

# 1 Using Self-Generated Cues to Facilitate Recall: A Narrative Review

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7 **Keywords: retrieval cue<sub>1</sub>, encoding specificity<sub>2</sub>, spreading activation<sub>3</sub>, cue distinctiveness<sub>4</sub>, cue**  
8 **generation<sub>5</sub>, self-generated cue<sub>6</sub>, Mental Reinstatement of Context<sub>7</sub>, encoding-retrieval match<sub>8</sub>.**

## 9 Abstract

10 We draw upon the Associative Network model of memory, as well as the principles of encoding-  
11 retrieval specificity, and cue distinctiveness, to argue that self-generated cue mnemonics offer an  
12 intuitive means of facilitating reliable recall of personally experienced events. The use of a self-  
13 generated cue mnemonic allows for the spreading activation nature of memory, whilst also presenting  
14 an opportunity to capitalize upon cue distinctiveness. Here, we present the theoretical rationale  
15 behind the use of this technique, and highlight the distinction between a self-generated cue and a self-  
16 referent cue in autobiographical memory research. We contrast this mnemonic with a similar retrieval  
17 technique, Mental Reinstatement of Context, which is recognized as the most effective mnemonic  
18 component of the Cognitive Interview. Mental Reinstatement of Context is based upon the principle  
19 of encoding-retrieval specificity, whereby the overlap between encoded information and retrieval cue  
20 predicts the likelihood of accurate recall. However, it does not incorporate the potential additional  
21 benefit of self-generated retrieval cues.

## 22 1 Introduction

23 Being able to reliably recall a personally experienced event is sometimes of critical importance. A  
24 good example is when an eyewitness is required during a police investigation to give a complete and  
25 accurate account of criminal activity witnessed. In a more everyday context, the recall of personally  
26 experienced events can function as a means to understand ourselves and others in the world around  
27 us. Through recalling personal memories we can identify who we are as an individual consistent over  
28 time, learn from the past, solve current problems, and plan for the future. We can also strengthen  
29 social ties and build and maintain intimacy in our relationships through the sharing of stories about  
30 past events (Fivush, 2008; Harris, Rasmussen, & Berntsen, 2014).

31 Successful recall of information from memory is often dependent upon the provision of retrieval cues  
32 (see Tulving, 1974 for discussion). Retrieval cues are aspects of an individual's physical and  
33 cognitive environment which aid the recall process; they can be explicitly provided at recall, self-  
34 generated, or encountered more incidentally through the retrieval context (Pansky, Koriat, &  
35 Goldsmith, 2005). Given the potential importance of accurate recall of personally experienced events  
36 outlined above, it is unsurprising that numerous mnemonic techniques have been developed to  
37 facilitate this process. The most successful of these build upon established principles of memory,  
38 such as the idea that encoding information leaves behind a memory trace comprised of multiple  
39 pieces of related information. This means that effective retrieval cues are those which contain a large

40 amount of overlap with encoded information, and that different retrieval cues may facilitate the recall  
 41 of different items of information (Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon, & Holland, 1986).

42 In the discussion that follows we outline the qualities necessary for a retrieval cue to be effective, and  
 43 based upon the extant literature, argue that self-generated retrieval cues represent a unique  
 44 opportunity to maximize each of these qualities. We contrast use of self-generated cues with  
 45 established context reinstatement techniques, in particular Mental Reinstatement of Context, found  
 46 principally within the eyewitness domain. Based upon this discussion, we argue that the theory  
 47 underpinning Mental Reinstatement of Context also supports the effectiveness of self-generated cue  
 48 mnemonics, and that self-generated cues offer an additional opportunity to capitalise upon the benefit  
 49 of cue distinctiveness. We close by outlining three memory principles underlying each of these  
 50 mnemonic techniques: spreading activation, encoding-specificity, and cue distinctiveness. Our aim  
 51 throughout this review is to consider how existing memory theories might contribute to the beneficial  
 52 effect of self-generated cues on recall, as demonstrated by the empirical studies outlined, and not to  
 53 consider alternative explanations of these findings.

## 54 **2 Discussion**

### 55 **2.1 Episodic memory**

56 The recall of personally experienced events falls within the domain of episodic memory. Episodic  
 57 memory, first proposed as a memory system by Tulving (1972), consists of highly detailed sensory  
 58 information about recent experience. It principally involves recalling the what happened, where, and  
 59 when of events. As such, episodic memory deals more with personal experience than with general  
 60 facts about the world and ourselves. It is the ‘personally experienced’ aspect of episodic memory that  
 61 distinguishes these memories from semantic memories for more general facts (Tulving, 2001). This  
 62 concept has been revised by Conway and colleagues to define episodic memory as a system  
 63 containing highly event-specific, sensory-perceptual details of a recently experienced event. These  
 64 events usually cover a relatively short-time span, often lasting just minutes or hours (Conway, 2001).  
 65 It is the high levels of sensory-perceptual detail incorporated into episodic memories that make the  
 66 re-experiencing of previous events possible through ‘mental time travel’, something Tulving argues  
 67 is likely to be unique to humans (Tulving, 2001, 2002). Tulving (2002) suggests that the episodic  
 68 memory system is relatively early-deteriorating, and Conway (2001) argues that episodic memories  
 69 persist on a longer-term basis only when incorporated into autobiographical memory structures  
 70 (indeed Conway argues that autobiographical memory structures typically consist of one general  
 71 event, alongside at least one episodic memory). Autobiographical memory, in contrast to the shorter-  
 72 term, high event specificity of episodic memory, can be taken to be a system of long-term memory  
 73 containing three levels of specificity: lifetime periods, general events, and event-specific knowledge.  
 74 It is also generally considered that the self is of central importance to autobiographical memory  
 75 (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Here, we refer to episodic memory in line with Tulving's (1985)  
 76 suggestion of episodic memory as a specialized subcategory of memory relating to the conscious  
 77 recall of personally experienced events. In this sense, episodic memory is both a particular type of  
 78 encoded information, and a particular type of recollective experience (Tulving, 2002).

### 79 **2.2 Effective retrieval cues**

80 A number of key qualities have been suggested as necessary for a retrieval cue to effectively support  
 81 recall. Good quality retrieval cues often have: (i) constructability (cues generated at encoding can be  
 82 reliably reproduced at recall); (ii) consistency between encoding and retrieval within a given context  
 83 (i.e. an effective retrieval cue should be compatible with the memory trace created during encoding

84 and show high cue-target match); (iii) strong associations with the target and the ability to be easily  
 85 associated with newly learned information; and (iv) bidirectionality of association (the cue recalling  
 86 target information, and target information recalling the cue). It is also important that retrieval cues are  
 87 distinctive or discriminable. That is, it should be possible to distinguish cues from one another, and to  
 88 differentiate the target memories associated with each. If retrieval cues are not recognized as being  
 89 distinct from one another, then cues are likely to become associated with more information, which in  
 90 turn reduces the effectiveness of the cue in prompting the recall of target information. This is known  
 91 as cue overload (Watkins & Watkins, 1975), which leads to slower less accurate recall as a result of a  
 92 cue (node) containing too many associative links (the fan effect; Anderson, 1983a). In addition, fuzzy  
 93 trace theory (e.g. Brainerd, Reyna, & Brandse, 1995) suggests that multiple traces are encoded within  
 94 memory for a single event. In other words, separate memory traces are created which contain either  
 95 general information about an event (gist traces) or exact details of the same event (verbatim traces). It  
 96 has been suggested that gist traces are likely to be activated by a wider range of retrieval cues than  
 97 verbatim traces (Tuckey & Brewer, 2003). This means that more distinct retrieval cues are necessary  
 98 to access detailed target information (Bellezza & Hoyt, 1992; Tullis & Benjamin, 2015a).

99 **2.3 Self-generated cues**

100 The self-generation of cues to prompt recall of information at a later date is a relatively natural  
 101 process; for example, individuals regularly create file names to cue themselves as to the contents,  
 102 create slides to prompt themselves as to presentation content, or take notes on important information  
 103 to allow detailed recall in the future (Tullis & Benjamin, 2015b). Generally, it can be expected that  
 104 individuals should be effective at generating cues to prompt their own future recall. When generating  
 105 cues ourselves we are able to rely upon rich, unique, personal knowledge to produce cues which are  
 106 often distinctive, highly associated with the target, and consistent between encoding and retrieval  
 107 (and therefore stable over time). Research has demonstrated that individuals do not consistently favor  
 108 any one of these principles over the others when self-generating retrieval cues; instead, they utilize  
 109 these characteristics flexibly to fit with the current task demands (Tullis & Benjamin, 2015a). For  
 110 example, when learners are provided with information about the similarity of competing targets (they  
 111 were made aware that targets were similar to one another) prior to generating their cues, they focused  
 112 more on distinguishing between the targets through maximizing cue distinctiveness, and so improved  
 113 their performance on a recall task (Tullis & Benjamin, 2015a).

114 **2.3.1 Defining a self-generated cue**

115 Research has suggested that the most effective self-generated cues are likely to have been developed  
 116 with the explicit purpose of cueing later retrieval. This helps individuals to make deliberate choices  
 117 distinguishing the target from other items stored within memory, rather than merely describing the  
 118 properties of the target (Tullis & Benjamin, 2015a). In this way, developing self-generated cues can  
 119 be considered as an active process, resulting in cues which uniquely and functionally represent the  
 120 critical properties of the target memory (Mäntylä & Nilsson, 1983). For example, when learners were  
 121 told directly that the cues they generated would be used to guide a future retrieval attempt (mnemonic  
 122 cues), their cues tended to include more idiosyncratic knowledge and personal experience, were more  
 123 distinctive, and associated to fewer potential targets, and so facilitated greater levels of recall than  
 124 cues generated to simply describe the target (Tullis & Benjamin, 2015a). Self-generated cues are  
 125 likely to include idiosyncratic details based upon the personal context of encoding. They are also  
 126 likely to make particular use of distinctive aspects of the information to be encoded to distinguish the  
 127 representation of the target memory from others already stored in memory (Mäntylä, 1986).

128 As far as we are aware there is no widely agreed definition of a self-generated cue. Here, we refine  
 129 the definition of a self-generated retrieval cue to mean any detail salient to the individual, and  
 130 actively generated by the individual themselves, which serves to facilitate more complete retrieval of  
 131 a target memory, and as such represents the critical properties of the target memory. In defining a  
 132 self-generated cue, it is also important to distinguish our interpretation of a self-generated from other  
 133 similarly named concepts within the domain of memory research. For example, from the related  
 134 concept of the generation effect, as well as from self-referent cues commonly found in the  
 135 autobiographical memory literature. Each of these is treated individually below.

### 136 2.3.1.1 The generation effect or elaborative processing

137 It has been suggested that information is better recalled when it has been actively and effortfully  
 138 processed, rather than passively received. This can be considered as a *necessary* but not *sufficient*  
 139 prerequisite for unique encoding (Mäntylä & Nilsson, 1983; Slamecka & Graf, 1978). Production of  
 140 unique cues at the encoding stage encourages enhanced encoding of target material. One means of  
 141 inducing more active unique encoding is to have participants generate the stimuli to-be-recalled for  
 142 themselves. For example, participants might be given a word with some letters replaced with blanks.  
 143 This is often presented alongside a strong semantic cue (e.g. *fruit*: a p \_ l \_). Learners are asked to  
 144 complete the word, and then to encode this word for later recall (Laffan, Metzler-Baddeley, Walker,  
 145 & Jones, 2010; Schmidt, 1991). Self-generated stimuli are more accurately recalled than stimuli  
 146 passively encoded under the same conditions, and this effect persists over a longer retention period.  
 147 This effect (known as the *generation effect*) holds constant across a range of measures such as cued  
 148 and uncued recognition, free recall and cued recall, and confidence ratings (Laffan et al., 2010;  
 149 Mäntylä & Nilsson, 1983; Slamecka & Graf, 1978).

150 The generation effect can be considered as representing the impact of deeper, semantic, more  
 151 distinctive encoding strategies (Derwinger, Neely, & Bäckman, 2005). While this potentially works  
 152 on some of the same principles as our definition of self-generated cues, these two processes are  
 153 subtly different. In essence, it seems that when a generation effect approach is taken, learners are  
 154 generally trying to generate the encoding material. In contrast, a self-generated cue in our context is  
 155 one that is generated by the individual (and so can be as idiosyncratic as necessary) to prompt the  
 156 recall of encoded material, but does *not* necessarily consist of the target material itself. It is worth  
 157 noting that some research has found that the generation effect improves memory for target items, but  
 158 can lead to a reduction in memory for contextual details (Mulligan, 2004; Mulligan, Lozito, &  
 159 Rosner, 2006). It is not yet known whether self-generated cues might also fail to enhance memory in  
 160 all contexts.

### 161 2.3.1.2 Self-referent cues

162 References to ‘self-referent cues’, ‘self-relevant cues’, or ‘personally-relevant cues’ are not  
 163 uncommon in the autobiographical memory literature. It has been suggested that there is a strong  
 164 relationship between the self and memory, and that in particular the self-referencing of  
 165 autobiographical memories distinguishes them from other types of memory (Conway & Pleydell-  
 166 Pearce, 2000). In addition, it has been suggested that memory is, at least in part, organized around the  
 167 concept of the self (see for example Greenwald & Banaji, 1989; Symons & Johnson, 1997). A self-  
 168 referent cue generally involves processing information in reference to the self. In the simplest terms,  
 169 this means thinking about oneself during the encoding process (Turk et al., 2015). In doing so the  
 170 individual associates a piece of to-be-remembered information with a self-relevant item (as in  
 171 Greenwald & Banaji, 1989). This has been shown to have broader implications for recall, as well as  
 172 impacting achievement in educational contexts (as in Turk et al., 2015). However, this is somewhat

173 different from the definition of a self-generated cue to (non-autobiographical) retrieval we outlined  
 174 above. The main distinction being that self-generated cues reflect those that represent critical  
 175 properties of a target memory, while self-referent cues are those that act as a cue relating to an aspect  
 176 of the self.

### 177 **2.3.2 The benefit of self-generated cues over cues generated by, or for, others**

178 It is well established that strong cue-target relationships, cue distinctiveness, and compatibility  
 179 between encoding and retrieval are necessary to maximize the effectiveness of a retrieval cue. It is  
 180 reasonable to assume then that if we are able to capitalize upon each of these principles, then recall  
 181 performance will be further improved. If this is the case, then allowing individuals to generate their  
 182 own retrieval cues represents our best opportunity to utilize cues that are unique, and include a high  
 183 level of cue-target match. Indeed, some researchers have already argued that the high levels of recall  
 184 demonstrated when the target information shares a unique relationship with the cue become more  
 185 striking when the cue is self-generated (Hunt & Smith, 1996). This is not altogether surprising; if  
 186 effective retrieval cues are both distinctive and compatible with the encoding experience, then it  
 187 follows naturally that cues are more effective when they are self-generated than other-generated. The  
 188 ‘tester’ cannot know what information was most salient to the learner at the time of encoding, nor can  
 189 they anticipate which aspects of that information are most distinctive to the learner (Mäntylä, 1986).  
 190 As a result, other-generated cues (i.e., cues that are formulated by someone other than the individual  
 191 themselves) rely heavily upon more general, semantic, gist-based aspects of the target information,  
 192 rather than the more specific idiosyncratic episodic details incorporated into self-generated cues. In  
 193 this sense, other-generated cues can be considered to rely primarily upon associative strength  
 194 (between cue and target), without the additional benefit of cue distinctiveness and encoding-retrieval  
 195 match offered by self-generated cues. In support of this, Tullis (2013) highlights that when learners  
 196 recalled an incorrect target, this response appeared to be driven by the associative strength between  
 197 the cue and the incorrect response. This suggests that when learners are unable to access specific  
 198 episodic details for a cue they resort to a ‘best guess’ based upon associates of the cue provided to  
 199 them. In other words, when specific episodic details are unavailable, learners fall back upon more  
 200 general semantic knowledge. This suggests that strong cue-target associations (favored by spreading  
 201 activation theories of memory) are the backup route to recall, when cue-target overlap and cue  
 202 distinctiveness fail.

203 It has been argued that research into self-generated cues makes an important contribution *beyond* the  
 204 understanding of cue distinctiveness. For example, in examining the use of self-generated cues, we  
 205 are able to move beyond understanding encoding as the perception and comprehension of an item, to  
 206 viewing this process as an additional source of potential retrieval cues (Hunt & Smith, 1996). This  
 207 argument was based primarily around the extraordinary findings of Mäntylä & Nilsson (1988) who  
 208 showed that given distinctive self-generated verbal cues and a consistent encoding-retrieval  
 209 environment, recall of unrelated verbal targets is consistently of a high level, even with a long  
 210 retention interval. This advantage is specific to the producer of the cue, with the cue itself failing to  
 211 function effectively as a prompt for another individual’s recall. In effect, even where two individuals  
 212 have encoded the same information, they are likely to produce unique retrieval cues, and so benefit  
 213 exceptionally well from their own cues.

214 The retrieval benefit of self-generated cues over other-generated cues has been suggested as being  
 215 linked to the generation process (e.g. through encouraging more active processing of the target  
 216 memory). However, the research outlined above suggests that this benefit is the result of both the  
 217 generation *process*, and the generation *context*. The potentially idiosyncratic nature of self-generated  
 218 cues means that one individual’s cues that are given to another individual at test would be unlikely to

219 benefit their performance, even if the same information had been presented at encoding. Despite this,  
 220 individuals do frequently generate cues to benefit others in naturalistic settings. For example, we  
 221 might consider how best to prompt an employee to complete a task, or cue one another's memories  
 222 for shared events when reminiscing with friends (Tullis & Benjamin, 2015b). It is then interesting to  
 223 examine how asking individuals to generate cues specifically for use *by others* impacts upon the  
 224 types of cues generated, and the effectiveness of these cues at test. During one such study participants  
 225 generated cues for themselves and cues for others. At recall, they received another person's cues (this  
 226 could be a friend or stranger), but never their own self-generated cues. Results suggest friends are  
 227 able to cue each other more effectively than strangers. However, performance overall improved when  
 228 participants were provided with cues generated with the knowledge that the cue would be used to  
 229 support someone else's recall (Andersson & Ronnberg, 1997, Experiment 2).

230 Tullis and Benjamin (2015b) examined how the quality of a retrieval cue changed when it was  
 231 generated for use by others rather than use by the self. Participants each generated two cues for each  
 232 of sixty words. These cues were to be used to support their own later recall attempt, or to aid another  
 233 learner in recalling the items on the wordlist. The stimulus words were selected as having relevance  
 234 to the life of college students, and so were considered to offer opportunities for the use of cues based  
 235 on personal experience. Cues presented at recall were either self or other-generated, and were  
 236 intended for use by either the self or another individual. In general, cues generated for the self were  
 237 consistently more idiosyncratic, and so less beneficial when presented to another learner.  
 238 Consequently, performance was better when participants received an other-generated cue meant for  
 239 another individual, than an other-generated cue meant for the self. In addition, self-generated cues  
 240 intended for another individual were no longer as effective in facilitating the originator's recall  
 241 performance. Although this difference did not reach significance, this does suggest that the benefit of  
 242 self-generation of the cue is removed when self-generated cues are intended for use by others. This is  
 243 perhaps as a result of the reliance on more semantic cue-target associations, rather than distinctive,  
 244 and often idiosyncratic details, of the encoding experience. It can therefore be assumed that the  
 245 benefit of self-generated cues lies in the inclusion of personal experience and idiosyncratic  
 246 knowledge to create a distinctive and meaningful cue.

### 247 **2.3.3 Empirical tests of self-generated cue mnemonics**

248 Mäntylä and colleagues were among the first to note the benefit of self-generated cues on recall.  
 249 Mäntylä and Nilsson (1983) were able to demonstrate strikingly high levels of recall (round 96% of a  
 250 30-word list), but only when participants were able to self-generate retrieval cues, and when these  
 251 same retrieval cues were presented at test. These extraordinarily high levels of recall have been  
 252 replicated in other contexts. For example, when participants were able to generate three cues at  
 253 encoding, and then received these cues during an immediate recall test they recalled around 90% of  
 254 up to 600 words. Performance levels declined slightly when only one self-generated cue was  
 255 presented at test (to around 50-60%), but self-generated cues consistently resulted in high levels of  
 256 performance. When other-generated cues were presented performance was particularly low (around  
 257 5% given one cue, rising to 17% when three cues were presented; Mäntylä, 1986). This suggests that  
 258 the benefit of self-generated cues lie with the inclusion of idiosyncratic details within the cues,  
 259 resulting in a unique cue which overlaps with few targets. It is then unsurprising, in terms of the  
 260 encoding-specificity principle of memory, that these cues were only beneficial when they were self-  
 261 generated (Hunt & Smith, 1996).

262 The high levels of performance demonstrated by Mäntylä and colleagues (Mäntylä, 1986; Mäntylä &  
 263 Nilsson, 1983) did however decline considerably as the retention interval increased. This decline was  
 264 suggested as being the result of a decrease in the compatibility of the encoding and retrieval context,

265 stipulated as a requirement of effective recall by the encoding-specificity principle of memory  
266 (Mäntylä, 1986). If this is the case then it is possible that that retrieval is impaired because the  
267 meaning of a cue is interpreted differently at encoding than at recall, and so consistent use of cues  
268 could help to maintain levels of performance. Essentially, reducing *within participant* cue variability  
269 for the same target item should reduce the decline in performance. Mäntylä and Nilsson (1988) asked  
270 participants to focus in particular on distinctive properties of the target when generating a cue in an  
271 attempt to reduce the intrasubject variance (and so make it more likely that the exact same cue will be  
272 produced on more than one occasion). They showed that when cues are generated with distinctive  
273 features in mind, then the decline in performance over time is much smaller (in comparison to a  
274 group who generated their own cues according to personal experience as an appropriate description  
275 of the target word) than has been previously suggested (e.g. in Mäntylä, 1986). This effect persists  
276 throughout a retention interval of up to six weeks. This suggests that asking learners to focus  
277 specifically on distinctive aspects of the to-be-recalled information during encoding results in self-  
278 generated cues which maximize distinctiveness in a way that is unaffected by changes in context  
279 (reduced levels of encoding-retrieval match), and in turn ensures that levels of performance are  
280 maintained over time (Mäntylä & Nilsson, 1988).

281 Self-generated cues have also been shown to be effective in recalling more complex stimuli. For  
282 example, recall of paragraphs of text has been showed to improve with use of self-generated cues.  
283 Van Dam, Brinkerink-Carlier, and Kok (1987) asked participants to study twenty standalone  
284 paragraphs in a factual narrative. Recall of the contents of each paragraph was more complete when  
285 participants were able to first generate a list of keywords (from memory) that they felt represented  
286 the content of each paragraph (i.e. the generated keywords did not have to be present in the  
287 paragraph). Interestingly, this was only effective when keyword generation took place *before* the first  
288 full recall attempt. When an initial recall of the paragraph contents was attempted, and then the  
289 keywords were generated to supplement this attempt, self-generated cues had no impact on the  
290 amount recalled.

291 Furthermore, research has suggested that there is a potential benefit of self-generated cues for those  
292 experiencing the beginnings of cognitive decline. For example, use of self-generated cues has been  
293 shown to facilitate the recall of a word list in both young adults (aged 20-39) and older adults (aged  
294 70-89). Learners generated cues that were either semantic or phonetic (rhyming) dependent upon the  
295 instructions given. A benefit of self-generated cues was shown regardless of the level of processing at  
296 which the cue was generated. However, the benefit was more pronounced for older adults, and in  
297 particular self-generated semantic cues greatly reduced age-related differences in performance  
298 (Sauzéon, Rodrigues, Corsini, & N’Kaoua, 2013). The fact that self-generated cues may benefit older  
299 adults more than younger adults is particularly striking, and further distinguishes self-generated cues  
300 from self-referent cues. For example, while both younger and older adults have been shown to  
301 benefit from encoding items to be recalled with reference to the self, research has suggested that  
302 older adults benefit less from self-referent processing than younger adults. In particular, it has been  
303 suggested that the effectiveness of self-referent encoding varies dependent upon the availability of  
304 cognitive resources, and that older adults are more limited in their ability to use this technique  
305 flexibly (Gutchess, Kensinger, Yoon, & Schacter, 2007).

306 In addition, training in the use of a mnemonic, whether this was an established mnemonic or a self-  
307 generated strategy, has been shown to improve four-digit number recall of older adults. Older adults  
308 were trained using a number-consonant mnemonic (whereby a series of number-consonant pairs are  
309 memorized, and a word-phrase generation technique used to memorize number strings) or asked to  
310 use a systematic approach during practice sessions to develop an effective strategy for recalling the

311 target digit-strings. The self-generated strategy group were asked to monitor their encoding processes  
 312 and to make a note of the strategy they adopted to memorize each four-digit number string. For  
 313 example, in attempting to memorize 2468 participants might enter “my birth year (24), my wife’s age  
 314 (68)”, “digit sequence beginning at 2 and adding 2”, etc. If participants were unable to think of a  
 315 specific strategy they might report “repeated the numbers”, etc. In this way the participants retrieval  
 316 strategies, and the reporting of these strategies, was not constrained in any way. Both trained groups  
 317 outperformed a control (who received no training or practice time) at pre-test and post-test, both with  
 318 and without cognitive support (cognitive support consisted of the generation of a word cue to prompt  
 319 recall). Between the two training groups, the mnemonic group showed an improvement in  
 320 performance from pre-test to post-test, and this improvement was magnified when post-test support  
 321 was provided. In contrast, the self-generated strategy group showed a (non-significant) improvement  
 322 from pre-test to post-test without support. This reached significance when post-test support was  
 323 provided. The fact that both groups showed broadly similar levels of improvement from pre- to post-  
 324 test is particularly striking when it is considered that the self-generated strategy group received  
 325 slightly less training than the mnemonic strategy group (Derwinger, Neely, Persson, Hill, &  
 326 Bäckman, 2003). The gains in performance made by both the trained groups were also shown to  
 327 persist after an eight-month delay (Derwinger et al., 2005). This gain persisted for the self-generated  
 328 strategy group even when cognitive support was removed (the trained mnemonic group in contrast  
 329 showed a decline in performance at this stage). These findings suggest that cognitive support is less  
 330 necessary for the benefit of self-generated strategies to be maintained, in comparison to a more  
 331 cognitively demanding mnemonic technique (Derwinger et al., 2005).

332 Although self-generated cues and self-generated mnemonic strategies have been used successfully by  
 333 older adults, it is important to note that this finding is not as clear cut as might first appear. For  
 334 example, Mäntylä and Bäckman (1990, Experiment 2) demonstrated that when participants were  
 335 asked to recall a target word in response to presentation of a cue word self-generated three weeks  
 336 prior, younger adults outperformed older adults. Mäntylä and Bäckman argue that these results  
 337 reflect an age-related increase in encoding variability. For example, when both younger and older  
 338 adults were asked to generate properties for target words in two sessions up to three weeks apart  
 339 (with the instruction in the second session to generate properties describing their current  
 340 interpretation of the target word, rather than trying to recall the descriptions generated in the first  
 341 session), older adults were less consistent in the properties generated. Older adults also tended to rely  
 342 on more generic properties, rather than utilizing more distinctive idiosyncratic properties (Mäntylä &  
 343 Bäckman, 1990, Experiment 1). They suggest that this increase in age-related encoding variability is  
 344 likely to contribute to the decline in episodic recall performance. Despite this, the potential benefit of  
 345 self-generated cues in facilitating recall of both younger and older adults is something which merits  
 346 further research.

#### 347 **2.4 Context as a retrieval cue**

348 Retrieval cues can also come from the context of an event. The contextual dependence of memory  
 349 and the benefit that physical or mental reinstatement of encoding conditions at retrieval can have  
 350 upon recall has long been established in laboratory research (see for example Smith, 1979). The  
 351 relationship between memory and context is a natural extension of the encoding-specificity principle  
 352 of memory (Tulving & Thomson, 1973). In addition, the provision of contextual cues may enhance  
 353 the completeness of recall through facilitating the spread of activation from accessible items to those  
 354 not initially accessible (Hershkowitz, Orbach, Lamb, Sternberg, & Horowitz, 2002).

355 One of the most established and frequently tested context reinstatement techniques is the Mental  
 356 Reinstatement of Context. This is one of the cognitive mnemonic techniques incorporated into the  
 357 Cognitive Interview (developed by Fisher, Geiselman, Holland, & MacKinnon, 1984). Mental  
 358 reinstatement of context describes the process of guiding the individual to reconstruct an internal  
 359 representation of the physical context of an event. This generally includes instructions to “reinstatement in  
 360 your mind the context surrounding the event” through considering the layout of the scene, the  
 361 weather, the people and objects that were nearby, and so on. It is also considers the personal context  
 362 of the event, through attempting to recall thoughts, feelings, and reactions to the event to-be-recalled  
 363 (Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon, & Holland, 1985). This technique is frequently used within  
 364 laboratory studies on eyewitness memory. A recent meta-analysis suggested that 100% of the studies  
 365 conducted using the CI and its variants over the preceding 25 years had incorporated MRC  
 366 instructions (Memon, Meissner, & Fraser, 2010). It is also noted as being a highly effective recall  
 367 technique. For example, provision of physical cues from encoding and encouraging mental  
 368 reinstatement of the context of the event has been suggested to increase the accuracy of  
 369 identifications in an eyewitness context (Krafka & Penrod, 1985). This process has been shown to  
 370 result in an increase in the level of detail (although not necessarily the amount of detail) provided in  
 371 real-world accounts (e.g. Hershkowitz et al., 2002).

#### 372 **2.4.1 The benefit of self-generated cues over context reinstatement**

373 It has been suggested that the benefits of context-based cues become more apparent only  
 374 when more effective cues are unavailable, suggesting that the benefit of context-based mnemonic  
 375 approaches can be overshadowed if individuals are able to provide their own cues (Pansky et al.,  
 376 2005). One potential means of reinstating context whilst also encouraging the use of an individual’s  
 377 own cues is the Sketch Mental Reinstatement of Context. Developed by Dando and colleagues  
 378 (Dando, Wilcock, Behnkle, & Milne, 2011; Dando, Wilcock, Milne, & Henry, 2009) this technique  
 379 allows trained interviewers to guide individuals towards using their own contextual cues when  
 380 recalling a complex event. When using this technique, the witness sketches details of the event to be  
 381 recalled, describing these aloud as they do so. Use of the Sketch Mental Reinstatement of Context  
 382 has been suggested as comparable to the standard Mental Reinstatement of Context procedure in  
 383 terms of both accurate information elicited and overall accuracy. The additional benefit of the Sketch  
 384 Mental Reinstatement of Context is that it introduces self-generated contextual cues which are likely  
 385 to be more salient (and so more effective) than contextual cues provided by an interviewer (for  
 386 example through the standard MRC procedure).

387 However, even where context reinstatement techniques can be combined with self-generated retrieval  
 388 cues, there remains problems with the application of these techniques. Context reinstatement  
 389 techniques such as Mental Reinstatement of Context can be both difficult and time-consuming to  
 390 implement effectively. For example, trained interviewers report finding Mental Reinstatement of  
 391 Context (and other Cognitive Interview techniques) cognitively demanding, requiring flexibility, and  
 392 difficult to incorporate in real world settings (Brown et al., 2008; Kebbell et al., 1999). It should be  
 393 noted here that the Sketch Mental Reinstatement of Context technique has been suggested to reduce  
 394 some of these demands, but more research is needed before this can be stated conclusively.

395 In contrast, the limited work that has investigated the use of self-generated cues in an applied context  
 396 suggests that they might be preferable to techniques which require greater levels of training. As  
 397 Derwinger and colleagues suggest the ease of use and personal compatibility inherent in self-  
 398 generated strategies may mean that they are relatively easily incorporated into everyday routine, thus  
 399 providing practice effects over time (Derwinger et al., 2005). The self-generated cue research  
 400 described thus far has some applied relevance, but still relies primarily upon fairly artificial stimuli

401 and artificial means of self-generated cue production. The work outlined in the following section  
402 begins to take steps to move the use of self-generated cues into a more ecologically valid domain.

403 When faced with a complex event, particularly one rich in temporal details or involving multiple  
404 actors, accurate recall of information becomes a more cognitively demanding task. Interviewee-led  
405 cueing methods have begun to appear in an eyewitness domain, and these techniques show  
406 undoubtable promise. For example, Hope, Mullis, and Gabbert (2013) demonstrated that use of the  
407 timeline technique facilitated retrieval in an eyewitness testimony context. When using this technique  
408 individuals are able to delineate a complex event into key stages by placing person description cards  
409 and action cards on a physical cardboard timeline. This allows the interviewee to recall the  
410 individuals, actions, and sequences involved in a complex event in a witness-compatible manner (e.g.  
411 by beginning at the most salient point of the event). Use of this technique has been shown to facilitate  
412 the retrieval of more details than a free recall account alone, with no cost to accuracy. This benefit  
413 persists even after a two-week delay. Furthermore, use of multiple mnemonics, including self-  
414 generated cues, during an interview about repeated events (in this case family gatherings) facilitated  
415 witness recall, even when the witness judged that they had recalled as much as they were able (and  
416 after repeated attempts to keep trying yielded no more information). Results showed an increase in  
417 recall of around 70% when using a combination of seven distinct mnemonics than when recalling  
418 unaided (Leins, Fisher, Pludwinski, Rivard, & Robertson, 2014). Taken together these findings  
419 suggest that self-generated cues may be an intuitive means of facilitating recall in everyday settings.

## 420 **2.5 Theoretical underpinnings of self-generated cue mnemonics**

421 The research outlined thus far suggests a clear benefit of the use of self-generated cues on retrieval.  
422 We now address the theory underlying this approach. There are three key principles of memory  
423 which contribute to explaining the effectiveness of self-generated cues: the spreading activation  
424 theory of memory, the encoding-specificity principle of memory, and cue distinctiveness. We outline  
425 each of these in turn in the sections that follow, and speculate on how these principles of memory  
426 relate to the success of self-generated cues in aiding retrieval.

### 427 **2.5.1 Spreading Activation Theory of memory**

428 In attempting to recall information from episodic memory we have to access long-term memory, a  
429 relatively slow process in comparison to other human information processing systems (Anderson,  
430 1983a). Spreading activation models view information in long-term memory as being represented by  
431 a network of associated concepts. The assumption is then that it is possible to recall a given item  
432 from memory by recalling other information associated with the target. This is made possible through  
433 the process of activation spreading through the network (Anderson, 1983a; Crestani, 1997).

434 Memory is generally viewed as a network of interlinked nodes (as in Anderson, 1983b; Collins &  
435 Loftus, 1975). Within these networks, units of memory are conceptualized as cognitive units, made  
436 up of a unit and its associated elements (or key properties of the node). Cognitive units make up the  
437 essential units of encoding and retrieval. During encoding, a cognitive unit is formed via a copy in  
438 working memory, which is later transferred as a more permanent long-term memory trace (Anderson,  
439 1983b). Associative networks are formed of generic nodes, representing concepts or categories and  
440 knowledge about the category member, and episodic nodes, representing specific instances of generic  
441 nodes, connected by associative links (Tuckey & Brewer, 2003). There has been some debate around  
442 whether cognitive units are limited or unconstrained in terms of the number of linked elements they  
443 are able to contain. Irrespective of this, it is likely that memory networks represent a complex

444 structure of links between concepts and associated properties (see Anderson, 1983b, and Collins &  
 445 Loftus, 1975, for examples of opposing views on this issue).

446 Spreading activation models generally assume that when information is encoded in memory it is also  
 447 incorporated into a semantic network. In other words, information can be considered as being  
 448 organized around semantic similarities. If this is the case, then the extent to which any one concept  
 449 primes activation of another is a function of the number of connections between the two concepts. In  
 450 other words, as activation spreads between semantically related memories during a recall attempt, the  
 451 recall of one item often primes the recall of other semantically related items and so on (for further  
 452 discussion of this assumption and the underlying experimental data see Collins & Loftus, 1975).

453 Further support for the assumption of semantic organization of memory networks is shown through  
 454 the use of category clustering recall techniques. Paulo, Albuquerque, and Bull, (2016) examined  
 455 whether recall of a complex eyewitness event could be improved by asking participants to recall the  
 456 target event in terms of the person, object, action, and location details of the event. Their results  
 457 suggest that this category clustering is an effective mnemonic technique. Paulo et al. (2016) suggest  
 458 that according to Collins and Loftus' (1975) spreading activation theory of semantic processing, a  
 459 key benefit of recalling via semantic (or category) clusters is that this approach gradually allows  
 460 activation within the network to reach a level which triggers other semantically related information  
 461 which may not otherwise have been activated and recalled.

462 Spreading activation models of memory all generally view a memory search as the process of  
 463 spreading activation from concept nodes along associative links throughout a semantic network until  
 464 a threshold is reached (Collins & Loftus, 1975). The original spreading activation theory was  
 465 proposed by Quillian (1962, 1967) who attempted to develop computer simulations of human  
 466 memory search (see also developments by Anderson, 1983b; Collins & Loftus, 1975). It is generally  
 467 accepted that a memory cue (sometimes termed a memory probe) triggers a memory search  
 468 beginning at the node or nodes originally activated by the cue. The activation then spreads to all  
 469 nodes connected to the initial node, and then to all nodes linked to these first tier activated nodes, and  
 470 so on (Collins & Loftus, 1975). As activation spreads throughout the network information associated  
 471 with the sources of activation becomes available (Anderson & Pirolli, 1984). This process is shown  
 472 in Figure 1 below. In this example, the cue triggers activation of the black node; this activation then  
 473 spreads to the three dark grey nodes connected to the initial node (the first tier or spreading  
 474 activation), and from there the activation continues down all pathways connected to the first tier  
 475 activated nodes to reach the light grey second tier of activated nodes. Anderson (1983a) suggests that  
 476 the transmission of activation is bidirectional; as shown in Figure 1, nodes can rebound activation  
 477 back upon nodes which are already activated. The level of activation reached by each node begins to  
 478 decrease as soon as the information contained in the node drops from the focus of attention  
 479 (Anderson, 1983b) and continues to decrease with the passage of time (Collins & Loftus, 1975).

480 <Figure 1 about here please>

481 Figure 1 also depicts the fanning of activation down parallel paths. Activation begins at the initially  
 482 activated node and continues out along multiple parallel paths. Where an active concept node has  
 483 links to multiple other nodes (these links are referred to as the fan of the concept), the activation  
 484 spreads in parallel among these pathways. For example, the level of activation initially received at the  
 485 source node (in black) splits simultaneously down the three pathways leading to the dark grey first  
 486 tier activated nodes. Anderson (1983a) argues that nodes have a finite capacity for activation, and so  
 487 the more paths a node is connected to, the less activation it is able to send down any one path (as the

488 level of activation transmitted out along the path is a function of the amount of activation received  
 489 minus the total number of paths connected to the node), and so the slower the recall process is. In  
 490 essence, this means that where the fan effect occurs the amount of activation available for any one  
 491 pathway decreases, and the time taken to retrieve information increases. The more facts that are  
 492 linked to a given concept, the longer it takes to recall any one fact associated with that concept  
 493 (Anderson & Reder, 1999).

494 Targets are recognized (or recalled) when a threshold level of activation has been reached (Anderson,  
 495 1983a). The overall amount of activation a given node receives predicts the amount of time it will  
 496 take to accurately recall the information contained within that node (Anderson, 1983b). The level of  
 497 activation that a node receives can be considered as a product of the strength of their associations.  
 498 Nodes which are more closely or strongly related to the source of activation receive more activation  
 499 than those which are further removed. In other words, as activation spreads throughout the network,  
 500 its strength decreases. As Collins and Loftus (1975, p. 411) state “activation is like a signal from a  
 501 source that is attenuated as it travels outwards”. In this way, the level of activation of other nodes  
 502 within the network varies in terms of their degree of association to the source nodes. The activation  
 503 arriving from multiple sources at a single node will sum. As such, information contained within any  
 504 given node is processed more quickly when multiple sources spread activation to the target node  
 505 (Anderson & Pirolli, 1984). Ultimately the level of activation within a given area of the network  
 506 predicts the speed and accuracy with which information within that area can be recalled (Anderson  
 507 1983b). To illustrate, in Figure 1 the information stored in nodes to the left of the vertical dotted line  
 508 is more likely to be recalled quickly and accurately than the information stored in nodes on the right  
 509 (all else being equal, the activation received by nodes on the left is greater than that received by those  
 510 on the right). Individuals can also capitalize upon the gathering of activation within specific areas of  
 511 a network by refocusing activation from the initial node to a more active subnode to enable faster a  
 512 spread of activation (see Anderson, 1983b for discussion).

513 Within spreading activation models of memory there has been some debate around which factor  
 514 ultimately predicts the time taken to recall a target item. It has previously been assumed that the time  
 515 taken to recall an item is a function of the amount of time it takes activation to spread throughout the  
 516 network (Ratcliff & McKoon, 1981). In contrast, Anderson (1983b) suggests that processing time can  
 517 be explained as the time taken for activation to reach a peak (an asymptotic level of activation). This  
 518 argument is based primarily on the findings of priming studies (see Anderson 1983b for discussion),  
 519 and is a key feature distinguishing Anderson’s (1983b) model of spreading activation from other  
 520 spreading activation models. The strength of individual nodes and their associated links also  
 521 contributes to understanding of how some nodes reach higher levels of activation sooner than others.  
 522 One assumption of the fan effect described above is that as a node becomes active, each path from  
 523 the concept node to its properties is equally activated. However, data suggests that this might not  
 524 always be the case. As stated above, both Anderson (1983a, 1983b) and Collins and Loftus (1975)  
 525 argue that the strength of the relationship (and so the distance between) a node and the source of  
 526 activation predicts how much activation that node is likely to receive. As a result, it can be assumed  
 527 that not all concepts and links are of equal strength (Anderson 1983a, 1983b). For example,  
 528 Anderson (1983a) suggests that activation is allocated among competing paths based upon their  
 529 relative strength. He gives the example of slower response times for two-fan facts studied four times,  
 530 when an alternative has been studied more frequently, and takes this as the basis for the argument  
 531 that activation is allocated based upon the relative strength of each possible pathway (see Anderson,  
 532 1983a for further discussion).

533 Proponents of spreading activation theories of memory generally agree that individual nodes vary in  
 534 strength. A number of explanations as to how this occurs have been put forward. For example, node  
 535 strength may be predicted by frequency of exposure. When facts about concepts are studied and  
 536 tested more frequently, the individual nodes containing these facts (and their associated memory  
 537 traces) become stronger, resulting in faster, more accurate recall. This strengthening effect occurs  
 538 even when practice sessions occur in quick succession (for further discussion of practice effects see  
 539 Anderson, 1983b; Tuckey & Brewer, 2003). Anderson (1983b) argues that once formed traces are  
 540 not lost, but their strength does decrease gradually over time. In this way, Schacter (1999) suggests  
 541 that spreading activation theories of memory can go some way towards explaining what he refers to  
 542 as ‘the sin of transience’, or gradual forgetting over time. When not bolstered by the strengthening  
 543 effects that retrieval attempts can have, the associated memory traces begin to gradually weaken, and  
 544 so to become less accessible over time. On the other hand, Tuckey and Brewer (2003) argue that the  
 545 strength of associative links is also in part determined by how schema-consistent or inconsistent the  
 546 items encoded are. For example, aspects of an event that are schema consistent are more likely to be  
 547 rehearsed and so are more likely to be strongly encoding than those that are schema inconsistent.  
 548 This is supported by their finding that schema inconsistent information shows greater levels of decay  
 549 than schema consistent information. Regardless of the reason for their strength, stronger nodes are  
 550 also able to transmit and receive greater levels of activation, and thus allow more activation to gather  
 551 in areas of the network containing stronger nodes (Anderson, 1983b). The implication of this for  
 552 retrieval processes is that the most salient cues are the ones which are most likely to enable fast,  
 553 accurate retrieval of information.

554

### 555 **2.5.1.1 Spreading activation theory and self-generated cues**

556 Spreading activation theories underpin the effectiveness of retrieval cues based upon a number of key  
 557 properties. As has been previously discussed, a high-quality retrieval cue generally has a strong  
 558 association with the target memory, whilst also being able to easily incorporate new related  
 559 information as necessary. These associations should also be bidirectional, whereby the cue recalls the  
 560 target information, and the target information recalls the cue (Bellezza & Hoyt, 1992). When the  
 561 effectiveness of a retrieval cue is described in terms of these properties, then it is clear that the  
 562 spreading activation theory of memory is of critical importance in explaining successful recall. We  
 563 suggest that self-generated cues offer the opportunity to maximise the benefit of these properties, and  
 564 briefly outline how this may be the case below.

565 It is well established that recall of one item can prompt further recall of semantically related items  
 566 (Collins & Loftus, 1975). This occurs through the spread of activation through the associative links  
 567 of the memory network. When the associative links are stronger, then information is recalled faster  
 568 and more accurately. For example, when recall of a target word is cued by a word more closely  
 569 associated with the target then the target is recalled faster, than when the target is cued by a word  
 570 situated further away in the network (Ratcliff & McKoon, 1981). The benefit of strongly associated  
 571 semantic clusters has also been demonstrated through category clustering recall. In line with the  
 572 spreading activation theory, if memory is indeed organised according to semantic similarity, then  
 573 focusing on and recalling information by semantic cluster is likely to produce enough activation to  
 574 cue associated items. When individuals are asked to make a second or third recall attempt using  
 575 category clustering (i.e. attempting to recall further information one semantic category at a time, for  
 576 example person details, action details, and so on), then recall improves without a cost to accuracy,  
 577 compared to recall attempts using other established mnemonic techniques such as the change order  
 578 mnemonic (Paulo et al., 2016). The prime benefit of this approach is that it is relatively intuitive;

579 individuals often spontaneously encode, organise, and recall information in semantic clusters (see  
580 Paulo et al., 2016 for further discussion).

581 Although further research is needed to test these assumptions, we propose that self-generated cues  
582 represent a prime opportunity to capitalize upon the semantic organisation of memory. In allowing  
583 individuals to define their own semantic clusters, we give individuals the opportunity to focus their  
584 recall attempts on clusters most compatible with their own encoding of the target material. Self-  
585 generated cues also present the opportunity to cue recall using strong associative links. In allowing  
586 individuals to generate their own cues we maximise the opportunity to trigger activation from the  
587 point most critical to the recall of the target material. For example, by allowing individuals to select  
588 their own cues we can capitalize upon the strongest associative links, and minimise the distance in  
589 the network between cue and target.

590 The importance of the bidirectionality of associative links becomes apparent when we consider  
591 ‘recognition failure’; where associative links do not have bidirectionality, then it is possible that a  
592 target memory will not be selected in a recognition context without the associated learned cue or  
593 context. Interestingly, this means that individuals may be able to recall details of the target memory  
594 given an associated concept that they are not able to provide in a recognition task (Tulving &  
595 Thomson, 1973; Wiseman & Tulving, 1976). Similarly, where a cue and target evoke each other with  
596 high frequency (e.g. tree cues oak, and vice versa) then the target is recalled more quickly when a cue  
597 is provided, than when a cue and target evoke each other with low frequency (e.g. cloth cueing orlon,  
598 or vice versa). Importantly, where the cue and target evoke each other with equal frequency then  
599 either word can be used to prompt recall of the other (i.e. it doesn’t matter which is presented as the  
600 cue, and which as the target). In contrast, where there is an imbalance in this strength of association,  
601 and so the cue evokes the target at a higher frequency than the inverse (as with seafood-shrimp;  
602 seafood evokes the word shrimp at a higher frequency than shrimp does seafood), then reaction time  
603 varies significantly dependent upon which word was used to cue which (Collins & Loftus, 1975).  
604 This demonstrates the importance of bidirectional relationships. We suggest that if self-generated  
605 cues do indeed offer the opportunity to minimise the distance between cue and target within the  
606 semantic network, then it is also plausible that they can contribute to maximizing the bidirectionality  
607 of associative links.

### 608 **2.5.2 Encoding-Specificity Principle of memory**

609 Initially developed by Tulving and colleagues, the encoding-specificity principle of memory (or  
610 encoding-retrieval specificity) refers to the idea that retrieval cues are effective only to the extent that  
611 information within the memory cue is also contained within the target memory trace created at the  
612 time of encoding. As Tulving and Thomson (1973, p. 353) note “what is stored is determined by  
613 what is perceived and how it is encoded, and what is stored determines what retrieval cues are  
614 effective in providing access to what is stored.” Put another way, the encoding-specificity principle  
615 of memory takes as its core the idea that it is only possible to retrieve what has been stored in  
616 memory, and that the way this information has been encoded and stored governs the ways in which  
617 this information can be retrieved (Tulving & Thomson, 1973).

618 Tulving and Thomson (1973) agreed with the principles of memory outlined in spreading activation  
619 theories that: (a) information within memory is stored as a memory trace; (b) a memory trace is a  
620 collection of elements, features, or attributes of the encoded information; and (c) that an encoding  
621 phase is situated between the perception of an event, and the creation of a memory trace. However,  
622 they viewed retrieval as a selective process, relying on a complex interaction between encoded  
623 information and features of the retrieval environment (Tulving & Thomson, 1973). Tulving and

624 Thomson (1973) argue that it is well established that identical information encoded under different  
625 conditions can lead to differences in recall and recognition performance. Likewise, the information  
626 present at retrieval can greatly influence the recall and recognition of items stored under identical  
627 encoding conditions. These findings, as well as more general forgetting, can be explained through  
628 encoding-specificity in terms of the accessibility of information in memory; information may not be  
629 lost, so much as inaccessible given the cues available at the time of the recall attempt (Brown &  
630 Craik, 2000). Together, these ideas suggest that different cues might make different memory traces  
631 more accessible than others, which in turn raises the question of what constitutes an effective  
632 retrieval cue.

633 Tulving and Thomson (1973) argue that the spreading activation explanation of differences in recall  
634 performance as being caused by differing strengths of memory traces is of little practical value.  
635 Tulving and colleagues also suggest that the benefit of a strong cue-target association is likely to be  
636 lost if the cue is not also encoded alongside the target information (for further discussion see  
637 Thomson & Tulving, 1970; Tulving & Osler, 1968; Tulving & Thomson, 1973). If information is not  
638 salient at the time of encoding, then it will not act as an effective memory cue for the target,  
639 regardless of how central the cue might be to the target in general terms (Brown & Craik, 2000). In  
640 essence, this means that the match between features of recall and features of encoding is more  
641 important for a successful retrieval attempt than the strength of the association between the cue and  
642 the target information (Pansky et al., 2005; Roediger & Guynn, 1996).

643 A number of studies have demonstrated support for this concept. For example, across a series of three  
644 studies, Thomson and Tulving (1970) demonstrated that when weakly associated cues were encoded  
645 alongside target information, then strongly associated cues provided at recall (but not at encoding)  
646 did not facilitate retrieval of the target information. In addition, Higham (2002) found strongly  
647 associated retrieval cues not presented at encoding produced less correctly recalled information and  
648 more incorrect recall than weakly associated cues which had been previously presented at study.  
649 Furthermore, Rosenbluth-Mor (2001 cited in Pansky et al., 2005) found that weakly associated cues  
650 presented at both encoding and retrieval facilitated recall in comparison to a no cue control, whereas  
651 presenting a new (not seen at encoding) weakly associated cue at retrieval impaired performance in  
652 comparison to a no cue control. Taken together, these findings demonstrate that mismatch between  
653 encoding and retrieval cues impairs recall, rather than the more conventional view that increasing the  
654 match improves recall (Pansky et al., 2005). It is however important to note that this view is not  
655 universally shared by researchers. For example, research has shown that an encoding-retrieval  
656 mismatch has a more detrimental effect on those with high working memory capacity than those of  
657 low working memory capacity. It has been suggested that this effect is seen because individuals with  
658 high working memory capacity are more likely to encode information strategically, and to utilize  
659 these strategies at recall, and so experience a decline in performance when their planned strategies  
660 are disrupted (Unsworth, Brewer, & Spillers, 2011). In addition, some researchers have found means  
661 of improving recall performance using strongly associated cues not presented at the time of encoding  
662 (see Higham, 2002, for discussion of this).

663 It is not the case that the encoding-specificity principle ignores the role that semantic relationships  
664 between cues and items to be recalled can play. Rather, this is seen as a part of the cognitive  
665 encoding environment. For example, when encoding a wordlist for later recall we can assume that  
666 information is encoded about the appearance of a given word in the present context. This might or  
667 might not include encoding information about the semantic relationships between wordlist items: if  
668 so then another item on the wordlist might constitute an effective retrieval cue, if not then this will  
669 not be the case (see Tulving & Thomson, 1973 for empirical support for these claims). In addition,

670 where target words are encoded alongside cue words, there is often an assumption that these cues will  
 671 reappear at test, and as such the cue word forms part of the context in which the target is encoded.  
 672 This means that the target memory trace cannot always be readily accessed in a recognition context,  
 673 where the memory cue provided consists solely of the target word itself without the associated  
 674 encoding context. This is termed ‘recognition failure’ (see Wiseman & Tulving, 1976 for further  
 675 discussion of recognition failure).

676

677 It should be noted that the encoding-specificity principle and the spreading activation theory are not  
 678 necessarily mutually exclusive. Anderson (1983b) argues that the findings of encoding-specificity  
 679 studies (such as Tulving & Thomson, 1973) can still be incorporated into a spreading activation  
 680 framework. In particular, when a cue has multiple possible interpretations (e.g. the word ‘jam’ might  
 681 be interpreted differently dependent upon whether it is presented alongside the associated word  
 682 ‘raspberry’ or ‘traffic’), then the encoding context determines which interpretation is encoded  
 683 (potentially alongside other cues from the encoding context itself). At retrieval, context can then be  
 684 used to determine the appropriate interpretation to activate, and the activation spreads from this point  
 685 out into the network. The probability of recall or recognition is therefore higher when the same  
 686 interpretation is selected at both encoding and retrieval, thus allowing activation to spread directly  
 687 from the node directly linked to the memory trace and reducing levels of activation sent down  
 688 pathways linked to alternative interpretations.

### 689 **2.5.2.1 Encoding specificity and self-generated cues**

690 As previously noted, the encoding-specificity principle of memory and spreading activation theory  
 691 are not mutually exclusive. Context can be used to activate appropriate concepts within memory  
 692 (Anderson, 1983b), and facilitate the spread of activation through a memory network (HersHKowitz et  
 693 al., 2002). Research around the generation of cues for the self versus another individual suggests that  
 694 self-generated cues contain more idiosyncratic episodic details than cues generated by, or for use by,  
 695 others. The latter tend to contain more generic, semantic details (Mäntylä, 1986; Mäntylä & Nilsson  
 696 1988). Interestingly, cues generated by older adults to cue their own memory also tend to show this  
 697 same generic focus (Mäntylä & Bäckman, 1990). In addition, when learners recall an incorrect target  
 698 in response to a self-generated cue this seems to be driven by a strong associative relationship  
 699 between the cue and the incorrect response (Tullis, 2013). Taken together, these findings suggest that  
 700 spreading activation can be considered as a ‘back-up’ route in cue generation, seemingly forming a  
 701 default option when cognitive resources are low, or when recall via a more efficient means (such as  
 702 encoding-specificity or cue distinctiveness) has failed. In this sense, spreading activation theory can  
 703 essentially be viewed as the foundation upon which effective retrieval cues, whether generated by the  
 704 self or another, can be built, with encoding-specificity and cue distinctiveness providing an additional  
 705 benefit beyond this default route.

706 The encoding-specificity principle of memory suggests that good quality retrieval cues have a high  
 707 level of overlap between encoding and retrieval. This allows cues generated at encoding to be  
 708 reproduced at retrieval reliably and consistently. These qualities, combined with the benefit of  
 709 semantic clustering, make for highly effective retrieval techniques. For example, while the category  
 710 clustering recall technique previously outlined allows recall to be cued using strongly associated  
 711 semantic clusters, this technique also provides the additional benefit of framing recall in an encoding  
 712 compatible manner. The same benefit is provided by self-generated cues; indeed, we would suggest  
 713 that this benefit is magnified in the case of self-generated cues. According to the principle of  
 714 encoding-retrieval specificity, effective cueing relies on a knowledge of the most salient aspects of

715 information to be recalled. If this is the case then it follows logically that the best cues are generated  
716 by the self to guide recall, than by an other.

717

### 718 2.5.3 Cue distinctiveness

719 Overall, the idea that the same material may be encoded differently in a different cognitive context,  
720 resulting in different routes through which to access the information, lies at the heart of the encoding-  
721 specificity principle of memory. Yet, Tulving and Thomson (1973) also highlight the influence of  
722 other, somewhat indefinable factors. They demonstrate that an additional factor is likely to operate  
723 alongside the properties of an encoded item, and that this unknown factor further impacts upon the  
724 chance of successful retrieval. As Nairne (2002) states, even when we ensure a *nominal* match  
725 between encoding and retrieval (e.g. through use of identical cues), this does not guarantee a  
726 *functional* match between the cue and the memory trace for the target item. Therefore, despite the  
727 widely accepted beliefs that once encoding has been completed it is the match between encoding and  
728 retrieval conditions that is the primary predictor of memory performance, data from memory studies  
729 (see Nairne, 2002) suggest that there must be other factors also at play. One candidate which may  
730 help to explain the differences in recall performance not captured by encoding-specificity, is cue  
731 distinctiveness<sup>1</sup>.

732 Nairne (2002, p. 390) considers the process of remembering to be “an active process of  
733 discrimination” during which we use retrieval cues to guide us towards viable retrieval candidates.  
734 He argues that although the encoding-specificity principle of memory is of some practical value, its  
735 theoretical relevance is limited. The rationale behind this claim is that the relationship between  
736 encoding and retrieval is correlational rather than causal. Instead Nairne (2002) argues that cue  
737 distinctiveness has a stronger influence on retrieval. Increasing the overlap between encoding and  
738 retrieval benefits recall through increasing the probability that distinctive features unique to the target  
739 will be utilized. He is not alone in this belief; it has been suggested that a key property of an effective  
740 retrieval cue is discriminability (Bellezza & Hoyt, 1992). Retrieval cues which are distinct from each  
741 other are more likely to prompt the recall of target information, and more likely to result in the recall  
742 of verbatim, rather than gist-based information (Anderson, 1983a; Anderson & Reder, 1999; Tuckey  
743 & Brewer, 2003). Cue distinctiveness is based upon similar principles.

744 Cue distinctiveness (or an absence of cue overload) refers to whether a cue is uniquely associated  
745 with a target memory. If a cue is linked to multiple memory traces (and so is ‘overloaded’), then it  
746 becomes more difficult for that cue to activate the current target trace. This clearly will reduce the  
747 effectiveness of the cue in facilitating recall of the target information (Watkins & Watkins, 1975). In  
748 other words, a retrieval cue is useful only to the extent that it provides diagnostic information about  
749 the occurrence of a target item (Pansky et al., 2005). Cue distinctiveness is also entwined with the  
750 encoding process. Encoding information in ways that lead to a more precise memory trace, and in  
751 doing so separating one encoding experience from others contained within memory, facilitates recall.  
752 Distinctiveness is critical to this process (see Schmidt, 1991, for a review of the distinctiveness  
753 literature). When unique elements of an event (those which do not overlap with other events) are

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<sup>1</sup> It should be noted that some researchers distinguish between the terms ‘unique’ and ‘distinctive’ (see Mäntylä & Nilsson, 1983 for discussion of this). While we agree with Mäntylä and Nilsson (1983) that a careful conceptual analysis of these terms is needed, this is beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, throughout this manuscript we use the terms unique and distinctive interchangeably to describe a retrieval cue which recalls one particular memory at the exclusion of others, and as such can be considered to have diagnostic value.

754 encoded, then these elements form a unique identifier for the target event, and so increase the  
 755 likelihood that it can be discriminated from other events stored in memory. Where this distinct  
 756 element is available at retrieval then the unique cue reinstates the original memory trace, provided  
 757 that the context (of the distinctive element) is the same (Hunt & Smith, 1996).

758 Most researchers currently favor a two-factor account, which accepts that both encoding-retrieval  
 759 match (encoding-specificity) and cue overload (or cue distinctiveness) combine to influence memory  
 760 performance. However, Nairne (2002) argues that this approach impedes our ability to make practical  
 761 predictions about memory performance. He gives an example of trying to recall a target event ( $E_1$ )  
 762 from a series of events ( $E_2$ ,  $E_3$ , and so on). If a participant is cued with an event feature unique to the  
 763 target event (feature  $X_1$ ), then this is likely to facilitate recall. However, if the feature used as a cue  
 764 was present for events one, two, and three ( $E_1$ ,  $E_2$ ,  $E_3$ ), then this cue (feature  $X_2$ ) loses its diagnostic  
 765 value, making it more difficult to discriminate the target event memory from other competing event  
 766 memories. In this case, we can reasonably expect recall performance to decline. In short, memory  
 767 performance is equal to the match between cue ( $X_1$ ) and target ( $E_1$ ) and declines as the number of  
 768 items associated with cue ( $X_1$ ) increases (Nairne, 2002). The critical aspect of the cue distinctiveness  
 769 principle then is that cue-target match is *necessary* but not *sufficient* for accurate retrieval. Nairne  
 770 (2002) and other advocates of the benefit of cue distinctiveness (e.g. Moscovitch & Craik, 1976)  
 771 accept that retrieval cues are effective only if they match the memory trace of the target item (as in  
 772 the encoding-specificity principle of memory), but suggest that diagnostic cues, which specify a  
 773 single target item and exclude others, are key in predicting recall performance. In other words, if a  
 774 retrieval cue is specific to the encoded event, then this is more likely to result in accurate recall than a  
 775 more generic cue, and it is this diagnostic value that is key (Goh & Lu, 2012; Nairne, 2002).

776 Several studies have shown support for cue distinctiveness as a predictor of recall performance. For  
 777 example, Moscovitch and Craik (1976, Experiments 2 & 3) manipulated the number of targets paired  
 778 with a cue, and the similarity of this cue to others encoded. Participants encoded questions as cues  
 779 alongside target words, and were then asked to recall the target words given the question cue. When  
 780 cues were shared among a set of ten targets, recall performance was lower than when each target was  
 781 prompted by a distinct cue question. This is consistent with other research (e.g. Watkins & Watkins,  
 782 1975) and with well documented effects such as the list length effect. However, Moscovitch and  
 783 Craik's findings suggest that this effect was not universal across all stimuli (for example semantically  
 784 encoded words, or items associated with a positive response to the cue question). In addition, they  
 785 noted that recall of rhyme-encoded words showed little decline in response to the shared cue  
 786 manipulation. They argue that this suggests that there are 'levels' of distinctiveness, and that surface  
 787 level distinctiveness is of little importance in comparison to more meaningful forms of  
 788 distinctiveness. In order to test this hypothesis, Goh and Lu (2012), manipulated both encoding-  
 789 retrieval match and the degree of cue overload in a 2 (overload: high, low) X 2 (encoding-retrieval  
 790 match: high, low) design. In each condition participants learned a list of word pairs and were later  
 791 tested on these pairs in a cued recall task. In high encoding-retrieval match conditions participants  
 792 were provided with the originally encoded cue word, alongside a second cue of the semantic category  
 793 the target word belonged to. In low encoding-retrieval match conditions, only the originally encoded  
 794 cue was provided. To manipulate cue overload, Goh and Lu (2012) ensured that the semantic  
 795 category cue provided at test applied to several (in some cases all) of the words learned at encoding  
 796 (high cue overload) or was unique to the target word (low cue overload). Goh and Lu's (2012) results  
 797 suggest that high encoding-retrieval match does not necessarily facilitate recall, showing instead that  
 798 high encoding-retrieval match improves performance only when cue overload is low (see  
 799 Brandimonte & Passolunghi, 1994, for similar support of cue-distinctiveness in a prospective  
 800 memory task).

### 801 **2.5.3.1 Cue distinctiveness and self-generated cues**

802 The principles of encoding-specificity and cue distinctiveness can be difficult to disentangle in terms  
 803 of their contribution to the effectiveness of retrieval cues, and of self-generated cues in particular. It  
 804 is clear however, that cue distinctiveness adds to the effectiveness of cues with a high degree of  
 805 encoding-retrieval overlap. For example, while the effectiveness of a cue which has a high level of  
 806 overlap with the target, and contains idiosyncratic details about the encoding context can be  
 807 understood in terms of encoding-specificity, maintaining this advantage can be seen as a product of  
 808 cue distinctiveness. In other words, the best retrieval cues are those which emphasize distinctive  
 809 aspects of the target, resulting in increased consistency with which targets are produced in response  
 810 to cues over a longer retention interval. Where this consistency is lost, we see increased encoding  
 811 variability, and poorer memory performance over time (Anderson & Reder, 1999; Mäntylä &  
 812 Bäckman, 1990; Watkins & Watkins, 1975). Asking learners to focus specifically on distinctive  
 813 aspects of the to-be-recalled information during encoding results in self-generated cues which  
 814 maximize distinctiveness in a way that is unaffected by changes in context (reduced levels of  
 815 encoding-retrieval match), and in turn ensures that levels of performance are maintained over time  
 816 (Mäntylä & Nilsson, 1988). In addition, the idiosyncratic nature of self-generated cues means that  
 817 one individual's cues that are given to another individual at test would be unlikely to benefit their  
 818 performance, even if the same information had been presented at encoding. This additional benefit of  
 819 cue distinctiveness beyond merely cue-target overlap demonstrates the separate qualities that cue  
 820 distinctiveness and encoding-specificity bring to effective self-generated cues. Cue distinctiveness is  
 821 naturally maximized where cues are self-generated. Where individuals generate cues for use by  
 822 others, they tend to revert back to more general, semantic, gist-based aspects of the target  
 823 information, rather than the more specific idiosyncratic episodic details incorporated into self-  
 824 generated cues. In this way, self-generated retrieval cues capitalize upon cue distinctiveness, and so  
 825 maximise the effectiveness of the cue (Hunt & Smith, 1996; Mäntylä, 1986).

## 826 **3 Conclusion**

827 Successful recall of information from memory is often dependent upon the provision of retrieval  
 828 cues. Retrieval cues might form part of the retrieval context, and can be self or other-generated  
 829 (Pansky et al., 2005). In line with the spreading activation theory of memory, and the principles of  
 830 encoding-specificity, and cue distinctiveness, effective retrieval cues are often strongly associated  
 831 with the target item, have a strong cue-target overlap, and differentiate between different items stored  
 832 within memory (Bellezza & Hoyt, 1992; Tullis & Benjamin, 2015a). Based upon the literature  
 833 discussed, we argue that if self-generated cues are taken to be cues containing details salient to the  
 834 individual, and actively generated by the individual themselves, which serve to facilitate more  
 835 complete retrieval of a target memory, and as such represent the critical properties of the target  
 836 memory, then it follows logically that self-generated retrieval cues represent our best opportunity to  
 837 capitalize upon these three principles of memory. In particular, it is in relation to the principle of cue  
 838 distinctiveness that self-generated cues offer an advantage over other mnemonic techniques (e.g.  
 839 Mental Reinstatement of Context). While other-generated cues rely heavily upon more general,  
 840 semantic, gist-based aspects of the target information, self-generated cues are able to incorporate  
 841 more specific idiosyncratic episodic details to maximize the diagnostic value of a cue (Nairne, 2002).  
 842 This important when it is considered that the benefits of context-based cues become more apparent  
 843 only when more effective cues are unavailable. In other words, the benefit of context-based  
 844 mnemonic approaches can be overshadowed if individuals are able to provide their own cues (Pansky  
 845 et al., 2005).

846 Overall, the literature discussed suggests that self-generated cues represent an effective and viable  
 847 mnemonic technique which can aid recall in a variety of settings. The high level of compatibility of  
 848 self-generated cues with individual requirements and abilities means they do not require complex  
 849 training or regular practice to be used effectively. As a result, we suggest that self-generated cues  
 850 represent a promising development in episodic memory domains. Throughout the preceding  
 851 discussion we have speculated on the effectiveness of self-generated cues, however further research  
 852 is needed to establish the extent of the contribution self-generated cues are able to make to the field.  
 853 In particular, future research should seek to replicate existing findings on the benefit of self-generated  
 854 cues, especially in comparison to other mnemonic techniques such as Mental Reinstatement of  
 855 Context, or category clustering techniques. Future research is also needed to extend current  
 856 knowledge of the most effective means of self-generating retrieval cues. For example, through  
 857 establishing the qualities of an effective cue generation technique, and by contrasting existing  
 858 methods of cue generation. Future research should also seek to establish the boundary conditions of  
 859 effective self-generated cues. For instance, under what conditions are self-generated cues most  
 860 effective, or what impact does varying the delay between encoding, cue generation, and recall have  
 861 upon retrieval. It may also be of interest to investigate whether use of self-generated cues improve  
 862 item memory, but reduce memory for context as has been shown with the generation effect  
 863 (Mulligan, 2004; Mulligan et al., 2006). It is also important to establish the potential implications of  
 864 use of self-generated cues in a variety of settings, for example in eyewitness testimony contexts,  
 865 educational settings, and during collaborative learning and recall. Throughout this article we have  
 866 also speculated on how spreading activation theories, the encoding-specificity principle of memory,  
 867 and cue distinctiveness each contribute to the effectiveness of self-generated cues. While we  
 868 acknowledge that these principles are often strongly intertwined, we believe that it would be  
 869 beneficial for future research to address which of the mechanisms outlined contributes most strongly  
 870 to the success of self-generated cue techniques.

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1065 Figure 1 – The Spread of Activation through a Memory Network (adapted from Crestini, 1997)

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