

The temporal borders of asylum.

Temporality of migration controls in the EU border regime.

20 March, 2016, Island of Lampedusa: the Italian Coast Guard has just disembarked 130 migrants at the harbour of Lampedusa after rescuing them on the high sea. The personnel of the cooperative that runs the hotspot take the migrants to the centre by bus, escorted by police officers. Once they are inside the Contrada Imbriacola hotspot, they are all identified and fingerprinted by the Italian Scientific Police in few hours. From that moment on, the migrants have been divided and their future destinations will differ. Some of them have been allowed to claim asylum and will be transferred within days to hosting centres on the mainland where they will stay as asylum seekers until their demand is processed. Others, meanwhile, have been illegalized “on the spot”, insofar as they have been denied the right to claim asylum and have been given a decree of expulsion that obliges them to leave the country seven days, although almost all of them will remain “irregularly” in Italy. This story on the southernmost island of Europe is not an exceptional event but, rather, a snapshot of an ordinary scene of migration management in the wake of the implementation of the Hotspot System. Such an ordinary migration scene taking place at the external frontiers of Europe is characterised not only by a series of spatial bordering mechanisms but also by a certain temporality of control, made of specific and uneven rhythms and by a multiplication of temporal borders. This article explores the temporality of control that is currently at stake in the EU border regime.

The Hotspot Approach was launched by the EU in the *European Agenda on Migration* in May 2015 as the main EU’s response to the increased number of migrant arrivals by sea. The Hotspot System consists of infrastructures for detention and of a series of procedures and mechanisms for identifying and selecting migrants (Garelli, Tazzioli, 2016a; Kasperek, 2016; Scieurba 2016). The hotspots have been devised as “part of the immediate action to assist frontline Member States facing disproportionate migratory pressures at the EU’s external border”¹, hence their location is at critical border-sites. It is important to highlight

¹http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/2_hotspots_en.pdf

that the Hotspot System has been conceived in conjunction with the Relocation Programme, which in principles should alleviate Greece and Italy from the “refugees’ burden” . The Programme establishes the “transfer of asylum seekers who are in clear need of international protection from one EU Member State to another European state”, where his/her asylum claim will be in fact processed. Yet, only a highly selected migrant population is eligible for the Relocation, since “it applies to nationalities of applicants with an EU-wide average recognition rate of 75% or higher”², and it is proceeding at a very slow pace.

The accelerated temporality of identification procedures and preventive exclusion from the channels of the asylum is one of the main mechanisms which shape the hotspot-machine in a distinctive way. The *swift pace of control* when combined with the multiplication of *temporal borders* as techniques for further restricting and hindering access to the asylum system, is the EU’s border strategy put into place to discipline and respond to practices of migration that could not be regulated through spatial containment. However, such a relative rapidity in the procedures apt to fingerprint migrants and denying the access to the channels of the asylum has as its main consequence that (many) asylum seekers remain stranded in border-zones - waiting the response about their appeal against the denial of the international protection. Migrant movements are slowed down and migrants’ autonomous temporalities are disrupted, while at the same time the channels of deportations and forced returns are hastened.

Importantly, the Hotspot System as such should not be read in terms of a radical break with previous or still coexisting mechanisms and infrastructures for identifying and managing migration. Rather, through the hotspots, the European Union has boosted a humanitarian-security mode of intervention that is predicated upon accelerated procedures of preventive illegalization for restricting the access to the asylum system. Since the opening of the hotspots in 2015, we have witnessed to a multiplication and a frantic variation of temporal borders migrants are subjected to upon landing, which also generated a proliferation of statuses and differential channels of protection, deportation and illegalization.

The opening vignette could be taken from many different analytical angles, such as the “production of migrant illegality” (De Genova, 2004), the economy and the micro-econom-

²http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5698_en.htm

ies of detention (Conlon, Hiemstra, 2014; Belcher, Martin, 2013; Mountz et al., 2013), the effects of detention on migrants (Gill, 2009), the role of humanitarian and military actors in rescuing and managing migrants (Cuttitta, 2015), the spatial transformations of containment (Mountz, 2015; Williams, 2014) and the embodied temporal experience of borders (Griffiths, 2014). Instead, this paper engages with the what I call *the temporality of control that underpins the working of the EU border regime, which in turn reshapes its strategies for selecting, governing and disciplining migration*. By temporality of control I mean the specific temporalities that are at stake in the techniques and modes of migration governmentality; at the same time, I also refer to the fact that temporality itself plays a crucial role in the reshaping and the enforcement of migration controls. Within the framework of the temporality of control, I introduce the theme of *temporal borders*: these consist in the establishment of deadlines and time limits which impact on migrants' lives and geographies. Temporal borders, I contend, play a crucial role in regaining control over unruly migration movements. The lens of the temporality of control enables seeing that time is not only object of mechanisms of control - control *over* time - but also a mean and a technology for managing migrant - control *through* time. Temporal borders do not supersede spatial boundaries and geopolitical borders, nor they can be analysed as autonomous objects. On the contrary, a gaze on the temporality of control and on temporal borders enables grasping the transformations of the "spaces of governmentality" (Tazzioli, 2015) in the field of migration management; and, conversely, it requires analysing the heterogenous articulations and disjunctions between temporal and spatial bordering mechanisms.

The three arguments that sustain this article are the following. First, I suggest that in order to grasp the restructuring of the EU border regime it is fundamental to investigate the variations and changes in the temporality of control and in temporal borders that are enforced for selecting migration. Second, through this article I show that the current Mediterranean migration context is characterised by a multiplication of temporal borders - set for producing hierarchies of mobility and restricting the access to the asylum, through mechanisms of preventive illegalisation - and by an accelerated temporality of control. This latter is not in opposition to nor in contradiction with migrants' legal limbo and protracted wait inside hosting centres in Italy and in Greece. The temporality of control concerns identification and fingerprinting procedures migrants are subjected to soon after landing as well as the

first step of the asylum process . Relatedly, and as a third point, through this article argues that the temporality of control and temporal borders are functional to slow down and disrupt migrants' autonomous temporalities and geographies of movement, and to hasten at the same time the channels of deportation.

By bringing attention to the current Mediterranean migration context I do not want to suggest that the working of temporal borders is a peculiarity of the Hotspot System. We should also caution against any risk of “presentism” (Walters, 2011) in describing the establishment of temporal borders and the speeding up of identification procedures as something totally new or unprecedented. Temporal restrictions have been important mechanisms in the government of mobility for long time. Rather, I point to the work of temporal borders in governing migration and to their changes and alterations (Jeandesboz, Pallister-Wilkins, 2016). This becomes particularly visible if we look at the functioning of the hotspots: the restructuring of the EU's politics of mobility for regaining control over migration and disrupting their autonomous geographies and temporalities of movement, should be read in the sense of a multiplicity of subtle re-assemblages that require in-depth investigation. More precisely, a focus on the functioning of the Hotspot System in Greece and in Italy enables us, firstly, to deal with temporal borders by showing both continuities and discontinuities in the techniques enacted for governing migrants. In fact, on the one hand an analysis of the hotspots makes possible highlighting the centrality played by temporal borders in governing migration. Secondly, with the implementation of the Hotspot System the EU has presented the “swift processing of migrants”³ as a priority, in order to avoid protracted and huge spatial concentrations of migrants in landing spaces or in critical border zones. In reality, as I will show later, not only migrants inside the hotspots are managed by keeping them spatially stranded and suspended in a juridical limbo - with the hotspots becoming in many cases spaces of containment. Together with that, it is worth noticing that the EU and some member states have multiplied temporal borders, that is deadlines that migrants have to comply with in order to be eligible for the Relocation Programme or to access the asylum procedure. Thirdly, the hotspots appear as a lens for seeing that temporal borders have been fostered in

³ [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/556942/IPOL_STU\(2016\)556942_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/556942/IPOL_STU(2016)556942_EN.pdf)

the current European context for regaining control over unruly mobility and to discipline asylum claims, restricting the access to the channels of protection.

Investigating the transformations of “border temporalities” (Walters, 2016) in the Mediterranean, this article proceeds as follows. In the first section it makes an overview of the existing literature which tackles temporal borders and temporality in the field of migration governmentality. Then, it provides a theoretical analysis of the ways in which temporality is implicated in the government of migration. Building on the research fieldwork that I conducted in Greece and in Italy, the article moves on by analysing the temporal borders and the temporality of control which are at stake there, and illustrates how the Hotspot System contributes to enforce hierarchies of mobility. This is followed by a section that deals with the desultory temporality of control which is at stake in the government of intra-European migration movements and the forms of spatial containment that this latter engenders. The article concludes by considering the ways in which migrants often come to “jam” the logistics and the temporality of migration governmentality, refusing to be fingerprinted or to comply with temporal borders.

This article is the result of the research fieldwork that I conducted in Italy (Lampedusa, Sicily and Ventimiglia) and in Greece (Lesbos, Chios and Athens) between 2015 and 2017⁴. This research is characterised by the articulation of data and information gathered from the field - participatory observation with semi-structured interviews with institutional actors and interviews with migrants - with an analysis of EU documents. Importantly, what I present here is not an ethnographic description of the hotspots but, rather, a reflection on the temporality of control in the EU border regime which builds on the empirical findings I got through the fieldwork. The decision to take into considerations different islands such as Lampedusa, Chios and Lesbos, does not mean disregarding the differences and the peculiarities concerning the ways in which migrants are managed upon landing. I bring attention to

⁴I conducted ethnographic research at the hotspots and at the ports of Lampedusa, Lesbos and Chios interviewing national police, the Coast Guard and UNHCR’s officers. In Italy I did fieldwork in Ventimiglia, at the French-Italian border and in Lampedusa (December 2015 and February 2016). In Lampedusa I conducted semi-structured interviews with fifteen migrants and five interviews with local NGOs and one with the manager of Misericordia, the cooperative that runs the hotspot. In Greece I interviewed also the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) at Athens headquarters and the Greek Asylum Service (April 2017) which is responsible for processing asylum claims. In Lesbos I interviewed Doctors without Borders and got access to the hotspot on April 21, 2017 via the NGO Mercy Corps upon official request. Inside the hotspot I could interview NGOs officers (8) and I also conducted ten semi-structured interviews with migrants. I also interviewed five migrants in the premises of the camp. In Chios (July 2016 and April 2017) I interviewed UNHCR’s officers at Souda refugee camp and the manager of the camp.

these islands as they play a major role in the so called Hotspot System; in these border-zones the multiplication of temporal borders through which migrants are managed, selected and divided is particularly visible.

Temporal borders and temporality of control:

A considerable wealth of literature has produced in-depth studies on migration and temporality, focusing on migrants' individual or collective time experiences (Cwerner, 2001), the life-course approach (King et al., 2006), prison time in carceral geography (Moran, 2012) and the production of migrant precarity and temporariness (Bagelman, 2016; Griffiths, 2013; Robertson, 2014). Nevertheless, the temporality of "border works" (Rumford, 2006) - that concerns how borders are enacted, how they function, and how they generate effects of containment and selection - has remained quite unexplored, although with a few notable exceptions (Andersson, 2014; Mezzadra, Neilson, 2013). The relative marginality in the literature of the relationship between temporality and techniques of migration and border controls frictions with the fact that, as Ruben Andersson has aptly noticed, temporality "has become a multifaceted tool and vehicle – even a weapon of sorts – in the 'fight against illegal migration'" (Andersson, 2014: 2).

This article does not intend to bring a contribution to the field of time geography as such (Hägerstrand, 1985; Thrift and Pred, 1981); rather, it is situated in critical geography literature on migration and it has the goal of understanding how temporality is deployed in mechanisms and tactics of migration control as well as in bordering practices. It also engages in a twofold partial shift in relation to carceral geography literature which addresses migrant detention (Moran, 2012; Moran, Gill, Conlon, 2013) since, firstly, this piece does not concern migrants' embodied experience of time - migrants' lived experience of protracted wait - but rather on bordering techniques; secondly, it does not look at spaces of detention and moves to consider the spatialities of control and containment that are connected to detention centres. In particular, I pay attention to the analysis of temporal borders done by Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson in the book *Border as Method*, as it constitutes a fundamental reference for the findings that I propose on the temporality of control. Mezzadra and Neilson deal with the issue of temporality arguing that "only from the perspective of border crossing and struggles can the temporal thickness and the heterogeneity of the border be discerned" (Mezzadra, Neilson, 2013: 166). They show that temporality is one of the mech-

anisms around which borders are enacted, highlighting that the border itself is “an important mechanism of temporal management, which aimed through its spatial operations to synchronise” the heterogeneous temporality of migration (Mezzadra, Neilson, 2013: 134). Such an expression refers to the manifold ways in which bordering techniques for regulating migration are enacted by exerting control *over and through time*. That is to say, migrations are governed, selected and contained even through the establishment of temporal borders and through mechanisms of control that affect and disrupt the temporality of migrants’ journeys. By mobilising such an analytical angle, this article ultimately speaks to the debate in the field of political geography about border transformations: many scholars have pointed at the disjunctions between geopolitical borders and the borders of migration control, stressing at the same time the “ubiquitous” (Balibar, 2002) character of the borders against the traditional representation of the border as a line (Casas-Cortes et al. 2010; Johnson et al. 2011; van Houtum, 2005). Borders are not only multiple at the level of their forms and functioning, they are also mobile: for this reason, authors have gestured towards a “mobile epistemology” (Amhilat-Szary, Girault, 2015; BurrIDGE et al., 2017) able to capture borders’ movements. Yet, all these analyses engage in redefining what a border is or in grasping the actual spatial transformations that occurred at the level of bordering processes. This article complements and expands on this debate by bringing attention to the ways in which bordering mechanisms have been enforced also through non-spatial techniques, that is through temporal frontiers.

The uneven temporality of border working has become an object of concern in the field of normative political theory that points to the limits of tackling borders from a merely spatial perspective. These scholars take into account the complex temporality of borders and the ways in which borders are enforced in order to deeply rethink practices of management (Koenig-Archibugi, 2012; Little, 2015; Parker-Vaughan-Williams, 2009). Adrian Little makes an important distinction between “tempo” or “pace” and “temporality”, showing that the latter involves a subjective dimension - how subjects experience temporal changes dynamics - and it “is not just whether change takes place at a slower or faster rate but is more focused on the different speeds at which change takes place across different aspects of bordering” (Little, 2015: 431). Speaking about “temporality of control” I also make reference to the change in speed, that concerns both mechanisms of control and asylum procedures,

situating it within a broader analysis about the global political technology of borders. Such an expression offers a clear insight into bordering mechanisms and the subsequent effects of containment, selection and exclusionary sorting, even through the instantiation of differential temporal paces. However, the focus on borders' temporalities differs markedly from normative approaches. In fact, it aims to highlight the changes and alterations that often occur in the pace of governmentality which is at play in border-zones at the level of the ordinary practices of identification and control. Far from implicitly assuming a homogenous temporality, I bring attention to the discontinuities, alterations and irregularities that characterise the pace of migration controls.

The temporality of control represents an advantageous perspective for grasping how concretely borders operations are re-crafted by states and non-state actors as a response to new migration movements. Temporal techniques of bordering are at the core of the present reshaping of the European politics of mobility in the face of what both member states and the European Union has defined a "refugee crisis". Regarding the use of such a term - "refugee crisis" - I put it deliberately in inverted commas insofar as I do not want to corroborate the EU's narrative about Europe being under crisis because of the arrivals and the presence of people seeking refuge. On the contrary, I concur with authors that speak about a partial crisis of the EU border regime and of the European project at large, as well as a crisis of the migrants stranded at the borders of Europe (De Genova, Garelli, Tazzioli, 2018; Bodzadjiev, Mezzadra, 2015); starting from that, I take into account the ways in which by declaring that a refugee crisis is going on, both the EU and member states have contributed to reshape the EU migration politics. Hence, I do not present here a distinct timeframe of the crisis; rather, I analyse which transformations occurred, beyond the discursive register, at the level of techniques of migration management with the implementation of the Hotspot System.

In order to regain control over unruly mobility into and across Europe, the government of migration through and over time has gained central stage to supplement spatial bordering mechanisms. This latter is not characterised by a linear temporal rationale - for instance, by an accelerated temporality of control. Rather, it is predicated upon heterogenous temporalities, which in the current context are formed by the speeding up of identification procedures and by the preventive exclusion from the channels of the asylum system, as well as, together, by indefinitely protracted moments of wait and of legal impasse. In fact, migrants are al-

ternatively subject to abrupt accelerations and to indefinite wait, as well as to moments in which migrants themselves jam and slow down the logistics of deportation (Vaughan-Williams, 2015). In other words, by exploring how temporality is used as a technology of government in the EU border regime, I do not echo at all an accelerationist perspective concerning the government of mobility. Instead, I want to draw attention to the role played by temporal borders in articulation with the multiplication of modes of spatial confinement.

In fact, a focus on temporality does not involve disregarding the spatial dimension of migration governmentality. Rather, a close look at the ways in which borders establish a specific pace and temporal limits enables us to grasp the transformations that occur in dividing and managing migrants, both as singular individuals and as part of multiplicities. Such an analytical angle allows grasping effects of “containment beyond detention” (Garelli, Tazzioli, 2016b), that is to say techniques for governing migration that are not narrowed to modes of spatial confinement nor to block migrants and that, rather, consist in disrupting and diverting migrant geographies, generating effects of forced mobility.

This means engaging in an analysis that considers the temporality of control in relation to the heterogenous spaces of migration governmentality. It is important to remark that, the spatialities of migration and border controls are multiple: while the focus of this paper is mainly on effects of containment generated on migrants, actually migrants are governed through heterogenous spatialities of migration control that involve, for instance, control over migrant routes, the spaces produced by EU’s bilateral agreements with third-countries and deportation routes. An analysis of border temporalities enables a greater focus to be placed on the emergence of non-territorial spaces, such as spaces of control that stem from exclusionary partitions and profiling activities among migrants which are also made through temporal restrictions and according to a pace of control (Ngai-Ling Sum, 2003). The angle through which I approach the temporality of migration control is the asylum system and the measures enacted for identifying, selecting and partitioning migrants in seek of asylum, as well as the measures through which they are preventively denied to access the asylum procedures⁵.

⁵ Temporal borders are established and enacted in many migration scenarios, as well as in diverse mechanisms deployed by states for regulating mobility, far beyond the asylum system - such as for instance, circulation migration programme, migration labour schemes, student visas.

The EU's response to migrant arrivals in Italy and Greece and to the increased presence of asylum seekers across Europe represents a distinctive insight into the way in which temporal borders are reassembled for regaining control over *unruly mobility*. The reshuffling of the temporality of control concerns different dimensions: the pacey variations in the identification and sorting procedures, and the enactment of *temporal deadlines* imposed on migrants - which consist of precise dates and lapses of time that delimit migrants' right to enter a certain space, to obtain humanitarian assistance or to access the asylum system. On this point we should recall the suspension of the Schengen agreement on free movement imposed by six member states in the span of a few months⁶. Additionally, it is important to highlight the multiple entry restrictions according to nationality established by states along the Balkan route - e.g. the Macedonian-Greek border was initially closed to North African migrants in November, 2015. Restrictions were then imposed on all nationalities except Syrians, Iraqis and Afghans in March, 2016. Nevertheless, speeding up of identification procedures constitutes only one among many temporal measures which seek to introduce new exclusionary partitions.

The speed of preventive illegalization in Greek and Italian hotspots:

The implementation of the hotspot system represents a case in point of a broad reshuffling that concerns the temporality of control in border-zones. The hotspot model, formed by a series of variegated and arbitrary measures for fingerprinting, illegalizing and dividing migrants, has proliferated across spaces well beyond the physical barriers of those detention centres that have been renamed "hotspots"⁷. Nevertheless, it is important to highlight the partial elusiveness of the Hotspot System in contrast with a representation of it as a well-defined and stable set of material infrastructures and identification procedures. In fact, every hotspot, in Italy and in Greece, is characterised by a peculiar daily functioning and, more

⁶ Denmark, Sweden, Germany, France, Norway and Austria suspended the Schengen Agreement. France was the first in June 2015. Already in 2011 France suspended the Schengen Agreement for some months in the face of a sudden increase in Tunisian migrants.

⁷ Lesbos, Kos, Chios, Samos and Leros in Greece; Lampedusa, Pozzallo, Taranto and Trapani in Italy

broadly, the criteria and effective practices for selecting, identifying and dividing migrants change over time.

The analytical angle of the temporality of control that set the pace of the exclusionary criteria of the asylum allows shifting away from the spatially bounded sites of detention towards an analysis of the ways in which mobility is channelled and illegalized, and of how migration categories and profiles are generated. Building on Michel Foucault's methodological gesture which consists in moving around the prison for understanding the economy of illegality that sustains it (Foucault, 1995, 2009), I look here at the spaces of containment and mobility that stem from the hotspot system, producing effects well beyond the fences of those reception centres now renamed "hotspots". This does not involve paying less attention to the logistics of migration management and to identification procedures taking place inside the hotspot. Rather, it involves dealing with the broader channels of containment and mobility that the hotspot is part of, taking as a privileged analytical angle the temporality of control.

The islands of Lampedusa and Lesbos are privileged sites for grasping border temporalities, that is to say practices of control and regulation exercised on singular migrants and on migrant multiplicities through the enactment of specific *rhythms of governmentality*. Through such an expression I refer both to the disciplining of mobility through dates and "deadlines" that migrants have to comply with in order to become eligible for protection and for relocation, and to mechanisms of partition, selection and identification that rapidly change over time,.

Lesbos 2017. The spatial and political transformations that have occurred in the last three years in the strategies of capture, control and containment of migration movements have followed a *hectic pace*. The rapid transformations occurred in the temporality of migration control has reached high rhythms after the implementation of the EU-Turkey agreement, signed on March 18, 2016. Importantly, the frantic changes made at the level of criteria for selecting migrants and processing asylum claims contribute to produce what Claudia Aradau has aptly defined as "nonknowledge", which consists in "ignorance, opacity and uncertainty" and into a "variable density of unknown" (Aradau, 2015: 3-4). Indeed, the rapidity of changes in the temporal deadlines that migrants have to comply with, produce a generalised nonknowledge, regarding the "rules of the game", as an EASO officer declared to me

in Athens, both among asylum seekers and, at a different degree, among the actors involved in managing migration. Thus, the frenetic alterations of temporal borders is part of a mode of government through confusion and uncertainty that in itself produces effects of temporal suspension and spatial confinement on migrants.

Due to the clause contained in the EU-Turkey agreement that considers Turkey a “safe third country”⁸, migrants who arrived on the Greek islands after March 18 2016 are processed under the Fast-Track Procedure: few days after they land on Greek islands, the European Agency EASO (European Asylum Support Office) interview the migrants assessing whether or not Turkey is a safe country for them. This constitutes a sort of pre-step that determines migrants admissibility to the asylum procedure: those migrants who are considered not to be in danger Turkey are preventively denied of the possibility to claim asylum and become deportable. Which temporal borders have been established in Greece ? Can we speak of an accelerated temporality of the asylum procedure ? The Greek asylum system is predicated upon a split temporality of control formed by different speeds: on the one hand, denials of the refugee status and preventive exclusions from the asylum channels have hastened, together with the process of asylum applications laid by those Syrian nationals who had passed the admissibility step; on the other, as I realised during my participant observation on the island of Lesbos, interviewing both migrants and NGOs personnel, migrants who had been firstly denied of the international protection remain stranded in the hotspots for months waiting for the result of the appeal against the first instance decision.

As an officer of the Greek Asylum Service explained to me in an interview that I conducted in Athens in April 2017, “Syrians who are declared admissible to claim asylum in Greece are transferred to the mainland and their application is processed in one day; while the others remain on the islands where their asylum claim is processed or where they wait to be deported”. As I also have the possibility to observe during my fieldwork in Lesbos and in Chios, only Syrians and “vulnerable subjects” are lifted of the geographical restrictions imposed on all migrants who had arrived on the Greek island after March 18, 2016, that establish that they cannot be transferred to the mainland before getting the refugee status. Hence, temporal borders and spatial restrictions are strictly entangled with numeric thresholds: mi-

⁸[http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release MEMO-16-1664_it.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-1664_it.htm)

grant nationals whose rate of success in getting the asylum is less than 25% bypass the admissibility step - since the introduction of admissibility procedure was in fact made for restricting access to those migrants who have high chances to get the asylum. However, it would be misleading to stick to the official documents on the fast-track procedure on the Greek islands, in which well-defined temporal borders are established: the asylum procedure should be conducted in principle in no more than two weeks,; the time given to the applicant to prepare himself for the interview is of one day: the person has eventually five days only to appeal against the denial of the international protection and then a final decision should be taken by Greek authorities in three days⁹.

In reality, the prolonged presence of migrants in Lesvos tells us another story. I got the authorisation to enter the hotspot of Lesvos, Moria, via the NGO Mercy Corps, that is in charge of providing cash assistance to asylum seekers inside the camp. “I have been here for fourteen months, still waiting for the result of the appeal I made against the negative first instance decision on my asylum application”: R., a 28 years old guy from Mali just renewed his asylum card for the tenth time. In fact, normally asylum cards validity in the Greek hotspots is of one month, despite on average migrants remain inside the hotspot for one year. Therefore, the short-term expiration date marked on asylum cards conflicts with migrants’ protracted forced permanence inside the hotspot. Similarly, on the island of Chios while migrants’ admissibility to the asylum procedure is quickly examined - and thus many are preventively excluded from the asylum system -, at the time when I was conducting research there in July 2016 and in April 2017 there were however about 700 migrants who were waiting for about one year in the refugee camp of Souda¹⁰. Temporal borders have been also introduced for the first time by the International Organisation for Migrations (IOM) as a condition for migrants to apply for “voluntary returns” to their country of origin from the Greek islands. Migrants are allowed to apply only if they do that in five days after they receive the denial of the international protection and exclusively if they renounce to appeal against the

⁹ <http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece/asylum-procedure/procedures/fast-track-border-procedure-eastern-aegean>

¹⁰ Souda refugee camp was shut down in September 2017, while I was finalising this article.

negative decision¹¹. Therefore, temporal borders can have dissuasive effects and lead to counter-routes.

Yet, on this point two considerations should be made. First, the accelerated temporality concerns the partition between migrants who are allowed to claim asylum and those who are preventively excluded, under the clause of admissibility. Second, as I briefly mentioned above, the temporality of control is not characterised by linearity nor by homogeneity: the uneven temporality of control reinforces racialized hierarchies of migration and to make it harder for the migrants to navigate the asylum system. The change that took place in the Greek asylum politics with the signature of the EU-Turkey Deal did not concern the speed of the politics of control but its modulations and subsequent impact on migrants. In fact, until the end of 2015, rescued migrants were taken to the hotspot of Moria to register; the registration was the necessary condition for getting the authorisation and a ferry ticket to leave Lesvos and go to the Greek mainland on the route to Macedonia and the Balkans, with a temporary permit of one month (all nationalities) or six months (Syrians only) to circulate in Greece¹².

The temporality of control in Italy has been subject to a less frantic alteration than in Greece. The logistics of the hotspot in Italy has been structured around a relatively centralised mechanism for channelling migrants and transferring them from their initial points of arrival in southern Italy to hosting centres across the country. In Italy, the longstanding history of migrants coming by sea on the one hand, and the marginal role of EU agencies in managing migration upon landing on the other, makes alterations in the temporality of control by far less frequent and visible than in Greece.

Nevertheless, even in Italy the *pace of migration controls* is formed by criteria of selection that is not constant over time, following desultory changes in government practices and that has become more glaring with the implementation of the hotspot. On the island of Lampedusa the rapid decisions taken on migrants' asylum claims gave rise to a huge increase in the number of illegalized migrants on the Italian territory. Soon after Lampedusa, even the detention centre in Trapani became a hotspot in December, followed by Pozzallo in

¹¹ Interview with IOM in Athens, April 21, 2017.

¹² Interview with Doctors without Borders, Lesvos, 8 April 2016.

January, 2016 and Taranto in March. For approximately four months, (November, 2015 to March, 2016) migrants who landed in Lampedusa were subjected to a mechanism of preventive illegalization and systematically prevented from claiming asylum. Migrants in Lampedusa used to be taken from the harbour to the hotspot upon disembarkation, where they are quickly identified within hours by the Italian Police, while Frontex and EASO officers control the Italian authorities, confirming that migrants are fingerprinted and their data transferred to the EURODAC database, as it was explained to me by the cooperative Msericordia which runs the hotspot in Lampedusa.

The hotspot¹³ procedures rapidly identify migrants who are eligible for relocation (Syrians, Eritreans, Iraqis), and approve their asylum applications. The majority of migrant nationals from West African countries - among which Nigerians and Gambians, who in early 2016 were the first two nationalities of migrants arriving in Italy - and all migrants from “North Africa” have been illegalized “on the spot” (Garelli, Tazzioli, 2016a), as a group of about eight Nigerian migrants confirmed to me in the premises of the hotspot. The non-judicial label of “economic migrant” is now used to deny them access to the asylum procedure. These preventively illegalized migrants are given a decree of expulsion that obliges them to leave Italy in seven days. Yet, most of them remain in Italy as illegalized migrants, except those migrants nationals from Nigeria, Egypt and Tunisia that can be rapidly deported due to the repatriation agreements between Italy and these countries. Temporal borders were introduced to reduce the possibilities for migrants to appeal against their preventive illegalization: fifteen days is the time-limit to make an appeal and try to enter legal asylum channels. In this regard, it is important to highlight that Italy has been put under pressure by the EU concerning the obligation to fingerprint migrants. In this way, preventive exclusion from asylum channels can be seen as an Italian strategy to avoid having to pay the cost of humanitarian assistance. In short, in a time of economic crisis, the cost of the asylum system has been reduced to a minimum, preventing most migrants from receiving humanitarian support and reducing them to the position irregular migrants in Italian territory. Therefore, the accelerated temporality of control contributes to narrow down the space of protection as much as

¹³ Since the hotspot is a restricted access reception centre, this could be reconstructed only from the direct testimonies of the migrants who have left and been transferred to Sicily, or those who were able to leave the hotspot of Lampedusa during the day.

possible and to *temporally anticipate the threshold of deportability*. That is to say, instead of granting rights to asylum seekers, Italian authorities have illegalized many migrants on the spot, transforming them into irregular and thus potentially deportable subjects.

When spatial containment does not hold. Temporal borders' cut.

Which specific form of control is at play in the hotspots? The strategy of control deployed in the hotspot does not exercise a constant hold over migrant conducts. What matters is the speed of identification procedures and of the partitions made among migrant multiplicities,. Related to this, the accelerated temporality of control actually concerns the first stage of migration management upon disembarkation. On this point, it is worth recalling the argument by Dimitris Papadopolous, Niamh Stephenson and Vassilis Tisanos in the book *Escape Routes* on the notion of the “decelerated circulation of mobility”, contending that “camps appear as the spaces which most drastically attempt to regulate the speed of this circulation and to decelerate it” (Papadopoulos, Stephenson, Tsianos, 2008: 198). Such an analysis is helpful in clarifying that the accelerated temporality of migration governmentality concerns the rapid identification and selection procedures upon landing. If we focus on its impact on migrants’ lives and their journeys, we see that it functions as a spatial capture practice that ends up in slowing down the speed of some migrants’ movements - generating protracted situations of legal limbo or preventively illegalizing asylum seekers -while hastening some others, as it is the case of deportations from Greece to Turkey and channels of expulsions.

In the *Explanatory note on the “Hotspot” approach*, the European Commission envisages the possibility “to intervene, rapidly and in an integrated manner, in frontline Member States when there is a crisis due to specific and disproportionate migratory pressure at their external borders”¹⁴. Similarly, in *The European Agenda on Migration* the speed required in the hotspot does not concern the time needed to find a solution and a protected space for people seeking asylum but, rather, the capacity to “*swiftly identify, register and fingerprint incoming migrants*”¹⁵. Thus, more than transit points, the hotspots appear as spatial and temporal

¹⁴ Explanatory note on the “Hotspot” approach (<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/jul/eu-com-hotspots.pdf>)

¹⁵ *European Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 240 final* (<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0240&from=EN>)

“chokepoints”, that is as sites of mobility disruption. Mobilising Debora Cowen's work on logistics and readapting it to the hotspot context, I suggest that migration management necessitates spatial and temporal chokepoints to slow down and select migrant movements, the main concern of the authorities being that these crucial sites could be jammed and unsettled in their functioning (Cowen, 2014). To sum up, the *hotspot as a chokepoint* obstructs and decelerates migration movements and simultaneously speeds up identification and selection procedures. Nevertheless, as I illustrated regarding to the Greek context, far from resulting in a generalised acceleration of the logistics of migration governmentality, after the phase of identification and first partition of migrants upon disembarkation or in critical border-zones, many remain spatially blocked or are stuck in a legal limbo, or detained indefinitely.. In a nutshell, the speeding up of controls concerns the digital and legal presence of migrants more than their actual physical presence in space.

When practices of spatial confinement no longer work in a given context, temporal borders produce further restrictions and “vertical” cuts, namely hierarchies of mobility and protection, for instance concerning the conditions to access the asylum system. Temporal borders are always at stake in border-zones. Yet, in a context in which migration movements cannot be managed through forms of spatial control and existing exclusionary categories for selecting migrants, the work of temporal borders becomes more tangible. Thus, the government of migration *through* and *over* time contributes to generate effects of spatial containment and to disrupt and deflect migrants’ autonomous geographies. The implementation of temporal borders set by the European and national authorities has had a major role in producing hierarchies of mobility and in resulting into immobility on some migrants, and in forced movement for others: temporal borders produce territorial material limitations.

As illustrated above, nationality certainly represents the main criterion used in both Greece and Italy to establish exclusionary partitions among migrant multiplicities. Yet, nationality is not enough as a parameter for keeping migrants out of asylum channels and of relocation, particularly in Greece. While the date of the signature of the EU-Turkey agreement produced a split temporality, formed by a “before” and an “after”, migrants’ eligibility for the relocation and for the pre-registration procedures¹⁶ has been subject to temporal borders

¹⁶ On the pre-registration procedure for asylum seekers in Greece, see <https://www.easo.europa.eu/news-events/joint-press-release-pre-registration-asylum-seekers-greek-mainland-starting-today>

enacted as time intervals into which migrants fit. The government of asylum seekers who have entered Greece between 2015 and 2017 pivots around a dense calendar of dates that establishes, on the basis of the migrant's day of arrival and on other related events, who is *not allowed* to access the relocation procedure. The Relocation Scheme is in place only for those who entered Greece before March 20, 2016; Iraqis who have been registered after July 1 are excluded from the relocation; the pre-registration procedure is applicable only for those who arrived between January 1, 2015 and March 20, 2016. These are some of the time intervals that migrants must be lucky to match in order to be potentially successful candidates and to remain in Europe without being illegalized. When strategies of spatial containment are not sufficient in limiting mobility and narrowing access to protection, states introduce temporal borders that *vertically cut across* the sites where migrants are identified and registered, producing a further hierarchisation of "legitimate" mobilities. In the Greek context, temporal borders have contributed to officially fix migrants to a certain space and to simultaneously declare those labelled as deportable or inadmissible to the asylum procedure. In the Course at the College de France, *The Punitive Society* (1972-1973), Michel Foucault compellingly describes the way in which unruly conducts had been fixed to apparatuses of production in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. These mechanisms of spatial fixation were not only used to improve capitalist production but also to discipline "illegalisms of dissipation" (Foucault, 2013: 201) among which mobility itself is included. These considerations certainly cannot be transposed to the contemporary government of migration; however, Foucault's analysis provides a compelling insight for grasping how governments generate forms of spatial fix and containment over and through time. Spatial fixation enables governments to take control of migration movements and routes, hampering migrants' autonomous mobility.

Forced inverse routes and migrants' jamming the temporality of control:

In order to understand the uneven temporality of control in all its nuances, we have to disjoin our "sight of migration" (Tazzioli, Walters, 2016) from the directionality of migration movements as represented on maps. That is to say, we should not stick to the visibility of migration that is generated by state cartographies or by Frontex maps. Indeed, the epistemology of migration maps conveys a directionality of movement. The vectorial character of maps ultimately recalls Michel De Certeau's definition of space to us, as a "practiced place"

that exists only to the extent that “one takes into consideration vectors of direction, velocities, and time variables. Thus, space is composed of intersections of mobile elements” (De Certeau, 1988: 117). Maps crafted by states and non-state actors depict migration according to a South-North orientation: they visualise migration according to the virtual direction of migration controls and of monitored channeled mobility (Walters, 2017). Indeed, the maps’ visualisation of South-North migration movements does not take into account migrants’ forced returns nor migrants’ intra-European movements. This brief excursus on the cartographic representation of migration enables showing the connections between temporality of control and spaces of containment, as well as between temporality and visibility. Relatedly, this involves not to narrow our account of the Hotspot System to the moments and spaces of migrant detention, moving instead to consider what happens to them “after” being identified and selected inside the hotspots. In other words, an in-depth analysis of temporal borders entails refusing to stick to the punctual moment of identification and control which take place upon migrants’ arrival.

The government of migration through temporal borders is related to strategies of spatial containment. These strategies take place not only by blocking people while they try to move Northward but also by *moving migrants back* and by forcing *migrants to move around*. Migrants are apprehended and transferred or returned while they are trying to find a way to cross or while they temporarily stay in informal camps or in the cities. The impact on migrant geographies consists in a disruption of trajectories and in a protracted state of convoluted mobility. In the face of migrants trying to reach Northern Europe, states have reacted by dividing and scattering migrant multiplicities, and by transferring migrants from critical border zones. The goal of taking them in the opposite direction to their move was twofold: producing an effect of deterrence and making their journeys longer. Thus, states adopted a moving back strategy. Such a move back and the consequent retry tactic on the part of the migrants comes to multiply erratic geographies. Migrants are kept on the move according to a desultory temporality of mobility which generates diversions in their routes as well as temporary blockages.

The proposal released by the European Commission in 2016, entitled “Completing the reform of the Common European Asylum System” set up new directions for preventing and tackling unmapped migrants’ geographies. The document seals a strategy aimed at fixing

migrants in given places, preventing and criminalising mobility across Europe. The real target is not mobility per se but asylum seekers' unruly movements: the humanitarian protection is subjected to a spatially-bounded condition. "In cases where an asylum seeker is not complying with the obligation to reside in a specific place and where there is a risk of absconding, Member States can make use of detention"¹⁷. Being an *absconder* to the systems of traceability means not being mappable and not remaining fixed in the allocated place. It is noteworthy that the EU is trying to deter and tackle intra-European migration movements through a *temporal and spatial move back strategy*. The measure of spatial fixation will be in place anytime that migrants are apprehended in the "wrong" member states: "Member States would have an obligation to send asylum seekers who have absconded back to the responsible Member State, where they would be subjected to an accelerated examination procedure"¹⁸.

Thus, an investigation on the temporality of control necessitates coming to grips with migrants' intra-European movements. Secondly, an analysis of temporality as a mechanism for managing migration also entails considering the *temporality of visibility* and questioning the *visibility of migration* produced by governmental actors. Temporality of visibility refers to the desultory and delimited visibilization of spaces of migration control that complicates an understanding of what happens to migrants after they are rescued and identified, or after that they leave hosting centers or receive a deportation notification. In order to fully explore the temporality of control at stake in migration governmentality and the spaces of containment that are enforced, we have to follow more invisible channels of control.

The hotspots have become part of a broader infrastructure of migrant forced transfers and *forced inverse routes*: hotspots are used not only to identify and sort migrants at their first entry-points in Europe, but also as sites of temporary containment. A case in point is represented by the weekly internal forced transfers of migrants made by the Italian police from the cities of Ventimiglia, located at the Italian-French border, and from the city of Como, at the Swiss-Italian border, towards the hotspot of Taranto, 1200 kilometres Southern. Italy's plan

¹⁷ *Completing the reform of the Common European Asylum System: towards an efficient, fair and humane asylum policy*, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2433_en.htm)

¹⁸ "Towards a reform of the common European Asylum System and enacting legal avenues to Europe", COM (2016) 197, final.

of “lightening”¹⁹ critical border-sites such as Como and Ventimiglia reveal that following swift identification procedures in which biometric traces and partitioning mechanisms matter most, the physical presence of migrants becomes a “problem”.

The focus on the temporality of control should not lead us to depict an image of an overwhelming machine of governmentality in which any drift in the mechanisms of control is seen as a mere failure of the system. Measures for disciplining and filtering migration are reactive cartographies of control deployed for containing unruly mobility, in some cases on a merely responsive basis while in others through a preventive logic that tries to foresee future migration scenarios and acts accordingly. From such a perspective, the temporality of control is also a way to preventively disrupt the temporalities of migration. These latter are not completely autonomous, insofar as they are to a large extent the outcome of the limits and conditions imposed by migration policies (McNevin, 2011). Yet, the ways in which migrants move partly take place out of the established channels of relocation, control and transfer set by states. More precisely, migrants have repeatedly jammed the ordinary functioning of the hotspots and of their desultory temporality.

The Italian context sheds light on the obstructed and slow pace of the institutional channels of asylum. In fact, while according to Italian directives, migrants should stay in a hotspot for no more than 72 hours, as I had the opportunity to observe during my fieldwork and interviewing local NGOs, people remain in the hotspots of Lampedusa and Pozzallo for two weeks on average, and some for up to four months. In some cases this delay is the result of collective or individual forms of refusal with vengeance on the part of migrants, who oppose to the obligation to be identified and fingerprinted. December 17, 2015, 6-7 January 2016, 8-16 May 2016: these are the most salient temporal landmarks of collective migrant refusals that took place in the hotspot of Lampedusa in the form of public protests and sit-ins, without mentioning the individual and silent resistance that is not captured by the spotlights of the media and that have remained fundamentally unknown and invisible. While I was conducting the fieldwork in Lampedusa, on December 17, 2015, about 230 migrants from Sudan and Eritrea went out of the hotspot and gathered in front of the main church of Lampedusa, and proceeded to march in the streets of the village with banners chanting, “No

¹⁹ That is to say, the Italian Home Office has planned not to leave too many migrants waiting in critical border-sites like Ventimiglia.

fingerprints. We want freedom. We want to move out from the camp”²⁰. These collective refusals jammed the hotspot logistics for some time, although at the expense of the migrants themselves, since the police detained them indefinitely in Lampedusa due to their refusal to be fingerprinted. Moreover, the migrants were eventually fingerprinted by force after four months of detention, and after being transferred to the mainland, were left to their own devices by the police in both rural and urban areas of Sicily. Even if some did succeed in escaping, their spatial containment was potentially produced through the biometric traces they were forced to leave in Italy²¹.

Nevertheless, I do not want to suggest a direct contrast between the temporality of control and the temporality of migration. Struggles over the temporality of control can take different forms; the eventual accelerations, decelerations and moments of suspension and blockage depend on the specific power relations that are at play in a certain space. Speed and desultory temporality are not on the side of the migrants nor on the side of techniques of control, and the same can be said for interruptions and decelerations. For instance, the temporal borders established in Greece have also worked as *slowing down devices* to gain control over migrants’ rapid transits. Yet, this struggle between migrants’ speed and bordering mechanisms which restrict the access to asylum and simultaneously decelerate and obstruct migrant movements, cannot be taken as a blueprint of the clashes around mechanisms of control over and through time. Indeed, the strategies that have been put into place to slow down and control migrants in transit are significant with regards to a very specific moment that coincided with the “long summer of migration” (Kasperek, 2016), that is to say summer and autumn 2015. As illustrated above, the signature in March, 2016 of the EU-Turkey Deal triggered important changes in migrants’ strategies and, simultaneously, in the struggles over the temporality of control. Confronted with accelerated channels of deportation, most of the migrants detained in the hotspots opted for claiming asylum. After March 20, within a few days migrants claimed for asylum en masse, clogging up the logistics of deportation, and using the spatial control usually exercised over asylum seekers as a form of guarantee against forced removal, becoming non-deportable as a result. As an Afghan migrant suc-

²⁰ When the protest took place I was on the island conducting fieldwork. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-lampedusa-fingerprint-idUSKBN0U02H720151217>.

²¹http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/examination-of-applicants/index_en.htm

cinctly told me in the premises of the hotspot of Moria in April 2016, “we do not have other choice than trying the asylum path. Either we will be deported or we will make to Europe through the channels of the asylum”. Hence, the asylum system, inherently predicated upon strategies for capturing and controlling mobility, has been appropriated and used by migrants as a (temporary) guarantee of non-deportation: the implications of the EU-Turkey agreement led them to “hijack” the asylum system and its exclusionary boundaries.

Conclusion:

Political geography scholarship has extensively discussed the transformations of borders, highlighting the disjunctions between geopolitical frontiers and the borders of migration control, studying also the heterogenous bordering mechanisms that are in place to regulate, select and disrupt migration movements. This analysis of the temporality of control of EU migration governmentality is grounded in this debate, as it has accounted for the recent changes occurred in refugee governmentality in Europe at the level of border controls. Nevertheless, while this literature mainly focuses on the “emerging spatialities of mobility control” (Burridge et al. 2017: 5), this article has brought attention to the emerging political technologies for governing migration over and through time. Yet, these latter are not taken at all in opposition to or in the place of an analysis centred on spatial transformations: rather, temporal strategies of control are tackled here as part of heterogenous bordering mechanisms and of their ongoing reshaping in the face of migrants’ presence. Such an analytical angle enables highlighting the effects of subjectivation produced by border enforcement practices: in fact, the precarisation of migrant lives appears as an outcome of the uneven temporality of control that consists of protracted condition of wait and sudden accelerations.

Temporal borders have been mobilised by states as a strategy for regaining control over unruly migrant movements,. As I have shown throughout the article, the temporality of control represents a fundamental analytical angle for grasping the ways in which the authorities seek to limit “unruly mobility” (Tazzioli, 2016). “Technologies of temporal management” (Mezzadra, Neilson, 2013: 133) are more visible in contexts in which they supplement mechanisms of spatial containment and the establishment of exclusionary legal partitions by restricting further the access to the asylum process and also by multiplying migrant categories and degrees of semi-legality and illegality. The current Southern European

context in the aftermath of the implementation of the Hotspot System is particularly relevant for better grasping the functioning and the transformations underway of the temporality of migration control. In fact, the role played by temporal borders becomes particularly glaring by looking at the Hotspot System, as hotspots have been devised for speeding up identification procedures. Simultaneously, a study of the Hotspot System makes possible bringing to the fore new features and arrangements of temporal borders, which mainly concern the politics of asylum - e.g. the frantic multiplication of deadlines that migrants have to comply with in order to claim asylum, and the preventive illegalisation on the spot of potential asylum seekers. More precisely, an insight into the present Greek and Italian migration context shows that the enforcement of temporal borders corresponds to the frantic attempt by member states to regain control over unruly mobility, by speeding up identification procedures, fixing temporal deadlines and slowing down migration movements.

“Spaces of governmentality” (Tazzioli, 2015) are characterised by the mutual entanglement between temporal borders and forms of spatial containment that change over time in response to migration movements that exceed and trouble exclusionary categories and bordering techniques. Temporal borders not only strengthen exclusionary mechanisms and an implementation of new ones: restricting the possibility to access the channels of the asylum, they also contribute to the multiplication of migration profiles and of degrees of semi-legality and irregularity and hierarchies of subjects deserving protection. “We need to pass”: the slogan repeatedly chanted by migrants blocked at the Italian-French border tells us about the impatience of migrants in moving on, confronted with bordering tactics that slow down their journeys and try to impose the pace of control on the temporalities of migration.

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