of Japanese involvement with international English-language film production in the 1980s and 1990s. Masato Hara executive produced two major international projects with Japanese directors who had found their films impossible to finance solely within the Japanese film industry: *Merry Christmas Mr. Lawrence* (Nagisa Oshima 1983) and

Ran (Akira Kurosawa 1985). Building on their experience in these projects, Satoru Iseki and Michiyo Yoshizaki, who had been junior colleagues of Hara, launched their careers as two of Japan's most prominent international art-house film financiers/producers. Iseki and Yoshizaki went on to form NDF (Nippon Film Development and Finance Co) and co-financed films such as *Naked Lunch* (David Cronenberg 1991); *Howards End* (James Ivory 1992); and *Crying Game* (Neil Jordan 1992). The case studies of Iseki and Yoshizaki provide striking examples of the ways in which Legitimizing and Resistance Cosmopolitanisms became complex and contradictory in the age of globalization.

A massive amount of Japanese capital was poured into English-language films in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, but the majority of them failed miserably - both commercially and critically. One of these films was *China Shadow* (*Shadow of China*, Mitsuo Yanagimachi 1990) which Satoru Iseki produced. In his interview with me, Iseki stated that he wanted to transform the conditions of Japanese filmmaking by drawing on international finance. For Iseki, producing English films was a step towards producing *Kokusaiteki* (global) Japanese films. However, for Japanese films to be truly "global", he believed Japanese cinema had to be re-invented through hybridization so that it was more appealing to financiers who were aiming for the international market.

Michiyo Yoshizaki has a different type of cosmopolitan outlook and relationship to "Japanese cinema" to that of her ex-colleague. This has a lot to do with the fact that she is a woman and has lived in Europe for most of her life. Unlike Iseki, who says his ultimate goal is to transform Japanese cinema and production

systems, Yoshizaki says that she feels very little attachment to Japanese cinema. She escaped from Japan to lead an independent woman's life in Europe because she believed there was no place for a woman in the Japanese film industry and society in general. Yet, she is fully aware that it is her access to Japanese finance that is enabling her to operate successfully in Europe and this seems to make her reflective about her cultural identity. Her Resistance Cosmopolitanism is paradoxical in the sense that she is an agent of Japanese capital and her personal escape from the constraints of social expectations in Japan is sustained by the success of the Japanese economy that underpins the continuance of Japanese patriarchy.

While Hara, Iseki and Yoshizaki all generally distributed and produced relatively major art-house films, the final case study in this chapter will examine a Japanese producer/ distributor of smaller, more radical independent films. Takashi Asai was the producer of *Robinson's Garden* (Masashi Yamamoto 1987), which I discussed in Chapter Two. Takashi Asai started his production/ distribution company Up-Link with a print of *Angelic Conversation* (1985), the experimental film shot on super-8 by the gay British filmmaker Derek Jarman, which he bought for US\$5,000. Consequently Asai became known as the premier distributor of gay films in Japan, but according to his own accounts, he is not gay and does not feel any particular loyalty to gay films. He loves films that purport to “resist the establishment for [fight for] social change” (Asai interview 2006) in general and gay films of the 1980s happened to be of that nature. He states that his motto is to produce films anywhere that “offers the best creative talent and affordable production costs” regardless of sex, gender or ethnicity. So, he appears to be not only a self-proclaimed Resistance Cosmopolitan with radical politics, but also a self-professed transnational

entrepreneur in the avant-garde art business.

Banal Cosmopolitanization and the Mini-Theatres

Using the money generated by the Japanese economy to embark on a program of intensive consumption of foreign goods, food, and travel, young single women soon emerged as the most thoroughly 'cosmopolitan' population in Japan. In the Process, some of these women, particularly urban office workers with a degree of professional ambition who were frustrated by the unapologetic gender discrimination of the Japanese corporate structure, began to pursue more serious involvement with the foreign... [T]hese 'internationalist' women began to speak anew of the West as a site of deliverance from Japanese gendered structures of family and work. (Kelsky 2001: 85-6)

Paul Wolfowitz, who at the time was Assistant Secretary of State delivered one of hundreds of speeches made by high-ranking US officials calling for urgent improvements in the Japanese-US trade relationship in 1985. He stated that the emerging trade war between Japan and the US had the potential to be a bigger threat to the free world than the Soviet-US cold war had been (Wolfowitz 1985). In response to these US pressures, Japan took various measures to reduce its trade surplus. The Japan Export Trade Organization (JETRO) - the government agency tasked to promote Japanese "export" - was officially given an additional task of

promoting “imports” (Sakurai 2004). A highly politically charged, if not vaguely absurd, and intensive media campaign took place to encourage Japanese people to buy and consume more American goods. Also in 1985, the first Tokyo International Film Festival was established partially so that more foreign films would be screened in Japan. As a result of this politico-economic milieu, the number of film imports to Japan increased dramatically. New small independent cinemas, called *mini-theatres*, proliferated in the major cities of Japan to cater to increasingly diverse audience tastes. It was at this time that Masato Hara and his distribution company, Herald Ace, emerged as leading proponents of the *mini-theatre* boom.

There is a revealing anecdote about a cultural consequence, or “side effect” (Beck 2006), of *Kokusaika* and the Japan-US trade conflict. As part of the extravagant media campaign promoting *Kokusaika*, the Japanese prime minister at the time, Nakasone, made an appeal to Japanese consumers that, as citizens of the international community “every single Japanese person should spend at least US\$100 on foreign products” in order to reduce the Japanese trade surplus (Hara 2006: 8). As part of this appeal a television program covered the prime minister’s visit to an Imported Products Fair held in a high-class department store in Tokyo, where he spent 71,000 yen (approx. US\$280) of his own money on imported goods. However, when the content of his purchases were revealed, it turned out that inside his shopping bag was an entirely European product range: Italian brand ties, French brand clothes etc. Unwittingly, perhaps, he did not buy anything American (ibid.: 8). What ended up happening with film imports to Japan was remarkably similar. The number of foreign films imported into the country increased from 264 in 1985 to 522 in 1989 (MPAJ), but a large portion of this increase comprised of European art-house

films, world cinema, and small American independent films, rather than of Hollywood products.

The significance of this anecdote is that it shows that the objective of consumption for affluent individuals in Japan in the 1980s and 1990s was more to do with consuming difference and transforming the self into the other, rather than with demonstrating to which group they already belonged – “conspicuous” consumption in Veblen’s (or in Bourdieu’s) sense (Veblen, cited in Delanty 2003: 126). For the discerning Japanese consumer of the 1980s, mass-produced American cultural products signified the sameness of “a democratised low culture” (Delanty 2003: 117) that the dominant Japanese culture had already appropriated long ago, whereas “European designer products – such as the bag brand names Chanel, Gucci and Prada, important for a bag-conscious society – enjoy higher consumer esteem” (ibid.: 124) because they signified a difference which would, hopefully, transform the self into cultural otherness.

These practices of self-othering through the consumption of difference offered possibilities for discerning consumers to distance, or, even withdraw themselves – physically or psychologically - from nationally dominant ways of living. Thus, the sociologist Gerald Delanty suggests that this consumption was “more related to a nascent cosmopolitanism than to Americanization” (ibid.: 127). I agree with Delanty that consumption in the *Kokusaika* milieu contained the seeds of a desire for cosmopolitan ways of life, and that the practice contained within it elements of resistance to the nationally dominant way of life, which was often characterized as hierarchical, group-oriented and male-dominated. Heavy

consumption of Western goods and symbols was fuelling a fantasy rather than satisfying the desire for “possible lives offered by the mass media” (Appadurai 1996: 54). As Appadurai puts it, the fantasy became “social practice” (1996: 198) for sections of the Japanese population, most notably, young women who had doubts about the traditional gender roles assigned to them.

According to Karen Kelsky, who studied the exodus of Japanese women to the West as well as their fetish for the white male, Japanese women particularly “urban office workers with a degree of professional ambition” (Kelsky 2001: 85-6) were increasingly “frustrated by the unapologetic gender discrimination of the Japanese corporate structure” (ibid.). Thus they were seriously contemplating mass defection using the resources that had been generated by the bubble economy of the 1980s. “Office Lady” (OL) was a name given to members of this occupational group who were expected to work only until they got married and then become home-makers. They were the reserve army of “nascent cosmopolitans” who were building up their collective fantasy to travel, to study, and possibly to live in the liberal West. And, in the 1980s, new places of film consumption, a new type of cinema, were designed and built with this female population in mind. This type of cinema was called the *mini-theatre*.

My first task in this section is to illustrate how the film distributor Masato Hara and his company Herald Ace engaged with this “nascent cosmopolitanism” in Japanese film culture. The arrival of new methods of film distribution and loci of film consumption successfully promoted a particular kind of film that came to signify difference in comparison to films produced by both Hollywood and the

Japanese majors. Cinema Square Tokyu, a small cinema with a 224-seat capacity, which opened in 1981 in the entertainment district of central Tokyo, is widely acknowledged as the first *mini-theatre* (Otaka and Inaba 1989: 27). What was distinctive about this type of cinema was that, firstly, Cinema Square Tokyu was not part of a chain and thus it was able to establish its own unique program of film screenings. Secondly, the cinema was equipped with comfortable chairs and a luxurious lobby area, which was tastefully furnished with young female audiences in mind (Hara 2004: 69-70). In other words, the *mini-theatres* were designed to cater for an audience who had access to the highest disposable income and enjoyed the greatest amount of leisure time and who were actively seeking to mark these differences and enjoy the privileges it gave them access to. This audience was educated women in their 20's, mostly 'Office Ladies' and female college students. *Mini-theatres* sprouted up in major cities across Japan in the late 1980s, and by 1989 over twenty *mini-theatres* were listed in Tokyo alone (Otaka and Inaba.1989: 139-151).

It was Masato Hara who designed the concept of the first *mini-theatre* - Cinema Square Tokyu. Hara spent the early part of his career in film publicity and he called himself a "publicity producer" because he believed publicity to be part of the "creative" production process of cinematic experience (Hara 2004: 35). In the year Cinema Square Tokyu opened, Hara established his own distribution company, Herald Ace, separate from its parent company, Japan Herald. Hara set up this new company with two particular objectives in mind. Firstly, Herald Ace was going to distribute small specialist films which his parent company did not handle, because he believed the "audience's needs were diversifying" (ibid.: 68). Secondly, he wanted to

undertake film production as a central part of his operation because he wanted to do “his best to resurrect the Japanese film industry that was in a deep trough” (Hara 2004: 82). In his view the proliferation of *mini-theatres* was central to achieving both these goals.

Cinema Square Tokyu was designed to “transform the experience of cinema-going itself”, due to its luxurious atmosphere and aimed to make the “act of going to this cinema itself a fashionable practice” (Hara 2004: 70). Hara therefore focused on promoting the theatre, Cinema Square Tokyu, itself. He even suggested that he probably spent more on “publicizing the chairs in the auditorium” (Hara 2004: 70) than on the films the cinema was showing.

Besides the luxurious atmosphere and large comfortable chairs, another selling point of the *mini-theatre* was that it was the site of *tankan road show* (the single cinema road show). The single cinema road show was designed to add scarcity value to the cinema-going experience by making a particular *mini-theatre* the only place in the whole Tokyo area showing one particular film. In this way it promoted the differentiation of the unique and individual quality of *mini-theatres* and their films from the mass circulation Hollywood and Japanese major studio films that were usually widely released on many screens simultaneously.

That such intense attention was paid to the site of film consumption and the distribution method does not mean that the films shown there were not important for *mini-theatre* audiences. On the contrary, the Japanese film journalist, Hiroo Otaka, suggests that there were discernible common characteristics amongst the films that

became successes in the *mini-theatres*. He uses two key words to explain these characteristics: “*abunasa*” (edginess) and “*fashion sei*” (fashionableness) (Otaka and Inaba 1989: 48-9). According to Otaka, most of the films that were a success in the *mini-theatre* had some elements of *abunasa* (edginess or subversiveness); for example, the lives being lived on the margins amongst the young New Yorkers in *Stranger Than Paradise* (Jim Jarmusch 1984), or, the sexual subversiveness of gay films that became emblematic of *mini-theatre*. Films with gay themes or characters such as *Another Country* (Marek Kaniévka 1984); *Kiss of The Spider Woman* (Hector Babenco 1985); *My Beautiful Laundrette* (Stephen Frears 1985); *Angelic Conversation* (Derek Jarman 1985); *Caravaggio* (Derek Jarman, 1986); and *Maurice* (James Ivory 1987) were the most consistently successful films in the *mini-theatre*. To the surprise of many film distributors and pundits, the majority of the audience for these “gay films” in Japan was comprised of women in their late-teens and twenties (Otaka and Inaba 1989: 49).

According to this view, the textual quality of *abunasa* (edginess or subversiveness) attracts a discerning audience that is seeking to explore and experience difference. What is equally important to this audience however, is the *fashionsei* (fashionableness) of the *mini-theatre* as a site of cultural consumption. This is because it is the *fashionsei* of the *mini-theatres* that allows female audiences to consume *abunai* (edgy or subversive) films within an environment that reassures them as to the stability of their status as affluent consuming subjects (Otaka and Inaba 1989: 49). In other words, the success of the *mini-theatres* can be explained by the fact they provided a culturally safe and “fashionable” space for young women to consume otherness that otherwise could have been seen as too “subversive” within

the context of the dominant Japanese culture.

Assessing and understanding audience reception of the *mini-theatre* films, or more precisely, the young Japanese female audience's reception of gay films in detail is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, drawing on feminist studies such as the one by Karen Kelsky mentioned above, I would like to note in passing that there is a strong correlation between the practices drawn on by the *mini-theatres* and the increasing flight to the West by Japanese women. Kelsky argued that "the turn to the foreign has become perhaps the most important means currently at women's disposal to resist gendered expectations of the female life course in Japan" (2001: 2). She demonstrated how the "white male" was constructed as an object of desire through dominant representation systems in the Japanese media, which consequently motivated many Japanese women to reject traditional gender roles and to move towards the West – both physically and psychologically. In this sense, cosmopolitanism for many Japanese women became a potent means of resistance. Following Kelsky, I speculate that experiences at the *mini-theatre* nurtured the nascent cosmopolitanism of those female audiences, who were "frustrated by the unapologetic gender discrimination of the Japanese corporate structure" (Kelsky 2001: 86), encouraging them to take their Westward flights.¹⁰

Hara was clear about his strategy to reinvent the cinema experience for young female audiences, but the choice of films was not entirely his. It was his film

¹⁰ Even within my limited personal experience, I have met a quite few young Japanese women who came to study, or live, in London who mentioned a film viewing experience (particularly, Derek Jarman) as the main factor which motivated them.

buyer in London, Michiyo Yoshizaki who selected the films that received *mini-theatre* distribution.

In 1987, Hara and Herald Ace were involved in designing and running another *mini-theatre* called Cine Switch. The original concept of this cinema was to break down the conventional segregation of Japanese and foreign screens, and switch the same screen in turn to show Japanese and foreign films (Hara 2004: 71). Cine Switch was a joint project with Fuji TV, which was about to embark on a programme of low budget film production. While Herald Ace supplied foreign films that contained some element of “edginess” in them, such as *Maurice* (Ivory 1987) – an Edwardian gay love story set in Cambridge, which became one of the biggest box office successes at Cine Switch - Fuji TV supplied Japanese films that were aimed at the same target audience: mostly young women. The idea was to promote Japanese films to those young female audiences who came primarily to see the foreign imports (Otaka and Inaba 1989: 51).

This strategy was largely successful and the same format was used by many other *mini-theatres*. In this way, the *mini-theatre* opened a new route for the distribution of Japanese independent films and the conventional segregation between screens allocated to Japanese films and those allocated to foreign movies started to collapse. The “fashionableness” of the *mini-theatre* helped to improve the general image of Japanese films, and in turn some independent Japanese films added a degree of “edginess” to the viewing experience.

As a producer, Hara describes himself primarily as an “organizer” or a

“coordinator” type (2004: 87) who brings people together, rather than as a producer with any particular technical skill or talent. In other words, what he thought was distinctive about himself was his capacity to bring together two domains, that had conventionally been separated, for new business and creative opportunities. These domains might include examples such as: auteur filmmaking and popular entertainment; the film and TV industries; Japanese directors and foreign producers and so forth. Hence, being cosmopolitan is a part of his occupational identity. Does he legitimize or resist notions of national identity in any obvious way, however?

In autobiographical accounts that he gave to the Japanese media, Hara emphasized the fact that he started his career in the left-wing independent film production movement of the post-war period (Hara 2002: 12; 2004: 6). A number of prominent filmmakers were red-purged from the film industry after the American Occupation force quelled a labour dispute at the Toho studios in 1948. There followed a short period in the early 1950s when socialist filmmaking was invigorated. However, this movement was stranded by the mid-1950s largely due to the major studios’ oligopoly on film distribution and exhibition (Sato 1995b: 209). After giving up study at university due to his ill health (tuberculosis) and involvement with student activities, Hara worked for an independent production house from the age of twenty-two to twenty-six (Hara 2004: 6). He states emphatically that that was how and where he learnt the tradition of Japanese film making: not in the major studios, but through the independent socialist film production movement (ibid.: 7).

According to his “project of the self” narrated by himself, when the independent production company closed down he spent a couple of years picking up

odd jobs and being supported by his wife. It was impossible for him to gain secure employment. On one hand, he could not take on physical labour because his lung capacity was only 1500cc. On the other, he had dropped out of university because of his student activism (2004: 7-8). Then, in 1958, the founder of Japan Herald, Katsumi Furukawa, a businessman who owned a chain of cinemas and restaurants in Nagoya, transformed Hara's life. Furukawa had purchased a small distribution company in which Hara was doing odd jobs, and when he launched into the film distribution business in Tokyo (ibid.; 8) he made Hara in charge of publicity. According to Hara's own account, it was Furukawa who taught Hara the basic "truth" of life, which he subscribed to as a kind of motto for the rest of his days: "ideals alone are not enough to feed one's stomach – a man needs money as well as ideals" (ibid.: 13-5). This is the path through which Hara describes how he, as a left-leaning young man, came to accommodate capitalist principles, how he came to realize the importance of marketing, and how he came to devote himself to becoming Japan's top "publicity producer".

It is noteworthy that Hara's "narrative of self" presents him as being part of the original "resistance" movement against the old Japanese film industry and the political ideology of post-war modernization that accompanied it. The way in which he described how this resistance failed is also noteworthy, as if this failure were a natural course of history, and that his acceptance of the primacy of the market economy was a natural part of his professional and personal maturation. Meanwhile, his insistence on calling himself a "publicity producer" rather than simply a "publicist" indicates his affinity with the sphere of creativity associated with film production. In short, he presents himself as an example of having a *failed* Resistance

Identity - as somebody who discovered a way to accommodate “reality” and matured as a vanguard of capitalism in the global age - but as still being able to embrace the failure of his young days, which he sees as the source of his love for creativity.

Hara does not resist or legitimize national identity in an obvious way. His *failed* Resistance Identity seems to retain the spirit of resistance, but only in business form. While he eventually abandoned left-wing politics altogether, he did challenge the studios’ oligopoly control of film exhibition by instigating the *mini-theatre* boom. Hara also played a key part in realizing the films *Merry Christmas Mr. Lawrence* (Oshima, 1983) and *Ran* (Kurosawa, 1985). As an executive producer, Hara brought together Oshima and the British producer Jeremy Thomas to work on *Merry Christmas Mr. Lawrence*, as well as putting together 50% of the film’s finances. He also rescued the French co-production of Kurosawa’s *Ran*, by guaranteeing two thirds of its budget (Hara 2004: 94, 139). The media campaigns for *Merry Christmas Mr. Lawrence* and *Ran* did emphasize the international achievements of their respective Japanese directors and other talent involved in the projects. However, there is very little sense of national legitimization in the ways in which Hara spoke of these projects in his autobiography.

Instead, the personal significance of the production of *Merry Christmas Mr. Lawrence* for Hara was that he learnt new methods to finance film productions internationally which drew on various tax shelter funds and insurance schemes that were not known in Japan previously (Hara, 2004: 103). *Merry Christmas Mr. Lawrence* was shot in New Zealand to utilize the generous tax shelter fund there. The production was financed by pre-selling the international rights and cash-flowed by

borrowing from a bank on the condition that the completion of the project was guaranteed by an insurance policy called completion bond. By working with the British producers, Jeremy Thomas and Terry Glinwood, Hara discovered that it was possible for independent producers without large capital assets - like Thomas and Glinwood themselves - to carry out sizable international productions by using these financial schemes and the completion bond. In Japanese corporate culture, small independent companies were usually treated as subcontractors and had very little control over their own projects. Thus, this discovery was a real eye-opener for Hara and his colleagues, Iseki and Yoshizaki. From this experience, they learnt “the norms and standards of international film co-production” and found their future direction in leading a trend that became almost taken for granted in the early 1990s: co-financing international film projects with Japanese capital.

Globalizing Japanese Cinema: Reticent and Ambivalent Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism

The fundamental problem for Japanese [cinema] is language. There is no other people (*minzoku*) in the world who share the Japanese language. (Mata Yamamoto, film producer, 1985: 77)

[Working on an international co-production is] five or ten times more tiring. There is so much more work to do. I can see why co-production fails so often. The Americans and the Japanese have a different mentality. What is beautiful for the Japanese is

not beautiful for the Americans. I can either compromise or contest. The more I understand, the more I see the differences....
(Mitsuo Yanagimachi, the director of *Shadow of China*, cited in Harada 1989)

Backed by a strong yen and the “bubble economy” of the late 1980s, Japanese companies were buying into Hollywood as well as numerous media businesses in the West. It was in this context of the ongoing “trade war” between Japan and the US, that the Western media declared that Japan was “stealing America’s soul” (Morley and Robins 1995: 149). The main proponent of the cultural imperialism thesis, Herbert Schiller, pointed out the irony of the situation created by what he saw as the “reverse Cultural Imperialism” of Japanese economic power:

The buyout of MCR/Universal – one of the Hollywood ‘majors’ – by the Japanese super electronics corporation Matsushita has already had one beneficial effect. It has caused the American news media, along with the government foreign-policy makers, to recognize a problem whose existence they have steadfastly denied for the past twenty five years – cultural domination by an external power. (Schiller 1990: 828)

In hindsight, however, seeing these Japanese investments in the Western media industry as acts of “reverse Cultural Imperialism” has proven to be a misconception. On the contrary, the consequence of this massive out-flow of Japanese capital was the massively increased in-flow of American and European films back into the

Japanese market, which resulted in the further marginalization of domestic film production.

This situation developed because Japanese corporations made investments with the aim of occupying advantageous positions within the emerging global media production system. Their priority was thus to acquire globally popular media content, regardless of its national origin, and they naturally assumed the “global popular” to be Western in origin, not Japanese. Thus, far from being “cultural imperialists” who were attempting to dominate the West by flooding the Western media space with Japanese content, Japanese investors were in fact rarely interested in Japanese film productions, unless they saw international potential in some way.

This does not mean that these Japanese capitalists had no cultural affiliation to their native country. As Castells observes, it is likely true that “there is probably a higher cultural/ geographical loyalty among Japanese companies toward their country than other companies of similar global reach” (2000: 242). Still, in comparison with the way in which the previous generation of Japanese film producers, such as Masaichi Nagata, attempted to throw back the Japanese “to-be-looked-at-ness” to the Western gaze through film exports, the new generation of Japanese film producers were far more reticent and ambivalent about the legitimization of national particularity.

Numerous attempts were made to globalize Japanese cinema and filmmakers, and these happened in many different ways. For example, Japan’s top TV commercial director, Hiroaki Yoshida, directed *Iron Maze* (1991) - based on the

story *Yabu no naka (In a Grove)* by Ryunosuke Akutagawa – the very same story that Kurosawa's *Rashomon* (1950) had been based on. Yoshida re-set the *Rashomon* story as a crime mystery taking place in the industrial decay of contemporary Pittsburgh in the United States. *Iron Maze* was executive produced by Oliver Stone and featured a mainly American cast and crew, which included Bridget Fonda as the lead character. Fonda played the wife of a Japanese businessman whose attempted murder was the centre of the mystery. The project was backed financially by Yoshida's own TV commercial company TYO and Kitty Film in Japan. *Iron Maze* opened in over one hundred cinemas across the USA (Kakii 1991: 101) but with disappointing critical and box office results. After *Iron Maze*, Yoshida concentrated on his commercial production business and never directed a feature film again.

Similarly, a big budget science fiction film *Crisis 2050 (Solar Crisis, Smithee 1990)* was entirely financed by the Japanese companies NHK Enterprise and Gakken. The Japanese science-fiction writer, Takeshi Kawada, developed the original story based on the prediction that in 2050 the expansion of solar flares will fry the Earth; in order to avoid this catastrophe, a mission is organised whereby astronauts have to travel to the sun to drop a special bomb that can save life on Earth. The story involved only one Japanese character - an astronaut who was played by a young, un-known Japanese actor. The main selling point of this project was the participation of special effects supervisor, Richard Edlund, who was known for his work at George Lucas' Industrial Light and Magic. In this extravagant sci-fi special effects affair, the director Richard C. Sarafian disowned the film and it is credited as being directed by 'Allen Smithee'. (Tomita 1990: 114; Kakii 1992: 241).

Another example of a big budget film financed by Japanese capital and made in Hollywood was *Wind* (Carroll Ballard 1992). The Japanese producer, Mata Yamamoto, developed the film's premise - a love story centred on an American Cup yacht-race and put together the \$50 million dollar budget with investment from nine Japanese companies (Hachimori 1992: 86). The cast and crew were mostly American and Australian, and there was no other major Japanese creative or technical contributions apart from that of Yamamoto himself. Yamamoto persuaded Francis Ford Coppola to act as executive producer of *Wind*, and the film opened in over one thousand cinemas across the US (ibid.: 86) as the result of a distribution deal with Columbia TriStar. However, the film has grossed only \$5.52 million dollars at the US box office to date (Internet Movie Data Base Pro, *Wind*).

These examples show some of the different ways in which Japanese filmmakers, producers and investors have attempted to integrate themselves into the global system of film production and distribution which is based in the US, usually without success. Their projects contained representations of different degrees of Japanese cultural particularity from the fairly particularistic *Iron Maze*, in which the Japanese director adapted a classic Japanese story for a global audience, to the fairly non-particularistic science fiction film *Solar Crisis* or, *Wind*, which contained no Japanese elements apart from its Japanese producer and financing.

These films were hardly recognizable as Japanese films in the conventional sense, apart from the fact that they were financed and owned by the Japanese. However, the lack of culturally specific signifiers in these films does not mean that Japanese producers had lost interest in legitimizing their cultural identity through

cinema. For example, the producer of *Wind*, Mata Yamamoto, wrote in an article entitled “Is Internationalization of Japanese Cinema Possible”:

Having spent time abroad, I became conscious that ‘I am Japanese’... I learnt to speak English and people told me ‘Mata is an international man, a cosmopolitan’. But my feeling about Japan and Japanese identity is stable. If somebody speaks ill of Japan, I will get upset and I will nail my point insisting on how wonderful a country Japan is. And I have the right vehicle to convey these feelings - that is cinema. (Yamamoto 1985: 79)

Yamamoto’s statement reveals a certain psychological complexity that is involved in global film financing for Japanese film producers. As Japanese finance was “disembedded” (Giddens 1990: 21) from the national framework in the process of globalization, these Japanese producers and directors concurrently attempted to “disembed” their filmmaking practices from Japanese cultural context. However, unlike financial transactions that seemed to slip seamlessly into the new global context, the re-embedding of cultural practice into Western - supposedly global - contexts was far from instant and most of these projects failed.

Similarly, a certain legitimizing impulse was behind the creation of *Shadow of China* (Yanagimachi 1990), the film produced by Satoru Iseki. This project was initiated by the Japanese director, Mitsuo Yanagimachi, who was regarded as an important emerging art-house director at the time. His previous film *Himatsuri* (*Fire Festival*, 1985) had won prizes at the Locarno and Rotterdam

international film festivals and had been distributed across various European art-house cinemas. Yanagimachi managed to attach the star of *The Last Emperor* (Bertolucci 1987), John Lone, one of the very few Asian actors working in English-language films who had become a recognizable international star due to the success of *The Last Emperor*, to his project. This director-actor combination was attractive enough to make Japanese financiers and the media believe *Shadow of China* would open new horizons for Japanese cinema in the global age. In an interview Iseki gave to a Japanese film magazine, he claimed that the production of *Shadow of China* would transform “Japanese cinema and Japanese talent to the international level” (Iseki, cited in Hachimori 1990g: 147). The production of *Shadow of China* offers an interesting example of how Japanese filmmakers sought to legitimize their national identity within the *Kokusaika* discourse, and how paradoxical it was.

After working on Kurosawa’s *Ran* (1985), Iseki left Herald Ace to head the Japanese office of the American distribution company, Vestron Video. According to Iseki, he made this move because he wanted to go into film production and Vestron had plans to produce feature films in Japan. Thus Iseki was originally involved with *Shadow of China* with a view to produce it for Vestron (Iseki, cited in Hachimori 1990g: 146). When Yanagimachi came to Iseki asking for financing John Lone was already attached to the project but the script was still in development. Japan at that time was in the middle of the bubble economy and there were “so many Japanese companies wanting to take part in the software business” (ibid.: 146), that Iseki did not have much difficulty finding Japanese financial partners for the co-production. However, after several attempts at convincing them, the head office of Vestron in the

US rejected the project and this eventually led Iseki to resign from the company and decide to produce *Shadow of China* independently.

Iseki thus gave up a six-figure salary, which was guaranteed by Vestron Video, and embarked on the precarious life of an independent producer. Why was he so committed to *Shadow of China*? In an interview Iseki gave to a Japanese film magazine, he says that it was impossible for him simply to give up when Vestron rejected the project, because he had already made commitments to his Japanese co-production partners; it was a matter of saving his face and his professional reputation. Besides, he had a strong belief in the director Yanagimachi and the project. He states:

I have worked with great Japanese artists in the past. I worked on the production of Osamu Tezuka's animation *Cleopatra* (1970), Nagisa Oshima's *Merry Christmas Mr. Lawrence* (1983) and Akira Kurosawa's *Ran* (1985). Working with these directors for me was very rewarding and it is these experiences that keep me going in the film business... I believe Yanagimachi is like these great Japanese directors...in the making.... (Iseki, cited in Hachimori, 1990g: 145)

For Iseki, producing *Shadow of China* was about creating the next step forward after *Merry Christmas Mr. Lawrence* and *Ran* in the history of Japanese cinema. He believed this project would provide an example of a new system of international production, and herald the arrival of a new generation of Japanese cinematic talent to

international audiences.

The project began when Yanagimachi met John Lone at the New York Film Festival. Lone had come to see his film *Himatsuri (Fire Festival)* (1985). At that time, Yanagimachi had just been discovered by Western film critics and was being touted as an emerging art-house film director. John Lone was also on a path towards becoming one of very few memorable oriental faces in Hollywood with his performance of an archetypal villain in *Year of the Dragon* (Michael Cimino 1985). They chatted through a translator after the screening – since Yanagimachi did not speak much English - and they kept in contact afterwards. Yanagimachi found a crime mystery by a Japanese writer set in Hong Kong, called *Jatoh (Snakehead)*, (Nishimoto 1985), which he adapted for John Lone and which would become *Shadow of China*. From the time of their first accidental meeting in New York, the production of *Shadow of China* took three and half years to realize.

From the beginning, it was agreed by those who were involved in the project that *Shadow of China* should be an English-language film and had to be produced not in a “Japanese way” but in the “American style” (Hachimori 1990g: 145). Aimi O, a half Chinese woman born in Japan, who represented John Lone as his agent and also acted as an associate producer on *Shadow of China* states:

As the agent of John Lone, I could not advise him to play the role if *Shadow of China* was a *Japanese film*... It had to be an English-language film because of the nature of the story and I thought it would be a fatal mistake to make this film in an

environment in which the majority of crew and cast members were Japanese, who did not speak English. If that were the case, I would have had to advise John not to play the part... By the nature of the project, I believe *Shadow of China* had to be produced with a mixed crew, a mixed cast, and as an international project. (O, cited in Hachimori 1990d: 117)

For O, *Shadow of China* had to be an English-language film made in an international environment for the sake of its authenticity. Yanagimachi agreed, despite his own poor English communication skills. Although his English improved greatly over the course of the production (Yanagimachi, in *Kinema Junpo* 1989: 197), it remained fairly basic throughout. Therefore, O interpreted for Lone and Yanagimachi during the shoot. Another key person whose involvement made this complex international project possible was the cinematographer, Toyomichi Kurita. Kurita had worked as a camera assistant in the Japanese film industry when he was young and Kurita and Yanagimachi knew each other from those days. Kurita had subsequently moved to the US to study at the American Film Institute at the age of twenty-nine and after graduation he remained in the US and worked on numerous American independent films, including Alan Rudolph's *Modern* (1988) in which John Lone played a young Chinese business tycoon (Hachimori 1990e: 117). Key American crew members, including the producers Don Guest and Elliot Lewitt and the scriptwriter Richard Maxwell, were brought onto the project through Kurita's contacts (Hachimori 1990c: 122). Kurita was the first - and so far the only - Japanese cinematographer in post-war history who successfully migrated between Japan and the US. Therefore, bi-lingual and bi-cultural Japanese staff like O and Kurita were very scarce and they

played a vital role in making the production of *Shadow of China* possible.

In the interview I carried out with Satoru Iseki in 2006, he stated that producing “Japanese cinema” was his long-term ambition, which he has not yet fulfilled:

As I am Japanese, I have a feeling for Japanese cinema and I understand Japanese cinema culturally to be the best. However, producing Japanese cinema is difficult because the audience for Japanese film is limited to Japan only, hence the budget is limited. The size of the existing market for Japanese cinema is not sufficient for the kind of filmmaking I am interested in. I don't like the size of the market to dictate what kind of film I produce. Thus my intention was to expand the market for Japanese cinema. As I have come from a distribution background, I know the scale of the market for English-language films and how it operates.... (Iseki interview 2006).¹¹

For Iseki, *Shadow of China* was an attempt to expand the cultural framework of Japanese cinema in order to make it increasingly marketable in the English-language market so that larger production budgets for Japanese films would become possible. However, by producing a Japanese film in the English language with an international cast and crew, *Shadow of China* ended up as, at best, “a grand experimental film which explored contemporary Japanese identity” (Konaka, in

¹¹ Satoru Iseki, interviewed by Yoshi Tezuka, August 26th 2006 in Tokyo.

Hachimori, 1990h: 56).¹² What this sympathetic comment from a Japanese film critic indicates is that the film ended up being confusing and incoherent in a way that reflected uncertainties about Japanese identity at the time, an identity which was hopelessly confused by the new international milieu that had been engendered by *kokusaika*.

The budget of *Shadow of China* was approximately \$9 million and it was financed jointly by four large Japanese corporations. These companies had been interested in investing in the “software business” and they took on a large part of the losses when the film failed at the box office. However, Iseki was still left personally in debt for a large sum. Later on, after this experience, Iseki set up a financially successful operation with Michiyo Yoshizaki in London - Nippon Film Finance and Development Co (NDF). NDF was set up to invest Japanese monies in European films using Yoshizaki’s network of contacts in various European film industries. Nevertheless, Iseki insists that his original goal was unchanged:

When I set up NFD, what I really wanted to do was to produce Japanese cinema. My goal was to produce Japanese cinema within the international framework of film finance that was commonly used in the US and Europe. (Iseki 1998: 122; Iseki interview 2006).

What he means by this is that he wanted to establish a system to raise production

¹² The synopsis of the film tell us that *Shadow of China* is about a “mysterious young tycoon, John Lone, [who] fights to seize control of Hong Kong – and to hide a past that could destroy him and the empire that he built” (New Line Home Video). The secret that John Lone fights to hide is his “true” identity - he is biologically Japanese but was brought up as Chinese.

financing for Japanese films by pre-selling distribution rights for different territories in the world. In this way, an independent producer is able to maintain control over a project without intervention from large corporate sponsors, unlike the hitherto dominant Japanese system in which independent producers were treated as subcontractors to the larger corporate investors. Iseki's vision was to finance Japanese films like American independent and European art films, using the financial schemes which Iseki and Yoshizaki learnt about through their experiences working on the production of *Merry Christmas Mr. Lawrence*.

In reality, however, after the failure of *Shadow of China*, Iseki never made another film with a Japanese director. This is because, according to him, he “did not meet a single Japanese film director who is internationally pre-sellable and bankable” (Iseki interview 2006). Instead, what he did was to work with those Chinese-American and Chinese directors who were internationally “bankable”. He produced *Smoke* (1995) with Wayne Wang and Paul Auster by pre-selling the North American distribution rights to Miramax, and *The Assassin* (1998) with Chen Kaige by pre-selling the North American distribution rights to Sony Classics.

Through his involvement in these projects, Iseki established his reputation as a *Kokusaiha* (internationalist, or, cosmopolitan) producer who specialized in international production. Nevertheless, Iseki still insists that producing these non-Japanese films with Asian directors in a global context were, for him, “steps towards building the conditions that would enable us to produce Japanese films within the international system of film financing” (Iseki 1998: 122; Iseki Interview 2006).

The Precarious Life of a Japanese Resistance Cosmopolitan in Europe

A YEN FOR MOVIE:

So, who does invest in the British film industry? Meet Michiyo Yoshizaki... (Coles 1993: the Guardian, May14th).

Backed by a strong yen, Yoshizaki and Iseki set up NDF, to co-finance American and European films using Japanese money. However, according to Yoshizaki, their first project, David Cronenberg's *Naked Lunch* (1991), produced by the British producer Jeremy Thomas, was a financial "disaster". She said "technically [we] lost everything... It was good in the UK, in Japan so-so, but in the States it was a disaster. Luckily the Japanese economy was prosperous at that time" (Yoshizaki, in *the Guardian*, May14th 1993). Even more luckily, the next two projects she picked - *Howard's End* (1992) by Merchant-Ivory productions and Neil Jordan's *The Crying Game* (1992) - were hugely successful.

The worldwide success of these films heralded the Renaissance of British cinema in the 1990s, and made Yoshizaki famous for her "canny eye for a winner" (*Screen International*, December 1996). *The Crying Game* had been rejected by Miramax because of its homosexual content before Neil Jordan made a personal phone call to beg Yoshizaki for financial rescue. Thus without her Japanese money, probably *The Crying Game* would never have been made.

She invested in the British film industry when nobody else was investing,

and established herself as the “lady with yen power”. Her success in doing so is illustrated by the fact that Yoshizaki was chosen as number 12 on the list of “the most powerful 100 people” in the UK film industry by *Screen International*, in which Jeremy Thomas occupied 17th and David Puttnam 26th place (*Screen International*, December 1995).

Yoshizaki studied film in Italy in the early 1970s. Then after a short period of working in Japan she returned to Rome as a film buyer for Japan Herald, where she met Hara and Iseki. Yoshizaki then moved from Rome to London in the late 1970s because of the decline of Italian cinema and “the surge of English-language films” (Yoshizaki interview 2006).¹³ The structure of the original partnership with Iseki in NDF was that Yoshizaki looked for projects in Europe that would be suitable for investment, while Iseki organized the finances in Japan. For both Iseki and Yoshizaki, however, their eventual aim was to become producers in their own right rather than merely to invest in projects developed by others. Thus they operated independently after Yoshizaki established NDF International as a UK production company in 1995.

Yoshizaki sees herself and her role as a producer as being that of a “co-producer of international co-productions” mainly in the realm of European art-house cinema. Unlike Iseki, who expressed a strong loyalty and commitment to Japanese cinema and the Japanese film industry, for Yoshizaki producing “Japanese cinema” is not really a possibility. She thought she was too unusual for the Japanese

¹³ Michiyo Yoshizaki, interviewed by Yoshi Tezuka, recorded on December 26th 2006, January 15th and February 10th 2007 in London.

film industry and her specialist knowledge and skills in international co-production would not be made best use of in Japanese cinema. Although she is a Japanese woman and a Japanese film producer, she does not consider her films Japanese, and in fact, none of her films contain any sign of “Japanese-ness” nor does she wish to inscribe such a signature. She likes “powerful” films that are “sexually dangerous” and “have socially meaningful things to say” regardless of nationality. The films she has produced include: *Basquiat* (Julian Schnabel 1996) – the story of a young graffiti artist in New York, Jean-Michel Basquiat, who was later “discovered” by Andy Warhol’s art world crowd; *Kama Sutra: A Tale of Love* (Nair 1996) – a story of sexual rivalry and friendship between two girls in 16th century India directed by Mira Nair of *Salaam Bombay!* (1988); and *Wilde* (Brian Gilbert, 1997) – the story of Oscar Wilde, who was sentenced to two years hard labour by the courts of intolerant Victorian English society for his homosexual relationship with a younger man.

As I mentioned earlier, Yoshizaki imported many films that contained some *abunasa* -- the edginess or subversive textual quality seen, for example, in many gay films—that became phenomenally popular among young female audiences in the *mini-theatres*. I suggested that the experience of viewing these films fostered young Japanese women’s cosmopolitanism as desiring subjects who resisted expectations that they would follow what was seen as the traditional life course for women, and encouraged them to travel, study and work in the West.

In our interview, I asked Yoshizaki how she selected these films and why she thinks Japanese female audiences love gay films so much. She replied: “I often said ‘homosexuality is my department’ as a film buyer. I believe it is natural for

women to take pleasure in looking at beautiful men.” However, “that alone is not good enough to make a film commercially successful. It has to have artistic values so that women are not embarrassed about visiting the cinema to see these films.” But, why do those ‘beautiful men’ always happen to be ‘white’ and gay?

The popularity of gay films in Japan has a lot to do with girl’s comic book culture there, she speculated. According to Yoshizaki, Japanese women’s “fetish of the white man” (Kelsky 2001: 133) is very common. She felt she could tell this based on her own experience of being brought up as a daughter of an ordinary family in Japan. She said:

Recently, I reread my childhood diary. When I was a twelve-year old, I was praying everyday to Buddha, ‘please let me escape from Japan and live abroad’. Between my house and the school, there was a Buddhist temple. I dropped by the temple and I prayed every day. By the age of sixteen, I knew what I wanted in my life. I wanted to have an independent life abroad [in the West], and have a baby with a white man. I may sound like I was just a weirdo but I don’t think so. Because when I told my friends about my vision of life, everybody said how wonderful such a life would be. (Yoshizaki interview 2006)

Yoshizaki believes that the desire for the West and for the white male as symbolically associated with the West is widespread and has been deeply embedded among generations of young women in Japan for a long time, but nobody dared to talk about

it. It therefore only became visible in the 1980s, within the *Kokusaika* milieu, because Japan became rich enough that Japanese women could afford to escape more easily.

Yoshizaki was born the youngest daughter of seven children. Her father was a schoolmaster in Tokyo and her mother was a full-time housewife. For Yoshizaki, leaving Japan was not at all easy as her family was not rich. But she was determined to study abroad. She believes that she was so determined because of her mother's experiences:

As the youngest daughter of her seven children I was brought up listening to my mother complaining about a woman's life as a housewife everyday. This was really enough to put me off from pursuing the conventional woman's life. I wanted to have an independent life. Then I discovered Italian cinema and I adored Italian men, I thought they were gorgeous, the most romantic, and Italians were producing good cinema too. So I just really had to go to Rome (Yoshizaki interview 2006).

Yoshizaki worked as a receptionist at the World Expo'70 in Osaka to save money and with the help of her elder sister she managed to persuade her parents to send her to study at Centro Sperimentale di Cinematografia (CSC) in Rome. There, master filmmakers, such as Pier Paolo Pasolini and Roberto Rossellini were amongst her teachers. After school, she returned to Japan to work. At first, she was an assistant director at a TV station. There, she was told "it would take at least twenty

years for a woman to become a director” (Yoshizaki interview, 2006). So she quit the job. This was not, however, because she wanted to become a director, she says, since becoming a film director was somewhat unthinkable for a woman of her generation anyway. What she really wanted to do was to find a job, which would send her back to Europe as soon as possible, so that she could find a suitable “Italian male to have a baby with” (Yoshizaki interview, 2006).

She eventually found a job at the film distribution company, Japan Herald, where she met Masato Hara who eventually sent her back to Europe as their film buyer. As a film buyer, who “enjoys business negotiation more than anything apart from making love” (Yoshizaki interview, 2006), for her to go on to become a producer was a natural progression. While she remained unmarried, Yoshizaki gave birth to her son, who was conceived with an Italian man who was based in Paris, in 1979. She brought up her son in London as an “independent” single mother. So, her lifetime ambition was achieved.

As we have seen, Yoshizaki’s narrative of the self contains many characteristics of a Resistance Cosmopolitan. She clearly resisted Japanese patriarchal norms and rejected conventional ideas about woman’s gender roles and expectations. She did, however, emphasize the fact that, for her, womanhood and motherhood were still somewhat more important than her professional life. She had escaped from Japan to live her life to the fullest, which included leading an independent woman’s life, motherhood, as well as professional life. In order to achieve these goals, she desired a white male, and to be part of the Western cultural and social milieu.

As the power of the yen, fuelled by the spending power of Japanese consumers, rose in the late 1980s and into the 90s Yoshizaki's position within the European film industry progressed along with it as she advanced from being a "film buyer" for the Japanese territory to that of "executive producer." As she had achieved her life's ambition, to have a life as a successful film producer and having a Euro-Asian son who is now a grown-up and working as her assistant, I wondered, how does she feel about Japan, Japanese cinema and her national identity?

"I love Japan" (Yoshizaki interview, 2006), she says. After more than thirty-five years of living in Europe, she still travels on a Japanese passport and has no intention and sees no point in acquiring one from another country. When I visited her private home in North West London near Hampstead, I was asked to take my shoes off to enter her house, as one would in a traditional Japanese house. Then, she led me to a large living room space, which overlooked her "Japanese garden" with a pond and a stone lantern she had created in the back of her typically Victorian yellow brick house. She does not think she will ever produce a "Japanese film" as such because she is too "Westernized," but she hopes her son may, because he is very "Japanized." Her son, now twenty-seven years old, was educated at a famous English public school, but she brought him up to be bi-culturally and bilingually Japanese-English. Currently, he is developing a film idea based on a Japanese fairy tale, *Kappa* (a water spirit), under her guidance.

Yoshizaki's filmography has a seven-year gap between *Titus* (Julie Taymor 1999) and her latest film *Guantanamo* (Vincente Penarrocha, 2006). During this

period, economic conditions in Japan deteriorated with a slump in the Japanese economy in the 1990s. Japanese interest in Hollywood and European film investment evaporated. More recently however Yoshizaki did manage to secure a part of the \$6 million dollar budget for her latest project *Guantanamero* - a British and Spanish co-production that tells the story of an ex-prisoner of the Guantanamo detention camp – from Japan. However, she acknowledges that Japanese financing has become much less important for European films. Firstly, because Japanese financial resources have more or less dried up and, secondly, because European countries have developed an EU co-production framework to work within. Consequently, Yoshizaki's name had disappeared from the list of the 100 most powerful people in the British film industry by the late 1990s. In this sense, her project of Resistance Cosmopolitanism is precarious. Like most Resistance Cosmopolitan projects, it pre-supposes and is actually dependent on the domineering power of the nation-state.

So far, we have examined the cases of three major Japanese independent film distributors - Hara, Iseki and Yoshizaki - and the complex ways in which their Legitimizing and Resistance Cosmopolitanisms engaged with the globalization of film financing. The disembedding of Japanese capital and the further opening of the domestic market positioned these film distributors on the frontline of new international film production and investment practices, which blurred and problematized conventional understanding of national borders and outlooks.

In their narratives of self, all three expressed their aspirations to be a part of the creative process of filmmaking and to take on the role of "film producer." Their professional success was therefore seen as central to their self-actualization and

formed a core part of their identity. Thus, professional imperatives overrode both Legitimization of and Resistance to national identity and they prioritized individual wellbeing and success when conflicts of interest arose between these and strict loyalty to notions of “the national.”

This is evident in Hara’s case when he identifies himself as an example of “failed resistance”, and, in Iseki’s case when he talks of his desire for the legitimization of Japanese national cinema internationally but admits that he has not yet produced “Japanese cinema.” In Yoshizaki’s case, her resistance to Japanese patriarchy drove her to reject the traditional national way of life, but for the sake of her own individual survival in the West she also made use of the fact that she is a Japanese woman with access to Japanese financial resources. She is, however, aware of the subsequent contradictions in her project of resistance, and what she appears to be saying is that she is capable of accommodating these contradictions.

All of this should not be taken to imply that the intentions of these individuals to support either cultural legitimization or resistance were insincere or mistaken. On the contrary, what I believe these case studies illustrate is how these individuals, who had strong aspiration for themselves, were subjectified under the discursive regime of neo-liberal economic globalization, in which the goals of the market transcend national sovereignty. These case studies demonstrate that subject formation in the era that saw the globalization of film finance was very different from that which occurred under the era of the internationalization of Japanese cinema. In the latter, as we have seen in the case studies of Masaichi Nagata and others in Chapter Four, Legitimizing Cosmopolitans often ignored commercial rationales and

market logic for the sake of legitimizing their national culture and identity. In contrast, under the discursive regime which accompanied the globalization of film finance, an individual's occupational or professional identity is privileged over national identity and often overrides it in the case of conflicts between them. I will demonstrate this point further in the next section and Chapter Six.

Japanese Alternative Cinema and Cosmopolitanism

Japanese independent cinema was in its infancy in the 1960s...[It] meshed with the 'counter-culture' of that time, and a lot of films got made.

But independent cinema came to mean something different in the 1970s, after the May '68 revolution and the defeat of the anti-establishment movement. From then on, independent films were either private introspections, almost completely disengaged from the world around them, or films made as stepping-stones by directors who wanted to break into the film industry. (Shuji Terayama, cited in Rayns 1984: 16)

In Japan, where there is no public support for art, the market economy dictates everything. This includes alternative, experimental, avant-garde, or counter-cultural art and cinema. (Takashi Asai interview 2005).¹⁴

¹⁴ Takashi Asai, interviewed by Yoshi Tezuka, recorded on July 28th, August 10th and

In the last section of this chapter, I shall focus on the career of a smaller, and more radical alternative film distributor and producer, Takashi Asai of Up-Link Company. His narrative of the self will provide an example of the Japanese Resistance Cosmopolitans who spent their formative years in the milieu of the counter-culture of the 1970s.

At the age of eighteen, Takashi Asai came to Tokyo from his hometown of Osaka to study art. Instead of going to art school however, in 1974 he joined Tenjosajiki - the legendary avant-garde theatre troupe led by the Japanese poet, playwright and filmmaker, Shuji Terayama. Asai spent the next ten years acting as the stage manager for the company and he also took on the role of assistant director when Terayama made films. The multi-talented director made numerous experimental short and feature films, including *Shanghai Ijin Shokan (Les Fruits de la Passion, Terayama 1981)*, which was shot in Hong Kong for the French producer, Anatole Dauman, as a follow-up to Oshima's *Ai no Corrida (1976)*. Through working with Terayama, Asai was part of numerous transnational collaborations and international co-productions in film and theatre production.

As part of the globalization of film financing, the production and consumption of "alternative" or "independent" cinema was rapidly transnationalized as well as commercialized. Filmmaking practices of this kind were no longer publicly subsidized cultural activities, and the filmmakers and the production companies had to survive as businesses just like any other. In this politico-economic

17th 2005 in Tokyo.

milieu “resistance” to mainstream culture was more often defined in terms of the aesthetic rather than the political content of the representation. Many Resistance Cosmopolitan projects and cultural representations found niche spaces within the market economy. Previously un-commercial “alternative” and “independent” films were financed by Japanese monies and found pathways to achieving commercial distribution.¹⁵ Individual entrepreneurs, such as Takashi Asai, were amongst the catalysts of such transnationalization and the accompanying commercialization of “alternative” cultures.

As Japan’s best-known avant-garde theatre, Tenjosajiki was often performed overseas and was invited to numerous international theatre festivals. For Asai, touring and performing in foreign countries was the high point of life with Tenjosajiki. When they performed abroad, they were treated as artists and respected, sometimes they were even “invited to the palace as royal guests” (Asai interview 2005). He travelled with the company to Iran, Poland, Holland, Belgium, Germany, Italy, France, the UK and the USA.

Back in Japan, however, the mass media and the general public largely ignored Tenjosajiki. Here, they were seen as “a group of weirdo, skinheads with white painted faces” (Asai interview 2005). In those days, Asai lived in a tiny room (a three tatami-mat room) with a communal toilet and without a bathroom and he supported himself by working as an office cleaner because the work at Tenjosajiki was unpaid –as it was for most other members of the company.

¹⁵ It is worth noting here that the surge of Japanese yen power coincided with the drastic reduction of public funding of arts in Britain. Thus, many British artists and filmmakers were looking to Japan for alternative sources of finance.

The time spent with Tenjosajiki provided Asai with opportunities to travel and to meet artists, musicians and filmmakers of many different nationalities, which underpinned his later career as a film distributor and producer. For instance, when Tenjosajiki was performing at the Riverside Studios in London in 1978, Asai was introduced to Derek Jarman – the gay British filmmaker – for the first time. The film critic Tony Rayns had a part in Terayama's play and Jarman came to see the show because they were friends (Asai interview 2005). For Asai, Tenjosajiki was a transnational, or, cosmopolitan community of artists - it attracted people of different nationalities and many non-Japanese artists participated in its activities - where he nurtured propensities which he was able to draw on later in life. He believes that throughout his ten years with the company, Terayama's radical aesthetic was inextricably ingrained in him.

In 1984, Shuji Terayama died and Tenjosajiki was disbanded. Asai used these developments as an opportunity to start to engage in film work. For example, he acted as the line-producer on Masashi Yamamoto's *Robinson's Garden* (1987), which was discussed in Chapter Two. In this film, the director Yamamoto wanted to work with the American independent filmmaker, Tom DiCillo, who had photographed *Stranger Than Paradise* (Jarmusch 1984). According to Asai, avant-garde theatres were far more cosmopolitan than independent filmmaking, so Yamamoto's proposal did not surprise Asai too much. But for Japanese independent filmmaking, bringing in the cinematographer from New York was something special, a very expensive option that was unthinkable before the sudden rise of the value of the yen after the Plaza Accord in 1985.

A transnational collaboration of this kind suddenly became a possibility in the minds of independent filmmakers in Japan and in the West from the mid 1980s. The main reason for this development was that the proliferation of international film festivals was beginning to facilitate and provide increased opportunities for the invigoration of communication and net-working between filmmakers of different nationalities at this time. Following the screening of Masashi Yamamoto's *Yami no Carnival* (*Carnival in the Dark*, 1983) at the Berlin International Film Festival, works by the post-studio generation of Japanese filmmakers, who were making super-8 and 16mm films with their own finances, started to circulate amongst the international film festivals. The key moment for the Japanese independents came when Tony Rayns, who had been closely associated with Terayama, organized the first major screening of Japanese independent films called *25 Years of Japanese Cinema* at the Edinburgh International Film Festival in 1984. In the introduction to the Edinburgh catalogue, Rayns suggested:

Let's start from a scandalous proposition: that Japanese cinema is not in any fundamental way different from cinema in the West. The proposition is scandalous because it goes against all Western orthodoxies, which hold that Japanese cinema is exotic, is somehow different...

Illusions die hard, but it's time to shatter the myth we have built around Japanese cinema. Developments in Japanese filmmaking since the 1950s have almost exactly paralleled developments here: mass audiences have slumped, the major

production companies have gone into decline, an independent sector (more closely in touch with social and political changes) has come to prominence. At the same time, there has been an explosion of 'alternative' cinema.... (Rayns 1984: 7)

Rayns railed against common views about Japanese cinema that tended either to fetishize a certain idea of "quality" in Japanese cinema based on limited acquaintance with films by Kurosawa, Mizuguchi and Ozu, or, to fetishize a certain idea of "cultural difference" in Japanese cinema and use this as a stick to beat the drum either for or against Western aesthetics. Instead, Rayns' selection of films aimed to show the coeval developments of "independent" or "alternative" cinema on a global scale, of which Japanese alternative cinema was a constitutive part. Rayns observed similar industrial developments and the emergence of similar cultural practices and aesthetics among the filmmakers in Japan as well as in Western countries; and he argued that these similarities should be taken as signs of the global convergence of alternative cultures. In his view, Japanese cinema and filmmakers should no longer have been seen as being Other to Western film culture, and, equally, there was no space that should have been idealized as being outside global capitalism and commercialism. All filmmakers around the world were now "in the same sinking boat" and they all needed to learn from each other with regards to how to swim in the changing world of the 1980s (Rayns 1984: 7).

After the screenings in Edinburgh, many other European and North American festivals started to show new Japanese independent films, and numerous films secured commercial distribution. Films such as *Gyakufunsha Kazoku* (*Crazy*

Family, Sogo Ishii 1984) and *Tampopo* (Juzo Itami 1985) achieved cult popularity in many European countries. Then, the Tokyo International Film Festival was launched as part of the *Kokusaika* policy in 1985.¹⁶ The festival held a grand competition for young filmmakers, in which the winners would receive a \$1.5 million dollar investment for their next project. This cash-rich festival put Japan firmly on the map of international film festivals as a place to go for young filmmakers. The next year, PIA Film Festival – a well established alternative film festival in Tokyo – organized a screening of New York independent cinema and invited Jim Jarmusch, Spike Lee, and John Waters to Tokyo. There they made contact with Japanese independent producers, including Yamamoto, and it was as a culmination of these interchanges that Tom DiCillo came Tokyo to shoot *Robinson's Garden* later in the same year.¹⁷ To sum up, the exchange between Japanese and Western filmmaking communities in this period was invigorated to the extent that it became possible to talk about the emergence of transnational networks and the “growing sense of coevality” among filmmakers, as Tony Rayns suggested that they should.

In 1987, Asai started his film distribution business with a print of *Angelic Conversation* (1985) – a poetic experimental film in which the filmmaker Derek Jarman photographed his gay lover and friends in intimate settings with a super-8

¹⁶ The first Tokyo International Film Festival was held from May 31st to June 9th 1985 and aimed to be the “Cannes Film Festival of the East” (Watabe 1987: 90). Michiyo Yoshizaki was in charge of organizing the competition juries and guests and so forth while Masato Hara was one of the masterminds behind the organization of the festival as a whole (Yoshizaki interview 2007).

¹⁷ Jarmusch's *Stranger Than Paradise* (1984) was a phenomenal success in the *mini theatres* (Otaka and Inaba, 1989: 43); and Japan became the single most important market for New York independents – Jarmusch's *Mystery Train* (1989), *Night on Earth* (1991), *Dead Man* (1995), and *Ghost Dog: The Way of the Samurai* (1999) were all financed by JVC entertainment.

camera, and then video-processed the footage to render it into a theatrical feature. Asai started out with a small private loan and no capital assets or any connections to the existing film exhibition sector. This was possible because of the favourable conditions for new small import businesses engendered by *Kokusaika*. The price of foreign film rights was driven radically down after the Plaza Accord in September 1985 – for example, a dollar was down from 240 yen to 150 yen in October 1986. Additionally, the proliferation of *mini-theatres* made theatrical bookings accessible to highly specialized films. His company Up Link was a one-man operation to start with. His break came when he screened Derek Jarman's short films in Parco Part 3. In this *mini-theatre*, a much softer film dealing with a homosexual love affair set in 1930's Cambridge - *Another Country* (1984) – had previously set a phenomenal record for box office taking. There, Derek Jarman's films found a strong cult following among young female audiences, and fuelled a “gay film boom” in the Japanese *mini-theatres*.

Derek Jarman visited the second Tokyo International Film Festival to screen his film *The Last of England* (1987). By this time, he had publicly declared his HIV positive status and this had been identified as contributing to the strong sense of urgency that was driving his filmmaking. He advocated personal filmmaking using super-8 and low-budget video technology that would free him from financial constraints. In an interview he gave in Tokyo he stated:

Honestly, I am tired of thinking and worrying about finances all the time. I am dreaming somebody will sponsor me to do my video experiment. To tell the truth, apart from the film festival, I come to

Tokyo because I was hoping somebody here might, actually ...
(laugh). (Jarman, in *Kinema Junpo* 1987: 37).

It was Asai who put up his hand. After successfully distributing most of Jarman's films to the *mini-theatre* audiences, Asai co-financed and co-produced Jarman's last four films – *The Garden* (1990); *Edward 2* (1991); *Wittgenstein* (1993); and *Blue* (1993). During Jarman's lifetime, Asai became known as his Japanese producer on the European film circuit, and in Japan Asai's Up Link brand developed synonymously with Derek Jarman's films. For Asai, Shuji Terayama and Derek Jarman were "the two master artists who shaped my life, aesthetics and sensibility most profoundly" (Asai interview 2005).

As an independent film producer, the most valuable lesson Derek gave me was that he showed how individual artists can fight, and live one's full potential facing the biological limit of life. He always struggled against his material circumstances, but he often managed to turn material luck into a source of his creativity. His use of super-8 and cheap video technology was a good example.
(Asai interview 2005)

Due to his association with Derek Jarman and his involvement with queer activism, Asai became known as the premier distributor of gay films in Japan. According to Asai, however, he is not gay himself, and it was "the existential quality" of Jarman's work to which he was most deeply attracted. Those four Jarman films he worked on, he believes, have a similar "existential quality" to works by

Terayama who also had a terminal illness and died prematurely. Asai has huge amounts of respect for the way Jarman stood up to become an icon for queer politics, but Asai does not necessarily feel any commitment to gay films and politics in general. His sense of camaraderie goes out to all radical artists and filmmakers who resist hegemonic culture regardless of class, gender or nationality. And so it happened it was gay films and filmmakers that were the most radical in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Derek was a self-professed gay artist but Terayama was not. Terayama was Japanese but Derek was not. Neither sexuality nor nationality matters too much to me. I just like to work with artists I feel respect for and I think are interesting. (Asai interview 2005)

After the death of Derek Jarman, Asai's production work became more diverse. He produced the "Japanese Sci-fi Porn Adventure" - *I.K.U.* (Cheang 2000) with the Taiwanese-American cyber-punk artist Shu Lea Cheang, and he also co-financed the Chinese filmmaker Lou Ye's *Suzhou River* (Lou 2000). His first full Japanese production *Akarui Mirai (Bright Future)*, Kiyoshi Kurosawa 2003) was nominated for a Golden Palm at the Cannes Film Festival and distribution rights were sold to over 14 countries. At the time of our interview, he was working with the Russian film director Sergei Bodrov on his latest project called *Mongol*, which was set to star the Japanese actor, Tadanobu Asano, as Genghis Khan. I asked Asai whether producing a Japanese film was any different for him. He replied:

Because we share the same language and cultural background,

working with Japanese film directors is easier in some ways. But, I think we are not that different fundamentally and nationality does not really matter. Moreover, as a small independent film producer, I cannot afford not to work internationally.

After all, producing film is not much different from producing T-shirts or mobile phones. Once I ripped a mobile phone into pieces and found out that the all parts were made in different countries, Malaysia, Singapore and China etc. It was indeed multinational... Of course, films cannot be produced simply where labour is cheap. But I find it really exciting to meet a talented filmmaker who came from the country where production costs are affordable. (Asai interview 2005)

As a highly reflexive, self-proclaimed “counter-culture” film producer, Asai shows no interest in legitimizing Japanese national culture in the international field, nor, in fact does he show much interest in questions of national identity. Yet, despite his high sense of reflexivity, there was no apparent indication that his Resistance Identity was developing into what Castells called a new Project Identity in a collective form, which “redefines their position in society and, by so doing, seeks the transformation of the overall social structure” (Castells 2004: 8). In late modernity, according to Castells, the constitution of subjects - that is the heart of social change - would take a different route to the one we knew during modernity. He suggested:

[S]ubject, if and when constructed, is not built any longer on the basis of civil societies, which are in the process of disintegration,

but as prolongation of communal resistance. White in modernity (early or late) project identity was constituted from civil society (as in the case of socialism on the basis of the labor movement), in the network society, project identity, if it develops at all, grows from communal resistance. (Castells 2004: 11-12)

Castells anticipated that a new kind of Project Identity would develop out of the prolongation of oppression, and resistance by groups based around aspects of identity (such as, for example, gay or women's rights groups) in a post-patriarchal society. However, in Asai's narrative of the self arises from his youth when he was a participant in the counter-culture of the time and today he still sees himself a primarily as a proponent of the counter-culture. It seems that his occupational identity overrides the other aspects of his identity to the extent that not only did he show no interest in questions of the national, but also no interest in taking up identities based on other subject positions such class, gender or sexuality and so forth. According to his narrative, he is the same resisting subject with the same desires, ambition and social standing as he was when young, despite the fact that his business had grown much bigger and more complex over the last twenty years.

Now, Uplink Co, his one-man operation has grown to employ over twenty people. Asai is a proprietor of his own *mini-theatre*, which includes an event space and café-restaurant in a central Tokyo location. On one hand, it appears that his Resistance Cosmopolitanism has successfully carved out a niche within the market that emerged under *Kokusaika* - economic globalization – but, precisely because he was successful, his cosmopolitanism did not develop into a new identity “project”

that sought transformation of overall social structures.

Conclusion

As we have seen, the globalization of film finance in the 1980s and 1990s was a very different experience from the internationalization of Japanese cinema in the 1950s for the Japanese filmmaking community. Japanese capital became “disembedded” (Giddens 1990:21) from notions of the national and had to be re-embedded elsewhere in the West. Many Japanese filmmakers attempted to do the same with their filmmaking practice. But, the re-embedding of cultural practice involves processes that are far more complex and time consuming than financial transactions, thus such attempts failed. This was almost inevitable.

A consequence of this phenomenal out-flow of capital was the phenomenal influx of goods and symbols from the West and elsewhere. I have argued that this banal cosmopolitan condition engendered “nascent cosmopolitanism” (Delanty 2003: 127) among the *mini-theatre* audiences who consumed cultural differences, and shaped many Japanese filmmakers to become “actually existing cosmopolitans” (Robbins 1998: 1; Beck 2006: 19). Among them, the foreign film distributors, who had privileged access to the Western film industry, played prominent roles in the globalization of Japanese film finance. They moved into film financing and producing under the *Kokusaika* milieu, and this was a very important career progression for them. Their cosmopolitan competence was central to their occupational identity and success as film producers.

The narratives of the self, which formed the case studies of Hara, Iseki, Yoshizaki, and Asai, have shown us the centrality of their occupational identity - being a successful film producer - for their self-actualization. It appears their individuality as successful professionals underpinned and held their other identities together. Thus, their occupational imperatives often overrode other imperatives including national identity when their different loyalties were in conflict. This salience of individuality and occupational identity is the main difference from the previous generations of Japanese filmmakers discussed in Chapter Four. The older generation presumed the primacy of national perspectives as absolute and natural, and often ignored the economic viability of their projects for the sake of legitimizing their national identity.

Despite their high reflexivity, however, none of the individuals I have discussed developed what could be called Project Identity or Project Cosmopolitanism in the collective form, which Castells had anticipated might develop out of Resistance Identity in late modernity (2004: 8). Yoshizaki and Asai were driven by a strong sense of resistance against the patriarchal Japanese culture, and both of them were highly reflexive cosmopolitans. Thus, theoretically speaking, they were strong candidates for developing new transformative identities as women, homosexuals, or, counter-cultural activists for communal struggles.

This did not happen. This was probably because they were, at the same time, highly individualistic entrepreneurs, who were successful in surviving within the market conditions set by global neo-liberalism. In this discourse, the primacy of

occupational identity not only pushes back national identity but also discourages Resistance Cosmopolitans from committing themselves to communal resistance, since their goal is individual self-actualization and liberation from the communal/traditional orders through individual professional achievements. Therefore, although the subversive potential of the “side effects” (Beck 2006) of their actions is very significant, the possibility of these reflexive Resistance Cosmopolitans becoming conscious moral and political agents for communal struggles is limited by the regime formed by neo-liberal globalism.

Chapter Six

Global America? : American-Japanese Film Co-Productions from
Shogun (1980) to Grudge 2 (2006) via Lost in Translation (2003)

[T]he Americans have colonized our subconscious.

(Wim Wenders 1991: 98)

Freedom was imagined as the absence of coercion or domination; it was a condition in which the essential subjective will of an individual, a group or a people could express itself and was not silenced, subordinated or enslaved by an alien power. The central problems of such analyses were: Who holds power? In whose interests do they wield it? (Rose 1999: 1)

Here [in developed counties in Asia], cosmopolitanism degenerates into a set of strategies for the biopolitical improvement of human capital. It becomes an ideology used by a state to attract high-end expatriate workers . . . (Cheah 2006: 495)

Introduction

In their study of how Hollywood's global domination works, Miller et al. argue that

exploitation of the “New International Division of Cultural Labour” (NICL) through foreign location production is a key mechanism of its hegemony. According to Miller et al. “Hollywood is global, in that it sells its wares in every nation, through a global system of copyright, promotion and distribution that uses the NICL to minimise costs and maximise revenue” (2001: 216). Hollywood thrives on the creative differences and cheap labour offered by foreign talent and location shooting.

Similarly, Goldsmith and O’Regan have investigated the development of a global infrastructure that caters for international English-language film production across the world, in places such as Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, England, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Romania, and South Africa. Their study suggests that, “this global dispersal of production is best understood as an unstable and unequal partnership between a footloose international production economy and situated local actors and intermediaries” (2005: xii). The strong economic incentives that Hollywood blockbuster projects pose for local industries mean that local actors across the world are driven to invest in studio infrastructure and training of English speaking crews for global film productions.

How does the Japanese film industry fit into this development of the global film service industry to cater for English-language productions emanating from the US? On the surface, it hardly fits at all.

Firstly, the soaring foreign exchange rate in the late 1980s made Japan one of the most expensive countries in the world, and so there was no obvious economic incentive for foreign producers to shoot in Japan. Secondly, self-consciousness about

Japanese cultural differences prevented Japan from developing a film industry that would attract foreign filmmakers, and a shortage of English-speaking film crews made it very difficult to organize international productions. Thirdly, since the demise of the studio production system in the 1970s, the filmmaking infrastructure had become severely dilapidated. Both Japanese studio facilities and equipment were hopelessly outdated by the 1980s. As a result, Japan as a film location built a reputation as a place that was expensive, where nobody spoke English, and where only inadequate studio facilities and equipment were available. Therefore, structurally speaking, Japan is hardly a part of the worldwide network which Goldsmith and O'Regan call *The Film Studio*, and which serves Miller et. al.'s *Global Hollywood*. Nevertheless, numerous foreign films have been shot in Japan over the last few decades, and Japan is being integrated into *Global Hollywood*.

The weakness of the political economic approach is its tendency for structural determinism and its inability to fully account for local subjects' apparently voluntary self-commodification and self-exploitation. It fails to account for the peripheral subjects' desire and anxiety to be part of the global cultural process. Political-economic accounts tend to reduce radically the complex micro-level contestations of powers that shape individual subjecthood to the ideological domination by global capital, rendering the subjects as "ideological dupes." But this explanation is hardly satisfactory.

In what follows, I endeavour to illustrate how micro-level power contestations manifested themselves in the cases of Japanese-American transnational film production. And, I argue, despite cultural resistance and Japan's apparent failure

to satisfy the structural conditions necessary in order to join the network of *The Film Studio*, the discourse of *Global Hollywood* has been effective in its bio-political government of subjects in Japanese film making communities.

In this chapter, first I will discuss the experiences of filmmakers and crews who worked on two international co-productions filmed in Japan: the film and TV series adapted from James Clavell's *Shogun* (Jerry London, 1980) and Sofia Coppola's *Lost in Translation* (2003). Produced more than twenty years apart, a period of radical global change separates these two films. Both projects were initiated by English-speaking producers and filmed entirely on location in Japan with different degrees of Japanese financial, technical and creative participation. Through the analysis of how differently the Japanese and American filmmakers and crews experienced these two international film productions in Japan in each historical context, the first aim of this chapter is to illustrate the changes in the subjectivities of filmmakers and crews, as well as changes in filmmaking practices before and after the economic globalization that took place in the late 1980s and 1990s. While the primacy of national identity and allegiance to one's national film making community was usually taken for granted in the pre-globalization days, loyalty to a transnational network of filmmakers and meeting with globally accepted – usually American - norms and standards of filmmaking practice has become a professional imperative for those who work in the film industry of the global age.

The second aim of this chapter is to illustrate the experience of local subjecthood under the discursive regime of transnational capitalism. The chapter aims to show how the discourses of *Global Hollywood* are shaping local subjectivity

and how they are lining themselves up to be called into the system of global film production. A huge gap is appearing between those filmmakers who are globally mobile and those who are locally immobilized. Financial remuneration and social recognition for those who are “global” and those who are “local” are worlds apart, even within the same national film industry.

To illustrate these points, I will examine another case of transnational film production: the Hollywood remaking of *Grudge 2* (Takashi Shimizu 2006). By successfully remaking Japanese horror films (J-Horrors) for Hollywood audiences, the Japanese producer, Taka Ichise, was elevated to the rank of globally successful Hollywood producers. Unusually for Hollywood re-makes, *Grudge 2* was directed by the original Japanese director and shot in Japan. Thus the Japanese media called it a “Hollywood production made in Japan by Japanese filmmakers” (*Yomiuri*, 1 April 2006). This case study aims to show how those individuals who are in the local filmmaking communities are titillated by *Global Hollywood* and oscillate between the desire to be part of “Transnational Capitalist Class (TCC)” (Sklair 2000) and the anxiety about the meanings of locally specific filmmaking being emptied out.

Economic globalization has engendered a “banal cosmopolitan reality” (Beck 2006: 16) in which the everyday lives of local individuals have become integrated into the global market economy. As a significant “side effect” of economic globalization, Ulrich Beck argues that “banal cosmopolitanism” is changing and undermining the conventional ways in which we conceive ourselves as national subjects; we all are becoming cosmopolitan in one way or another, even without knowing it. According to Beck, unlike philosophical or normative cosmopolitanism,

actually existing cosmopolitanization in today's world means "*latent* cosmopolitanism, *unconscious* cosmopolitanism, *passive* cosmopolitanism which shapes reality as do the side effects of global trade or global threats such as climate change, terrorism or financial crisis." (Beck 2006: 19, italics in original) In our banal cosmopolitan reality, he states: "My life, my body, my 'individual existence' become part of another world, of foreign cultures, religions, histories and global interdependencies, without my realizing or expressly wishing it" (ibid.:19).

By recognizing that subjectivity is a product of disciplinary mechanisms, techniques of surveillance, and power-knowledge strategies in the Foucauldian sense, I believe Beck's observations about the way that the cosmopolitan subject is constituted in the global age are useful for understanding the process of subjectification and of those individuals who work on transnational film production and engage with cultural difference as part of their professional practice. In this sense, most individuals in film industries are becoming actually existing cosmopolitans of one kind or another, due to their professional imperative. They develop a technique of the self that requires self-entrepreneurship in the context of "advanced liberalism" (Rose 1999: 137) in the global age, in which "one constructs one's self with a view to marketability and value-adding propensities" (Ursell 2000: 810).

Leslie Sklair observed the emergence of "the transnational capitalist class (TCC)," the new ruling class of the global age. One of its main characteristics is that the "TCC seek to project images of themselves as citizens of the world as well as of their places and/or countries" (Sklair 2000: 4). This differs from classic class theory in that the TCC includes not only those who own capital and control major

corporations, “but also other groups whose resources and actions are deemed vital to the process of globalization: neo-liberal bureaucrats and politicians, assorted professionals and technocrats, advertisers and the mass media” (Burris 2002: 416). Thus it includes a wide range of people who promote and benefit from the process of globalization, including executive producers in Hollywood, or, high-flying independent filmmakers like Sofia Coppola, the director of *Lost in Translation*, if we identify the TCC within the context of the global film industry. Cosmopolitanism’s complicity with capitalist accumulation is an age-old truism. As Marx points out: “cosmopolitanism is realized as exploitation on a world scale through international commerce and the establishment of a global mode of production.” (cited in Cheah 1998: 26) On one hand, *Global Hollywood* thrives on commodification of local differences and cheap labour. But on the other hand, *Global Hollywood* provides opportunities on a global scale to a small number of local filmmakers and producers who join the TCC, or become local affiliates of the TCC.

I have chosen *Shogun* (1980) and *Lost in Translation* (2003) as my case studies of the discursive rupture because they bookend the years before and after economic globalization in the late 1980s and 1990s. This leads me to expect that they would show historical differences. In addition, they were well-known film productions, which, I believe, represent a certain ethos of their respective times. Comparison between them will contrast the ways Legitimising Cosmopolitans naturally assumed the primacy of national identity in pre-globalization days and the ways in which Resistance Cosmopolitans formed alliances with neo-liberal globalism, often unconsciously and uncritically, in the post-globalization condition.

The main focus and the key source of my information is the experiences of Japanese line producers. Hiroaki Fujii was in charge of the production of *Shogun* and Kiyoshi Inoue was in charge of the production of *Lost in Translation* in Japan. I carried out semi-structured, in-depth interviews with both of them in the summer of 2005. Since I had known both Fujii and Inoue personally for a few years through my film industry contacts, and they knew me as a producer in the UK, the interviews took the form of informal peer conversations. Interviews with James Clavell and Sofia Coppola, as well as members of the American film crew who worked on these two projects, are taken from various existing archives and published materials, including newspapers, film magazine articles, and promotional materials.

The main function of the local line producer in such international co-productions is to act as an interface between the American production team and the local Japanese crew. Both Fujii and Inoue were responsible for managing the budget and organizing Japanese casts, crews, locations, studios and sets—virtually everything the American production needed for filming. The function of the line producer is absolutely crucial for the production to proceed smoothly and for the people involved to operate effectively as a coherent team. However, being a mediator is not an easy task, and the line producer is often on the frontline of conflict. The line producer is constantly put in a position whereby he has to mediate and negotiate with regards to different loyalties and interests between different parties.

The main aim of the in-depth interviews was to gain an insight into what it was like for the Japanese film crews to work with their American counterparts on these productions, rather than simply obtaining factual information about the

productions and confirming archive research. I was interested to know how Fujii and Inoue saw the differences and similarities between the American and the Japanese crews and their ways of doing things; how they managed to bring the two sides together to work as a team or how they failed to do so, and what it was like to be mediators as line producers of projects which demand such transcultural practices.

In other words, I was interested in how they made “cultural distinctions and classifications” (Alasuutari 1995: 63) through their articulation of nationalistic or cosmopolitan cultural values in their speech. Studying cultural distinction is a way to study “culture”: “Within the Birmingham School, where the concept of ‘cultural studies’ originates, the concept of culture has been taken to refer to something like *collective subjectivity* – that is, a way of life or outlook adopted by a community or social class” (ibid.: 25). In this sense, my main goal is to gain insights about the culture of the Japanese filmmaking community in 1980 and 2003, before and after economic globalization, with particular reference to how they dealt with the Western “otherness” of American film crews.

The study of cultural distinction concerns how individual interviewees construct reality via studying how s/he conveys her/his story. A great deal of attention is paid to “how the views or ideas expressed are being produced through different distinctions and classifications” (ibid.: 65), rather than on the factual validity of what is being said, since the study aims to “find out the individuals’ inner conceptual world or the motives for their actions” (ibid.: 69).

I carried out both interviews in the same year, 2005. Therefore, while Fujii

had to go back twenty-five years to recall his memories, Inoue had to recall what occurred only two years before, so the factual information provided by him is likely to be more accurate than Fujii's. But equally, a twenty-five year time lag has given Fujii a critical distance on the dominant discourse of his time that Inoue probably lacked. Moreover, the power relations within the dominant discourse in the filmmaking community at these two times was different and I wanted to discover how my two interviewees had responded to the different demands made upon them.

The two interviewees also belong to different generations and have very different professional backgrounds. Hence, they belong to different filmmaking communities within the Japanese film industry. Fujii is about thirty years older than Inoue and he started his career in a major film studio - Masaichi Nagata's Daiei - in the heyday of the Japanese film industry in the 1950s, while Inoue started his career in low budget independent films after the demise of the studio production system. Although Fujii and Inoue are both cosmopolitans of their respective generations, I expected their views and attitude towards Americans and transnational practices would be different from each other. I was particularly interested in exploring how they would differ in their openness towards otherness and their attachment to Japanese ways of doing things and feelings.

In order to look at the Hollywood re-making of *Grudge 2* (2006), I carried out in-depth interviews with the cinematographer Katsumi Yanagijima and the line producer Satoshi Fukushima. Yanagijima has been personally known to me since 1996 when he spent one year as a government sponsored artist-in-residence in the UK. He is one of the top Japanese cinematographers, and he photographed most of

Takeshi Kitano's films. It was Yanagijima who introduced me to the line producer of *Grudge 2*, Satoshi Fukushima and I was interested to discover, when we met for the first time, that Fukushima had worked for many years as an assistant for Fujii – the line producer of *Shogun*. Furthermore, Fukushima respected Fujii as his “*sensei*” (master). So, in a way, by comparing Fukushima and Fujii we can observe pre- and post- globalization generational differences - a rupture - within a professional genealogy.

The Production of *Shogun* (1980)

Shogun was a twelve-hour TV mini-series made for the American network NBC and based on the 1,200-page best-selling novel by James Clavell. The novel is inspired by the real story of an English navigator who reached Japanese shores in 1600. The navigator, William Adams, was given a Japanese name and made a samurai by the *Shogun* (the overall ruler of feudal Japan). He built Japan's first Western-style sailing ship and became a high ranking officer and adviser on Western matters for the shogun. The film version of *Shogun* follows this story and concentrates on the subjective experiences of an English navigator, (given the fictional name of John Blackthorne), who came into this land of striking otherness and eventually learnt a way to respect its seemingly barbaric, foreign way of life.

James Clavell's novel *Shogun* was published in May 1975, and remained at the top of the best seller list for 32 weeks. Seven million copies were sold in the first five years in the US alone. It was translated into over twenty languages across the

world. Outside Japan, *Shogun* probably remains the most widely read novel set in Japan to this day and when the TV mini-series drawn from it was aired on American network television for five days in September 1980, the New York Times reported that, on average, over 30 per cent of American households with television sets watched the series and this hit 47 per cent in San Francisco (Chino 1980: 90). The result was “*Shogun* fever” amongst the American public, during which Japanese food, sake, and kimonos, amongst other things, sold like hot cakes. Moreover, learning a few words of Japanese became a fad (Fisher 1980: 22) A number of cultural commentators in both Japan and the US linked this phenomenal success of *Shogun* to the rise of the Japanese economy, a rapidly shifting economic power balance between the two countries, and the underlying tensions and anxieties of the American public (cf., Fisher 1980; Amano 1981). In retrospect, the extraordinary reception of *Shogun* was a cultural symptom of the coming “trade war” which led Japan to pursue *Kokusaika* in the 1980s - the opening of the Japanese domestic market and the diminishing of its “cultural uniqueness” - which we discussed in the previous chapter.

Shogun was Clavell’s third novel following *King Rat* (1962) and *Tai-Pan* (1966). His first novel, *King Rat*, was based on his experience as a Japanese prisoner-of-war in Changi Prison near Singapore, one of the harshest POW camps, where he suffered greatly at the hands of his Japanese captors. According to Clavell, the weight of the world shifted from Europe to America after the war, then “we lost it in the West” (Clavell 1986) and the weight of the world shifted again this time to the Pacific area, thus important to know about Japan. In the Western media in general, *Shogun* was seen as pro-Japanese, a sympathetic portrayal of the strikingly different

culture and tradition of the country and people.

Shogun was the first major co-production involving major Japanese financial participation since the small boom of American and European films about Japan in the 1950s (see Chapter Four). A consortium of Japanese media companies allegedly paid US\$7.5 million (Fujii interview 2005)¹⁸ of a US\$22 million budget (Shogun DVD booklet), in return for the rights to create their own Japanese theatrical version. Tohokushinsha was in charge of the location shoot in Japan and Toho Studios distributed a special two-and-a-half hour Japanese version in cinemas across Japan. TV Asahi broadcast the television mini-series later.

Before this international co-production framework materialized, Clavell had attempted to set up *Shogun* as a feature film with Hollywood studios for many years but without success. The Japanese financial participation was a crucial factor in making *Shogun* possible. And, the \$7.5 million the Japanese invested in *Shogun* - 1,5 billion yen at the exchange rate of the time - was a truly vast figure by Japanese standards: it was equivalent to the budgets of 25 average Japanese studio films or 75 independent films¹⁹. The production of *Shogun* was an event which heralded the coming of a new relationship with Hollywood for the Japanese film industry in the age of globalization.

The shooting of *Shogun* took place over a six-month period in 1979. All the key production personnel- the producer, the director, the cinematographer, the

¹⁸ Hiroaki Fujii interviewed by Yoshi Tezuka on August 5th 2005 in Tokyo.

¹⁹ Average studio features cost approximately 60 million yen and independent films cost approximately 20 million yen in the late 1970s (Fujii interview 2005).

production designer, and the sound mixer, as well as all the key crew plus gaffers, grips and chief assistants came over from the US. Altogether, the American crew formed a group of around fifty-plus people while the Japanese crew and cast exceeded one hundred on most shooting days (Fujii interview 2005). In Japan, the production of *Shogun* was publicized as an epic-scale American-Japanese co-production, and an unprecedented cultural event.

However, the filming of *Shogun* was not at all easy for the American crew. The problems were attributed to “the clash of cultures” between American and Japanese ways of making films.

The first thing that struck American crews was the surprising technical “backwardness” - the poor state of the Japanese film studios and the unavailability of the latest equipment and so forth. The poor conditions in Japan were due to the sharp decline of the film industry and the severe lack of new investment in the 1960s and 1970s, but this made the Americans very suspicious of the technical standard of Japanese crews. The cinematographer, Andrew Laszlo stated: “it was not a little culture shock but it was a huge surprise ... the camera and lighting equipment in Japan was at least twenty years behind what we have in the States” (Laslo 2004). This obviously did not help the two parties to built trusting relations - especially given that communication was difficult in the first place because of the putative “cultural differences.” Overall, it was very difficult for the Americans, who were used to getting what they needed and wanted regardless of where they were. The film director Jerry London states:

Some of the American crew went home. I had an assistant director, a production manager, a prop man; they just said: 'It's too hard. I can't get what I want easily', and left. We had to replace them. It was a tough job, because of the fact it was not a normal way of living. You are living with an entirely different group of people. And, they have their own way of doing things, as we do . . . (London 2004).

It was not that the Americans were inexperienced in filming abroad or even that they were inexperienced in filming in Japan. Many American films had been shot without much difficulty in Japan before. In fact, one of the American production managers on *Shogun* had spent years in Japan as part of the occupation force immediately after the war. He was very experienced and knowledgeable about Japan, but things were different this time.

The Japanese Line Producer of *Shogun*: Hiroaki Fujii

My main interviewee, Hiroaki Fujii, was born in 1929, and he was a student during the war. Upon graduation from a prestigious private university, he joined Daiei, the studio that produced many international prize winning films such as *Rashomon* (Akira Kurosawa 1950), *Ugetsu* (Kenji Mizoguchi 1952) and *Jigokumon* (*The Gate of Hell*, Teinosuke Kinugasa, 1953) and whose president, Masaichi Nagata, led the internationalization of Japanese cinema in the 1950s (see Chapter Four). Daiei had also facilitated numerous foreign productions such as *The Tea House of*

The August Moon (Daniel Mann, 1956); *Hiroshima Mon Amour* (Alain Resnais, 1959); and *Flight from Ashiya* (Michael Anderson, 1964). Fujii is considered a cosmopolitan type in the Japanese film industry, because he has had experiences of shooting films abroad and facilitating foreign film crews in Japan.²⁰ Like the majority of the educated class of his generation, Fujii reads English but is not comfortable in spoken communication. According to Fujii's regular interpreter²¹, Fujii is actually quite competent in English but he prefers to talk through an interpreter. As far as I know, Fujii was the most cosmopolitan Japanese film producer around in 1980²², and in fact I do not know of a single Japanese film producer of his generation and calibre whose English is sufficiently fluent and who is confident enough to communicate with Westerners without an interpreter.

As the Japanese line producer, Fujii was in charge of organizing all the production requirements for the American production team. *Shogun* was not an easy operation and many crew members were hired and fired, which would have been very unusual on a Japanese production. Unlike the Americans, who were used to working on weekly contracts, the Japanese crews were normally employed for the entire period of a production. They did not leave or get fired, except under

²⁰ Fujii produced a Japanese film shot on location in Italy, *Eden no sono* (*The Garden of Eden*, Yasuzo Masumura 1980). He also produced a film directed by the fashion designer Kenzo Takada and called *Yume, yume no ato* (*Dream, After Dream*, Kenzo Takada 1981) in France, and facilitated the Japanese location part of Josef Losey's *Trout* (1982).

²¹ The interpreter, Jun Mori, used to work in my production office in London and we chatted a lot about Fujii.

²² Fujii is known for his close friendship with the controversial writer Yukio Mishima. After Mishima's death, Fujii became in charge of the film rights of all Mishima novels for his estate. However, according to Fukushima (the line producer of *Grudge 2* who was close to Fujii) this does not mean Fujii shared the same political views with Mishima. For instance, Fujii was also close to the progressive left-wing writer Kobo Abe – the author of *Suna no onna* (*The Woman in the Dune*); *Tanin no kao* (*The Face of Another*) and so forth. (Fukushima interview 2006)

extraordinary circumstances. Nevertheless, Fujii found the *Shogun* production intolerable and left half way through. He was involved in what he felt was an irreconcilable disagreement with the executive producer, James Clavell.

According to Fujii, the nature of the problem on the *Shogun* production was apparent from the very beginning due to the American lack of trust in the Japanese team and lack of understanding about the ways things work in Japan. During the pre-production period, for example, the American production team came over to scout for the main locations. They brought the American production manager, an ex-air force lieutenant who had spent years in Japan as part of the occupation force. He tended to command the Japanese production team in an “occupation force” manner and, although he was trusted as a “Japan expert” by other Americans and the location scouting was organized based on his memory from thirty years ago, Fujii pointed out that it would have been much more efficient and easier if the Americans had trusted the Japanese and consulted their local knowledge, instead of just issuing orders based upon sketchy knowledge. Fuji felt the production of *Shogun* was reminiscent of the military occupation: “Thirty years after the occupation, they still treated us like twelve year olds, just as General MacArthur had done.” (Fujii interview 2005)

As we discussed in Chapter Four, there was a short period during the Occupation when the Japanese media often referred to the Japanese population as “the children of MacArthur” and enthusiastically celebrated the liberty and democracy that the Occupation had implemented. They fantasized about being part of Western modernity along with America, but disillusion came when General

MacArthur made a famous speech in American Congress that compared the mental age of the Japanese to that of “a boy of twelve.” The speech made it blatantly clear that the Japanese did not belong to the same modernity as the Americans, and that they would never be conceived of as equals. This disillusion inscribed deep shame and resentment within the post-war Japanese psyche. Thus, at the root of the problem of trust and the communication difficulties was the stigma of the war and occupation, which re-surfaced as Japan regained its confidence and its economic power grew.

A similar point was made by Chiho Adachi, the 26-year-old bilingual secretary to James Clavell, who had spent part of her life in the US – hence she was probably more capable of maintaining a balanced viewpoint than Fujii. Adachi stated that one of the Americans had been in Japan just after the war. At that time, the Americans took the role of teachers:

I think he had the same image 30 years later. . . . We are going to Japan again to teach these people how to make a film. And he influenced the rest of the crew. It was like, ‘We’re going to be the teachers and they’re going to learn, and we are going to do it in our way.’ But as you know, Japan has come up in the world since then. They have their own ways, and they are set ways. It was hard for them to accept that here are these Americans coming in and ordering them around and if they said anything, the Americans would just reject it. (Adachi, cited in *Making of James Clavell’s Shogun* 1980: 214)

As a result, there was constant conflict during the production - and Japanese crew members often felt degraded. However, the experience was well compensated financially. Before he left the production as the line producer in charge of the budget, Fujii had negotiated Japanese crew rates according to the old studio union agreements. The Japanese crew were paid handsome overtime, double-time over the weekend, and so on, even though none of this was the norm in the Japanese film industry.

The Japanese film labour market was rapidly shifting towards flexible specialization – short contracting on a job-to-job basis – during the 1970s, and freelancers were not unionized. Only some of the Japanese crew working on *Shogun* were members of Toho Studios' union and the majority were freelance. Nevertheless, the rates of crew payment for all Japanese crew on *Shogun* were based on the studio union agreements, including all the extra charges stipulated in the old union rules.²³

According to Fujii, there were several reasons for this. Firstly, extra incentive was necessary to recruit high quality professionals. Secondly, even with all those extra charges the Japanese labour costs were still low by Hollywood standards, and so the American producer accepted them without quibbling. Even the extra cash “per diem” payments for location expenses that were not in the Japanese union rules were paid in accordance with the normal American practice. Fujii stressed that he was just doing his best to make sure his Japanese crew was treated as fairly as possible. Indeed, his reputation of being a cosmopolitan is partly based on his

²³ Toho studio, where *Shogun* was shot, was the site of the fiercest labour struggles in post-war history, but its labour union was weakened considerably by the 1970s (Sato1995b: 189-205).

negotiation skills with foreigners.

However, even though the job was very well paid, and he was in the precarious business as an “independent” producer, Fujii decided to leave the production of *Shogun* half way through.²⁴ The discord with the American production team, and the executive producer James Clavell in particular, became unbearable for him. Fujii described Clavell as “solemnly pompous.” I found Fujii’s reaction a little emotional, so I asked him if he thought the problem was something to do with Clavell having been a victim of Japanese war atrocities—it is well-known that Clavell survived one of the worst Japanese camps, where 14 out of 15 prisoners died (Making of ... 1980: 23). Fujii was not sure if that had something to do with his problems with Clavell, but he was certain that both American and Japanese attitudes and relations were still affected by the war.

The Production of *Lost in Translation* (2003)

As we discussed in Chapter Five, economic globalization, or, what was called *Kokusaika* in the late 1980s and 1990s, banally cosmopolitanized the life of the Japanese middle classes. *Kokusaika*, the Japanese configuration of economic globalization, refers to: “The switch from export-led to domestic demand-led economic growth, the gradual diminution of Japan’s ‘uniqueness,’ and the sharing of the burdens of maintaining free trade and a growing world economy together with

²⁴ Masaichi Nagata’s Daiei, where Fujii was the head of script development, went bankrupt in 1971. Since then, Fujii has produced films through his independent production company and occasionally freelanced.

the United States and the European Community.” (Higashi and Lauter 1990: 6)

Kokusaika was about the moderation of Japanese cultural exceptionalism and the beginning of attempts to integrate so-called Japanese “uniqueness” into the emerging global economy in the post-cold war constellation of powers. In practical terms, *kokusaika* was a consumption-based project that purported to open the Japanese market further for foreign goods, symbols, and labour. It was in this economic and cultural milieu of *kokusaika* in the 1990s in Tokyo that the director of *Lost in Translation*, Sofia Coppola, found a successful professional career as a fashion designer and photographer - the experience of which became the basis for her film.

Lost in Translation is about two Americans, a young woman (Scarlett Johansson) and a middle-aged actor (Bill Murray), who feel trapped at the Tokyo hotel at which they are staying. She is newly married but left alone in a city where she knows nobody and has nothing to do. The actor is earning easy money by appearing in a whisky TV commercial. However, his stay has been accidentally extended, so he is also stuck in a city where he knows nobody and has nothing to do. They form a sort of comradeship and explore the city together, and become romantic and introspective in turns.

The director, Sofia Coppola, states that it is about the two characters “going through a similar personal crisis, exacerbated by being in a foreign place.” (Coppola 2003) The Park Hyatt, a high-tech designer hotel frequented by Western celebrities in Tokyo, and the floods of neon signs on the streets, which look beautiful

but mean nothing to these characters, provide an ideal setting for this romantic tale of being lost in a cosmopolitan environment.

The story is said to be based on Sofia Coppola's personal experiences in Tokyo which she visited frequently when searching for a new career direction in the 1990s. Her acting career had taken a dive after *The Godfather: Part III* (1990), a film directed by her father Francis Ford Coppola, in which her "portrayal of Mary Corleone was widely attacked and ridiculed." (Hirschberg 2003) Sofia Coppola found herself being treated much more seriously in Japan. She published a book of her photographs and created a clothing label called *Milk Fed* with an old school friend in 1995. Coppola states that although: "*Milk Fed* is now sold almost exclusively in Japan, where the clothes are produced . . . the clothing company does well enough that I don't have to make money from movies." (Coppola, cited in Hirschberg 2003) She often stayed at the Park Hyatt Hotel, where she filmed *Lost in Translation*, when she was in Tokyo. Tokyo and the Park Hyatt Hotel are special places for Coppola, because there she found new professional success and a grown-up identity.

Lost in Translation was filmed entirely on location in Tokyo. The twenty-seven days of filming took place in autumn 2002, and its modest budget of US\$4 million, of which approximately US\$1.7 million was spent in Tokyo, was financed independently with some Japanese participation (Inoue interview 2005).²⁵ About a dozen key crew and cast flew from the US. The film was intended to be a low budget production by American standards, and based on the independent spirit of

²⁵ Kiyoshi Inoue, Interviewed by Yoshi Tezuka on August 4th and 12th 2005 in Tokyo.

location filmmaking, meaning that a minimal crew with minimal equipment would go to the location and shoot, sometimes without permits. The American producer, Ross Katz, indicated that it was Coppola's philosophy not to impose the American way of doing things on the Japanese. She wanted to learn and to adapt to how the Japanese crew made films. Her intention was to collaborate (Katz 2003).

Nevertheless, the production was not without real crises. For example, in the second week of the shoot, when a Japanese location manager and an assistant director declared that they were quitting because the situation was out of control and they had had enough, a gap began to open up between the two sides that brought the production to a halt. This happened after a day of shooting in a busy shabu-shabu hotpot restaurant. The location was only available on the condition that they would abide strictly to a time limit, and the Japanese production manager had given a personal guarantee to the owner of the restaurant in order to make filming on that day possible. However, the day went slowly and filming continued much longer than anybody had expected. Coppola and her cameraman kept shooting despite the repeated warnings and pleas from the Japanese location manager and the assistant director. They had gone beyond the time limit by "hours" and the restaurant owner was fuming. Eventually, the location manager had literally to pull the plug – he cut the electricity.

At the end of the long shooting day, Inoue, the line producer summoned everybody - the Japanese location manager and assistant director, Sofia Coppola, Ross Katz and the cameraman - for a meeting to talk over the problem. Later, Coppola recalled that night when answering a question from an American journalist -

“How did you get over the language barrier in Japan?”

You can offend people without knowing you are. We were shooting late at one location, we were only about ten minutes late—totally normal for American shoots, but there we had totally disrespected them. So it was definitely a challenge getting through all that.
(Coppola, cited in Michell 2004)

In some situations, what feels like “only about ten minutes” for one person feels like “hours” for others. Eventually though, a reconciliation between the Japanese location manager and Coppola and her cameraman was effected in the meeting, so that business went on as usual from the next day. However, Katz, Coppola and her cameraman had to go to apologize to the restaurant owner to save the face of the Japanese location manager. Inoue reckons that Katz and Coppola were palpably not comfortable offering apologies for a problem that they did not really acknowledge. But Inoue was glad they did it because their gesture helped to smooth it over, and he managed to talk the location manager out of quitting.

The Japanese Line Producer of *Lost in Translation*: Kiyoshi Inoue

Kiyoshi Inoue started working in the low-budget independent sector of the Japanese film industry in the early 1980s, while he was still a college student.²⁶

²⁶ Inoue worked on *Hentai kazoku aniki no yomesan* (Abnormal Family, Masayuki Suo 1983) as an assistant director, the film by Masayuki Suo who later directed *Shall We Dance?* (Suo, 1996). Inoue worked on numerous low-budget exploitation films in

After years of working in impoverished conditions, he decided to go to the US. According to him, this was because he thought “speaking English and communicating with foreigners would be essential for work in future. And I wanted to learn the American way of filmmaking.” Being a freelance assistant producer and director, Inoue was not earning very much, and he did not have rich parents. But still it was possible for him to study in the United States, because of the strength of the Japanese yen and social conditions under *kokusaika* that encouraged young Japanese to study abroad. The dollar came down to 125 Japanese yen in 1988, making a dollar worth half what it was worth before the 1985 Plaza Agreement that allowed the dollar to depreciate against the yen. Also, “banal cosmopolitanization” was taking root.

Inoue spent two and a half years studying English and filmmaking in Los Angeles. Then in 1991, he met the producer, Doug Claybourne, who was preparing location filming in Japan for *Mr. Baseball* (Fred Schepisi 1992). Inoue was hired as a production assistant for *Mr. Baseball*, and came back to Japan as a part of the American production team. Inoue’s spoken English is not perfect; he speaks with a rather heavy Japanese accent. But he is willing and confident enough to communicate in English on most production matters and he seems at ease among Westerners.

Unfortunately, *Mr. Baseball* became another American production in Japan that suffered from the so-called “clash of cultures” between Japanese and American

the 1980s before he went to the US. After the collapse of the Japanese studio production system in the 1970s, these sex exploitation films were one of only few places where young filmmakers could gain working experience.

crews. However, in Inoue's view, the main cause of the problems was less to do with "cultural differences" than with the clash between big Hollywood movie-making culture and smaller, non-Hollywood, ways of making films. According to Inoue:

Japanese locations are not suitable for big Hollywood productions: if they want to shoot in Japan it is better to adopt more independent ways of filmmaking. (Inoue interview 2005)

Inoue's point is the scale of the production and the materials necessary to sustain the grandeur of Hollywood productions makes location work in Japan impossible. For instance, the number of vehicles the Hollywood production demanded made moving from a location to the next location through narrow Japanese streets painfully slow. Finding parking spaces anywhere near the location was impossible, because of the general lack of space in Japan. The number of crew and cast members and the amount of equipment that the Hollywood production demanded was impossible to accommodate in most Japanese buildings.

During the production of *Mr. Baseball*, for example, on one occasion, the director wanted to shoot a scene on a balcony with a view over the city. The Japanese location manager found a location with a balcony which looked perfectly well-built, but an American technician became suspicious as to whether the balcony could hold the weight of their camera and grip equipment. So the production manager told Inoue to find out how much load that balcony could hold. Although he thought it was a bit excessive to want to bring up so much grip gear that it could potentially collapse the balcony, Inoue hired a structural engineer to survey the building. However it turned

out that it was not something even the structural engineer could work out. As a result, a new location had to be found. From the Japanese viewpoint, however, it was utterly incomprehensible that the Americans could not make do with less equipment - it appeared that the Americans just wanted to have a huge amount of equipment around - which they might never use.

Hollywood productions demand the same scale and standard wherever they go, as if they were shooting in California. However, according to Inoue, working on *Lost in Translation* was a very different experience from working on *Mr. Baseball*, mostly because *Lost in Translation* was an “independent” production. For Inoue, the borderline that marks the real cultural difference is not about national culture, but about the difference between “Hollywood” and “independent” filmmaking cultures:

Independent filmmaking is far more flexible, and independent filmmakers share similar problems everywhere in the world. Since I came from the independent background myself, I enjoyed working on *Lost in Translation* much more than I did on *Mr. Baseball*.

(Inoue interview 2005)

Inoue identifies himself as an “independent film producer” working transnationally, and this occupational identity appears to override his loyalty to the interests of fellow Japanese film crew members to a certain extent.

He became involved with *Lost in Translation* through Stephen Schible in New York; Schible spoke Japanese and was a co-producer of the film. They had

come to know each other through a low budget Japanese independent film shot in New York and called *Artful Dodgers* (Takuo Yasuda 1998). Inoue estimated the Japanese part of the production budget for the producer, Ross Katz. He gave a very competitive estimate, which included an offer to set up “Lost in Translation Ltd” in Japan, and operate all finances through this company. In this way, the American production company could avoid paying production mark-ups. These would usually be around 10 -15 per cent of the expenditure in Japan, and would be paid to a Japanese production service company.

Lost in Translation was made on a tight budget, and Inoue is proud that the production was managed cost-effectively, insisting that it cost no more than a Japanese independent film of similar size. He negotiated everything on the basis of what a low budget Japanese independent film production would pay. Moreover, Inoue admits the crew labour costs were kept at the lower end of the scale even by Japanese independent standards. Inoue thought this was appropriate, because *Lost in Translation* was an independent film on a tight budget, even though it was American. Having seen what a global box office success it was, however, Inoue now feels that perhaps he should have paid his Japanese crew a bit better. But, of course, this is something he could have never have known in advance. To be a good independent line producer, he just had to do his best to be as competitive as possible.

Comparing the Two Films and the Two Japanese Line-Producers

The protagonists of *Shogun* and *Lost in Translation* both travel to Japan to

make their fortune. The English navigator Blackthorne in *Shogun* has to go through a dangerous sea voyage to reach Japan, whilst the actor Bob Harris in *Lost in Translation* only had to endure a ten-hour flight in first class. These two stories are set four hundred years apart in narrative terms, and they were produced twenty-three years apart, during which time the process of globalization had transformed the symbolic and economic significance of Japan and its capital city radically to the extent that images of Japan as the essential otherness to Western civilization had been superseded by the image of Tokyo as a strange place of hybrid culture that is an extension of bourgeois cosmopolitan reality.

Both *Shogun* and *Lost in Translation* are highly personal projects for the key creative individuals, James Clavell and Sofia Coppola. These films exist because of their strong motivations to express something about their personal experiences with Japanese otherness. The huge popularity of the TV-series and the film indicate that their personal experiences also resonated with a wider public imagination of the time. In each case, Japanese otherness played a key part in shaping the sense of the self, for both James Clavell and Sofia Coppola, but in strikingly different ways.

According to a radio interview Clavell gave, Japan was his most fierce enemy, which he needed to subsume and make peace with in order to regain control over his own destiny. In the POW camp, Japanese captors treated him terribly badly because “according to their [Japanese] code, the worst possible thing a soldier could do was to capitulate” (Clavell, interviewed by Swain 1986). He did not know about this code at that time, but when he learnt the code of Samurai, he “naturally” engendered “a great admiration as a soldier” for it (ibid). In the extreme conditions

of the prison camp the Westerners were treated as inferior soldiers and controlled through violent means. The understanding or even internalization of the norms and cultural values of the Japanese military regime was a matter of life and death for the prisoners and, as an 18 year-old-boy with a strong “soldiering family background” (ibid), James Clavell may have been particularly susceptible to such inculcation of moral values and the virtue of militaristic discipline. The exact process of his psychological journey is not known but he eventually came to imagine and believe that his previous life was as a samurai, and as a result he wrote *Shogun*.

In contrast, Sofia Coppola’s experience with Japan and its cultural differences in the 1990s was benign and emancipatory. There, she found her first professional success and her grown-up self. Japanese consumerism was particularly empowering for Western cultural producers like Sofia Coppola - it provided a space for a wide range of Japanese-Western cultural hybridization. Tokyo is not New York, but it is full of places that could just as easily be found in New York, such as the “New York Bar” in The Park Hyatt represented in the film. The hybrid environment in Tokyo is different enough for a cosmopolitan Westerner like Sofia Coppola to find it exciting - but at the same time it is similar enough for her to feel safe, since, after all, most of these hybrids are based on American prototypes. Thus, the Japanese otherness in Tokyo in the 1990s presented a version of America that is different enough to make Coppola think about her cultural identity but also similar enough to enable her to operate as a successful professional.

Like Bob Harris in her film, Coppola summarizes her experience in Tokyo with the following words: “happy [she] came to Tokyo, happy to be going home”

(Coppola 2003). This is in contrast to Blackthorne in *Shogun* who was unable to leave Japan for the rest of his life, or Clavell who could not shake off the image of himself as a samurai in his previous life. This contrast between Clavell's and Coppola's attitudes toward their transcultural experiences and the cultural otherness tells us about the radical changes that had happened through banal-cosmopolitanization.

The contrast between the cultural distinctions that the two Japanese line producers, Hiroaki Fujii and Kiyoshi Inoue, made in their interviews also indicates a discursive disjuncture between 1980 and 2003. For Fujii, the primacy of national identity comes naturally and he showed no hesitation in identifying himself as a "Japanese producer" who belonged to the history and tradition of the Japanese cinema and film industry. In his thinking, respect for national culture is the precondition for international cooperation. Therefore, he was more or less saying that if Americans come to Japan to make films about Japan, they should trust the Japanese and follow Japanese ways. On the other hand, for Inoue, who started his filmmaking career after the demise of the Japanese studio production system and its tradition, his sense of belonging to the Japanese cinema and film industry is much less clearly defined. Inoue sees himself primarily as "an independent producer" and defines himself almost in resistance to both Japanese majors and Hollywood productions alike. His occupational identity seems to come before national identity, and he expressed a strong feeling of affiliation with the independent filmmaking community that is supposedly transnational. Inoue stated:

I like working on independent films and I like working on

international projects. It used to be the case that only major film companies were involved in international projects, but not anymore. Like *Lost in Translation*, independent filmmaking has also become international. Producing independent films is always a financial struggle, but I find the experience more rewarding. (Inoue interview 2005)

The difference between Fujii's and Inoue's ideas about what a good line producer should be and where their loyalties should lie is manifested most clearly in the ways they handled Japanese crew rates. For Fujii, it was important and necessary to pay all Japanese crew members, including freelancers, impartially. Here, the normal division in the Japanese labour market between the studio employees and freelancers was erased against the external otherness of the American employer. Fujii mentioned the friendship he developed with the American crew members of *Shogun* and the respect he gained for their craftsmanship. However, when he had to take a side, his loyalties seemed to lie naturally with the Japanese crew.

On the other hand, Inoue set the crew rates at the same level as Japanese low budget independent productions, which meant that on *Lost in Translation* they were paid at the lower end even by Japanese standards, despite the fact that the Japanese film workers' rates are already much lower than American rates. This was because the Japanese labour market for film workers had been fully flexibly-specialized by the late 1980s, they were not unionized, and they had no means of group negotiation or wage protection.²⁷

²⁷ For example, based on my own experience, an average rate of pay for a first

At one point during the interview in his office, he took out the actual budget and cost report of *Lost in Translation* and showed it to me. This openness surprised me, because producers are normally very secretive about actual numbers, even if there is no reason to hide them. Inoue showed me the budget. It was compiled using standard American production budget software, which is rarely used in Japan. Furthermore, he was keen to demonstrate the transparency of his budget and the way he ran the production according to internationally accepted norms and standards – the so-called “global standard.” He showed a few signs of regret when he talked about the level of wages he paid to the Japanese crew, but said that it was the nature of the global film business and there was nothing he could do about it.

As Beck cogently points out, “really existing cosmopolitanism” is often “deformed cosmopolitanism . . . because it is sustained by individuals who have very few opportunities to identify with something greater than what is dictated by their circumstances,” (Beck 2006: 20) - like financially struggling local filmmakers and producers who venture into transcultural projects. The comparative case study of the two Japanese line producers, I believe, clearly demonstrates the transition from “national” to “cosmopolitan” discursive regimes, which shapes their subjectivities. Inoue’s case signals the emergence of Japanese transnational identity that identifies with a transnational community. And, it also shows the extent of the permeation of the Transnational Capitalist Class (TCC) ideology among self-styled “independent” filmmakers.

assistant director in the early 2000s in the US was about US\$650 for ten hours a day, whereas in Japan ¥30,000 (approx. US\$250) would buy a very experienced first assistant director for a flat day, which normally means over 14 hours.

The concept of TCC marks the fault line between the “winners” and “losers” of globalization. In the next section, I will illustrate how the gap between the “globally mobile” TCC and the “locally immobilized” non-TCC is widening within the national film industry. And how a new regime of discipline and surveillance in the global age, which manages local filmmakers’ desire and anxieties, is emerging. And in some cases, “cosmopolitanism” becomes indistinguishable from neo-liberal “globalism”.

Remaking Global Hollywood: Synopticon Control of Locals

Since the earliest days of its cinematic production Hollywood has adapted, copied, plagiarised, and been inspired by other works. The terminology used to describe this phenomenon is dependent on the position of the critic but in short it is fair to say that Hollywood has constantly remade. (Lucy Mazdon 2000: 2)

The remaking of foreign films is an age-old practice in Hollywood. What is new about remaking in the age of *Global Hollywood* is inclusion of East Asian cinemas as sources of the remaking and inclusion of some Asian talents and filmmakers to TCC. The originators of J-Horrors movies, the producer Takashige Ichise, and the director Takashi Shimizu, joined the ranks of globally successful filmmakers-- the TCC of the film world—as the first Japanese filmmakers to do so. The success of their film *Juon* (*The Grudge* 2003) was such that it attracted the

interest of Hollywood and they were invited to remake it as an American production. The *Grudge* (Shimizu 2004), was made as low-budget horror movie that reportedly cost \$10 million and earned \$110 million at the US box office alone (IMDB pro, The Grudge). As a result, the budget for *Grudge 2* (Shimizu 2006) was doubled, allegedly, allowing Ichise and Shimizu to earn seven digit US dollar fees (Fukushima interview 2006).²⁸

The principal photography of *Grudge 2* took place in Toho studios in Tokyo – *Shogun* was shot in the same studios twenty-odd years ago – and it was shot with a mainly Japanese crew. Assistant directors and make-up artists were brought over from the US because the main cast of *Grudge 2* were Americans - Sarah Michelle Gellar and Jennifer Beals plus others. American executive producers partially attended the Tokyo shoot but the actual running of the production was left to the Japanese line producer, Satoshi Fukushima. The principal photography of *Grudge 2* took approximately forty-five days on a seven-day-a-week basis for the Japanese crews, while American actors worked ten-hours-a-day five-days-a-week, because the American actors were protected by American union regulations (Fukushima and Yanagijima interview 2006).²⁹

The story of *Grudge 2* was developed by the director Shimizu and the American scriptwriter Stephen Susco. Half of the story takes place in Tokyo and the other half in an apartment building in Chicago in the US. However, all the principal

²⁸ Satoshi Fukushima interviewed by Yoshi Tezuka, on August 11th 2006 in Tokyo. In the interview, his contract did not allow Satoshi Fukushima to tell me actual numbers in the budget. However he did not deny these “estimated” and “alleged” numbers.

²⁹ Katsumi Yanagijima, interviewed by Yoshi Tezuka on August 6th 2006 in Tokyo.

photography including these American scenes were shot in studios in Japan, according to the cinematographer Katsumi Yanagijima, against his and the director's wish to shoot the American scenes on location in Chicago. Then, after test screenings of the first cut in the US, the executive producers decided the film needed an extensive amount of additional shots and scenes. All these additional materials were shot in US/ Canada studios with American/ Canadian crews. The principal cinematographer, Yanagijima was not asked to come to the US/Canada for additional photography. Instead, he was told to give the detailed information on all of his original lighting set ups and so forth to the American cinematographer so that they could re-create exactly the same sets and lighting set ups in the US/Canadian studios (Yanagijima interview 2006). All this was for financial rationalization.

Despite the estimated 20 million dollar budget (IMDB Pro, *Grudge 2*) and seven-digit fee paid to Ichise and Shimizu, the production of *Grudge 2* was strongly rationalized financially. The wages for the Japanese crews were kept to a modest level. In Yanagijima's case, *Grudge 2* paid him even less than he would normally be paid on Japanese productions. In fact, what Yanagijima was paid monthly was equal to what a standard American cameraman would be paid weekly.³⁰

Yanagijima says that what keeps him excited about his job is the sense of being part of a communal creative process. But the experience of shooting *Grudge 2* was hardly exciting for two main reasons. First of all, those who were considered to be "globals" and "locals" were treated very differently in terms of fees and other

³⁰ Yamagijima told me that he was paid "less than one million yen a month" – that is approximately eight thousand US dollar a month. This is not a low wage in the literal sense but this is extremely low for a top class cinematographer's fee on international standard.

working conditions. The “globals” were the main creative core of the production - producers, the director and American actors - and the “locals” were others who worked in technical or in a more mundane capacity - mostly the Japanese film crews and cast. The gap was so wide that it was difficult to feel they were part of the same team. Secondly, he did not feel he was given enough respect for his craft. He was contracted only for the minimum period for the principal shoot in Japan, and they hired another cameraman for the shoot in America to re-create exactly the same set-up. This made him feel like he was a cog in the machine. Yanagijima stated:

In Japan, filmmaking is much more of a communal team effort. Wages are low in the Japanese film industry but we work on a project basis so that we tend to be employed longer and get involved with a whole process from the pre- to post production. So we feel we communally own the film. But American production is more individualistic, and a much bigger and more serious business. I understand the financial rationale behind the ways the American system works, but that is too business-like for me to like it.

(Yanagijima interview 2006)

Therefore, overall working on *Grudge 2* was very disheartening for Yanagijima, although the experience was educational in some ways.

I interviewed Yanagijima in his home, a two bedroom apartment in a trendy part of central Tokyo, where he lives with his wife Naomi, who works for Sony Pictures Japan. I interviewed him after we had dinner on the terrace which

overlooked the Tokyo night scene. I asked Yanagijima whether he would work again on similar projects for Hollywood if he had the chance. To my surprise, his answer was affirmative and he hesitated only a short moment to answer the question. Why? He says that he feels that he cannot afford to turn down work, particularly work on American films, which might provide him with new opportunities, even if the job itself does not pay well and treats him like a cog in the machine.

Here, I think it is helpful to remind ourselves about the “Synopticon control”, which we discussed in Chapter One. Along with the rise of global mass media, Zygmunt Bauman observed the development of a new disciplinary and surveillance technology. He called it “Synopticon” (1998: 52). The Synopticon extends the controlling power of Jeremy Bentham’s prison project “Panopticon” over to the individuals who are practically confined in a locality and feeling stuck in the global age. Michel Foucault used Bentham’s “Panopticon” to great effect as a metaphor for “the modern redeployment and redistribution of controlling powers” (Bauman 1998: 48). Under the constant surveillance of the Panopticon, the individual “inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection” (Foucault 1979: 202-3). Synopticon control produces the self-regulating subject in just the same way as the “Panopticon”. But in Synopticon control the position of *watchers* and *watched* is reversed, as in pre-modern time, power impresses “itself upon the *populus* through letting the commoners watch in awe, fear and admiration its own pomp, wealth and splendour” (Bauman, 1998: 51-2, Italics in original):

In the Synopticon, locals watch the global... the globals are literally

'out of this world'... simultaneously inaccessible and within sight, lofty and mundane, infinitely superior yet setting a shining example for all the inferiors to follow or to dream of following; admired and coveted at the same time – a royalty that guides instead of ruling.

(Bauman 1998: 53-4)

In Synopticon control, locals watch and discipline themselves to follow or to dream of following the example set by the globals (TCC). These locals cannot take their eyes off the globals because of the fear of exclusion, or of the fear of waking up to the reality that they are already excluded from all the joys and pleasures that are reserved only for the globals.

Here, Bauman is actually talking about the operation of the powers of the mass media - television and cinema - over the local audiences. But it seems that Synopticon control works even more effectively over those who are in the site of cultural production, where locals watch globals in their physical proximity with their own eyes.

Yanagijima gave me another anecdote. Nowadays his agent gets calls from the US from time to time because his works are becoming known internationally. Recently, he was shortlisted for a film that was to be directed by a well-known American director. Yanagijima was told he was one of three cinematographers whom the director wanted to meet and discuss the script with. But, there was a problem. Yanagijima had a Japanese film that he had already committed to, and the pre-production was due to start very soon. So, if he was to meet the American

director for this job, he had to leave the Japanese project without delay so that the Japanese production could find another cinematographer without any guarantee that he would get the American job. Still, he decided to leave the Japanese job and wait to hear from the Americans. However, nothing happened for days and weeks, there was no word from the Americans about the interview. This story ends with not only with Yanagijima not getting the interview for the American job, but also with him being without work for a few months as a result of quitting the Japanese job. By telling me this story, he probably wanted to show me he knows what he is doing and has some sense of humour about the situation - thus he is not a simple "ideological dupe" - but still he can't help picking every opportunity that might make him a "global".

I interviewed Satoshi Fukushima, a 45-year-old line producer of *Grudge* and *Grudge 2*, in a staff room in Toho studios. At that time, there, he was working with the last remaining Japanese maestro of the studio era, the film director Kon Ichikawa. It was Fujii who used to produce Ichikawa films because they both came from Daiei studios. I was surprised when I heard Fukushima worked as Fujii's assistant/ junior producer for over fifteen years. But this coincidence was actually not too surprising because the number of producers who deal with big international projects in Japan is fairly limited. And Fukushima had to come from somewhere to get to his position.

Fukushima acknowledged that it is possible Yanagijima is usually better paid than what he received on *Grudge 2*. This is because, according to Fukushima, the crew rates on *Grudge 2* were based on the Japanese average rates, and did not allow the top rate fee for the cinematographer. And, his budget had no frills attached

for being a Hollywood production. Unlike twenty years ago, when Fujii line produced *Shogun*, no union agreements now existed at Toho Studios. He said:

A long time ago, I hear Japanese crews charged more for working for American films. But I don't think that is fair and it could give us a bad reputation. So I budgeted according to the normal Japanese going rates. (Fukushima interview 2006)

By his contractual agreement with Americans, Fukushima was not allowed to talk about actual numbers to third parties, but near to the end of my two-hour interview, he told me:

Actually, working on these American projects is not that profitable. I would be making more money by producing Japanese films. (Fukushima interview 2006)

He explained to me that he normally produced Japanese films through his own company. But in cases of American projects like *Grudge* and *Grudge 2*, he was employed as a freelance line producer - thus his company earned no production fees. These productions were operated through the same production structure as Inoue had operated during the production of *Lost in Translation*. They registered "Grudge Inc", the single purpose production company specially set up in Japan for the project. In this way, all the financial transactions became transparent to the American producers and they avoided paying production fees to local production companies. For local line producers, this American system meant not only less financial reward but also

less discretion at the local level. Fukushima was contractually obliged to report back to America every production detail which had financial implications, but in reality he found this too time consuming and impractical. For the smooth running of a film production, decisions very often have to be made there and then. There may be no time to report back to America, and to wait for the executive decision. Thus, according to Fukushima, he often had to make his own decision and tell the Americans later. He knew this would be technically a breach of contract but he had no choice, otherwise the filmmaking would be too demeaning for local filmmakers and technicians.

After having operated the first *Grudge* successfully, Fukushima was recognized as one of only a few “bondable” line producers in Japan – a line producer completion bond guarantors approve of. So he often gets calls from US producers who are planning to shoot in Japan. But, every time he produces budgets for them, he says half jokingly that he secretly hopes:

I won't get this job, because if I had the choice, I would rather be producing Japanese films. (Fukushima interview 2006)

However, like Yanagijima, Fukushima does not really feel that he can afford to turn down American jobs. He believes there will be more American jobs in Japan and he does not want to be excluded from these opportunities. Thus he invests in his future, in which Japan is more integrated into *Global Hollywood* – the future in which everybody has some chance to be “global”.

Conclusion

The comparative case studies of *Shogun* (1980) and *Lost in Translation* (2003) reflect a radical change of perspective – a discursive rupture – between the two historic points. The economic globalization and concomitant banal cosmopolitanization in the 1980s and 1990s subdued articulations of national identity and uniqueness in favour of transnational occupational identities and cross-border commonality for younger generations in the Japanese filmmaking community. The Japanese line producer of *Lost in Translation*, Kiyoshi Inoue, identifies himself as an “independent” film producer and openly expresses his affinity with American and European independents. For Inoue, the declaration of an identity as an “independent” producer meant a resistance to Japanese mainstream production systems.

However, Resistance Cosmopolitanism in this Japanese context is susceptible to TCC ideology. Sometimes, “cosmopolitanism degenerates into a set of strategies for the bio-political improvement of human capital” (Cheah 2006: 495). Pheng Cheah issues this warning in the quotation I have give as the opening epigraph to this chapter. We have seen in the case study of *Grudge 2* that it is indeed possible that “cosmopolitanism” could become indistinguishable from neo-liberal “globalism.” It forms part of the discursive regime that disciplines and regulates the subject in the age of the transnationalized culture industry.

Chapter Seven

Pan-Asian Cinema?:

The End of Japan-Centred Regional Cosmopolitanism

It does seem to me that fresh cultural production and innovation... are the crucial index of the centrality of a given area and not its wealth or productive power. This is why it was extraordinarily significant when the ultimate Japanese moves to incorporate the U.S. entertainment industry – Sony’s acquisition of Columbia Picture and Matsushita’s buyout of MCA – both failed: it meant that despite immense wealth and technological and industrial production, even despite ownership itself and private property, the Japanese were unable to master the essentially cultural productivity required to secure the globalization process for any given competitor. (Fredric Jameson 1998: 67)

Japan has for the first time encountered other Asian nations as “modern” cultural neighbours. (Iwabuchi 2002: 6)

Introduction

This chapter explores the ways in which Japan’s perception of itself and its relationship with other Asian nations changed over the course of economic

globalization and the consequent economic downturn, a change I will illustrate taking examples from the Japanese filmmaking community. As the economic power of other Asian countries rapidly caught up with Japan's, the latest cinematic technologies became available to them more or less simultaneously. This made Japan's technological superiority much less evident. The economic and technological conditions that underlined the Japanese tenet about their cultural uniqueness and superiority became shaky and were clearly challenged. Japan was no longer the only non-Western economic power. As a result, the Japanese perception of Asia, and itself, changed.

In his influential study about the increasing presence of Japanese popular culture such as comics, music and TV drama in the East and Southeast Asia region – *Recentering Globalization* (2002) – Koichi Iwabuchi argued that at various sites of cultural production and consumption, “Japan's conception of being ‘in but above’ or ‘similar but superior’ to Asia is asserted, displaced and rearticulated.” (2002: 199) After a long period of Japan looking solely to the West, according to Iwabuchi, this phenomenon became salient in the process of what has been called “Japan's cultural return to Asia” in the 1990s. In what follows, I will question the structural base of this putative “Japanese cultural power”, which Iwabuchi seems to presume is solid and sound, and explore some of the consequences of what I see in contrast as an erosion of this power.

Iwabuchi discussed the case of Dick Lee. This Singaporean-Chinese singer advocates East and West cultural hybridization, and many Japanese cultural critics appreciate the fact that Lee's music succeeded “in expressing an Asian aesthetic by

incorporating different Asian musical traditions and languages into a new form without rejecting the West.” (2002: 167) Thus Lee’s Asian hybridism could be an objection to Japan’s claims about its “unique” cultural capacity, which allegedly enabled only the Japanese to adopt Western modernity without losing their cultural essence.

In reality, however, Lee’s Asian hybridism was subsumed by Japan’s desire to construct a regional sphere of cultural influence. According to Iwabuchi, “at the same time that Lee’s music was subverting a Japan-centric conception of pan-Asian cultural fusion, it was encouraging the Japanese music industry to expand into other Asian (notably Chinese) markets by becoming an organizer of cultural hybridization.” (ibid.: 168-9) Therefore, Dick Lee’s Asian hybridism only fuelled an “unfilled fantasy of Japanese media industries that one day a trans-Asian – and possibly global – pop star will emerge from the region through Japanese initiative” (ibid.: 201). In this fantasy:

‘Asia’ is imagined as a cultural space in which Japan is located in the implicit centre, playing the part of the conductor of Asian pop musical cross-fertilization. (Iwabuchi 2002: 170)

Drawing on such examples, Iwabuchi insists that the “resurfacing of Japan’s nationalistic project to extend its cultural horizon to East and Southeast Asia is not simply discursive or ideological.” (ibid.: 201) He stresses “it is structurally backed by a general increase in Japan’s transnational cultural presence and influence under the forces of cultural globalization.” (ibid.: 201) What seems to be driving

Iwabuchi's argument is his conviction that Japanese cultural power has now structurally "decentred" the process of globalization from the "West" to "Japan" in the context of Asian regionalization.

Iwabuchi is right to point out that such a "fantasy" of occupying the centre of the Pan-Asian cultural sphere - by being an "organizer" or "conductor" - was rife in the Japanese media industries in the 1990s. In the film industry, for example, Satoru Iseki's productions *Shadow of China* (Mitsuo Yanagimachi, 1990) and *The Assassin* (Chen Kaige 1998) were part of such attempts and there were numerous Japanese-Asian co-productions in which Japanese producers attempted to gain control over filmmakers and artists from Hong Kong, Taiwan or mainland China by financing their projects. But, we must also remember that such a "nationalistic project to extend its cultural horizon" (Iwabuchi 2002: 201), led by Japanese producers, failed almost without exception, commercially and artistically, as we have already seen in Chapter Five. Moreover, the global success of Chinese-led "Asian cinemas" in the early 2000s, which had no direct Japanese input, casts a big doubt over the soundness of the historic structural advantage which Iwabuchi believed Japanese cultural producers were enjoying in the context of cultural globalization.

For example, the Hong Kong producer Bill Kong who produced *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon* (Ang Lee 2000), and *Hero* (Zhang Yimou 2002) and led the "Asianization of Hollywood" (see Chapter One) did not seek a Japanese co-production partner for his recent Pan-Asian project with the Chinese film director, Zhang Yimou – *Tanki senri o hashiru* (*Riding Alone for Thousands of Miles*, 2005) starring the Japanese actor, Ken Takakura. Ken Takakura's popularity among the

generation of Chinese who experienced the end of the Cultural Revolution is legendary and is popular across East and Southeast Asia (Liu 2006: 10). During the Cultural Revolution, production of entertainment films stopped domestically and foreign film import was banned. Japanese films including Ken Takakura's *Kimiyo funnu no kawa o watare* (*Cross the River of Anger*, Junya Sato 1976) were imported to China heralding the end of the era, and became hugely popular. The director Zhang Yimou says that Ken Takakura was the biggest inspiration of his young days and many young Chinese, like himself, watched the film more than ten times (Liu 2006: 10-12).

Instead of co-producing with a Japanese company, Kong sought financial backing from private investors in mainland China for this Asian collaboration project, *Riding Alone for Thousands of Miles* (2005). Then, he sub-contracted the Japanese production company, Toho Film, to line-produce the Japanese parts of the story, while he pre-sold only the Japanese distribution rights to Japanese distribution company, Toho. (Morishige 2006).³¹ The Japanese companies were excluded from the equity investment, thus they would not receive any profit-share of the film's business outside Japan despite the fact the main selling point of the film is the Japanese actor, Ken Takakura; in addition, Toho was allowed to exploit the film within Japan only for a limited period. As this example shows, the popularity of Japanese talents and other symbols in Asia does not necessarily mean that the Japanese producers have networks, or, structures, that enable them to exert economic

³¹ Akira Morishige, interviewed by Yoshi Tezuka, August 2nd 2006 in Tokyo. According to Morishige, the Japanese line producer of *Riding Alone for Thousands of Miles*, Toho paid 900 million yen (approx. US\$7.5 million) for the Japanese rights and Toho Film received 90 million yen for line producing the Japanese parts. Although he was not officially informed about the budget total, he estimated that the Japanese sales alone probably covered the total production costs.

or cultural hegemony over other parts of Asia. On the contrary, it appears that power is already being “de-centred” from Japanese media industries in the process of Asian regionalization.

In considering “how deep is the import of Japanese popular culture” (2002: 67) in Hong Kong in the late 1990s, Y. Y. Yeh and D.W. Davis found that “today Hong Kong filmmakers do not necessarily look to Japan as a model of technical, economic and creative advancement, a standard to which they aspire. Japanese media and fashion are more like a trove for ideas that can be mined for exportable elements. Contemporary production does not ‘look up to’ Japanese film, as the Shaw Brothers did in the 1960s, so much as it ‘looks across’ to Japanese VCDs, games and comics already assimilated within Hong Kong entertainment” (2002: 64). In addition to American culture, Yeh and Davis convincingly argue that Japanese popular culture has become a form of abundant “raw material” which Hong Kong filmmakers appropriate and incorporate into their works in a highly opportunistic manner.

As we discussed in Chapter Four, numerous Japanese filmmakers went to work in the Hong Kong film industry in the 1960s. They transplanted new cinematic technologies and techniques from Japan, and helped to train a generation of Hong Kong filmmakers (c.f., Yau 2003: 139-75; Nishimoto 2004). But, these Japanese filmmakers worked under Chinese pseudonyms to hide their national/ ethnic identity because, on one hand, the Japanese did not want to publicize the fact that they were moonlighting in Asia, and on the other hand, the Hong Kong film industry deliberately suppressed the contributions of these Japanese filmmakers because of their own national-ethnic pride as Asia’s number one film industry. In contrast to

those old days, now, Yeh and Davis observe that “contemporary Hong Kong producers, far from concealing them, now capitalize on Japanese sources as a selling point, part of its ‘brand name’ appeal” (2002: 64).

Yeh and Davis argue that Japan and Japanese talent are “a value-added, flexible element in Hong Kong films. In the hands of resourceful Hong Kong entrepreneurs, ‘Japan’ is an elastic semiotic resource, expanding and contracting as the market is perceived to change” (2002: 77). Contrary to Iwabuchi’s claim that Japan’s nationalistic project is being “structurally backed by a general increase in Japan’s transnational cultural presence and influence under the forces of cultural globalization” (Iwabuchi, 2002: 201), Yeh and Davis’ argument points to the structural shallowness of Japanese influences over the contemporary Hong Kong film industry compared to the 1960s, when the economic and technological power differential was far larger between the two industries.

Iwabuchi convincingly argued that there is a feeling among those who consume Japanese popular culture that they now share a modern temporality with Japan - what he called the emerging sense of “coevalness with the Japanese.” (Iwabuchi 2002: 122) According to him, the popularity of Japanese popular culture was a manifestation of this sense of shared temporality. But if so, and if we push Iwabuchi’s argument further and acknowledge that the ubiquity of Japanese popular culture in Asian countries is related to the rising economic power of these Asian countries, then, shouldn’t it be more logical to read this ubiquity as a sign of the erosion of Japan’s hegemonic power in the region, rather than to read it as a sign of increasing cultural power? The historic evidence from the Hong Kong and Japanese

film industries suggests that the fact that the emerging Asian middle class shares the same temporality with Japan does not reinforce the historic structural condition. On the contrary, it has radically tipped the balance of power in favour of the emergent nations.

When the economic and technological power differential between Japan and the rest of Asia was clearly visible and “Japan” was perceived as above “Asia”, the trace of Japanese cultural influence and cross-cultural fertilization was carefully suppressed for the maintenance of national/ethnic pride by both sides, as in the case of the Hong Kong film industry in the 1960s. Therefore, I believe it is more plausible to say that the diminution of the economic and technological power differential has alleviated the psychological stigma and complex between the parties, transforming the structural condition to a new phase in which a new cosmopolitan subjectivity could emerge. In order to consider this further, we can first look at Japan’s changing relationship with the Hong Kong film industry.

One of thousands of young Japanese females who moved to Hong Kong in the early 1990s, the production translator, Kaoru Nakamura, went to study Chinese, preferring to “work abroad rather than to stay in the male-oriented culture of Japanese work places” (c.f., Sakai 2003: 132). Later, Nakamura and her husband Akira Morishige, an independent film producer based in Japan, made a number of Japan-Hong Kong co-productions such as *Nankin no kirisuto* (*The Christ of Nanjing*, Tony Au 1995), and *Kitchen* (Yim Ho 1997), and they facilitated Jackie Chan’s *Thunder Bolt* (Gordon Chan 1995) and the producer Bill Kong’s *Riding Alone for Thousands of Miles* (Zhang 2005) in Japan. Nakamura observes that now it is the

Hong Kong filmmakers who are the catalysts for the formation of regional Asian networks, and various forms of “Pan -Asian collaboration” between Taiwan, mainland China, and Korea and so forth. And she is concerned about the way the major Japanese media companies became increasingly inward looking after economic recession in the 1990s.

A second set of examples gives a glimpse of the changing relationship between Japan and China through the movements and experiences of foreign film students. After working in the international division of the Shanghai Film Studio, Thomas Tang arrived in Japan in 1994 with a small amount of yen in his pocket, which had taken him years to save. For a long time Tang had wanted to study abroad, preferably in England or the US. But for a Chinese national to study abroad he/she needed a foreign guardian, and it was very difficult for an ordinary Chinese person to afford such a connection with a foreigner.

Fortunately, Tang met a friendly Japanese producer who offered to be Tang’s guardian in Japan; so he decided to go there. After graduating from a Japanese university, Tang stayed in Japan, working as a production translator/co-ordinator. As well as being a regular translator for the most popular Chinese actress in Japan - Zhang Ziyi, the star of *Hero* (Zhang Yimou 2002) and *Memoirs of a Geisha* (Rob Marshall 2005), Tang taught Chinese to a number of prominent Japanese actors and actress. Tang remarks: “Before Ziyi, many Chinese actresses and singers had learnt Japanese to work in the Japanese film and TV industry.” But that changed: “Ziyi didn’t have to learn Japanese to be popular here; because she became internationally popular through her Chinese films and now she works in Hollywood”

(Tang interview 2006). The tables are turned and it is Japanese actors who are more keen to learn Chinese to work in the Asian film and TV industries nowadays.

Another notable trend which marks the rise of Chinese cultural power in Japan is an increasing number of Japanese students who go to study filmmaking in China. The Beijing Film Academy is known for having trained globally known filmmakers, such as Zhang Yimou and Chen Kaige. For a long time, the popular destination for Japanese students to study filmmaking was the US, and going to China to study filmmaking was unthinkable. However, the first Japanese student officially enrolled in The Beijing Film Academy in the late 1990s, and, by the mid 2000s, the number of Japanese students studying at The Academy and its language school had grown to over twenty. China's two top educational bodies in the media and performing arts, The Beijing Film Academy and The Central Academy of Drama, screened their first graduation films directed by Japanese students in the 2006 Yokohama Student Film Festival. Now it is possible to speculate that the next generation of Japanese filmmakers may be Chinese-trained.

I interviewed a Chinese filmmaker who studied in Japan and a Japanese filmmaker who studied in China in order to gain some insights about this cultural trend. They are: Ren Shujian, a Chinese documentary filmmaker, who came to Japan after finishing his degree in journalism at Nanjing University; and Sanshiro Iwata, a 28-year-old Japanese television documentary director, who studied at The Beijing Film Academy. At the time of my interview, Iwata was about to go back to China again to study at The Beijing Film Academy with the aid of a Chinese government scholarship. For Iwata, China has been a place of "akogare" (adoration) since his

childhood. He said he always wanted to go there and never thought of going to the West or the US to study film.

Peter J. Katzenstein, who studied the process of Asian regionalization and regionalism, observes that the “architecture of the Japan-centred Asian regionalism is hierarchical” (2002: 44), or, vertical, whereas the Chinese network is horizontal. In the Japanese scheme of regionalization, “Japan controls the flow of aid and the technologies and provides producers in other countries with capital and intermediate inputs.” (ibid.: 44) In contrast, the younger generation of Chinese entrepreneurs have responded to globalization in a different way by “running their business along traditional Chinese lines and maintaining close contact with the Chinese business communities in Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and China.” (ibid.: 44) Thus, in comparison, Japanese networks are closed, Japan-centred and large-corporation based, whereas the Chinese global network possesses no fixed national point of origin, and is family-business based. The Chinese network is essentially “open, flexible and disposable” (Borras, cited in Katzenstein 2002: 45). And, in the process of globalization, rapid economic growth was realized from “the horizontal and open networks of the overseas Chinese, rather than vertical and closed ones, which are typical of Japan” (Hamilton and Walters, cited in Katzenstein 2002: 45).

Katzenstein’s analysis of the differences between the Japanese and Chinese network architecture provides a sound explanation of the decline of Japanese influence in the face of Asian regionalization, and why the majority of Japan-led Pan-Asian media projects have failed. After all, it is not surprising to find that open, horizontal and disposable networks offer a more effective foundation for the flexible

accumulation of capital in a global age than ones that are vertical, closed and conceived as long-term. Based on wide-ranging empirical evidence from different domains such as politics, economics and culture, Katzenstein argues convincingly that:

East Asia is moving rapidly beyond any one national model to the coexistence of several viable alternatives and the emergence of a truly hybrid form of regionalism... In a nutshell, in the making of an East Asian region, 'flying-geese-style Japanization' is out, 'beyond Japanization' is in. (Katzenstein 2006: 2-7)

In what follows, despite Japan's apparent disengagement from the regionalization process since the time of its economic decline, I will show how individuals and small independent companies in the Japanese filmmaking community are engaging with emerging "hybrid forms of regionalism" in East Asia that are different from the previous Japan-centred regional cosmopolitanism.

The Japan-Hong Kong Interaction Since the Late 1980s

Now, I have established production companies both in the US and Japan... But, it was my encounter with Hong Kong cinema – e.g., *A Chinese Ghost Story* (Ching Siu-tung 1987) - in the late 1980s and the experiences in the Hong Kong film industry that formed my propensity to work abroad, and on international projects. (Taka

Ichise, the producer of J-Horrors 2006: 66).

The “golden age of the Hong Kong-Japanese cinematic interchange” (c.f., Yau 2003: 139) ended sometime in the early 1970s, as we discussed in Chapter Four. For the next fifteen years there was little collaboration and during which the fortunes of the respective film industries were reversed. While the Japanese film industry declined as its audience base was reduced, the Hong Kong film industry developed new genres of action, comedy and ghost stories, which began to hit the Japanese box office in the late 1980s.

A new trend of the Hong Kong-Japanese cinematic interchange in the late 1980s was initiated by Chua Lam, who had been in charge of the Shaw Brothers’ operation in Japan in the 1960s and was now a vice president of the Golden Harvest production company in Hong Kong. His first collaboration was a film based on the Japanese comic *Kujaku O* (*Peacock King*, Lam 1988), co-produced with Japan’s television broadcaster Fuji TV. The most noticeable change in the nature of the Japan-Hong Kong collaboration in this new phase was that the creative control of almost all of the projects was in the hands of Hong Kong filmmakers. Often Japanese contributions were limited to the provision of stars and with providing the original story, often based on Japanese comics (*manga*) or novels. The Japanese cameraman Tadashi Nishimoto provided a vital link between the Japan and Hong Kong film industry even after he retired as a cameraman in the mid 1970s. In *Peacock King* he acted as the production coordinator to help with setting up the project and the director, Ngai Kai Lam, had been his apprentice when he was young (Nishimoto 2004: 201). Thus there was some continuity from the “golden age” in the 1960s, but the dynamics of the relationship were now very different.

Chua Lam explains how Hong Kong filmmakers' attitudes towards co-productions with Japan have changed since the time of Shaw Brothers. According to Chua:

Before, the co-production provided an opportunity for Hong Kong filmmakers to learn new technologies and mass producing techniques from Japan. But this is no longer the case. Instead, now, Hong Kong producers are seeking commercial benefits. We expect the Japanese partner to provide half of the production costs and Japanese stars. In this way the return from the Japanese market is guaranteed... Otherwise, there is not much point doing co-productions with Japan anymore. (Chua, cited in Yau 2003: 209).

This adds weight to the point made by Yeh and Davis that "Japan" for contemporary Hong Kong filmmakers is "a value-added, flexible element" (2002: 77), which they pick and use principally for its export value. Thus, they no longer "look to Japan as a model of technical, economic and creative advancement, a standard to which they aspire" (2002: 64). In other words, the process of so-called "flying-geese style modernization" of the Asian film industry, which positioned "Japan to be Asia's main bridge to the West" (Katzenstein, 2006: 7), is clearly over.

As Taka Ichise, who would become the first successful Japanese producer in Hollywood when he remade Japanese horror movies, indicates in the epigraph of

this section, the impact of new Hong Kong cinema on Japan was immense. He wrote in his autobiography about how shocked he was when he saw *A Chinese Ghost Story* (Ching 1987) because the film clearly showed him that “Hong Kong cinema is far ahead of Japanese cinema” (Ichise 2006: 67).

The daredevil stunts and high entertainment value of Hong Kong cinema captured the enthusiasm of many Japanese cinema audiences as well as filmmakers. The co-production film *Peacock King* was an action-fantasy based on a Japanese comic and loaded with special effects. The Japanese production company, Fuji TV, hired Ichise as the SFX producer because they believed post-production technology in Hong Kong was not of a sufficient standard and insisted that all the special effects should be done in Japan (Ichise 2006: 69). For Ichise, this was his first experience of film production abroad. He spent three months in Hong Kong and was greatly inspired by the transnationality of the Hong Kong film industry and the spirit of “entertainment for entertainment’s sake” commercialism (Ichise 2006: 66-76), which strengthened his belief that it is savvy producers who make good films - not dilettantes of art.

In his view, Hong Kong cinema’s high entertainment value and its commercial success derives from the fact that Hong Kong films are not made for Hong Kong audiences alone, because its small domestic market meant that they could not make a profit at home, but for wider audiences across Asia. And, for him, the decline of Japanese cinema has a lot to do with the fact that most Japanese films are made for Japanese audiences and have not attempted to reach wider audiences beyond Japan, because of the complacency of Japanese producers able to call upon

its relatively large domestic market (ibid.: 73-4). The transnational features of the Hong Kong film industry inspired Taka Ichise to work beyond the Japanese national borders that protected, and at the same time, confined Japanese filmmakers to the domestic market.

Yet not all Japanese filmmakers would have agreed with Ichise that “Hong Kong cinema was far ahead of Japanese cinema.” The Japanese star of *Peacock King*, Hiroshi Mikami, spoke to *Kinema Junpo* film magazine (December 1988) on his return from Hong Kong. In the interview, he disassociated himself from the film and criticised the working conditions in the Hong Kong film industry which he described as “abhorrent” and disastrous for creativity (ibid.: 36). According to Mikami, he accepted the part in *Peacock King* because he was told the common language to be used on the project would be English. However, on set, he was told to deliver his lines in Japanese while his Chinese opposite spoke in Cantonese, with all of the dialogue of the film being dubbed during post-production to produce Japanese and Cantonese versions. Moreover, the director, Ngai Kai Lam, did not speak English so Mikami was unable to communicate with him at all. In his view, producers have so much power in the Hong Kong film industry that directors are left with very little creative control it appeared to Mikami that their main concern was to shoot the film as quickly as possible to please producers (ibid.: 36-7).

Before *Peacock King*, Mikami had appeared in a number of high profile Japanese-Western co-productions such as *Soumeikyu (Grass Labyrinth)*, Shuji Terayama 1983); *Merry Christmas Mr. Lawrence* (Nagisa Oshima 1983); *Mishima* (Paul Schrader 1985); and *Tokyo Pop* (Fran Kuzui 1988). He therefore probably had

certain ideas about how international co-productions should be, based on these more art-house oriented co-productions. But, filmmaking in Hong Kong was something quite different. As Ichise put it, Hong Kong transnationalism was based on “the spirit of entertainment” and “downright commercialism”. As such, it defies the cosmopolitan value of an elite art-film tradition. As a self-proclaimed cosmopolitan and as an artist, Mikami felt deeply humiliated and indignant about his Hong Kong experience. As a matter of fact, mainstream Japanese audiences considered Hong Kong cinema to be nothing but cheap and quick action-comedy exploits until the “Hong Kong boom” in the mid 1990s which followed a concerted campaign by Japanese media companies to create a new image of Hong Kong as “modern”, “cosmopolitan” and “stylish”, on the eve of Hong Kong’s return to China (c.f., Iwabuchi 2002: 181-186).

My main interviewee for this section, the Chinese-Japanese production translator and coordinator Kaoru Nakamura, was drawn to Hong Kong through “Hong Kong Noire” films.³² This term refers to a group of action gangster films made in Hong Kong in the late 1980s to 1990s – such as *A Better Tomorrow* (1986) produced by Tsui Hark and directed by John Woo. Nakamura was in her late 20s at the time and working for Tokuma Japan, the audio-visual software company, which had sometimes financed film productions in China, such as *Ju Dou* (Zhang Yimou 1990). Her independent film producer husband, Akira Morishige, was working for Amuse Inc, a Japanese talent agency and audio-visual software company, which was expanding its activities into Asia. So Nakamura had various contacts with Chinese filmmakers through her work and through her partner (Nakamura and Morishige

³² Kaoru Nakamura interviewed by Yoshi Tezuka, August 3rd 2006 in Tokyo.

interview 2006).

Nakamura and Morishige first met a group of Hong Kong filmmakers by chance in the editing suites of a Japanese film lab in the late 1980s, when it was widely acknowledged among Asian filmmakers that Japanese film labs and post-production sound facilities provided technically better quality works than the facilities in any other Asian film industry. Thus many Hong Kong, Taiwanese and other Asian filmmakers preferred to do their post-production work in Japan if their budget permitted (Jinbo, in *Kinema Junpo* October 1993: 122-125). In addition, when Fifth Generation Chinese filmmakers started to make films with foreign finances under post-Tiananmen political conditions, they also chose to do their post-production in Japan. As a result, Japanese film labs, such as Imagica, and sound studios, such as Nikkatsu, became places where Japanese and Asian filmmakers could meet and mix.³³

It was Shu Kei, the filmmaker, critic and producer who had probably done more than anyone to bring together Chinese and Japanese filmmakers,³⁴ who convinced Nakamura that she should move to Hong Kong and work in their film industry. According to Nakamura, Hong Kong filmmakers were very keen both to collaborate with the Japanese and to work in Japan because of its strong economy but

³³ Although Chua Lam's observation that Japan had stopped being a model to follow for Hong Kong filmmakers was true in general, Japanese technological superiority was still evident in some areas, and this was widely acknowledged. Therefore, the provision of superior technologies and finance still remained a feature of Japan-centred regional cosmopolitanism in the late 1980s.

³⁴ Shu Kei frequented Japan especially after producing the documentary film *Sunless Days* (1990). The film explored the impact of the Tiananmen Square incident on the Chinese community. According to Nakamura, Shu Kei feared prosecution by the Chinese authorities and remained for a long time in Japan

were finding it difficult. In the early 1990s the fan base for Hong Kong cinema in Japan was still small and nobody in the Japanese film industry spoke Chinese as far as she was aware. Looking back now, Nakamura thinks that Shu Kei probably wanted a Japanese person who was sympathetic to Hong Kong cinema to help them in their dealings with Japan. She was told that there would be work if she came to Hong Kong but when she eventually moved there, she found that:

Of course, there wasn't work as such for someone like me, who didn't even speak Chinese. So I decided to study Cantonese first.

(Nakamura interview 2006)

Nakamura studied Cantonese at The Chinese University of Hong Kong between 1990 and 1993 and then spent another year learning Mandarin. She started to work as a production translator and coordinator while still a student. Many of the films she worked on in the Hong Kong film industry were stereotypical anti-Japanese war films with evil Japanese characters. Her task was to translate the dialogue into Japanese and teach the Chinese actors who played Japanese parts to say it properly. She did not particularly enjoy working on these films, but her options were limited and her only alternative was working in the office of a Japanese affiliated company in Hong Kong, in which the working conditions for women were as hopeless as those she had left behind. So she much preferred to work on these films even if they were anti-Japanese.

In addition to her love for Hong Kong cinema, it was a lack of prospects in the Japanese film industry that was driving Nakamura away. As a woman in her late

20s, she did not feel she had a career in Japan unless she a specialist skill such as being able to speak foreign languages. As we have seen, there were many Japanese women in the early 1990s who had a strong desire to abandon male-oriented “Japanese companies and go abroad or to foreign affiliated firms in order to seek a more rewarding job” (Sakai 2003: 136). Many of these internationalist women thought Hong Kong was the place to go.

However, according to qualitative research carried out by Chie Sakai (2003), many of the Japanese women who took flight hoping to find more rewarding jobs ended up feeling trapped in working conditions that were no better than in Japan. The concerted media campaign that constructed “‘modern’ and ‘fashionable’ images of Hong Kong” (Iwabuchi 2002: 182) in the 1990s established a new discourse which convinced many internationalist women that “working conditions in Hong Kong would be totally different from those in Japan” (Sakai 2003: 136), and that, “Hong Kong was a place of equality in terms of gender and other attributes” (ibid.: 138). However, according to Sakai, the Japanese business community in Hong Kong was strictly hierarchical in reality, and gender and ethnicity were as much barriers to their advancement as in Japan if not even more so (ibid.: 141-2). So, Nakamura was wise to avoid this trap by opting to work on anti-Japanese Hong Kong films instead.

While Nakamura was studying in Hong Kong, her partner, Akira Morishige, developed two co-production film projects with Chua Lam of Golden Harvest – *Nankin no Kirisuto* (*The Christ of Nanjing*, Tony Au 1995) and *Kitchen* (Yim Ho 1997). At the time, Morishige was in charge of film development and production in a company in Japan called Amuse Inc which represented Japanese

music and acting talent as well as producing audio and visual media content. Amuse Inc was also very keen to expand and promote its properties in the Asian market. Therefore, these two films were developed as star vehicles for the company's leading actress, Yasuko Tomita. At least that was the intention from a Japanese viewpoint. From a Chinese point of view, however, the Japanese stars in these co-productions films were strategically placed as a point of identification for Japanese audiences in order to guarantee income from the Japanese box office.

According to the Chinese executive producer, Chua Lam, "adapting Japanese comics [and novels] was the easiest way to persuade the Japanese side, since there was not a chance that the Japanese would accept original scripts by Hong Kong writers" (Chua, cited in Yau 2003: 209). As matter of fact, both *The Christ of Nanjing* and *Kitchen* were developed from stories by well-known Japanese authors, but the adaptation was done by a Hong Kong director and scriptwriter team.

In the interview I carried out with the Japanese producer, Morishige confirmed that it was Hong Kong filmmakers who initiated the idea of these co-productions. The fact that in both cases the original stories were Japanese was an important factor in motivating the Japanese side to participate. Nevertheless, Morishige acknowledged that the creative control of the projects remained in the hands of Hong Kong filmmakers throughout the production of both films.

This necessity for Hong Kong filmmakers to adapt Japanese stories in order to gain an access to Japanese finance sometimes gave interesting political twists to their projects. For example, *The Christ of Nanjing* was based on a typical

Japanese Orientalist story by the Japanese canonical writer, Ryunosuke Akutagawa. It is a kind of variation of *Madame Butterfly* set in China in the 1930s with a Japanese Pinkerton. In the story, Ryuichi Okagawa, a Japanese writer who worked as a reporter in China, meets a devoutly religious Chinese girl named Jin-hua. He finds happiness with her and they marry. However, he already has a wife in Japan, and this revelation destroys Jin-hua. When Okagawa has to go back to Japan to fulfill his family obligations, leaving Jin-hua behind, she is forced to work as a prostitute. Eventually Okagawa returns to China to rescue her, only to find that he may be too late...

Although it is easy to see that the story may have appeal as a Japanese male fantasy, there is nothing that makes it obviously attractive for Chinese audiences. To turn what Iwabuchi termed an “Oriental’s Orientalist” (2002) fantasy into a film Chinese audiences would find watchable, the director, Tony Au, chose Hong Kong’s top actor, Tony Leung Kar-Fai, to play the part of the Japanese reporter, and, Yasuko Tomita, the Japanese actress, to play the ill-fated Chinese girl. According to Morishige, by swapping the actor’s and actress’s nationality/ethnicity, the film was designed to allow male Chinese audiences to identify with Tony Leung Kar-Fai, as well as to encourage both Japanese and Chinese audiences to sympathize with Yasuko Tomita. Since Tony Leung Kar-Fai had a huge female following in Japan, having a Chinese actor playing a Japanese part was not a problem at the Japanese box office.

Yasuko Tomita’s performance won the Best Actress award at the Tokyo International Film Festival and the film did reasonably well in Japan. Morishige

believes that the film also did well in Hong Kong and other Asian countries although Golden Harvest never kept him informed about its performance outside Japan since the contract with Amuse Inc gave Golden Harvest exclusive rights to distribute the film in all other Asian countries. This meant that Amuse Inc was entirely dependent on Golden Harvest for the promotion and distribution of the film, despite the fact that they had intended this co-production to be a star vehicle for Yasuko Tomita across the Asian territory.

This had to be agreed because, according to Morishige, Japanese companies like Amuse Inc do not have the regional contacts and distribution networks across Asia of Chinese companies like Golden Harvest. Although Morishige is one of the most experienced Japanese producers in Asian co-productions, yet he considers that working through Chinese diaspora networks is the only way for a Japanese producer to operate in Asia. This point was confirmed by another experienced Japanese producer, Satoru Iseki, who recently completed a Pan-Asian co-production, *Bokko (Battle of Wits)*, (Jacob Cheung 2006). According to Iseki, the choices are “either go through the Chinese network or go through the Hollywood network” (Iseki interview 2006).³⁵

In the context of Asian regionalization generally, Peter Katzenstein observed that Japanese “vertical” and Chinese “horizontal” networks “are in some ways also complementary” (2002: 45-6). And “Japanese firms find it very difficult to work without Chinese middle men” (ibid.: 46). In the case of the regionalization of Asian film industries, however, it appears that Japanese producers are almost

³⁵ Satoru Iseki interviewed by Yoshi Tezuka, August 26th 2006 in Tokyo.

incapable of operating in Asia without Chinese help. And, by the mid 1990s, the role these Hong Kong film producers played was much more than “middle men.”

Nakamura and Morishige facilitated the production of Jackie Chan's *Thunder Bolt* (Gordon Chan 1995), which was shot in Japan and then worked on a Japanese film shot on location in Hong Kong called *Hong Kong Daiyasoukai* (*Hong Kong Nocturne*, Watanabe 1997). In the course of these two productions, Nakamura was able to observe the Hong Kong film crews working in Japan and Japanese film crews working in Hong Kong on these occasions and found their different approaches striking. When Hong Kong filmmakers worked in Japan, their mode of production was free flowing often changing things at the last minute and expecting the Japanese production teams to deal with it, which often they could not. On the other hand, when the Japanese worked in Hong Kong they planned every detail in advance and expected the Hong Kong production team to execute their plans with precision but they could not work effectively in this way.. Overall, however, Nakamura feels that the Hong Kong production team found it easier to adapt to the Japanese way of working much better than the Japanese production team was able to do with the Hong Kong filmmakers. And this is because:

Japanese film crews are inflexible. They have their own ways of doing things and they tend to stick to it. They probably looked down on Hong Kong filmmakers a little thinking they were disorganized and chaotic. In contrast, Hong Kong film crews are flexible. They never said no to any of the demands the Japanese made; they did their best to find a way to do things. When we

were shooting in Hong Kong, Japanese film crews were happy because the Hong Kong crew were very easy to get along with.

(Nakamura interview 2006)

It has been remarked that in the era of post Japan-centred regionalism, “an adherence to the Japanese way now signals serious weakness” (Katzenstein 2006: 25) rather than strength. According to Nakamura, now it is Japanese filmmakers who have a lot to learn from Hong Kong filmmakers about how to survive in the age of regional cosmopolitanisation.

The Undercurrent of Japan-China Interaction

Co-productions, which incorporate the funds and talent of more than two territories, are the only way to let Chinese language films step out of the limited market of the Chinese-speaking world.... One of the main reasons for such co-production schemes is risk-sharing. And another is to be able to create an at least mediocre [box-office] record in all the distributed markets.... Usually if a film can be good enough to span two markets in Asia, there is a 90 percent chance for it to open the European market. And probably 50 percent of these films can make it in the US market. (Producer-director Peter Chan, *Taipei Times*, 26 December 2001)

It took five years to complete this Asian co-production film, *A*

Battle of Wits (Cheung 2006), ... I knew it was impossible to finance this project in Japan alone so I sought co-production partners across Asia. Luckily, it was the opening and rapid growth of Chinese market that made this cross-Asian co-production possible. The project was financed by 35% Japan, 29% China, and 18% each by Hong Kong and Korea. (The Japanese producer of *A Battle of Wits*, Satoru Iseki 2007)

Satoru Iseki is one of only a few Japanese producers to have been active in “Pan-Asian” film co-productions. As he indicated in the above epigraph, the opening-up and rapid expansion of mainland China has engendered totally new conditions for both Japanese and Hong Kong film industries, changing the dynamics of Asian regionalization and in consequence “Japan and East Asia is embarking on a new phase of their mutual engagement” (Katzenstein 2006: 18).

Today, the market orientation of Hong Kong productions has shifted to mainland China and other international - European and US - markets and existing markets in Southeast Asia and Taiwan shrank drastically between 1993 to 2005 (Lim 2006: 349). At the same time, mainland filmmakers have sought collaborations with Hong Kong-based producers principally because they realized that “without some expertise in commercialism, without the high-tech support or cinematic skill especially evident in action films, and without the immense financial backing that Hong Kong had, it was not possible [for mainland filmmakers] to compete with Hong Kong films” (Lau 1995: 19). The cultural geographer, Kean Fan Lim, observes:

[T]he roots of Hong Kong film industry are concatenated to a string of extra-local supply-and-demand factors since the Second World War, and while the geographies of these extra-local nexuses have changed, they seem even more enhanced and essential today... Quite peculiarly, Hong Kong now functions as a domestic space for both China and Taiwan after the implementation of CEPA ... Hong Kong-produced films simultaneously count as 'guopian' [national film] in two geopolitical territories. (Lim 2006: 342, 346)

Following Hong Kong's handover to China, according to Lim, "the city's linkage with (and dependence on) China has only augmented, and is expected to strengthen, after the establishment of the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) on 1st July 2004" (2006: 344).

Japan's relative economic decline and China's rapid rise changed the dynamics of Asian regionalism. In these circumstances, a number of high profile Hong Kong based filmmakers, like the producer Bill Kong, have developed new and open China-centred Asian-regional networks which encompass Hong Kong, Taiwan, mainland China and other Asian territories, such as Thailand and Korea.

In contrast, however, the Japanese media industry became increasingly reclusive and inward looking after the economic stagnation in the 1990s. Today, all the major Japanese media companies are preoccupied with tightening their oligopoly control of the domestic market. These companies appear no longer to be interested in

participating and taking risks in inter/trans-national projects in the way they did in the 1990s.

Domestically, Japanese cinema is said to be booming at the time of writing, early in the 21st century. The old major film studios and TV broadcasters have teamed up in joint efforts to win back young audiences to Japanese cinema, and have made impressive progress. For example, Toho distributed feature film versions of a popular TV series *Bayside Shakedown* (Katsuyuki Motohiro 1998: 2003) by Fuji TV and broke historic box office records. The number of Japanese films produced increased from 287 in 2003, to 310 in 2004, 356 in 2005, and to 416 in 2006 (MPAJ). In 2006, Japanese films took more than 50 percent of the domestic box office for the first time in over twenty years. The phrase like “the revival of Japanese cinema” spread through film magazines and became a hot topic in business journals (e.g., *Boss* 2004, 2005, 2006; *Toyo Keizai* Aug. 2006; *Zaikai* July 2006).

The problem is, however, that this “revival of Japanese cinema” has remained a peculiarly domestic affair. None of these Japanese TV-based blockbusters has made an impact in neighbouring Asian countries, let alone been successfully exported to Europe or the US market. As a matter of fact, many independent producers I have interviewed were not at all sanguine about this alleged “revival”. On the contrary, those who are not part of the major media institutions were extremely concerned. The Japanese market is currently dominated by a relatively small number of successful films produced by the TV broadcasters and distributed by the old studio majors. These major media companies are producing films narrowly aimed at domestic audiences. And the Japanese market is becoming increasingly

isolationist. Satoru Iseki, one of only a few Japanese producers who is still active in international co-productions, expressed his view:

Japan is alone and unaided. While all the other Asian countries are seeking ways to collaborate, Japan is peculiarly isolated. Japan has the biggest market in Asia, thus it can economically afford to isolate itself since it is much easier to do business just among Japanese. At present, Japan is not taking active part in the development in Asia, nor in the West. It is in the limbo situation... (Iseki interview 2006).

The conspicuous lack of Japanese participation in China-centred transnational film productions despite the recent upsurge of Asian collaboration evinces Iseki's point. After a decade of economic stagnation, it seems there is no enthusiasm left for the *Kokusaika* anymore as far as the major Japanese media companies are concerned. We no longer see large amounts of Japanese capital going into Asian or Western film projects as used frequently to happen in the 1990s.

According to Peter J Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi, "Japan and East Asia are embarking on a new phase of their mutual engagement" (Katzenstein 2006: 18), after "a substantial erosion of Japan's dominant role" (ibid.: 25). Now, the regionalization in East Asia is marked by growing complexity and variable links among the actors, in which national models "no longer supplant one another in sequential fashion" (ibid.: 14). They argue plausibly that "[t]his is true of domains as different as regional production, ecology and agribusiness, and popular culture. Regional outcomes in these domains transcend clearly distinguishable national

models and permit the emergence of a hybrid regionalism” (ibid.: 33).

My findings from the Japanese filmmaking communities also suggest the “growing complexity” and “increased variable links between individual actors” which goes beyond, or undermines, a hitherto national perspective. Despite the apparent disengagement by the major media Japanese companies from the process of East Asian regional cosmopolitanisation, many of my interviewees - independent producers and film students - testified that their personal and professional lives became increasingly enmeshed within regional Asian development. One probable explanation to account for this difference toward regionalization between the major and small independent producers is the Resistance Cosmopolitan tendency of the latter. Marginalized by the major media companies in the domestic market and mainstream culture, small independent producers often seek outside alliances and alternative cultural spaces for their meaning construction – identity building. However, the traditional sources of the external alliances and alternative cultural spaces, Europe and the US, became less affordable as a result of the economic decline, while Asia emerged as a new and possibly a more attractive option.

For example, the independent producer, Takuji Ushiyama, launched his new production outfit, Movie Eye Entertainment Inc. with a number of Japan-Asia film co-production films. *Hajimete no koi, saogo no koi* (*First Love, Last Love*, Hisashi Touma 2003) was a love story set in Shanghai and was Shanghai Film Studios’ first co-production with Japan. *About Love* (Shimoyama, Yee and Zhang 2005) was a set of three short films set in three different Asian cities, Tokyo, Taipei and Shanghai. *Black Night* (Akiyama, Jitnukul, and Leung 2006) was also a set of three short horror

films set, this time, in Hong Kong, Tokyo and Bangkok. Movie Eye's latest Asian co-production was made in collaboration with a private investor in mainland China, *Yoru no Shanghai (The Longest Night in Shanghai)* (Zhang Yibai 2007) and is a romantic comedy set in Shanghai starring Vicki Zhao.

Before launching the production division of Movie Eye Entertainment Inc, Ushiyama worked for fifteen years as a film distributor in Japan Herald and Gaga Communications, handling mostly major European art-house and American independent films. Thus he had very little previous experience with Asian cinema and film industries before his first trip to Shanghai in 2001. This trip was arranged by Thomas Tang, the Chinese production coordinator/translator whom we discussed earlier in this chapter (Tang interview 2006).³⁶ According to Ushiyama:

As a new and relatively small independent company, we can not compete with the major media companies such as TV broadcasters in the domestic market. Thus we have to look elsewhere. But, nowadays, dealing with the American or European film industry requires a huge amount of capital flow that we really do not have. When I started Movie Eye, no Japanese film companies had connections to China. So I decided to go to Shanghai to find out about the place and meet people (Ushiyama, in *Kinema Junpo* July 2004: 32).

Tang introduced Ushiyama to his ex-colleagues at Shanghai Film Studio.

³⁶ Thomas Tang interviewed by Yoshi Tezuka, August 10th 2006 in Tokyo.

Through their networks, Ushiyama met many prominent Chinese filmmakers and artists. After the trip, Ushiyama decided that Asian collaboration and co-production would be the main strategy of his new company and so he set up Movie Eye's Shanghai office with the help of Tang in order to show the company's long-term commitment and to be able to engage in everyday interactions with Chinese filmmakers and artists. In the interview I carried out, Ushiyama stated that it was the meeting with Tang that was the key factor which led him to embark on the Asian engagements (Ushiyama interview 2006).³⁷ This example shows how an individual act of transnational border crossing by someone like Thomas Tang can contribute to the construction of complex regional networks.

Furthermore, border crossings to Japan for Chinese students became much easier as China's economic profile rapidly grew. For example, Ren Shujian is nine years younger than Thomas Tang and arrived in Tokyo to study filmmaking in 1998. In interviews I carried out with him, the recurring theme of Tang's story was his financial struggle and the hardship of being a poor Chinese student juggling several jobs at the same time as studying (Tang interview 2006). In contrast, for Ren, being a Chinese student in Japan was not at all about being poor. Ren made a documentary film called *Tampopo no saigetsu (Dandelion, Ren, 2003)*³⁸ which portrayed the life of a Chinese illegal immigrant family in Japan. As a documentary filmmaker, Ren was acutely aware of his privilege and the gulf of experience emerging between the middle class Chinese who crossed national borders as students and the poor rural

³⁷ Takuji Ushiyama interviewed by Yoshi Tezuka, August 17th 2006 in his Tokyo Office.

³⁸ Ren Shujian interviewed by Yoshi Tezuka, August 12th and 25th 2006 in Tokyo. *Tampopo no saigetsu (Dandelion, 2003)* was his graduation project from Nihon Eiga Gakkou (Japan Film School). The film was screened at Yamagata International Documentary Film Festival 2003.

Chinese who crossed the same borders as illegal immigrants. He says that coming to Japan was not really his idea; he came to Japan because his girlfriend was studying Japanese history in a Japanese university. In an ideal world, he wanted to study filmmaking at The Beijing Film Academy. But the Academy was not taking any graduate students in his chosen discipline in the year he was going to apply, so he decided to study in Nihon Eiga Gakko (The Japan Film School) instead, since his girlfriend was in Japan. Ren's parents agreed to finance his study with the funds they had saved up for his marriage ceremony. According to Ren, studying abroad became widely affordable to the urban middle class population, and he points out that studying in Japan is actually a cheap option compared to studying in Europe or the US (Ren interview 2006).

For Ren Shujian and Thomas Tang, studying in Japan was not their ideal but it was a realistic choice in order to expand their horizons and further their careers. In contrast, for Sanshiro Iwata, the young Japanese TV documentary director who studied at The Beijing Film Academy, China was his place of "akogare" (adoration) for a long time (Iwata interview 2006).³⁹ Interestingly, this Japanese word "akogare" which means a strong desire, is conventionally used to describe the Japanese desire for Western things, such as the Japanese woman's fetish for the white male (cf., Kelsky 2001). Iwata saw a TV documentary about the Great Wall when he was in primary school which made a life long impact on him. In the programme, the famous Japanese Actor, Ken Ogata, travels to the remote part of China searching for the end of the world - where the Great Wall ends. On the way, the actor went through mountains and deserts, meeting with ethnic Chinese people, and he was introduced to

³⁹ Sanshiro Iwata interviewed by Yoshi Tezuka, August 22nd 2006 in Tokyo.

a variety of different ways of life in China. The sense of a vast space and the scale of the Great Wall made a tremendous impression on Iwata as a child. He was moved so deeply that he made up his mind that he would go to China as soon as he was old enough to travel abroad.

So, in his first summer holiday as a university student, Iwata travelled to China, going to remote regions such as Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang province and Tibet. He was interested in photography as a hobby, and took many pictures of people and landscapes in China. During this trip he also learnt about the human rights issues in Tibet for the first time. Iwata caught a glimpse of the life of Tibetan herders who had been forcibly relocated to urban areas and farmland, and he photographed them. He said that this was because he wanted to relate to the people he met during the trip in China, but he did not know any other way to do so that to take photographs. Looking back now, it was probably through this experience that he nurtured the idea of becoming a documentary filmmaker; he thought it might give him a more active involvement with reality, with what he saw, than taking photographs as a tourist (Iwata interview 2006).

At university, Iwata studied international culture and Chinese language; and he educated himself in cinema by watching at least one film a day and when he discovered Chen Kaige's *Farewell My Concubine* (1993) he considered it to be the masterpiece of all time. So when he heard that the Beijing Film Academy, where Chen Kaige and the other famous Chinese filmmakers had been trained, had opened its doors to foreign students, he felt that he had to go there to study.

Iwata was not the only young Japanese wannabe filmmaker who was excited about the prospects offered by the Chinese film school. A substantial number of Japanese students have studied in The Beijing Film Academy since the late 1990s. For example, in 2000 the actress Chie Maeda was, according to the Tanabe Agency website, the first full-time foreign student accepted by the department of acting, one of the most competitive departments in the Academy. Maeda has played leading roles in a number of Chinese films during and after film school - *Purple Sunset* (Feng Xiaoning 2001); *Autumn Rain* (Sun Tie 2003) and is currently regularly hosting the *Study Chinese Conversation* programme on Japan's national TV broadcasting station. There is also the director, Takahiro Nakamura, who studied at The Beijing Film Academy from 1999 to 2001 (yokohamamary website); his first feature-length documentary film, *Yokohama Mary* (Nakamura 2006) was theatrically released in 2006. And in the same year, at the Yokohama Student Film Festival, The Beijing Film Academy and The Central Academy of Drama - China's two top film and drama educational institutions - screened their first graduation films directed by Japanese students.⁴⁰

After graduating from a Japanese university, Iwata studied at The Beijing Film Academy for one and half years as a short-term student. On his return to Japan, he got a job as an assistant director in a small TV production company. He was promoted to director a couple of years ago. At the time of my interview, he was about to leave for China again as he had been given a grant by the Chinese government to undertake another year of study at The Beijing Film Academy; this, he believes, will

⁴⁰ Shinji Aoyama directed his graduation film from The Beijing Film Academy *A Day in Beijing* (2006), and Yukari Nishiyama directed her graduation film from Central Academy of Drama *Fifth June, Sunday, Cloudy* (2006).

give him an excellent opportunity to extend his connections in China and could help in furthering his career as a documentary director (Iwata interview 2006).

At the time I interviewed him, Iwata and his friend, Ren Shujian, were working on a project about the new Qinghai-Tibet Railway which climbs the Himalaya Mountains and runs across Tibet's snow-covered plateau – the 'roof of the world'. This first railway link between China and the Tibet Autonomous Region was inaugurated by the Chinese President Hu Jintao in July 2006, who said: "this is a magnificent feat by the Chinese people, and also a miracle in world railway history" (BBC News, 01 July 2006). The Chinese authorities and tourist industry were very keen to publicize the railway and so Ren, having strong connections with China, organized trips for Japanese press and TV journalists to cover the journey on this picturesque railway with the help of Iwata's connections in Japan. On one hand, the Qinghai-Tibet Railway is said to bring "major opportunities to a poor region", but on the other hand it is feared that it "consolidates China's control over Tibet" (ibid.) Thus, Iwata says that he was ambivalent about collaborating on this project at first, but decided to go ahead with it because:

There are political issues and historic questions I normally avoid when I talk to my Chinese friends, because they are bound to bring up arguments; human rights issues in Tibet is one of them, and the Japanese atrocities in China is another. But between Ren and I, we agreed that the differences could become productive if we keep talking and collaborating professionally. (Iwata interview 2006)

Iwata says that he has to be pragmatic about how to deal with complex political issues. He has an unfinished documentary project about Tibetans in Beijing on which he has been working, on and off, since he was originally a student at The Beijing Film Academy. He filmed the lives of Tibetans living in Beijing and interviewed them. But he has not publically shown the footage to anyone, because if the Chinese authorities find out about his project he will be probably banned from entering China. He plans to continue filming when he gets back to Beijing, but has to be convinced that the project is worth risking his visa status before he will make it public. On one hand, it is very important to keep on good terms with the Chinese authorities as a documentary filmmaker who works in China, on the other hand, he has ambitions to make films with some social significance.

Ren Shujian made a documentary film about life in North Korea and showed it on Japanese television – *Kita chosen no natsuyasumi (Summer Holiday in North Korea, 2005)*. Since Chinese nationals have privileged access to the otherwise closed country Ren was able to take part in a group tour organized for Chinese nationals to North Korea and made a film about his experiences. According to Ren, there are certain political and professional advantages of being a Chinese filmmaker working in Japan and this is one example (Ren interview 2006). In a similar way, Iwata also says that there are certain advantages to be a Japanese filmmaker in China; for example, it is easier for him to approach Tibetans because he is a foreigner, and if he gets found out by the Chinese authorities, the consequences will not be as bad for him as for a Chinese filmmaker – though he may not allowed to come back to China ever again (Iwata interview 2006). In the complex and various ways actors are said to be interacting in the process of “truly hybrid regionalization” (cf.,

Katzebstein 2006: 2), Ren and Iwata's examples provide a insight into how those actors are engaged in more "horizontal" and "open" relationships and networks after the erosion of Japan's dominant power.

Conclusion

The relative decline of Japanese economic power and the rapid ascent of Asian countries, particularly China, has changed the dynamics of the regionalization process significantly. In various domains including culture, Japan-centred regional cosmopolitanism, which locates "Japan" above "Asia" and invites other Asian countries to follow Japan's example – the so-called "flying geese model" of development - lost credibility. Instead, "Japan" became a symbol of an Asian modernity which was perceived to be attainable by the emerging middle class in other Asian countries. This changing relationship between "Japan" and "Asia" was evinced clearly in the ways the relationship between the Japanese and Hong Kong film industries changed between the 1960s and the 1990s.

As the economic recession continued, the major Japanese media companies turned away from risky overseas projects and became less involved with the regionalization processes despite the rising trend of China-centred regional co-productions in the twenty first century. Nevertheless, I have argued in this chapter that underneath the surface, the experiences of individuals in the Japanese filmmaking community, particularly the independent filmmakers and film students, are increasingly enmeshed and framed by the networking effects that spread beyond

national borders. In other words, Japan is inescapably a part of “a truly hybrid form of regionalism” (Katzenstein, 2006: 2) that is presently underway in East Asia.

The Chinese-Japanese translator/dialogue coach, Thomas Tang, taught Chinese to numerous well-known Japanese actors and Japanese to Chinese actors. Tang finds that Asian actors are keen to learn each other’s languages and he himself started learning Korean recently. He states:

I taught Japanese to the Taiwanese actor Chen Bo-lin. Bo-lin wanted to work in Japan because if he became popular in Japan, it would help his popularity in Korea. And if he becomes popular in Japan and Korea, he will be an ‘Asian’ star and Hollywood may take notice of him. I taught Chinese to the Japanese actress Rena Tanaka who had a similar idea and wanted to work in Chinese film. They all want to work in other Asian countries. (Tang 2006)

In the cultural geography in which “Japan” is no longer above “Asia”, “Asia” is simply bigger than any one nation-state and its market. And for those ambitious individuals in the media industry, becoming “Asian” is perceived as a step closer to becoming “Global.”

Conclusion

As a conclusion I will give a brief summary of the findings, corresponding to the four sets of questions I posed in Chapter Three.

- 1) What constitutes Japanese national identity, as a social and historical construction? How was this challenged or reinforced through the post-war modernization/ westernization process? What were the consequences of the Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism we identified among Japanese filmmakers as they defined themselves against the West and Asia during the internationalization of Japanese cinema in the 1950s?

As we saw, post-war Japanese cinema and industry defined itself as “different” from the West, but “above” Asia. This ideological double-bind was internally challenged in the 1960s and 70s by filmmakers such as Oshima, who highlighted the unresolved issues of Japanese imperialism. But it was a series of events in the 1980s and 90s, especially following the end of the cold war, that finally brought an end to the socioeconomic conditions that had underpinned this constitutive double-bind of Japanese identity. Since the opening of the country in the mid-nineteenth century and throughout the process of modernization/Westernization, the sense of Japanese national identity was sustained by its unique and privileged position between the “West” and “Asia” in a hierarchically organized world.

However, economic globalization and the consequent cosmopolitanization

have flattened this world-view. Moreover, the rapid rise of the economic and technological standards of other Asian countries has undermined Japanese confidence at the same time as it has necessitated the formation of a new and a different kind of relationship. In Chapter Four, I demonstrated that there was strong continuity between the pre- and post-war Japanese film industry in terms of industrial structure and the mentality of the filmmakers. The Legitimizing Cosmopolitanism of the latter reaffirmed and reinforced the Japanese national identity within this double bind.

2) How, and why, was globalization in the 1980s qualitatively a very different phenomenon from the preceding internationalization for the Japanese film industry? What happened to national identity? Why and how did Resistance Cosmopolitanism emerge as the most active type of cosmopolitanism at this juncture?

Aside from American pressures to open and globalize the domestic market, I argued in Chapter Five that there were a number of internal dynamics which led the Japanese film industry to a historic rupture in the 1980s. First, the Japanese film industry had been in decline since the 1960s and the studio production system had collapsed by the late 1970s. Hence change in the production system was overdue in the 1980s. Second, mainstream “hardware” industries like Sony became interested in the “software” business. Thus, a new prospect for the film industry was on the horizon. Third, because the Japanese film companies had not been recruiting new blood for a long time, a new generation of filmmakers and producers had to come in from outside the conventional film industry. As a result, a long tradition and culture

that had sustained Japanese cinema through the studio production system for generations had largely broken down by the 1980s. Fourth, the above condition called for the development of an independent production sector in which producers would put together creative, financial, and distribution packages in the flexible market conditions existing outside the studio production system.

Under these circumstances, a new generation of producers who started their careers as distributors of European films, such as Masato Hara of Herald-Ace, Satortu Iseki and Michiyo Yoshizaki of N.D.F., Takashi Asai of Up-link, and Lee Bong-U of Cine Qua Non played important roles in transforming the Japanese production practice. They were more experienced in international dealings than conventional Japanese film industry figures and were characterised by what we identified as Resistance Cosmopolitan tendencies. They were not only keen on international co-productions and investments, but they were also keen to modernize domestic production practices, since the role of producer had to be re-invented as a subject of flexible accumulation in the global age.

Chapter Five demonstrated how economic globalization made conventional “national perspectives” paradoxical and produced potential agents (or “*subjects*” as Castells calls them [2004: 10 italics original]) of social change. However, my empirical research in the Japanese film industry suggests that Project Cosmopolitans are individualistic. Therefore, the likelihood of Project Cosmopolitanism developing into a collective form so as to become the agent (*subject*) of wide social change is limited to very exceptional historic conjunctures. Project Cosmopolitans tend individually to carve out their niche space within the

existing structure. Having said this, however, repercussions and “side effects” (Beck 2006) of these seemingly minor isolated alterations to the social condition cannot be overlooked in their potential contribution to overall structural change.

3) How differently are cosmopolitan subjects produced in the Japanese filmmaking community before and after globalization in the 1980s? What is the new mode of subjectification in the age of *Global Hollywood* (Miller et al., 2000)? In what way has Japan’s relation to Western “otherness” changed?

The comparative case study in Chapter Six has shown the differences between the ways in which Japanese filmmakers thought about their national and occupational identities before and after the historic rupture. Before the rupture, Japanese cultural uniqueness was naturalized in the process of modernization, to the extent that more or less everything was explainable in terms of their unique culture, including their miraculous economic success. It was in their mutual interests for both the Americans and the Japanese to emphasize Japanese uniqueness, as we have seen in the case of the production of *Shogun* (1980). On the other hand, the case study of *Lost in Translation* (2003) provides an example of ways in which Japanese uniqueness and identity were understood under the new post-cold war discursive regime. After the heavy dose of consumerist hybridization and the prolonged economic recession in the 1990s, the Japanese uniqueness no longer represented either a useful tool of ideological control or a threat to American universalism. A new generation of Japanese filmmakers and producers were much keener to be integrated into the global production system than had been the case with the earlier generation.

For many of them, transnational identification through their occupational category overrode their national identity. However, this seeming transcendence of national identity through occupational category has another aspect. As I have argued, and demonstrated with examples from the remaking of *Grudge 2*, there is a strong indication that the discursive regime of transnational capitalism and its control are intensifying the need for subjects to apply self-discipline to themselves in order to be “cosmopolitan” in the age of Global Hollywood. Chapter Six showed that being “cosmopolitan” necessitates working not only with nationalism but also with neo-liberal “globalism” to a certain extent. Therefore the development of analytical tools that enable us to distinguish a “cosmopolitan” moment in the process of globalization from a “globalist” moment is necessary for studying the dynamics between the two.

4) How differently has Japan interacted historically with Asian “otherness” compared to Western “otherness”? How was this change manifested both before and after globalization in the 1980s? In what ways are Japanese filmmakers involved in the cosmopolitanization of Asian film industries on a regional level?

When the Japanese and Hong Kong film industries resumed exchange in the late 1980s, it was palpable that Hong Kong filmmakers had the upper hand. As Yeh and Davis put it, Hong Kong filmmakers no longer “look[ed] to Japan as a model of technical, economic and creative advancement, a standard to which they aspire[d]. Japanese media and fashion was more like a trove for ideas that [could] be mined for exportable elements” (2002: 64). By the end of the twentieth century it

became evident that Japan was not the only Asian country which had adopted Western modernity and enjoyed a high level of material consumption, in the process creating symbols which represented the hybrid lives they were living using the latest Western technology. In the face of the relative decline of the Japanese economy and the rapid economic ascent of China, the dynamics of regionalization in East Asia have changed fundamentally.

In socioeconomic conditions in which “Japan” is no longer so different from the “West” and certainly not above “Asia”, the major Japanese media/film companies are becoming inward-looking and now tend to eschew taking part in transnational projects at the point of writing in the early twenty-first century. In Chapter Seven, however, I have argued that on the level of small independent companies and individual filmmakers, a life in the Japanese filmmaking community is increasingly more enmeshed within, and linked to, various transnational networks. Thus, despite its appearance, the process of cosmopolitanization in the Japanese filmmaking community and the culture industries in general is inescapably under way.

Afterthoughts

This afterword is based on my reflections on the core arguments of my thesis and on comments made by readers. It addresses three key aspects of the position I have put forward that raise contentious issues. These are:

(1) the relative balance between two epistemological approaches to social change that stress breaks and ruptures (as in the pre and post globalisation schema) on one hand, and those that emphasise the importance of taking account of continuities and historical legacies on the other hand.

(2) the growing complexity of regionalisation within the East Asian audio visual sphere, with particular reference to the emergence of two relatively separate networks of relations-one centred on Japan/S Korea and the other on China/Hong Kong and Taiwan.

(3) the question of whether, given the increasing convergence of formerly separate audio visual industries, as a result of innovation in digital technologies, further research on film needs to focus on the 'content industries' rather than the film industry.

The critical readers of my thesis were of the view that the descriptions of the shift from “national” to “cosmopolitan” discursive regime in Japan was too categorical and that Beck’s “cosmopolitanization theory” had been applied too rigidly to the empirical materials. It became clear that it is important to retain the distinction between having a sense of being a “citizen” of a society and having a

sense of “national belonging”. This was necessary for the continuance of democratic institutions even in a so-called cosmopolitan society, thus it was a grave mistake to collapse this distinction and hastily claim that “national categories became zombie categories” (Beck 2006). Without this distinction, “banal cosmopolitanization” will simply end up as another name for “commercialization”.

My understanding of Beck’s comment is that he was criticizing the sociological convention which equated a “society” with a nation-state and assumed that all the important social institutions were organized nationally. On reflection, however, it is true that I could have read Beck more critically; I may have overstated the case and placed too much stress on “breaks and ruptures” sometime.

I did not think of globalization so much in terms of a transition from being a “citizen” in a society to being a “consumer” in the market because of the particularities of Japanese history. “Democracy” was implanted by the American occupation after the war, and the concepts of citizen and consumer were collapsed and confused from the beginning. The Japanese accepted and appropriated the concept of “democracy” enthusiastically as an essential part of capitalist modernity during the course of economic re-building. “Democracy” and “capitalism” came to Japan as parts of the same package and have never been distinguished properly. No sense of the citizen, nor of social security, had been fully developed before globalization, and as a result citizenship and commercialism have never been considered in the minds of Japanese people as being in conflict.⁴¹

⁴¹ There is an interesting study about the Americanization of the post war Japan by the sociologist Shunya Yoshimi. He documented the various ways in which washing machines, refrigerators, and television sets were

To help clarify the way I understand the two different epistemological approaches to social changes, I would make reference to the distinction made by Deleuze and Guattari between philosophic and scientific time. They suggest that:

[Philosophic time] is a stratigraphic time where “before” and “after” indicate only an order of superimpositions... Mental landscapes do not change haphazardly through ages: a mountain had to raise here or a river to flow by there again recently for the ground, now dry and flat, to have a particular appearance and texture. It is true that very old strata can rise to the surface again, can cut a path through the formations that covered them and surface directly on the current stratum to which they impart a new curvature. Furthermore, depending on the regions considered, superimpositions are not necessarily the same and do not have the same order. Philosophical time is thus a grandiose time of coexistence that does not exclude the before and after but superimposes them in a stratigraphic order (1994: 58-9 italics in original).

On the other hand, while scientific time is no more confined to a linear temporal succession than is philosophy:

[I]nstead of a stratigraphic time [of philosophy], which express

introduced to the Japanese home as symbols of the American life style, and democracy. (Yoshimi 1999: 160)

before and after in an order of superimposition, science displays a peculiarly serial, ramified time in which the before (the previous) always designates bifurcation and rupture to come, and the after designates retroactive reconnections. This results in a completely different pace of scientific progress (1994: 124).

According to Deleuze and Guattari, this amounts to saying with Kuhn that “science is paradigmatic, whereas philosophy is syntagmatic” (1994: 124), and I believe this distinction is helpful in understanding the discrepancy between the two approaches to social changes: the one that stresses breaks and ruptures (as in the pre and post globalisation schema) on the one hand, and that emphasises the importance of taking account of continuities and historical legacies on the other hand. They come from two different academic traditions – those of the natural sciences and of the humanities - and they have different analytical values.

To sum up my response to the critique, I accept that I was keen to make my points about the transformative nature of globalization and I used Beck’s theory as a leverage to get my point across rather than critically evaluating his cosmopolitanization theory. This uncritical attitude towards the theory may have taken the critical edge off my argument, and as a result the conclusion of the thesis might suffer from a touch of over optimism about the prospect of cosmopolitanization. Having admitted this shortfall in my scholarship, I would still like to clarify that it was not at all my intention to claim that I found empirical evidence of a simple progression from national to cosmopolitan subjectivity within the Japanese filmmaking community, nor to claim that globalization was a “paradigm

shift” in the scientific sense. My attitude towards the “balance between two approaches” is that although it is possible and sometimes useful to stress “breaks and ruptures” for articulating certain aspects of social changes, in general it is empirically more accurate to describe social changes in “philosophical time” rather than in “scientific time”. Both within society and human minds, I believe, what was there before coexists underneath the present surface. The underneath, “before” remains active and remains in tension with the “present” and occasionally cuts through into the strata above and re-surfaces in the “present” to form an even newer social landscape.

I move on to the second issue about “the growing complexity of regionalization within the East Asian audio visual sphere”. This issue was raised because my thesis dealt mainly with Japan’s relationship with the Chinese and Hong Kong film industries, but did not really deal with its post-colonial relationships with other countries such as Korea and Taiwan. A reader wanted to know why not.

My answer is that I certainly did not avoid talking about Japan’s post colonial/imperial issues, and in fact, one of the case studies in chapter two concerned Zainichi- Korean (Japanese resident Korean) filmmakers. However, it was not possible to discuss this issue in more detail and greater depth in this thesis, simply because I felt that would have been too much of a diversion. Having said this, I am very much interested in this issue as a topic for my future research.

As I touched upon in chapter two, since Korea’s official opening to Japanese popular culture in 1998, and the recent phenomenal successes of Korean

films and TV dramas in Japan, it has been said that Korean and Japanese audience tastes have been converging rapidly. What is popular in Korea is now highly likely to become popular in Japan and vice versa. Consequently, many big budget films have been co-financed by Korean and Japanese sources in recent years, and a number of Japanese film producers to whom I have spoken confirmed that it became common for Japanese film projects to have a Korean distributor attached at an early stage, and a reputable Korean distributor has nowadays become a key element for the successful financial packaging in Japan. Thus Japanese-Korean regional convergence is happening on at least two levels, one to do with audience taste and another to do with film financing.

Another interesting regional development in East Asia is the emergence of a “Pan-Asian Cinema” discourse centred in the Chinese cultural zone. I touch on this subject in chapter seven, showing how the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPE) between Hong Kong and mainland China made it possible for overseas Chinese, including Taiwanese, to invest in the mainland through Hong Kong. As a result, two distinctive cultural and economic blocks are emerging within the East Asian audio visual sphere: that of Japan-Korea on one hand, and that of the Chinese language areas, which includes Hong Kong, Taiwan and mainland China. I believe these regional dynamics indicate a possibility of talking about post-post colonial, or post-post imperial, relationships between Japan and her neighbouring countries and a new landscape of the East Asian audio visual sphere.

The third issue raised by a reader of my thesis is, whether “further research on film needs to focus on the 'content industries' rather than the film industry”

because of the increasing convergence of formerly separate audio visual industries as a result of innovation in digital technologies. My answer to this question is: not necessarily, because, both the “film industry” and the “contents industries” are mental concepts that mark out the contours of a certain group of individuals and companies rather than constituting a solid socio-economic institution; furthermore, it is quite possible that we are simply using different words for the same socio-economic phenomenon and the focus on the “film industry” will be most likely to remain important.

As is very often said, Hollywood no longer exists in California but in people’s minds. The film industry ceased to be a material existence when the studio production system collapsed during 1970s in most of the film producing counties and it then became more of a mental concept. It lost its definable institutional boundaries, and it had become an indistinct space or an interdisciplinary field for freelancers who had a variety of backgrounds more than twenty years before the new term - the ‘contents industries’ - was invented.

This new term, the contents industries, started to circulate in cultural/ economic policy documents in conjunction with the development in new digital technologies in recent years. The latest technology, the I-phone, for example, is a mobile handset capable of delivering texts, graphics, music, and movies alike to consumers. This phenomenon is called the digital convergence of media platforms and the contents industries, as the industries that produce contents for a multiplicity of media platforms, now appear to be converging and diversifying at the same time. Historically speaking, however, the interesting thing about the concept of “film” and

the “film industry” is the fact that in the recent past they have been constantly defying such technological determinations. For example, “filmmakers” have been working on TV, advertising, and educational videos for decades now. Nowadays they shoot their “films” using video cameras and edit their “films” on computer and then distribute them on DVD, or, upload them onto internet, but they still identify themselves as “filmmakers” and what they make are “films” regardless of what technologies they use. In this sense, being a “filmmaker” in the “film industry” is a matter of cultural distinction rather than a job description, and “film” is an aesthetic category rather than a material description of the technology they work with. In other words, the film industry functions as a powerful symbolic system which subsumes all sorts of media people and contents. It classifies the people and media contents, and adds cultural/commercial value to them.

The “film industry” has already survived a number of socio-economic re-organizations and technological transformations. In the process, the “film industry” has ceased to be a discrete part of the contents industries and became a symbolic centre of a field that overlaps with all the other fields of media production. My speculation about the future of the film industry in the age of digital convergence is that the significance of this implicit symbolic centre will be more likely to increase than to decrease. Therefore, focusing on the “film industry” will remain a viable option for researching into how the “contents industries” work in the age of so-called digital convergence.

List of Recorded Interviews

Araki, Keiko (The director of Pia Film Festival), Hidetoshi Morimoto (Pia Film Festival), and Yuko Sekiguchi (Chief editor of Kinema Junpo) recorded on July 30th 2005 in Tokyo.

Asai, Takashi (President of Uplink, independent producer, distributor, exhibiter), recorded on July 28th, August 10th and 17th in Tokyo.

Fujii, Hiroaki (Film Producer), recorded August 5th 2005 in Tokyo

Fukushima, Satoshi (Film producer), recorded on August 11th 2006 in Tokyo

Furusawa, Binbun (Film producer), recorded on August 24th 2006 in Tokyo.

Inoue, Kiyoshi (Film producer), recorded on August 4th and 12th 2005 in Tokyo

Iseki, Satoru (Film producer), recorded August 26th 2006 in Tokyo.

Iwata, Sanshiro (Documentary filmmaker), recorded August 22nd 2006 in Tokyo .

Morishige, Akira (Film producer), recorded on Feb 12th 2006 in Berlin and on August 2nd 2006 in Tokyo.

Morishige, Kaoru (Chinese-Japanese production interpreter), recorded on August 3rd 2006 in Tokyo

Nishimura, Takashi (Film producer and director of Uni-Japan), recorded on July 28th 2005 in Tokyo and on Feb 13th 2006 in Berlin .

Oiwake, Shiro (Film producer), recoded on July 30th 2005.

Ren, Shujian (Documentary Filmmaker), Jyo, Gyochin (徐業程 Cinematographer), and Tomomasa Muto (Sound recordist), recorded on August 12th 2006. Then, a single interview with Ren recorded on August 25th 2006 in Tokyo.

Tang, Thomas (Chinese-Japanese production translator, dialogue coach), recorded on August 10th 2006 in Tokyo.

Ushiyama, Takuji (Film producer) and Shoko Kikuchi (Film journalist), recorded on August 17th 2006 in Tokyo.

Yamagigima, Katsumi (Cinematographer) and Naomi Yanagijima (Sony Pictures Japan), recorded on August 6th 2006 in Tokyo.

Yoshizaki, Michiyo (Film producer, NDF international), recorded on December 26th 2006, January 15th and February 10th 2007 in London.

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