In Different Voices: A Practice-based Intervention into the Assemblage of Crime

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I hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.

Philippa Thomas

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Abstract

This is a practice-based project which explores and critiques the dominant assemblage of crime, through undertaking experimental empirical research with ex-prisoners, a policeman, a private investigator and criminologists who produce differing and conflictual versions of crime. Sensitive to the 'enforced narratives' of criminalised people, I 'translated' my empirical data into new forms. The outcome is a collection of short literary fictions and a film, and a written thesis, which explore the politics of showing and telling about crime. Following the ontological premise that our research methods *produce* rather than represent our objects of investigation, this practice-based project rejects the stable 'moral construction' of criminals, victims and criminologists which is implicit in much criminology. Conceptualising crime as a multiplicity or an 'assemblage', necessitates disengaging from the pursuit of a 'hidden reality' of crime and claims of strong causality, to instead pay close attention to the patterning of present contradictions. The thesis seeks to make an original contribution firstly, in engaging a body of poststructuralist philosophy - marginalised within criminology, to rethink some of its central concepts. Secondly my project extends what criminology can be and can look like. Thirdly, it performs a politics of research that aspires to be answerable to those researched. Finally, reading across these compositions produces a more morally nuanced version of crime as a complex multiplicity.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Chapter One: Making Crime Strange: Crime as a Multiplicity

<u>Introduction: 'Cracking' Crime?</u>

'Crime, together we'll crack it'[1] assured a ubiquitous British public information slogan of my childhood. This phrase formulates crime as a social problem, and its wording effects a number of things:

Crime…

the slogan doesn't specify what crime is, it assumes we already know and as such implies that the concept of crime is transparent and consensual.

together we'll …

creates a collaborative, cohesive community. Through needing to crack or comprehend crime, this community is signalled as being made up of people who are not involved in undertaking criminal acts (not criminals), but nevertheless *involved* in crime through being disadvantaged by it (potential victims of crime): 'we', the people who want to get rid of crime.

… crack it.

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[1] This long running publicity campaign was launched in 1988 as part of increased policy emphasis on community led crime prevention.

Undefined and inchoate 'crime' is imbued with a sense of solidity through the very demand that it be 'cracked'. The choice of the word crack is productively ambivalent – crime could be smashed into pieces, or solved, like a puzzle or code. The slogan is reassuring but also entreats the reader for help, the government can't crack crime alone, but needs 'us' to cooperate with them.[2]

For me, this public information slogan captures something of the problematic of crime. Crime is the designation for a category of acts and practices which are hugely diverse, sharing an essential commonality only in their illegality. What belongs in this category is historically and geographically contingent, a contemporary example of this being the differing legal status of homosexuality worldwide. However, crime is not only produced by the employment of laws which can impose sanctions and punishments, but hovers over the intersection of myriad social and legal practices. Although there is some overlap with acts and practices which are cast as socially deviant – by which I mean different from the norm – this is not necessarily the case. There is also some crossover with acts and practices that are seen as socially harmful, although again harm is hard to measure, and many socially harmful things are not criminalised. To work on crime is necessarily to engage

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[2] As Alison Young points out, the government's production of this slogan at a time where there was increasing criticism focussed on the practitioners of criminal justice due to high profile miscarriages of justice, like the Guilford Four, seemed intended to provide a more flattering counter-image of criminal justice actors as detectives, scientifically and rationally discovering the source of crime. Alison Young, *Imagining Crime: Textual Outlaws and Criminal Conversations* (London; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1996), 8.

questions of how one should live, of morality and what constitutes the socially tolerable. Kaleidoscopic images of crime are now consistently part of our public debate and popular culture, shifting to produce new 'public feelings'[3] and new criminal 'types'. Although self-reporting crime surveys suggest that committing crimes, whether unreported, unprosecuted or prosecuted, is common within the general population (crime is normative, and not statistically socially deviant),[4] there is simultaneously a prevalent moral condemnation of crime and revulsion towards prosecuted criminals (social deviants). I am interested in how as a society we often blithely live out this paradox.

Reality Multiplies

To 'enstrange'[5] a familiar object means to manipulate it in a way that makes its audience see it afresh and unfamiliar. It shows the object to be unnatural

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[3] Ann Cvetkovich uses the term 'public feelings' to draw attention to the way that emotions and affects are not private and individual but public and shared. As such they act as a political resource. Ann Cvetkovich, *Depression: A Public Feeling* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012).

[4] I will discuss this further in chapter three of this thesis.

[5] 'Ostraniene' or 'enstrangement' was coined by the literary theorist Viktor Shklovskiĭ in his essay 'Art as Device/ Technique' (1917). In this essay, he argues that our lives and perception of the world are dulled by routine to the point in which we no longer actively "see" anything, but merely passively recognise things as they fit within our formulas and preconceptions. In his view the purpose of art is, via novel or surprising presentations, to make familiar things strange and 'to lead us to a knowledge of a thing through the organ of sight instead of recognition'. Viktor Shklovskiĭ, 'Art as Device/ Technique', in *Theory of Prose*, trans. Benjamin Sher (Elmwood Park, IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 1990), 5–6.

and invented. To make strange is explicitly to interfere with the object: the transformer's finger prints are left all over it. This practice-based project explores and enstranges crime, through undertaking experimental, empirical, processual research with a number of people, including those who have experienced criminalisation or victimisation and people who are involved in policing social deviance and defining crime.

Out of these encounters I present a series of 'compositions'[6] which 'do' crime in different voices, by performatively demonstrating how different social actors assemble their version of crime and showing why this difference matters. This is not an incitement to relativism: it is important to establish here that I employ a non-unitary conception of the self, in which people are in process, and are produced from their material and affective[7] relations with the rest of the world.[8] I take up Annemarie Mol's point that one of the limitations of critiques which draw attention to different perspectives on an object or

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[6] I am using the term composition because it spans the literary and the visual. My preference in using 'literary composition' rather than 'fiction' to describe these research outputs signals the imaginative translation of research data into new forms, and foregrounds the purposeful work of the composer. My use of composition here is different in meaning from the use of composition within Deleuze and Guattari's exploration of the 'plane of composition' also known as the plane of immanence or consistency: see especially Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Brian Massumi (London: Continuum, 2004), 256–341. Similarly, I am aware of but not connecting my project to Bruno Latour, 'An Attempt at a "Compositionist Manifesto"', *New Literary History* 41 (2010): 471–90.

[7] Throughout this thesis I use 'affect' in an imprecise sense to relate to both named emotions and un-named sensations. As Cvetkovich summarises technically, affect 'signals precognitive sensory experience and relations to surroundings' whereas emotion signals 'cultural constructs and conscious processes that emerge from them, such as anger, fear, or joy'. Cvetkovich, *Depression*, 4.

[8] I return to the question of what it means to think of subjects in this way in chapter two.

event is that the 'object of the many gazes… remains singular, intangible, untouched'.[9] As such, rather than interpreting these research encounters as providing multiple perspectives on a singular object (crime), I argue that crime itself is a multiplicity. In the conceptual schema of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari it is an 'assemblage:' a reasonably mobile configuration of affects, utterances, things, practices and acts that produces effects based on its shifting configuration and connection with other assemblages.[10] Originating in the work of Deleuze and Guattari, the term 'assemblage' has been taken up, and variously adapted and developed in the work of numerous scholars within the humanities and social sciences.[11] Further complicating my discussion of the concept, the assemblage has also become a general term within academic discourse in recent years, used, for example, to indicate something's complexity, its determinative irreducibility, or as shorthand for a complex system. However, in this work I am using the assemblage in a very specific way, which I will now explain. I follow Deleuze and Guattari in using the assemblage as an analytic tool useful for defamiliarising and problematising

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[9] Annemarie Mol, 'Ontological Politics. A Word and Some Questions', *The Sociological Review* 47, no. 1 (1999): 76.

[10] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*.

[11] For example: Bruno Latour, *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Manuel DeLanda, *A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity* (London: Continuum, 2006); Jasbir K Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007); Saskia Sassen, *Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages* (Princeton, N.J.; Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2008); Jane Bennett, *Vibrant Matter A Political Ecology of Things* (Duke University Press, 2009).

things that seem stable, coherent and understood, by drawing attention to the way that things are included or excluded by the concept in its constitution. In the way that I am using it, it is a *political* concept. In the employment of the assemblage for analysis, it is not adequate to describe the content of the assemblage; we have to look at what it effects in its arrangement. So if we were to think of crime as an assemblage, we would have to also ask: what is this configuration of crime in aid of, and what effects does it produce? I will elaborate upon my use of the concept as an analytical and political tool in more detail later in this chapter. Now I move on to discuss other aspects of the conceptual framework of my work.

My reading of criminology was influenced by my earlier interactions with postcolonial theories which trace how the 'oriental' is produced as an object of knowledge in the scholarship of the colonisers.[12] As such, this project works against the criminological tendency to produce criminal 'others.' Throughout this thesis I hope to demonstrate that a practice of research grounded in analytic openness and experimentation, and an ethical relationship with research participants who I take to be complex and changing, is vital to developing an alternative conceptualisation of crime that does not treat crime and its actors as comprised of essential identities or a fixed set of properties. In treating crime as a multiplicity, my project intervenes into

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[12] Paradigmatically, the method in Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (London: Routledge, 1979).

varieties of criminology and sociology of crime that take crime to have an ontological reality, independent of the researcher, 'out there' in the world. I am not simply referring to self-defined realist schools of thought, although I shall attend to these in chapter three. Instead I implicate a broader approach as 'most criminological research, past and present, has operated with what can be regarded as naïve realism. It has simply taken for granted the categories of criminal law as the objects of analysis'.[13] The version of crime that I take issue with has an essence, and causes that can be discovered by the researcher. There are of course, scholars working within criminology who have troubled the ontological stability of crime, and I draw upon their work throughout this thesis.[14] As I shall discuss further in the chapter, this is a move away from epistemological questions of adequate knowledge and accurate representation, into the 'ontological politics'[15] of a performative practice that shows its workings. My project takes up Annemarie Mol's provocation that 'if

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[13] Robert Reiner, *Crime, The Mystery of the Common-Sense Concept* (John Wiley & Sons, 2016), 7.

[14] For example: Carol Smart, *Women, Crime and Criminology: A Feminist Critique.* (London: Routledge, 1977); Louk H. C. Hulsman, 'Critical Criminology and the Concept of Crime', *Contemporary Crises* 10, no. 1 (1 March 1986): 63–80; Colin Sumner, *The Sociology of Deviance: An Obituary* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1994); Young, *Imagining Crime*; George Pavlich, 'Criticism and Criminology: In Search of Legitimacy', *Theoretical Criminology* 3, no. 1 (1 February 1999): 29–51; George Pavlich, 'Forget Crime: Accusation, Governance and Criminology', *Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology* 33, no. 2 (1 August 2000): 136–52.

[15] Mol, 'Ontological Politics. A Word and Some Questions'.

instead of bracketing the practices in which objects are handled we foreground them – this has far researching effects. Reality multiplies'.[16]

In chapter two I lay out my methodological approach and interventions. The compositions I present are an intervention into the dominant tendency to deal with the ontological instability of crime either by privileging the perspective of one actor, for example the victim or the researcher, as apprehending the 'reality' of crime, or taking one category of crime as the model for others. Rather than engaging in this kind of metonymic substitution where the affective force of victimisation can be used to legitimate harming 'criminals', or a predatory criminal act be used to label *all* crimes predatory, the compositional method that I employ holds differences together and makes them struggle against each other, which, as I will claim, allows crime to be apprehended *as an assemblage*.

I have employed a variety of traditional and non-traditional methodologies including discursive analysis of texts, participant observation, formal and informal interviews, writing fiction, filmmaking, and printmaking. These methodological moves came about from a process of reflecting on each research encounter as it was developing, thinking critically about the effects of my own research, and the properties of each method. Carolyn Steedman's

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[16] Annemarie Mol, *The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice* (Durham, N.C. ; London: Duke University Press, 2003), 5.

work on the 'enforced narratives'[17] that the state and its agencies demands

from socially vulnerable people in order for its aid was especially important

in my development of an ethical approach to working with people who have

experienced criminalisation. How ethical considerations became a 'creative

constraint' in the development of novel approaches to research is a key theme

of this thesis. As I will discuss further in chapter two, each composition is

made from combinations of heterogeneous materials including interviews,

observations, rumours, news stories, images, and statistics. I 'translated'[18]

these materials (which are all commonly found in criminology), into new

forms which play with a range of styles within the thesis – from the literary

and film works that comprise my practice portfolio, the literary style of

chapter four which stands in for and echoes an absent film, and a conversation

about an archive which moves between text and image (chapter five). This

range of forms are employed in an attempt to capture the complex ontology

of crime.

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[17] Carolyn Steedman, 'Enforced Narratives: Stories of Another Self', in *Feminism and Autobiography: Texts, Theories, Methods*, ed. Tess Cosslett, Celia Lury, and Penny Summerfield, Transformations (New York: Routledge, 2000).

[18] I take the concept of 'translation' from actor-network theory. The use of 'translation' originated from Michel Callon's engagement with the concept as it appears in the transdisciplinary philosophy of Michel Serres, and has been extensively theorised in the work of Callon, Bruno Latour, John Law and their collaborators since the 1980s. See: Michel Serres, *Hermès III: la traduction* (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1974); Michel Callon, 'Struggles and Negotiations to Define What Is Problematic and What Is Not: The Sociology of Translation', in *The Social Process of Scientific Investigation*, ed. Karin D Knorr, Roger G Krohn, and Richard Whitley (Dordrecht, Pays-Bas: D. Reidel, 1981), 197–219.

My analysis draws on three years of undertaking experimental projects with participants in and near London. Early in my project the Open Book Group was an invaluable site of learning. Open Book is an education project which supports people facing significant challenges, including criminalisation, into higher education. Initially, in 2014, I participated in their creative writing class and got to know the group. From this experience and noting how members talked about performances of recovery, responsibility and apology for criminal justice practitioners like forensic psychiatrists and probation officers, I developed 'interviews about being interviewed' and the idea of a creative writing exchange project with group members. As I will discuss further in chapter two, although this writing exchange didn't materialise, within my portfolio there are also a number of literary compositions which draw on my interviews and conversations with members of the group. In the summer of 2015 I ran a reading group on prison abolition for Open Book, as a way of contributing to their programme and to share something of my research in process. The reading group wasn't presented to Open Book as part of my research, and as such I don't write directly on the experience in this PhD. However, these discussions dislocated my own assumptions and commitments about criminalisation and punishment in ways that have fed back into the compositions I have made. Happenstance also played a role in the development of these projects, as a conversation with

a friend in the film industry led to me finding 'Craig Campbell',[19] and I met 'Marlowe',[20] a private investigator, though my housemate's poker connections. Chapter four restages the lost film *Cop Show* (2014) made from my encounter with Craig, who worked simultaneously as an actor of police roles for television and film, and as a police officer. Within the portfolio the film *Double Tears* (2015) reworks my interview with Marlowe to explore questions of moral performance and responsibility. I also discuss this composition in chapter two. I first encountered Howard Slater, an ex-prisoner, activist and archivist, while looking at the collection of the New England Prisoners' Association newsletters at Mayday Rooms.[21] Chapter five centres on my conversation with Howard and his own archive of materials relating to his experiences of prison, his artwork about this, and anti-prison activism. I am extremely grateful that Howard chose to share his archive with me, as it is not catalogued and I wouldn't have found it otherwise. Each of these projects have affected me and changed me as they have also my research participants, developing my capacity to think beyond my initial research questions – 'developing the problem'.[22]

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[19] "Craig Campbell" is a pseudonym. I interviewed him in 2013.

[20] "Marlowe" is a pseudonym. I interviewed him in 2015.

[21] I interviewed Howard in 2015. Mayday Rooms is a radical archive based in Fleet Street, London.

[22] Mariam Fraser, 'Experiencing Sociology', *European Journal of Social Theory* 12, no. 1 (1 February 2009): 75.

I will now situate my work in terms of my intervention into the sociology of crime and criminology and previous challenges to the ontology of crime. Further to this, chapter three focuses on my critical encounter with criminological productions of crime.

Criminological Productions of Crime

My disciplinary home is in sociology, my theoretical framework comes from philosophy and sociology, and my art practice has been vital to the development of this project. As such, the substantive materials that I have drawn on in this interdisciplinary project are from sociology, philosophy and the arts. However, I took the view that working on the topics of crime and criminalisation necessitated that I should also have a substantial engagement with criminology, the discipline which has historically organised itself around conceptions and practices of crime and punishment. My project does not endorse criminological constructions of crime; crucially, mine has been a critical perspective *on* criminology, rather than an adoption of its disciplinary aims or conceptual frameworks. However, I felt that refusing to engage with criminology would make a fetish of criminology's malevolence, and let other forms of disciplinary and non-disciplinary knowledge production off the hook too easily. In the UK, which provides the geographic and cultural context for my empirical work, contemporary criminology is a diverse interdisciplinary

field encompassing a range of approaches and topics, for example qualitative

scholarship on human rights abuses, gender, war, trauma, and popular

culture as well as the more quantitative, policy-led, actuarial, and statistics-

driven approaches which dominate American criminology.[23] I am not aiming

to defend the discipline in stating this, but merely pointing out that there is

diversity in both the content and the politics of the work. I believe that

continued critical academic, artistic and activist research into the way crime

and justice are produced in our society is essential if we are to resist the

damaging effects of these productions, but this is very different from arguing

that criminology is best place to do this work, or being invested in the

continuance of the discipline.

I have engaged with criminology as a critical, disciplinary outsider –

my project doesn't seek to address the tasks of criminology (as paraphrased

by Stanley Cohen after Edwin Sutherland[24]): 'why are laws made? Why are

they broken? What do we do or what should we do about this?'[25] Unlike much

of the criminology I have encountered, my work is not concerned with the

causality of crime (criminogenesis). But I am certainly interested in how crime

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[23] If citations can be accepted as some indication of the influence of critical and sociological approaches on contemporary British criminology, a study of the citation practices in the British Journal of Criminology (in no way a radical publication) showed that the most cited scholar in the period 2006-10 is David Garland, followed by Mike Haugh, who works on the British Crime Survey and public attitudes, and Michel Foucault at number three. Ellen G. Cohn and Amaia Iratzoqui, 'The Most Cited Scholars in Five International Criminology Journals, 2006–10', *British Journal of Criminology* 56, no. 3 (2016): 609.

[24] Edwin H. Sutherland, *Principles of Criminology* (Chicago: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1947).

[25] Stanley Cohen, *Against Criminology* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1988), 9.

is *produced* within criminology, especially as few criminologists operate with a legal-determinist concept of crime based purely on current legal definitions. As such, most incorporate ideas about social deviance, i.e. deviance from (locally defined) social norms, into their conceptualisation of crime. Although its ontology is contested within criminology, the discipline usually brackets off this uncertainty, and a 'common sense' version of crime is adopted in order to go on with the work of explaining crime, measuring its incidence and formulating policies to deal with it.

David Matza (1969) famously claimed that criminology is unique in that it aims at 'getting rid' of what it is studying.[26] In Matza's observation, crime is unquestionably bad, a social ill which criminologists are (or should be) trying to eradicate. However, if we hold that our methods performatively *produce* the real rather than representing it, we have the paradox of criminology's simultaneous production and reduction/destruction of crime. Some criminologists are very aware of this. For example, Carol Smart (1976) worried that her pioneering feminist critique of historical and present theories of female criminality might unintentionally help make female criminality into

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[26] David Matza, *Becoming Deviant* (Englewood Cliffs ; London: Prentice-Hall, 1969). More recently the criminologist Lynne Copson (2013) suggests that her discipline is 'utopian' in its 'commitment to the development of practical projects concerned with eradicating or at least reducing crime', based on a vision of the "good society." See Lynne Copson, 'Towards a Utopian Criminology', in *Crime, Critique and Utopia*, ed. Dr Margaret Malloch and Dr Bill Munro (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 114. But the imagined conditions of a utopia always express the historical conditions that created it. Who does this vision of the good society include, and where does it come from? Surely the notion of good society relies upon an excluded "bad" outside – where does crime fit in this schema?

a 'visible' and identifiable social problem, 'leading to the appearance of increases in the rates of crimes and in the reports of violent and criminal offences by women and of delinquency in girls'.[27]

Within contemporary criminology there is sharp division over the proper subject matter and aims of the discipline.[28] Criminology has tended to focus on individual law breakers, and to start from state-defined social problems, and has only recently taken up questions of globalisation and postcoloniality. Criticism of the historically narrow and state-defined subject matter of criminology has led to demands, such as Biko Agozino's, for a 'counter-colonial criminology' that must 'get over' its obsession with the crimes of the poor.[29] It has also led to an expansion of the discipline – producing work on social harms such as racism, sexism, global imperialism, state crimes and labour exploitation. Towards this, Paddy Hillyard et al. (2004) advance their 'zemiology' which attempts to engage with social harms in their psychological, emotional and material complexity. Importantly, rather than equally problematically fixing and reifying 'harm' in place of 'crime', they

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[27] Smart, *Women, Crime and Criminology*, xiv.

[28] Mary Bosworth and Carolyn Hoyle, 'Introduction', in *What Is Criminology?*, ed. Mary Bosworth and Carolyn Hoyle (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

[29] Biko Agozino, *Counter-Colonial Criminology: A Critique of Imperialist Reason* (London ; Sterling, Va: Pluto Press, 2003), 230.

recognise that 'harm is no more definable than crime, and that it too lacks any ontological reality'.[30]

George Pavlich argues that 'in criminology, *realism* is privileged to the point that it has become *the* mechanism for isolating central from marginal texts (as in the common derogatory refrain: "that is just theory"!)'.[31] If we accept his diagnosis, a symptom of this would appear to be that despite the expansion of the discipline, criminology that engages with poststructuralist philosophy (especially in its ontological assertions) is still a niche endeavour. Some theorists of surveillance have taken up Deleuze and Guattari's work on assemblages, and also Deleuze's late fragment on the social effects of a movement beyond Foucault's 'disciplinary society' into a 'control society'.[32] In an important essay Sheila Brown argued that criminologists drawing on Deleuze and Guattari and Science and Technology Studies (STS) approaches have focused on the 'technical', and what is needed is the development of criminological 'theories of the technosocial: the cyber, the data-human, the

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[30] Paddy Hillyard et al., *Beyond Criminology: Taking Harm Seriously*, First edition. Paperback edition (London ; Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2004), 20; Danny Dorling et al., *Criminal Obsessions: Why Harm Matters More Than Crime* (London: Crime and Society Foundation, 2005).

[31] Pavlich, 'Forget Crime', 140.

[32] Gilles Deleuze, 'Postscript on the Societies of Control', *October* 59, no. Winter (1992): 3–7. It is in this text that Deleuze described what he saw as a fragmentation of the 'disciplinary' society's production of 'individuals' into the production of information/data 'dividuals' by the society of 'control'. For example:Kevin D. Haggerty and Richard V. Ericson, 'The Surveillant Assemblage', *The British Journal of Sociology* 51, no. 4 (2000): 605–22; William Bogard, 'Surveillance Assemblages and Lines of Flight', in *Theorizing Surveillance: The Panopticon and Beyond*, ed. David Lyon (Cullompton: Willan, 2006), 97–122.

cybernetic and the a-modern'.[33] She asks, 'what sort of contributions, what challenges, might such theorisations make to analyses of crime, law and control?'[34]

In comparison with the humanities and other social sciences, the ontological implications of Deleuze and Guattari's work has had little engagement within criminology.[35] A notable exception is the work of Dragan Milovanovic.[36] Initially producing with Stuart Henry a 'constitutive criminology' which built on Anthony Giddens' 'structuration theory' and advocated creating a 'replacement discourse' to challenge the dominant discourse on crime,[37] Milovanovic has since focused on the work of Deleuze and Guattari to advance 'an alternative paradigm built ground up from the ontological percepts [*sic*] of quantum and holographic theory'.[38] Another

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[33] Sheila Brown, 'The Criminology of Hybrids: Rethinking Crime and Law in Technosocial Networks', *Theoretical Criminology* 10, no. 2 (May 2006): 227.

[34] Brown, 227.

[35] As an indication of this absence there is no mention of Deleuze in two recent compendious surveys of the discipline: Mary Bosworth and Carolyn Hoyle, eds., *What Is Criminology?* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Mike Maguire, Rodney Morgan, and Robert Reiner, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology*, 5th ed (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012).

[36] Dragan Milovanovic, ed., *Chaos, Criminology, and Social Justice: The New Orderly (Dis)Order* (Westport, Conn. ; London: Praeger, 1997); Dragan Milovanovic et al., *The French Connection in Criminology: Rediscovering Crime,Law,and Social Change* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2005).

[37] Stuart Henry and Dragan Milovanovic, 'Constitutive Criminology: The Maturation of Critical Theory', *Criminology.* 29, no. 2 (1991): 293–316; Stuart Henry and Dragan Milovanovic, 'The Constitution of Constitutive Criminology: A Postmodern Approach to Criminological Theory', in *The Futures of Criminology*, ed. David Nelken (London; Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1994), 110–33; Stuart Henry, *Constitutive Criminology: Beyond Postmodernism* (London: SAGE, 1996).

[38] Dragan Milovanovic, 'Revitalizing Criminology: Comments on Steve Hall (2012),Theorizing Crime and Deviance: A New Perspective', *Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology* 6, no. 2 (2014): 159.

exception is the collection *New Directions for Criminology* (2010), edited by

Ronnie Lippens and Patrick van Calster, which invited contributions on the

poststructural theories of Deleuze and Guattari, Actor Network Theory, and

complexity theory, among other topics. As if to re-emphasise the marginality

of poststructuralist thought within criminology, these chapters were not

written by criminologists, but for them, by those in fields such as legal theory

and philosophy. As such, Lippens and van Calster stress the need 'to translate

or at least direct the most important tenets of poststructuralist thought

towards [Cohen's] three basic questions'.[39] Although these engagements are

productive, it is important to note that my work doesn't share this orientation

towards making poststructuralist thought 'work' within the familiar territory

assembled through criminology. Instead, I share Jamie Murray's contention

that a sincere 'cross over of Deleuze & Guattari and criminology would

presage not only deviating concepts of crime, but also deviating ethical and

political becomings'.[40] In other words, rigorous engagement with Deleuze and

Guattari's thought entails accepting an ontological premise which (in their

terminology) 'deterritorializes' much of criminology's familiar terrain and

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[39] Ronnie Lippens and Patrick van Calster, 'Introduction', in *New Directions for Criminology: Notes from Outside the Field*, ed. Ronnie Lippens and Patrick van Calster (Antwerp: Maklu, 2010), 10.
[40] Jamie Murray, 'Germinal Deviance', in *New Directions for Criminology: Notes from Outside the Field*, ed. Ronnie Lippens and Patrick van Calster (Antwerp: Maklu, 2010), 77.

entails a 'reterritorialization':[41] a new practice of criminology in which commonplaces like 'crime', 'harm' and 'deviance' are understood as produced through interactions with other social assemblages and processes.

Beyond Social Constructionism: Crime after the Ontological Turn

As I have stated, a fundamental premise of my work is that crime is not 'out there' in the world independently of our modes of producing it. This is not the same as suggesting that crime is not real, or that its meaning is 'socially constructed'[42] and masks a suppressed but perceptible reality. For example, in 1986 the Dutch penal abolitionist Louk Hulsman argued that crime has 'no ontological reality. Crime is not the *object* but the *product* of criminal policy'.[43] Further, 'people who are involved in "criminal" events do not appear in themselves to form a special category of people'.[44] Hulsman drew attention to the heterogeneity of situations deemed criminal, for example domestic violence, violence in the street, pollution, some political actions and so on.

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[41] These terms first appear in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (London: Continuum, 2004), 36.

[42] For example, Edwin M. Lemert, *Human Deviance, Social Problems, and Social Control* (Englewood Cliffs, [N.J.]: Prentice-Hall, 1967); Edwin Michael Schur, *Labeling Deviant Behavior: Its Sociological Implications* (New York ; London: Harper and Row, 1971); Malcolm Spector and John I. Kitsuse, 'Social Problems: A Reformulation', *Social Problems* 21 (1973): 145–59; Steve Woolgar and Dorothy Pawluch, 'Ontological Gerrymandering: The Anatomy of Social Problems Explanations', *Social Problems* 32, no. 3 (1985): 214–27; Frances Heidensohn, 'The Social Construction of Crime', in *Crime and Society* (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan Education UK, 1989), 1–15; Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991).

[43] Hulsman, 'Critical Criminology and the Concept of Crime', 71.

[44] Hulsman, 63.

Claiming that beyond the criminal justice system being authorised to take action against them, there is no common denominator between these events in terms of the motivations of those involved, nor in terms of harm caused, nor in desirable responses to these situations.[45] The insights of penal abolitionists have been an important influence on my work, and I share their view that social problems, harms, and antagonisms, including those that come to be legally defined as crimes, are a part of everyday life. As such, involving the criminal justice system cannot 'solve' crime, and is often counterproductive, perpetuating social problems and damaging lives.[46] Despite its influence on my orientation towards criminal justice and my personal politics, I have not employed an abolitionist theoretical framework for this project, nor reviewed the work extensively in this thesis, for the following reason. There is a wealth of abolitionist materials relating to the American criminal justice system, and this work is produced within a vibrant intellectual and activist culture that works to analyse and resist the specific conditions of contemporary criminal justice in North America. In contrast, the UK penal abolition movement is small, and reliant on the USA for much of its

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[45] Hulsman, 64.

[46] As an indication of abolitionist perspectives see: the work of the organisation Critical Resistance http://criticalresistance.org/, Ruth Morris and W. Gordon West, *The Case for Penal Abolition* (Toronto, Ont.: Canadian Scholars' Press, 2000); Nils Christie, *A Suitable Amount of Crime* (London: Routledge, 2004); Angela Y Davis, *Are Prisons Obsolete?* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2010); Thomas Mathiesen, *The Politics of Abolition* (London: Martin Robertson for the Scandinavian Research Council for Criminology, 1974).

conceptual framework and strategies of resistance.[47] The distinctions between these systems and their contexts make it dangerous to assume that its problems and harms will be expressed in the same way, should be resisted in the same way, or that we can use the same concepts to analyse its workings. I took the view that in a project of this complexity, which furthermore utilises a processual methodology and theories of multiplicity, meaningfully translating American prison abolition materials into a UK context would be a doctoral project of its own.

Annemarie Mol argues that although interventions based on social constructionist critiques made important challenges to the stability and naturalism of dominant Eurocentric thought, they fell short of a radical overturning because they still invoked a model of the real truth behind false appearances.[48] For instance, in Hulsman's account, (real) criminal policy produces a (false) crime – holding out for the possibility that we could really

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[47] There is vital work being done in terms of solidarity building and information sharing by UK abolitionist activist groups such as the Empty Cages Collective, and the Bent Bars project. There are abolitionist scholars in law, criminology, and sociology departments who write and teach explicitly from that standpoint. For example: Joe Sim, *Punishment and Prisons: Power and the Carceral State* (Los Angeles; London: SAGE, 2009); Vincenzo Ruggiero, *Penal Abolitionism* (Clarendon Studies in Criminology, 2010); Sarah Lamble, 'Queer Necropolitics and the Expanding Carceral State: Interrogating Sexual Investments in Punishment', *Law and Critique* 24, no. 3 (4 August 2013): 229–53. As I will discuss in chapter five there is a growing body of 'convict criminology' written by prisoners and ex-prisoners which, whilst not always explicitly abolitionist, can amplify the voices of those who have experienced state punishment.For a history of prison abolition in the UK see: Mick Ryan and Tony Ward, 'Prison Abolition in the UK: They Dare Not Speak Its Name?', *Social Justice* 41, no. 3 (137) (2015): 107–19.
[48] Mol, 'Ontological Politics. A Word and Some Questions'.

know crime, or that better policies could produce a (true) crime.[49] In my project, I do not seek to make an argument about what acts and practices should or shouldn't be defined as crime through criminal law and policies. I do not argue for the decriminalisation of some acts, to focus on 'real' crime. It is not a question of some acts being incorrectly represented as crime, which could be resolved by adopting a different and perhaps marginalised perspective. I contend that crime *is* what we make it. However, this cannot be understood as a neutral objective making, but a thoroughly politically invested and motivated production. We should therefore look at the interactions forming crime and ask, is this the best we can do? Might we not want to do this better? By better here, I mean in ways that better capture the non-essential specificity of crimes and the complexity of crime in its intersections with other social productions such as race, class and gender. Mol's point about the limitations of epistemological critiques is essential in shaping my approach, precisely because I engage with the different versions of crime produced by people who have experienced criminalisation and people who haven't, as well as privileged actors in the assemblage of crime such as criminologists, and a police officer. However, I don't engage with these more marginal actors because I wish to privilege their perspectives over

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[49] Don Crewe also makes this critique of Hulsman: see Don Crewe, 'Assemblage Theory and the Future for Criminology', in *New Directions for Criminology: Notes from Outside the Field*, ed. Ronnie Lippens and Patrick van Calster (Antwerp: Maklu, 2010), 41.

the perspectives of mainstream researchers and academics. Rather, I do so because their accounts add to the complexity of the assemblage of crime by dramatising its contradictions.

As I stated at the start of this chapter, a problem with pluralist critiques is that they don't challenge the 'object of the many gazes… [which] remains singular, intangible, untouched'.[50] This is further confused by the fact that here our object, crime, is already a *category* and as such the name given to multiple, disparate things, aside from whether we consider any singular crime event as a *multiplicity*. There is a lack of specificity in much of the work I have encountered on the topic of crime, where despite acknowledgements that crime is a category of heterogeneous things, the researcher then tends to make generalisations about crime based on a metonymic substitution of one sub-category of crime for crime in general. The sub-category chosen to represent crime is often street robbery, a telling choice for a discipline that favours a 'common sense' version of crime. Street robbery is easy to picture, as there appears to be agentic transparency, a clear victim, and bounded action. It is visible happening on the street (public property), not hidden in the 'safety of one's own home'. It might involve a physical confrontation with the perpetrator, who is often imagined as young, male and black: a 'mugger'. Against this simplification, I maintain that crimes are messy, opaque events,

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[50] Mol, 'Ontological Politics. A Word and Some Questions', 76.

and the actors' agency and intentions are not so clear. What happens if we make a different crime like speeding, rape, illegal downloading or embezzlement a model for all crime? This is not a glib question, as making a racialised crime *the* model for crime has had effects beyond the realm of criminology.[51] As the American writer John Edgar Wideman remarks 'It is not racist to be against crime, even though the archetypical criminal in the media and the public imagination almost always wears "Willie" Horton's face'.[52] I discuss these issues further in chapter three.

So far, we have dealt with crime as a multiplicity by dint of its being a broad category, but what of singular crime events? By Mol's account, different versions of an event are not aspects of a single reality to be reconciled, but multiple versions of reality itself.[53] Following this, and taking a specific crime event as an object of enquiry, would mean treating it as plural and irreducible. It means accepting that we are unable to make final claims as to the hidden reality of crime, because we acknowledge that the reality of crime, in its meanings and practices, is in process rather than fixed. This doesn't mean that

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[51] This cultural intervention was made at the height of the racialised public debate on "mugging" in the mid-1980s by cultural studies scholars, for example Stuart Hall et al., *Policing The Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1978); Paul Gilroy, 'The Myth of Black Criminality', *Socialist Register*, 1982.

[52] John Edgar Wideman, 'The Politics of Prisons: Doing Time, Marking Race', *The Nation* 261, no. 14 (30 October 1995): 503. The reference to Willie Horton relates to the infamous use of the mug shot and criminal convictions of the African-American Horton in the 1988 Republican presidential campaign. Horton had offended again whilst on a prison weekend release scheme in Democrat-held Massachusetts.

[53] Mol, 'Ontological Politics. A Word and Some Questions', 77.

we cannot engage with questions of agency, intentionality or responsibility, but it means that we do not have a blueprint for doing this work.

Mike Savage argues that one of the central challenges to dominant modes of thinking posed by Deleuze and Guattari's flat ontology is to pay attention to the 'surface'.[54] This task stands in contrast to a tradition in the social sciences of thinking in terms of abstracting depth, hidden causal or base structuring processes, from a surface of detail seen as unremarkable, and, importantly, uncontroversial in itself.[55] Attending to the surface should therefore not be conflated with an acceptance of whatever seems immediately apparent, or obvious. Such 'common sense' reasoning is characterised by too quickly accepting an appearance as reality and then ignoring any details which threaten this truth. The role of the researcher is not to take a position 'outside' the event where we could claim that we see the whole thing clearly. It is not to read across differences and produce an explanation that posits an organising causal principle. Instead, it is to experiment with these differences, reflecting on repeated patterns and contradictions.

I will now elaborate the key concepts I take from Deleuze and Guattari, demonstrating how I think they can help us to 'enstrange' crime.

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[54] Mike Savage, 'Contemporary Sociology and the Challenge of Descriptive Assemblage', *European Journal of Social Theory* 12, no. 1 (1 February 2009): 155–74.
[55] Savage, 157.

Deleuze, Guattari and the Assemblage of Crime

Faced with the slipperiness of the crime concept, criminology's preference for essentialism, and the premium placed on determining the root causes of crime, I turned to Deleuze and Guattari for the mobility of their concepts. In particular those concepts developed in *A Thousand Plateaus* (1980, first translated into English in 1987). Here, the philosopher Deleuze's processual ontology of 'becoming' rather than fixed 'being' is given a socio-political formulation through collaboration with Guattari's politicised practice of psychoanalysis.[56] Their conceptual cosmology is densely populated and I have only selected a few of their concepts to work with. This is as much for the sake of communicative clarity as my desire not to have my work 'overcoded' by their ideas or indeed their own dazzling style. Instead I have employed these concepts as 'tools'[57] in my attempt to capture the complicated versions of crime that my research produced. In embracing the challenge of balancing philosophical explorations with undertaking and analysing my

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[56] *A Thousand Plateaus* is the second part of two-volume text *Capitalism and Schizophrenia,* the first part being *Anti-Oedipus* (1972, first translated into English in 1977).

[57] Deleuze claims 'a theory is exactly like a box of tools… it must be useful. It must function. And not for itself… [it is] necessarily an instrument for combat'. Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault, 'Intellectuals and Power', in *Desert Islands and Other Texts, 1953-1974*, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Mike Taormina (Los Angeles, CA ; London: Semiotexte, 2004), 208.

own empirical work I have drawn on literature from philosophy, the arts, humanities and the social sciences which reflects the 'ontological turn'[58] in knowledge production.[59]

Deleuze was engaged in an ambitious project that targeted what he termed the central 'illusion' of philosophy: that there is a transcendent principle or set of principles outside of our practices and discourses that can be invoked authoritatively and innocently to give them order, value and meaning to the world.[60] He argued that the dominant mode within European thought prioritised the representation and recognition of fixed identities, essences, origins and truths. Against this, drawing on a lineage of thinkers including Baruch Spinoza and Henri Bergson, he attempted to conceptualise life in the flux of 'becoming', rather than through the defining and fixing of

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[58] For example, Anna Hickey-Moody and Peta Malins, eds., *Deleuzian Encounters: Studies in Contemporary Social Issues* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Lisa Adkins and Celia Lury, 'Introduction What Is the Empirical?', *European Journal of Social Theory* 12, no. 1 Special Issue on the 'new empiricism' (1 February 2009): 5–20; Fraser, 'Experiencing Sociology'; Celia Lury and Nina Wakeford, eds., *Inventive Methods: The Happening of the Social* (London: Routledge, 2012).

[59] A number of secondary texts have been extremely helpful for my understanding of Deleuze and Guattari's work, see: John Marks, *Gilles Deleuze: Vitalism and Multiplicity* (London: Pluto Press, 1998); Dorothea Olkowski, *Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1999); Simon O'Sullivan, *Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari: Thought Beyond Representation* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Adrian Parr, ed., *The Deleuze Dictionary*, Rev. ed (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010); Nathan Widder, *Political Theory After Deleuze* (London: Continuum, 2012); Ian Buchanan, 'Assemblage Theory and Its Discontents', *Deleuze Studies* 9, no. 3 (2015): 382–92; Ian Buchanan, 'Assemblage Theory, or, the Future of an Illusion', *Deleuze Studies* 11, no. 3 (25 July 2017): 457–74; Thomas Nail, 'What Is an Assemblage?', *SubStance* 46, no. 1 (2017): 21–37.

[60] For works that develop this critique and a new 'image of thought' see in particular Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton, [New ed.]. (London: Continuum, 2004); Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, ed. Constantin V Boundas, trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale (London: Continuum, 2004). *Difference and Repetition* was originally published in French in 1968, and *The Logic of Sense* in 1969.

static forms: 'being'. Thinking with 'becoming' privileges experimentation, movement and attention to sensation over placing things into a pre-existing schema. In a passage that for me recalls Shklovskiĭ's art of 'enstrangement', he writes:

> Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental *encounter*... It may be grasped in a range of affective tones: wonder, love, hatred, suffering. In whichever tone, its primary characteristic is that it can only be sensed. In this sense it is opposed to recognition.[61]

In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari develop this new image of thought via the concept of the 'rhizome'[62] or 'assemblage'. The assemblage has been key for my reconceptualisation of crime and I must now spend some time describing the features of the concept.

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[61] Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 176.

[62] A rhizome is a plant with an acentered root system, for example ginger. Rhizomes can grow in any direction and if cut off or blocked in one path, will sprout forth elsewhere like the mythical Hydra's heads. Deleuze and Guattari invoke the rhizome for the differing model it provides from the biological image they claim dominates western thought: the tree. Trees are organized hierarchically, with branches growing out from a central trunk, and all the root network and spread of leaves working to nourish and maintain a central stem. For Deleuze and Guattari the dominant western philosophy has modelled itself upon this 'arborescent schema', to produce a rigid hierarchy of concepts with largely unquestioned transcendental truth claims at the top, organizing the production of thought all the way down and rendering some thoughts inconceivable. See Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 3–28.

Defining the Assemblage

The assemblage is an important concept in Deleuze and Guattari's thought; indeed Deleuze described it as the 'general logic' of *A Thousand Plateaus*.[63] Here, the concept is not introduced as a formal analytic model but rather is presented through a series of examples that demonstrate their 'theory-practice of multiplicities'.[64] Deleuze and Guattari claim that things usually categorised as discrete subjects and objects, such as humans, artworks, and institutions, etc. can be conceptualised as assemblages, mobile arrangements of heterogeneous elements (including acts, statements, practices, things, affects, emotions and concepts).[65] These elements are made to congregate via repeated couplings; assemblages are machinic and inventive in their operations, producing the connections and disconnections with other assemblages which maintain their existence.[66] Although the assemblage is mobile and capable of change, they tend towards stability and stratification.[67] Assemblages are not static hierarchies or constellations of relations, but

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[63] In this interview, from the year of the publication of *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze suggests that the work of analysing assemblages to find their 'general logic' had only just begun. Gilles Deleuze, 'Eight Years Later: 1980 Interview', in *Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975 - 1995*, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2007), 177.

[64] Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*, trans. Seán Hand (London: London, Athlone, 1999), 14.

[65] Importantly, assemblages do not just exist on the level of discourse: Deleuze and Guattari describe assemblages as comprising both 'contents' and 'expressions.' Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 200–201.

[66] Deleuze and Guattari, 448–49.

[67] Deleuze and Guattari, 4, 45.

neither are they random in their configuration. It is important to be aware of the impact of a connection with a more immobile or enduring assemblage which has the power to affect and re-shape emergent assemblages. Assemblages tend to 'actualise' the 'virtual'[68] field in ways that not inevitable but are nevertheless 'always concerned about questions of power'.[69] They are 'purposeful',[70] but not in the sense of comprising a homogenous intentionality that could be seen as evidencing simple causality or design. It is more a question of thinking about the assemblage as a machine for doing something, or that has a tendency to produce certain effects.

Etymologically, it should be noted that the English word 'assemblage' is an approximate translation of the French *agencement*, which has no direct correlation in English.[71] Unlike the English word 'assemblage', which indicates a more-or-less fixed arrangement in which you bring the necessary parts together to create a whole, for example, to assemble a bike, an agencement is 'a construction, an arrangement, or a layout'[72] which may change and does not have the same part/whole relationship. Agencement

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[68] Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, 'The Actual and The Virtual', in *Dialogues II*, trans. Barbara Habberjam, Eliot Ross Albert, and Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 112–15.

[69] Buchanan, 'Assemblage Theory and Its Discontents', 382.

[70] Buchanan, 385.

[71] This translation is attributed to Paul Foss and Paul Patton see: Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, 'Rhizome', trans. Paul Foss and Paul Patton, *I & C* 8 (1981): 49–71. Ian Buchanan suggests 'arrangement' as a preferable translation, see: Buchanan, 'Assemblage Theory and Its Discontents', 383.

[72] Nail, 'What Is an Assemblage?', 22.

therefore indicates an arrangement of a mobile multiplicity with associations of agency and creativity that are lost in the English assemblage. Ian Buchanan suggests that the plain language meaning of the English 'assemblage' has resulted in an 'undue emphasis on the idea of "assembling" as the core process of assemblages'.[73] By this he means that the focus is too often on gathering things together (compiling), rather than analysing how things are structured or arranged (composing).[74] This is an important point because the analytical power of the assemblage is in showing how the diverse components of the assemblage work in combination to produce particular effects. Despite these important issues of translation, and notwithstanding Deleuze and Guattari's inconsistent use of the term,[75] in keeping with common academic practice, I will use the translated English term 'assemblage' throughout this work, inviting the reader to retain a sense of the assemblage as a composed yet mobile multiplicity.

So, in thinking through crime as an active or purposive assemblage we might notice the way that certain versions of the assemblage territorialise the space of crime and appear tenacious, or 'stratified'. There are recurring

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[73] Buchanan, 'Assemblage Theory, or, the Future of an Illusion', 458.

[74] Buchanan, 458.

[75] By 'inconsistent' I mean that sometimes they don't use the term itself but it is clear that they are using the model of the assemblage.

features within versions of the crime assemblage. As an in-exhaustive list of materials that *might* be included in the assemblage of crime, I offer:

The acts and statements of state agencies such as the various courts, prisons, police forces, parliaments, the Home Office, political parties, semi-autonomous think tanks, grassroots political organisations, religions and social movements, universities, schools and other sites of learning. The acts and statements of academics who assemble versions of crime through their work, and of those persons produced as 'criminals', and of those who break laws through their actions but are not criminalised. The affective and emotional states of these human and non-human bodies. The algorithmically-determined search results returned upon querying 'crime' on an internet search engine. Present and past conceptualisations and practices of morality, law, virtue, human nature, property, need, violence, justice, society, community, danger, harm, gender, revenge, race, class. Concepts and feelings that cause some people to decide to cross the street to avoid other people. Doors locked or unlocked at night. The statements made in prior criminological texts and by contemporary practitioners, all of which interact with ideas and affects outside the discipline. The statements which enact the laws that define the criminal in a specific time and place, simultaneously defining the 'victim' of crime. The domestic extremism watch list. Technologies, like DNA testing, the survey, handcuffs, CCTV, or the interview

and the different kinds of data they produce. Forms of representation – graphs, maps, photographs and diagrams and text and novels and films and TV judges. Characters enunciated – plural images like crime as a 'disease' or an 'epidemic' of a certain type of crime. Images of crime as rarity like the 'serial killer' or the 'master criminal'. Stock images with built in social explanations such as 'crimes of passion', 'honour killings', 'mercy killings', 'angels of mercy', 'black widows', 'bad cops', 'broken windows', crime as the glue of our social fabric, a crime of opportunity, crime as inevitable or banal, the 'ex-con', the retired gangster living in the Costa del Sol…

This list should not be imagined as comprising of unchanging, discrete elements, but rather as composed of materials that themselves are also multiple, complex, transforming and interactive. Some of the institutions and agencies included above are themselves social assemblages (for example, prisons, courts, and religions) which produce their own territory. The reader may have noticed how geographically and temporally located my list is – even this initial list hints at a territory and casts a shadow portrait of the list-maker. Crucially, the above list is not an assemblage of crime, it is merely a speculative list of materials. Each assemblage takes:

> 'a particular form: it selects, draws together, stakes out, and envelops a territory. It is made up of imaginative, contingent articulations among myriad

heterogeneous elements… these bodies only appear to be in proximity with one another given a particular act of imaginative gathering'.[76]

Despite this mutability, assemblages also have (at least some) appearance of coherence and boundedness. Thus, although connectivity is an important principle of the assemblage,[77] it is not the case that everything is therefore connected together. The way these assemblages are figured intersects with organising flows of power, making inclusions and exclusions. Determining what can be said and done. As we shall see in chapter three, thinking in terms of connectivity also helps me to uncouple seemingly 'natural' pairings like crime with immorality, social decline or the 'underclass'. The virtual aspect to the assemblage is like a kind of excess, in that actualisations of the virtual don't limit the potential to produce new actualities.

The mobility of the assemblage can help us think about the contingency of crime, as a particular shift in the arrangement of elements included in an assemblage might mutate it into something else, for example, an 'accident' rather than a crime. Different versions of crime assemble different elements, and stake out territories of differing scales, based on the extensity of their networks of elements, and the stratification of certain elements through their

[76] Jennifer Daryl Slack and J. Macgregor Wise, *Culture and Technology: A Primer*, 2nd Edition (New York: Peter Lang Inc., International Academic Publishers, 2014), 156.
[77] 'Principles of connection and heterogeneity: any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be. This is very different from the tree or root, which plots a point, fixes an order'. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 7.

repeated inclusion – for example, the police as actors. This repetition might appear to give the assemblage an essence or attribute of enduring power. However, it's important to note that Deleuze and Guattari, and STS theorists who employ the concept of assemblage or related network concepts, follow Foucault in maintaining that elements of assemblages such as power, agency and organisation are *effects* of the articulations or elements, rather than *properties* of things or persons. The territory produced through an assemblage of crime might work to hide other possible ways of assembling crime which would necessarily have different effects. Thus the content and form of the constellation of crime *matters*, affecting our lives, our representations and practices. Despite occupying various states of stratification, assemblages are not static, timeless, or inevitable. They are relatively open systems animated by the dynamics of social processes. Deleuze and Guattari write: 'the assemblage has both *territorial sides,* or reterritorialized sides, which stabilize it, and *cutting edges of deterritorialization,* which carry it away'.[78] Although the assemblage reproduces itself in order to stabilise and establish a territory, every brush against the outside of the assemblage entails deterritorialisations or the pursuit of 'lines of flight'[79] which transform it. As William Bogard writes, 'in a crucial sense, assemblages as a whole are lines of flight'.[80] He

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[78] Deleuze and Guattari, 98.
[79] Deleuze and Guattari, 9.
[80] Bogard, 'Surveillance Assemblages and Lines of Flight', 108.

draws attention to the way in which assemblages pursuing a line of flight, for example the shift from the spectacle of public torture to the isolation of prison, retain deterritorialised traces of the former configuration within the new assemblage of punishment.[81] Public adulation of the clandestine 'master criminal' is an example of a 'line of flight' in the crime assemblage. As Foucault noted, the popularity of physiognomic theories of deviance in the late 19th century had the side-effect of creating the character of the unmarked 'master criminal' who is able to pass unknown among polite society.[82] Perhaps the best example of this character is Marcel Allain and Pierre Souvestre's anti-hero Fantômas,[83] who perpetually outmanoeuvred the police detectives committed to his capture and thrillingly denied a fascinated public the visual pleasure of looking into his eyes and *knowing* him.[84] This is not an arc of freedom, as lines of flight get tied up again,[85] and we need to think about the faceless, fictional Fantômas in conjunction with the relentless public appetite for images of 'real' criminal bodies.

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[81] Bogard, 108.

[82] Michel Foucault, 'Prison Talk', in *Power/ Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 46.

[83] The 32 novels in the Fantômas series were published between 1911 and 1913.

[84] I had Fantômas in mind when I wrote *You Will Have Your Day in Court* (2017), which tells the story of Paul Bint – a successful serial imposter – and one of his targets, the barrister turned politician Keir Starmer. I will discuss this literary composition in chapter two.

[85] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 250.

The Dispositif

As Deleuze acknowledged,[86] the assemblage is closely related to Foucault's concept of the *dispositif*, often translated into English as 'apparatus,' which was gained importance within his later works.[87] Giorgio Agamben argues that the dispositif is 'a decisive technical term in the strategy of Foucault's thought,' essential to his political philosophy of power and 'governmentality'.[88] This locates the dispositif (and therefore, I would suggest, the assemblage), as part of a network of political concepts which attempted to comprehend the period's altered sense of power, subjectivity, state and sovereignty, in the wake of contemporary anti-colonial and worker struggles, and to reckon with the future of Marxism in the crisis brought about by Stalinism. Both Deleuze and Agamben wrote influential accounts of the dispositif where they attempt to pull together a general definition from Foucault's contextual uses of the concept.[89] In his essay Agamben quotes from a 1977 interview in which Foucault describes the dispositif as made up of:

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[86] Gilles Deleuze, 'What Is a Dispositif?', in *Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975 - 1995*, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2007), 338–48; Deleuze, *Foucault*, 14.

[87] It is present in works written in the mid-1970s for example in *Discipline and Punish*, *The History of Sexuality Volume 1*[87] and his Collège de France lectures from 1975/6 onwards.

[88] Giorgio Agamben, *'What Is an Apparatus?' and Other Essays*, trans. David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella, Meridian (Stanford, Calif.) (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009), 2. Agamben draws an etymological lineage for the dispositif which stretches back to the Greek notion of oikonomia, claiming it therefore refers 'to a set of practices, bodies of knowledge, measures, and institutions that aim to manage, govern, control, and orient – in a way that purports to be useful – the behaviours, gestures, and thoughts of human beings.' Agamben, 12.

[89] Deleuze, 'What Is a Dispositif?'; Agamben, *"What Is an Apparatus?*

> a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions - in short, the said as much as the unsaid… The dispositif is the network which is arranged between these elements.[90]

We can see here how the dispositif shares with the assemblage a conceptualisation as a mobile arrangement of practices, statements, things and the relations between them. In defining the dispositif as the 'network which is arranged between these elements' it is clear that the configuration of the dispositif and what it includes and excludes is of vital political importance. According the Foucault, the dispositif works 'a perpetual process of *strategic elaboration*',[91] which nonetheless has unforeseen effects.[92] Foucault uses the historical example of the dispositif of imprisonment having the unintended effect of producing 'delinquency', a form of social life or subjectivity shaped by repeated imprisonment and surveillance.[93] Consequently, prison cannot be understood to be a response to, nor a remedy for, delinquency. In *A Thousand Plateaus* Deleuze and Guattari pick up this example, arguing that following Foucault, we need to understand 'prison' and 'delinquency' as 'in a state of

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[90] Michel Foucault et al., 'The Confessions of the Flesh', in *Power/ Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 195–96; Agamben, *"What Is an Apparatus?*, 2.

[91] Foucault et al., 'The Confessions of the Flesh', 195 emphases in original.

[92] Foucault et al., 195.

[93] Foucault et al., 195–96.

unstable equilibrium or reciprocal presupposition'.[94] The unforeseen effects of the dispositif's elaboration is also very close to the assemblage in its 'lines of flight' which escape from the assemblage and mutate it.

As Foucault specifies, the dispositif is as much the 'said' and the 'unsaid', and it is in his work from this period that he began 'to examine the empirical interactions between discursive and non-discursive'.[95] In *Discipline and Punish*, he shows how 'punishment' is produced by an interactive articulation of both material practices such as torture and imprisonment *and* discourses, utterances and laws which are mutually shaping. Writing on *Discipline and Punish*, Deleuze and Guattari argue that understanding how these different things are brought together requires attempting to map or diagram 'a whole organization articulating formations of power and regimes of signs… operating on a molecular level'.[96] In other words, it requires us to map out the assemblage.

The assemblage should not be comprehended as a direct descendent of Foucault's dispositif, because of the reciprocal influence of Deleuze's work on Foucault's later thought, and their shared intellectual milieu. In the creation of their concepts Deleuze and Guattari drew inspiration from literary theory,

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[94] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 75.
[95] Mark Olssen, 'Discourse, Complexity, Normativity: Tracing the Elaboration of Foucault's Materialist Concept of Discourse', *Open Review of Educational Research* 1, no. 1 (1 January 2014): 37.
[96] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 75.

structuralist linguistics, novels, visual art, music, cybernetics, complexity and systems theories and Guattari's clinical observations as well as anthropology, political theory, psychoanalysis and philosophy. I have drawn much from Foucault's thought. However, as befitting his 'genealogical' approach, his materials were primarily historical textual artefacts drawn from institutional archives. In contrast my project is an attempt to comprehend research encounters as they are unfolding. For example, when I discuss an archive in chapter five, it is not as a bounded collection of artefacts, but as a machine in process, one that produces new outcomes and affects (e.g. activism, scholarship, art, history) through its interactions. I found in Deleuze and Guattari's work a richer conceptual vocabulary to try and capture this multiplicity.

Molar and Molecular

In *A Thousand Plateaus* Deleuze and Guattari use the example of the interpretive confusion in the wake of the events of May '68 as a way of foregrounding the need for political analysis which *also* attends to the 'micropolitics' of an event, rather than assuming that these can be fully analysed according to pre-established political groupings such as classes,

factions, and political parties.[97] Toward this analysis, Deleuze and Guattari contend that assemblages operate between two immanent and intersecting 'lines' or processes: the 'molar', and the 'molecular'.[98] It is important to note that their theory doesn't map onto common sociological ideas of the more easily separated (large-scale) macro and (small-scale) micro social phenomena in which each could be claimed to condition the other. Instead, the lines are enmeshed; both 'haunted' in their 'operation and organization'[99] by the other.

Emerging from thresholds of molecular flows of force, the molar line is formed of clearly defined and rigid segments. This is the level of individual entities, whose formation is dependent on the actions of machines which through a process of 'exclusive disjunctions'[100] – 'this, not that' – cut out, or mark, binary subjectivations, races, sectors, professions, crimes, classes, genders etc. from the flux of force and energy. They also refer to this process as 'coding… a socius of inscription where the essential thing is to mark and be marked'.[101]

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[97] Deleuze and Guattari, 238.

[98] See especially plateau 9, '1933: Micropolitics and Segmentarity', Deleuze and Guattari, 229–55.

[99] Keith Ansell-Pearson, *Germinal Life: The Difference and Repetition of Deleuze* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2012), 182.

[100] Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 83–90.

[101] Deleuze and Guattari, 156. Also see in particular their chapter 'Savages, Barbarians, Civilised Men'. This conception of the organization of social space can be linked to Michel Foucault's model of 'disciplinary power', which 'functions like a piece of machinery… it is the apparatus as a whole that produces "power" and distributes individuals in this permanent and continuous field'. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Allan Sheridan (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 177.

As I will argue in chapter three, much thinking about crime follows the machinations of molar selection to assemble crime from the populations already codified as criminal, for example the working class, the male, the young, the unemployed, and ethnic minorities. To do this almost inevitably means working from a sample to produce a general theory of crime that both pre-criminalises those who fit the code (scaling down) and treats qualitatively different crimes as if they were the same (scaling up).

The second, 'molecular' line consists of 'fluxes'[102] of pre-personal affects and perceptions. Deleuze and Guattari warn that the molecular line should not be misconceived as being more 'intimate', 'imaginary', of a more 'personal' nature, or 'freer', as molecular lines are constantly being brought back under the order of molar representation in a process which is complex and subtle in creating new codes.[103] They note the potential for erroneously 'believing that a little suppleness is enough to make things "better"… microfascisms are what make fascism so dangerous, and fine segmentations are as harmful as the most rigid of segments'.[104] As Deleuze and Guattari make plain, segmentation also operates on the molecular level, for example through the machine of 'faciality':

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[102] Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, 'Many Politics', in *Dialogues*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London: Athlone, 1987), 124.
[103] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 237.
[104] Deleuze and Guattari, 237.

The face is not an envelope exterior to the person who speaks, thinks, or

feels… A child, woman, mother, man, father, boss, teacher, police officer, does

not speak a general language but one whose signifying traits are indexed to

specific faciality traits. Faces are not basically individual; they define zones of

frequency or probability, delimit a field that neutralizes in advance any

expressions or connections unamenable to the appropriate significations.[105]

The machinations of faciality are not random, and Deleuze and Guattari are

keen to diagnose 'the relation of the face to the assemblages of power that

require that social production'.[106] So, if not all assemblages require

facialisation, 'when does the abstract machine get triggered?'[107] They suggest

instances such as 'the maternal power operating through the face during

nursing… the political power operating through the face of the leader … the

power of film operating through the face of the star and the close-up'.[108] As I

demonstrate in chapter three, the Criminal Justice System has always required

facialisation and continues to do so.[109] Thus, one can add examples like the

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[105] Deleuze and Guattari, 186.
[106] Deleuze and Guattari, 201.
[107] Deleuze and Guattari, 194.
[108] Deleuze and Guattari, 194.
[109] As Kelly Gates argues: 'a cultural analysis of automated facial recognition and expression analysis technologies provides evidence that the drive to "know the face" continues to be stimulated by new photographic technologies, while at the same time pushing the development of these technologies in particular directions'. Kelly A. Gates, *Our Biometric Future: Facial Recognition Technology and the Culture of Surveillance* (New York: NYU Press, 2011), 8. These new developments in surveillance and image analysis correspondingly drive new technologies of masking, evasion and image scrambling. See Alex Hern, 'Anti-Surveillance Clothing Aims to Hide Wearers from Facial Recognition', *The Guardian*, 4 January 2017, sec. Technology, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jan/04/anti-surveillance-clothing-facial-recognition-hyperface.

face of the ringleader who led the 'headless' mob; the face designated as that

of a properly *political* prisoner; or the serial killer who looked like a heartthrob.

Faciality reminds us that subtle interpersonal acts of looking and being looked

at form part of the machinery of social codification and inscription. For

example, we might think about the subtle reading of working class bodies as

'respectable'[110] or not; or the affective reading of a racialised urban area as

'sketchy' or dangerous; or the feeling that someone is giving a truthful

account; or the legitimation of an act of violence based on the agent's fear or

sense of foreboding. Faciality is a concept that I will refer back to throughout

this thesis because of its centrality to practices of criminalisation and resistance

to criminalisation,[111] and also its centrality to forms of social research, such as

the interview, which depend upon an initial mutual establishment of

signifying traits such as apparent trustworthiness.

Versions of the concept of the assemblage appear across Deleuze and

Guattari's single-authored and joint-authored works,[112] and here I draw

primarily on the assemblage as conceptualised in *A Thousand Plateaus*. As

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[110] See Beverley Skeggs, *Formations of Class and Gender: Becoming Respectable* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 1997).

[111] I explore resisting faciality in my discussion of strategic "headlessness" in chapter five of this thesis.

[112] For example, the assemblage is a redefinition and development of Deleuze and Guattari's concept of 'desiring machines' in Anti-Oedipus, where, according to a set of relational rules, machines are coupled with each other in a 'productive synthesis'. See Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 5. They also previously discussed the assemblage in relation to the fiction of Franz Kafka, see: Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Kafka: Toward A Minor Literature*, trans. Dana Polan (Minneapolis, Minn.: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2012).

evidence of the continued importance of the assemblage to Deleuze and Guattari's thought, one can discern its conceptual logic in their definition of the philosophical 'concept' in their final co-written work *What is Philosophy?*[113] Analogously to the assemblage, they describe the concept as a 'multiplicity'[114] which simultaneously holds a past 'history,' as well as a future 'becoming' determined by its interactions with other concepts.[115] Again akin to the composition of the assemblage, the character of the concept is 'a matter of articulation, of cutting and cross-cutting. The concept is a whole because it totalizes its components, but it is a fragmentary whole'.[116] They employ the metaphor of a dry-stone wall as an example of how this 'fragmentary whole' inheres, writing:

> As fragmentary totalities, concepts are not even the pieces of a puzzle, for their irregular contours do not correspond to each other. They do form a wall, but it is a dry-stone wall, and everything holds together only along diverging lines.[117]

The wall is held together only by the force exerted by its contents, which have been arranged to engender coherence. Their deployment of the assemblage-

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[113] In this text they argue that philosophy is the 'art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts.' Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (London: Verso, 1994), 2. Originally published in French in 1991.
[114] Deleuze and Guattari, 15.
[115] Deleuze and Guattari, 18.
[116] Deleuze and Guattari, 16.
[117] Deleuze and Guattari, 23.

like concept here demonstrates their continued commitment to an ontology of becoming and multiplicity and to the usefulness of the term.

In conclusion, I will sketch out the version of the assemblage of crime that I want the reader to have in mind as they go forward with this thesis.

A Sketch of a Crime Assemblage

* Crime as an assemblage.

Jasbir Puar argues that adopting the open model of the assemblage allows us 'to attune to movements, intensities, emotions, energies, affectivities, and textures as they inhabit events, spatiality, and corporealities'.[118] As I will demonstrate throughout this thesis, thinking of crime as an assemblage enables one to decentre the individual, be it the criminal or the victim from our analysis of crime. It allows one to pay attention to the workings of other human and non-human actors in the assemblage of crime, and it forces us to pay attention to the labour of the researcher. It sensitises us to repetitions and stratification within the assemblage, but enables us to effect some change in our pursuit of lines of flight.

* Crime is distinct from criminalisation.

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[118] Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages*, 215.

In this thesis I will maintain that criminalisation is not a necessary outcome of committing a crime. Criminalisation is an effect of molecular and molar processes that codify some of us, and not others, as criminal. This separation draws our attention to the politics of the crime assemblage, and also to the differing temporalities of crime as an event, and criminalisation as an effect of longer process involving repeated social codification. This has implications for social policy: for instance, what is the appropriate measure of punishment in time for a criminal act? I suggest that it is inappropriate to incarcerate people for an extended period of time if we (punishers and punished) are not singular and authentic subjects but multiple selves shaped by our ongoing social interactions with others.

* Crime causality.

Throughout this thesis I will not be conjecturing on the causes of crime. Assemblages produce a multitude of effects that are not direct or linear, but diffuse. As a result, I argue that one cannot engage Deleuze and Guattari's work to produce a theory of strong crime causality.

* Deterritorialising is not the same as unmasking.

Actualisations of the assemblage don't exhaust its potential to be otherwise, and to produce another actuality. The assemblage of crime is not static, it is always being deterritorialised and reterritorialised, even if it appears relatively stable. As such, what I am doing should not be interpreted

as intervening in or acting on something that is otherwise fixed and stable. In deterritorialising and reterritorialising crime, my work does not seek to unmask the dominant version of crime as a fraud. Pursuing 'lines of flight' is something that is happening to the crime assemblage anyway. My intervention just makes this mutation explicit, and hopefully the performativity of my method makes my decision-making more apparent.

* Quantity and scale.

For this thesis I have collaborated and negotiated projects with only a few research participants. For me, this small sample is not a limitation of my work but necessary for the kind of work I do. On a practical level, maintaining ongoing informed consent is labour intensive, and the only way I could do this adequately while developing these projects was to work with fewer people. On a theoretical level, my approach to knowledge building does not rest on gathering a body of evidence to argue that the people I have collaborated with are typical representatives of the roles in which they have been cast (by me). However, I argue that looking carefully at the contents and expressions contained within the assemblage that each individual arranges reveals something of a wider state of affairs.[119] In theorising the social via the

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[119] I recognise that in focusing on interactions with individuals, I am not producing what appears to be a strong theory of the state, or law – something that might be expected from a critical project about the way crime is assembled. Following Foucault, I think of the state as the effect of practices which constitute everyday life. As such we can look at these quotidian interactions and their codification and see how they map social power.

molar and molecular, it is important to remember that for Deleuze the difference between them is qualitative, not quantitative.[120] Thus we cannot 'scale up' from molecular flows to grasp molar segmentations. Instead, I move between the versions of crime assembled by my participants. For example, Craig occupies an unusual position as both policeman and police actor and I have tried to understand how these roles co-produce his notion of crime, rather than attempting to gauge whether Craig is a 'typical case' by interviewing and comparing notes on other police personnel.

Conclusion: Deterritorialisation and Enstrangement

If this project as a de/reterritorialisation of crime, what territory am I producing? This is a version of crime which doesn't start from the molar segmentation of criminal acts and criminal subjects. Instead, through the creation of compositions that bring together disparate features and translate them into new forms, it tries to capture the affective dimensions of crime and the movements between molar and molecular crime constitutions. Deterritorialisation or lines of flight are not positive,[121] liberatory, or simply affirmative. According to Deleuze and Guattari they run the danger of being 'recaptured in the end, letting themselves be sealed in, tied up, reknotted,

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[120] Marks, *Gilles Deleuze*, 100.
[121] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 250.

reterritorialized',[122] and also of turning to pure destruction, or extinction. This is what Deleuze and Guattari term the danger of 'wildly destratifying'.[123] So, how can we safely create something new, how can we destratify and produce lines of flight? Deleuze and Guattari suggest the following:

> Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times. It is through a meticulous relation with the strata that one succeeds in freeing lines of flight.[124]

As I will discuss further in the following chapter, each of the projects I have undertaken *cautiously* follows something of a methodological 'line of flight' in the creation of their compositions. What I mean by this is that I haven't started my research from a blank page (if such a thing were possible). I have begun with an established approach and then 'enstranged' it a little in response to initial research findings and experiences. These shifts in my practice are deliberate, rigorous and careful, which is why I refer to them as 'translations'. For example, the 'interviews about being interviewed' came out of an attempt to do interviews differently and better, not to abandon the

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[122] Deleuze and Guattari, 250.
[123] Deleuze and Guattari, 178.
[124] Deleuze and Guattari, 178.

interview form. The literary compositions are an attempt to alter the

audience's perception of the transmission of evidence and truth. Within the

context of the field of visual sociology, my use of text *as* image is similarly a

divergence of this kind. The style of chapter four is a creative compromise

for the loss of my film *Cop Show* due to the participant's removal of consent.

The form of chapter five attempts to show how important photographs were

in developing an argument about visualisations of crime, punishment and

resistance. I am not dismissing standard research methods, but

experimenting with the fuller range of options that I see operating in the

social sciences, philosophy and art to produce crime differently.

Chapter Two: Composing Crime

Introduction: In Different Voices

In this chapter I will reflect on my processual research methodology, which developed via attempts to attend to the intricacy and mutability of life in flux, as posed in chapter one. Firstly I will introduce some key aspects of my method: translation, composition and research as a 'becoming'-with research participants. I will then focus on my literary compositions, demonstrating how they developed out of an earlier period of undertaking more standard sociological methods: interviews and participant observation. I will argue that to translate research data into non-standard and 'unscientific' forms interrupts the audience's seamless reception of the crime assemblage as 'fact'. This is not to suggest that these compositions do not make truth claims, but that these are never claims to a final, impartial truth. My work could be seen as an attempt to 'take seriously that the intricate web of connections that characterises any event or problem *is the story*'.[125] Shaping empirical research into forms which perform the fragility of our knowledge about crime affects the audience, transmitting a sense of uncertainty.

The title of this thesis, 'in different voices', subtly references the working title of T.S Eliot's poem *The Waste Land*: 'he do the police in different

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[125] Avery F. Gordon, *Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination*, 2nd Revised edition (Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press, 2008), 20. Emphasis in original.

voices'.[126] Eliot's poem skips between voices, times, and places. The gaps

between these are productive, and the unsaid aids in the creation of character

both human and non-human. One of the questions my project explores is what

can be done with characters to foreground the complexity of crime, and

processes of criminalisation. In doing this work I neither claim to represent

other people's experiences with fidelity, nor do I claim to 'give voice' to others.

Sara Ahmed writes that 'speaking for the other… is premised on fantasies of

absolute proximity and absolute distance'.[127] There is danger in the

construction of sociological narratives in which 'we' academics play out our

fantasies of compassion, benevolence, risk, danger, excitement, and imagine

that we might come to take the place of the 'other'. Avery Gordon and Stephen

Pfohl (1986) remind us that, aside from explicitly terming an intellectual

approach 'realist', there is a more fundamental commitment to realism in both

positivist and humanist approaches to theorising, as both view 'social facts' as

independent of the researcher's practice. In their view, positivists locate these

social facts in terms of abstract and objective data that are quantifiable and

classifiable, whereas humanists see the subjective meaning-making of

researchers and participants as factual starting points of qualitative theoretical

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[126] T. S. Eliot, *The Waste Land: A Facsimile and Transcript of the Original Drafts, Including the Annotations of Ezra Pound*, ed. Valerie Eliot, Limited ed.. (London: Faber and Faber, 1971), 4. Eliot in turn took this fragment of text from a passage in Charles Dickens's novel *Our Mutual Friend* (1864-65, Chapter 15) where a character discusses her domestic pleasure in being read aloud police reports from the newspapers.
[127] Sara Ahmed, *Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality* (London: Routledge, 2000), 166.

work.[128] How do we come to believe we 'know' our research participants, or can speak for them? Mindful of this 'humanist' realism, I still try to capture something of how the actors involved in each of my compositions assemble crime. At the same time, I don't seek to hide my negotiated role in co-constituting these assemblages, and instead try to dramatise the contradictions, collaborations and gaps in what we co-produce.

An important ethical consideration hovers around the question of what we think is becoming intelligible through our research. Or, in other words, what are we, our research participants, and our audiences coming to know? How do we become different through our research encounters? What effects and affects can a literary composition produce about understanding experiences of homecoming after prison that a report cannot?[129] As I will discuss further in this chapter and in chapters four and five, this has been as much about choosing what information *not* to hear, translate and communicate. As I argued in chapter one, to practice what Annemarie Mol terms 'ontological politics' means going beyond a concern with making adequate representations or having sufficient (epistemological) knowledge of the real, and to claim that 'reality does not precede the mundane practices in which we interact with it, but is rather shaped within these practices'.[130]

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[128] Avery Gordon and Stephen Pfohl, 'Criminological Displacements: A Sociological Deconstruction', *Social Problems* 33, no. 6 (1986): 596–97.
[129] This is the theme of my short story *Ranked Outsider*, included in the portfolio.
[130] Mol, 'Ontological Politics. A Word and Some Questions', 75.

Although there is often an effect of permanence or inevitability to this performance, there are other possible realities: other possible ways to assemble crime. Reflecting this in our work means researchers need to conceptualise the politics of their practice differently. We must not imagine that we employ research methods that neutrally reveal the reality of states of affairs in the world. This intellectual tendency of the 'ontological turn' draws on past and present poststructuralist, feminist and postcolonial and decolonial projects which deconstruct or decentre discourses of disinterested knowledge production, foregrounding the performativity of our methods of knowing and telling. John Law and John Urry argue researchers should 'think about the worlds [they] want to *help* to make'.[131] Their use of 'help' here recognises that the social sciences are relational and interactive in their social enactments, i.e. messily entangled with, and often subservient to, other social productions.[132]

Actors as Assemblage: Practice as 'Becoming'

As I have intimated, I follow Deleuze and Guattari in working with a conceptualisation of actors, including human actors, as a mobile assemblage of affections and perceptions, constituted and reconstituted by their relationships with human and non-human others. In reconceptualising

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[131] John Law and John Urry, 'Enacting the Social', *Economy and Society* 33, no. 3 (2004): 319. Emphasis in original.
[132] Law and Urry, 392.

subjects as multiple, we cannot invoke criminals, victims, witnesses, or researchers as discrete individuals, let alone as sharing essential qualities with all others we might seek to categorise with them. Dorothea Olkowski suggests that Deleuze's philosophical project entails a 'ruin' of representation – a breaking of the smooth production of representational practices which hierarchically categorise things based on the apparent differences between them.[133] For Deleuze and Guattari categories conceal as much as they express, and they aim instead to disassemble such social stratifications through experimentation. Consequently their work has been taken up by many scholars and activists seeking to move beyond a politics based on identity.[134] For example, Dorothea Olkowski draws together Deleuze and Guattari's work with a feminist political sensibility, well-expressed by Iris Marion Young that the 'social movements of oppressed or disadvantaged groups need a political vision different from both the assimilationist and separatist ideals… a politics that treats difference as variation and specificity, rather than exclusive opposition'.[135] Deleuze's philosophy is incompatible with the liberal politics of difference consisting of 'recognition' and 'inclusion' of the marginalised

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[133] Olkowski, *Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation*.

[134] Anna Hickey-Moody and Peta Malins, 'Introduction: Gilles Deleuze and Four Movements in Social Thought', in *Deleuzian Encounters: Studies in Contemporary Social Issues*, ed. Anna Hickey-Moody and Peta Malins (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 5.

[135] Iris Marion Young (1995) quoted in Olkowski, *Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation*, 13.

'other' within a dominant system. Instead we should experiment with new ways of being with each other that allow for change and indeterminacy.

As assemblages we are open to the world, mutually affecting the things brought into contact with ourselves. This mixing creates a new assemblage: a new 'me', although it is not about dissolving one's borders entirely – 'you have to keep enough of the organism for it to reform each dawn'.[136] A non-essential and non-unitary conception of the subject has strong implications for the place of the researcher in the assemblage of crime. The researcher is not a pre-formed subject who then goes and performs the research, but is rather constantly being constituted as a researcher *through* the research process. To return briefly to our earlier discussion of faciality, the researcher is constituted (provisionally accepted) as one who can speak as a researcher.

With a mobile, non-essential model of things and people in mind, we cannot accept that criminalised people are simply or intrinsically criminal. Because of their position within the assemblage of crime, serving and ex-prisoners are allowed to speak in our society but only under certain conditions, in certain forms, and on certain topics can they be heard.[137] For example, the other social actors in my project – criminologists, police and private investigator – have, like myself, the researcher, the privilege of being

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[136] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 178.
[137] I will take up this problem again in chapter five of this thesis.

able to undertake a construction of crime without being defined by this association. If a police officer or criminologist has intimate knowledge[138] of crime, it is nevertheless usually perceived to be knowledge of something external to them, rather than as *the* experience which defines them. This problem of overdetermination could be re-posed via Avery Gordon's important question: who has the right to 'complex personhood?'[139] Which lives are recognised as simultaneously straightforward and complicated, and which cannot be told faithfully because they are in process? In contrast, which lives are essentialised and overdetermined? Who is forced to produce an honest account of their failings? These questions aid us in the development of a non-essentialist understanding of crime, and in our role as a researcher working within a state of uncertainty.

Inspired by Deleuze and Guattari's conceptualisation of 'becoming',[140] the anthropologist Alphonso Lingis invokes a sense of research as practicing a social bond, one that is not premised on a 'social contract', or a relationship of extraction or exchange, but rather on 'couplings'.[141] This is not the coupling at the level of individuals, but becoming-with in a symbiotic relationship.

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[138] As discussed earlier in this thesis, I am working with a notion of knowledge not as something possessed by an actor, but rather something assembled by that actor out of the materials that move and affect her.

[139] Gordon, *Ghostly Matters*, 4.

[140] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 256–341.

[141] Alphonso Lingis, 'The Society of Dismembered Body Parts', in *Gilles Deleuze and the Theater of Philosophy*, ed. Constantin V Boundas and Dorothea Olkowski (New York ; London: Routledge, 1994), 293. For an alternative discussion of 'becoming-together' see Fraser, 'Experiencing Sociology'.

Becoming-with is not mimesis: it is not to suggest, for example, that researching with police is to become identifiably *like* police, but rather that in the encounter we both affect each other and become different.[142] Becoming is not turning from one thing into another, i.e. an in-between state from one identity to another. Instead it refers to a ceaseless process of transformation. We and everything else are always becoming-different, even when it appears as if nothing is changing.[143] Through this understanding, I argue that people (including researchers) cannot access the 'whole truth' about themselves and their experiences. Yet this does not mean that they cannot produce imaginative, affective, and compelling accounts, which plot their current position or trajectory within the assemblage of crime.

In this project I have been keen to avoid closed moral structures which limit the possibility for experimentation. Other scholars seeking guidance for how to practice such research have found much to work with in Deleuze's interpretation of Spinoza's (1677) *Ethics*.[144] This is an ethics practiced in the understanding of the capacity of an emergent relation to both enrich and diminish each other's power to act and to be affected. I have found this very

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[142] I will address this further in chapter four.

[143] 'This is the simultaneity of a becoming whose characteristic is to elude the present. Insofar as it eludes the present, becoming does not tolerate the separation or the distinction of before and after, or of past and future. It pertains to the essence of becoming to move and to pull in both directions at once'. Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 3.

[144] See Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988); Gilles Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1992). For scholars working this seam, see for example Elizabeth Grosz, Rosi Braidotti, and Claire Colebrook.

difficult work to do, not least because of the vagueness of the terrain. For example, when is a relation emergent? Which relations count? What or who is the judge in this? As Jason Read points out, there are difficulties with deriving an interpersonal ethics, i.e. at the level of human actors, from a trans-individual and pre-personal theory of affects.[145] This research does not seek to answer these questions. However, at a minimum, I did try and make work which could be read by my research participants without them feeling judged, misrepresented or objectified. For example, in my selection of concepts to use from Deleuze and Guattari's work I avoided the term 'schizoanalysis'[146] partly because one of my research participants describes himself as living with 'schizo-affective disorder', and was hospitalised at one point during our collaboration. His mental health sometimes causes him distress and pain which he carries with incredible grace and humour, and I would be mortified to share this work with him if it was written in terms that could be taken to romanticise his experience. Whilst not suggesting that such terms should never be used, I think we should be mindful of what invoking these concepts does, particularly in the context of work that involves ongoing relationships with other people.

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[145] Jason Read, 'The Affective Economy: Producing and Consuming Affects in Deleuze and Guattari', in *Deleuze and the Passions*, ed. Ceciel Meiborg and Sjoerd van Tuinen (Punctum Books, 2016), 104.

[146] They outline schizoanalysis in Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 301–417.

Throughout this research I pursued projects with people who maintained a sense of performative distance from the roles they play in relation to crime and criminality.[147] This is important firstly because a sense of distance can promote the kind of reflections that enrich research, and secondly as I was engaged in feeding back my work to research participants I was eager not to harm them or dismiss their experience: akin what Gayatri Spivak termed 'epistemic violence'.[148] As I show respectively in chapters four, five and in my portfolio, I found that a disaffected police-actor, *ex*-prisoners, and a private investigator (who felt like he was doing a job that the police should do but were incapable of) had already positioned themselves as on or beyond the margins of that experience and able to reflect upon it with more ease. Thinking about research as becoming-with research objects (whether human or not) offers us a valuable lens through which to produce crime and criminality in radically different ways. I will now discuss my methodology in detail.

Making Compositions: An Outlining of Method

I have so far made reference to 'composition' as a practice that allows the assemblage of crime to be apprehended *as an assemblage*. These

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[147] Erving Goffman argued for a kind of cynicism, or distancing from our social roles as a kind of self-protection from the 'alienation' of truly believing we are one of the social roles we play. See Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (London: Penguin, 1990).

[148] Gayatri Spivak, 'Can the Subaltern Speak?', in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988).

compositions are not representations of problems I have already 'solved': my work is practiced-based in the sense that the process of constructing each composition further transforms my thinking. As I stated in chapter one, I chose the term composition to characterise my practice because it spans literary and visual production. My compositions imaginatively produce a performative reterritorialisation of crime, and the structure and style of each reflects my thinking through of the materials generated by each research encounter.

In this project my working method has been both compositional and inductive, as follows:

In any period of time I will have a concept or set of concepts that I am thinking about in relation to my research questions. At times these questions will be at the forefront of my mind, at other times they function as a kind of background attentiveness, which both conditions how I understand empirical sensation and experiences, and the specific data that I accumulate. During the years I have spent undertaking this project, such data has included 'true crime' stories, tweets, police memoirs, archival texts and images, newspaper articles, my field notes in the form of ethnographic observation, autoethnography, poetry, and informal interviews that I have conducted, recorded and transcribed. Although these materials are different in kind, they all contain

information pertinent to my research question and I treat them all as valid materials for compositional inclusion.

I do nothing active with major parts of this diverse collection, beyond maintaining its existence as a resource. However, sometimes patterns, links and contradictions emerge from the material which becomes the start of a composition. I might start playing with a piece of data simply by charting repeated words and phrases, or by imagining a character who might be connected to it, or an alternative scenario in which it could play out. Most of these initial experiments either fail to develop in the way I initially imagined, or something unexpected emerges and the fragment I have been working on is translated into a part of a different composition.

Research necessarily involves transformations and the altering of forms, and so I have found it helpful to think about research as a process of translation. To do this I have drawn on the conceptualisations of 'translation' within the work of Science and Technology Studies (STS) scholars, and in particular actor-network theory (ANT) approaches.[149] Here, translation figures as a verb, an active process undertaken by an actor or actors, rather than as a fixed output. It is important to point out that translation is not a special action – it is inherent to all acts of representation. Within ANT,

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[149] John Law characterises ANT as 'empirical stories about processes of translation'. John Law, 'Notes on the Theory of the Actor-Network: Ordering, Strategy, and Heterogeneity', *Systems Practice* 5, no. 4 (1 August 1992): 386.

'translation means to alter the form of something to bring it into alignment with a technology, system, or culture'.[150] In this thesis, this means translating various kinds of data into presentations which blend artistic forms, such as literature and film, and academic forms. Drawing on Callon's description of translation as an act of 'displacement' in which the researcher makes herself a 'spokesperson' for the object of her enquiry in her act of transforming it into a different form,[151] Michael Guggenheim writes that 'the notion of translation displaces the notion of objectivity understood as non-interference, because it always assumes interference and acknowledges that the researcher has a practical involvement in this transformation with her own body and various media technologies'.[152] As such, the researcher's translations are an interested act of interference with ethical and ontological implications. To make oneself a spokesperson is to claim the right to speak for others, but only from one's limited vantage point inside the assemblage. Here there is specificity, contingency and intimacy, as opposed to a claim to universality, permanence and objective distance.

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[150] Slack and Wise, *Culture and Technology*, 140. Bruno Latour notes that translation is 'a relation that does not transport causality but induces two mediators into coexisting' in an assemblage. Latour, *Reassembling the Social*, 108. What is made to coexist is not determined from the outset. However, the actor does not act freely but is affected and maybe limited by the traces of other translations, which may be so often repeated that they seem "natural," inevitable, or cause and effect.

[151] Michel Callon, 'Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the Scallops and the Fishermen of St Brieuc Bay', *The Sociological Review* 32, no. 1_suppl (1 May 1984): 203. I will discuss the ethics of making oneself a 'spokesperson' in chapter three.

[152] Michael Guggenheim, 'The Media of Sociology: Tight or Loose Translations?', *The British Journal of Sociology* 66, no. 2 (June 2015): 352.

I employ translation in my work, rather than the related concept of transformation, because of the suggestion that in a translation, the translator works to retain something of the sense of the previous iteration: '*something* at least is kept constant'.[153] But how is this selection made and how is this work done? A crucial aspect of the conceptualisation of translation is the gap: the difference between versions of content. My decisions about what to translate and what to lose through cutting, or disguise through transformation, are based partly on my narrative and aesthetic preferences, and partly on ethical reasoning about the impact of my compositions on the lives of the people who gave me information. In this instance, a gap between two points in a chain of translations is only visible to myself and the research participant. I make stylistic decisions about each piece of work based on what I want it to produce, or *do* to the audience: how I want it to affect and influence those who come into contact with it. In each of my finished works the 'original' data I select to work with is treated differently depending on the kind of impression I am trying to make. For example, I sometimes 'quote' very directly and make it clear that this is what I am doing,[154] whereas at other times I either absorb or translate material into something else. The appearance of authenticity can be

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[153] Bruno Latour, 'The More Manipulations, the Better…', in *Representation in Scientific Practice Revisited*, ed. Catelijne Coopmans et al. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2014), 158.

[154] I am using quotation here in an expanded sense to refer to selected and repurposed material (not necessarily textual) that feels bounded and has origins easily traceable from my collection. I do this direct quoting in my composition *Double Tears* (2015) and the risoprinted images in chapter five.

a useful tool for initially engaging an audience, and as such I sometimes employ a style which is associated with some tropes of authentic presence, be it the confessional, stream of consciousness, academic footnotes, quotation marks etc. However, here I still switch between styles or speakers, unsettling the impression of authenticity at the very moment that the audience might be searching for it.

My finished compositions are very precisely constructed and the product of continual revisions, usually made over a number of years. Within finished works, the translated parts of data act as traces of the earlier iterations of the research, and also act as pathways or links to the world outside the thing I am creating, including other things I have written and made. Vitally, when I work with material someone else has given me (usually in the form of an interview) I will return the composition I have made to them for comment, amendment and approval. Each composition relates to other pieces of work I have undertaken, and thematic connections become apparent when one reads between different pieces and finds the repetition of themes such as violence, gender, fear, fraudulence and home. These compositions are united by their attempt to work through my research questions. However, I try to do justice to the complexity of my data and the multiplicity of crime, and resist the urge to 'correct' accounts so they are all in agreement. As I have argued, the assemblage of crime includes contradictions.

This way of working and the final compositions which comprise this project are built out of the 'failures' of prior experiments and explorations. I discuss this process in terms of adaption to an evolving research relationship with regards to my project *Cop Show* in chapter four, but here I will now briefly relate the process which led to the creation of my literary compositions.

Enforced Narratives and Unreliable Narrators

Before I began to undertake my empirical research, I was sensitised to the unequal power relations inherent to traditional methods of social research, such as interviews, with concerns similar to those of many advocates of participatory research and participatory action research.[155] As such, I aspired to do work which was collaborative and, if at all possible, participant-led. I also knew that in order to understand criminology's production of crime as one version of crime, albeit a dominant version, I wanted to work with people who self-identified as criminalised – something outside of my own experience. Through an introduction from my supervisor Les Back, I started working with the Open Book group in 2014, initially joining their weekly creative writing class. Through participating in the group I became aware of how much state-

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[155] For a sample of the debates around participatory research see: Orlando Fals-Borda and Muhammad Anisur Rahman, eds., *Action and Knowledge: Breaking the Monopoly with Participatory Action Research* (New York : London: Apex Press, 1991); Lesley-Anne Gallacher and Michael Gallagher, 'Methodological Immaturity in Childhood Research? Thinking Through "Participatory Methods"', *Childhood* 15, no. 4 (1 November 2008): 499–516; Sally Holland et al., 'Rights, "right on" or the Right Thing to Do? A Critical Exploration of Young People's Engagement in Participative Social Work Research', Working Paper (ESRC National Centre for Research Methods, 2008), http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/460/; Melanie Nind, 'Participatory Data Analysis: A Step Too Far?', *Qualitative Research* 11, no. 4 (2011): 349–63.

required confessions, self-narrativising and storytelling is a part of 'infamous' lives,[156] with periodic interviews with parole officers, forensic psychiatrists, police, social and key workers functioning as a sort of high-stakes performance of passage or transformation (i.e. from being classed 'a danger to society' to contrition and reintegration, from addict to aftercare). As one participant who could not remember a time in which social services was not a part of his life joked, 'I could tell you the story of my life in interviews'.[157] Carolyn Steedman draws attention to the clichéd narrative form of the life stories of the poor and socially marginalised. She terms these 'enforced narratives' because they have been demanded by the state in exchange for its aid, at least since the 17th century and the development of the administrative state.[158] As such, Steedman argues that we should interpret such accounts as evidencing a 'history of expectations, orders and instructions rather than one of urges and desires'.[159] I argue that this historical framing is absolutely vital

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[156] Foucault writes: 'an important moment it was when a society loaned words, turns of phrase and constructions, rituals of language to the anonymous mass of people in order that they be able to speak about themselves… How simple and easy it would be, no doubt, to dismantle power, if it only worked to supervise, to spy upon, to sneak up on, to prohibit and punish; but it incites, instigates, produces'. Michel Foucault, 'The Lives of Infamous Men', in *Power*, ed. James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley, Foucault, Michel, 1926-1984. Selections. English ; v. 3 (London: Penguin, 2002), 172.

[157] "Hitherto," in discussion with the author, 2014.

[158] She sees this as running in parallel to the development of elite autobiographies and their particular mode of performing the self. The elite form is argued by many to be a key cultural aspect of liberal modernity's 'possessive individualism'. See for example, Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age.* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991); Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson, eds., *De/Colonizing the Subject: The Politics of Gender in Women's Autobiography* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992). Steedman, 'Enforced Narratives: Stories of Another Self', 28.

[159] Steedman, 'Enforced Narratives: Stories of Another Self', 28.

to any contemporary attempt to analyse the narratives of self, made by those who have already been repeatedly produced as criminal through such narratives.

Part of my attraction to Open Book as a program is that it focuses on participants' futures and on developing their interests and skills, rather than on past troubles. I was very conscious not to undermine this ethos, and hoped to find a way to disrupt the production of enforced narratives, or confessions. As there were a number of enthusiastic writers in the group I proposed a writing exchange project. After an interrogation about the exact nature of my research proposal and my political intentions,[160] a few class members agreed to participate. I regard the stage following as a misstep in part because they developed from a sense that I didn't know how to get the project going. Instead of 'risking' starting with fiction, and thinking it would give us material to work from and help develop a 'sociable method',[161] I arranged one-to-one conversations with my participants – although perhaps a conversation where one participant has the information desired by the other is more accurately termed an interview. Nevertheless, because I was keen to avoid a situation in which participants felt compelled to repeat 'their story' again, I took up the

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[160] One member (who later agreed to be a participant) misunderstood my project, got very angry and accused me of probable social experimentation and manipulation. This interviewee, who will be identified by the pseudonym '"Hitherto," has been a valued critic and challenging force in the project.

[161] Shamser Sinha and Les Back, 'Making Methods Sociable: Dialogue, Ethics and Authorship in Qualitative Research', *Qualitative Research* 14, no. 4 (August 2014): 473–87.

group's playful reflexivity – they had been joking with each other in class about enforced narratives – and conducted un-structured interviews *about* being interviewed by state actors.[162] There was to be no confessions – a condition that it was much easier for me to fulfil, not having undergone a lifetime of conditioning to confess.

Despite the conversational tone of the conversations that followed, I still asked a majority of the questions, and none of my interviewees asked me probing questions about my assemblage of crime. I was largely able to avoid becoming the focus of the conversation, and thus an object of the research. I regarded this as a (productive) misstep because it acted as an immediate, uncomfortable reminder that, whatever my intentions, I am still a privileged actor. When I arrived to conduct the first conversation, the participant 'Pete' looked at me guiltily and apologised for forgetting to do his homework – confusing me for his social worker. When we started talking he joked that 'I just better be careful of what I say, ey? ... or maybe the men in white coats will come along'.[163] A lack of trust in researchers, and suspicion that we might share information with other actors such as psychiatrists and police, is both reasonable and sensible on the part of interviewees and other participants in research. A more subtle problem lies in how researchers are able to consume

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[162] The interviews took place in public spaces around Goldsmiths as chosen by each interviewee, and lasted between one to two hours, coming to an end by mutual agreement. I interviewed four members of the Open Book group in 2014.
[163] "Pete," an Open Book group member. Interviewed in 2014. Pete is a pseudonym.

the pain of others as a resource for the self. Steedman questions us whether 'the possession of a terrible tale, a story of suffering, [is] *desired*, perhaps even envied, as a component of the other self'.[164] Similarly, Beverley Skeggs critiques the implicit class dynamics of this constitution, as researchers often resource themselves through reflecting on knowledge gained via accessing the bodies and voices of the working class and socially marginalised.[165] My research participants seemed well aware of this, and crucially I believe that acts such as evasions, retractions, and silence on the part of interviewees are forms of their *solution* to the problem of interviews. I assumed that people would make edits, and communicate the version of their experience that they desired to tell.

The collaborative writing project didn't happen as intended, firstly because I had underestimated the role of the writing class in providing a structure which made it possible for people to write. I overestimated the effect of distancing that the performativity of the interview would have on participants. I also underestimated the paralysing effect that receiving transcripts full of the hesitations, evasions, and contradictions that make up real conversations would have on my interviewees. I had shared verbatim transcripts because I hoped that this would engender in the interviewees a

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164 Steedman, 'Enforced Narratives: Stories of Another Self', 36.
165 Beverley Skeggs, 'Techniques for Telling the Reflexive Self', in *Qualitative Research in Action*, ed. Tim May (London: SAGE, 2002), 361.

sense of joint ownership and of being fairly represented. This I see now as a mistake. To successfully fictionalise something, we need to be able to create some distance between the empirical data in order to have the freedom to make something new. This was obviously much easier for me to do as we weren't talking about my life, the stories weren't entangled with memory. More positively, undertaking these interviews reaffirmed the importance, when seeking to investigate crime, of conducting primary research with people who have experienced criminalisation. They evidenced that when they are more sociable in form, interviews could act to build relationships with the people who challenged my analysis, by helping to build their confidence as a critical force. For example, exchanges within these interviews led to the creation of the Open Book reading group on prison abolition, where we continued thinking about punishment together.

As a compromise with the original scheme, I wrote a series of short stories which incorporate material and insights from these interviews. I still wanted to retain something of the collaboration, and in each instance I have shared what I have written with the person who gave me the data. This is a part of my attempt to employ a method that exposes the research and researcher to more scrutiny, challenge and input from research participants during the research process.

I will now discuss my literary compositions in the context of sociological and criminological uses of fiction as research.

Feminist Interventions: Fiction and Faction as Social Research

As Patti Lather argues, 'given the indeterminacies of language and the workings of power in the 'will to know' we are all - researchers and researched - unreliable narrators'.[166] The stories that I have produced play with the monologue, and unreliable narrators, emphasising that we cannot tell the truth about ourselves or our experiences, by *performing* the partiality and provisionality of knowledge claims. I have found that the creation of characters is a way to anonymise interview and ethnographic material and also to help me think about it in ways that are not overdetermined by its source. These literary works are poetic in their use of language and form, and, like film, cut between characters, voices, times and places. I think of them as 'compositions' because I aim to hold disparate things together to create an impression, rather than developing a linear narrative or a solid sense of scene. Stylistically, then, they aim to appear imprecise and associative, but each is actually painstakingly constructed.

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[166] Patti Lather, 'How Research Can Be Made to Mean: Feminist Ethnography and the Limits of Representation', in *Public Acts: Disruptive Readings on Making Curriculum Public*, ed. J. Francisco Ibáñez-Carrasco and Erica R Meiners (New York ; London: Routledge, 2004), 141.

Interventions undertaken in the 1990s by feminist scholars like Avery Gordon, Laurel Richardson, Donna Haraway, Kathleen Stewart,[167] Margery Wolf[168] and Patti Lather did a huge amount to address the concerns of the social sciences regarding validity, evidence and rigour in the blurring of fact and fiction that takes place in research which takes on a more literary form. Many of these highly inventive practices came out of feminist critiques of knowledge production, and an attempt to create a difference by writing differently. For example, Haraway defined her pioneering work as a political 'struggle for language and the struggle against perfect communication, against the one code that translates all meaning perfectly'.[169] This was not a refusal of language, but a struggle for language as multiplicity rather than as indexicality. As Richardson states:

> In feminist writings of poets and social scientists, the position of the author is linked aesthetically, politically, emotionally, with those about whom they write. Knowledge is not appropriated and controlled, but shared; authors recognize a multiplicity of selves within themselves as well as interdependence with others, shadows and doubles.[170]

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[167] Kathleen Stewart, *A Space on the Side of the Road: Cultural Poetics in an 'Other' America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

[168] Margery Wolf, *A Thrice Told Tale: Feminism, Postmodernism, and Ethnographic Responsibility* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1992).

[169] Donna Haraway, 'A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s', in *Feminism / Postmodernism*, ed. Linda J Nicholson (New York; London: Routledge, 1990), 218.

[170] Laurel Richardson, 'Poetics, Dramatics, and Transgressive Validity: The Case of the Skipped Line', *The Sociological Quarterly* 34, no. 4 (1993): 705.

Lather describes Richardson's work as exemplifying 'a disruptive excess which brings ethics and epistemology together in self-conscious partiality and embodied positionality and a tentativeness which leaves space for others to enter, for the joining of partial voices'.[171] In the context of her discussion of methodological validity, Lather suggests that Richardson's research generates an authority that comes from its performative excess: in '"go[ing] too far" with the politics of uncertainty'.[172] On her transformation of an interview transcript into a poem made solely from her interviewee's words, Richardson claims that this 'poem displays how sociological authority is constructed, and problematizes reliability, validity, and truth… A poem as "findings" resituates ideas of validity and reliability from "knowing" to "telling."'[173] Richardson produces a complicated account which captures the fragility of knowing reality as multiple.

Producing fiction as sociology is gaining more mainstream acceptance within the discipline, although I think it is interesting that most practitioners call it something other than fiction. For example, Stewart terms her work 'ethnographic creative non-fiction', and Patricia Levy 'social fictions' or an 'academic novel'. This signals that although it can 'pass' as fiction, it is intended to be read as research, or *researched*. By terming the work I produce

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[171] Patti Lather, 'Fertile Obsession: Validity After Poststructuralism', *Sociological Quarterly* 34, no. 4 (1 November 1993): 683.
[172] Lather, 683.
[173] Richardson, 'Poetics, Dramatics, and Transgressive Validity', 704.

'literary compositions' within a research context, I am doing the same work of signalling. However, when situated in a literary context I would be happy to describe this work as fiction or possibly faction, in recognition that novelists and poets also often use social research methods such as archival research, interviews and participant observation to produce their work.[174] That a novel is an outcome of a research process is sometimes performed by the text. For example Laurent Binet's (2009) *HHhH* is simultaneously a thriller about the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich during World War II and a metacommentary on the author's restaging of history.[175]

The mainstream popularity of these works of faction is appealing to sociologists who seek a wider audience for their work. Advocates of producing fiction as sociology often justify their work on the basis of a claim that fiction is more accessible to audiences than standard sociological texts. For example, tapping into disciplinary anxieties about the public influence and relevance of sociology, Ashleigh Watson suggests the 'sociological novel'

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[174] For example novels like Truman Capote, *In Cold Blood. A True Account of a Multiple Murder and its Consequences* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1966); Hilary Mantel, *Wolf Hall* (London: Fourth Estate, 2009); Marlon James, *A Brief History of Seven Killings* (London: Oneworld, 2014); Maggie Nelson, *The Argonauts* (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Graywolf Press, 2015)., or poetry like Muriel Rukeyser, 'The Book of the Dead (1938)', in *Selected Poems*, ed. Adrienne Rich (Bloodaxe Books Ltd, 2013); Charles Reznikoff, *Testimony* (Boston: Black Sparrow Press, 2015); Marlene Nourbese Philip, *Zong!* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 2008). These poets all worked with fragments of legal texts to produce hugely affecting work about the differing valuation of life and liberty.
[175] Laurent Binet, *HHhH*, trans. Sam Taylor (London: Harvill Secker, 2012).

as a promising form for 'public sociology',[176] as public engagement and dialogue 'requires affective sociological narratives'.[177] Similarly the sociologist and novelist Patricia Leavy sees her research-based novels as 'a means of representing qualitative research, raising feminist consciousness, accessing hard-to-get-at dimensions of social life, opening up a multiplicity of meanings, tapping into empathy and resonance as ways of knowing and researching diverse audiences with feminist social research knowledge'.[178]

Leavy works within the genre of 'chick-lit' as a way of trying to make her sociological novels accessible to her target audience: young American women.[179] For Leavy, part of this is the creation of characters and a world which her audience can easily relate to. I outline these contemporary tendencies but note that this is a differently motivated strategy for producing fiction as sociology to mine. For example, my work shares some formal qualities with experimental literature, but this is not out of a desire to make my sociological work accessible to the readers of such fiction. I don't think fiction is necessarily more accessible to readers than sociology, and accessibility is not the only aspect that determines a work of fiction's impact

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[176] Michael Burawoy, '2004 ASA Presidential Address: For Public Sociology', *American Sociological Review* 70, no. 1 (2005): 4–28.

[177] Ashleigh Watson, 'Directions for Public Sociology: Novel Writing as a Creative Approach', *Cultural Sociology* 10, no. 4 (1 December 2016): 431–47. Watson's doctoral thesis in sociology will take the form of a novel and supporting statement.

[178] Patricia Leavy, 'Fiction and the Feminist Academic Novel', *Qualitative Inquiry* 18, no. 6 (1 July 2012): 517.

[179] Leavy, 519.

and readership. I value the power of experimental forms of writing to produce new effects and affects, and to better capture the complex ontology of crime. As Deleuze commented, 'creating has always been something different from communicating'.[180] I hope that sociologists don't shy away from writing prose that is experimental or hard to process, in deference to an imagined audience.

Similarly within the British contemporary visual arts, the writing and often performance of texts and fiction is increasingly commonplace.[181] This is unsurprising when one considers the contemporary centrality of reading art theory and writing criticism to fine art education.[182] There is a rich history of explorations of the visual form of writing on the page which has been embraced by the visual arts, including Guillaume Apollinaire's calligrammes, concrete poetry (for example the work of Bob Cobbing), Gertrude Stein, and the Oulipo group (including George Perec and Raymond Queneau). Perhaps surprisingly with all the literary efforts of visual artists, the production of fiction as method is currently rare within visual sociology.[183] To think through

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[180] Deleuze (1990) quoted in Nathan Moore, 'Nova Law: William S. Burroughs and the Logic of Control', *Law and Literature* 19, no. 3 (2007): 442.

[181] For example Tom McCarthy, Katrina Palmer, Holly Pester, Tinho Seghal, Nina Wakeford and Maria Fusco.

[182] John Douglas Millar, 'Art/Writing', *Art Monthly* 349 (September 2011): 11–14.

[183] Signalling this marginality, most primers on visual research or visual sociology and visual anthropology focus predominantly on photography, with chapters on film and video. Recent texts on visual research methods tend to give consideration to the internet and online cultures of non-textual communication, on the embodied practices of the researcher or on the sensory beyond the dominance of optics. Emmison, Smith, and Mayall sought to 'clarify the status of "the visual"' and thus included in their study not only two dimensional images such as photography and illustrations, but three-dimensional objects and people as 'living visual data' to be observed. Interestingly, despite this expansion they still didn't include fictional representations as data, even in their 2012 second edition. See Michael Emmison,

the question of why the textual is relegated within visual sociology, it is necessary to return to the situation of the historical emergence of the sub-discipline. The dominant explanation[184] is that although visual methods of collecting, recording and presenting material have been in use in sociology since the birth of the discipline, specific attention to what visual modes of representation *do* only developed in the mid-1990s. Although not seeking to deny the existence of visual sociology research that uses methods of textual or performative representation, texts like Knowles and Sweetman's (2004) suggest that their predominant focus on photography, film and video reflects the balance of work undertaken in the discipline. They argue that to do otherwise would be 'to render visual material indistinct from most other forms of data'[185] and lose the specificity of what visual pictorial representation contributes to sociology. These considerations notwithstanding, this apparent lack of interest in the textual and literary by visual sociologists seems like a missed opportunity to experiment with the visuality of writing – by which I

Philip Smith, and Margery Mayall, *Researching the Visual* (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2012). In comparison with sociology primers, literary methods are included in, for example: Ieva Zake and Michael DeCesare, eds., *New Directions in Sociology: Essays on Theory and Methodology in the 21st Century* (Jefferson, N.C. : London: McFarland, 2011); Michael Hviid Jacobsen et al., eds., *Imaginative Methodologies in the Social Sciences: Creativity, Poetics and Rhetoric in Social Research* (Burlington: Ashgate Publishers, 2014).

[184] For example, this is the narrative in Clarice Statz, 'The Early History of Visual Sociology', in *Images of Information: Still Photography in the Social Sciences*, ed. Jon C. Wagner (Beverly Hills ; London: Sage Publications, 1979); Sarah Pink, *Doing Visual Ethnography: Images, Media and Representation in Research* (London: SAGE, 2001); Caroline Knowles and Paul Sweetman, eds., *Picturing the Social Landscape: Visual Methods and the Sociological Imagination* (London: Routledge, 2004).

[185] Caroline Knowles and Paul Sweetman, 'Introduction', in *Picturing the Social Landscape: Visual Methods and the Sociological Imagination*, ed. Caroline Knowles and Paul Sweetman (London: Routledge, 2004), 4–5.

mean, based on my experience as a reader, the richly ambiguous mental perception of images that flash up in my mind as I read or listen to a story. This is not to claim universality for this experience, but to express how innately *visual* writing is, in my experience. I aim to make images form in the reader's mind as they engage with my literary compositions.

Guggenheim argues that anxiety about appearing adequately 'scientific' prevents visual sociologists from employing what he calls 'loose' translations (for example, ethnographic writing and drawing) for fear that they be seen as 'art'.[186] He suggests that this is what has led to a situation in which documentary photography and film dominate as 'tight' translations due to their apparent (but misleading) objectivity as methods of mechanical non-interference.[187] Guggenheim suggests that thinking about these methods as (different) practices of translation frees us from the imperative to judge and value these translations based on the measure of indexicality to the 'real world'. For him, loose translations are necessary as they bring together disparate things in a way that a medium like photography cannot.[188]

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[186] Guggenheim, 'The Media of Sociology', 363.
[187] Guggenheim argues that visual sociologists should take courage from the way STS has shown that 'elaborate instruments and media are central for the production of facts'. Guggenheim, 346.
[188] Guggenheim, 'The Media of Sociology'.

Criminology has a late-blooming but growing interest in the use of narrative methods, of which the key exponent is Lois Presser.[189] Notwithstanding some commonalities in approach, there is a clear distinction between Presser's method of analysing interviewees' narratives about crime, and the literary compositions that I create. Presser argues that 'just as most criminologists are inclined towards positivism, most criminologists treat narrative either as record or as interpretation'.[190] Against this tendency she draws on Paul Ricoeur's theories of narrative to argue that criminologists should consider that narrative might not echo the real, but help give form to reality itself.[191] Presser is interested in how the stories we tell shape our sense of self and produce identities.[192] Similarly, in his work with ex-prisoners Shadd Maruna has attempted to 'identify the common psychosocial structure underlying self-stories, and therefore to outline a phenomenology of desistance'.[193] His resulting claim that 'to desist from crime, ex-offenders need

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[189] Lois Presser, 'Been A Heavy Life: Stories of Violent Men', *Contemporary Sociology.* 38, no. 4 (2009): 326–327; Lois Presser, 'The Narratives of Offenders', *Theoretical Criminology* 13 (2009): 177–200; Lois Presser, 'Collecting and Analysing the Stories of Offenders', in *Advancing Qualitative Methods in Criminology and Criminal Justice*, ed. Heith Copes (London: Routledge, 2012); Lois Presser and Sveinung Sandberg, eds., *Narrative Criminology: Understanding Stories of Crime* (New York: New York University Press, 2015); Lois Presser, 'Criminology and the Narrative Turn', *Crime, Media, Culture* 12, no. 2 (August 2016): 137–51.
[190] Presser, 'The Narratives of Offenders'; Presser, 'Collecting and Analysing the Stories of Offenders', 47.
[191] She references Ricoeur's *Time and Narrative* (1984) in Presser, 'Collecting and Analysing the Stories of Offenders', 46.
[192] Presser, 'Criminology and the Narrative Turn', 146.
[193] Shadd Maruna, *Making Good: How Ex-Convicts Reform and Rebuild Their Lives* (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 2000), 8.

to develop a coherent, pro-social identity for themselves'[194] makes a strong causal link between people's narratives and their future actions. Although I agree that the stories we tell about ourselves are socially meaningful, it is important to recognise the guiding hand of the 'autobiographical injunction'[195] here. If prisoners and ex-prisoners largely know what state agents and academics want to hear, what is the value of a narrative told 'correctly' to the person who tells it?

While I welcome Presser's sensitive and reflexive approach, I am perturbed by the alignment of her project with realist criminology,[196] with which it seems incompatible. Sveinung Sandberg outlines Presser's stance thus: 'studying narratives are still useful for realist criminology, because stories are *antecedents* to crime'.[197] Here, rather than being treated as 'records' of what happened, narratives become future predictors of criminal behaviour. But to what extent? Narratives are also full of fantasy, to an extent that criminologists might not be best placed to judge.[198] To me, this is

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[194] Maruna, 7.

[195] Steedman, 'Enforced Narratives: Stories of Another Self', 28.

[196] Presser, 'The Narratives of Offenders', 185.

[197] Sveinung Sandberg, 'What Can "Lies" Tell Us About Life? Notes Towards a Framework of Narrative Criminology', in *Advancing Qualitative Methods in Criminology and Criminal Justice*, ed. Heith Copes (London: Routledge, 2012), 65.

[198] For example, 'cultural criminologists' Keith Hayward and Jock Young state that 'with its association with criminality, rap is an obvious place for the selling of crime'. Keith Hayward and Jock Young, 'Cultural Criminology', in *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology*, ed. Mike Maguire, Rodney Morgan, and Robert Reiner, 5th ed (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012), 126. This is problematic in a number of ways. Firstly researchers should attend to the racialized history of *why* rap is 'associated' with criminality rather than accept that it simply *is* or should be. Secondly, Hayward and Young subscribe to an outdated notion of how people experience culture (i.e. as passive receivers of a clear

a reminder of the danger of importing a poststructuralist ontology into a realist conceptual framework which favours strong causality, and claims access to the real. This is a depth-based model in which the researcher has transcendent interpretive powers.

John Braithwaite claims that criminology and fiction share the basic appeal of producing 'narratives of lives that transgress'.[199] While not denying the excitement of representations of social transgression, my work deliberately seeks to avoid producing narratives of some lives as *essentially* transgressive and reifying the idea of the criminal 'other'. I tend to resist the dramatic potential of crime, instead emphasising its banality or social enmeshment. My compositions attempts to situate criminalised acts within lives which are complex, multiple and not defined by those acts, although they may be significant. Consequently, my literary compositions may disappoint the seasoned reader of crime fiction. I will now discuss three of the compositions featured in my portfolio in order to demonstrate how they each work differently to reterritorialise crime.

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message), that doesn't take into account more contemporary understandings of the ways people play with culture, for example in ironic distancing or ambivalent pleasure. What is the valence of saying that listening to rap sells crime? Does listening to Tom Jones's *Delilah* similarly promote femicide? This is to diminish culture through a disciplinary interpretation, which is already attuned to black cultural expression as dangerous.

[199] John Braithwaite, 'Foreword', in *What Is Criminology?*, ed. Mary Bosworth and Carolyn Hoyle (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), viii.

I would ask the reader of this chapter to pause here and turn to my portfolio, in order watch my video work *Double Tears* (2015) and read *Ranked Outsider* (2017) and *You Will Have Your Day in Court* (2017) before you read on in this chapter. *Double Tears* should be watched with headphones if possible and is available at http://vimeo.com/137246361 the password is: newbusiness, alternatively it is on the DVD at the back of this thesis.

Commentary on *Double Tears* (2015)

Double Tears is a video work which is built on a sound recording. To make this composition, I worked with the audio I had recorded and the memory of my interview with 'Marlowe', a private investigator. The audio is constructed through making multiple cuts and manipulations of the material. This began with a process of listening to the recording of the interview many times, and starting to note emerging themes and patterns in our dialogue. Re-listening repeatedly also allowed me to notice the dynamics between the narratives we were constructing: about the power and pleasure of being a PI; Marlowe's gritty realist account of the work of surveillance; and the moral framework he had developed for his work. As a 'businessman' he aligns what's good for his business with an idea of the social good. For example, Marlowe described the people he spies on as unanimously guilty of socially deviant immoral behaviour, justifying his action as bringing the truth to light.

Whereas when I asked him about the clients who pay him to continuously report on the movements and behaviour of their partners, an action which could be seen as a gross invasion of privacy, he brushed it off as an example of the variety of ways that people 'get off', asking: who is he to judge them?

I noticed that there were points where he repeated himself almost word-for-word including the emotional emphasis he put on certain phrases - Marlowe was very used to performing, theorising, and justifying his role. Our interview was arranged for me by a male friend who plays poker with Marlowe, and he had previously given me an account of his rowdy poker persona. The London poker scene is male-dominated, with very few female players, and most women present occupy service roles as masseuses, waitresses or croupiers. From the way Marlowe talked about the vulnerability of his distraught female clients and his self-identified role as a 'shoulder to cry on', I suspected I was being 'handled' in a mode determined by my gender. I am not suggesting that poker-playing Marlowe is the 'real' him. The interview was frustrating in its repetition of the same phrases and ideas, and a refusal of nuance; I was unable to interrupt the 'Marlowe Machine' in action. This particular composition attempts to pay attention to a surface flow of information in order to tease out the complexity, particularly as Marlowe was careful to keep producing stock responses. The final sound edit makes use of these repetitions as a structuring device, but I also created more repetitions

through cutting – these jumps are more or less obvious depending on how hard one listens. The piece is a manic concentration of the elements that made up our interview, including my nervous laughter, awkward pauses and the rhythm of our verbal turn taking. The video acts as an anchor for the audience. I did this on the back of feedback from one listener to the sound piece, who said it made her so uncomfortable that she wanted to get up and leave. The film I added is of a door being 'watched', i.e. covertly filmed. This both references the boredom of much surveillance work – Marlowe informed me that he spends most of his time waiting for something to happen – and, in its promise of eventually being opened, lures the audience into remaining and engaging with the whole piece. Beyond Marlowe's crime construction, the encounter that this composition captures interested me because of Marlowe's sense of his own absolute agency, both in his work and in the construction of his narrative. He appeared to have no concern about my input in the conversation, my interest in him, or even my intentions for the work. His lack of interest in seeing the piece gave me a freedom to play more with the comedic aspects of our exchange.

Commentary on *Ranked Outsider* (2017)

My literary composition *Ranked Outsider* is based on a long anecdote related to me by 'Pete', about his experience on leaving prison. His anecdote

highlights a systematic flaw in post-prison provision, where a calculation of

need based on the vulnerability of different groups meant that single ex-

prisoners are often not given priority for the allocation of council housing,

effectively rendering them homeless on release unless they find someone to

take them in. This is despite the well-known difficulty of finding work and

rebuilding relationships on release from prison. I don't know whether Pete's

experience is typical, but it is clear that the scale of the problem is large enough

that a bill making all prison leavers priorities for housing allocation is

currently going through parliament.[200]

Pete was in prison for many years, and told me about the pain of

submitting to a process of psychological 'breaking' and remaking through the

prison's addiction recovery program, which forced him to think about himself

in terms of his flaws and behavioural problems. In truly submitting himself to

this process, and in producing an 'enforced narrative' which fixated on the

teleology of future 'normal' life in civilised society outside of the prison, he

was actually rendered unprepared for the prejudice and problems he faced on

release. Not only did his housing officer refuse to help Pete, but also

researched him on the internet and taunted him with his knowledge of his

crime. Pete, a resourceful and intelligent man, then started getting drunk and

sleeping rough on the steps of the council and threatening the council officer

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[200] 'Homelessness Reduction Act 2017', accessed 2 July 2017,
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2017/13/contents/enacted.

until they found him housing. When relating this story Pete spoke bitterly of having to 'live up' to the stereotypical image that the council officer had of him as a violent criminal in order to gain access to housing.

In the creation of this composition I changed very little of the narrative because I found it compelling in the way it illuminated the intersections of public policy, public feelings and human resourcefulness. I invented the other characters and details, making the narrator of the story a sympathetic but useless junior housing officer called Paula. I did this partly because her relative powerlessness places her in a position to tell the story clearly, and to comment on the action without changing the central narrative. More significantly, I didn't write the narrative from Pete's perspective because I cannot imagine what he went through at that time, and knowing that I would be sharing the work with him I didn't want to try to do it badly. Although I have written from the perspective of someone undergoing significant mental turmoil elsewhere, here I found it necessary to produce the narrative positioned against a backdrop of bureaucracy, sympathy, curiosity and office dynamics.

Commentary on *You Will Have Your Day in Court* (2017)

In this literary composition, I reimagine the 'true crime' story of 'King Con' Paul Bint, who for a period in 2009 successfully impersonated Keir Starmer, the former Director of Public Prosecutions and since 2015 the Labour Party MP for Holborn and St Pancras.[201] Bint's story captivated the tabloids, in no small part because he was a serial impersonator of individuals holding high status jobs such as doctors and barristers, and because he seems to have impersonated men with higher social statuses partly in order to seduce professional and well educated women.

Like many writers and performers engaged in creating characters, I am fascinated by fraud. What is identity fraud within the conceptual framework of the performative self? Successful fraudsters exert a strong cultural fascination, attested to by both the popularity of fantastical true crime stories (for example, Jean-Claude Romand, who pretended to be a doctor for eighteen years, and killed his whole family when he was discovered), novels (for example, Patricia Highsmith's 'talented' Tom Ripley) and fictionalised true stories (for example, the story of Frank Abagnale Jr, realised in film by Steven Spielberg as *Catch Me If You Can* (2002)). In cases of imaginative and sustained fraud such as Bint's, there is already something of a slippage between moral

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[201] Unusually, in *You Will Have Your Day in Court*, the characters have the names of living people. This is because instead of working from interview material and in collaboration with the participant, I am using a publically known story as a catalyst to explore ideas about crime and criminality.

condemnation and appreciation of his 'experiments with truth'[202] in the public reception of his case. This ambiguity provided a pool of affective responses for me to play with in constructing this work. Whatever one makes of the harm he has caused, there is an upwardly-mobile class-'passing' element of his story which is seductive and aspirational. We could celebrate working-class Bint as an Eliza Doolittle who managed to 'pass' (for a while) as a lady even without a Henry Higgins to teach her.[203] Helpfully for my narrative structure, Starmer is also from a working class background - unusual for such a powerful public figure. I characterised Starmer as feeling something of an 'imposter' with his increased social status, as a way of thinking about identity fraud on a spectrum of social performativity. I also used the fact that Starmer had (then-unrealised) political aspirations at the time of Bint's impersonation of him, and that he had worked as a barrister, as a way to comment on the performative aspects of politics and law. This is in addition to the exploration of interpersonal relationships that the more obvious performance of Bint's fraud affords.

In *You Will*, the story is told through 'stream of consciousness' prose from the imagined perspectives of both Starmer and Bint, who throughout the text are both referred to only as 'Keir'. I often use the common literary

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[202] This is a reference in name only to Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, *An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth*, trans. Mahadev Desai (London: Penguin Classics, 2001).
[203] George Bernard Shaw, 'Pygmalion', in *Pygmalion and Three Other Plays* (New York, NY: Barnes & Noble, 2012).

technique of 'free indirect style'[204] in my work, as it allows me to subtly remind

the audience that there are other voices and perspectives at play in the work.[205]

One of the features of this style of prose is cutting and switching combined

with an appeal to the audience's emotion and affective capacities - to engage

'affect as immanent evaluation, instead of judgement as transcendental

value'.[206] Although their monologues are intertwined on the page, Starmer

and Bint don't interact with each other directly within the narrative. They do

interact occasionally with other characters, and when they do so the language

becomes less poetic and takes on more of the aspect of reported speech,

situating them in their worlds. There are differences in the kinds of language

I have used for Starmer and Bint; for example Starmer's text often indulges in

rhetorical cliché such as 'Believe you, me'. When I was writing the text I

attended a political hustings to get a sense of Starmer's linguistic style, and

have used samples from his speech such as 'sometimes you don't need a great

big stick, you just need a forum' and 'the slippery slope of presumption'.

Starmer's dreams are full of speeches reformulating these phrases, including

an absurd extended metaphor built from the 'slippery slope' involving the 'ski

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[204] Free-indirect style/discourse: 'The presentation of thoughts or speech of fictional characters which seems by various devices to combine the character's sentiments with those of a narrator'. J. A. Cuddon, *The Penguin Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theory*, New Ed (London: Penguin, 1999), 330. I often do this simply by collapsing speech marks, and not framing my character's thoughts and actions, i.e. Keir thought: "…"
[205] Deleuze and Guattari's acknowledge their debt to Mikhail Bakhtin's conceptualisation of speech as 'polyphonic' and 'plurivocal'. See *What is Philosophy*, 188.
[206] Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (London: Athlone, 1989), 141.

lifts of legal aid'. He is terrified of saying or doing the wrong thing. In comparison, Bint uses more intimate, chatty and sentimental language, his prose is often cloyingly romantic and emotive. Although we rarely hear the voice of the person he's speaking with, we can hear how he shifts his narrative based on his reading of his interlocutor and his sense of what they want to hear.

In an interview in the *Daily Mail*[207] Bint likened himself to 'Lawrence of Arabia', whom he considers a man of unusual agency. As men of decisive action (heroes), I bring the figure of Lawrence of Arabia in to haunt both Starmer and Bint. When the press tried to understand a motive for his crimes, there was much interest in the confession that he might make, and speculation as to whether he was psychologically 'abnormal'. I am not interested in assembling Bint as mentally ill, and in terms of the content of my characterisation of Bint, he is largely engaged in producing social explanations for his crimes, which change dependent on the audience. Sometimes he adopts a confessional tone, sometimes he rehearses what he thinks people want to hear using the language associated with that form – for the jury he is the victim of childhood neglect or 'he just wanted to be loved':

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[207] James Tozer, 'Fraudster "King Con" Claims He's Earned £2m from Crime and Slept with 2,500 Women as He's Released from Prison', *Daily Mail*, 3 January 2011.

It made me just so happy to be sat beside them, just watching rubbish telly, rubbing feet and ribbing on the passing scenes, but them thinking he is so clever and this is how the smart guy watches telly. It made them feel good I knew it, better that I had chosen them, to share with this sweet time.

I honestly loved them all. They'd tell their friends "oh I forget the details, but Keir always remembers that [politics] kind of stuff." They were smart girls, I could tell. They wanted the secrets of the Big Man, the famous barrister and that I needed them – that was the secret and it made them love me more. Perhaps I shouldn't have done it but I know I made them happy. Their dream. It was for the girls really.

Performing for the male journalist, he is 'in control' and 'living the dream', possessed of enviable criminal knowhow:

This is all for you – where did you get that fur coat? - There's no one left and now I'll be unwatched forever – write that down – he lit his Cuban cigar, I offered him a match. He smoked it slowly his oversised Omega watch slipping back down his skinny wrist into the fur after each puff. – Are you getting all this? Do you want me to show how it's done, the con? What are you into – girls – cars – stubble smile, lips putting forth snaggleteeth.

Shit teeth.

Testing… you're a car man I can tell – Too thin for his padded shoulders –

Let's get us a ride, people in glass showrooms shouldn't, heh, there's a joke in there somewhere. That one's free.

My decision to focus on Bint's mobilisation of common social explanations for crime was prompted by an anecdote told to me by one of my other interviewees. 'Hitherto' told me about an interview with a journalist who had published an online article on his life story containing multiple damaging errors. He felt that the journalist had assumed that as a vulnerable person living in a hostel he wouldn't have access to the internet or wouldn't care or even know about the article, and thus how he was being represented. The misleading article was read by his family, causing serious problems for him, of which the journalist was blithely unaware. When I asked him why he hadn't pursued it with the journalist, he replied, 'what's the point?' Aside from the obvious ethical issues here about careless misrepresentation, I was compelled by what Hitherto seemed to be saying about the way marginalised people might be imagined to be unaware of worldly representations of them or people in similar situations. In contrast, during our interview Hitherto mobilised and played with numerous social narratives on crime and criminality. Following this, in my characterisation Bint does not provide a final rationale for his crimes. His changeable confessions are not evidence of mental illness, but show how he produces explanatory stories in collaboration with what he knows of affective and moral responses to crime, and with the psycho-social literature on the causes of criminality that feeds into popular culture. Narratively I provide no other voice to step in and reveal the (one) 'truth'. All these confessions could be true, or equally some or none of them.

Nevertheless, how some explanations are more 'stratified' or seem more compelling is something I hope my compositions materialise and problematise.

The narrative of *You Will…* is temporally distorted. The story starts with Bint engaging in some banter as 'Keir' in the pub, then it jumps to Starmer leaving another pub some months later. Starmer walks home drunkenly reflecting on his prospects as a Labour candidate, juries, being impersonated by Bint, and the sudden appearance of a young woman out of the darkness. Some of the character's reflections are built out of my painful experience of undertaking jury service in my early 20s, sensory memories of intoxicated walking and public space at night. The rest of the narrative flows between the two Keirs' dreams. The presentational structure on the page works as a key, with Bint's story on the left and Starmer's story on the right, providing some mooring in a presentational form which could easily otherwise become incomprehensible. The spacing of text on the page is an indication of how I want the work to be read. When text is blocked together tightly it should be read quickly, when there are gaps there should be pauses. Each reader should find the pace that feels right to them. I was much inspired by the poem *Un coup de dés jamais n'abolira le hasard* (A dice throw at any time never will abolish chance) by Stéphane Mallarmé (1897).[208] Here, he dispensed with punctuation

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[208] Stéphane Mallarmé, 'Un Coup de Dés Jamais n'abolira Le Hasard', in *Collected Poems and Other Verse* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 139–81.

and instead used the size of fonts and the space between words to create something like a musical score, leading the audience into the rhythm that he wished his composition to be read in. The visuality of Mallarmé's text is striking, and not an afterthought but rather an integral feature of the piece.

Another literary technique I use to interrupt a seamless narrative flow is quotation and intertextual references. For example, I found some potentially apocryphal references on the internet to Starmer being the inspiration for the character of Mark Darcy in Helen Fielding's *Bridget Jones's Diary*.[209] Darcy is one of the heroine's romantic interests, with a name and manner modelled on Jane Austen's Mr Darcy from *Pride and Prejudice* (1813).[210] Austen's Darcy is a man under considerable social pressure to 'do the right thing' as a wealthy landowner, and I have incorporated a little of Darcy into Starmer's anxious dreams about his social power. Starmer is haunted by the 'dark figure' of crime as he walks home, who I turn into a figurative presence lurking behind the bins. Starmer's fear is meant to suggest that in his anxiety over his responsibility to define and manage crime, he gives it an existence outside of himself to be vanquished.

These characters are fragmented and multiple, formed and reformed under varying social pressures and processes. This ties to my earlier critique

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[209] Helen Fielding, *Bridget Jones's Diary* (London: Picador, 1996).
[210] Jane Austen, *Pride and Prejudice* (London: Penguin, 2002).

of 'essential' criminality and the nature of crime. So, how do these three compositions assemble crime in a way that makes crime apparent as an assemblage?

Double Tears works with the edited dialogue of an interview, but as it is presented in the form of a video with sound, the texture of spoken language works to problematise the bland moral narrative being constructed by Marlowe. This piece encourages the audience to consider the activities of private surveillance workers, and wider questions of power and knowledge. *Ranked Outsider* has the most straightforward narrative as I wanted to get across the details of the case clearly, as related to me by 'Pete'. This work demonstrates the enmeshment of the molar and molecular, and the fractious interaction of policy directives, human agency, and empathy within criminalisation after prison time has been served. *You Will…* assembles crime through the interweaving of the voices of 'Keir' and his impersonator. Using stream of consciousness-style prose here allowed me to bring together many aspects of the crime assemblage such as notions of justice, the role of juries, fraudulence, class and agency. Reflecting on my compositions as an assembled series, I note that despite their differences, they have something important in common. They are all about characters who are struggling with, or testing the limits of, their power to affect other lives – working through their position and options for movement within their own 'couplings'. My practice has

reaffirmed that attempting to compose crime is always also to compose the social; they cannot be prised apart. I hope that this sense of crime as socially entangled and complex is transmitted to the audience.

Conclusion: Compositions and the Real

As I have argued, my compositions try to stick with the intricate surface details in the research data, rather than translating them all according to a predefined explanatory code. This is especially important as this project engages with the accounts of different social actors who produce different versions of crime. When I am working with people's accounts I don't attempt to create an explanation for their experience, or 'debunk' their actions and interpretations. Instead I bring other associations into play, which might change how the initial account reads: for example it might universalise it, problematise it, or disguise it. However this is never to claim some kind of interpretive authority over people's stories. Through attending to the contradictions and collaborations between these versions via careful, empirical attention to detail, we might grasp how is that some versions of crime dominate.

As I have discussed, my methodology draws on the rich legacy of feminist, poststructural, and postcolonial critiques of, and experiments with,

knowledge production. It also comes out of concerns shared with participatory researchers about researching and representing the lives of others. I hope that my methodology could be useful for those who are trying to involve research participants as a critical force in their work, and for those who are trying to develop an approach that is ethically nuanced, processual and adaptable to change. This work still makes claims about the real world, but recognises that these truths are partial. To phrase this a different way, it undertakes empirical work whilst maintaining a sense of a real that is in process and becoming. That might be graspable in the moment from one's particular vantage point, but is not the same thereafter.

Reflectively making choices about the practices of translation that one employs *as* we undertake our work reminds the researcher of her simultaneously limited vantage point in the assemblage of crime, and yet central role in creating her research compositions. It reminds her that research is world-building within a context beyond control. In this chapter I have established how my compositional practice aims to make the assemblage of crime apparent as an assemblage. In each of the chapters that follow, I demonstrate the differing versions of crime produced when a different actor or actors is/are the point through which the assemblage is materialised.

The following chapter is on the role of the criminologist within the assemblage of crime. In this, I discuss in more depth the impact of the abiding

presence of positivism and essentialism within criminological constructions of crime and criminality, and modes of knowledge based on the transcendental moral judgment of the researcher. It is in part this critique of criminological essentialism that led to my development of a compositional methodology which produces crime as a multiplicity, and draws attention to its own acts of interpretation and invention.

Chapter Three: The Character of Criminology

Introduction: How Do Criminologists Come To Know Crime?

This chapter looks at how criminology produces its defining object of enquiry, crime, through examining the role of criminologists as privileged actors in the assemblage of crime that I outlined in chapter one. I argue that this disciplinary construction of crime is simultaneously the creation of the character of criminology. In producing this portrait I am not suggesting that all criminologists are essentially alike or fit my characterisation. Neither am I going to recount stories about the legendary 'personalities' of criminology. Criminology produces and reproduces categories such as the 'career criminal', 'victim', 'recidivist', and 'deviant', and as such my chapter could be read as a playful categorisation of the 'criminologist'.[211] Drawing on ANT approaches, my project is 'not primarily concerned with mapping interactions between individuals… [but] concerned to map the way in which [actors] define and distribute roles, and mobilise or invent others to play these roles'.[212] Crucial questions here will be, how has the criminal been invented by the criminologist? How do I now invent the criminologist through this chapter?

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[211] Similarly Ian Loader and Richard Sparks created a taxonomy of criminologist types, for example, the 'policy advisor', 'the lonely prophet' in Ian Loader and Richard Sparks, *Public Criminology?* (London: Routledge, 2010), 29–37.

[212] John Law and Michel Callon, 'Engineering and Sociology in a Military Aircraft Project: A Network Analysis of Technological Change', *Social Problems* 35, no. 3 (1 June 1988): 285.

As I demonstrated in chapter one, I maintain that the ontological instability of crime means that there can be no general explanatory theory of crime. Each time such a theory is produced, certain features are 'stratified'[213] and formed into a reasonably fixed state of affairs, a solid proof that can then be interpreted and explained by the criminologist expert, and then mobilised as a model to predict future crime. Perhaps because criminology is often involved with making value judgements and policy recommendations disproportionately affecting working class, ethnic minority, and economically and socially vulnerable people, assembled versions of crime often include numerical data sets which import associations of neutrality and simple fact. I argue that this is to inadequately attend to the 'ontological politics'[214] of knowledge production. I suggest that one can read between the 'molar' and 'molecular'[215] lines of the different versions of crime which have been assembled within criminology, and observe features of the 'moral construction'[216] of the criminal, the victim and the criminologist that, following Simon Cottee, 'calls into question the foundational criminological assumption that criminology, however value laden, is still a serious candidate in the

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[213] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 4, 45.

[214] Mol, 'Ontological Politics. A Word and Some Questions'.

[215] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 229–55.

[216] Simon Cottee, 'Judging Offenders: The Moral Implications of Criminological Theories', in *Values in Criminology and Community Justice*, ed. Malcolm Cowburn et al. (Bristol: Policy Press, 2013), 5–20.

business of producing credible and morally neutral explanations of why or how people offend'.[217]

Within the assemblage of crime, the criminologist performs an important role as a socially valued expert in the production of crime. This is usually characterised by the criminologist as 'knowing' the reality of crime. As outlined in chapter one, my poststructuralist approach takes knowledge not as an accurate representation of something independently 'out there' in the world, but rather 'a product or an effect of a *network of heterogeneous materials*'.[218] The kind of materials included in the assemblage (for example ethnographic accounts of lawbreaking, or forensic images of crime scenes, or large data sets), and the way these materials are arranged and ordered, shapes the character of crime that is produced. Knowledge, then, is not something that the criminologist possesses, but something she assembles out of the materials that animate and affect her – moving around and through her. Indeed, as I explained in chapter two, the criminologist herself is an assemblage comprising perceptions, affections, technologies, and non-human and human partnerships. The criminologist produces crime through performing 'translations'[219] of material: 'creating convergences and

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[217] Cottee, 7.
[218] Law, 'Notes on the Theory of the Actor-Network', 381. Emphasis in original.
[219] See chapter two for a full account of how I am using the term 'translation', and its development within ANT.

homologies by relating things that were previously different'.[220] However, a translation is never direct and always involves a shifting of terms, whether or not this excess is acknowledged. Although these translations might appear durable, it should be understood that such durability is produced through the repetition of the relations that constitute it.[221]

In the following chapter I map some influential criminological assemblages of crime, showing how they simultaneously construct the criminologist as character. Each case follows the introduction of a new element which shifts the composition of the assemblage. This chapter is not a self-portrait, but one produced by a disciplinary outsider, who as such has a different set of concerns, blind spots, and productive connections to make between materials. I have chosen some versions from the early period of the discipline for their endurance, or stratification of elements, of the criminological assemblage of crime. Among these are the criminologist as servant of the state, the criminal as physically and morally 'other', crimes as distinct and calculable acts, and the criminologist as (socially) morally compelled to intervene, yet (scientifically) morally neutral in her enquiry. Attending to the issue of how 'method helps to bring what it discovers into being',[222] I analyse some of the ways in which criminologists have interpreted

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[220] Callon, 'Struggles and Negotiations to Define What Is Problematic and What Is Not: The Sociology of Translation', 211.
[221] Law, 'Notes on the Theory of the Actor-Network', 385.
[222] Law and Urry, 'Enacting the Social', 393.

data and produced crime, particularly through the involvement in crime assemblages of the newly developed technologies of the time such as statistics, photography and surveys. I am particularly interested in *to* whom criminologists feel that they are speaking, *for* whom they feel they are speaking and acting, and which features and actors are excluded from their version of crime. This chapter highlights both stratified features, and lines of flight within the history of criminological assemblages of crime. This lengthy demonstration of my critical engagement with criminology, is necessary in order to locate the methodological and theoretical innovations that I have undertaken elsewhere in the thesis.

I begin this chapter by looking at the production of 'moral statistics' and 'composite photography' in the 19th century. Here I follow Allan Sekula's (1986) 'The Body and the Archive'[223] on statistics and images, but extend his argument to explicitly engage with the criminological production of statistics. I then move on to the use of the 'dark figure' metaphor in criminological discourses on crime rates, as a way of understanding the more recent development of the character of the criminologist as expert who mediates access to the real. I spend the remainder of this chapter examining the 'left realist' criminological assemblage of crime as a case study in this regard, particularly the work of Jock Young. I have chosen left realism because it is a

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[223] Allan Sekula, 'The Body and the Archive', *October* 39 (1986): 3–64.

British founded but internationally influential, relatively recent example of a project to practice a 'pragmatic',[224] 'theory driven',[225] 'policy forming'[226] yet 'radical'[227] criminology. Left realism is not treated as a metonym for criminology as a whole, but attended to in its specificity and significance. As I will discuss in the chapter, the political architects of 'New Labour' were engaged with key members of the left realist school, and adopted much of their philosophy of crime and punishment.[228] Furthermore, I chose to focus substantively on a British case study was because of its high relevance to my empirical work. All the participants in my study, including myself, have interacted with the UK criminal justice system in the period from the 1980's to the present date. This is the same time period in which left realism was making theoretical and practical interventions into the UK's criminal justice policy. A key feature of left realist thought maintains the independent ontological reality of crime and aims at producing a general theory of crime causality. This makes it an excellent case study for trying to understand how the concept of crime has been made to cohere in the wake of radical critiques of criminology

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[224] Roger Matthews and Jock Young, 'Questioning Left Realism', in *Issues in Realist Criminology*, ed. Roger Matthews and Jock Young, Sage Contemporary Criminology (London ; Newbury Park, Calif: Sage Pub, 1992).

[225] Roger Matthews, *Realist Criminology* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 29.

[226] John Lea and Jock Young, *What Is To Be Done About Law and Order?* (London: Penguin, 1984).

[227] Jock Young, 'The Failure of Criminology: The Need for Radical Realism', in *Confronting Crime*, ed. Roger Matthews and Jock Young (London ; Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1986).

[228] Ian Brownlee, 'New Labour – New Penology? Punitive Rhetoric and the Limits of Managerialism in Criminal Justice Policy', *Journal of Law and Society* 25, no. 3 (1 September 1998): 313–35.

which foregrounded punishment rather than crime. Left realism has been in existence for the past 30 years, so here I map a necessarily partial selection of features. I argue these demonstrate a need for the adoption of an ontological sensibility within alternative versions of the assemblage of crime – the need to articulate our methods of knowing as simultaneously producing crime.

Although I have organised these portraits into chronological order for the sake of legibility, this is not to suggest a teleological narrative of progression or causality. Instead, I hope the reader will follow me in finding resonances and counterpoints across diverse instances in the production of this assemblage.

Adolphe Quetelet and Moral Statistics

Initially associated with Francophone statisticians such as Adolphe Quetelet and André-Michel Guerry, 'moral statistics' was the mass scale, positivist, quantitative science of immorality; it aimed at the quantification and categorisation of deviancy, criminality, conviction rates, prostitution, and divorce.[229] The prodigious development of statistics in the 19th century came as European governments increasingly wanted to chart changing

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[229] For example, André Michel Guerry, *Essai sur la statistique morale de la France; précédé d'un rapport à l'Académie des Sciences, par MM. Lacroix, Silvestre et Girard.* (Paris: Crochard, 1833). This text presented a comparative series of crime rates against property and person, broken down by age, sex and location, and presented in tabular, graphic and cartographic forms.

demographics and trends, and enumerate the economic and human cost of events such as health epidemics across their emerging states and empires.[230] This constitution and binding together of the state through counting is what Ann Rudinow Saetnan et al. term 'the mutual construction of statistics and society'.[231] As many have argued, counting and categorising are social acts rather than objective reflection of reality.[232] However, it is not my aim to dismiss statistics as mere fantasy or too problematic to engage with: statistics are an extremely useful method enabling the analysis and comparison of large data sets. 'Numeric statements about the world are tickets into specific discourse forums and forms',[233] and as with every method or technology we need to attend to its ways of producing the social. In statistical modelling it is possible to categorise either using the finest of distinctions, or equally to categorise a group of things as qualitatively similar or as identical in kind. Helen Verran argues that within practices of categorisation 'there is a seamless

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[230] The word statistics derives from the Latin for "affairs of state" (status), although the modern sense of the term is of a discipline that concerns itself with numeric data, and its collection, organization, analysis and presentation.

[231] Ann Rudinow Saetnan, Heidi Mork Lomell, and Svein Hammer, 'Introduction: By the Very Act of Counting - The Mutual Construction of Statistics and Society', in *The Mutual Construction of Statistics and Society*, ed. Ann Rudinow Saetnan, Heidi Mork Lomell, and Svein Hammer (New York: Routledge, 2011), 1–17.

[232] Ian Hacking, *The Taming of Chance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Ian Hacking, 'How Should We Do the History of Statistics?', in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 181–95; Ian Hacking, 'World-Making by Kind-Making: Child Abuse for Example', in *How Classification Works: Nelson Goodman Among the Social Sciences*, ed. Mary Douglas and David Hull (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992), 181–238; Ann Rudinow Saetnan, Heidi Mork Lomell, and Svein Hammer, eds., *The Mutual Construction of Statistics and Society* (New York: Routledge, 2011).

[233] Saetnan, Lomell, and Hammer, 'Introduction: By the Very Act of Counting - The Mutual Construction of Statistics and Society', 2.

elision of the dual moments of articulating an order so as to create value, and valuing the categories created in the order, to stabilize the order'.[234] One of greatest powers of statistics is the power to produce associations and truth claims anchored in the categorisations we produce. As we shall see, methods of counting and categorisation have important implications for the assemblage of crime.

Albert Biderman and Albert Reiss claim that the 'subject [that] has dominated the field of criminal statistics … since its inception: … [is] the search for the key moral statistic– a measure of the "criminality" present among the population'.[235] This focus demonstrates the inaugural role of positivist criminology in aiding governments to better see or 'know' their subjects, even if it was not always clear what signs they were looking for. In the 18th and 19th centuries, debates raged about whether crime was an inevitable component of societies,[236] whether it was the result of racial degeneration and visible on the body,[237] whether crime is pathological and

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[234] Helen Verran, 'Number', in *Inventive Methods: The Happening of the Social*, ed. Celia Lury and Nina Wakeford (London: Routledge, 2012), 112.

[235] Albert D. Biderman and Albert J. Rees Jr., 'On Exploring the "Dark Figure" of Crime', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 374 Combating Crime (November 1967): 2.

[236] A position notably taken by Émile Durkheim. See Emile Durkheim, *The Rules of the Sociological Method* (New York: Free Press, 1982).

[237] A position associated especially with Cesare Lombroso's positivist 'criminal anthropology'. See Lombroso (1876) *L'uomo delinquent.* Published in English as Cesare Lombroso, *Criminal Man* (New York ; London: GP Putnam's Sons, 1911).

spreads like disease through imitation,[238] or is a product of rational calculation and can be deterred by threat of punishment.[239] Even without problematising the conceptualisation of criminality as a measurable quantity, the calculation of the criminal population is by no means straightforward. It is dependent, for example, on whether one thinks a particular social group is responsible for multiple crimes and immoral acts, or whether one thinks that crimes are committed across the social spectrum, with some in society better equipped to evade detection or prosecution. From either calculative perspective it is generally assumed that there is an excess, i.e. more criminal activity taking place than that which will be captured in officially recorded crime data. As I will explain later, in the 20th century this excess became understood through the metaphor of the 'dark figure' of crime.

As Helen Verran reminds us, numbers act as both order and value and as such, they can be mobilised within assemblages to create problems and compel solutions.[240] Many of the 'problem' categories that are naturalised in contemporary society were invented through attempts to collect numerical

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[238] A position popularised by Gabriel Tarde. See 'Criminal Youth' (1897) in Jean Gabriel Tarde, *On Communication and Social Influence.* (Chicago ; London: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1969).

[239] An argument associated with the utilitarian 'classical' approach of Jeremy Bentham. See, for example, Jeremy Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Etc.* (London: T Payne & Son, 1789). See also Cesare Beccaria (1764) *Dei Delitti e Delle Pene*: see Cesare Beccaria, *On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings*, ed. Aaron Thomas, trans. Jeremy Parzen and Aaron Thomas, Lorenzo Da Ponte Italian Library Series (Toronto ; London: University of Toronto Press, 2008).

[240] Verran, 'Number'.

data, for example the concept of 'recidivism' and the category of 'recidivist' were created when the quantitative study of crimes commenced in the 1820s.[241] Up until as late as the 1950s, most criminologists used the more readily available data about repeat rather than one-off or occasional offenders to make inferences about criminality in general. This significantly contributed to the long running trope of the 'criminal outcast', and caused the social treatment of all offenders to be clouded by the image of the persistent, agentic, pathological criminal.[242]

The historical development of statistics as a tool of governance points to the importance of the translation of this numerical data into expressive visual forms. This history is rich in imagery and invention. Graphics are indeed 'instruments for reasoning about quantitative information',[243] but graphics also *produce* new realities. For example, statistical models of biological deviance among populations rely upon the central conceptual category of the 'average man', composed by Quetelet out of aggregates of social and biological data.[244] Quetelet modelled his 'average man' on the bell-shaped curve produced by the astronomer Carl Friedrich Gauss in 1809, itself

[241] Hacking, 'How Should We Do the History of Statistics?', 182.

[242] Hacking, 182; Leon Radzinowicz, 'The Criminal in Society', *Journal of the Royal Society of Arts* 112, no. November (1964): 920.

[243] Edward R. Tufte, *The Visual Display of Quantitative Information* (Cheshire, Conn.: Graphics Press, 1983).

[244] Adolphe Quetelet, *A Treatise on Man and the Development of his Faculties*, ed. Thomas Smibert (Edinburgh: W and R Chambers, 1842).Quetelet attempted to spatialize statistics in order to generate early 'crime maps', and to correlate rates of offence to other data such as age and gender to produce generalised "problem" demographic categories.

an attempt to determine accurate measurements from the distribution of random errors around a central mean. As Sekula explains,

> in an extraordinary metaphoric conflation of individual difference with mathematical error, Quetelet defined the central portion of the curve, the large number of measurements clustered around the mean, as a zone of normality. Divergent measurements tended toward darker regions of monstrosity and biosocial pathology.[245]

The mean became the average (and non-criminal) man. Quetelet argued that individuals who fell into this category were also those likely to embody moral, financial, psychological and physical health.[246] Consequently, acts like opening a savings account become indicators of non-criminality. Thus, the birth of statistics is also the birth of the process of what Felix Stalder terms 'our bodies… being shadowed by an increasingly comprehensive "data body."'[247] He adds that today 'this shadow body does more than follow us. It does also precede us'[248] as patterns of our digital activity are mined for indicators of potential deviance. As Georges Canguilhem noted, 'the problem is [still] to know within what range of oscillations around a purely theoretical average value individuals will be considered normal'.[249]

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[245] Sekula, 'The Body and the Archive', 22.

[246] Piers Beirne, 'Adolphe Quetelet and the Origins of Positivist Criminology', *American Journal of Sociology* 92, no. 5 (1987): 1159.

[247] Felix Stalder (2002) quoted in Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages*, 155.

[248] Puar, 155.

[249] Georges Canguilhem, *The Normal and the Pathological*, trans. Carolyn R. Fawcett (New York: Zone Books, 1991), 154.

Statistical techniques involve calculations of mathematical probability and thus are always aimed at 'obtaining knowledge from incomplete data'.[250] There is no perfect or whole data set available no matter how big your sample, and given that, general theories created from partial data should carefully articulate the limits to their claims set by the initial fields of the enquiry. Quetelet himself emphasised that whilst statistical analysis allows us to observe how crime rates resemble the patterned behaviour of physical phenomena, we cannot use statistics to discover laws that determine individual behaviour.[251] In statistical analysis there is great potential for an ontological elision of the population and the individual. I argue that we should not too hastily scale up or down, or assume that the individual somehow models the population. For example, Quetelet's inference that young, poor, less educated and underemployed men were more likely than others to *commit* crimes was based solely on *conviction* rates. Quetelet was aware that to make such inferences about the commission of crimes we actually needed to look at the behaviour of the general population, not just those convicted, but this comparison was never made.[252] Instead, the idea of

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[250] Yadolah Dodge, *The Concise Encyclopedia of Statistics* (New York: Springer, 2008), 518–19.

[251] Beirne, 'Adolphe Quetelet and the Origins of Positivist Criminology', 1152.

[252] Beirne, 1155. In the mid-20th century, attempts to capture more of the dark figure by surveying those not normally the focus of crime quantification studies produced data that troubled some entrenched assumptions. For example, one of the outcomes of self-reporting crime studies was the discovery of the unexpectedly high number of white, middle- and upper-class people that admitted to having committed criminal acts which were nevertheless not prosecuted or detected due to their social status. For example see: Harwin L Voss, 'Socioeconomic Status and Reported Delinquent Behaviour', *Social Problems* 13, no.

young, poor, underemployed men as more likely to be either essentially or by circumstance criminal took on the status of an accepted truth, with consequences for persons fitting the category. As we shall see in the next section, and as Allan Sekula argues in 'The Body and the Archive', the statistical figures assembled here were soon to be furnished and fixed with human faces.[253]

Francis Galton and Pictorial Statistics

Sekula notes that the early photographic projects of criminal typography, forensics, and the development of primitive databases and archives of arrestees were all dependent upon the newly created and codified practice of statisticians in the early 19th century.[254] The development of photographic technologies brought portraiture and amateur photography into the province of an increasingly large section of 'respectable' society, and simultaneously accelerated the reproduction and circulation of medical typologies of deviance: largely the criminal and the insane. Recalling briefly my discussion of method in the previous chapter, this early understanding of

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Winter (1966): 314–24. Such studies gave statistical support to claims of police bias in targeting working class and black, Asian, and immigrant communities, and also to arguments to seriously investigate 'white-collar crime'.

[253] Sekula, 'The Body and the Archive'.

[254] Sekula.

photography is an indexical conceptualisation in which the image mimetically and impartially captures the real.

In the 1880s Francis Galton developed the technique of 'composite photography', which consisted of partially-exposing multiple images onto the same photographic plate to create a single image. His hope was that in layering portraits of criminals common features of criminal physiognomy would be apparent in the final image, whilst idiosyncratic features would fade away into blur, creating a blueprint of deviance for comparison with live human subjects. In Galton's project, photographic technology was being used to aid in the creation of a scientific archive of criminal biotypes. It is worth pointing out here that the human face is mobile rather than static, with facial expressions altering the appearance of a face. Thus, Galton's project is one of measurement and comparison of features, not the indexing of criminal expressions. Contributing to Galton's assemblage of crime was the fact of his renown as a statistician, his pioneering of the new technologies of fingerprinting and the questionnaire. As the 'father' of eugenics, he was passionately invested in the scientific 'improvement' of the human species through selectively out-breeding those he deemed socially, racially and intellectually inferior to his fantasy heritage of noble ancient Greeks with perpendicular foreheads. Terming composite photographs 'pictorial statistics', Galton claimed the process produced 'much more than averages…

The blur of their outlines, which is never great in truly generic composites, except in unimportant details, measures the tendency of individuals to deviate from the central type'.[255]

Linking Galton to Quetelet, Sekula writes that in pictorial statistics,

> the symmetrical bell curve now wore a human face. This was an extraordinary hypostatisation. Consider the way in which Galton conveniently exiled blurring to the *edges* of the composite, when in fact blurring would occur over the entire surface of the image, although less perceptibly. Only an imagination that wanted to *see* a visual analogue of the binomial curve would make this mistake, finding the type at the center and the idiosyncratic and individual at the outer periphery[256]

Sekula makes this argument about the connection between Galton and Quetelet in order to raise an important point about the visuality of statistics. I am extending it to talk about the production of the 'real' in relation to number, archive, image and the character of the criminological expert as the point through which the assemblage is manifested. Here, Galton acts like an alchemist or magician pulling criminal types out of a muddy mass of numerical data. Nevertheless Galton's 'pictorial statistics' never achieve the pure indexicality they seek; Galton himself recognised that his composites didn't evidence a generic criminal type that could be detected from

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[255] Galton, 'On Generic Images' (1879) quoted in Sekula, 48.
[256] Sekula, 48.

physiognomy, claiming instead that he had managed to identify people who are 'liable to fall into crime'.[257] He complained that through his technique 'the special villainous irregularities… have disappeared, and the common humanity that underlies them has prevailed… All composites are better looking than their components'.[258]

This accidental beautification of criminals didn't mesh with Galton's alignment of the good with the beautiful. The intended creation of generic images of hideous criminality seems also to fulfil a desire to look into the eyes and *feel* something – awe, horror, empathy etc. Here, the photograph is a metonymic substitution for looking into the eyes of a criminal, popularly imagined as a rarer and much more dangerous activity in 'real life'. As numerous theorists of the photographic image claim[259] (expressed aptly by Tiziana Terranova):

> what is important of an image, in fact, is not simply what it indexes—that is, to what social and cultural processes and significations it refers. What seems to matter is the kind of affect that it packs, the movements that it receives,

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[257] Galton, 'Composite Portraits' (1879) quoted in George Pavlich, 'The Subjects of Criminal Identification', *Punishment & Society* 11, no. 2 (1 April 2009): 181.

[258] Pavlich, 181.

[259] For example Roland Barthes, *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2010); Susan Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others* (Picador, 2004); Ariella Azoulay, *The Civil Contract of Photography* (New York ; London: Zone, 2008).

inhibits and/or transmits. The place of an image is thus always within an ecology.[260]

The photograph itself has agency in publically circulating and producing both tacit, affective and explicit links between the body and crime. Recalling my discussion of faciality in chapter one, the molecular flux of bodies passing in the street is cut into segments by these popular photographic representations of criminality, marking some bodies as suspect and a potentially criminal threat. Faciality can be seen in the treatment of the most reproduced media image of Mark Duggan, the man whose fatal shooting by police sparked the urban riots of 2011. The image is a tight portrait of Duggan staring intensely into the camera, however as it later became apparent that the image was actually a crop of a photograph which shows Duggan holding his daughter's gravestone. The intense look on his face is for his child's death, but cropped out of context his intensity is facialised and criminalised for a racist public. Here blackness is equated to an implied threat and guilt: the police and media used the cropped image as a non-verbal tool to aid in public acceptance that the police had been right to shoot Duggan.

If photographic taxonomies of criminals render everyone in society a potential expert on crime, what can the criminologist offer to preserve her

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[260] Tiziana Terranova, *Network Culture: Politics For the Information Age* (London: Pluto Press, 2004), 142.

status? I am going to argue that the criminologist might assemble a version of crime that is partially submerged, with hidden causes, be they psychological, spiritual or affective, working below the surface of appearances. To do this, I turn to the 'dark figure' of crime.

Leon Radzinowicz and the Dark Figure of Crime

> The figure of the criminologist I have left looming in the background. What can I say of him? ... Perhaps he cannot avoid appearing as a bird of ill omen, a kind of academic vulture brooding over the dark figure of crime. It is unlikely that he will be short of employment for a long time to come. Yet at least the criminologist can claim that he is a bird of good omen in one respect. He represents the desire to find direction and purpose in dealing with crime, not just to hit back blindly at the criminal.[261]

Here, Leon Radzinowicz (1964), the founding director of the Cambridge Institute of Criminology – one of the key institutional bodies in the post-war British assemblage of criminology[262] – suggests that as long as crime is a stable feature of society (which will nevertheless fluctuate, causing social concern), the measured responses of criminologists will be needed to counter punitive

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[261] Radzinowicz, 'The Criminal in Society', 926.
[262] The institute was founded in 1959, and its research funded by the Home Office.

acts of retribution from other quarters.[263] In a self-portrait that has featured in many subsequent criminological assemblages of crime, Radzinowicz characterises the criminologist as undertaking a practice that, whilst it may retain something of the alchemist's flourish, is nevertheless 'realistic… empirical… moderate',[264] and necessarily interdisciplinary.[265]

In the quotation above, Radzinowicz employs the evocative metaphor the 'dark figure of crime',[266] a phrase in common usage in criminology and policy discourses since the early 20th century. It refers to the predicted quantity of unknown (and potentially vast) unreported or unrecorded crime at any specified time. As Nathan Moore, discussing Deleuze's 'societies of control' fragment,[267] argues:

> control demands more knowledge in the face of what is unknown and, in
>
> creating such knowledge, also creates the statistical uncertainty inherent in it
>
> – what is unknown. In short, knowledge, under control, becomes a never-

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[263] This version of the criminologist's role is echoed by Loader and Sparks. See Ian Loader and Richard Sparks, 'What Is To Be Done with Public Criminology?', *Criminology & Public Policy* 9, no. 4 (1 November 2010): 771. Loader and Sparks, *Public Criminology?*

[264] Leon Radzinowicz, *Adventures in Criminology* (London: Routledge, 1999).

[265] Ian Loader and Richard Sparks, 'Situating Criminology: On The Production and Consumption of Knowledge about Crime and Justice', in *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology*, ed. Mike Maguire, Rodney Morgan, and Robert Reiner, 5th ed (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012), 8.

[266] According to Matthieu De Castelbajac the phrase seems to originate from Shigema Oba: a Japanese student studying for his doctoral dissertation in Germany. He uses the phrase 'Dunkelziffer', which translates as 'dark digit' or 'dark number' (Shigema Oba, *Unverbesserliche Verbrecher und ihre Behandlung* (1908)). For a survey of the development and uses of the 'dark figure' metaphor, see Matthieu de Castelbajac, 'Brooding Over the Dark Figure of Crime', *The British Journal of Criminology* 54, no. 5 (1 September 2014): 928–45.

[267] Deleuze, 'Postscript on the Societies of Control'.

ending self-production of ignorance and uncertainty.[268]

Reaffirming the importance of governments as actors in the assemblage of crime, Biderman and Reiss (1967) claimed that the 'dark figure' is actually a re-formulation of Quetelet's key moral statistics: the measure of the 'criminality' of a population.[269] The idea of the 'dark figure' of crime was imported to the UK by two influential German criminologists in the 1940s,[270] but only popularised in the UK in the 1960s by Radzinowicz, who was melancholic about the prospect of filling in the gap between known and unknown crime. For him, the dark figure of crime was the 'ominous phrase [which] expresses our disillusionment'[271] at ever being able to offer a watertight representation of the criminality within the general population. He asked:

> Who can say what our attitude towards the criminal – in emotional terms as well as in terms of practical policy – would be if the whole, or at least a large segment, of the dark figure were brought into the open and thus another two, three or even four million offenses added to the recorded figure?[272]

His question is interesting in its foregrounding of the relationship between

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[268] Moore, 'Nova Law', 449.
[269] Biderman and Rees Jr., 'On Exploring the "Dark Figure" of Crime', 2.
[270] Hermann Mannheim, *Social Aspects of Crime in England between the Wars.* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1940); Max Grünhut, 'Statistics in Criminology', *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* 114 (1951): 139–62.
[271] Radzinowicz, 'The Criminal in Society', 917.
[272] Radzinowicz, 918.

data, feeling and practice. Radzinowicz invokes a unified social body having to face up to the reality of its 'dark secret': the true social extent of crime. If crime is de facto morally wrong, this suggests that 'our' responses to a shift in the dark figure might be shame and self-loathing. If crimes are diversely damaging, this opens up the possibility for a more nuanced set of responses, including accepting the banality of crime and the potential harmfulness of many things which are not currently criminalised.

In the early 20th century German criminologists such as Robert Heindl, Kurt Meyer and Bernd Wehner[273] challenged Quetelet's claim that the statistical relationship between unrecorded and recorded crime is inherently constant across different categories of crime.[274] They argued that the dark figure is in fact dark *figures*, and predictions should take into account the statistician's common-sense understanding of the reasons for reporting different types of crime, and the differing ease with which crimes are concealed.[275] Heindl, Meyer and Wehner were sceptical about using conviction rates as the basis for calculation of the dark figure, and argued for the use of the more numerous reports of crime detailed in police statistics.[276]

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[273] de Castelbajac, 'Brooding Over the Dark Figure of Crime', 931.
[274] Quetelet, *Research on the Propensity of Crime at Different Ages* (1848) quoted in Beirne, 'Adolphe Quetelet and the Origins of Positivist Criminology', 1153.
[275] For example, most car theft is reported to the police because this action is required by insurance firms, whereas rape and sexual assault might not reported by the victim because of lack of physical evidence or fears he or she will not be believed by police.
[276] de Castelbajac, 'Brooding Over the Dark Figure of Crime', 931.

This was controversial for various reasons, from claims that only acts found guilty in a court of law are proven crimes and should be counted as such, to concerns about the enormously varied data collection practices of police forces, who additionally possess individually enacted powers of discretion which give them the authority to choose to intervene in non-criminal activity that they find suspicious, and to select what and how to record incidents as crime. In making interpretive evaluations of what counts as crime in initial instances of investigation, police have a major impact on the later iterations of the data, i.e. what counts as crime in aggregate, and then what kinds of crime become exemplary.[277] Heindl, Meyer and Wehner questioned the treatment of crimes as qualitatively or quantitatively identical, a move which alters what constitutes both crime and the scale of the problem. Albeit in a different conceptual language, they point to the interaction of a mobile assemblage – police, property, prejudice, fear etc., which produces different versions of crime.

To reflect on the dark figure's linguistic rather than numerical power is to examine the associative work done by metaphors within the assemblage of crime. Criminological discourse is as full of metaphors as any other, and they have played an important role in the assemblage of crime since the birth of the

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[277] I explore the issue of 'police discretion' in chapter four of this thesis.

discipline.[278] Alison Young foregrounds the pathological metaphors commonly used to characterise crime as abnormal and corrupting such as 'virus', 'rot' and 'blight', and the military and technological terminology mobilised to 'crack', 'beat' and 'battle' it within 'crime talk' in criminology, media and social policy.[279] The central organising metaphor here is that of crime as a threat. The pathological image of crime is often paired with an image of the unified yet threatened 'body' of the state, a semi-permeable Leviathan that must work to strengthen its borders by expelling or disciplining its undesirables.[280] To note some of 'dark figure' metaphor's basic Anglophone cultural-linguistic associations: 'dark' refers to the secret, occult, mystical or unknown, for example 'dark matter', and often to the potentially fearful or sinister, for example the 'dark web'. Darkness also has racialised connotations of blackness, Africa, was the mysterious 'dark continent' to 19th century Europeans.[281] Curtis Mayfield played on this racialised connotation when he sang 'we are the people who are darker than blue' (1970): a soulful

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[278] For example, Quetelet (1848) wrote: crime was 'a pestilential germ… contagious… [sometimes] hereditary'. Quoted in Beirne, 'Adolphe Quetelet and the Origins of Positivist Criminology', 1160.

[279] Alison Young and Peter Rush, 'The Law of Victimage in Urbane Realism: Thinking Through Inscriptions of Violence.', in *The Futures of Criminology*, ed. David Nelken (London; Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1994), 154–72; Young, *Imagining Crime*.

[280] The image of the body politic can be extended using related concepts like autoimmunity, inoculation or immunisation, with implications for the political imaginary.

[281] Although at this time, when Lombroso was formulating his ideas of racialized criminality, many northern Italians claimed that the 'dark continent' included southern Italy, deeming its inhabitants less civilised and racially distinct from northern Italians. Daniel Pick, *Faces of Degeneration: A European Disorder, c.1848-c.1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 114.

commentary on the straightjacket of social categorisation. Although 'figure' here refers to number, it could equally refer to a person or character. This creates the potential for a metonymic substitution in which a person, caricature, or category of person comes to stand in for crime. Unsurprisingly, considering the connotations of darkness discussed above and the association of crime with atavism, the 'dark figure' is often racialised. Assailants are popularly imagined as acting at night, or emerging silently from shadows. In the racialised imagination of crime, people with darker skin are imagined to find it easier to hide 'under the cover of darkness'. The personification of crime (as dark figure) allows us to treat the nonhuman entity crime as if it exhibited human behaviour. It is not merely that crime is personified, but more specifically that crime is an *adversary* that wants to hurt us and must be fought.[282] I have played with aspects of this characterisation of crime in my literary composition *You Will Have Your Day in Court* (2017), included in the portfolio.

Politically, the 'dark figure' metaphor is quite elastic and can be used to suggest that a government listens to its subjects' experiences of crime whether they have been officially validated or not, or equally used to terrify the public with the idea of a hidden 'epidemic' of crime. Matthieu de Castelbajac argues that Radzinowicz used the idea of submerged 'iceberg' of

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[282] George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 33–34.

crime to further 'civic education',[283] and to instil the belief that it is each

citizen's duty to report all victimisation to the authorities in order to decrease

the size of the dark figure. Here, an uninterrupted flow of information

between government and the governed is a key part of the imagination of

efficient crime control. It might be interesting to think instead about the

different social bonds operating which work to make the extent of crime less

visible to governments. For example, aside from the issue raised earlier of

tangible evidence or the prejudice within CJS practices, why else might there

be unreported crimes? What is the general public's relationship to criminals

or the concept of criminality? Is some criminal activity not expelled from the

social body, but rather managed, accepted or tolerated as a part of society?

Versions of crime dominated by the 'dark figure' metaphor thus also assemble

the social as a site of mystery, which can only be unravelled by the

criminologist as scientific expert on crime.

This chapter does not aim to produce a comprehensive account of

criminological versions of the crime assemblage, and in making a selection I

have necessarily neglected other important currents within criminology

which produced different versions of crime. Despite this, here I want to briefly

mention the emergence in the late 1980s of what Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan

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[283] de Castelbajac, 'Brooding Over the Dark Figure of Crime', 932.

Simon termed 'actuarial justice'.[284] This is a pragmatic mode of criminological

reasoning and crime control based on the mathematical approaches originally

developed to enable calculations of risk and insurance valuations.[285] Enabled

by the rapid developments in computing technologies of the late 20th century,

actuarial approaches shift the emphasis away from responses and

explanations for crime, towards its prediction, risk calculation, surveillance

and management.[286] Echoing Durkheim, and the findings of decades of self-

reporting and victim crime surveys, actuarial approaches treat crime as

statistically normal and commonplace, rather than the exceptional product of

pathology or faulty socialisation. Actuarial approaches conceptualise crime as

opportunistic, and thus best managed by minimising the possibilities for

engaging in criminal activity. They work with aggregates of data and on the

basis of 'risk profiles' rather than identifying individual criminal subjects.[287] In

common with many of the versions of the criminological crime assemblage

delineated in this chapter, this emphasis on rational calculation has allowed

actuarial approaches to present their findings as neutral and objective rather

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[284] Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon, 'Actuarial Justice: The Emerging New Criminal Law', in *The Futures of Criminology*, ed. David Nelken (London; Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1994), 173–201.

[285] Actuarial approaches also draw on a combination of routine activity theory, situational crime prevention and rational choice theories. David Garland, *The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 127.

[286] Malcolm M. Feeley and Jonathan Simon, 'The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications', *Criminology* 30, no. 4 (1992): 449–74; Pat O'Malley, 'Risk, Power and Crime Prevention', *Economy and Society* 21 (1992): 252–75; Feeley and Simon, 'Actuarial Justice: The Emerging New Criminal Law'; Richard Victor Ericson and Kevin D. Haggerty, *Policing the Risk Society* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).

[287] Feeley and Simon, 'The New Penology', 449.

than subject to the frailty and prejudice of human reasoning. In comparison to some older approaches there is less emphasis on punishment as a method of reforming or rehabilitating an individual, and more stress on containment and 'neutralising' those seen as most dangerous or likely to commit offences. Conceptualising prison as a place of containment rather than rehabilitation means that if high numbers of parolees are returned to prison this can be branded a success, rather than as a failure of the system to reform or help people.[288]

As will be apparent from the versions of the crime assemblage already discussed in this chapter, actuarial approaches are a recent development of approaches to knowing and managing crime that have been present since the birth of the discipline. However, my interest in this chapter is not to present a teleological or linear narrative, but instead to show how versions of the crime assemblage combine often contradictory approaches and epistemologies. Actuarial frameworks have not replaced older criminal justice models in the UK, but intersect with prior approaches based on different agendas such as rehabilitation and retribution.[289] Furthermore, as Garland argues, despite their growing influence on British and particularly American governments since the 1990s, the actuarial conceptualisation of crime have so far 'barely

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[288] Feeley and Simon, 455.
[289] O'Malley, 'Risk, Power and Crime Prevention'.

impinged upon public attention'.[290] Popular and public assemblages of crime have continued to reinforce the idea of crime as exceptional and socially deviant. This lack of public visibility is one of the reasons I have chosen not to substantively engage with the actuarial assemblage of crime, choosing instead to work on criminological versions of crime which intersect with popular and public conceptions of crime. Towards this end, I now move to discuss left realism as a case study.

Left Realism, Victim Surveys and the Production of Racialised Fear

The interventions of left realist criminology in the mid-1980s were closely associated with British criminologists John Lea, Roger Matthews, Richard Kinsey, Ian Taylor and Jock Young.[291] There has necessarily been variation in their criminological project, as it has been in development over the last thirty years – years which have seen huge shifts in the intellectual landscape brought on through the challenges to Eurocentric, androcentric epistemologies from poststructuralist, feminist and postcolonial theories, and globalisation and neoliberalism. However, left realism has worked hard to

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[290] Garland, *The Culture of Control*, 127.

[291] Middlesex Polytechnic founded a Centre for Criminology in 1986, employing and supporting key members of the left realist group. Notable early works include Ian Taylor, *Law and Order: Arguments for Socialism* (London: Macmillan, 1981); Lea and Young, *What Is to Be Done about Law and Order?*; Richard Kinsey, John Lea, and Jock Young, *Losing the Fight against Crime* (Oxford, UK ; New York, NY: Basil Blackwell, 1986).

maintain its core episto-ontological assumptions, and it is this process of de- and reterritorialisation which I find so interesting. I summarise these core assumptions as follows: Crime is a social evil that can be located in the world without the interference of the researcher. The criminologist's role is to diagnose the root causes of crime and suggest practical solutions. Criminology is a moral and political project on behalf of the victims of crime – subjects who can really tell us about their experiences in a direct way. As will be clear from previous chapters, these assumptions are antithetical to the core assumptions of my project.

Part of the reason that the left realists' intervention was so dramatic was that they had been prominent in the previous decade's development of 'radical' or 'critical' criminology. In Ian Taylor, Paul Walton and Jock Young's *The New Criminology* (1973), and later their *Critical Criminology* (1975) they had attempted to advance an 'empirically-grounded'[292] and 'fully social'[293] theory of deviance and crime, and an 'immanent critique' of the dominant version of criminology, which they saw as invested in demonstrating the faulty-psychology of offenders.[294] At the first 'National Deviance Conference'

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[292] Ian Taylor, Paul Walton, and Jock Young, 'Advances towards a Critical Criminology', *Theory and Society* 1, no. 4 (1974): 461.

[293] Theirs is a conceptualisation of society as a comprehendible totality. Ian Taylor, Paul Walton, and Jock Young, *The New Criminology: For a Social Theory of Deviance* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), 278.

[294] Ian Taylor, Paul Walton, and Jock Young, eds., *Critical Criminology* (London ; Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), 20.

(1968),[295] this new generation of Marxist criminologists challenged what they saw as British criminology's leaden positivism and conservatism. They saw capitalism as criminogenic and law breaking as resistance, and heralded a socialist future free from crime. Radical criminologists of the 1970s drew upon a mix of symbolic interactionist labelling theory,[296] subcultural theory,[297] and social conflict theory,[298] to develop Marxist theories of the state, law and crime.[299] Texts by disciplinary insiders such as Stanley Cohen's *Images of Deviance*[300] and by disciplinary outsiders such as *Policing the Crisis* by Stuart Hall et al.[301] enacted a Gramscian Marxism, and included conceptualisations from the developing field of Cultural Studies, to foreground the power of media representations of crime and criminality to shape public opinion and political agendas, and produce crisis. However by the 1980s, the criminologists who would come to be known as the left realists seemed

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[295] The conference was initiated by Kit Carson, Stan Cohen, David Downes, Mary McIntosh, Paul Rock, Ian Taylor and Jock Young. The group were extremely active in staging 13 conferences between 1968 and 1973, forming a NDC working group.

[296] For example, Howard Becker, *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance.* (New York: Free Press, 1966); Matza, *Becoming Deviant*; John I. Kitsuse and Malcolm Spector, *Constructing Social Problems [1977]* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000).

[297] For example, David M. Downes, *The Delinquent Solution. A Study in Subcultural Theory* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966); Stanley Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics (1972)* (London: Taylor & Francis, 2011).

[298] For example, William J. Chambliss, 'Toward a Political Economy of Crime', *Theory and Society* 2, no. 1 (1 January 1975): 149–70; Richard Quinney, *Class, State and Crime: On the Theory and Practice of Criminal Justice* (New York ; London: Longman, 1978).

[299] Marxist and anarchist criminologies tend to assert that crime is mobilised by the powerful to distract the general public from the structural inequality of society, whilst perpetuating this inequality through practices targeted at the most vulnerable. Some suggest that all crime is political in nature whether or not articulated as such.

[300] Stanley Cohen, *Images of Deviance* (London: Penguin, 1975).

[301] Hall et al., *Policing the Crisis*.

disillusioned with the concept of 'the deviant'[302] and were desperate to

distance themselves from their influential formative work,[303] which they now

branded 'romantic left idealism'[304] and 'Marxist extremism'.[305] Although they

continued to maintain that crime was a 'social construct',[306] the left realists

claimed that their former work was 'an inherent apology for criminals and

criminal behaviour'[307] that had failed to explain why people commit crimes

and what should be done about it. Two important early influences on this shift

were feminist critiques of radical criminology's silence in relation to women,[308]

and the American realist criminologist Elliott Curie (later an ally and

collaborator) who suggested that *The New Criminology* whilst 'traditional

criminology tended to see pathology everywhere'[309] it looked, 'Taylor et al. see

it *nowhere*; both positions seem to me to be essentially static, impoverished and

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[302] 'Since deviance is strategic to all ideas of morality and politics, its explanation has been championed with great fervour'. David M. Downes and Paul Rock, *Understanding Deviance: A Guide to the Sociology of Crime and Rule Breaking*, 3rd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 1.

[303] One can detect an intellectual foreshadowing of a break from critical criminology in some of the work undertaken by the realists since the mid-1970s, for example Jock Young, 'Working-Class Criminology', in *Critical Criminology*, ed. Ian Taylor, Paul Walton, and Jock Young (London ; Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975); Taylor, *Law and Order*.

[304] Lea and Young, *What Is to Be Done about Law and Order?*, 92.

[305] Roger Matthews and Jock Young, 'Reflections on Realism', in *Rethinking Criminology: The Realist Debate*, ed. Roger Matthews and Jock Young (London ; Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1992), 2.

[306] Lea and Young, *What Is to Be Done about Law and Order?*, 15.

[307] Roger Hopkins Burke, *Criminal Justice Theory: An Introduction* (Abingdon, Oxon ; N.Y.: Routledge, 2012), 55.

[308] Frances Heidensohn, 'The Deviance of Women: A Critique and an Enquiry', *British Journal of Criminology* 19 (1968): 160–73; Smart, *Women, Crime and Criminology*.

[309] Elliot Currie (1974), quoted in Ian Taylor, 'Critical Criminology and the Free Market: Theoretical and Practical Issues in Everyday Social Life and Everyday Crime', in *Contemporary Issues in Criminology*, ed. Lesley Noaks, Mike Maguire, and Michael Levi (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1995), 406.

divorced from close attention to the behaviour of real people in the real world'.[310]

Currie pointed out that rather than viewing their acts as revolutionary, people who commit crimes sometimes see their own behaviour as harmful or undesirable.[311] In other words, overcoding crime as inherently revolutionary is still an overcoding which doesn't pay attention to the complexity of crime. Jock Young subsequently attributed radical left positions on law and order to 'social distance' from crime.[312] This spatial conceptualisation of close proximity to crime as authentic knowledge foreshadows his later 'cultural criminology' with Jeff Ferrell and Keith Hayward on the emotional excitement of law breaking.[313] Young appears to have been deeply troubled by the shifting assemblage of crime during this period, complaining that 'left idealists… manage to construct a theory of crime without a criminology!'[314] Young maintained the supremacy of criminology and the criminologist in 'knowing' crime, whilst expressing fears about how a version not dominated by criminologists might challenge or displace the assemblage of crime favoured by his brand of criminology. Thus, their earlier work can be included in the

[310] Elliot Currie (1974), quoted in Taylor, 406.

[311] Taylor, 407.

[312] Jock Young, 'Ten Points of Realism', in *Rethinking Criminology: The Realist Debate*, ed. Roger Matthews and Jock Young (London ; Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1992), 62.

[313] Jeff Ferrell, Keith Hayward, and Jock Young, *Cultural Criminology: An Invitation* (Los Angeles ; London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2008); Hayward and Young, 'Cultural Criminology'.

[314] Young, 'The Failure of Criminology: The Need for Radical Realism', 19.

left realist crime assemblage, but given a negative value: that of having 'gone too far' and being *beyond* the limit point of being able to know crime.

I argue that the success of the left realists should be seen as part of a backlash against the forceful critiques during the late 1960s and 1970s of the politics of the social construction of categories such as the 'criminal', with some of the criminology of that period forming new assemblages with feminist, queer, black, prison abolition, and anti-psychiatry movements. Many of these assemblages were fraught and contained contradictory elements and gaping absences,[315] with some resulting in the positing of 'radical criminology' as an untenable enterprise.[316] The radical critiques of criminal justice of this time resulted the development of some 'restorative justice' projects, and the increased use of mediation in formal settings, but these have continued on the margins of the criminal justice system 'offsetting the central tendencies without much changing the overall balance of the system'.[317] Without wishing to downplay the enormous importance of the interventions of the 1960s and 1970s for the practices of knowledge production that followed, it is necessary to recognise that one of the ways that policy-oriented criminology countered

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[315] It is worth noting that the authors of the "fully social" theory of crime didn't consider women *at all*, either as lawbreakers, victims or members of society. They mention race and racism in passing. See Taylor, Walton, and Young, *The New Criminology*, 117–18.

[316] Smart, *Women, Crime and Criminology*. Similarly, Paul Hirst argued that Marxist criminology was oxymoronic, 'mistakenly elevating "a given actuality of crime and law" to an absolute status worthy of scientific consideration' in a way that was incompatible with Marxism. Hirst (1975) quoted in Pavlich, 'Criticism and Criminology', 32.

[317] Garland, *The Culture of Control*, 104.

these critiques – which often drew attention to patterns of racialised or gendered victimisation (*including* those victimised through state practices of racialised criminalisation) – was through an increased focus on the category of 'victim', and a new imperative for criminologists and policy makers to act on behalf of or claim to speak *for* the victim.[318] The increasing power of the category of victim is palpable in this FBI formulation of 1963:

> many impassioned and articulate pleas are being made today on behalf of the offender tending to ignore the victim and obscuring the right of a free society to equal protection under the law.[319]

Rather than taking up the demanding feminist, queer and black deconstructive projects of undoing or blurring categories, this is a hierarchical substitution and reification of the category of 'the victim' over that of 'the criminal'. This victim is characterised simply as one who wants and needs protection, and demands justice and punishment by the state for the harm done to them. As Carol Smart demonstrated, the left realists claimed the moral high ground for their modernist, interventionist approach, ironically casting

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[318] On the entanglements of research, pedagogy, law and social justice when she cautioned 'I would like many more students to hesitate before they call for legal reforms as solutions to problems they have identified'. Indeed, Smart predicted that within criminology the future study of female criminality would be ghettoised into a separate field, freeing the mainstream of criminology from the responsibility of engaging with feminist critique. Carol Smart, *Law, Crime and Sexuality: Essays in Feminism* (London: Sage, 1995), 2. Debates on "carceral feminism" continue to this day around the appropriate feminist response to crime and victimisation in the context of state criminal justice practices.

[319] US Department of Justice, FBI, *Crime in the United States: Uniform Crime Reports* (1963) vii, quoted in Biderman and Rees Jr., 'On Exploring the "Dark Figure" of Crime', 8.

emerging postmodern feminist and anti-racist critiques of the lack of specificity of general theories of crime into the role of an immoral opposition that denied real suffering.[320] As we shall see, the value of the victim is a central component in the left realist's assemblage of crime.

The left realists are described perhaps more accurately as 'populist socialist',[321] or 'social democrat',[322] than politically radical. An important institutional and political body of the left realist crime assemblage was the Labour Party. The Conservative Party had come to power in 1979, and in their early years, the left realists advanced crime control policies explicitly aimed at getting Labour into power,[323] writing in the introduction to the first *Islington Crime Survey* (1986):

> the question is how to develop policies which help protect women, ethnic minorities and the working class – those who suffer most from the impact of crime – who are the natural constituents of Labour, whilst refusing to accept the draconian policing policies and penal practice of the Tories.[324]

We can see here how their formulation of criminology as a moral and political project was tied to a wider political project (soon to be called New Labour)

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[320] Smart, *Women, Crime and Criminology*, 39.

[321] Burke, *Criminal Justice Theory*, 51.

[322] Eamonn Carrabine et al., *Criminology: A Sociological Introduction*, Third edition (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2014).

[323] Lea and Young, *What Is to Be Done about Law and Order?*, 122.

[324] Trevor Jones, Brian MacLean, and Jock Young, *The Islington Crime Survey* (Aldershot: Gower, 1986), 6.

which they believed would bring about a more fully social treatment of crime problems. Although the extent of their influence on New Labour's crime policies is still debated,[325] I argue that one can see a mirroring of the realists' position in the rhetoric of shadow Home Secretary Tony Blair's article 'Why crime is a socialist issue', (1993):

> Crime profoundly affects the quality of our lives. It is ultimately linked with the strength and cohesion of the community. It is a cliché, but true nonetheless, that it is people who live on inner-city estates or use public transport – many of them Labour voters – who suffer most. Many of these people feel disenfranchised after fourteen years of Tory neglect of inner city crime. It therefore intensely interests our core voters, who look to Labour to reflect their anxiety and anger, not to respond with patronising sympathy or indifference.[326]

New Labour's 'tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime' soundbite repeated throughout that period can be seen to perform both Labour's desire to show that they had developed a set of responses to crime that treated the causes as an interplay of individual agency (the predominant focus of crime causality for the right) and social structure (the predominant focus of crime causality for the left). The realist's stance on crime complements the 'third

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[325] See Brownlee, 'New Labour – New Penology?'; Tim Newburn, *Criminology* (Cullompton: Willan, 2007); Vincenzo Ruggiero, 'How Public Is Public Criminology?', *Crime, Media, Culture* 8, no. 2 (1 August 2012): 154.
[326] Tony Blair, 'Why Crime Is a Socialist Issue', *New Statesman*, 29 January 1993.

way' between traditionally left and right politics advocated by the Anthony

Giddens, one of the key figures in the development of New Labour's

theoretical position.[327] The left realists argued that 'the major task of a radical

criminology is to seek a solution to the problem of crime and that of a socialist

policy is to substantially reduce the crime rate'.[328] They asserted that the

criminologist's role is to demonstrate 'a commitment to problem solving, to

the improvement of service delivery and to the provision of a more equitable,

responsive and accountable criminal justice system',[329] within the 'wider social

and political objectives of greater equality, opportunity and freedom of

choice'.[330]

That the assemblage outlined above was positioned as 'radical' by the

realists can perhaps be better understood when one considers that the left

realists aimed to temper the influence of the entrepreneurial American realists

of the 'New Right' on British crime policy. New Right discourse married neo-

liberalism with neo-conservatism to powerful effect, producing a policy-

oriented assemblage of crime which explained crime causation through

rational choice and moral decline. Texts by Charles Murray, and James Q.

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[327] Anthony Giddens, *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994); Anthony Giddens, *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy* (Malden, Mass. ; Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).
[328] Young, 'The Failure of Criminology: The Need for Radical Realism', 28.
[329] Matthews and Young, 'Reflections on Realism', 21.
[330] Matthews and Young, 'Questioning Left Realism', 13.

Wilson and his collaborators[331] commanded the levels of public impact desired by the left realists for their own 'moral realism'.[332] The left realists adopted and slightly modified many of the new right's positions, for example the link they stress between crime and visible urban disorder.[333]

A key element in the development of the left realist's crime assemblage is their championing of the technology of victim surveys[334] in Britain. Their local area victim surveys[335] convinced them that working class and, especially, poor people are targeted by a 'criminal element living in their own communities and from whom they require protection, [which] has not always been recognised or forthcoming'.[336] Thus, the realists situated crime as primarily an intra-class problem affecting the working class. As such, they argued that radical criminologists must 're-balance' radical thought by focusing on allegedly 'working class crimes' such as street assault and burglary, which they claimed are the types of crime most people are actually

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[331] George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson, 'Broken Windows', *The Atlantic*, March 1982; James Q. Wilson, *Thinking about Crime*, Rev. ed., 2nd (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Charles A. Murray, *Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980* (New York: BasicBooks, 1984); James Q Wilson and Richard J Herrnstein, *Crime and Human Nature: The Definitive Study of the Causes of Crime* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985).
[332] Lea and Young, *What Is to Be Done about Law and Order?*, 49.
[333] Lea and Young, 55.
[334] Victim surveys combine questions about general attitudes to crime-related topics with questions intended to ascertain the levels of unrecorded victimisation experienced by a random sample of the population and "fill in" more of the 'dark figure'.
[335] For example: Trevor Jones, John Lea, and Jock Young, *Saving the City: The First Report of the Broadwater Crime Survey* (London: Middlesex Polytechnic Centre for Criminology, 1987); Kate Painter, John Lea, and Jock Young, *The West Kensington Estate Survey* (London: Middlesex Polytechnic Centre for Criminology, 1988).
[336] Burke, *Criminal Justice Theory*, 20.

worried about.[337] Based upon the model of consumer satisfaction surveys,[338] and already in use in the USA since the late 1960s, victim surveys were initially seen by many British criminologists and politicians as both costly and methodologically suspect, and ironically, the first British Crime Survey (1982),[339] a large scale victim survey,[340] was launched by the Home Secretary William Whitelaw not because the Home Office or the majority of British criminologists were convinced that the method was valid, but because he needed to appear to be doing something novel in response to current urban social 'unrest'[341] and increased fears of victimisation.[342]

The role of the Metropolitan Police (Met) as an actor in this public production of increased fear of victimisation is important to consider. In March 1982, the Met released statistics directly to the press which departed from normal proceedings in providing a breakdown of street robberies in

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[337] Lea and Young, *What Is to Be Done about Law and Order?*, 12. This move exposed them to the accusation that the crimes committed by white collar workers, by corporations and the powerful, are simply left out of the picture (and therefore not subjected to the same punitive measures). They were obviously aware of this imbalance, claiming in the 1990s that their new work would examine 'white-collar' offences. See Matthews and Young, 'Reflections on Realism', 5.

[338] Keith Hayward, *City Limits: Crime, Consumer Culture and the Urban Experience* (London: Cavendish Press, 2004), 106.

[339] Published the following year as J. M. Hough, 'The British Crime Survey: First Report' (London: Home Office, 1983). Hereafter referred to as the BCS.

[340] The BCS continues to produce a 'dark figure' of crime; for example in the 2000 BCS it was suggested that 39% of crime was reported. Lee Sims and A Myhill, 'Policing and the Public: Findings from the 2000 British Crime Survey' (London: Home Office, 2001).

[341] For example the 1981 'race riots' in Brixton, London; Handsworth, Birmingham; Chapeltown, Leeds and Toxteth, Liverpool.

[342] Michael Hough et al., 'British Crime Survey After 25 Years', in *Surveying Crime in the 21st Century*, ed. Michael Hough and Michael G. Maxfield (Cullompton: Willan, 2007), 15.

terms of race, including the *perceived* race of criminals according to victims.[343]

Instead of responding to this inflammatory act with questions about police accountability and institutional racism, Lea and Young used it as an opportunity to conjecture on the links between race and criminality.[344] In response, Lee Bridges and Paul Gilroy accused the realists of being 'ready allies of the police' who were engaged in giving intellectual support to racist stereotypes of the black community, of capitulating to 'the weight of racist logic' and reproducing 'pathology in polite social-democratic rhetoric'.[345] Gilroy and Bridges argued that these statistics were released by the Met as a deliberate political intervention to bolster public and parliamentary support for militarised policing after the Met feared that the Scarman Report didn't provide legitimation for a much desired 'police offensive against an insurgent black community'.[346] They were nonplussed as to why socialist criminologists like Lea and Young would use official crime rates unreflexively when even the police at the time were arguing that 'no informed person regards the existing criminal statistics as the most reliable indicator of the state of crime'.[347] As

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[343] Scotland Yard, 'Press Release', *The Guardian*, 11 March 1982.

[344] See John Lea and Jock Young, 'Urban Violence and Political Marginalisation: The Riots in Britain, Summer 1981', *Critical Social Policy* 3 (1982); John Lea and Jock Young, 'Race and Crime', *Marxism Today*, August 1982.

[345] These points were selected and laid out by Lea and Young as Gilroy's attack on them in Lea and Young, *What Is to Be Done about Law and Order?*, 113. The first two refer to Lee Bridges and Paul Gilroy, 'Striking Back: The Police Use of Race in Crime Statistics Is a Political Act', *Marxism Today*, no. June (1982): 34–35. The second two quotations are from Gilroy, 'The Myth of Black Criminality', 52–53.

[346] Bridges and Gilroy, 'Striking Back: The Police Use of Race in Crime Statistics Is a Political Act', 35.

[347] *Police Federation Magazine*, quoted in Gilroy, 'The Myth of Black Criminality', 55.

Gilroy surmised, 'the neat scenario which presents rising street crime as the cause and police militarisation as the effect, places the blame for this state of affairs squarely on the shoulders of a minority of deviant blacks'.[348] Stubbornly, Lea and Young maintained that since the 1960s black people really had committed a disproportionately higher number of crimes than white and Asian people,[349] and that Gilroy and his co-authors were 'vacuous'[350] to question the link between race and crime suggested by these statistics. Thus the left realists did nothing to diminish the impact of the 'moral panic'[351] around the fear inducing figure of the 'black mugger', and went so far as to state that *Policing the Crisis* (1978) 'denied or downplayed the level of crime, portrayed the offender as victim of the system, and stressed a multiculturalism of diversity and struggle where radicalism entailed the defence of the community against the incursions of the State, particularly the police and the criminal justice system'.[352] This episode is an example of how the left realists quickly adopted a positivist stance towards statistics, when they needed the association of the 'moral neutrality' of numbers to avoid accusations of racism. This was even more remarkable considering their attacks on the 'positivism'

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[348] Gilroy, 53.

[349] See David Cowell, Trevor Jones, and Jock Young, *Policing the Riots* (London: Junction Books, 1982); Lea and Young, *What Is to Be Done about Law and Order?*, 165.

[350] Lea and Young, *What Is to Be Done about Law and Order?*, 107.

[351] Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics (1972)*.

[352] Jock Young, 'Left Realist Criminology: Radical in Its Analysis, Realist in Its Policy', 1997, 1, www.malcolmread.co.uk/JockYoung/leftreal.htm.

of their opponents.[353] As Carol Smart commented, they seemed to confuse

political conservatism with positivism – positivism is beyond left and right in

its epistemological claims.[354] The belief that there must be some 'truth' in the

figures, precludes the possibility that the statistics demonstrate the 'truth' of

societal racism, including but not limited to the practices of the criminal justice

system. Here, Lea and Young seem to embrace Radzinowicz's definition of the

role of criminology as 'realistic', 'empirical', and 'moderate'.[355] However, in

ignoring data from outside criminology that challenges the official narrative

on race and crime (recall that Radzinowicz also defined criminology as

necessarily interdisciplinary),[356] they mystify a process of criminalisation that

wasn't mysterious to many outside the discipline, especially those working on

manifestations of racism 'new'[357] and old.

In the mid-1980s, using the data produced by early British Crime

Surveys, the Home Office mounted a publicity campaign to argue that public

fear was often overstated, irrational or misplaced when compared to the actual

risk of victimisation.[358] That a Conservative government took this approach

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[353] Young, 'Ten Points of Realism'; Matthews and Young, 'Questioning Left Realism'.
[354] Smart, *Law, Crime and Sexuality*, 33–34.
[355] Radzinowicz, *Adventures in Criminology*.
[356] Loader and Sparks, 'Situating Criminology: On The Production and Consumption of Knowledge about Crime and Justice', 8. Please note that I am not positioning interdisciplinarity as some kind of immuniser against academic myopia.
[357] Martin Barker, *The New Racism: Conservatives and the Ideology of the Tribe* (Junction Books, 1981).
[358] Paul Rock, *Helping Victims of Crime: The Home Office and the Rise of Victim Support in England and Wales* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), 262; Garland, *The Culture of Control*, 122.

allowed the Labour-supporting left realists to seem more in touch with 'the people' when they argued that 'serious crime really is what people at a particular time define as serious'.[359] This must be read as an early victory for the realists as the government recanted and began to enact crime policies that treated 'crime' and the 'fear of crime' as two distinct objects to target for reduction. For example, police street patrols and neighbourhood watch schemes aimed to reassure the public that they were safe, and thus reduce fear, rather than to reduce crime rates. Richard Sparks suggested that to too strongly emphasise that fear is rational is to invert the logic of 'moral panic' rather than correct it.[360] He welcomed the left realist assertion that fear has a 'rational kernel'[361] but complained that they deem fear rational only 'if its existence is wholly accounted for by an antecedent level of objective risk'.[362] But as I hope my literary compositions demonstrate, this is not the setting within which life is lived.

So how did the left realists think people should engage with crime and the production of the criminal? Young wrote that:

criminalization involves the selection of certain activities [and deeming them

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[359] Lea and Young, *What Is to Be Done about Law and Order?*, 13.

[360] Richard Sparks, 'Reason and Unreason in "Left Realism": Some Problems in the Constitution of the Fear of Crime', in *Issues in Realist Criminology*, ed. Roger Matthews and Jock Young (London ; Newbury Park, Calif: Sage Pub, 1992), 125.

[361] Jock Young, 'The Tasks Facing a Realist Criminology', *Contemporary Crises* II, no. 4 (1987): 348.

[362] Sparks, 'Reason and Unreason in "Left Realism": Some Problems in the Constitution of the Fear of Crime', 122.

criminal] in a political process which stretches from the public via the police through the courts... for realists it is vital that such a process of criminalization should be democratized. It involves the public, but it does not involve the public enough.[363]

He also saw crime as analogous to 'illness' in that it is an issue that affects us all, and thus if 'the social bricks and mortar' are mobilised effectively against it, crime is potentially also a great social unifier[364] and basis for social consensus. Like Radzinowicz, he was frustrated and confused by public unwillingness to provide information on crime.[365] Young wanted to practice criminology on behalf of a community of victims, but failed to see his own part in producing and defining that role. His project can't account for victims that might not desire that criminals be punished, or might feel solidarity with the criminal, or refuse the characterisation of victimhood being offered them.[366] In order to provide 'valid' data and categorise correctly, victim surveys need to produce subjects who can and will tell the truth about their experiences of victimisation and translate these experiences into levels of fear that can be measured. Triangulating victim survey claims with the records of

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[363] Young, 'Ten Points of Realism', 43.
[364] Young, 53, 58.
[365] Young, 40.
[366] I have explored issues of fear, violence and victimisation throughout my work but in particular in my literary composition *Lodger* (2016), included in the portfolio. It does this through problematizing the figures of the "vulnerable elderly person" and "young woman" as mobilised in criminology, popular and policy discourses on crime and fear. This work subtly critiques the role that habitual recognition of categories plays in the misreading of the dynamics of social relations.

other victimisation data producers such as police should be relatively straightforward as both deal with numerical data,[367] but how can we qualify and quantify fear? As Bateson elucidates, 'number' is different from 'quantity': the former is the product of counting and the latter of measuring:

> numbers can conceivably be accurate because there is a discontinuity between each integer and the next. Between *two* and *three*, there is a jump. In the case of quantity, there is no such jump; and because jump is missing in the world of quantity, it is impossible for any quantity to be exact. You can have exactly three tomatoes. You can never have exactly three gallons of water. Always quantity is approximate.[368]

A recent reappraisal of the BCS's data on fearfulness concludes that 'the extent of fear of crime… may have been overstated by standard research tools'.[369] In Foucault's later work he argues that governmental practices present 'technologies of the self' with which willing subjects can take an active part in

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[367] However, a quick glance at the history of the BCS shows that this process of comparison is also fraught with problems. The BCS counts the number of victims, not the number of criminal acts (and additionally, victim surveys cannot count victimless crimes), which leads to major problems in terms of generating comparable data with that gathered by other data collection agencies such as the police. Since 1998 the Home Office has adopted the same counting rules as the BCS, which has now replaced police crime statistics in status as the tools seen as the most reliable for measuring trends in crime. Nevertheless, there are ongoing doubts as to the usefulness of the BCS for measuring crime as it 'gathers information on large numbers of (overwhelmingly minor) personal and household thefts which do not map sufficiently well on to police definitions of crime for any direct comparisons to be made'. For a full discussion see Mike Maguire, 'Criminal Statistics and the Construction of Crime', in *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology*, ed. Mike Maguire, Rodney Morgan, and Robert Reiner, 5th ed (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012).
[368] Gregory Bateson, *Mind and Nature* (New York: Hampton Press, 2002), 45.
[369] Emily Gray, Jonathan Jackson, and Stephen Farrall, 'Reassessing the Fear of Crime', *European Journal of Criminology* 5, no. 3 (2008): 377.

their own subjectification.[370] I argue that victim surveys produce subjects

through asking respondents to imagine themselves both as members of an

'imagined community'[371] of victims and potential victims of crime, and also as

belonging to a state which cares for them and intends to act on the information

provided. Asking people to respond in this way is to set the memory to work,

to encourage those subject to the survey to think – when have I felt afraid?

When have I been at risk? When did I have a lucky escape? It is thus to create

an emotional or affective identification with the idea of victimisation and

specifically victimisation as something one worries about or is fearful of

happening, rather than something one is angry about or resigned to or a little

uneasy about. It also isolates crime out from its home among other human

fears. Through explicitly linking fear to crime, victim surveys *produce* fear as

the appropriate response to crime and imagined crime. Recalling my

discussion in chapter two, we might reimagine the victim survey as a

technology which engenders a monologue with an unreliable narrator. As I

have argued, both the qualification and quantification of fear is vague. For

example, what is the temporality of this fear and how does it impact on lived

experience? In British criminology of the late 20th century the old productive

ambiguity of the 'dark figure' of crime is yoked to the new ambiguity of the

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[370] For example Michel Foucault, 'The Subject and Power (1982)', in *Power*, ed. James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley, Foucault, Michel, 1926-1984. Selections. English ; v. 3 (London: Penguin, 2002), 326–48.
[371] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006).

fearful subject, to assemble a crime with a conspicuous absence: the 'criminal', or rather, criminalised actors. As I demonstrate throughout the following chapters and in the compositions I have made, involving these actors makes it much harder to maintain crime and immorality as an immutable unit. How the left realists constructed the criminal is the topic of the following section.

Left Realism, Relative Deprivation and the Roots of Crime, or Anomie by Any Other Name

Jock Young (1986) claimed that criminology was in the grip of an 'aetiological crisis':[372] a crisis in the provision of adequate root causal explanations for crime, which he hoped could be solved by the 'radical realism' that he and his collaborators proposed. However, as Lea (1992) admitted, they didn't actually have a new theory but had synthesised existing theories into a symbolic interactionist 'action and reaction' interpretive model of crime,[373] which they called the 'square of crime'.[374] Matthews, Lea and

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[372] Young, 'The Failure of Criminology: The Need for Radical Realism'.

[373] John Lea, 'The Analysis of Crime', in *Rethinking Criminology: The Realist Debate*, ed. Roger Matthews and Jock Young (London ; Newbury Park: SAGE, 1992), 74.

[374] 'The square of crime', is designed for plotting a specific crime event out in order to analyze the interplay of 'two dyads': 'victim and offender' and 'actions and reaction'. Roger Matthews and Jock Young, eds., *Rethinking Criminology: The Realist Debate* (London ; Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1992).

Young expressed a faith in the possibility of criminology capturing and representing the *whole* of the criminal process, criticising all prior models of crime as inadequate due to their 'partiality'.[375] However, as Alison Young argues, this is to fallaciously claim an 'isomorphic' relation between criminology as a representational form and the complex processes of criminalisation.[376] In other words, they treated criminology as a 'mirror of nature' that is able to capture crime in its totality. Alison Young criticises the limits of what she construed as the left realists' 'structuralist' approach,[377] of creating binary pairs as in the 'square of crime', claiming that despite its pretentions towards impartiality and clarity, 'there is always an excess to structuralism; in realist criminology it arrives with the injunction to remember the victim', and that this imperative ends up as a supplement, or the '*a priori* of the criminological enterprise'.[378] According to Young, for the realists, the criminal is a shadowy, under-theorised actor, instead 'the victim offers up the finality of reality, the term that secures and determines the value of the real'.[379]

Similarly Vincent Ruggiero (1992) critiqued Matthews and Young for not adequately considering the impact of their own actions and presence in

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[375] Matthews and Young, 'Reflections on Realism', 19.
[376] Young, *Imagining Crime*, 53.
[377] Young, 53.
[378] Young, 54.
[379] Young, 51.

the field, especially in defining terms for those surveyed.[380] He joked that they had currently figured the 'triangle of crime', as they relied on victims to furnish them with details of both offender and victim, and suggested that if the realists continued with their model it should be reformulated reflexively as a pentagon, with the fifth vertex being occupied by the 'criminologists' currently invisible in this work.[381] Jock Young claimed that the 'square of crime' was a 'deconstruction'[382] of crime, but as Pat Carlen argued, simply choosing smaller units for analysis, 'but not an analysis which might subvert the common-sense meaning' of crime, is a misunderstanding of the practice of deconstruction.[383] Carlen also wondered why the left realists insisted that to be valid, theories should be unitary and not partial, adding that one of greatest contributions to criminology was the symbolic interactionists' insistence that law-breaking and criminalisation are separate processes.[384] This can be seen in the different ways that law is applied at all points of contact with the Criminal Justice System, dependent on the segmentation of molar and molecular lines effecting race, class and gendered identities. Thinking about crime as an assemblage, as I propose, maintains the partiality and mutability of these

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[380] Vincenzo Ruggiero, 'Realist Criminology: A Critique', in *Rethinking Criminology: The Realist Debate*, ed. Roger Matthews and Jock Young (London ; Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1992), 128.

[381] Ruggiero, 136.

[382] Young, 'Ten Points of Realism', 27.

[383] Pat Carlen, 'Criminal Women and Criminal Justice: The Limits to, and Potential of, Feminist and Left Realist Perspectives', in *Issues in Realist Criminology* (London ; Newbury Park, Calif: SAGE, 1992), 59.

[384] Carlen, 59.

processes. An instance of an assemblage can be provisionally and imaginatively mapped – this is what I aim to do in some of my compositions. However, it cannot be definitively diagrammed.[385]

Keen to provide a causal theory of criminality within neoliberal societies which placed emphasis on individual choice and adaptation as well as societal conditions, the realists drew on Durkheimian social theories of 'anomie'[386] and 'relative deprivation' developed within the 'strain theory' associated with Robert K. Merton (1938)[387] and Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin (1960).[388] To explain how it is that *all* poor and working class people are not criminals, the realists cited relative rather than absolute deprivation as a core cause of crime. Accordingly, if a marginalised group 'has no desire to participate in the structure of opportunities and social rights from which it is excluded, frustration need not occur'.[389] Thus, it is those who are aware of suffering inequality (in Merton's terms those 'innovators' living by their own rules for success in an unequal society), who are most likely to commit crimes.

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[385] If someone were to develop a model assemblage or 'rhizome of crime' comprised of fixed elements, it would be the result of a lack of understanding of Deleuze and Guattari's concept.

[386] Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labour in Society [1893]*, ed. Steven Lukes (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

[387] Robert Merton, 'Social Structure and Anomie', *American Sociological Review* 3, no. 5 (1938): 672–82; Robert Merton, 'Anomie, Anomia and Social Interaction: Contexts of Deviant Behaviour', in *Anomie and Deviant Behaviour*, ed. Marshal B Clinard (New York: Free Press, 1964).

[388] Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin, *Delinquency and Opportunity* (New York: Free Press, 1960).

[389] Lea and Young, *What Is to Be Done about Law and Order?*, 218.

In Jock Young's (1999) *The Exclusive Society* he offers the most contextualised narrative of relative deprivation, linking it to the apparent upsurge in recorded crime between the 1960s and the mid-1990s. Firstly, he claimed that parallel to rising crime, British society had moved from a post-war inclusive state (1948-1960s) where the state assimilated difference, to an 'exclusive society' (1970s-2000s) where the state rejected difference, with the excluded committing a disproportionate amount of offences.[390] Secondly, Young argues that today relative deprivation has been transformed within advanced capitalism and is now not only a 'gaze upwards…but also a gaze downwards: it is dismay at the relative well-being of those who although below one on the social hierarchy are perceived as being unfairly advantaged',[391] i.e. those in receipt of state benefits such as the disabled and jobless. Finally, Young develops relative deprivation into a theory that links crime causally to consumer desire: capitalist consumerism becomes criminogenic,[392] working the mind of the individual who unrealistically desires what he can't possess. He argues that 'crime, whether street robbery or embezzlement, is rarely committed in order to reach the average median wage… they do so in order

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[390] Young's version of history downplays early 20th century racism, antisemitism, and homophobia in mainland Britain and its empire, to focus on the anxieties of his time about 'windrush' migration to the UK and the behaviour of the children of these migrants.

[391] Jock Young, *The Exclusive Society: Social Exclusion, Crime and Difference in Late Modernity* (London ; Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 1999), 9.

[392] In the words of Keith Hayward consumerism produces: 'new (and often destructive) emotional states, feelings and desires that contribute to the crime problem in a number of new and novel ways'. Hayward, *City Limits*, 158.

to excel in their affluence and to exult in their edge over all comers'.[393] Thus, relative deprivation 'morally constructs' the offender as a contemptible, hyper-individualistic, would-be consumer, embodying a 'chilling… logic of immediate gratification in the pursuit of consumer goods, or of instant status and recognition'.[394] The criminal here is figured as a calculating and therefore 'responsibilisable'[395] individual.

In Majid Yar and Sue Penna's (2004) critique of *The Exclusive Society*, they argue that Young implicitly recuperates the theoretical and methodological characteristics of positivism, which he had consistently attacked as a flawed approach.[396] Young does this via his 'dependence on empirically apparent patterns in offending as the basis for developing a causal hypothesis to explain said behaviour'.[397] Young takes these crime statistics and then mechanistically explains them with a hidden driver of action: generalised moral decline, punctuated by individual 'relative deprivation'. Yar and Penna claim Young's positivism is also evidenced by his continued reliance on Merton's sociology of deviance. Merton simply assumed that the working class really do commit more crime based on the shaky statistical evidence

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[393] Young, *The Exclusive Society*, 53.
[394] Elliott Currie and Philip C. Stenning, 'Social Crime Prevention Strategies in a Market Society', in *Criminological Perspectives*, ed. John Muncie, Eugene McLaughlin, and Mary Langan (London;Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1996), 348.
[395] O'Malley, 'Risk, Power and Crime Prevention'.
[396] Young, *The Exclusive Society*, 35. For an earlier critique of the left realists' implicit positivism see Smart, *Law, Crime and Sexuality*, 33–39.
[397] Majid Yar and Sue Penna, 'Between Positivism and Post-Modernity? Critical Reflections on Jock Young's The Exclusive Society', *British Journal of Criminology* 44 (2004): 538.

available in the 1930s. However, if the working class are statistically also more

likely to be stopped, arrested and charged, the explanation looks like

'taxonomical essentialism'[398] commensurate with Quetelet and positivist

statistics. Young argued that Merton was not a positivist because he located

the causes of crime in *culture* rather than solely socio-economic conditions; he

rejected poverty as a sufficient (socio-economic) cause for crime, adding a

further (cultural) condition that in combination could 'objectively' explain

crime.[399] This is precisely what Young does with his formula that 'crime occurs

where there is cultural inclusion and structural exclusion.[400] As I discussed in

chapter one, Deleuze and Guattari warn us against 'believing that a little

suppleness is enough to make things 'better'.… fine segmentations are as

harmful as the most rigid of segments'.[401] Young's shift in talking about crime-

prone races[402] to the language of 'excluded criminogenic subcultures' fits the

form of what Martin Baker and Anne Beezer called the 'new racism': a shift

from speaking about problematic racial and social groups to talking about

problem cultures.[403] This shift has not seen the diminution of the threat of the

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[398] 'Taxonomical essentialism' refers to a process where only elements with a particular property (in this case members of the working class) are included in a group (detained by police), then the property (of being working class) is used as the 'essence' of crime.
[399] Yar and Penna, 'Between Positivism and Post-Modernity? Critical Reflections on Jock Young's The Exclusive Society', 539–41.
[400] Young, *The Exclusive Society*, 81.
[401] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 237.
[402] In 1984, Lea and Young mused on the perplexing '"ethnic factor" intrinsic to the ethnic minorities themselves' within crime rates that did not fully relate to socio-economic conditions. Lea and Young, *What Is to Be Done about Law and Order?*, 160.
[403] Barker, *The New Racism*; Martin Barker and Anne Beezer, 'Scarman, Brixton and Racism', *International Socialism (ISJ)* 2, no. 18 (1983): 108–25.

racial other in assemblages of crime, merely a change of language and the flexing of a more subtle set of social codes.

Despite the death of Jock Young in 2013, key figures continue to forward the left realist analysis,[404] and it is still taught as a canonical approach within British further education in sociology and criminology.[405]

As another sign of its abiding power we may recall the strange alignment with realist criminology of Lois Presser's 'narrative criminology', as discussed in chapter two.

Conclusion: The Criminologist as Spokesperson

In presenting selected scenes from the early life of criminology and showing how they inhere in the more recent manifestations of the discipline, I am playing with the form of 'enforced narratives'[406] – producing a story of criminology which whilst it may have some truth to it, but is necessarily partial. As I made clear in my first chapter, criminology is a complex, diverse

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[404] See for example Matthews, *Realist Criminology*; John Lea, 'Left Realism: A Radical Criminology for the Current Crisis', *International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy* 5, no. 3 (2016): 53–65; Burke, *Criminal Justice Theory*. Taking a somewhat different route via the Lacanian psychoanalysis of Slavoj Žižek, Steve Hall and Simon Winlow advocate an 'ultra-realism'. Steve Hall and Simon Winlow, *Revitalizing Criminological Theory: Towards a New Ultra-Realism* (London : New York: Routledge, 2015).

[405] Left realism remains a core topic within IB, AS and A Level Sociology syllabi, where it is presented as a recent and influential criminological approach. For example, see this content guide for teachers of the AQA AS and A Level in Sociology, unit 4.3.1: 'Crime and Deviance' http://www.aqa.org.uk/resources/sociology/as-and-a-level/sociology/teach/teachers-guide.

[406] Steedman, 'Enforced Narratives: Stories of Another Self'.

and developing discipline and I have chosen to make an intervention in spaces where I think my assemblage of crime can produce something interesting or challenging. I have shown criminology's complicity with the aims of government both in its initial development as a science, the 'dark figure', and later the production of citizens who identify as potential victims of crime. However influential these versions of the criminologist have been, this is not a universal characterisation of the criminologist. In my assemblage of the criminologist as character, certain problematic features appeared more clearly (like the central zone of one of Galton's composite photographs) and stratified, such as:

A tendency to treat crime as if it had an independent reality in the world. Whilst seeking to scientifically eliminate crime, ironically preserving crime through criminology's disciplinary focus. An outright conflation of, or an associative slippage between, the diverse things classed as crimes, legitimising the production of general theories, unified approaches to dealing with crimes, and the treatment of 'criminals' as a separate category of people. I argue instead that we must attend to the specificity of crime assemblages, and seek to understand how they are enmeshed in other social assemblages. Although many criminological approaches have attempted to generate social theories of crime, I argue that the isolation on crime as object of analysis over-determines criminology's perception of the social. Instead of thinking about

the key relationship relevant to criminology as being the breaching of the 'social contract' and individual law breaker, we might attend to the sociality of crime through the non-hierarchical organisation of the assemblage – as I have already commented, what else might the 'dark figure' of crime say about the criminality of society? In light of this, what kind of criminology is useful and to whom?

There is a tendency for the criminologist to be presented as one blessed with bold and insightful powers of crime detection and interpretation, and a lack of attention to how criminologists are involved in the production and translation of this data and thus the reality of crime. A faith in the ability of criminologists to assemble the 'whole truth' of crime reflects an overstatement of the criminologist's role in the assemblage of crime. As I explained in chapter one, assemblages always contain a virtual *excess*, and crime is being assembled differently from different positions in the assemblage. To return to the idea of researcher as 'spokesperson', I am not suggesting that researchers should not make interpretive claims, or bid to speak on behalf of other human and non-human actors. However, we must always recognise that our position is partial, and produced from our position within intersecting social assemblages. Thus, in place of a whole truth, I offer 'partial truths'[407] and experimentation. As such

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[407] James Clifford, 'Introduction: Partial Truths', in *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography: A School of American Research Advanced Seminar*, ed. James Clifford and George E. Marcus (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).

we can produce interesting, compelling and illuminating accounts of crime, but these are always in process and never finally decided.

I note a strong tendency to treat crime as de facto morally wrong and socially damaging, rather than as diverse products of social life. This places an imperative on the criminologist to take a morally disapproving position on crime and the criminal (or criminalised), and to prioritise theories which suggest how crime might be curtailed. This has the result of privileging interventionist approaches based on a commitment to eradicating crime, a downplaying of harms which are not criminalised, or a drive to criminalise such harms. Whilst not denying that crime can produce effects that are harmful and affects which are negative, an uncoupling of crime from evil allows one to observe the implicit affective dimension at play in the normative conceptualisation of crime as a terrible and fearful thing, and certain actors such as criminologists and police (as we shall see in chapter four) tasked with engaging with it on behalf of the rest of society.

There is a tendency to stabilise and stratify part of the assemblage – whether this is statistical findings or people's accounts of crime or victimisation – and then to produce causal explanations for this stabilised feature, now presented as fact rather than as an effect produced through specific forms of translation. When technologies produce surprising outcomes or 'fail' there is still a hope that in future the data will be more complete in its explanatory powers. My

approach recognises the productive agency of technologies as part of assemblages of crime, but is neither technologically determinist, nor naïve as to how these technologies come to be prominent under certain conditions.

As will now be clear I do not think total knowledge of crime is possible, but I do value the *complication* of, and destabilisation of, stratified elements of the crime assemblage through the involvement of actors often excluded from the assemblage (except insofar as they are subject to it), particularly those who have experienced criminalisation. This is against the tendency within criminology to construct a general theory of crime based on a narrow sample of the usual suspects, to continue the practice of socially 'looking down' and to produce a 'criminology of the "other."'[408] As I hope to demonstrate throughout this thesis, rather than aporia, the spaces of contradiction and ambiguity that emerge through the inclusion of those who are long present as the objects of criminological knowledge, but largely excluded as actors, is vital to the construction of a morally nuanced theory of crime and criminalisation.

In this chapter I have reviewed a sample of criminological literature, producing a portrait of how the criminologist invents crime and the criminal. In the following chapter I look at how a specific actor, engaged in the entertainment industry and professional police work, produces his version of

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[408] Garland, *The Culture of Control*, 137.

crime. This chapter is based on empirical work and as part of this will reflect

on issues of research ethics and collaboration.

Chapter Four: Looking Like a Policeman: Representation, Ethics and Making Things Visible.

<u>Establishing Shot</u>

Chapter three showed how criminologists claim to 'know' crime through the development of a variety of disciplinary methods. It critiqued the positivism and essentialism underlying different criminological constructions, and used the metaphorical 'dark figure' of crime to exemplify the creative ambiguity and affectivity that I argued operates within criminology.

This chapter continues the approach of my thesis in demonstrating how a specific actor produces his version of crime. 'Craig Campbell'[409] is a white, Scottish man in his late 30s, who runs a successful, growing business based in the south of England, supplying police costumes, props and specialist police actors to the television and film industries. In addition to playing police on screen, and working as a policing consultant for these industries, Craig claims to be a serving police officer.

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[409] "Craig Campbell" is a pseudonym. I interviewed him in 2013. All unreferenced quotations are from this interview or subsequent conversations with Craig. All Craig's film and television appearances are similarly anonymised.

Our hero leans on a rail of military jackets, the camera is tilted upwards, an upturned face. The camerawoman (me) is bracing it at chest height, and struggling to keep its motion still. Craig looks into my eyes and says:

> Had it been mainstream BBC or ITV that asked me to do an interview then I wouldn't have done it, because it'd be shown too many places where it might be seen by the wrong people. But [he nods at me] different situation so that's alright. But no, I agree that whatever I think I'll give an opinion on. I mean… I'm not going to go out of my way to tell you on camera that policing's wrong, but I do point out that there are aspects that could get changed.

Pause.

Initially I had intended to find and interview an actor who specialised in playing police officers after a costume designer told me that such actors tend to bring their own costumes, and behave on set like they're real police. However, as I was setting up the camera in his warehouse, Craig, the consenting actor, claimed that he knew all about me, and my alleged hostility to police. He added that not only did he dress like a police officer on camera, he was also 'a real cop'. Craig wouldn't give me details of his force, rank or role, but claimed he was a weapons expert, and killer dog handler. I was shocked, defensive and not prepared for this revelation but improvised new questions based on a provisional acceptance that Craig was telling me the truth about his two jobs.

Craig was quite candid in his criticisms of policing. We talked for three hours, and whilst I filmed much of the exchange there were certain things he was careful to tell me only off-camera. As the comment relayed above suggests, Craig was aware of his role as a gatekeeper to the worlds of policing and entertainment and implied that he could speak to me with some openness *because* of my lack of status. Initially looking back through my video footage I was seduced by the possibility that despite his efforts to control the encounter, Craig might have underestimated how revealing the interview had been, and I might be able to use my film to show a policeman ruminating awkwardly on his privileged social role. I hoped that this filmed portrait of Craig would expose some contradictions in the practice of policing and producing crime.

After our interview Craig signed a standard documentary film release form, which gave me full rights to make and screen the film that I desired as long as I kept Craig informed as to my plans. I initially made an edit of the film that Craig approved in 2014. However, in 2015 when I got back in contact about an opportunity to publically screen the film, he sent me a series of emails asking for an increasing number of aspects to be censored. First the guns, and his sexist joke, and next the company name and his views on policing, then his feelings about his job, and finally his face. I experimented with anonymising Craig in various unsatisfying ways. To obscure his face I zoomed in to his mouth, becoming furious with the disembodied organ. When he emailed me

again to request that I disguise his voice too I knew that the film was no longer feasible.

This chapter restages some fragments of this 'lost' film, *Cop Show* (2014), and connects them to scholarship on social order to bring out the texture of Craig's version of crime and the social. Rather than cut all reference to the film and interview out of my PhD, which I felt would be a loss of valuable material relating to how police actors assemble crime, I have 'translated' the film into the purely textual form of this chapter. In order to try and retain something of the texture of the earlier work, parts of the chapter takes the form of a filmless film: an edited sequence of words, sometimes grouped into shots, or interrupted by an image from 'outside', in reference to the original.[410] Of course, what I am presenting here is different to that film, and works differently to produce its effects and affects. Much of what the film achieved, especially in terms of 'showing not telling', cannot be reproduced in its new form as a thesis chapter. I cannot textually replicate the way that the film captured Craig performing policing as a unique social role of which wearing the police uniform was only a part. Returning to Deleuze and Guattari's concept of 'faciality' which I introduced in chapter one, Craig's face is absolutely essential to his successful functioning as police. This is not to claim

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[410] I call this a filmless film rather than a film script because unlike a script my text weaves in academic references, camera shots etc. A film script is used as the basis for a work to be realised in film, whereas this text stands in for and tries to capture a lost film work.

that the face he presents is 'real', or that the police do not play with masking, secrecy or surveillance, but being able to embody the law entails being able to successfully mobilise the (non-individualised) face of a police officer. This was apparent even in our interview, for example in the way his face was mobilised to enthusiastically relate stories of gritty 'front line' experiences of crime and criminality, and how he subtly physicalised the decision not to answer some of my questions because such things are not for me to know.

I am not suggesting that the earlier film captured our encounter more 'realistically', but rather that the medium of film expressed the event in a different way to an academic text. I valued the film for its potential to engender a nuanced audience reading of how police might perform and rationalise their social power. It is frustrating to lose my earlier film work. However, this new textual presentation functions as a compromise within the bounds of sociological research ethics regarding ongoing informed consent and anonymity. This translation ties to my discussion in chapter two of the ethics of my literary compositions as a kind of inventive process of anonymisation which aims to be able to give a sense of the hidden material without exposing others.

In this chapter I analyse my research encounter with Craig and the version of crime it produced, which I treat as uniquely the product of the intersections of his doubled professional role. I didn't interview others

involved either in the entertainment industry or policing, because my aim here is not to 'scale up' from Craig's account to make broader claims about policing or fictional representations of police. Nevertheless, if we recall my discussion of subjectivity in chapter two, Craig is not an individual 'island' but rather an assemblage produced by the intersections of different social processes. As such, by first attending to the detail and complexity of the data generated in this encounter, we can then follow the lines that shaped my research encounter with Craig outwards with the aim of thinking about these social processes themselves.

The chapter is structured in two 'takes' on different themes connected to this research. The first section of take one, 'looking like a policeman', focuses on Craig's account of professionally impersonating a police officer on camera. The second section, 'looking, *like* a policeman', focuses on how Craig perceives and characterises crime. In take two of this chapter I start by recounting the discussion Craig and I had of his use of 'police discretion', which is the police's power to define crime through their practice of reporting and recording incidents. I expand on the theme of police discretion to think about the role of discretion and consent in sociological research. As such, I will address the ethical and affective aspects of research, especially in projects such as this, which has involved ongoing informed consent and visual research methods.

Two questions I consider are, what would it look like to make Craig's conflicted position visible? And, as I asked in chapter two, what do we think our work makes intelligible? Read together, the two parts of the chapter add up to a parable about power, representation, ethics and ambiguity in both contemporary policing and sociological research.

Take One: Looking Like a Policeman

In his warehouse Craig is dwarfed by a sea of thick, black woollen coats, embroidered hierarchy badges and reflective plastics. His relationship to the costume is sensual and affective; he fusses with a collar, he trains my camera on a detail. He can't put into words why he likes the uniform so much, but recalls that when he was a child and saw a policeman walk past he was awed by the sight. Suggestively, at our meeting he is immaculately dressed in a Superdry branded double breasted pea coat which, with its embossed buttons, epaulettes and motif on the arm, is entirely in-style with police uniform.

Cut to:

Archival footage: a child's face gazing up at a kindly 'British Bobby', he places his helmet on her tiny head and she giggles in delight.

My first choice of film as a medium reflected the performativity and visuality of policing as a practice. In shared public space the police are highly visible symbols of law and order, and signify their special powers partly through their uniform and through professional behaviours such as their gait and vocabulary. One might further consider the contrast between the fear of 'criminals' passing unmarked in the street that I discussed in chapter three, and the hyper-visibility of police officers on the streets. I suggest that the sense that police have social powers which demand they should be immediately legible as such is attested to by public disgust about the widespread deployment of undercover officers. Police have a strong mimetic pull, and British popular culture is an archive of images of police,[411] often combining aspects of the authoritarian, excessively proper, or comically fastidious[412] with the violent and sordid. Craig claims that his fellow police are not only aware of but fascinated by these popular fictions of policing, which feed into how they see their profession. Diverse studies of professional 'police culture'[413] and

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[411] For example: BBC television series *Dixon of Dock Green* (1955-1976); Smiley Culture's hit song *Police Officer* (1984); Irving Welsh's novel *Filth* (1998); ITV's *Broadchurch* (2013-2017).

[412] In his definition of the comedic, Henri Bergson suggested that the joke or laughter 'corrects' the absurdity of seeing 'something mechanical encrusted upon the living', of which I offer the officious policeman as an excellent example. See Henri Bergson, *Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic* (Champaign, Ill: Book Jungle, 2008).

[413] I am not employing the term 'police culture' in the sense of policing having an "authentic" or innate culture. Instead, if it is existent, police culture is a set of performative practices that produce policing in a mutating, but often repeating form. 'Police Culture' is a concept that was developed from the study of the 'working personality' of the policeman in Jerome Herbert Skolnick, *Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic Society* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966). Although Skolnick doesn't use the term 'performative', he is not talking here of 'personality' as something innate or psychological, but rather as a performance encompassing some shared vocabulary, jokes, references, informal and formal

attitudes to work have echoed the findings of Simon Holdaway,[414] that many

officers divide their role between 'real' police work such as making arrests,

fighting crime or solving a case, and 'rubbish' police work: i.e. desk work and

administration. 'Real' police work is more likely to be depicted in fictional

representations of policing for obvious reasons, which in turn fuels

expectations of what meaningful police work should be for both police and

the general public. Thus, 'real' police work becomes a 'source of satisfaction

and frustration'[415] within the more mundane reality of officers' work.[416]

Medium close-up, Craig confides to camera:

> I don't enjoy my job any more, I've done it 10 years… I am *not* a bobby on the
>
> beat, I am in a specialist branch, not special branch but a 'specialist' branch,
>
> but yeah, I think I get my enjoyment out of doing things like this, and in a
>
> sense being respected for what I know police wise from TV and film crews
>
> who actually don't have a clue about it… Now that to me is what I should be
>
> doing my job but I can't do that because I am at a level where the management
>
> dictates to us what we do and not the other way around.

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procedures, etc. See also Robert Reiner, *The Politics of the Police*, 2nd ed (New York ; London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), 107–37.

[414] Simon Holdaway, *Inside the British Police: A Force at Work / Simon Holdaway.* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983).

[415] John Van Maanen, 'Kinsmen in Repose: Occupational Perspectives of Patrolmen', in *Policing A View From The Street*, ed. Peter K Manning and John Van Maanen (Santa Monica, Ca: Goodyear Publishing Company, 1978), 121–22.

[416] Peter K. Manning, *Police Work: The Social Organization of Policing / Peter K. Manning.* (Cambridge, Mass. ; London: MITPress, 1977).

Despite Craig's frustration with his policing career, he recognises that his ability to be credible as an authentic, authoritative 'police consultant' in film and television is dependent on him remaining a serving police officer rather than just a policing enthusiast. His insider knowledge is the element that gives his business a competitive advantage over other police costume hire outfits. Using his police contacts, Craig sources his uniforms and props from the same suppliers used by the police and is only licensed to have the uniforms on condition that they are used on closed theatrical sets. His warehouse unit is full of policing and military costumes including a carefully preserved costume once worn by 'Hard Man' Danny Dyer, scenes of crime props like white plastic suits and police tape, suitcases of fake money, three cars, body bags, riot shields etc. He also has imitation firearms, and tells me not to show them in my film as he's not meant to have them; in fact he signed an agreement that he'd already disposed of them. Craig is intensely conscious of his business as a potential security risk and casts himself as the responsible key holder tasked with protecting the contents of his lock up (the location of which is a secret). Most people would probably accept that a person wearing a police uniform was licensed to do so.[417] Craig comments:

[417] This trusting and deferential public attitude to police has been the basis for numerous cases of fraud successfully committed by people in fake uniforms, or claiming to be the police on the phone. The problem is widespread enough that most major police forces have public guidance about these scams on their websites.

this… is a hotbed for anyone who's a criminal. If this place gets broken into and the stuff goes missing, we've seen what's happened in London over the past few years with suicide bombers and that, all it takes is for someone to put that kit on, they look authentic because they're authentic uniforms, jump into a tube [train] and it's bye bye!

Cut to:

A peroxide blonde Javier Bardem in policeman's uniform stalking down the corridor of a moving London tube train, smiling cruelly while thinking of James Bond.

Craig describes the setting up of his company in terms of a heroic rescue mission, catalysed by the poor quality and sloppy costuming of police in TV and film productions. He stresses that 'being a serving officer I was disgusted at the uniform they were putting out, for me that was making police officers looks bad, it wasn't setting a good example of the UK police force'. Prioritising aesthetic concerns that mismatching uniforms or ill-fitting trousers cause grave damage to the image of policing, over concern about the impact of representations of police corruption or brutality, surprised and intrigued me. Craig dismissed police corruption as an inevitability in an organisation of such size, as there will always be a few 'bad apples', and he didn't think this damaged the reputation of the police. However, for Craig an

officer being poorly turned out seemed to symbolise more general decline.[418]

He spoke of his disgust at being asked to costume a plus-sized actor in police uniform, saying that the man shouldn't or wouldn't be allowed to serve in the police force.

Craig obviously possessed some curiosity about, or attraction toward the film and television industry, even before he got into the business of playing police on screen. He had competed in a popular televised game show some years ago, and I found footage on YouTube of him scrambling across a slippery inflatable assault course and plunging headfirst into water. This was when a co-contestant had suggested that he could get work in the industry as a 'police consultant': an on-set advisor about the accuracy of their representations of police. Consultancy led to acting roles, often, as he marvelled, better roles than trained actors get.

Cut to:

The 'Tom Cruise of Bollywood' approaches Craig on a train that has a bomb on board. Despite orders to evacuate all passengers for their own safety, something about the charisma of Bollywood's Cruise convinces Craig to throw protocol to the wind and allow him to attempt to dismantle the bomb.

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[418] One could think of this as equivalent to the broken window in Wilson and Kelling's famous thesis. Here the sight of a broken window anticipates (hidden) widespread neighbourhood decline. Kelling and Wilson, 'Broken Windows'.

And, Craig is normally so particular about absolute accuracy in the depiction of police procedure.

I ask Craig how he selects actors for police roles, he says:

> I tend to like people who look like police officers, now I know that's a stereotype 'cause police officers are all shapes and sizes, but someone who's got a stature about them, who holds themselves well.

I spin the camera around to myself in suggestion:

> You?! No, absolutely not!

Craig describes the professional background of the majority of the people he employs as serving or ex-police officers, security guards, prison guards, debt collectors and bouncers. Many of these people approach him personally for police roles. To me, this suggests a community of workers within the security industries heavily invested in a getting to act out their fantasies of social control. Fantasies perhaps not being fulfilled in their day jobs, which is interesting considering the cross-over with some aspects of policing in many security roles.[419] Indeed, we have seen the blurring of the boundaries between police and security workers brought on in part by the privatisation or

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[419] For accounts of security, private police, and community officers' frustrations and desire to be assimilated into a dominant police culture, see Mark Button, *Security Officers and Policing: Powers, Culture and Control in the Governance of Private Space* (Aldershot, England ; Burlington, VT: Routledge, 2006); Faye M. Cosgrove, '"I Wannabe A Copper": The Engagement of Police Community Support Officers with the Dominant Police Occupational Culture', *Criminology and Criminal Justice* 16, no. 1 (1 February 2016): 119–38.

outsourcing of police work to companies like G4S. The multiplying of authorised 'fake cops' on the street is a phenomenon of our times (for example volunteer Community Support Officers and dedicated antisocial behaviour patrol teams – both of which look almost identical to police but have ambiguous legal powers and less training). The behaviour, motivations and accountability of these agents is a source of public confusion and concern.[420]

The police's role has moral commitments which contain a potential for misuse with significant social impact. This dramatic potential is clear to TV writers who supply 'bad', compromised or conflicted cops for the audience to hate with gusto. The pleasure of such roles is not lost on Craig:

Cut to:

Essex Badboys #4 and Craig is playing a 'bent copper' who takes money from the gangsters for information, a 'good little role' he recalls. When I ask Craig

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[420] Public awareness of and anxieties about outsourcing and privatisation of policing crystallised in 2012 during the London Olympics, when security was outsourced to G4S, who later admitted that they were unable to cope with the job, leading the army to be brought in to fill security roles. Each police force has been different in their approach, but outsourcing police work to private firms has been increasing in recent years across a wide range of front-line and back room police functions. See Adam White, 'Post-Crisis Policing and Public–Private Partnerships: The Case of Lincolnshire Police and G4S', *The British Journal of Criminology* 54, no. 6 (1 November 2014): 1002–22; Adam White, 'The Politics of Police "Privatization": A Multiple Streams Approach', *Criminology & Criminal Justice* 15, no. 3 (1 July 2015): 283–99. Farcically, in 2016, five staff members in the control room of Lincolnshire Police, which had been outsourced to G4S since 2012, were suspended for making "prank 999 calls" to their own centre during quiet times to boost response time performance figures. Alan Travis, 'G4S Police Control Room Staff Suspended Over Claims of Bogus 999 Calls', *The Guardian*, 23 May 2016, sec. UK news, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/may/23/g4s-police-control-room-staff-suspended-claims-bogus-999-calls-lincolnshire-force.

if he considers himself an actor he claims: 'for me it isn't acting because it's just what I do in my daily life'.

I interrupt 'but you're not a dodgy cop so…'

He cuts back:

> but that's the beauty of it, because then you're the good guy at work trying to help people, but if you get a chance to go bad for a change you're like "yeah I'll have a bit of that!" Because you know it's not real. This one time I had to play a Scottish gangster, and I had this woman up by her throat, with a knife at her and I thought "this is great man!" because it is only… it is acting and it brings out a different side of you which you would never portray in real life… it's quite cool to see the other end, to see whether you could adapt to that situation.

'Phil, turn the camera off'.

Off-camera, Craig tells me that during police training he saw some 'terrible things' done by colleagues, especially to people in the backs of police vans. He doesn't give me details; after all, he did nothing to stop it. Craig's professional life as a police officer, and his ability to tell a good enough tale of the allegedly 'reformed' police, is haunted by the explicitly violent and piratical staging of masculinity that dominate both fictional and 'true crime' depictions of 20th century policing. Craig characterises this 'old school' *Life on Mars* style policing:

You could kick the shit out of somebody and nobody would care, no video cameras, no mobile phones… they were sexist to female officers, it was a very male dominated environment. But now you have to do everything by the book, you get put through training school, you've got to know the law, blah, blah, blah. Certainly back then it was we make up the rules as we go along… but it seemed to work didn't it!? Bring back old school policing I say! [he laughs]

I start laughing and say '*and* cut!'

Craig softly replies 'nah best not'.

Although he enthuses about getting to let off steam through playing bad cops on screen, Craig is reticent to hire non-police to play police officers. He suggests that an advantage of serving police playing police on camera is that they aren't excited by the costume because they wear it every day.[421] This seems an assiduous bid for representational control, in which only real police officers are responsible enough to represent police on film.

What I do find, because I have been a serving police officer, because I am a police officer is that if you've never been a serving officer and yet you want to be [does scare quotes] "an actor," the minute the uniform goes on you think you're a police officer for sure. I don't like to see that side because people get a bit of a power trip.

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[421] His comment implies that wearing their uniform does not excite police.

Ironically, Craig himself is dogged by rumours that he's not 'real' police. Fanning the flames of my own doubt he relates his anxiety about professional rivals who,

> find it amusing and think they'll get places because they slag me off and say "oh he's not a cop and he doesn't do this or that," well I don't care what they think to be honest, if they want to believe that they can believe it.

If you look like a policeman, and strongly and confidently claim to be a police officer in a non-policing scenario, many people would not ask for proof of identification, and would not be able to tell it from a forgery (indeed, I was too confused and embarrassed to ask Craig to see his ID). During our interview I wondered, perhaps Craig is not a police officer at all, but an imaginative civilian who has 'adapted' to being a police officer on set, where there is no one to challenge his authenticity. Alternatively Craig could be a police officer with a role or rank that gives him more limited experiences than those he claims to possess.

Whatever Craig's professional status regarding police work, in the world of film and television he has an assured status as an expert on policing which he feels his police role lacks. Beyond this desire for 'respect' and authority, that police like Craig should be strongly moved to influence fictitious representations of their profession is, I think, telling. Craig and his police associates are currently setting up a production company which will

make content by police, for police, and all the narratives will be policing themed. To return to my conceptualisation of crime as an 'assemblage', what is going on when police officers, who through their actions have a key role in defining deviance and crime, also seek to shape a broader section of the population's affective responses to policing through influencing screened representations of policing? To me, this is not recognising crime as a multiplicity, but rather seeking to multiply or proliferate a singular version of crime as the 'real' one. If policing is a kind of 'calling', to what ends is this directed? Has Craig, hampered by the changes in police protocol, moved further into the realm of fiction where no justification is needed because 'it's not real', and the valorisation of a more instinctive, affective policing is still largely unproblematic? I will return to this question at the end of the chapter.

Looking, *Like* a Policeman

Lunch time, film noir, a tense, string-section soundtrack.

Craig and I are in a petrol station shop. He could be wearing a fedora with his collar pulled up. Whilst selecting a sandwich from the fridge I notice that Craig is looking around suspiciously, narrowing his gaze to scrutinise both staff and customers. He undertakes a continual darting motion with his eyes. It is aggressive but comical. I feel embarrassed to be here with him; to me he looks like a drunk trying to appear sober, hoping to start a fight or to

steal a sandwich. I suspect that this whole scene (off-camera) is a performance

for my benefit.

Choosing to play along rather than ignore the previous scene, when we get

back in the car I ask him if he was 'scoping the joint'. He tells me it's impossible

to stop being a cop, impossible to be off duty, or to truly retire, if you (like

Craig) have developed 'a nose for trouble'. I ask him what he thinks of

vigilantes. He says, 'they're brilliant! Makes life more interesting ey?!'

This is Craig performing 'natural police', as in David Simon's American

television drama *The Wire*: the cop with an instinctive talent for sniffing out

and solving crimes. This is policing performed as a calling and type of

intelligence, as an experience which forever changes you, sensitises you to

illegalities and affray, bringing your life close to danger in the process.[422] The

popular literary genre of police-penned memoir[423] establishes a history of the

officer as a privileged actor in the assemblage of crime, a purveyor of tales in

'gritty' realist style, re-producing the frontline between criminal and civilised

society. Craig reflects:

It's like I've got a sixth sense for - I know something's going to happen here,

so I go. Or something's going to happen on the street. Like before it happens

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[422] This is another feature of how Reiner defined 'cop culture' Reiner, *The Politics of the Police*, 107–37.

[423] For example: Edwin Brock, *The Little White God* (London: Pan Books, 1965); Harry Daley, *This Small Cloud* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988); Inspector Gadget, *Perverting the Course of Justice: The Hilarious and Shocking Inside Story of British Policing* (Rugby: Monday Books, 2008).

I can tell something's going to happen, not like being psychic but you've seen it that much for yourself… I do switch off, but I can always tell when something bad is going to happen. And it's not bad cause when I'm out here with my mates, I'm with a bunch of cops anyway [he laughs].

I joke: 'undercover cops!'

He says: 'you'll find us in the strip bar! …When we're off duty we like to have some fun'.

It strikes me that the fun Craig has in the strip club is greatly enhanced by his being able to utter the words at a crucial moment (as he did to me): 'I'm actually a cop'.

But is he?

After our interview I discussed the encounter with a number of different people, in the process becoming increasingly unsure about the veracity of Craig's claim to be a police officer. Some of my politically-left friends were horrified that I had interviewed a police officer, even unintentionally. A few weeks after the interview Craig told me by email that he was in London doing some 'special weapons training'. This was the week of the public inquiry into Mark Duggan's fatal shooting by a police sniper that had catalysed rioting across England in the summer of 2011. Craig had told me he was a sniper and weapons expert, and I found myself obsessively looking for him in the photographs of the officers outside the court room

(zooming in to look at one face in particular which seemed similar to his). Eventually I emailed to ask him whether he'd been at the inquiry, which he denied. This moment of online investigation for Craig's image was in a sense, a continuation of the way I had been searching through the archives of video hosting websites for fragments of films featuring Craig to use in *Cop Show*. Through doing the visual research for the film I had got accustomed to looking for Craig and finding him.

I next undertook an unsuccessful freedom of information request to try to find out whether Craig was genuinely a police officer.[424] My behaviour at this time resembled lonely and slightly paranoid private detective work, a testament to how unsettling I found the research encounter in ways I couldn't yet articulate. At this point in the project I wanted the power of saying to Craig, as he had said to me, 'I know all about you'. I was angry, and wanted to make him feel as apprehensive as I had felt when he locked us alone together inside his warehouse 'for security'. I felt like I needed to put together the details and make complete picture of Craig. To un-mask him, and laugh off his policing stories as those of a fantasist. These are not noble feelings to confess. My desires at that point recall Foucault's introduction to Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus* where he cautions against 'the fascism in all of us, in

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[424] Unsuccessful because enquiries about third parties are ineligible for civilian enquiry. I undertook the request in January 2014.

our heads, and in our everyday behaviour'.[425] Ironically, at the moment where I desired most to 'fix' Craig, in some way, I myself was becoming more like 'him', or at least more like my idea of a police detective, in investigating him behind his back. I will work through the ethical implications of this later in the chapter.

Take Two: Exercising Discretion

In part two of this chapter I will start by recounting Craig's philosophy of 'police discretion', which is their professional power to define crime in everyday life through their practices of attention, reporting and recording incidents. I then develop the theme to think about discretion and exposure in sociological research. As such, I aim to address the ethical and affective aspects of doing collaborative but critical research.

Although Craig performs policing as an integral part of his identity that has lastingly changed the way he views and 'reads' social space, he is frustrated by what he sees as changes within policing. When I ask Craig for an example of these negative changes, he says:

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[425] Michel Foucault, 'Preface', in *Anti-Oedipus : Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (London: Continuum, 2004), xiv–xv.

before, you'd do it then you'd face the consequences: "well I thought I was right, I did it to the law, and I can justify it, and I'll stand up in court and I'll prove it." *Now*, you don't actually get to that stage you have to *think* what you're doing before you do it, before you get to the consequences, which to me is not policing.

To have the legal assurance to act instinctively, and then justify your actions with the support of the justice system, is an expression of considerable social power.[426] The police's decision-making powers to judge whether or not to follow police procedure, and when to uphold the law in different situations, is an aspect of 'police discretion'.[427] Discretion might be used to determine whose car to pull over, or when a domestic abuse incident doesn't warrant further action, or whether an instance of verbal abuse is a hate crime. This power to exercise the law dependent on how one interprets the situation rather than apply it uniformly, points to the function of ambivalence and affectivity within police power. As in my earlier discussion of criminologists' crime constructions, police assemblages of crime are staged within a cushion of ambiguity. As I will show, for Craig, police culture – as a mobile set of

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[426] This power is reinforced by the lack of successful prosecutions for serious issues such as deaths in police custody or after contact with the police. No officer has been successfully prosecuted in the UK on this charge since 1969.

[427] Discretion practiced primarily by rank-and-file officers on the street has been the subject of sociological fascination since the 1960s as an alleged hierarchical inversion of power. See, for example, James Q. Wilson, *Varieties of Police Behaviour : The Management of Law and Order in Eight Communities* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968).

professional norms and expectations – has a role in shaping his account of discretion.

I argue that police have an often-underestimated role in the 'front line' definition of crime and deviance through their practice of discretion, which works to naturalise the criminalisation and social exclusion of those seen as different or socially deviant. That discretionary powers are often ambiguously represented to and inconsistently employed against those detained, and that male ethnic minorities are unlawfully targeted in such stops,[428] is one of the key points of engagement in many social justice projects that criticise policing.[429] If we recall my discussion in chapter one of Deleuze and Guattari's theory of social inscription put forth in *A Thousand Plateaus*, we might illustrate the rigid 'molar' lines of social segmentation which mark out our bodies on the street with the action of identifying a police officer, or a youth;

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[428] According to StopWatch, the MET and City of London forces 'Black people were stopped and searched at just over 4 times the rate of white people across London in 2016/17, a slight increase on the previous year. Mixed people were searched at almost twice the rate of whites, Asians were searched at marginally higher rates than whites, and people from Chinese or Other backgrounds were searched at a slightly lower rate than whites. There is greater disproportionality under section 60, a suspicionless power which has been increasing in use across London in recent years. Black people are searched at almost 5 times the rate of whites and mixed people at almost one and a half times the rate of whites. Asians and people from Chinese or Other ethnicities were searched at far lower numbers to make any calculations meaningful. The raw numbers indicate that there were a total of 392 searches across London with 155 searches of whites, 150 of black people, 16 of Asians, 14 of mixed people, and 4 of people from Chinese or other backgrounds.' StopWatch, 'Metropolitan Police Stop and Search Statistics', StopWatch, accessed 29 May 2018, http://www.stop-watch.org/your-area/area/metropolitan.

[429] For example, the London based organisations StopWatch, Newham Monitoring Group, Netpol, The Monitoring Group. StopWatch.

and to the (often more dangerous) supple molecular line, offer police discretion as an illustration. In defence of discretion Craig claims:

> to me, discretion is the best tool a police officer has, because if I met you for example, and maybe you were doing something trivial – I don't know what happened to you the day before, or that morning, you could have lost a parent, you could have found out something [bad] had happened. So you've got to be, a police officer should be cautious in everything he does. Then the other side is, but if it's not so trivial and it is a serious matter you've got to be hard, you've got to be stern and set an example. So with things that are trivial I would be wanted to use discretion, or "words of wisdom" shall we say, rather than chastising them for something trivial.

Here, Craig characterises practicing discretion as combining anticipatory empathy, moral superiority and a demand for respect as an officer and a human being. Rehearsing but adding a further condition to the 'golden rule', he says 'I treat somebody the way I would like to be treated myself, until they step out of line or do something I deem inappropriate'. He gives the example of swearing at an officer as a case of inappropriate behaviour that cannot be tolerated and legitimises a switch to 'hard' policing. As a member of a dominant social group and the state's civil force, Craig might tend to recognise only certain persons and practices as being socially tolerable.

As Wendy Brown argues, the political discourse of liberal 'tolerance', in which the dominant 'normal' position decides what is socially tolerable

within the practices of a 'deviant' marginal minority, acts as a process of Foucauldian 'governmentality'.[430] Brown describes the indeterminate status of tolerance as a political value tied to moral 'virtue' but not enshrined as law:

> within secular liberal democratic states… tolerance functions politically and socially, but not legally, to propagate understandings and practices regarding how people within a nation, or regimes within an international system, can and ought to cohabit.[431]

As I noted in my discussion of Deleuze and Guattari's concept of faciality in chapters one and three, faciality is a social machine which functions to produce *provisional* inclusions or tolerance under conditions, and not just binary inclusion/exclusion.[432] By his own account, there is not much that a person needs to do under his gaze to warrant an intolerant response from Craig. However, he adds:

> I do try to do it nicely. I've been there myself, singing in the street, pissed at night, we've all done it, we've all been kids. It's not just the "youth of today" I've done it, my old boy done it, it goes back generations.

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[430] By 'governmentality' Foucault means the historical development and contemporary operation of an ensemble of institutions and practices that take a complex form of power which targets populations, is guided by political economy and employs apparatuses of security (for example police) to these ends. Michel Foucault, 'Governmentality', in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 201–22. Brown reworks Foucault's concept of governmentality to encompass an account of how states enlarge their political power, see 'Chapter 4' Wendy Brown, *Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire* (Princeton, N.J. ; Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2006).

[431] Brown, *Regulating Aversion*, 11.

[432] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 197.

This suggests that what Craig terms the empathy which guides his practice of police discretion would be primarily attuned to cultural practices which he recognises from his own autobiographical experience and those of his fellow police officers. This is the problem of a politics of recognition based on validation and acceptance of the same rather than of difference as hybridity or mutating practices: in Craig's case, this means tolerating other young, white men who like to have a 'bit of fun' that sometimes gets out of hand. Craig recognises the 'complex personhood'[433] of people who seem like him, people who he sees as being capable of regaining self-control.

(An echo) Craig says: 'you'll find us in the strip bar! ...When we're off duty we like to have some fun'.

I will now turn the camera back on myself, and reflect on what practicing discretion might mean as a researcher. Firstly, I am not claiming equivalence between Craig's social status as a police officer and mine as a doctoral student. I also recognise that the meaning of the term police discretion, as I have defined it, is very different to the kinds of discretion that might be practiced by researchers. However, if one thinks about discretion as the power to authoritatively define situations, it behoves researchers to reflect

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[433] Gordon, *Ghostly Matters*, 4.

on how we do this and why. Once more I reiterate Law and Urry's provocation: what kinds of world do we want to help make as researchers? [434]

As I stated at the start of this chapter, for me a key ethical consideration hovers around the question of what we think is becoming intelligible through our research, in other words, what are we (and our research participants) coming to know? When interacting with research participants with high social status such as police, it's easy to imagine that, vigilante-like, we, the lowly researchers, can dig through the ambiguity of the interviewee's self-presentation and construct a 'truth' about that person that complicates or negates their apparent status. I was certainly guilty of seeking this pleasure at one point in this project, which was to delude myself that the social harm done in the name of policing legitimised and outweighed any harm I might cause Craig by researching him. Maintaining his professional life relies upon Craig being able to mine his own authenticity, and as such his status is vulnerable. I eventually found a picture of Craig online; he is indeed carrying a siseable gun and has a dog running at his side. Craig works/worked as a police guard of an ex-nuclear site, his marginal status within the police perhaps explaining why he was sheepish about his comments on policing becoming public.

Producing work in an ethical way demands that my research doesn't conceivably harm Craig. The film didn't work without his face to anchor and

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[434] John Law and John Urry, 'Enacting the Social', *Economy and Society* 33 (2004), 391.

animate it, but I couldn't use images of his body or a record of his voice without exposing him to unknown consequences. To use film as a method, especially in a project where you wish to take a critical or questioning stance towards the self-presentation of the film's subjects, is to invoke historical debates both about visual evidence and on the dissembling 'seductions' of film.[435] There is excellent video work that plays with these connotations without exposing its research participants, such as the doctoral project of Mohamad Hafeda, which uses various strategies of masking, omitting or substituting parts of the image and parts of sound.[436] However, I didn't want to make this film employing that particular aesthetic, so I translated my film into this chapter and created the character of 'Craig Campbell'. This activity of translating data in an effort to overcome a creative constraint (in this case one imposed by my ethical commitments) recalls the response of the assemblage/ rhizome in encountering a blockage or a break: 'a rhizome may be broken, shattered at a given spot, but it will start up again on one of its old lines, or on new lines'.[437] Wherever I have translated data it is because I judged there to be information there too valuable to be lost.

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[435] For an account of these debates see Knowles and Sweetman, 'Introduction', 12.

[436] For the artist's discussion of his work see: Mohamad Hafeda, 'Bordering Practices: Negotiating Theory and Practice', *Architecture and Culture* 4, no. 3 (1 September 2016): 397–409.

[437] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 10.

Despite the point in this process where I had wanted to 'fix' Craig, this project is ultimately not about 'unmasking' the truth. In undertaking this project about a subject who occupies a doubled role, my interest is not to claim or establish that one of Craig's versions of policing is more real than the other. Earlier in the chapter I noted that it was at the point of feverish detective work into Craig's claims that I myself was becoming-detective. What I mean by this relates to my discussion of practice as a Deleuze-Guattarian 'becoming-with' my research participants in chapter two. Here I suggested that following my understanding of subjectivity as performative and non-essential, researchers and research participants are constantly being constituted and reconstituted through our research encounters. In my understanding, research 'couplings'[438] can be violent and unequal, not necessarily benign.

If I was momentarily becoming-detective in the period after the interview, Craig had also momentarily been becoming-critic during our conversation. He correctly assumed that I was critical of policing practices before our interview and understandably worried that I could edit the film footage to fit my research agenda. However, he still seemed to take enormous pleasure in giving me an account of policing that placed him as a marginal and critical figure. In the dialogic space that we co-constituted through our conversation he was emboldened to criticise policing to me, an apparently

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[438] Lingis, 'The Society of Dismembered Body Parts'.

critical outsider. I suggest that it only afterwards whilst back within the fold of his strongly hierarchical and loyal police force that he wanted to bury his criticisms of policing, and possibly some of his claims about his role which were very likely exaggerated.

End Titles

In this chapter I have presented a version of crime produced in negotiation with a police actor, who occupies a privileged position in the assemblage of crime. For Craig the demarcation of crime is part of his professional repertoire of acts, and part of the moral burden of his job as a police officer. As such, he verbalises his own agency as something performative and special, reflecting his unique knowledge of society. His desire for more autonomy in exercising his decision making powers can be seen in his frustrations with his position within the police hierarchy and his pleasure in being a valued expert in the world of police-themed entertainment.

I suggest that the conceptualisation of the interplay between molar and molecular can help us think about Craig's attempt to proliferate his vision of policing via the screen and the street. He is moved by his work, and his sense of the social role of policing. He feels that policing is misunderstood, and is passionate about correcting the public image of policing. However he

recognises his limitations to affect this at the level of molar identity: i.e., as just one officer. Craig finds that working in film is a way of influencing audience's perceptions of policing, even if subtly along molecular lines of affectivity. He also uses the screen as a space to play a little with the role of 'bad cop', a role that he seemed to feel was increasingly being denied him in professional police work. Whilst among police his professional status may be less impressive than he might hope or claim, on set he is the ultimate authority on policing: he absolutely speaks *as* police. This chapter has demonstrated how crime assemblages are comprised of an intricate mesh of affects and practices, and how this is complicated with every new coupling of the assemblage – in this case with myself the researcher.

As such, it would be too neat a narrative to complain that my film fell victim to the power of an outside force, such as the inconstancy of Craig's consent or the university ethics panel. Instead, I hope that this compromised translation from film to written chapter has made visible the relations of power that are immanent to this kind of sociological enquiry. Reflecting on this troubling research encounter and on the translation of my film into text has allowed me to address issues of visibility, ethics, and creatively navigating consent with a privileged actor in the assemblage of crime. In our engagement through this research Craig has been largely successful in controlling his crime assemblage. His pleasure and confidence in performing

his narrative contrasts strongly with my research encounters with people who have experienced criminalisation. The following chapter (five) will also focus on a co-production of crime with an individual: Howard Slater. However, rather than occupying a privileged place in the assemblage of crime, as an ex-prisoner Howard has a very different status. Through thinking and talking together about the archive on imprisonment that Howard has assembled, this chapter will return to address enforced narratives and partial truths, translation, and the ethics of collaborative research.

Chapter Five: On the Roof of the Prison with Fist Raised to the Sky: Resisting Enforced Narratives of Crime and Punishment

<u>Introduction: The Creation of an Archive</u>

> Archives hold no origins… Rather, they hold everything *in medias res*, the account caught halfway through, most of it missing, with no end ever in sight.[439]

As Carolyn Steedman suggests, archives start their activity of accumulation in the middle of the action. Although there are no clear beginnings in the archive, it can itself act as a catalyst for something new – this chapter for example. This chapter composes a version of crime out of my encounter Howard Slater,[440] an ex-prisoner, and with the archive assembled by Howard.[441] In collaborating with someone who has experienced the effect of criminalisation, this was a very different experience from that discussed in the preceding chapter. In chapter four I reflected on the process of undertaking collaborative research with a police actor who was used to producing the version of crime which

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[439] Carolyn Steedman, 'Something She Called a Fever: Michelet, Derrida, and Dust', *The American Historical Review* 106, no. 4 (2001): 1175.

[440] Howard Slater is an artist, activist, archivist and writer. By happy accident I came across Howard's archive when I visited the Mayday Rooms, a radical archive based on Fleet Street, London in Summer 2015. Howard, the archivist, brought me an additional unrequested box of materials in which I found his personal archive which related both to time spent incarcerated (eight months in various prisons including Strangeways in the late 1980s) and a period after his release.

[441] I interviewed Howard in 2015. As stated earlier, I share in the perspective of prison abolitionists that prisons are *knowingly* places of harm which perpetuate social problems. In keeping with my other interviews, when speaking with Howard I didn't hide my position, instead allowing my own stance to be interrogated by him. All quotations come from my transcription of our recorded interview (31/07/15) unless otherwise stated.

suited his sense of society and morality with little resistance. Craig was confident that he could say what he wanted to in the moment, with the assurance that he could later redact any part of it. In contrast, my empirical work has shown that people who have been criminalised generously agree to work with me *despite* fearing that I may produce research that hurts them. As such, this chapter also seeks to perform a research ethics in a manner appropriate to the different stakes of involvement for myself and Howard as participants in this encounter. Howard's archive is a paper folder of uncatalogued photocopier-enlarged images of prisoners on roofs with raised fists, plus hand-written notes, typewritten letters and statements, newspaper clippings and other ephemera. This small, uncatalogued archive of images and texts speaks both to *collective* experiences of prison resistance and rebellion, and Howard's *individual* attempts to analyse and express his experiences of incarceration after his release from prison in the form of art and experimental writing. In this engagement with the archive and with Howard, I am not seeking to analyse him, or locate an origin, cause or explanation of his crime. Instead I am interested in his initiative in making the archive and in his experiments with translating experiences of incarceration into art, creative writing and an archive. I will argue that both Howard's archive, and my re-composition in this chapter, both allow crime to be apprehended as an assemblage: a purposive and political arrangement of materials.

This chapter is a composition built out of parts of our conversation (which I sometimes quote at length), Howard's archive, my own archive and ongoing research. The form of the chapter does not an attempt to mimic Howard's archive, either to capture its materiality as a collection, or to taxonomise its contents. However, interspersed throughout the chapter are risoprinted[442] images that I have made using a mixture of materials from Howard's archive and my own collection. These images dialogue with the text, and extend my argument about visualisation of punishment and resistance. My use of collage echoes both our discussion about working with collage and juxtaposition, and the layering of material in the archive.

There is a vast literature on archives, but archives per se and issues they raise around materiality, absences, or ownership are not my point of enquiry here. For example, important questions about a researcher's acts of interpretation, and claims about its materials, are in my case shaped as much by my relationship with the living Howard as the archive. Howard's archive is composed of things that interested him, or felt meaningful, and things he didn't want to throw away, or thought might interest someone else in future. Importantly, Howard created the archive as a shared resource – a point I will

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[442] I made the images on the risograph located at the Mayday rooms. Risoprinting is a cheap computer-based but pre-digital method of making images. The riso produces slightly uneven results, and its messy aesthetic is beloved of small artist publishing and activist groups. When I went to print, Rowan who helped me with the machine warned me that the red ink had run out – unsurprising in a radical archive!

return to. In keeping with my Deleuze-Guattarian framework, to think of the archive as an assemblage is necessarily to recognise the politics of its absences, not as deficits, but what makes the archive what it is. As I have argued in previous chapters, assemblages always contain an excess, they can be configured differently to produce different effects. This excess forecloses the possibility on one authoritative interpretation. In interviewing Howard it was not my intention to validate or challenge Howard's memory of events through cross-referencing his narrative with the archive, or official documents such as prison records. In keeping with my general approach, my interest is not in locating or claiming some kind of final 'truth', but rather in looking at the version of crime assembled through this encounter, and ultimately at the connections that can be made across the versions of crime produced through this project's research encounters.

This chapter asks - when is it possible for a criminalised person to have a face whilst producing a version of crime, and when is it safer for them to be masked (faceless) or (hooded) headless? In other words, how can we represent experiences of criminalisation without being fixed and facialised? Can we contemplate a criminalised subjectivity that is a multiplicity, and performative rather than defined by a perceived lack or deficiency? The structure of this chapter is as follows: I will begin by reintroducing the key concepts through which I am thinking through Howard's archive: Carolyn Steedman's

'enforced narratives',[443] 'faciality'[444] from Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, and practices of masking. I will discuss these via a couple of anecdotes from Howard's related experience. I will then move on to discuss Howard's collection of images of 'headless' men protesting on roofs, suggesting that they work to disjoint and delay facialisation. Next, I discuss Howard's translations of his experiences of being criminalised into art and experimental writing are a necessary process in the transmission of his stigmatised knowledge. I will conclude by arguing that the archive is the mask which least fixes and facialises Howard as criminal, not by denying his crime or experience of criminalisation, but by enabling him to place it within a wider context of experience and activism, that complicates a linear narrative of individual criminalisation.

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[443] Steedman, 'Enforced Narratives: Stories of Another Self'.
[444] I draw primarily on their account in 'Plateau 7, Year Zero: Faciality' in Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 185–211.

Enforced Narratives and Convict Criminology

As I have argued elsewhere in this thesis, my empirical research suggests that criminalised people have a more ambivalent approach to the moral stories of self that are shaped by the state's 'enforced narratives'.[445] Whilst agreeing that performing them might be personally beneficial or therapeutic, my research participants have explained that is it nevertheless part of their punishment to submit to learning to convincingly perform the required character of guilt, repentance and recovery. As Howard commented:

> The ones with the vested interests [in expressing their experiences of prison] would be the ones who've had that experience of transformation, are born again, like born again "normal," non-criminals! For them, maybe they're able to express it without that level of trauma or want to re-live it because for them, they've valorised the prison experience in becoming rehabilitated.

To return to Deleuze and Guattari's concept of 'facialisation' here, as Howard points out there is a socially acceptable or even laudable face that an ex-prisoner can fit: that of the 'born again', cured, penitent. An essential part of this is an affirmation that prison works to rehabilitate the criminal. Unsurprisingly there is a whole genre of confessional narratives of 'ex-cons' used in Conservative policy recommendations which emphasise the redemptive power of religion, self-discipline, and male role models in

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[445] Steedman, 'Enforced Narratives: Stories of Another Self'.

avoiding a life of crime.[446] Again, Steedman is apposite here in her account of how, since the 18th century, for those of us not compelled to tell our life story in order to receive aid, 'a sense of self, a place in the world and identity, was identity, was articulated through the use of *someone else's* story of suffering, loss, exile, exploitation, pain'.[447] Thus the tainted 'other' has property in the life story desired by their social 'better'.[448]

Howard asked:

> What is it about wanting to express this prison experience… who is it for? I'm thinking of Abdellatif Laâbi – writing about the experience of prison afterwards can be quite traumatic, you know if you were in for a long time and you're revisiting feelings and affects from when you were in there… it's not what everyone wants to do… I had a literary background and thought I'd keep a journal… so maybe I had this sense "oh yeah, I could be Gregory Corsor" but I never did really, I kept phrases and a few bits, I couldn't really face it.[449]

Howard had read fiction and autobiography about prison before becoming a prisoner, and it gave him false hope that once incarcerated, writing would

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[446] Shaun Bailey, *No Man's Land: How Britain's Inner City Young Are Being Failed* (London: Centre for Young Policy Studies, 2005); Kathy Gyngell and Ray Lewis, *From Latchkey to Leadership: A Practical Blueprint for Channelling the Talents of Inner City Youth* (London: Centre for Young Policy Studies, 2006).

[447] Steedman, 'Enforced Narratives: Stories of Another Self', 34.

[448] Steedman, 36.

[449] For example, Howard used V44203: the prisoner number assigned to him as part of his experimental essay, see: Howard Slater, 'New Acéphale', *Inventory* 2, no. 3 (1997).

provide him with a structure to help cope with the experience by transforming it into literature. Prison memoirs and fictionalised accounts of imprisonment written by ex-prisoners have long provided an opportunity for criminalised people to give alternative accounts from the state 'enforced narrative' and influence public perceptions of criminal justice.[450] However the development of a collective and institutionally supported critical criminology informed by the researcher's own experiences of imprisonment has only developed relatively recently.[451] The American 'New School of Convict Criminology', associated in particular with the work of Stephen C. Richards, Jeffrey Ian Ross and Michael Lenza, came into being in 1997, with an affiliated group in Britain since 2011.[452]

That this collective approach has crystallised in the USA is perhaps unsurprising considering the more overt barriers to participation in civil society for people with prior criminal convictions, which necessitate working

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[450] To rehearse some well-known examples: the Marquis de Sade, Oscar Wilde, Rosa Luxemburg, Antonio Gramsci, Arthur Koestler, Chester Himes, Jean Genet, Angela Davis.

[451] There are antecedents of academic research written by ex-prisoners, usually from an ethnographic perspective. See, for example: John Irwin, *The Felon.* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970); Richard McCleary, *Dangerous Men, The Sociology of Parole.*, Sage Library of Social Research ; V.71 (S.l.]: Sage Publications, 1978). The Canadian *Journal of Prisoners on Prisons*, established in 1988, published the writings of current prisoners including Jo-Ann Mayhew, Jon Marc Taylor and Mumia Abu-Jamal.

[452] Associated Publications include: Jeffrey Ian Ross et al., 'Convict Criminology', *Critical Criminology*, July 2011, 160-171.; Deborah H. Drake, Rod Earle, and J. Sloan, *The Palgrave Handbook of Prison Ethnography* (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Springer, 2016); Jeffrey Ian Ross and Stephen C. Richards, *Convict Criminology*, The Wadsworth Contemporary Issues in Crime and Justice Series (Belmont, Calif. ; London: Thomson/Wadsworth, 2003); Rod Earle, 'Insider and Out', *Qualitative Inquiry* 20, no. 4 (2014).

together for survival.[453] The group is comprised of researchers who are currently incarcerated, those with criminal records, and academic and activist allies without them.[454] These allies are important in gaining resources, institutional legitimacy, and providing guidance for the less academically experienced prisoners.[455] Convict Criminologists see mainstream criminology as complicit with, or at least inadequately critical of the criminal justice system, and its emphasis on lengthy detention as the solution to lawbreaking. Influenced by phenomenology, they develop their theoretical perspective from prisoners' experience of criminal justice processes and procedures to make clear policy recommendations. Their approach encompasses direct observation, interviews, autoethnography, memory and retrospective analysis.[456] Vitally, they recognise that 'it may be hard for some prisoners to approach carceral spaces through the lens of anthropological strangeness that is typical of ethnography. It may be even more difficult for prisoners to separate themselves from the role they perform in the field as it is continually

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[453] In the USA criminal records are publicly available, with a negative bearing on ex-prisoners access to credit, housing, education and jobs. To understand the racial dynamics of these social processes see Michelle Alexander, *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness* (New York: New Press, 2010).

[454] As they themselves criticise as a limitation, the group is currently dominated by white working-class and middle-class men, predominantly convicted under the "war on drugs." See Stephen C. Richards, 'The New School of Convict Criminology Thrives and Matures', *Critical Criminology* 21, no. 3 (1 September 2013): 382.

[455] Ross et al., 'Convict Criminology', 161.

[456] Richards, 'The New School of Convict Criminology Thrives and Matures', 380.

forced upon them'.[457] Although emotionally and practically difficult to achieve, I share their belief that criminalised and imprisoned people should play a major role in any defensible approach to criminology.

'The Face is a Politics'[458]

We could think of these enforced narratives alongside Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the 'faciality machine' which I introduced in chapter one. For example, someone with a high social status cannot produce an 'enforced narrative', although they may produce a memoir or autobiography. Crucially, for Deleuze and Guattari, the face is not a surface expression of the character of the person who wears it. Instead, when we speak *as* a child or police officer our expressions are indexed to a communicable range associated with the social role we are performing. Deleuze and Guattari write against the cultural tendency to treat a face as a shortcut to character: to 'judge a book by its cover'. A face cannot express someone's innate inner goodness or innate evil. As such, Deleuze and Guattari work against the historical practice of reading the criminal face and body for barely-suppressible signs communicating the face-wearer's evil or moral degeneration, which I discussed in chapter three.

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[457] Justin Piché, Bob Gaucher, and Kevin Walby, 'Facilitating Prisoner Ethnography: An Alternative Approach to "Doing Prison Research Differently"', *Qualitative Inquiry* 20, no. 4 (1 April 2014): 455.

[458] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 201.

Indeed, the secondary function of the faciality machine they criticise is as a 'deviancy detector'.[459] The faciality machine tests faces against the model of communicative perfection: that of the White Man, Christ,[460] judging how far the face deviates in relation to the range of expressions available to its role. Thus to be a woman or a person of colour is already to be *slightly* more suspect of some kind of inherent deviance. People from whom it is demanded that they 'explain themselves' are not always straightforwardly submissive to this demand. In Deleuze-Guattarian terms there are 'lines of flight' from criminalisation. A potential escape from this overcoding is what I am thinking about as 'masking'. I am not using masking here to suggest that Howard might seek to hide his 'true self', instead I think about masks as allowing for the wearer to speak from a different place that's not overdetermined by how they are typically facialised. I am interested in looking at Howard's related experience in terms of moments he has used masking as a response to fitting or being 'fitted up' for a face.

'This is a Tragedy… an Anomaly'

As an 18 year old, Howard served eight months of a two year sentence for arson related to anarchist terrorism, after drunkenly petrol bombing his

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459 Deleuze and Guattari, 197.
460 Deleuze and Guattari, 196.

local town hall with a friend. His period of incarceration was during the late 1980s, and as such he experienced the criminal justice system during the period of racialised 'law and order' that I wrote about in chapter two. During our conversation, Howard reflected on feeling 'privileged inside the system', as he was consistently perceived as someone who shouldn't be there – a bright, white, working-class grammar school student. He was keenly aware at the time that he wasn't seen as a member of the 'criminal class': someone to be endlessly reinserted back into a system of corrections. Howard was 'morally constructed'[461] as 'too good' for prison by those involved in his case, his incarceration a waste of the young life of a boy with a future, indeed, his school teachers came to plead his defence. Howard was seen as an exception among those caught up in the criminal justice system: 'a tragedy… an anomaly'. He criticised this view for its implication that the other inmates deserved to be imprisoned. Howards experience reminds us of the racial discrimination in operation at all points of the criminal justice system. He recalled that his defence barrister commented 'if you were black and from down the road in Tottenham… you'd be looking at 10 years'. Once inside prison the racialised disproportionality of sentencing terms was affirmed when he met a black fellow prisoner who had got a 7 year sentence for setting a pub on fire,

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[461] Cottee, 'Judging Offenders: The Moral Implications of Criminological Theories', 7.

whereas Howard got only two years for bombing a town hall. As the old cockneys in his local pub surmised, 'you got a result mate!'

Howard rejected the face of the prodigal son or good boy who erred once, a comforting, linear narrative offered to him of his superiority to other prisoners (which is an individualised narrative offering escape), in favour of one of solidarity and resistance. That is to say, no one deserves imprisonment, and disgust at the prison system's inability to improve the lives of those who move through it – which is a collective narrative offering escape.

A Teenage Anarchist Hurls a Molotov Cocktail / We Thought You Were N.F!

As an anarchist and convicted arsonist, Howard found himself fitting the face of a petrol bomber – one of the most longstanding and romanticised icons of anarchism.[462] I asked him if he had felt fetishised as such upon his release, within his political community?

> Maybe… At that point, it saved me from thinking "my god I'm a pathological arsonist," because the political was there.

Here Howard touches on the fragility of our self-knowledge: how do we understand our actions, especially those spontaneous acts we find hard to justify, and are often judged by wider society to be deviant? Thinking the self as multiple rather than singular and essential can be a difficult and dangerous practice for any person, with or without the experience of being overcoded as essentially or pathologically criminal. Howard's act of arson fit with a politically unambiguous image of anarchism: that of committed political activist ready to act for the cause and suffer the consequences. Ironically, although in activist circles he well-fitted the image of anarchism, there was

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[462] This image initially gained currency during the Paris Commune of 1871, in which the myth of female petrol-bombers or *pétroleuse* led to the army shooting on sight women carrying items large enough to contain liquid. See Sharif Gemie, 'Revolutions and Revolutionaries: Histories, Concepts, and Myths', in *A Companion to Nineteenth-Century Europe: 1789-1914*, ed. Stefan Berger (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 130.

confusion in other social spaces about how his action should be read, Howard explained:

> When I got out [of prison] and back to the area, I went to the pub and people said, "Oh *you're* the guy that chucked that petrol bomb, we thought it was the N.F!" Because a lot of West Indians had their wedding ceremonies there [in the Town Hall], and there were some people saying "well you're a full-on anarchist…" or "we thought it was the N.F"… all these things make you ponder.

The possibility for such misreading is a salient reminder that our actions form assemblages with another things, political action is not distinct from other types of action in this way, and as such, there can be no 'pure' political gestures. Our actions, including those that might later come to be defined as criminal, are caught in a web of contexts, meanings, and interpretations. For Howard, when he threw the bomb, the town hall was a symbol of the state, but as he acknowledged in our interview, town halls are also civic centres – and he could easily have accidentally killed people. Anarchism is a broad and complex political philosophy, and Howard's anarchism wasn't prepared to kill people in the name of smashing the state. Fitting the face of anarchism so neatly masked Howard's more complex feelings about his act. Perhaps more significant to Howard's political development was his 'total experience of solidarity' that occurred when his co-defendant refused to blame Howard for their crime, thus giving up an opportunity to get himself a reduced sentence.

As he admitted in a tone of admiration, 'I had to question myself, would I have

done the same thing? Because I was quite terrified'.

Prison ↔ Everyday Life (Terrorist Society)

After he was released from prison Howard got a job at British Telecom, rushing through his work in order to spend as much of the afternoon as possible continuing his political self-education in the Marx Memorial Library. He also started experimenting more purposively with writing and art making, and was encouraged by his then girlfriend, who was an artist, to exhibit his work. Included in the archive is an exhibition proposal from 1989: *Terrorist Society*. At this time, Howard felt too inhibited to participate fully in former activist circles or protests such the poll tax riots of 1989-1990 because of fear of being arrested and having the 'book thrown at him' due to his prior conviction for terrorism: 'on my slate they had terrorist, TERR…' He talked about the paranoia of the 1990s and the infiltration of political groups by police spies. At this time, memories of prison and a present fear of covert surveillance acted to discipline him away from making overtly political expressions. For example, leaving a poll tax protest when things started heating up, he accidentally walked towards the police and felt a rising panic that he would be recognised and arrested (which didn't happen). His sense of being a convicted 'terrorist' whilst 'terrorised'[463] by the state, through possessing only

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[463] Henri Lefebvre's text 'Terrorist Society' was a strong influence at this time. See Henri Lefebvre, 'Terrorist Society', in *Everyday Life in the Modern World*, trans. Sacha Rabinovitch (London: Allen Lane, 1971).

provisional freedom easily revoked, is also apparent in the writings from this period included in the archive. In this writing he represents the parallel monotony of prison and non-prison labour as a continuum, and critiques the idea of work as salvation:

> Gates open and close, a mesmeric succession of locks. Door, alarms, computer passwords. Labyrinthine passages. Cream coloured corridors, the click of typewriters. Helicopters overhead. "Cat A," Level 1. Meat wagons rumble in through the gates. Console. Animals star gazing. Heavy iron cuffs aching the wrist. Pay day.[464]

For Howard, the institution of prison acts symbolically to fool those with the ability to move in society that they and their choices are free.[465] In these texts he avoids solely representing overt forms of oppression and restraint but also shows the self-disciplining that operates through affective investments and identifications with authoritative social institutions, including art institutions and academia. You can see his ambivalence about fully adopting the face of the artist most starkly in a capitalised, type-written statement[466] in the archive. Here he complains that:

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[464] Howard Slater, 'Excerpt' August 1989, HMP Archive, Mayday Rooms.

[465] For a similar sentiment from former prisoners that it is not they who are experiencing a 'social death' (Orlando Patterson, 1982) but rather that it is the "free" world that is 'dead' in its indifference to the suffering of its excluded and imprisoned people, see Avery F. Gordon, 'The Prisoner's Curse', in *Toward a Sociology of the Trace*, ed. Herman Gray and Macarena Gomez-Barris (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 17–55.

[466] Howard Slater, 'Political Art…' n.d., HMP Archive, Mayday Rooms. Howard doesn't remember writing this text, but suggests that as it's not in quotation marks it is probably his own work.

POLITICAL ART
SEEKS SUCCOUR IN
THE RELATIVELY
UNDEMANDING SPHERE
OF COMING TO TERMS
WITH A CULTURAL
ARTEFACT,ELEVATED TO
IDOLATORY STATUS.
AN ARTIFACT THAT
INVITES CONTEMPLATION
BUT NEGLECTS
ARTICULATING A
'PRAXIS'. IT IS AS
IF THE ARTEFACT
REPLACES THE
"STRUGGLE" THAT
GAVE RISE TO IT.

Headless Men on Roofs

In chapter three I described criminology's role in producing visual images of deviant and criminal bodies (especially faces), and its development of indexical, comparative models to aid this facialisation. Our official archives are full of images of bodies being punished, and of the hopeless, pained or resigned faces of the criminalised. There is an aesthetic to such images, and in the repeated tropes we can see the power of the state to arrange certain bodies before the lens. These images are of people that have been pacified – at least in front of the camera. Thus, I think it is significant that the most recurrent subject matter depicted in the collection of yellowing press cuttings contained in Howard's archive is photographs of prisoners protesting on the roof of prisons, often with raised fists. The raised fist is an internationally recognised sign variously expressing solidarity, strength, or resistance to oppression. These are images of criminalised bodies that are nevertheless active and hopeful – at least in front of the camera. The men on roofs are often faceless or headless, sometimes wearing hoods to conceal their identities. In many of these images, it is the technical limitations of photography or printing that have obscured the faces and thus anonymised the subjects. Some of these images are enlarged to the point where the original ink dots of the

photocopied image are visible. In this case, as Howard commented, 'the figures become like spectres'. I asked Howard where the images came from:

> They were in the press, I don't know why I photocopied them, just experiments with the image and messing about on an office photocopier, blowing it up so it looks more sinister… Men on roofs, that's where they went to protest… and I don't know why I kept photocopying them or kept them. I think it got sparked because of Strangeways [riot in 1990] and having been in [Strangeways Prison]… I got out in '87 and didn't know any of the people involved.

The Strangeways prison riot lasted 25 days, commanded huge public interest, and was symbolised by the inmates' rooftop protest. The 1990 protest was significant in that the subsequent enquiry and report[467] into the poor prison conditions that had led to riots at a number of prisons led to some positive prison reform. However, the prisoners identified as involved were personally punished, with dominant figures receiving exemplary sentences under the new offence of 'Prison Mutiny'.[468] The Strangeways riot was extensively covered by the press, whose relative autonomy from the criminal justice system was a fact that the rooftop protestors cleverly exploited, with prisoners repurposing the prison schoolroom's chalkboard to write out complaints of

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[467] Sir Harry Woolf, *The Woolf Report: A Summary of the Main Findings and Recommendations of the Inquiry into Prison Disturbances.* (London: Prison Reform Trust, 1991).
[468] For example Paul Taylor, and Alan Lord both received an additional 10 years to their sentences.

mistreatment by staff and the squalid conditions censored in prisoners' letters.

In *Camera Lucida* Roland Barthes claims that despite its inherent partiality the photograph shows something 'that-has-been'.[469] If something has been, or as in contemporary photojournalism is happening elsewhere, it could be again. Ariella Azoulay argues that criticism of a photograph as partisan and therefore misleading assumes 'that the photograph shows or performs something that is already over and done, foreclosing the option of watching photographs as a space of political relations'.[470] Images have effects, and for an ex-prisoner like Howard, now 'rehabilitated' and apparently disconnected from prison life, it was incredible to see photographic evidence of a successful protest against conditions which he personally knew to be intolerable. Although he felt surveyed and 'marked' as an ex-prisoner, the state and civil society could not censor his pleasure in these images and what they represented to him.

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[469] Roland Barthes, *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography* (New York: Hill and Wang, a division of Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), 77.
[470] Azoulay, *The Civil Contract of Photography*, 20.

Howard was fascinated by the writings of Georges Bataille, who had been involved in the influential surrealist-inspired *College de Sociologie* and the secret organisation *Acéphale* ('headless'). Howard saw a visual point of continuity between André Masson's drawing for *Acéphale* and images of 'headless' Strangeways protesters with bags over their heads. Perhaps he also saw a link in Masson's image of a headless man, which represented human sacrifice for Bataille and his colleagues, and the idea of contemporary prisoner as sacrifice. When I look at Masson's image I think of early criminology's scientific guides to cataloguing and classifying detained criminal's identifiable physiognomic features, such as tattoos, a likeness that I have played with in the image on the previous page. Deleuze and Guattari write:

> The head, even the human head, is not necessarily a face. The face is produced only when the head ceases to be a part of the body, when it ceases to be coded by the body, when it ceases to have a multidimensional, polyvocal corporeal code—when the body, head included, has been decoded and has to be *overcoded* by something we shall call the Face.[471]

If we accept this characterisation, we can see how hoods might momentarily return the head to the body, and a body free to move at a different speeds and rhythms than the face. Hoods and masks deny viewers the ability to judge at

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[471] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 188.

first sight and thus gain the wearer time to act without allowing the viewer to pre-empt through response. The panic this causes in those invested in maintaining public order has led to penalising those covering their faces, especially at political demonstrations. Howard suggested:

> This idea of men on roofs with hoods on, it's very powerful, sort of hoods, Ku Klux Klan, but also… images of Palestinians with hoods on and protecting your visual identity. Because you're making a representational image, or someone has captured you on the roof, but you want to protect your identity, to be anonymous. [So] you want to be seen, and that anonymity is also part of the collective and the solidarity.

Those who engage in acts of protest and resistance tend to want their acts to be seen, registered or recognised. As Howard phrases it, in protesting 'you're making a representational image'. However, if you're already overcoded as criminal, making yourself into an image is more challenging as you're already figured as someone who's broken the social contract and either less deserving in their plight, or in no position to complain about their governance.

In obscuring the face with hoods and masks, one might think of this becoming-headless or faceless as a form of becoming-collective:

> They were images that I liked… in opposition to the image of the ringleader. You look at these images and it's like "who's the ringleader here?" And the images of loads of people on the roof are fantastic, and then it gets down and

down to Paul whateverhisnameis [Taylor] and he was on that BBC documentary [about the Strangeways riot]. I always remember him, and he was *seen* as an anarchist when he was inside, and his hair was a kind of Mohican, so he *looked* like a guy who was in the anarchist scene almost.

Paul Taylor was an important figure in the Strangeways protest: making the speech which initiated the protest in the chapel which turned into the riot, articulating criticism of the prison service from the rooftop etc. However Taylor fit the image of a ringleader from a press perspective partly because of his appearance, with his head un-hooded he *looks* slightly like he could be part of the anarchist scene. If one was assembling a causal model of crime and criminality, it is an easy move from isolating features of his appearance as anarchist-like, to suggesting that he could have 'imported' anarchist political ideas into the prison: perhaps imagined as a space without collectivity, or its own political analysis of incarceration. In our conversation, Howard drew attention to the pitfalls inherent in the way that broadcast media tends to try and choose a ringleader or spokesperson when collective action takes place. Recalling but inverting Craig's claim in chapter three of individual rather than systematic police corruption, such individualisation creates a neat narrative of causality of 'one bad apple' spoiling the barrel, which means no one has to look carefully at systemic or collective problems.[472] The making of Taylor into

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[472] This individualisation by an outside agency can be highly divisive and is a long recognized problem within anti-hierarchical political movements seeking change. For an

a scapegoat is an example of what Deleuze and Guattari term the reterritorialisation that occurs after a deterritorialisation or 'dismantling the face'.[473] Here, the dismantling of the prison's image, with liberated hooded prisoners dancing on the roof to *I've Got The Power!* by Snap (1990), is reterritorialised forcefully by the public naming of those involved and reiterating their convictions in order to delegitimise their grievances to a curious public.

This movement of reterritorialisation was uncannily repeated in September 2015, only a few weeks after I had interviewed Howard, when Stuart Horner undertook a solo, three day protest on the roof of HM Prison Manchester (formerly Strangeways Prison). At the start of every news article he was introduced with epithets such as 'convicted murderer',[474] or 'moaning murderer',[475] or 'convicted killer'.[476] The press unanimously focussed on the nature of his conviction, giving more details about this crime than on the reasons for his protest. Horner must have expected that this would be the case, because the handwriting on his t-shirt read: 'It's not 1990 tell the Government we've all had enough. Sort the whole system'.

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excellent early feminist analysis see Jo Freeman, 'The Tyranny of Structurelessness (1970)', *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 17 (March 1972): 151–65.

[473] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 189.

[474] Jamie Grierson, 'Strangeways Prisoner Ends Rooftop Protest', *The Guardian*, 16 September 2015.

[475] Steve Robson, 'Who Is Stuart Horner?', *Daily Mirror*, 15 September 2015.

[476] Dean Kirby, 'Strangeways Protest', *The Independent*, 16 September 2015.

Horner cut a lonely but compelling figure on the roof, whilst below the crowd around the prison kept him company and held a party chanting, 'there's only one Stuart Horner!' Collective rooftop protest at Strangeways is much less possible now, where social organisation and the architecture had afforded an opportunity in 1990. Now in 2015, his solitary body was at times headless, or topless, entertaining onlookers by balancing on the apex like it's a tightrope, or smashing some windows. He looked haunted by the protest of 1990. Is it harder to imagine an individual embodying a collective cause? The visual impact is of a desperate or irrepressible individual, and a local celebrity. The solitary image of his body on the roof, in combination with the nature of Horner's conviction, was used as a way to delegitimise his criticism of the prison system. Ironically, this was at a time when prison reform groups and even a parliamentary special committee were warning that the prison system was again at crisis point due to systematic problems like chronic overcrowding and increase in indefinite sentencing through policies like IPP.[477]

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[477] Toby Harris, 'The Harris Review: Changing Prisons, Saving Lives', July 2015; Prison Reform Trust, 'Bromley Briefings', Prison Factfile, 20 November 2015; Justice Committee, 'Ninth Report, Prisons: Planning and Policies' (House of Commons, 4 March 2015). The government responded with a white paper which proposes reforms through increased privatisation and prison building: Elizabeth Truss, 'Prison Safety and Reform' (2016).

One should not be surprised by the vengeance with which the Criminal

Justice System works to 'facialise' prisoner-protesters like Taylor and Horner,

if one thinks along Foucauldian lines of the 'prison as panopticon', where the

system ensures that prisoners can be seen, but see as little as possible of their

captors in return.[478] The history of imprisonment provides us with examples

of the masked prisoner symbolising submission to authority, so it's important

to point out that the prisoner's mask or hood should not be interpreted as

inherently liberatory. Those awaiting execution will often be hooded or

masked, as much for the benefit of the executioner – it is popularly imagined

to be easier to kill somebody if you can't see their face – as the condemned. In

the 19th century prisoners in Pentonville[479] were forced to live in total silence

and wear masks when outside of their single occupancy cells. There was a

prominent element of theatricality to this epoch of imprisonment, when

prisons were much more open to public view than today. In his *Principles of

Penal Law,* written during the 1770s, Jeremy Bentham wrote with excitement

about the masking of prisoners when paraded for public view, suggesting that

the masks should:

> be more or less tragical, in proportion to the enormity of the crimes of those
>
> who wear them. The air of mystery which such a contrivance will throw over

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[478] See Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 195–230.
[479] Pentonville Prison was designed by Joshua Jebb, and built in 1842, it provided the model for hundreds of prisons built throughout the British Empire.

the scene, will contribute in greater degree to fix the attention, by the curiosity

it will excite, and the terror it will inspire.[480]

In Bentham's scheme, despite anonymising the wearer the mask is facialised

by this codification relating to the severity of wearer's crime. Although less

theatrical in their uniform, in Pentonville the prisoners still wore hoods. Thus,

irrespective of who is 'under there', they can be safely assumed to belong to

the general category 'criminal'. The mask or hood here becomes the 'true face'

of criminality. Of course this masking is a representation made for the 'non-

criminal' guests and guards, through his mask the prisoner sees:

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[480] Jeremy Bentham 'Principles of Penal Law', quoted in John Bender, *Imagining the Penitentiary: Fiction and the Architecture of Mind in Eighteenth Century England* (Chicago ; London: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 300, footnote 3.

Practices of Masking

I now want to move from our discussion of literal masking to more metaphorical masks, using some anecdotes from Howard's related experience. I continue to conceptualise masks here as tools to fashion different social relations, or delay or disjoint the process of facialisation. As such, masking is an active process of remaking the self, and the kinds of masks created reflects the social forces in its time of making. The essential point is that masks do not hide a real self or truth that could be discovered. There is nothing *behind* the mask.

Art as Defence

After Howard was arrested, the police raided his house, seizing a number of photographs and collages with potentially incriminating subject matter – including one that was repeated images of IRA members throwing Molotov cocktails. Ascertaining exactly what these artworks signified was a key area of his interrogation, used by the prosecution in court, and later, in his defence: 'it's only art'.

Phil: 'I was thinking about you using art as a defence and what, then, "art" was seen to mean. How does art explain away revolution? How does it make it safe enough? Is it because it's seen as just experimentation?'

Howard: 'I don't know whether it works. But to me it seemed to be, take 2 paths – go the political [path] and commit suicide in prison, by saying "fuck you" and all that, or try and couch this stuff, which was basically revolutionary iconography and make it into collage and art and William Burroughs, but it was quite interesting because I did use it as a defence, as a mitigation against what was being painted in front of people's eyes. So we're talking about the representation, I was trapped by them finding my own representations, which were pro-rioting'.

As the prosecution were making use of Howard's artwork as evidence of a premeditated terrorist act, it was necessary for his defence to make his act of arson intelligible within a wider pattern which would decrease the likelihood of lengthy incarceration. As such, Howard's act had to be framed within the pop-cultural imagination of a particular social typology of deviancy: the 'naturally' anarchic deviancy of 'the artist' as a kind of person slightly divorced from reality, obsessed with 'self-expression' at the expense of all else, passionate, impetuous, bold but ultimately naïve. However, in employing collage, an art form which deals with accumulation and repetition of images, Howard had to be very careful not to appear to fit another social stereotype of deviancy – that of 'the monomaniac', destined by his obsession to act out in a

particular way, and socially irrecoverable. This is a treatment of repetition in art as the signifier of a future mimetic act in the world. It is a reversed realism where the image prefigures the 'real' act. We discussed the representation of art, pathology and the multiple:

> [I] definitely had to do something to remove it from the pathological. Because, also, I'd be out with [a] partner taking photographs of an abandoned house in Epping, and it was burnt! And she was taking pictures of the burning rafters, and they'd found those photographs and I had to say "well I didn't take them," because it looked like a pathological fire thing, you know, arson as pathology. I just had to come clean, "this was an art project, looking at textures…" because I didn't have a psychological assessment I don't think, or maybe I did? I can't remember, maybe I blanked that all out.

Howard cannot be certain how effective the mask of artist was. Was it 'luck' that the defence worked, or did they read something in his demeanour that made him come across as more artist than arsonist? In order to save himself, Howard had to become interpreter for his own artworks and employ a particular form of artistic intentionality, i.e. 'my work means this and nothing else'. Perhaps, in light of the aforementioned cultural ideas about the repetition of images and crime causality, it is too risky to allow juries the

interpretive authority of Roland Barthes's emancipated audience? [481] In court, the artist-defendant as author is necessary.

Awaiting the verdict, he was aware of the huge significance that the particular characterisation of his anarchism would be likely to have for the jury. Would this random selection of strangers associate him with the potentially lethal anarchism of the 'propaganda of the deed', the comedic anarchists of GK Chesterton's *The Man Who Was Thursday* (1908), or the youthful punk-aesthetic of *The Sex Pistols*? As Howard pointed out to me, prisoners making art work (as self-expression) happens against a backdrop where your character is represented by the Criminal Justice System as fitting a stereotype in the form of an appropriate criminal category. In other words, the potential 'line of flight'[482] offered by prisoners translating their experience into new forms is simultaneously being caught up and reterritorialised by the Criminal Justice System as an expression befitting your criminality.

The Cyrano de Bergerac of Highpoint Prison

We took a break half way through our conversation, when we resumed as soon as I switched the voice recorder back on Howard said:

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[481] Roland Barthes, 'The Death of the Author [1967]', in *Image, Music, Text*, trans. Stephen Heath, Fontana Communications Series (London: Fontana, 1977).

[482] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 9.

What I've been pondering about was the means of expression question –
would someone *want* to express about being in prison? Like, while they're
there, or afterwards. There was an incident actually, I used to get "draw" off
a prisoner (that I gave to a cellmate actually), for writing him letters. And he
knew me because I had a job when I first came to London in what was called
the Community Program, I worked for the National Association of Care and
Resettlement of Offenders before I was an offender. And this guy was one of
the people on the painting and decorating team and he recognised me at
Highpoint [Prison] So I was finding myself writing letters to his girlfriend. So
that was one means of expression – how to express love and separation inside
prison. How do you do that except for on a visit? But then the letter is
extremely important, to get a letter and to send a letter… and it can create so
much anxiety because of the [potential for] misunderstandings… So to write
these letters for this guy, which felt unique in some way and also privileged
for him to tell me what he wanted to say to his girlfriend and to be this
intermediary. He didn't have the means of expression, he couldn't write… I
did it several times for him, I'd read it out. And he was much more *of* the
prison population that I was if you know what I mean, he was local Kentish
town, and he didn't seem to be stressed by "the bird."

Here Howard shifted our discussion of artistic expression and representation
to address a more fundamental means of expression: the ability to read and
write. Denied regular contact with loved ones whilst in prison, the written
word becomes a potent and problematic avenue for expression. In prison,

Howard fashions himself a mask as a person fellow inmates could trust to overcome their absence from the free world and translate their feelings into the form of a letter's physical presence in their loved one's hand. Although Howard writing letters for his friend is an intimate act in which he imparts something of himself into the letter, the fact that letters would be then be read and censored by prison staff reminds us of the publicness of private prison correspondence.[483]

Howard and I share a preference for experimental prose,[484] but as he commented:

> the realist stance of describing prison in a narrative form, to me might be boring, but for someone else it's an achievement to write a narrative story about being in prison.

Howard forced me to think about my own preference for reading and writing literary fiction, and his comment resonated with experiences I'd had as part of the Open Book creative writing group. Here, some members who had experienced criminalisation and wanted to clearly represent those experiences

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[483] See Les Back, *Prison Letters and the Book 'Lush Life' by Dick Hobbs 02/04/14*, Postcards From A Sabbatical, n.d., http://www.gold.ac.uk/podcasts/app/front/podcastsbyspeaker/68/10; Les Back, *The Life of the Mind Behind Bars 08/06/14*, Postcards From A Sabbatical, n.d., http://www.gold.ac.uk/podcasts/app/front/podcastsbyseries/24.

[484] 'I always thought that theory could be poetry and poetry could be theory… I started off in the poetry workshop [at school], so I've always had that line kind of, against social realism throughout my life, I was always more interested in surrealism. It's a constant toing and froing [between theory and poetry] in some respects, maybe it shows the Situationist influence…'

saw the neat and communicative style of realist prose as both the easiest to understand and perhaps as a sign of mastering and ordering difficult and messy experience.

Conclusion: The Archive as a Roomy Mask

As might be anticipated, this chapter's version of crime is different to those co-produced with the criminologists of chapter three, and the police actor in chapter four. Expectedly, there are resonances with the versions of crime expressed in my literary compositions, which are often created from interviews with others who have experienced criminalisation and are similarly marginalised 'experts' on crime. However, as I have already detailed, these literary compositions were produced through a series of translations undertaken by myself, where I anonymised research participants' experiences. In contrast, within this chapter Howard is a named participant undertaking his own translations and compositions. As I have previously explicated, translations are never direct, rather there is change in every permutation of the material. When Howard makes compositions which express his experiences of prison, whether in conversation, art or writing, he is drawing on loops of memory (already different each time they are repeated), affective echoes and knowledge drawn from other sources about prison. There

is knowledge which Howard will forget, or, through not translating and transmitting them deliberately, try to forget.[485] He comments:

> I think in [prison] you're a double – a double experience of prison, you're pondering prison but you're in it. You're in it in your mind, and you want to get out of it, out of your mind. Drugs or reading… you know drugs is what keeps the lid on the prison system. I've seen people crawling around, howling and shit, on heroin and all that. So you could see that it was a means of escape from the experience, so why would you express it?

Making and sharing art and writing that reflects on imprisonment requires you to be able to express your experiences with a detachment that might be inconceivable for those still suffering – if surviving an experience meant 'trying to get out of your head', why would you return to this experience once it is finally past?[486] This is one of the ways in which the 'enforced narrative' extends punishment. In sharing creative work based on experiences of imprisonment, Howard forced himself to dwell on his imprisonment whilst simultaneously asking the art world to validate and value his work. The exhibition proposal included in the archive[487] attempts to bring the prison to

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[485] It is important for the ethics of my project to note that the events and materials that Howard and I discussed are from a much earlier period of his life, rather than recent events that he is coming to terms with. As such, although still difficult topics to broach, Howard has a different perspective on them.

[486] This is also a sentiment I have heard from anti-prison activists who've been prisoners: it's exhausting to keep returning to the scene of traumatic experiences, especially in environments populated with actors invested in reiterating the "benefits" of prison.

[487] Howard Slater, 'Terrorist Society Exhibition Proposal' August 1989, HMP Archive, Mayday Rooms.

the art gallery through reproducing certain aesthetic features alongside his critique. Perhaps the spaces are too different for translation to occur in anything other than a superficial way: prison is bad. Being imprisoned for a period of time is very difficult to imagine if one hasn't had that experience, and it is easy to condemn prison if you have never been inside. Ex-prisoners are affected in more complex ways by having been part of the inmate world.

So as I asked at the start of this chapter, how can one represent these experiences without being fixed and facialised? Deleuze and Guattari do not advise some kind of valorisation of the body as an escape from the face. They criticise their own prior idealisation of anthropological studies of non-western cultures who do not worship the face, exalting it over the body as an example of themselves 'falling victim to a nostalgia for a return':[488] we cannot deny the power of the human face in late capitalist society. We can however make ourselves new collective, temporary or mutating mask-faces that resist facialisation, of which I argue that Howard's archive is a fascinating example.

Howard talked about his archive coming in to being as a result of 'desperation', of not knowing what to do with all the materials he had collected but not wanting to destroy them. He considered that ultimately, creating the archive has been a positive thing as 'it's sparked off a collection here [at Mayday Rooms]. Campaigning for prisoner's rights and explaining

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[488] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 211.

what it's like inside is not the most visible of leftwing activities'. Howard's

action of archiving seems like a form of witnessing the ongoing horror of

detention[489] and expressing solidarity with those imprisoned. Crucially, the

archive is not just about Howard's past, it is a collection of materials useful in

the present to activists as well as academics.

I interpret the archive as Howard's most productive and 'comfortable'

mask, by which I mean that the archive has the best fit of the faces available to

Howard, who wanted to be able to assemble a version of crime that's not

reduced to his individual experience of crime and punishment. In alluding to

the idea of the archive as a 'roomy mask' I am thinking about the archive as

literally creating space that others can enter and affect. It is the creation of a

shared resource that others will add to and learn from. Perhaps in its creation,

it has allowed Howard some psychic distance from his experience, or at least

from the burden of having to tell his story over again. The archive is a mask

that neither hides nor contains the 'real' Howard, but extends a version of him

into the world in a way that doesn't reduce him to his experience of

criminalisation. Although it is a collection shaped by his hands, and as such is

lively with his presence and perceptions (a room with a 'view' in both senses

of the term), it has a physical presence independent of his person. This means

that others can engage with it/his experiences without needing Howard

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[489] When I pulled out material from his archive, tiny paper rectangles scattered to the
ground: press announcements of deaths in custody in small print.

himself to be there and embody his experiences for them, or be answerable to their questions and opinions. The archive is not reducible to Howard or the version of Howard found in the archive – and there is some space in that.

In the following concluding chapter I will re-sketch the constellation of my key findings and arguments, and suggest some future directions for my work. I will conclude by maintaining the richness and challenge of thinking about crime as a multiplicity, and of research as becoming-with.

Convicted killer turned sculptor Jimmy Boyle's *Gulliver* to be demolished. One foot of 'gentle giant' will remain.

faceless

July 28, 2009 - 2:01 pm

I'd never heard of this before, but it's a great story. Here's hoping the bastard council are stopped in their tracks and the sculpture gets a new lease of life.

Reply

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s

September 11, 2012 - 11:06 am

Well Jimmy, if you wer some, and shall we say, some artist if posh stature, this would not be happening. I have a respect fore you in a differenr contects from others.
I have met you once or twice, thought I might have felt an inner fear talking to you, but nope. I like you, have a reputation in nthe past, and blown out of proportion. If you had any idea what so ever, the nunber of times that I would have loved to have times to sit down and talk to you, NOT ABOUIT FRIGGIN CRIME, but about art, and not about in that arty farty way, but man to man, have a laugh or two. You are a hard man to trace down .
Here is some of ther dhit I have down over my years in the websites, please have time to look over them.
As for your art being removed, god, does it piss me off,! I could share stories about some of my work you would piss you yourslf laughing at. and in this time in age. its something we all need. When I goot stuck upside down in those 25 foot fiberglass floors in Glenrothes, and thought I would die up side doen in there with ther blood rushing to my head.
If you could find time to talk to me, I would really enoy it. No tapes, to eritting down of stuff, no filming, just two old artists shareing ideas.

emails of some of my sites. addresses.

http://www

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S

Reply

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s

September 11, 2012 - 11:16 am

I ask a few moments of your time if you can imagine Jimmy.

Conclusion: 'We Murder to Dissect'[490]

On his delight in literary ruptures, breaks and detours, Deleuze remarked:

> It is never the beginning or the end which are interesting; the beginning and end are points. What is interesting is the middle.[491]

Researching crime as an assemblage has meant entering the action in the middle, and with the sense that things are already in flux. A key question has therefore been when to act, to interfere, so as to arrest the action through a research framing. Now I have concluded my experiments, I return back to the middle with new lines to pursue. In developing a methodology that could capture this, each project I have undertaken makes an intervention at a point of interest, and through its development produces new things and ideas which illuminate and mutate the problem. Nevertheless, following each line of enquiry has taken me back to the middle, and back to radical indeterminacy. In order to work in this way, one must become accustomed not only to '"going too far" with the politics of uncertainty',[492] but to setting up shop there and opening for business.

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490 William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 'The Tables Turned; An Evening Scene, On The Same Subject (1798)', in *Lyrical Ballads 1798 and 1802*, ed. Fiona Stafford (Oxford, United Kingdom: OUP, 2013), 118. Thanks to Matt Mahon for his suggestion of the title.

491 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, 'On the Superiority of Anglo-American Literature', in *Dialogues*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London: Athlone, 1987), 39.

492 Lather, 'FERTILE OBSESSION', 683.

Like most doctoral students I have often been asked to explain my PhD to people in pubs, and this has proved a useful place to work out how to communicate a poststructuralist approach to researching crime. People tend to have opinions on my topic, and ask me what I think about their favourite TV cop show as if I were in a better position to judge its realism, or recount dramatic anecdotes that happened to a 'friend of a friend'. Whilst I am grateful to be working on a subject that many non-academics find engaging and politically urgent, I have noticed that people often make comments containing inferences about my moral character. To select a few anecdotes of my own: the woman who informed me that as according to me crime was socially constructed, I wouldn't be needing a lift home with her that night. Or the activist who implied that I am the worst kind of scholar for researching criminalised people, whatever my intentions or findings. Both these accusations position me as someone who is deliberately deceiving others or deceiving myself as to the reality of crime. There are others who have incorrectly assumed that I have only worked with people who have committed non-serious crimes or things I might consider non-crimes, or that I take a less punitive stance on crime because I haven't experienced the trauma of victimisation. This latter accusation might encourage a researcher to 'out' herself as someone who has life experiences either of committing crimes or being a victim of crime. This incites the researcher to rest the validity of their research on a claim to personal authenticity: 'believe me, I was there'.

However, as I have argued throughout this thesis, confessions about victimisation or criminal activity can make one feel vulnerable, ashamed or objectified, whilst there is no analogous threat of being 'fixed' to the person performing the interrogation. At the other extreme, I have some friends who think my project is good not because of what I have done, but because they see criticising dominant ideas about crime and criminality as inherently valuable. It is often assumed that, in bringing together art with the criminal justice system, my methodology is 'art therapy'. In light of this, people sometimes seem confused or affronted that I am not claiming or aiming to make my research participants lives 'better'. These challenging engagements are a part of undertaking research, and they have aided me in thinking through my approach. I hope that the reader of this text will be able to see where I have worked to address these misunderstandings of my work in the previous chapters.

I found these pub conversations fascinating because they seemed to demonstrate how the conceptualisation of crime as 'out there' in the world, and nothing to do with us unless we are unfortunate enough to be victimised, is firmly socially established. Despite many decades of attempts to create theories that reflect crime's social complexity, reductionist and essentialist analyses of crime are alive and well in public and political discourses. For

example, in 2011, after a summer of rioting in several English cities, the

Conservative Home Secretary Theresa May proclaimed that:

> In the end, the only cause of a crime is a criminal. Whatever their
>
> circumstances, everybody gets to choose between right and wrong and
>
> everybody has to take responsibility for what they've done.[493]

Here, crime is not awkwardly shaped out of the flux of life, but comfortingly

begins and ends with the criminal whose bad 'free' choice to commit a crime

is the thing that renders them criminal. In May's crime assemblage society

only comes into contact with crime as an abstract threat within the clear

demarcation of right and wrong, and then after the fact in the practice of

judgement and punishment. *Our* virtuous hands stay clean.

Can we pose a counter image of crime which dirties all our hands?

My Thesis

I began this thesis by arguing that social life is complex and chaotic,

and that what we think of as crime is part of that, itself complex and multiple.

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[493] Theresa May, 'Theresa May Speech in Full', politics.co.uk, 4 October 2011,
http://www.politics.co.uk/comment-analysis/2011/10/04/theresa-may-speech-in-full. One
could compare this statement on crime causality with her recent comments as Prime
Minister about the wide use of food banks in the UK, as more and more people are pushed
into poverty by austerity measures. Here she suggested that rather than struggling or failing
to feed their families, there were "complex reasons" people turned to foodbanks. See
'Interview with Prime Minister Theresa May', *The Andrew Marr Show* (One: BBC, 30 April
2017), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/30041701.pdf.

As a condition of this, crime cannot easily be teased apart and understood isolated from other social processes, including those of the researcher. Thus whenever making this move we must attend to what is excluded from our 'assemblage'[494] of crime: historically, this has tended to be the perspectives of criminalised people, and crimes of the socially powerful.

I introduced my theoretical framework, which largely comes from the collaborative philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari and engagements with their work within the social sciences and humanities. In particular I drew out the implications of their conceptualisation of 'assemblages' for my critique of models of crime based on discovering hidden depths or a reality behind appearances. I argued that such realities are generally produced by following a line of crime construction undertaken by a particular actor and endorsing this version as most closely reflecting the real. Rather than attempting to capture crime in its totality, my project undercuts such attempts, instead showing how crime is assembled differently by different actors and why this matters. This is partially a matter of situating crime within the social processes which shape and constitute both crime and human subjects, and as such I drew on the concepts of 'molar' and

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[494] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*.

'molecular'[495] social processes of categorisation to capture the different ways through which social deviance and crime is produced.

In chapter two I explicated my experimental research practice, which I term making 'compositions', using examples from my portfolio. I described the development of my processual, collaborative method and through this addressed the problem of including the experiences and perspectives of criminalised people within my literary compositions. I argued that the kind of narrative of criminalisation that we are accustomed to is that of the 'enforced narrative',[496] and suggested that although telling one's life story might be therapeutic for the teller, because the story is demanded by the state, it is actually an extension of punishment. In light of this, I developed methodologies which could produce different kinds of knowledge, and hopefully different experiences for my research participants. Literary compositions worked well, both for the purposes of participant anonymisation, and as a 'mask' that enabled me to express ideas and experiences that I could not through other forms of representation, which place a premium on mimesis and authenticity. Thinking about the 'ontological politics'[497] of methodologies, I argued that research cannot be simply mimetic, but always involves the transformation and altering of forms. I drew on actor-

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[495] Deleuze and Guattari.
[496] Steedman, 'Enforced Narratives: Stories of Another Self'.
[497] Mol, 'Ontological Politics. A Word and Some Questions'.

network theory to describe my compositions as the result of a series of 'translations'. Translation has been a helpful concept in thinking through my methodology. As I have previously noted, translation is a process in which although each point along the chain of translations is different from the next, something of its former sense is kept constant. When we translate data into something else we make ourselves a spokesperson[498] for the information communicated.

In chapter three I playfully produced a portrait of the criminologist. Here, maintaining a holistic view of the healthy social body, crime acts as pathology that threatens it. As such, the criminologist's purpose has often been self-identified as diagnosing the sickness of society whilst performing a morally commendable commitment to reducing crime. Borrowing from the structure of 'enforced narratives', I reconstructed some of the ways criminology has assembled crime from its infancy, and showed how features of these were repeated in some more recent assemblages of the 20th century, in particular left realist criminology. I looked at the role of novel technologies including photography, statistics, and surveys in producing crime assemblages. Each of these was used to furnish a claim to the real, positioned as outside of the interference of the researcher. The criminologist acts as a scientist able to command the instruments and interpret the data produced by

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[498] Callon, 'Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation', 203.

these 'neutral' technologies. My argument is not that such technologies should be abandoned, but that their ability to help shape the real should always be made explicit.

In chapters four and five I focussed on specific projects that I have undertaken in order to demonstrate how I developed translation as a response to ethical constraints. In different ways both these chapters thematically and formally explored the performative politics of research. Here, questions about how researchers tell the story of their encounters with research participants, including presenting a critical view, or choosing not to 'tell all' were addressed.

Chapter four focused on my encounter with 'Craig', who was employed as both a police officer and an actor specialising in police roles. As a police officer Craig has a front line role in defining deviance and crime, and I was fascinated by his attempts to control or influence representations of police on screen. Here I argued that instead of intending to produce crime as a multiplicity, Craig was attempting to proliferate his own version of crime, overcoding both the screen and the street. I tried to think through what had happened in this challenging research encounter, out of which I had made a film which was eventually suppressed as a result of an ethical commitment to Craig. Rather than lose all the material I had generated, I translated the film into a chapter, the form of which recalls (but is different from) the lost film. I

took up the notion of police discretion to think about the power of the researcher in reporting and recording their findings. I reflected on how the ambiguity of Craig's status had affected me as a researcher, and that for a while I had succumbed to a desire to know the truth about Craig and reveal it. I termed this 'becoming-detective'.

Chapter five focused on my research encounter with Howard Slater and his archive. The form of the chapter, with its inclusion of risoprints that I made by collaging images from his archive and my own archive of images, extends my arguments made about the visualisation of criminality made in chapter three. Returning to Steedman's work on 'enforced narratives', I addressed the question of when and under what circumstances it is possible for criminalised people to express their knowledge of crime, without being fixed or overcoded as essentially criminal. I read Howard's collection of press photographs of hooded prisoners protesting on the prison roof as visual resistance against the history of photographing and cataloguing criminalised people. From this I developed the notion of 'masking' as a tactic to avoid 'facialisation' by the criminal justice system. I was interested in how Howard had translated his experiences of imprisonment into art, and eventually an archive. I argued that ultimately, in situating his experiences within the context of an archive containing material that related to other experiences of

imprisonment and resistance, the archive was the form that allowed Howard to best represent this experience in a way that gave him space to be multiple.

Extensions

Within this project, experiences like sharing stories I had written with the people who inspired them, and activities such as the reading group on prison abolition, suggest to me that with more time and resources than a doctoral project allows a much more collaborative way of theorising crime might be achieved. I envisage this as a way of assembling crime that doesn't come exclusively through my productions, but instead is the product of a sustained exchange and collaboration. In this scenario my translations would be challenged and enriched by the translations being undertaken by others in the project, and vice versa, creating a more intricate, nuanced, and wide-ranging assemblage of crime. In terms of projects that are currently pursuing the kind of collaboration that could potentially lead to the kind of assemblage of crime I am envisaging, there are a number of new initiatives developing in which undergraduate students of criminology are taking their classes in prisons with prisoners.[499] These developments are encouraging in terms of a

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[499] Such as the Learning Together project at University of Cambridge. See also Ruth Armstrong and Amy Ludlow, 'Educational Partnerships between Universities and Prisons: How Learning Together Can Be Individually, Socially and Institutionally Transformative', *Prison Service Journal* 255 (2016): 9–17.

more inclusive criminology, which aims to learn from those who have experienced criminalisation. A further example is the Distant Voices project[500] co-hosted between Glasgow University and Vox Liminis, an arts organisation which does music based workshops in prisons and with others affected by the criminal justice system.[501] As of August 2017 I will be the research associate on the project, where I will work as part of a research group comprised of ex-prisoners, musicians, artists, and academics to collaboratively research people's experiences of homecoming after prison, using arts-based and ethnographic methods. With a timescale of three years, greater resources and a larger, more diverse research group, I anticipate that this will be an exciting time for me to start to develop an approach that could generate a collaborative assemblage of crime.

Ideally, because all my literary compositions are written to be read aloud, I would have liked to present the stories in my portfolio as sound works. I hope to realise this work in the near future collaborating with actors and a sound designer. Encountering the doctoral thesis of artist Katrina Palmer,[502] which is presented as a novel, I questioned whether I couldn't have written my whole thesis in the form of a literary composition. However

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[500] Project outline at http://gtr.rcuk.ac.uk/projects?ref=ES%2FP002536%2F1

[501] http://www.voxliminis.co.uk/

[502] Katrina Palmer, *The Dark Object*, ed. Stewart Home and Gavin Everall (London: Book Works, 2010); Katrina Palmer, 'Reality Flickers: Writing With Found Objects And Imagined Sculpture' (Royal College of Art, 2011).

Palmer's text focuses on one site, the art institution, and in a project like mine which involves numerous actors and sites, I don't think it would have been possible for me to write the thesis as literature and to still give the materials and other voices in this project space to develop on their own terms. In other words, to turn the heterogeneous materials that make up this thesis into something that worked as literature would have meant overcoding it to work within the style set out by my composition. Similarly, engaging with the witty Goffmanesque mockumentaries of the artist Patrick Goddard[503] made me question whether I couldn't have found an actor who could replicate Craig's performance rather than translating the film into textual form. I will be revisiting the subculture of police involvement in the entertainment industry in future, with my camera.

In terms of addressing some of the key terms in which claims and counterclaims about crime and punishment are made: in chapter two I mentioned the problem of evaluating ethical acts within Deleuze's philosophical framework in which there is no 'ought'.[504] As such, how might we develop a practice of 'justice' that doesn't start from an abstraction? Can we think about judgment as an open process?[505] A brief exploration suggests

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[503] http://www.patrickgoddard.co.uk/index.html
[504] See Ian Buchanan, 'Desire and Ethics', *Deleuze Studies* 5 (2011): 7–20.
[505] I was prompted to consider these issues on attending Nathan Moore, 'What Is the Image of Thought?' (Lalangue and the Intersections of Politics, Law, and Desire, Birkbeck, University of London, 26 April 2017).

that I might follow the lead of legal theorists developing this work. For example, drawing on *Difference and Repetition,* Jamie Murray contends that if we want to engage Deleuze and Guattari's ontology to think about crime, there is a 'germinal deviance' (difference in itself) that we need to attend to, rather than starting with socially-defined deviance – as the transgression of norms.[506]

In this work I have been highly critical of criminological realism for its positivism, essentialism and divisive rhetoric. As such, I have found it simpler to avoid the positive invocation of the word realism in my work. However, this project does not give up on the possibility of making claims about reality or invoking some form of realism, but recognises that there is not a real that it is the exclusive privilege of the researcher to discover and tame. I look forward to developing my engagement with realism and claims to the real by engaging more deeply with Deleuze's texts in which he develops his conception of empiricism.[507] Deleuze states that his empiricism is:

derived from the two characteristics by which [Alfred North] Whitehead defined empiricism: the abstract does not explain, but must itself be explained; and

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[506] Murray, 'Germinal Deviance', 59.
[507] Gilles Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature* (Columbia University Press, 1991); Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*; Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*. I am grateful to Martin Savransky for our discussions around this topic.

the aim is not to rediscover the eternal or the universal, but to find the conditions under which something new is produced (creativeness).[508]

Deleuze's is a non-phenomenological empiricism, which 'is not a philosophy of the senses but a philosophy of the imagination'.[509] It is the imaginative act of selective attention which characterises *all* knowledge production, and I would like to further explore this in future work.

A True Crime, Lacking Edges

Now at the end of this project, I return to the pub. T.S Eliot is pulling pints behind the bar ('HURRY UP PLEASE ITS TIME'[510]). When the 'dark figure' of crime goes off to buy a round and someone asks me, 'who *was* that guy?' I reply 'it's complicated... I forgot! He's really skint, did you give him any cash for the round?'

I have often found that the place I begin to respond to challenges on my topic is in such simple acts of 'muddying' our hands. This usually takes the form of talking about our involvement in crime, whether it be illicit pleasures, fears, victimisation, or punishment and other social sanctions. Significantly, I

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[508] Gilles Deleuze, 'Preface to the English Language Edition', in *Dialogues*, by Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London: Athlone, 1987), vii.

[509] Constantin Boundas, "Introduction" in Gilles Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity: an essay on Hume's theory of Human Nature* [1953] (New York: Columbia, 1991), 7.

[510] Eliot, *The Waste Land*.

don't take an accusatory line of questioning, nor aim to elicit a confession from my interlocutor, instead we have a conversation where we share observations and begin to problematise crime. Often people demonstrate a social imagination of how these experiences intersect with processes of social codification without my prompting, echoing my experience of interviewing ex-prisoners. I suggest that these conversations are 'sociological explanations' in the sense that Mariam Motamedi Fraser describes, in being:

> an actual solution; a temporary and contingent solution to a virtual problem…
> [t]he best that a solution can do therefore is to develop a problem.[511]

Fraser goes on to argue that this shift rejects the notion of problem solving as explaining things away, but rather is an attempt to 'enable it to 'speak', or to pose it in terms which allow it to play itself out in productively creative ways', which also has the effect of changing what sociology is and can be.[512] With Fraser's formulation in mind, what version of crime have I assembled through this project?

As I have explained, Deleuze's is a philosophy of the 'surface', rather than one produced from the heights of transcendental truth or the depths of the psychoanalytic unconscious. He writes 'the philosopher is no longer the being of the caves, nor Plato's soul or bird, but rather the animal which is on

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[511] Mariam Fraser, "Experiencing Sociology," in *European Journal of Social Theory* 12 (1) (2009), 75.
[512] Fraser, "Experiencing Sociology," 76.

a level with the surface – a tick or a louse'.[513] I argued that our thinking about

crime is marred by a double simplification – firstly, in treating as identical the

variety of acts and practices that are simplified into a category: crime;

secondly, in the denial of the multiplicity of singular crime events. I assert that

there cannot be a general theory of crime or its causality because there is no

view from 'outside' that will give us a full understanding of the phenomenon

of crime. Being a tick buried within the assemblage of crime offers a different

perspective in which one cannot claim the heights of a transcendental moral

judgement on crime, but instead must acknowledge that the researcher is

collaboratively constituting crime as such.

Based on my empirical work, I argue that we will not discover the

authentic personality of the criminal justice system hidden within the accounts

of the criminalised. We might recall Avery Gordon and Stephen Pfohl's

observation that I cited earlier, that there is a form of humanist realism that

treats the meaning making of research participants as fact.[514] As I have argued

throughout this thesis, I prefer to work within the assumption that my

research participants are framing their experiences and understandings based

on the perception of me as a researcher, and making omissions and edits as

they see fit. For example, I realised that Craig must maintain the appearance

that he is a police officer in order to protect his trade in police fantasy. I saw

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[513] Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 150.
[514] Gordon and Pfohl, 'Criminological Displacements: A Sociological Deconstruction'.

how people who have been criminalised are expected to tell the truth about their experiences. With their unreliable narrators, my compositions play with such notions of credibility, authenticity and fraudulence.

My project adopts an intimate relation to crime, through attempting to affect the audience through my compositions. Although absolutely crucial to understanding my method, this intimacy with crime doesn't treat it as intimate-yet-'other' via either a romanticisation or horror at what crime tells us about our 'deviant' selves. As I have argued, to sincerely think of crime as an assemblage means giving up the claim to mastery through knowledge of crime or the criminal subject. This does not mean however that I wish to deny that crime exists and that it has effects, or that criminalisation effects and overcodes people's sense of self. In my work, there is nothing intrinsic to the criminal, and instead she emerges as someone whose acts are caught up in the movements of social processes which produce the effect of criminalisation. Crucially, this is not to concur with labelling theory in its hope that calling acts or people by less stigmatising names we might decrease the incidence of criminal or deviant acts. To elaborate, I turn to the 'molar' and 'molecular'. The act of naming or labelling a person a 'criminal', a 'gangster', a 'delinquent', etc, could be thought of as molar segmentation. However, as I have made clear, a more subtle segmentation progresses simultaneously along molecular lines of affective social sorting. This means that it is perfectly

possible to *tell* someone that you don't think that they're deviant, whilst *showing* them the opposite through various practices. I have tried to capture this in my thesis and compositions.

This research process has recognised that people's lives play out their location in a web of relations, which express relations of power. As such, it is not that we have no agency but that we cannot act without feeling the drag of those other actors. This is as true of Craig in his attempts to authorise the acceptable performance of policing, as it is of my own project. Craig framed his preferred version of policing as acting first, then justifying it. Thwarted in this, he sought to exert full control over my film. I have been thinking about this research as a process of becoming-different with my research participants. These research 'couplings'[515] have often, but not always, been benign or pleasant, and in each instance participants have made me aware that I am taking something from them and ostensibly offering them nothing tangible in return. As an illustration of this delicate negotiation, I have agreed to one interviewee's request that he be able to interview me in return once my thesis is finished. Explaining what sociology is to people can be difficult as much as it can be hugely rewarding, and as I have employed interviews as part of my methodology, I chatted, joked and argued with my interviewees, to reinforce the fact that I wasn't a therapist. I have not aimed to help people, but I tried

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[515] Lingis, 'The Society of Dismembered Body Parts', 293.

not to make people's lives worse, and came to terms with the fact that this meant losing some material I very much wanted to include in my project.

The compositions that I have made either perform the perspective of one character who is assembling a version of crime, or weave together a number of voices with differing perspectives. If I am writing from the perspective of one character I have used various techniques of writing (for example, free indirect speech) and editing (for example, jump cuts) to help the audience see how the character's perspective is partial and produced. I hope my compositions express the centrality of affect to constructions of crime by making the audience feel something and then maybe question those feelings. In playing with voices and turning data into characters, I hope it is clear that I am not pretending to 'give voice' to my research participants. This is not to dismiss that aim or claim when made by others,[516] but simply to reassert that this outcome is impossible under the parameters of my current research.

I locate myself as the central actor in this crime assemblage and I, like any other actor, necessarily have a limited perspective on the assemblage. I hope I have demonstrated that thinking about the creative power of the researcher, and the importance of ethics and agency, should remind researchers that we do not have powers of analysis that transcend our situated

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[516] Although I am irked by this claim when it is made by people undertaking projects where they have simply got permission to make representations *of* marginalised people.

entanglements. In other words, our perspective on the assemblages that we co-constitute is immanent, and cannot apprehend the assemblage other than through our place within it. Accepting this doesn't necessarily lead to the relativism of taking people's differing points of view as equally valid, because, following Deleuze, subjects and their points of view are an expression of their position within the social network.[517] As such, we can analyse how these views are produced and we can challenge subjects by adding new things into their crime assemblage. As I argued in chapter one, the assemblage is excessive in that every actualised assemblage of crime connects to a virtual field which is imperceptible and unrealised. In other words, actualisations don't limit future actualisations of crime: it can and will be different. My compositions are attempts to do crime differently, and I hope these could be absorbed into people's crime assemblages – necessarily although subtly altering it in some way. However, we must be modest about the impact of our work, and what we produce should not be imagined as necessarily having the power to work on and persuade legal or political institutions of its truth. Instead, I am hopeful about the development of lines of flight from careful and creative interrogation of the social production of crime, and the unexpected outcomes of research becomings.

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[517] Marks, *Gilles Deleuze*, 76–77.

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